The Riches of Gods Love

Section 1.

I come to the consideration of the second inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is charged; And that is nothing inferior to the former; to wit, The overthrow of true religion and good government among'st men. With what judgment these are termed inconvenices I am to seek, and I wonder what mischiefs are greater then these inconveniences; But I come to consider how well he makes good his charge.

1. If sin be no sin certainly the opinion must be erroneous that conceives it to be sin. I had thought there had been no predication more true then that which is Identicall. We are taught that sin is a transgression of God's law. That the wages of it, in the just judgment and decree of God is no less then death even everlasting death, both of body and soul; That God sent his own Son, and made his soul an offering for sin; that so he might set him forth a propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood. But let us see this Author's reason to prove his crimimination. He begins with an axiom, that, Necessity hath no law; and hereupon he doth expatiate with his instances too too impertinently; a course which Bellarmine takes not, whom yet I have answered on this very argument in my Vindiciae; least of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcel of my answer unto Bellarmine. Now this axiom is not applied to Agents unreasonable, but only reasonable, by them who treat thereof. As in case a man be driven to steal, to relieve natural necessity; yet all confess that a man is not only unexecusable, but also not to be pitied, if he hath brought this necessity upon him; And never any sober man that I know, denied stealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lions are not forbidden to prey, nor fishes to swimne, nor brute creatures to do according to their kind. For they are unreasonable, and consequently not capable of command, otherwise then by spurr, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like sort, children afore they come to the use of reason are not capable, of admonition As neither mad men are, nor fools, such as we call natural; But this Author is none such. For then his wit would not serve him for opposition as it doth. It is true likewise, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part sensitive; but only as touching his part reasonable, consisting of an understanding, whereby he is enabled to know his superiors, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to perform obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to set them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to go they go, if to do this they do it; As the Centurion signified, to our Savior the readiness of his servants to do their Masters commands.

At length he comes to conclude that, if to deal justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawless in these as in the other, by these he means acts of the soul rational; by the other, he means acts of the soul vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that anything is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internal emanations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindered in their operations; either by Angels as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angels and men. And albeit a question may be made as touching acts supernatural, whether the creature hath any free power to perform them freely; such as are the acts of the three Theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we do not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernatural principle into our souls, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of moral virtues, and of the contrary vicious actions, that there is a free power in man to perform them naturally; until such time as by a vicious disposition, procured by a custom in vicious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evil; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himself of a moral liberty unto actions virtuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soon as he hath thrown him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vicious habit contracted, man hath freedom moral unto actions virtuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of Aristotle, and thus he illustrates it. For certainly the habit of virtue is not an indifferent power to do an act virtuous or vicious, but it is a moral propension and inclination only to acts virtuous. So is the habit of justice a moral propension and inclination to perform only that which is just. The like may be said of every moral virtue in special. How much more doth supernatural grace consist not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and wait for the joys of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuse to perform any of these acts, but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the soul of man, moving and swaying it only to gracious acts pleasing & acceptable in the sight of God, which indeed constitutes a spiritual liberty from sin, and makes a man become the holy servant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our ways. On the other side without grace a man is left in that natural corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a slave to sin and a vassal to Satan led captive by him to do his will. Yet not withstanding there remains in everyone his natural liberty still, which consists only in the choice of means conducing to man's end; whereas moral virtue and grace do order the will a right towards aright end; moral virtues according to the knowledge natural which he hath of his right end natural, grace according to the knowledge supernatural, which a man hath of his right end supernatural, which is to be rightly disposed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this natural liberty still continueth the same; As for example, he that it virtuous so far forth as he is virtuous, continueth still free; not as freedom signifies an indifferency to perform an act virtuous vicious, but being thereby disposed only to virtuous actions, he is free whether to exercise this or that virtuous act, according to occasions offered; or in the same kind of a virtuous disposition; whether he will do this or that in particular, as to give in such a proportion, or in such a season, or to such or such persons, in all which being of a virtuous disposition he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of recta ratio, right reason, otherwise called wisdom. In like manner a vicious person still keeps his natural liberty, though he hath lost his moral, and is become Servus tot dominorum, quot vitiorum, a slave to so many Lord's as there are vices in him, as Austin somewhere speaketh. I say he keeps still his natural liberty. For let him be a Robber, he still continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lie in wait for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure person, still he continueth free to choose whom he will corrupt, to contrive what course he thinks best for the satisfaction of his lusts. Let him be covetous or ambitious, still he contintinueh free to make choice of the means conducing to the end obtained by him. In like sort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this spirit of regeneration he is moved only to do those things which are pleasing to his heavenly father, but still his natural liberty continueth the same, as whether to exercise the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the same kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confession of his sins, or upon thanksgiving, or upon supplication, & that either for blessings temporal, and the relief of his natural necessities; or for grace, and the relief of necessities spiritual; or to exercise himself in every kind of these, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewise if he give himself to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as also of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all these distinctions doth this Author take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedom to perform, either acts vicious, or virtuous; whereas the virtuous man's will, as he is virtuous, is inclined to virtuous courses alone; and the vicious man, as he is vicious, is inclined to vicious courses alone, and not to virtuous. And it was wont to be said, that, Habitus agunt ad modum naturae, habit's (whether virtuous or vicious) they work after the manner of nature, that is naturally and necessary, as before I have declared of a moral necessity, which still consists with a natural liberty; either in virtuous, or vicious exercises to make choice of particulars in respect of all variety of circumstances, according as their reason suggests unto them in the use of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of absolute necessity in all this; Much less is any man good by absolute necessity but by freedom of will accustoming himself unto good actions according to the dictates of reason. But a man that is dead in sin hath no power to regenerate himself; this work of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raising of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scripture, as also to creation; And by regeneration we are said to be made new creatures, now as God works this in time, so from everlasting he did decree to work it; and it was wont to be the general Tenet of Protestant Divines in opposition unto Papists, that a man in his first conversion is merely passive, in which particular Roffensis a Popish Bishop about an hundred years ago opposed Martin Luther. As for a sinful or a vicious act, that is always an act natural; For acts supernatural can neither be vicious, nor sinful; but merely gracious. And all confess that as all men have natural power to perform any act natural, so have they power also to abstain from it. Only until a man is regenerate he cannot but sin; yea though he do that which is good as touching the substance of the act, or abstain from that which is evil in like manner; yet can he not perform the one or abstain from the other in a gracious manner, Therefore you hear not God's word, saith our Savior to the Jews, because ye are not of God. They that are in the flesh cannot please God, That all men are cast into a necessity of sinning, both Arminius and Corvinus confess, as formerly I have shown. And Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no natural man hath libertatem a peccato, though forthwith he nicks it, in saying they have libertatem a necessitate, not explicating it that so he might clear himself from contradiction, whereas Doctor Fulke usually puts the distinction between liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction, and denying the former unto a natural man, he granteth the latter.

Now truly this Theologue taketh very profitable pains to prove that sin is not nothing; and exuberates in the proof hereof to the very solid conviction of all those that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any such creatures in terra Australi incognitâ, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Joviall world which is waited upon with four moons, as they that came lately from the discovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under color of making sin to be something, labor to draw us to an acknowledgment that it is some positive thing, as Doctor Jackson in his last book the 8th, as I take it of his Commentaries upon the Creed laboreth to prove with great strength of affections; Like as in the same vigor of resolution he professeth that whether God punisheth sin necessarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man; but he is not over prodigal of his reasons for either. We are very willing to grant that every sin as sin is something privative, and as touching the act substrate, it is something positive also; And when the Apostle defineth sin by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 if in that word the first letter be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 privative, clearly the form of sin is made to consist in privation, as much as to say an incongruity to the law of God; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admonish the Reader of the wisdom of this Author; All along; he supposeth that by our doctrine sin comes to pass by absolute necessity, this I say he supposeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any such necessity is consequent to our doctrine. And this himself knows full well. Alvarez, who maintains that God determines the creatures will to every act thereof, even to the act of sin, utterly denies that any absolute necessity of human acts followeth hereupon; or any necessity that stands in contradiction to human liberty. Bradwardine also sometime Arch-Bishop of Canterbury elect maintains, that God necessitates the will to every act thereof, yet denies peremptorily that human acts comes to pass by absolute necessity, or by any necessity that stands in opposition to the liberty of the creature; Only he saith that some kind of necessity, and that antecedent may well consist with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no pains to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to pass by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sin is no sin, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talks of things necessarily coming to pass, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seems to grant that sins may come to pass necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no pains to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins coming to pass in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evil. And whether he will have this term Antecedently to be an addition to the former term Absolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with terms proposed without all explication. But let us endeavor to boult out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Author have saith to come to pass necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to pass necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to pass not necessarily at all: If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, of absolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not, necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Author deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long ago disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall work necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to pass & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to pass necessarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we say, is absolute not conditional, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are absolute as touching the act of God willing; as Bradwardine hath demonstrated by clear reason; and Piscator out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not absolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, then faith should be given according unto works, that is, grace should be conferred according to men's works. And when I consider this Author's compounding of these terms absolutely, and antecedently, I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to pass antecedently, when it comes to pass by an Antecedent decree in this Author's language, (though most absurd.) So in his language, the things are said to come to pass by absolute necessity, when they come to pass by an absolute decree; the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to pass necessarily; & an absolute decree to make it come to pass absolutely necessarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upō which I am stūbled are I am aware. Now let the sober Reader judge how far these odd conceits are from all sobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and consequently? What therefore will it here-hence follow that the world had it's existence necessarily, and that by the way of absolute necessity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himself, namely to exist necessarily, and that in the way of absolute necessity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the transcendent perfection of God, To be most necessarily; to work most freely; Necessity and that absolute, being the greatest perfection of being: So that Bradwardine conceives this to be the prime and original perfection of God, esse necessario, to be necessarily. On the other side freedom in the highest kind, is the greatest perfection 〈◊〉 operation; and God alone so works, as without subordination to any superior Agent; but no creature, man or Angel so works, as without subordination to God the first Agent, the first cause, the first free worker. Now I come 〈◊〉 the second particular of this second inconvenience. 2. And that is that our doctrine taketh away the conscience of sin; and this we willingly grant is consequent upon the former. For if sin be no sin, there is no cause why any man should be troubled with the conscience of sin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and most untrue imputation never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evil to come to pass by absolute necessity, there can be no more truth in the consequent then there is in the Antecedent. We say that every sin that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much less doth any sin come to pass by any absolute necessity. For albeit there be some things that come to pass necessarily by necessity of nature, as proceeding from Agents natural, working naturally and necessarily. Yet is no work of nature wrought by any absolute necessity. God being able to set an end to nature and the works thereof whensoever it pleaseth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleasure of God, he restrains the course thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much less do the actions of men, not only in respect of God's agency, who is the first cause, but in respect of man's agency, a second cause, and working deliberately and freely come to pass not necessarily, but contingently, and freely; So far off are they from coming to pass by absolute necessity; to exist by absolute necessity being the incommunicable perfection of God himself. But I confess this Author showeth some humanity in the proof of it, to wit, out of the Tragedian very judiciously and learnedly. Fati est ista culpa; nemo fit fato nocens. It is the fault of fate or destiny, and what comes to pass by destiny is no fault of man's. Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate, finding his servant in a fault, when his servant excused himself upon fate, saying it was destiny that he should steal; made a ready answer saying, Et caedo, it was his destiny also to be punished; So far was he from justifying or excusing his servant upon any such ground, or forbearing to punish him. And doth not this Author know that Iocasta for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things; yet in conscience of her incestuous courses destroyed her self in the same Tragedian? But consider, indifferent Reader, whether this Author doth not carry himself, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpose were not to inform them; but to abuse and mock them. For is that all ways the faith or opinion of the Tragedian, whatsoever he puts into the mouths of this or that Actor? Do not they represent the absurd pretences of some, as well as the reasonable discourses of others? Then again who are they that maintain, Fatum, destiny? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines? Yet I confess this Author deals ingeniously in one thing, to wit, in walking so fairly in the steps of this forefathers. For thus the Pelagians accused the doctrine of Austin, not only after he was dead, as appears by Prosper's Epistle ad Ruffinum; but even while he was living as appears by Austin himself; Nec sub nomine gratiae fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus: neither do we maintain destiny under the name of grace, in saying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if some are pleased to call the will Almighty God by the name of fa • e (or destiny) we avoid the profane novelties of words but we do not love to strive about words. Where observe how first the same crimination was made against Austin's doctrine by the Pelagians, which this Author makes against ours.

2. The doctrine which the Pelagians opposed in this crimination was this, Grace is not confer'd according unto works. 3ly, Austin disavowes all antecedency of works to the bestowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be bestowed on any, which yet is the beloved Helena of this Author therefore he talks so oft against an Antecedent decree. Then again it is manifest that the greatest maintainers of destiny and sat, did not maintain it in any opposition to the free wills of men. And Austin him self professeth that such a necessity as is expressed in these words, Necesse est ut fiat, it must needs be that such a thing shall come to pass, contains no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudicial to the free wills of men. His words are these; Sienim necessitas nostra ida dicenda est, quae non est in nostra 〈◊〉 , •• detiamsi nelumus, efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis; Manifestū est 〈◊〉 nostras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, sub tale necessitate non esse, Multa •• im 〈◊〉 , quae si nolemus, non facerimus. Si autem illa desinitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut aliquid ita sit vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis liv • 〈◊〉 voluntatis auferat. If that is to be accounted our necessity, which is net in our power, but whether we will or no, worketh as it can such as is the necessity of death; It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the necessity of fate. For we do many things, which if we would not we should not do them. But if necessity be defined to be such a thing as when we say it must needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to pass; I know not why we should fear least such a necessity should bereave us of free will. And this Austin delivers to meet with the vain fears of those, who placed our wills among'st those things which are not subject to necessity, least so they should loose their liberty. Observe this well and compare it with the present discourse of this positive Theologue, who thinks to outface Austin with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifests that he speaks all this while of necessity in respect of God's decree not simply, but considered as irresistable; by the way making no bones of avouching some decrees of God to be resistible, notwithstanding the Psalmist's protestation Whatsoever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth; And St. Paul's emphatical expression of the same truth, saying, Who hath repsted his will? But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any reason to prove that any decrees of God are of any resistible condition? But let his decrees be never so irresistable, and let that be true which Austin saith, that, Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotence fieri velit; Not anything comes to pass, unless God will have it come to pass. And after Austin the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have everything come to pass agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, as Aquinas hath not only said, but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an establishment thereof rather, as the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, and Clergy of Ireland have professed in the foresaid Article; that I may show some authority for my sayings, as this Author represents none for his, but carrieth himself like a Master of Sentences, as if he were in his own sufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, then the Pope in a general Council: And albeit myself after many others, and some formerly mentioned have shown in a large digression to this purpose that necessity upon supposition, may well stand with contingency, and liberty simply so called. And in the first place have instanced in necessity of infallibility consequent to God's prescience, which though Cicero thought could not consist with man's liberty, yet Christians have always been of a contrary opinion; until the Sect of the Socinians arose; and Arminians are very apt to show them so much courtesy as to bear their books after them. Secondly I have proved a necessity upon supposition of God's decree to permit sin. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from sin, as Gen: 20. 6. He professeth as much to Abimelech, that he kept him from sinning against God. In case God will not keep a man from sin, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly sin without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, considering that of Austin; Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but willfulness. Thirdly and lastly upon supposition of God's will; And this I prove evidently to pass on everything which God foreseeth as future considering that contingent things are merely possible in their own nature; and cannot pass out of the condition of things merely possible into the condition of things future, without a cause: And no other cause of this transmigration can be devised with any color of reason or probability, save only the will of God. Neither do I find that digression of mine in any the least part weakened, or so much as assailed by ought that this Author hath delivered; Who showeth himself upon the stage, rather to brave his opposites with the bare authority of his words, then with sound argument to dispute ought.

Sect: 2.

Indeed if our doctrine make sin to be no sin, and therewithal take away the conscience of sin; it is not to be marveled, if it take away the desert and guilt of sin: For as sin is no sin; so likewise it is as fit that the desert and guilt of sin, should be the desert and guilt of no sin; and so no desert or guilt at all. This Author to serve his own turn takes great libery of discourse in talking of offenses fatal; these were called by Austin profane novelties of words. Yet elsewhere he professeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence. Sententiam teneant, linguā corrigant; let thē hold their orthodox meaning, but let thē correct their language Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working everything that is good, and permitting everything that is evil. And without this will of God not anything comes to pass in the judgment of Austin. Non aliquid sit saith he, nisi onnipotens furi velit, vel sinen • o ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo, Not anything comes to pass, unless Almighty God will have it come to pass, either by suffering it, or by 〈◊〉 working of it to wit, if evil, suffering it, if good working it; but of each he professeth that God wills it The abominable outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God, were such as God's hand and God's counsel sore determined, that is as much as to say, antecedently determined to be done. And the • en Kings in giving their kingdoms to the Beast, are said herein to have agreed to dce God's will. Yet this Author dares not say, that these actions could not be justly punished Yet the maintainets of destiny (as I have shown out of Austin) denied that the wills of men were subject to destiny; while this Author talks in their language, why doth he not talk in their meaning? And if he talks in our meaning why doth he not talk in our language? Now Austin farther saith (is I have shown out of the same place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all necessity, seared a vain and causeless fear; professing that as to some necessity the will is not subject, such as is the necessity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to some necessity it may be subject without any danger; and that necessity he expresseth to be such, as when we say, it must needs be that such a thing come to pass. Now such a necessity and no other is granted by us as consequent to the will of God, so that if God will give a man faith, it must needs be, such a man shall believe; if he will give repentance it must needs be, that such a man shall repent; If he will keep such a man as Abimelech from sinning against him, it must needs be, that such a man shall be kept from sinning against him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it must needs be, that such a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keep a man from sin, but suffer him to sin; it needs must be that such a one shall sin. If God harden the heart of Pharaoh, so that he shall not set Israel go, undoubtedly so it shall come to pass. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their kingdoms to the Beast, they shall infallibly give their Kingdoms to the Beast. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to do things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus prostituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they shall do those inconvenient things, be they never so abominable; yet not necessarily, much less in the way of absolute necessity, (as this Author wordeth it, affecting to speak with a full mouth (which is a quality natural to these Arminians, and runs in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a possibility, but also with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then surely their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and sovereignty, but yet not supreme and absolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God must have the prerogative still of being the first mover, the first cause, the first Agent, the first free Agent; So far off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by absolute necessity; that we utterly deny anything in the world to have 'its existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone, as before I have shown. Sciendum, saith Durand, quod loquendo de necessitate simpliciter, voluntas divina nec imponit, nec imponere potest rebus necessitatem; nec res creatae sunt capaces talis necessitatis. We are to know that speaking of necessity simply so called, the will of God neither doth impose, or can impose any such necessity on things, neither are creatures capable of such necessity. But if we speak of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by causes intermediate; it is to be said that all things do not come to pass of necessity; but some do, and some do not. God will have some things come to pass by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to pass necessarily; Others come to pass by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to pass contingently; Whereby, saith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to pass of necessity in reference to the Divine will; because, as hath been shown, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to pass freely; and therefore speaking absolutely, they may not come to pass, although, upon supposition that they are willed, they cannot but come to pass; but this is only necessity upon supposition.

1. Indeed if men did sin against their wills; and virgins sometimes are ravished, & men are slain by force full sore against their wills, they deserved no punishment. But is it possible that a man can will that which is evil against his will? Every ordinary Scholar in the University knows that axiom, Voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced. Lipsius his speech, fatali culpae fatalis poena, fatal faults have fatal punishments, this Author saith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason. As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate, yea the very first to understand themselves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called Fate Stoicall. Now Zeno was the father of the Stoics; yet when his servant was taken playing the thief, pleaded for himself, saying it was my destiny to steal. Zeno answered him in his own language, that it was his destiny to smart for it too; right in this same sense that Lipsius spake. Yet Zeno knew full well that he punished his servant freely. And Zeno is well known to have been a great Master of morality for all this, which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Author well knows. And Austin censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity, as men transported with vain and causeless fears; manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty. Magistrates though they believe with Austin that, Not anything comes to pass, unless Almighty God will have it come to pass; And with the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever should in time come to pass. And with Aquinas that the root of contingency, is the effectual will of God; yet may they well think it reasonable enough to punish offenses; seeing that God decrees that some things, even all the actions of men shall come to pass contingently; as well as other things shall come to pass necessarily. For to come to pass contingently is to come to pass avoidably; and if they be the actions of men, freely also. It is incredible that any sober man should remissly punish faults for the exorbitancy & strength sake of the passions, whereby they were committed, but rather in consideration of the potent causes which raised such passions in them, under a color of justice. And we commonly say the greater the temptation is, the less is the sin. So Peter surprised suddenly with fear denied his Master. Yet what saith Aristotle. In some things no force is suffecient for excuse; but a man ought to dy rather any manner of death, then commit them. For those things in Euripedes are ridiculous, which moved Alcmaeon to kill his mother. Indeed Plato maintained that things done through passion were not voluntary. But Aristotle a better Master then he, disproves it, and by excellent reasons confirms the contrary. And whatsoever Popilius the Roman Pretor judged of her, who slew her mother, provoked by her Mothers fact in murthering her children; yet let our laws be consulted, and the opinion of our Judges in such a case; and whether such a one were not to be condemned; and whether Popilius his judgment deserves to be admitted for the correction of the laws of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We should soon have a wild world, if everyone being provoked by the insolencies of others should thrust themselves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that potestas patria originally was power of life and death. But all is fish that comes to this Author's net; like as her fact who poisoned her husband and son for killing a son of hers; destroying two for one without all authority most unnaturally; and that not hastily, but in a deliberate way by poisoning. And doth it become Christians to admire such heathenish courses of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence? And was this so doubtful a case, whether so wicked a wretch avenging her self by poison secretly given upon her husband and son for the death of another son of hers, that the sentencing thereof should be put over until an 100 years after? But what of all this? These willfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is just with God to punish sin with sin; one man's sin by another. As of Sennacherib the Lord professeth, that he would cause him to fall by the sword in his own land, this was brought to pass by his own children falling upon him furiously, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of these. How was innocent Naboth used, and by public sentence condemned to be stoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practice of wicked Jezebel? Yet Solomon spareth not to profess that every man's judgment cometh of the Lord. Never were more abominable courses executed upon any, then upon the holy son of God: Yet these were all foredetermined by the hand of God, and the counsel of God, as the Apostles with one voice acknowledge. By the same providence was Joseph sold into Egypt, God working thereby the preservation of them that sold him; Thus Sihon was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with Pharaoh their King to their own destruction. Thus the Lord punished David's foul sin by the murder of Amnon contrived by his own brother; and by the sword of Absalom rising up against his own father; and by the sword of Shimei's tongue cursing David; wherein David acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he punished the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and so prostituting them to abominable courses. What outrages were committed by Sennacherib that proud and blasphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and the staff in his hand; is said to be God's indignation. And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occasions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate such corruptions; and withal gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will break forth into murder, as in Sennacherib's sons; and the Jews crucifying the Son of God; into stealth sacrilegious, as in Achan; into adultery and that in an incestuous manner as we see in Absalom; into insurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from Rehoboam; into treasons as Judas betraying his own Master; and into all manner of outrageous villainies, whereof the Scripture makes plentiful mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all material to the point in hand, though this Author in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exercised in actions good for the substance of them; or in abstaining from that which is evil, they never a whit the more either perform the one, or abstain from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace supernatural, which God is not bound to bestow on any. All sides confess that Divine concourse is necessary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in God we move, as well as in him we live, and in him we have our being. And about this concourse a question is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, modo nos velimus, provided that we will, is as absurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be devised; seeing the greatest question is concerning the act of willing: And is it possible that God shall work this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the same act be the condition of it self, and so both before and after it self? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's prescience, that at such an instant man will produce such an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worse then the former. For hereby each Agent's operation 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then again a thing is feigned to be foreseen by God as future, which hath no cause of the futurition thereof, being in it's own nature merely possible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifest by invincible reason. Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily required to every action, is made into the will it self moving it agreeably to the nature thereof, to do whatsoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely also; taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of means tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end, is natural and necessary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himself aloft, and superciliously despising to enter into any of these lists of argumentation; and as if the matter were conclusum contra Manichaeos, confidently supposeth, without all proof, that we maintain that all human actions come to pass by absolute necessity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone. 'It is true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatsoever comes to pass comes to pass by his will saith Austin: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectual will of God, saith Aquinas, as which, he makes the root of all contingency; And therefore as necessary causes work necessarily by the will of God; so by the same will of God do contingent Agents work contingently; and free Agents work voluntarily and freely. And observe the immodesty of this Author, he tells us what Zeno's servant pleaded for himself with his Master; but he doth not tell what Zeno answered him, that he conceals; it is enough for him to gull and cheat poor ignorants. The Adrumetine Monks, he saith, were misled by Austin; a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been always honorable in the Church of God; and the memorial of his opposites rots. Did Austin mislead them? did he draw them into error? If they did mistake Austin, shall it be true therefore to say they were misled by him? How many mistake and misunderstand God's word; what then? shall we be so audacious and blasphemous, as to say they are misled by the word of God? Why may not such impudent persons proceed, and say they are misled by the holy Ghost? Then that which he saith of these Monks, as misled by Austin, it is a notorious untruth; Cresconius and Felix that came over to Austin of their own heads to complain of some in their Monastry; laid to their charge indeed that they so taught grace, that they denied freewill; & that this they pretended to have learned out of Austin's book written to Sixtus the Presbyter. But Austin was not hasty to believe this crimination: And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monk of whom they complained, Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipse non intelligitur; either he understands not my book; or himself is not well understood by his brethren. If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained mistook Austin. For Austin doth not anywhere so maintain grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother understood Austin aright in that foresaid book of his, then he maintained no such opinion as Cresconius and Felix laid to his charge, but they rather misunderstood him. And this appeared to be most true afterwards. For Florus was the man whom Cresconius and Felix accused, and whom Austin desired of Valentinus the father of them, that he would send over unto him, as Coccius acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was sent over to Austin, as appears in Austin's book De corrept. & gratiâ cap. 1. With whom when Austin had conferred, he found him most orthodox as himself professeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoiced, and withal signifieth to Valentinus that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood Florus. And therefore when Austin in his Retractations comes to take notice of his book De gratiâ & libero arbitrio, and the occasion of writing thereof, he sets it down not absolutely, because of those who so do maintain grace, as withal they deny free-will, but with a disjunctive addition, thus, or because of those who think when grace is maintained, therewithal that free-will is denied. The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by Cresconius, and Felix against Florus; but the latter was according to Austin's suspicion at the first, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appears by the first chapter of Austin's book de correptione & gratiâ; where Florus is justified and magnified by St. Austin, and his criminators condemned. And seeing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accusants pretended, who so maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that also must needs be false which followeth in this Author, when he saith that against them also St. Austin wrote his other book De correptione & gratiâ: And the truth is the whole buisinesse was ended and the tumult appeased between those Adrumetine Monks, before Florus came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by Florus concerning the amicable composition of all things there. And Austin in this very passage which this Author grates upon, professeth that he writes not against them; only he answereth such an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by some of them formerly against Florus, and the doctrine of Austin maintained by Florus. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the same Florus, as it seems. But of this more at large in my digression concerning the predestinarian heresy, which I purpose to subjoine to this. Austin saith indeed that, Praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia vero ipsa donatio. Predestination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it self which was prepared; not the bestowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporal be the bestowing of a thing eternal? What entertainment Zeno's servant found at his Masters hands (which this Author conceals) I have often shown who taught no such doctrine as destiny as to free a knave from stripes; who as so great a Philosopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his servant; and himself so well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not Zeno so well instructed in the mystery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the selling of Joseph all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdoms to the Beast, which should come to pass in the latter part of the last times of the world. But let him make himself merry with Zeno's servant, who taken in a thievish fact was content to help himself with any pretence; but Zeno we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in despite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own brain without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvel if the house he builds thereon must needs totter and fall on his ownpate.

Sect: 3.

2. Undoubtedly if sin cannot be punished temporally, it cannot be punished eternally. We have no need, I should think of the Authority of any fathers to justify this. Where doth this Author find, that we maintain that a man is good or evil, not freely but by necessity, that Tertullian is brought in as opposing us here? Yet we think this is worthy of distinction: For was not Adam made by God habitually good? Durand. I am sure, maintains that in his creation he was endued with all Moral virtues: & this we read in Scripture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I presume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unless he were made virtuous, I cannot conceive. So likewise man being brought forth in the corrupt mass; when afterwards he is made good either in the way of justification, or in the way of regeneration; these are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I presume this Author dares not say that man regenerates himself But as for the denomination of goodness and badness in man, that ariseth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all such goodness or badness is acquired freely, not necessarily.

And as Tertullian takes necessity, to wit in opposition unto liberty; So I presume doth Jerome too; otherwise these two Fathers were yoked together unequally in this place. Now we know no such necessity domineering in man, as stands in opposition to liberty. Much less do we maintain any necessity over the will of man, depending upon fatal constellations; And as Epiphanius, and Austin discourse thus of necessity in reference to fatal constellations; So it seems likely that Jerome and Tertullian did discourse of necessity in the same sense. To sin by the will of God in Prosper is to sin by the predestination of God, as appears both by the Objection it self, and Prosper's answer thereunto throughout. Now predestination in the fathers meaning is of no other things, thē such as God purposed to work. And accordingly we answer that no evil in the world, as evil, comes to pass by God's will to work it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is Austin's express professiō, that Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotence fieri velit. Not anything comes to pass, unless God Almighty will have it come to pass; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; some by working them, others by permitting them; vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo; either by suffering it to come to pass, in case it be evil, or himself working it, in case it be good. Fulgentius justifies this sense in his sentence here alleged. For to sin by God's will in Prosper, is all one with being made an offender (or made to sin) by God, in Fulgentius. Now we say God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evil; only he doth not cure that natural or habitual viciousness, which he finds amongst men, in all. For He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and indeed he is bound to none. St. Bernard clearly maintains that there is no liberty from sin in any natural man; and consequently every natural man is cast upon a necessity of sinning; and therefore that liberty from necessity which he grants to man, can be no other then liberty from compulsion; And so Dr. Fulke usually makes the distinction run between Liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction; & denying the one he grants the other.

That the Ancients did call that necessity, which ariseth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of destiny; This Author brings not the least color of proof; neither do I think he is able to bring any, save only of the Pelagians, who traduced Austin's doctrine of predestination by the name of destiny. And so they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to men's works; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predestination, as is apparent De bono perseverantiae. c. 15. In the second I wonder this Author observes not how he contradicts himself. For if they used these words Necessity, & compulsion; promiscuously; doth it not evidently follow that they distinguished them not? but always took them of equivalent signification. But I do not find that Austin took necessity of the same signification with compulsion; when he distinguisheth of necessity; saying some necessity is such, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the necessity of death; and to such a necessity he saith, the will is not subject. Another necessity there is, as when we say, It must needs be, that this, or that come to pass, and he confesseth plainly that the will may be subject to such a necessity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof.

3 And well they might hold that God's judgments were not just on sinners, if they were held by any absolute necessity under the power of their sins. We say that nothing hath either existence, or continuance, by absolute necessity, save God alone. But I guess this Author calls that necessity absolute, which flows from God's absolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditional, it stands him upon to prove it, not boldly suppose it. Especially seeing Aquinas hath professed that never any man was so mad as to say that there is any cause of God's predestination, as touching the act of God's predestinating; and that there can be no cause hereof he proves because there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Doctor Jackson in his book of providence confesseth that the distinction of God's will, into a will antecedent, and a will consequent, is not to be understood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, seeing reprobation in it 's kind is the will of God, as well as predestination in it's kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing; no cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so neither can there be any cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And look how mad a thing it is for any man to maintain that there is some cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So as mad a thing it must be every way to avouch that there is a cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truly the Apostle St. Paul plainly manifests that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (namely because before Jacob or Esau were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger) upon the same ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evil works. And the same reason manifests that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the causes, the one of Election, the other of Reprobation; as well as good and evil works. And both Piscator by evidence of Scripture, and Bradwardine by evidence of reason have demonstrated, that no will of God is conditional, which is to be understood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be evidently further demonstrated thus; If anything be the cause of God's will, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; Not by necessity of nature, as is evident and all confess, there being no color of truth for that; besides such an opinion were most dangerously prejudicial to God's sovereignty, and liberty. If therefore they say, it is by the constitution of God, mask I pray what an insuperable absurdity followeth hereupon. For seeing God's constitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that upon foresight of this or that he would will such a man's salvation, and such a man's damnation. And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternal act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is apparent, that the objects of God's will are things temporal, never anything that is eternal But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be said there is a cause thereof as School-Divines do generally acknowledge. And thus Gerardus Vossius speaks of the conditional will, which he faith the Fathers do ascribe to God. For this is the instance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordains to bestow salvation on a man in case he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditional, inasmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but such as die in sin without repenance But albeit predestination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be said to be conditional according as the School-men explicate their meaning; and reprobation likewise as touching the particular of dānatiō mentioned: yet no such thing cā be truly affirmed either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of grāting, or denying the grace of regeneratiō, which are intended also by the decrees of predestinatiō & reprobatiō. For albeit God intends not to bestow salvation on any, but upon condition of faith; nor damnation on any, but upon condition of final impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to bestow the grace of regeneration on some for the curing of their natural infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the same infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the same grace of regeneration unto them. This I say God doth not intend to bring to pass upon any condition; For if he should, then grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all along in divers Synods, and Councils against the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds according to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our natural corruption; but merely according to the pleasure of his will, as the Apostle testifies saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And if the conferring and denying of this grace be absolute; how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute? And consequently that one man is delivered from the power of his sins, whether original or habitual; another is not, but still continueth under the power of them; This I say, doth, & must needs come to pass by virtue of God's absolute decrees. Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon. First because no greater necessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himself. Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world; yet no wise man was ever known to affirm that the worlds existence was, and is by absolute necessity. In like sort, God did absolutely decree, that Josiah should burn the Prophets bones, upon the Altar; That Cyrus should build his Citty and let go his captives; That no man should desire the Israelites land, when they should come to appear before the Lord their God thrice in the year; That God would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withal their heart, and with all their soul. To put his fear in their hearts, that they should never depart away from him; To cause them to walk in his statutes and judgments to do them. To work in them both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Yea to work in them everything that is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Likewise that Absalom should defile his fathers Concubines, that the Jews should crucify the Son of God; that some through disobedience should stumble at the word; that the Kings should give their kingdoms to the beast. Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they did ought in their lives; All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to pass; The good by God's effection the evil by God's permission; and decreed absolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be shown upon what condition on Absalom 's part, he should defile his fathers Concubines; upon what condition on the Jews part, they should crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, others through disobedience should stumble at God's word; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings should give their kingdoms to the beast. And if they take Arminias his way, let them reply upon mine answer to Arminius; if Bellarmine's, let them reply upon my answer to Bellarmine, that we may not trouble the world without Tautologies: If a different way from both these, I shall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it such entertainment as according to my judgment it shall be found to deserve.

So that with Epiphanius, though we are ready to concur in denying destiny, which as before we heard out of him was a necessity derived from the stars; yet with Austin we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity, to maintain the liberty thereof, and he gives instance in such a necessity as whereby we say, It most needs be that such a thing come to pass, as no way prejudicial to man's liberty. And Arminius confesseth, that upon supposition of God's decree it must needs be that the Soldiers should abstain from the breaking of Christ's bones; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing must needs come to pass which God hath decreed to come to pass, yet it is indifferent to come to pass necessarily or freely; which also God determines according to the nature of the things themselves; namely that necessary things shall come to pass necessarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpose he hath prepared different Agents, as Aquinas observeth some necessary working necessarily, some contingent working contingently.

4. Still this Author harps upon the same string imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle af a man's life a mere destiny; his meaning is that we take away all liberty, which is most untrue. As for destiny it is well known as before I have shown that this was the usual crimination, which the Pelagians cast upon the doctrine of St. Austin; and that, because he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's works. And what was Austin's answer hereunto, I have shown before: Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus, If men please to call the will of Almighty God by the name of destiny; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we do not love to wrangle about words. For God to work us to faith, to repentance, to every good work; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure (for which we have express Scripture, both in the old and New Testament, as erst I shown) & absolutely to decree this is to make the whole circle of man's like, as touching good courses, but a mere destiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, then grace must be conferred according to works, which is as true Pelagianism, as ever dropt from the mouth of Pelagius, & which himself was sonetimes driven torenounce yet this Pelagianism is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Again if non aliquid fit nisi omnipotence fieri velit, Not anything cōes to pass, unless God Almighty will have it come to pass; whether good or evil; which was sometimes delivered by Austin; and of late professed by the Church of Ireland in the days of King James, this is to make the whole Circle of man's life a mere Destiny; if this Author be of any credit so far as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is express from the unanimous consent of the Apostles, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, wih the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counsel had before determined to be done: Yet were they gathered together to do such acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done since the world began: And if we believe this Author, all this came to pass by mere destiny: And if this be to come to pass by mere destiny, why should we not believe it? Have we better or more complete testimony for ought throughout the whole book of God, then for this? All things that come to pass must needs be the issues of the divine decree; not only such things as come to pass necessarily, by necessary Agents working necessarily; but even such things also as come to pass freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as Aquinas hath proved and Austin and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath justified, and clear reason demonstrated, for as much as otherwise no future thing could be foreknown by God from everlasting. For nothing can be from everlasting known by God as future, unless from everlasting it were future. But without the decree of God passing upon it, no contingent thing can pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible (such as it is in it's own nature) into the conditiō of a thing future. So that whosoever denies God's decree to pass upon everything that comes to pass throughout the world, must therewithal deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Author avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never answer it while his head is hot •• conceive I have had sufficient experience of his strength already this way, and of the shameful issue of his adventure therein. He that said, Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotence fieri velit, Not anything comes to pass, unless the Almighty will have it come to pass, said also that God so works in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apostle said, that In God we move, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the same stamp a fardell of unshamefast untruths. Belike when God saith, I will cause them to walk in my statutes and to do them, God caused them to do just nothing. In like manner when the holy Prophet expostulates with God in the person of the Church after this manner, Lord why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts against thy fear, the meaning is, why hast thou caused us to do just nothing. In like manner when God restrains offenses, he doth it not by his laws, When he promotes virtue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts sinners he doth it not by sermons: when thousands were converted in one day, it was not by the ministry of Peter and his fellow Apostles. This Authors meaning seems to be, that unless man converts himself, it is not done by sermons. But see how he overlasheth; whē carrying the matter so as if God's decree necessitated and overruled all by our opinion; yet most absurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavors. And who seeth not that to overrule is to carry the reasonable creature on to do contrary to his own will and judgment. For unless he doth toss strenuouslly he can prevail nothing with any sober and indifferent Reader. In like sort to necessitate denotes such a motion whereby the creature is carried to do a thing necessailry but this is not Bradwardines opinion, who alone amongst School-Divines, that I know, useth this phrase of necessitating. For he saith that God necessitates the creature to his free act, & this necessity is but modall, according to that expression of Austin necesse est ut aliquid fiat, which Austin confessed 1200 years ago to be no impeachment to man's liberty. But because that phrase Necessitating, is not only of an harsh sound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary sense to that of the Author's; therefore other School-Divines, and generally our Divines use it not. And how immodest a course is this to think to choke us with other men's phrases, and that in a quite contrary sense to that wherein the Author's take it? And as if he had very substantially concluded the point, that laws do nothing, rules of religion, and men's endeavors do nothing, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philosopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere trifler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other prescribed; why men are encouraged to some things; and scared from the other. He might as well ask what meant King Hezekiah to have any care either of his food or of taking Physic for those 15 years which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant Paul to tell the Master of the ship, that unless the Mariners were detained in the ship they could not be saved; what meant some to trust to their swimming, others to boards & brokempeeces of the ship to get to land, when the Lord by his Angel had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that sailed with him? In the very days of Cicero the Stoics were acquainted with such like arguments made against their destiny, and knew how readily to answer them by distinguishing between Fatalia and Confatalia, as appears in Cicero's book de Fato, and Turnebus his answer to Ramus thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Author disputes not logically, if he did, the vileness of his argumentation would soon appear according to it's proper colors; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetorical flourishes, as if his wit served him for that best, whereat I wonder not a little, that he should forsake that wherein his faculty lieth most, according to the reputation that goes of him, & trust to that wherein his best dexterity hath been accounted but inficete. If our doctrine tends to the subversion of policy, religion and laws, society & government In the next place we expect when he will turn stark Atheist and profess as much of the word of God, seeing it is manifest our doctrine chiefly is founded upon the word of God even in that which sounds most harsh unto carnal judgment; namely as touching God's secret providence in evil, this Author not accomodating any answer to any one of those places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holiness, his contrary doctrine cannot stand without maintaining that Grace is given according unto men's works; which is expressly contradictory to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5, and opposed by the church of God as the sour leaven of Pelagianism, from the Synod of Palestine all along. For ask this Author wherefore God bestows faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to answer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not grown so impudent as to deny expressly; though the Remonstrants in their Censura censurae come so far, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they must answer that the reason hereof is, because the one by some act of his or other hath prepared himself for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plain terms as one hath expressed it, that God doth work in us Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe. But doth he not work also the very act of willing? Saint Paul saith he doth; yea everything that is pleasing in his sight. And how doth he work in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the absurdity whereunto they are driven, still fetching in a priority of man's act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet most preposterously. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of ourselves we will already? And this also utterly overthrows God's prescience of things future, which can have no true foundation besides the divine decree. As for Mathematici which were banished out of Rome, were those Divines, or Astrologers rather? If they subjected the event of all things to the influence of the stars, shall Austin be blamed or the Church of Ireland for subjecting all things to the council of God's will, and that according to the express testimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evil; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evil things to his will of permitting them. As for Prosper's saying in the last place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much less the actions of men to come to pass unavoidably, no not upon supposition of God's decree; but by virtue of his decree both contingent things come to pass contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to pass; & free things freely, that is joined with an active power in the Agent, either to suspend his action; or to do otherwise; as well as necessary things come to pass necessarily. This I say we avouch with Aquinas, and accordingly with him maintain the root of contingency to be the effectual will of God. Again I have often shown that Predestination in the phrase of the Ancients is only of such things as God decreed to bring to pass by his effection; notwithstanding this, Austin was bold to profess, that not anything came to pass unless God would have it come to pass; but evil things only by suffering them; good things by working them, As for compulsion which is Prosper's phrase, and which this Author corrupts rendering i • by the urging, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts supernatural; much less do we grant compulsion to acts natural; such as are all sinful acts; yea too connatural unto him, compared in Scripture to sweet morsels which they roll under their tongue, as the book of Job resembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Author's sufficiency and modesty. Austin never said that God predestinated any man to sin. For predestination with them (as hath been said) was only of such things as God determined to work. Yet the same Austin confidently professeth of those things which come to pass by God's sufferance (and these we all know to be evil things) that they come not to pass, unless Almighty God will have them come to pass,

Thus far in answer to this Author's additions to M. Hoord's discourse, and concerning the upper and more harsh and rigorous way which M. Hoord left unprosecuted. pag. 49, there is a passage added, a citation out of Peter, but it is of the same nature with the rest, & add's no strength to the argument; and my answer satisfies it as well as the rest.

P. 52. &c. Is inserted a representation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holiness.

Sect. 1.

Whereas I am quoted here to give the reason which moved the Synod of Dort, and some other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall, namely this, to avoid the imputation of making God the Author of sin I doubt this Author hath so long inured himself to leasings, that it is grown natural unto him to deliver untruths. For first I make no mention (in that fourth Digres of mine in the matter of predestination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. That Digression of mine is spent in answering the arguments of those who dispute against Massa nondum condita, and stand for massa corrupta, to be the object of election and reprobation. In the first chapter I make answer to Mr. Elnathan Parre in an English tract of his, wherein he deals upon this argument. In the second chap: I deal with others that make choice of the lower way; because it seems to be the easiest way, which I express in the very words of Mr. Doctor Abbats, Bishop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with most; and therefore I thought good so much the more thoroughly to discuss that. But do I say they took this course to free God from the imputation of sin? Nothing less; my words are these in the Digression cap. 2. Quod plurimos movet, illud est, nimirum quod in sententia illâ de massâ nondum conditâ, omnia sint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac vero de massâ corruptà predestinationi hominum praestruendâ contra clara sint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, judicio{que} antiquitatis planissime consentientia; where I mention two reasons that moved them to take this way 1. This, in that opinion concerning the Mass of mankind not yet created, all passages are intricate, perplexed, and entangled with infinite difficulties; but in the opinion concerning the Mass corrupt, all things are clear. 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are most plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgment of antiquity. Now after I had endeavored to discover the insufficiency of this plea in the second and third chapter of that fourth Digression in the matter of predestination. In the fourth chapter I propose mine own judgment concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt mass of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgment of others, as this Author carrieth the matter; but mine own judgment. For thus I begin. Ad extremum, vis libere pronuntiem, quid unice proficiatur ex hac nostrá praedestinationis Objecti sententiae temperatione. Dicàm igitur quid sentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapsu primorum parentum, decreto praedestinationis subjiciendo & subordinando liberemur huic unice provisum esse, ab istius quasi mediae & temperatioris opinionis assertioribus mihi plusquam probable, aut verisimile videtur, ne scililicet alias peccatum fieri statueretur, decernente Deo, tanquam medium ad fines à Deo, in praedestinatione sibi praestitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quàm author peccati constituendus sit, nullâ solidâ ration explicari posse videtur. In the last place, will you give me leave freely to profess, what we profic by thus tempering our opinion touching the object of predestination? I will therefore deliver what I think. So that herein I purpose mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. Herehence thus we gain that we are freed from subjecting and subordinating man's fall unto God's decree of predestination. It seems to me more then probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate openion do provide only against this inconvenience; (that is their way doth indeed provide against this, and against no other inconvenience in my opinion) to wit, least otherwise the sin of Adam should be said to come to pass God willing it, as a means conducing to those ends which God intended in predestination; from whence it follows as it seems, that it cannot be explicated by any solid reason that God is not made the Author of sin. All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others think so too; namely not that God is hereby made the Author and principal cause of sin; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any solid reason. Now Cajetan confesseth as much, namely that in these mysteries, all the distinctions that are used, do not quietare intellectum, satisfy the understanding; and therefore he doth captivate his own into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez justifies him in this, professing herein that he speaks doctissime & piissime, most learned and holyly. And in a peculiar disputation he maintains that the mistery of God's providence and predestination, standing with the liberty of our wills, is incomprehensible by us in this world. Lastly, consider, this is delivered only of the first sin of our first parents, which this author perverts most shamefully, when he avoucheth that I should acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoid the imputation of making God the principal cause, not of Adams sin alone, but of sin in the greatest number of men. And to confess a truth, if sin be made the means for the procuring of the ends which God intends in predestination, undoubtedly God himself should be the author of sin. For whosoever intends any end, he, and none but he, must be author in working the means which tend to this end. Therefore I said, only that in this case, It seems that the sin of Adam was intended by God as the means; Whereas in truth and upon due consideration it appears that not the creatures sin, but God's permission of the creatures sin, is the means whereby God brings to pass his glorious ends. Yet not the permission of sin alone, but joined together with the pardoning of it, and saving his elect in despite of it, is the complete means (together with the procuring of Christ's merits) for the manifestation of God's glory in the way of mercy; And in like manner, not the permitting of sin alone, but joined with the punishment of it, is the complete means for the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called, the declaration of his wrath. And whereas I said that hereby it seemed that it could not by any sound reason be manifested, that God was not the Author of sin, by the first way, this Author avoucheth of the defenders of the lower way which seems most temperate, that from their conclusions it followeth evidently, that of all the sins of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principal Author. Observe, this (he saith) followeth evidently from their conclusions; and forthwith he tells us that he thinks so, or, to his thinking, it doth so. And why is he not the Author of all the sins of the elect also? whereas original sin continues in them also, they carry about them a body of death, and have cause to complain, of a law in their numbers that rebelleth against the law of their mind, and leadeth them captive to the law of sin. Only there is a principle of spiritual life in them, that renews their repentance daily as their sins are renewed; but they look not to be freed, from sin as long as they live in this world. But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirms of the sins of the Reprobate, that God is made the Author of them by our doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that Cornelius a Lapide a Jesuit shapes Calvin's doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, in Reprobis manat certus & necessarius lapsus in peccata quaelibet, A certain and necessary falling into all manner of sins, doth flow in Reprobates. But not from these principles mentioned by this Author, but rather from two other principles. The 1. that God destinated Reprobates to everlasting punishment, as to their end; and unto sins, as to the means thereof. The 2. is that man doth nothing freely in negotio damnationis suae; but that in all things he is driven of God, as a bowle by him that throws it, as an hatchet by him that hewes with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot resist. This he imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly to Calvin. This Cornelius denies not, for ought I know, that by the just judgment of God, though executed according to his will and pleasure, hath brought all men forth into the world in original sin, or that any man can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for these two conclusions which he imputes to Calvin: as they are false in themselves, so they are as falsely charged upon Calvin. Haec loquendi ratio, nunquam apud me occurret, finem creationis esse aeternum interitum. Calvin expressly denies, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damn him; Neither is sin any means whereby God brings a man to damnation, but the permission of sin is God's means, and that together with damning for sin, is the complete means, whereby God brings to pass his end concerning Reprobates, which is the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, called his wrath upon those Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, as S. Paul plainly teacheth us. The other principle which he obtrudes upon Calvin, is as false, and as falsely laid to his charge. In good actions he grants the elect are so carried to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Liberty to consist in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confess he is in an error; but that reprobates do not that evil freely, which they do, is nowhere affirmed by Calvin that I know nor by any learned or sober Divine. For albeit we all concur in this with Bernard, that no natural man hath libertatem a peccato, liberty to keep himself from sin: Yet that he is carried into this or that particular sin, we all confess it is done freely. And the reason is evident, drawn from the difference between gracious actions, and sinful actions. Every gracious action is supernatural, either as touching the substance of the act, such as are the acts of faith, hope, and love; or as touching the manner of performing them, such as are all virtuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unless they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is some color, that such are not performed freely; but there is no such color, as if man were not free in performing actions vicious; considering that all vicious actions are natural actions, none of them supernatural. And surely every natural man as he hath power to perform any action natural; so hath he power to abstain from it. But proceed we along with our present Author.

1 The first doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is such, that I little thought there had been any difference between him and us thereabouts, consisting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt mass, or in the state of original sin.

2 The other, that man, in the state of original sin or natural corruption devoyd of the spirit of regeneration, is under the servitude of sin, hath no liberty from it. Now in these particulars I could not imagine that this Author differed from us, unless with Pelagius he entertains an affection to deny original sin. For if all men be borne in original sin, seeing it is God that takes us out of our mothers womb, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be denied, I should think, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in original sin. As for the second, Doctor Potter confesseth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in state of nature hath no liberty from sin. It is true, this liberty he distinguisheth from that liberty, which is called, liberty from necessity, which he grants to a natural man; to whom he denies the former, which cannot stand without contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from sin he must needs sin. And therefore Doctor Fulke upon the Remish Testament doth usually distinguish between liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction. And both Arminius and Corvinus confess that by the sin of Adam all men are cast upon a necessity of sinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this necessity of sinning upon reasonable terms to be performed on man's part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifestly breathing the spirit of Pelagius, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, that grace is conferred according to works or merits. This makes me conceive that this Author carrieth himself cunningly in the proposition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more then everyone is aware of. And indeed the phrase he useth of bringing men into an estate, is very harsh, though applied to Adam and Eve our first parents, much more applied to their race and posterity. For albeit Adam was created in a better state, and afterwards brought into the state of sin, and bondage of corruption: yet what sinister judgment moved this Author to impute this unto God, rather then to Adam himself? what if God took his holy spirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themselves naked and were ashamed? was it not just with God to do so? Doth not M. Hord profess, that it were just with God to damn all for original sin, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Author in his Lectures at Magdalene Hall, myself being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongst the errors of his youth, mistaking Bellermine, which now he is to wise to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the Gallows, is it the Judge or Sheriff, and not their sins rather? Yet this, though absurd enough, satisfies him not, but withal he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleasure which phrase is prone to work a persuasion in the Reader, that hereby is sign •• ed that God brought not man in this state in the way of justice for his sin, but merely of his own will or pleasure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to maintain any such prodigious assertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemns a malefactor unto death, & Sheriff takes order to execute him. Now if question be made why such a man be hanged, will any wise man refer this to the will and pleasure of the Judge or Sheriff, and not rather to the malefactors deserts? In like sort it is God that condemns a man, and inflicts eternal punishment upon him, but is there any color to say that he doth this of his will and pleasure, and not rather that he doth it in the way of justice provoked thereunto by men's sins? Lastly when it is said that God brought him into the state of corruption, who would not think that thereby were meant that God was the positive Author of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man himself averted himself voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangeable good; and converted himself unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God hereupon taking his Spirit from him and that most justly; left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, save by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phrase is more harsh applied to the race & posterity of Adam, in whose production he hath no other hand, then that which necessarily belongs unto him, as the Author of nature, namely, the quickening of them, and fashioning of them in the womb, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there springs a leprous fruit, should this seem strange? We all derive our nature from Adam fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereaved of God's Spirit most justly for his transgression; why should it seem strange then, that our natures should be no better then Adam's was after his fall? It is true the propagation of original sin, hath always been accounted of a mysterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very strange and odd conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some saying that the soul is derived from the parents a strange conceit even in Philosophy not only in peculiar reference unto the soul reasonable; but generally I find Philosophers have entertained peculiar contemplations about Datores formarum, in a more general way. Others have thought that the soul is defiled by the body, as a sweet and sovereign oil may be corrupted by a naughty box; which is worse then the former, no marvel that a bodily thing should corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body should corrupt the soul, the one being corporal the other spiritual is beyond comprehension: Far more probable or rather without question that the soul rather corrupts the body. The positive inclination unto evil is that which hath troubled all and made some conceive that it could not proceed immediately from God; For if so, then surely not impura, but pura. Others and particularly Arimininsis, as remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the serpent, others as Johannes Bicconius; that the soul though coming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the sin of Adam gives it over to the power of Satan, who as an universal cause supplies the place of a particular cause in the positive corrupting of it. This at the first seemed unto me as very singular, so a very strange adventure, and that Baccorius is a very rare School-man and more used in the Arabian philosophy then all the rest, save such as were of his own profession. And that I take to be the reason, why Aquinas discourseth as he doth of Intellectus Agens, making it a • ticulty of the soul; and Durand discourseth in such sort of that argument, as i • he never understood the state of the question; which I take to proceed frō this that they were so little acquainted with Averro's philosophy, wherein Zabarell was well seen. And I find him sometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this Johannes Bacconius was in some particulars of his mind, he doth not say, he learnt it of him. But I know no School Divine comparable to him for depth of philosophical speculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of original sin. I willingly confess it is one of the three points wherein sometimes I persuaded myself I never should be satisfied in this world▪ And that which most troubled me was the positive nature of it. Wherein Cajetan is thought to discourse strangely also, even to the palate of Pontificians; And Aquinas his definite on of it, calling it, Habitus corruptus; hath cost me no small pains in the discussion thereof. At length I conceive there is no great cause of so much pudder to be made about it, save that certain prejudices which we lay for grounds do cast us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, excepting it's due subjection unto God, I willingly confess was natural, but whether it did profluere ex principiis naturae, either specificae, or individualis, or was caused and maintained while Adam stood in his integrity by the special hand of God's providence; as some School-men profess finding the difficulty of maintaining the former (which yet might be consequent naturally to it's due subjection unto God for ought I see yet to the contrary) I dispute not. But as for it's due subjection unto God in faith and love, and such a love as joined with the contempt of it self; I have reason to conceive that this was not natural, as flowing from the principles of nature either specifical or individual, though this latter I heard sometimes maintained publicly in the University, but rather wrought in man in his creation by virtue of supernatural grace, and the holy Ghost's residence in him; which supernatural grace, and holy Ghost's residence had been natural unto all his posterity, had Adam continued in his integrity. I call it natural in as much as it had descended unto all his posterity, after the manner of an inheritance natural. But Adam by his transgression forfeited this blessed condition, not to himself only, but to all his posterity, being justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and left by the Lord where he found him; averted à bono incommutabili, and converted ad bonum communicabile in an inordinate manner, which conversion to the creature is positive, and not evil in it self, but as it is joined with aversion from God; & this makes it an inordinate conversion to the creature, not for God's sake, that it is not out of the love of God to the contempt of himself, which is the character of a child of God but out of the love of himself to the contept of God, which is the charecter of a child of this this world. So that as original righteousness whereunto we are restored in part by the grace of regeneration, transcends all motall virtues; so original sin transcends all moral vices & is found in the most virtuous amongst heathen men (of whom some have been very renowned in this kind, & great masters of their passions) as well as amongst the most vicious. And it is hard to resolve who have been greatest enemies to the truth of God and holiness; and generally to the holy ways of God, whether the most virtuous or the most vicious among heathen men. I come to his second position, which he casts upon us, as dissenting therein from himself; and it is this, That God leaves the Reprobates irrecoverably in it. Now on this point I would gladly know his contrary Tenet in what sense it proceeds, namely, That Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in original sin, or in such state wherein they cannot avoid sin. For I cannot comprehend his meaning herein. But it was wont to be said of