The Riches of Gods Love

Sect: 2.

Poets tell us there was a time when Giants on earth set themselves to fight against God in heaven; & because the place of his habitation was out of their reach, they laid mountain upon mountain hill upon hill, Pelion upon Ossa, that so they might make their approaches unto him, & beseige him in his own fastnes: this fable is a monumēt of the shipwreck of that truth among heathen-men, which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word. For when after the great Deluge in the days of Noah, men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth, they consulted how they might fortify themselves against the like inundation for the time to come; and thereupon encouraged thenselves saying, Go to let us build us a City and a town, whose top may reach unto the Heaven that we may get us a name, least we be scattered upon the whole earth. But how didthe Lord deal with these presumptuous adventurers? The Poet's fain that Jupiter destroyed them with his thunderbolts; and as for one of them Typhoeus by name, a proud fellow, he laid him fast enough under the hill Aetna in Sicily, where he breaths out smoke & fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe somewhat bigger then a good Caliver. But the Scripture tells us, how that for their saying, Go too, let us build. &c. the Lord answered them with a Come on, let us go down and there confound their language, that everyone perceive not one another's speech. This Author herhaps is but a Pygmie for bodily presence, yet he may be a Giant for his wit, and found 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to fight against God in a spiritual way in the opposing of his truth. As Gamaliel sometimes advised the high Priest with his counsel to take heed, lest they were found even fighters against God. It is true this Author no doubt persuades himself that he fights for God, in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of sin. But let not the simple Reader be deluded with shows, but seriously consider whither all this do, which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election: which is so much the more foul, because he doth it underhand; as conscious to himself of his own impotency to impugn it openly, or fearing the general opposition of our Church against him, & therefore he practiseth to undermine it. And this I have found to be his course divers years ago in his private undertakings to draw proselytes unto him, namely to decline the point of grace, & of election, to deal only upon Reprobation▪ and there to put his concurrent to begin, as if he would have a young Divine to inform a Sexagenarian, as I have seen under his own hand. But see the hand of God upon him in confounding his language, as when he stands for Reprobation evitable & avoidable, & reproacheth his adversaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable & unavoidable. This is the phrase of his School. For I do not remember to have met with it anywhere, but in him, & his disciples: Now what man of common sense doth not observe this phrase to be appliable only to things that are to come; but of a contingent nature; so that they may be avoided & declined; but by no means apply able to things already done, & that more then many thousand years ago. For what sober man could hear with patience another discourse of the avoidable nature of Noah's flood now in these days, & to maintain that it is at this day avoidable: what fustian like to this? Might he not as well take liberty to discourse of the Aequinoctiall pasticrust? It was wont to be said, that this alone God himself could not perform; namely to cause that which is done to be not done. As Aristotle in his Eth relates a saying of one Agatho to that purpose. Now reprobation is confessed by all to be of the same age with election; & election was as the Apostle tells us, performed by God before the foundation of the world And is not this Author then besides himself, when he pleads for evitable & avoydable Reprobation. But albeit this Author makes the worst of our opinions and expressions, yet I will not requite him by making the worst of his, that were base & inglorious, and to be overcome. I will therefore hearken to the Apostles counsel where he saith, Be not overcome with evil, but overcome evil with good. I will make the best of his, and according to the distinction of God's will used in Schools; as it is taken either quoad actum volentis, or quoad res volitas, as touching the act of him that willeth, or the things willed. So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making such a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we willingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the absoluteness of God's decree. We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland, that God from all aeternity did by his unchangeable council ordain whatsoever should in time come to pass, yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that whereas we see some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently; so God hath ordained that all things shall come to pass that do come to pass; but necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a possibility of not coming to pass. For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content myself with the article of Ireland, for this Aquinas thus distinguisheth. For having proposed this question, Whether the will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed. To this question this Author with whom I deal would answer affirmatively, saying, it doth impose a necessity on all such things, or at least obtrude such an opinion upon us; & himself undoubtedly thinks that in case God's will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed thereby, both which are utterly untrue, & this last utterly denied by Aquinas. For first, every will of God is absolute in the judgment of Aquinas, which I prove thus; That will which hath no cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Author will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of Aquinas therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit. And in the body of that question thus he writes, The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the distinction of God's will. For when a cause is effectual and powerful to work, the effect followeth the cause, not only so far as to be brought to pass, but also as touching the manner of its coming to pass. Therefore seeing the will of God is most effectual, it not only followeth that those things come to pass, which God will have come to pass, but that they come to pass after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to pass. Now God will have some things come to pass necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot fail, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may fail in working, from which effects are brought to pass contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to pass; but how? Not always necessarily or contingently. And that certain and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schools; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more clear; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evil cause delight in confusion, and fear nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either denial of Grace, which is joined with the permission of sin: Or damnation for sin, according to that on Aquinas, Reprobation includes the will of permitting sin, & inflicting damnation for sin. Now both the permission of sin, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to pass freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is no actual transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have no power to perform every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernatural, as the acts of the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But no sinful act is supernatural, all such are natural. Now it is confessed on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of original sin, yet he hath still power and free will to perform any natural act, and accordingly he hath free power to abstain from it. So that Judas had free will to abstain from betraying his Master; After he had betrayed him, he had free power to abstain from destroying himself; so that as these sins of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him, in like manner his damnation for these sins was avoidable. And allbeit God had determined that Judas by Divine permission should betray his Master, and destroy himself, according to to that of Austin, Judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini; Judas was ordained to betray his master. And that of the Apostles jointly. Of a truth against thy holy Son Jesus both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered to do what thy hand, and thy counsel had before determined to be done. Acts: 4. 28. Yet herehence it follows only, that it was necessary (to wit, upon this supposition, namely, of the Divine ordinance.) that these things should come to pass, namely, both Judas his betraying of Christ, and Herod's mocking of him, and Pilate's condemning him, and the people's crying out away with him, together with their preferring of Barabbas a murderer before him, and the Soldiers crucifying him. But how came it to pass? Not necessarily, but contingently, that is in this Authors phrase evitably and avoidably, inas much as it was joined with an absolute possibility to come to pass otherwise; Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God. For both Judas had free will to abstain from betraying him, and Herod with his Herodians could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him, and Pilate from condemning him, and the Priests and people from conspiring against him; and the Soldiers from crucifying him, only they had no power to abstain from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner, as no man else hath power to abstain from any evil in a gracious manner, without grace: Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God, and a love of God to the very contempt of ourselves, and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evil, is acceptable with God unto eternal life, unless it proceed from this faith and this love. That which is here produced out of Marlorate is a strange speech, and such as I never read or heard from any before: and such, as whereof I can give no tolerable construction. And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with? It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absoluteness of Reprobation, doth withal maintain an apostasy from grace, which we do not, If Marlorate had any such opiniō he sings therein to himself, & to his own Muses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damn any man otherways then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance? Had he spoken of Good works moral only, it is true any hypocrite is capable of them; and none taste deeper of Damnation then hypocrites. But as for the work of true faith & true repentance; it is the general profession of our Divines, that as faith and the spirit of repentance once given, never fail, so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life, and free him from condemnation. But anything serves this Authors turn to vent his stomach: And I am persuaded, there is not one more of all our Divines that he can show to concur with Marlorat in this. And if there were is it fit their improvident & inconsiderate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not, but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety? Brenz apud Marloratum in illud, John. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet, &c. Caeterum haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quae solet argute, magis quàm reverenter de praedestinatione disserere, & pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi pessime vivat. Nullum item à Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optime vivat; se itaque velle pro suâ libidine vivere. Ut ut enim solicit lahoret, non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere. Respondet hic Christus, Omnem palmitem, &c. qnod dicitur. Quid ad te de occultâ Dei praedestinatione? Hoc tu videris, ut tu in me maneas, & fructum feras, reliquae dispensationi & prudentiae Dei committenda sunt. Nam etiamsi videar is ad aeternam salutem praedestinatus, non tamen fructum feras, abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus palms. He instances in Saul, then whom there was not a better man in Israel. That which is here cited out of Marlorat his Expositio Ecclesiastica, it is set down as in Calvin's Commentary: but no such thing is found in Calvin. And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking. And Marlorat's own exposition succeeds in a few words thus. Quae ideo dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suâ salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas & ignavia ab hominibus tollatur. And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this, though a great C. as if it were Calvin's comes in between, and it begins thus. Certum est enim decretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse; quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agat, & retractet sententiam semel decretam. Then follows the passage here alleged, and at the heels of it these words: Time igitur, & in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum assequaris. Undoubtedly Marlorat approves of Brenz his exposition, otherwise he would not have placed it in his Expositio Ecclesiastica. Now Brenz brings in the very saying for which Maldonado is criminated, as the objection of some carnal person. Therefore when Marlorat seems to justify such a saying, it must be in another sense; and that either of good works in show, of which Brenz also observed, that such might have been found in Saul: Or of works in distinction from faith. And accordingly he concludes with exhortation fear: that is not to be secure, how good soever his works are; but to have an eye to God and trust only to him, that so he may obtain salvation through Jesus Christ. Calvin in John. 15. 6. Arescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quae à Christo resecta; sūt quia sicuti initiū vigoris ab ipso est ita & continuus tenor. Non quod ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari: sed quia multae hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent & virent, qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini frustrantur. They are said to to wither like a branch cut off, such as are cut off from Christ: because like as the beginning of their vigor is from him, so also their continuance. Not that at any time it falleth out that any of God's Elect is cut off, but because many Hypocrites carry a fair show for a time as if they were green and flourishing, who afterwards in rendering fruit make void the Lord's Expectation.

2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it, cannot be executed without sin; For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin, so that there is no place for damnation, where sin and that as a meritorious cause preceeds not. I had thought this Author needed not to run out to Piscator and Maccovius for proof of this; neither Arminius nor the Author is of any other opinion I am confident, then that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned. But there is another part of Reprobation For as Aquinas speaks, it includes the will of permitting sin. Now the execution of this decree, which consists in the permitting of sin, doth not require the precedency of sin. For when God first permitted the Angels to fall, this permission of his did not require any precedency of sin in them; nor the permission of Adam to fall; it cannot be said without manifest contradiction, that it did. For before the first sin there was no sin. Piscator saith that, God created men for this very purpose that they might fall; he saith, hoc consilio, which is as much as to say, with this purpose, not, for this purpose; to wit, to permit them to fall; And God purposing this, purposed that they should fall by his permission. For Arminius confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorū genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. It must needs be that no argument shall persuade him to will that, which God permits him to will. And that it is good that evil should come to pass by God's permission, both Augustine hath affirmed, & Bellarmine subscribed. And shall it not be lawful for God to will that which is good? Undoubtedly neither justice punishing, nor mercy pardoning, can be manifested without sin, either to be punished, or pardoned, or both: neither is it credible to me that this Author thinks otherwise. And is not the manifestatiō of God's mercy on some, and his justice on others, the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind, and consequently by the most received rules of Schools first intended, even before the permisson of sin? For if the permission of sin were first intended, then by the same rule of Schools, it should be in the last place executed; that is, God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some, and punishing others, and afterwards suffer them to sin; such is the learning and judgments of these Divines. And as for the foresight of sin, it is apparent, that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it; and more then that, it presupposeth the fruition of it. Now it is well known, that sin in its own nature is merely possible. How comes it to pass, that from the condition of a thing merely possible, it hath passed into the condition of a thing future? This cannot be done without a cause; and that cause must be eternal; for the effect was eternal. For from everlasting sin was future; for from everlasting God knew it to be future. Now there is nothing everlasting, but God himself, therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing merely possible in its own nature became future. And therefore, either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof, or by his will and decree. Not by his knowledge; for that rather supposeth thē to be future, then makes them such. It remains therefore that the will of God, and that alone makes every future thing to pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting. Let this Author satisfy this argument, and I will ease him of all further pains, and lay down the bucklers before him.

3. It is untrue that by our Doctrine Reprobates do unavoidably sin. I have already demonstrated the contrary. For as I said, Malum semper habitat in alieno fundo, every actual sin is a natural act; a work of grace may be supernatural as touching the substance of the act, so is not the work of sin, but always natural. Now no Christian that I know affirms that a man in the state of sin is bereaved of free will in things natural. Nay we generally confess, he hath free will in things moral, only as touching things spiritual he hath no freedom left therein: therefore as I said before, Judas might have naturally forborne to betray his Master; naturally forborne to destroy himself. If some object, the common opiniō of Divines is, that in a state of nature there is no liberty for sin. I answer; first out of Aquinas, that this is to be understood of sin in general, not of any in particular: Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. Though a man that is reprobated of God cannot obtain Grace, (for how should he obtain it if God will not give it? will they say that Grace is given according unto works?) yet that he falls into this or that sin, this is a contingent thing, and proceeds from his own free will. So say I every sinful act committed by man in the state of natural corruption, is committed freely in such sort that he might have abstained from it, but I do not say that he could abstain from it in a gracious manner. But whether he doth that which is good, he doth it not in a gracious manner; so that still he sinneth more or less, and all by reason that as yet he hath neither faith in God, nor love of God, which are the fountains of all gracious actions, both in doing that which is good, and in abstaining from that which is evil. As for Zanchi's saying, That God holds Reprobates so fast that they cannot but sin. This act of God is no other then his denying them grace to break of their sins by repentance, and to turn unto God. Now the Apostle professeth that as, God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth others, even whom he will, in denying this grace unto them. And mark what objection he shapes hereupon, thou wilt say then why doth he yet complain? (to wit of men's disobedience: for of nothing else doth the Lord complain.) For who hath resisted his will? Observe the chains wherewith God holds them fast irresistibly, to wit the chains of obduration. Let the Author therefore charge St. Paul as well as Zanchi for making God the Author of sin, and indeed he might have abounded in passages out of holy Scripture alleged to the same end, whereunto he allegeth these out of our Divines; yea and Papists too. But Piscator, Zanchi, and Calvin, these are his proper marks to shoot at, ever since he learnt in his age to correct the errors of his youth in taking frivolous exceptions against Bellarmine. As for a necessity of sinning brought upon all by the sin of Adam. Arminius acknowledgeth it, and this Arminius is acknowledged by Corvinus in his answer to Lilenus. Only God takes it away from his Elect at the time of their calling and regenerating, and leaves it upon the rest; and who can say black to the eye for this? Will we not give him liberty to have mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will? Then let us fly in the face of Paul as well as Calvin & Zanchi for so plainly teaching this. The hardness of men's hearts is the immediate cause why they obey not God's word; But there is another cause also that our Savior takes notice of, and that is this; That God doth not regenerate them, or hath not elected them. Of this our Divines may well take notice, because Moses before hath done the like. The Israelites profited neither by hearing of God's word, nor by the seeing of his mighty works, I say by none of these did they profit unto repentance; and what was the reason hereof? Surely the hardness of their hearts, as Moses signifies, Thou art a stiff-necked people. Yet he takes notice of another cause and that is this, Yet the Lord hath not given our hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day. So our Savior in the Gospel; He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God Now to be raised up in Calvin's Phrase, to illustrate God's glory in their damnation, is no other then to be brought forth into the world, and not to be borne of God, that is, to have the grace of regeneration denied them, and consequently to be suffered to go on in their sins; and lastly to be damned for their sin, to the manifestation of the glory of God's justice. Solomon saith as much, The Lord made all things for himself, that is for the manifestation of his glory, even the wicked against the day of evil. And St. Paul Rom: 9 by showing mercy towards some, signifies how God forms some after one manner, by hardening others he forms them after another manner comparing the 18. v. with the 20. And in the 21. He justifies God in this, and that in reference to different ends, which are the manifestation of his glory different ways, saying, Hath not God power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor. And verse 22. What if God to show his wrath and to make his power known, suffered with long patience the vessels of his wrath prepared to destruction. v. 23. And that he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory? What one of our Divines expresseth himself in this argument more fully, or more liably to carnal exceptions following the judgment of flesh and bood, then St. Paul doth in this? Here by the way as touching Piscator, I must fetch after mine answer in his behalf, to that which in the entrance to this Section was delivered of him, and overseen by me. For this Author confessing that our writers have never said directly in terminis, that God is the cause of sin, which introduction of his is the very same which Bellarmine useth, opposing our Divines on this very argument, lib. 2. Deamissione gratiae & statu peccati. cap. 4. Afterwards by a parenthesis brings in an exception of Piscator, and some other of the blunter sort, without naming one of them. And though he name Piscator yet he quotes no place; for if he had, he should withal direct his Reader to the grounds whereupon Piscator affirms this, namely that, God is the cause of man's fidelity. And it is the very place formerly mentioned in these words. He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God now what reasonable mā can deny, but that it is a sin not to hear God's words; then doth not our Savior plainly profess, that the true cause hereof is, because they are not of God? Now if to be of God in this place doth signify God's Election, then the cause of their sins hereby is made God's not electing of them. But if this phrase, To be of God, signify God's regenerating of them, as I think it doth, then God's not regenerating of them is made the cause of this their disobedience in not hearing God's word's: and indeed the evil of sin hath no efficient cause but deficient only, as Augustine hath delivered long ago. And God is not bound to any, either to elect him, or regenerate him; so that in failing to regenerate mā, he doth not deficere, or fail in any culpable mā ner: now let every indifferent Reader judge, whether here be not, Dignus vindice nodus a knot worthy to be loosed; & it will require some worth of learning in him that solves it. And is it decent for this Author to censure a man for a conclusion made by him out of the word of God, without showing the faultiness either of his interpretation thereof, or of his consequence framed therehence? So that this Author's wit & cunning is more to be commended in not specifying the place where Piscator delivers this doctrine, then either his learning or his honesty. He was loath to raise spirits, & afterwards to prove unable to lay them. Therefore thus I answer in behalf of Piscator; though God her by me made the cause why sone hear not God's words, to wit, in as much as he doth not regenerate thē, nor give the eyes to see, nor ears to hear, & an heart to perceive according to that of Moses. Yet he doth not make God any culpable cause, neither indeed is he any culpable cause, while he fails to perform so gracious a work towards thē: the reason whereof is this. He and he alone is a culpable cause, who fails in doing that which he ought to do: ut God all be it he doth not regenerate a man, yet he fails not of doing that which he ought to do. For it is no duty of his to regenerate any man; for he is bound to none. Now to be the Author of sin is not only to be the cause thereof, but to be a culpable cause thereof. Undoubtedly God could preserve any man from sin if it pleased him, and if he doth not, he is nothing faulty. Secondly I answer that in true account, God is only the cause, why our natural infidelity is not healed, our corruption not cured. Like as a Physician may be said to be the cause why such a man continues sick in as much as he could cure him, but will not: Soe God could cure the infidelity of all, but will not. Only here is the difference, the Physician may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbor as himself; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sin, and in the hardness of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for Piscator's saying here mentioned, Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sin; and therefore to sin that they may be justly punished. Hereing are two things charged upon Piscator. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that no Arminiā that I know denies Reprobates to be appoinby God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds merely according to his mere pleasure, or upon the foresight of sin. We say it proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sin preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sin, then it were of men's evil works. Now look upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good works, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evil works: for the argument for the one is this. Before Jacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evil; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therefore election is not of good works. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, Before Jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evil it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evil works. 2. If God doth ordain any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordain to annihilate them for their sins, instead of punishing them with eternal fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God. For if it were, mark what intolerable absurdities would follow, namely this, That God did ordain that upon the foresight of sin he would ordain men unto damnation; whereby God's eternal ordination is made the object of God's ordination; whereas all know that the Objects of God's decrees (which are all one with his ordinations) are things temporal, not things eternal. 3. If the foresight of sin goes before the decree of damnation, then the decree of permitting sin goes before the decree of damning for sin; that is the permission of sin was first in intention, and consequently it ought to be last in execution; that is, First man should be damned for sin, and not till afterwards permitted to sin. The second thing charged upon Piscator is this, that, Reprobates are precisely appointed to sin. Now here the crimination grates not upō the manner of being appointed thereunto; otherwise a way could be opened for a progress in infinitum. Now why should it be anymore a fault in Piscator to say of some that they are appointed to sin; then in Peter to say of some that they are appointed to disobedience: or in all the Apostles to profess that all the outrages committed by Herod and Pilate, by the Gentiles and people of Israel were such as God's hand & his counsel had before determined to be done? or why doth Piscator make God to be the Author of sin in this, more then Peter and all the Apostles? And considering this man's unconscionable carriage in this, let the Reader take heed how he suffers himself to be gull'd by this Author, and drawn to censure such speeches in Piscator, as making God the Author of sin, when hereby he is drawn ere he is aware to pass the like censure on the Apostles? And the holy Ghost himself, whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of Piscator. It is farther observable that Piscator saith, That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination do sin necessarily. I answer, Piscator was an excellent Scripture Divine, but no School-divine; and therefore no marvel if he want the accurateness of Scholastical expression. Yet I salve him thus. They sin necessarily upon suspicion that God will have them to sin by his permission; but this is no necessity simply so called, but only secundum quid. But God decrees the manner of things coming to pass, as well as the things themselves; as before I shown out of Aquinas. Soe that all be it it must needs be, that sin come to pass, in case God hath decreed it shall come to pass; yet if the question be, after what manner it shall come to pass, I answer, not necessarily, but contingently and freely, that is not only with a possibility of not coming to pass, but with a free power in the creature to abstain from that sin which is committed by him. For God ordained that everything that doth come to pass shall come to pass agreeably to the nature thereof, and accordingly moves every creature to work agreeably to their natures. Necessary agents, necessarily, contingent agents contingently. Free agents freely. And as formerly was mentioned, every sinful act is a natural act; and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to do, or to leave undone any natural act. And Piscator in other places dealing with Vorstius, clearly professeth as I well remember (though the the place come not to my memory) that wicked men do commit those things freely which are committed by them. And it is an excellent saying of Augustine, that, Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but willfulness; & indeed they show too much will therein, rather then too little: and in denying liberty to them that want grace, he speaks of liberty moral, which is only unto true good, not of liberty natural, which hath place only in the choice of means, and is inseparable from the nature of man: But true morality sets a man's soul in a right condition towards his right end.

4. It may be this Author could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning God's decree, which he criminates in our Divines are Scripture expressions; therefore to help his cause here he imputes unto them, that they maintain that God decreed this immutably; as if himself could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God, but not immutably. And would this Author have the will of God to be of a mutable condition, like unto ours? I am confident he dares not profess so much; for albeit he licks his lips at a conditional decree, yet how doth he conceive this to be mutable? For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith, and repentance, and perseverance; and damn others in case they continue in infidelity and impenitency; if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein is found, none damned but such as persevere in sin unto death; what change is there in all this? Unless this be it, that God did not resolve to save any particular person until his final perseverance was accomplished; And so God may be said in process of time, to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation, and another man's damnation: In which case God's decree also should not be eternal, but begin in time. Again as touching that which follows of of God decreeing that Reprobates shall live and die in sin. I answer, to decree not to regenerate Reprobates, is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated, for they are not able to regenerate themselves; and to decree that they shall not be regenerated, is to decree that they shall live and die in sin, by God's permission, he resolving never to show such mercies to take them of from their sinful courses by repentance. And so long as they are not borne of God, they will not hear his words, as our Savior testifies saying, Ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God. As for sin procured by the hand of God, which he obtrudes upon our Divines; not one passage doth he produce for that. Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in Piscator dealing against Vorstius, which at this time doth not come to my remembrance; but withal I remember that Piscator being charged therewith by Vorstius, forthwith represents certain passages of Scripture concerning God's's providence in evil, and appeals to the judgment of every sober Christian, whether to do that, which therein is attributed to God, be not to procure sin. It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth, that the Lord sent him into Egypt, yet was this brought to pass by the parricidiall hands of his brethren. And it is no less plain that God hardened Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel go And by Arminius his Definition of effectual grace, it is evident that by God's denying it, sin doth follow infallibly. And so likewise upon God's permission of willing this or that, he professeth that it must needs be, that by no kind of argument shall such a one be persuaded to nill it. I come to the means whereby he is said to procure it. The first is, by withdrawing grace necessary for the avoiding of sin. Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines. 2 I know no grace which this Author accounts necessary, that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawn by God. 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good; but this Author doth not account any such determination necessary to the avoiding of sin. 4 Prohibition, denunciation of judgment, dehortation and such gracious actions, God doth neither withdraw, nor withhold from the wicked, who are partakers of this grace as well as God's children, as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons.

5. An effectual restraint from sin, I know none but the fear of God; yet this he withdraws not from the wicked; for they never had it; nor from the children of God; only he doth not stirrre it in them at all times, so often as he suffers them to sin, which yet may be to gracious ends. As I for the confirmation of their faith, that nothing, no not sin shall separate them from the love of God; when they shall find the goodness of God minding them of their errors, and bringing them to repentance. 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonness in beholding the uncomfortable issue of it. 3 To provoke them to walk more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come, standing upon their guard, and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride, according to that of Austin. Audeo dicere, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestum{que} cadere peccatum. I am bold to speak it, It is good for a proud man to to fall into some open and manifest sin. I come to the second stay, whereby he objects to our Divines that they maintain that God procures the sins of men, and that is by his moving and inclining them by his irresistable and secret workings on their hearts, to sinful actions. To which I answer first that not any of the passages alleged by him out of Calvin (who alone makes totam paginam in this of his) makes mention of God's irresistable working; or of moving or inclining unto sinful actions. And let every sober man judge whether a bridle is fit to urge men to action, and not rather to restrain from action, and this is the force of the first Quotation. But this Author through heat corrupting his imagination took a bridle for a spurr. His second testifies only this, that man doth nothing but what God decreed, and by his direction appointeth; and this also upon pregnant testimonies of scripture; never undertaking to show Calvin's interpretation to be false, or his accommodation of them to be incongruous. In the third he grants that God works in the mind of men. In the 4. he saith that God stirs up the wills, and confirms the purposes of wicked men for the execution of his judgment by Satan the minister of his wrath. Where consider he doth this by Satan, that is he gives them over to Satan for this; so that 'tis Satan that stirs up their wills and confirms their endeavors, by God's permission without restraint either immediate or mediate by the ministry of his good angels; and all this is but to execute God's judgments. And that it is just with God to punish sin with sin, both scripture testifies in divers places, and Austin confirms with variety of Scripture testimonies, in his lib. 5. contra Julian: Pelag: cap. 3. The last is that God's work it is to harden man's heart, and thereby prepare him to destruction? And let every sober reader that is not willing to be cheated both of his faith and honesty all at once, examine these places in Calvin, and the Scriptures whereby he proves that which he affirms; and let him but ask the Author these questions. If Calvin delivers nothing in all this but what he proves out of Scripture, why is he found fault with more then the word of God. If Scripture be mis-alleged and mis-understood by him, why do not you confute him? 2 Though Calvin in all this makes no mention of God's inclining wicked men to sinful actions; yet Austin doth as before I have shown, and that by, variety of Scripture testimonies. And if this be to make God the Author of sin, why hath he not so much ingenuity as to confess at least in the close of all, that Calvin makes God the Author of sin, no more then Austin doth; and neither of them more then the word of God doth, and therewithal renounce the Scriptures and turn Atheist. 3 As the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh to his destruction, so did he the heart of Sihon also Nowsee what Cardinal Cajetan writes upon thisvery place. Utram{que} homines partē (spiritum & cor, hoc est superiorem & inferiorem) male dispositam à Deo intellige negative penes dona gratuita; positive autem quoad judicium, inclinationem & prosecutionem boni sensibilis. Ita quod Deus spiritum Regis durum (hoc est non cedentem petionibus) reddit, & non dando ei gratiam acquiescendi, & coo operando eidem, ad affectum securitatis & boni proprii, & similiter roboravit cor ad affectum boni, victoriae, & hujusmodi. Each part of King Sihon, his spirit and heart, that is the upper and lower part being ill disposed by God (understand this negatively) as touching gifts of grace; but positively as touching his judgment, affection, and prosecution of a sensible good. So that the Lord made the Kings heart hard; that is not to yield to the request made, both by not giving grace to rest satisfied, and by cooperating with him, to the affecting of security and his own good. And in like manner he hardened his heart to the affecting of victory, and the like. I have not heard that this my opposite hath been ever ready to censure Cajetan for making God the Author of all this; yet no passage I am persuaded throughout all Calvin's works can be found comparable unto this. Yet was Cajetan no Jesuit, he need not spare his censures.

I come to the sum of that which he hath delivered in a whole leaf. The first whereof is this, that we teach, That God appointed many miserable men from all eternity to unavoidable torments Now that God appointed many from eternity to everlasting torments, this Author acknowledgeth as well as we. As for the avoidable condition of them, it is confessed on both sides, that they are avoidable only by breaking off their sins by repentance before their death; and by this we acknowledge them to be avoidable of all and everyone, as well as they. But we say God doth not grant this grace to all. For he is not bound to give it to all, no nor to any; but he vouchsafeth this grace to whom he will, and he denieth it to whom he will, and this St. Paul hath taught us, where he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. The second is, that we teach, that God to bring about their intended ruin, decreed that they should without remedy live & die in a state of sin. To this I answer, that it is a most absurd conceit, to make the tormenting of any man God's end. We have learnt of King Solomon that, God made all things for himself; here is the end of his actions, the manifestation of his own glory And albeit, he made the very wicked also against the day of evil; yet the end thereof was, for himself, as formerly specified, that is for the manifestation of his just wrath, and that God hath power without any difference in the matter, to make some vessels of wrath, and some of mercy, as he thinks good. The Apostle plainly teacheth us, where he saith, Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor. And if any man's wicked proud heart make insurrection against this truth, the Apostle hath taught us to stop his mouth with this, shall the the thing formed say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus? Shall not God have as much power over the mass of mankind, as the Potter hath over the clay? So that this is God's end not man's damnation, but his own glory. Haec loquendiratio saith Calvin, this manner of speech, finem creationis esse interitum aeternum, the end of man's creation is his everlasting destruction, nusquam apud me occurret, shall never be found in my writing. So Beza in his questions and answers, I say God hath ordained not judicio, for judgment, but, judicio, for just judgment, that is to manifest his justice upon them. Secondly, we deny that God suffers them to persevere in their sinful courses without giving them grace to repent, to the end that he may damn them; But with Alvarez every way standing as much for absolute Reprobation as Calvin; that God suffers them to sin, and to persevere therein, and damns them for their sin, to this end, namely, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice. And as for this Author's opinion in premising the foresight of sin to the decree of damnation, I have already represented the manifest absurdity thereof, as namely in this, that seeing God cannot foresee sin, unless he first decree to permit it, it follows that by his opinion, the decree to permit sin must precede the decree of damnation, that is sin is first in intention, and then damnation. Whence it follows that if sin be first in intention, it must be last in execution; and consequently men shall be first damned for their sin, and after that suffered to commit sin; this is the glorious issue of the premises of this Author. His third and last is, that by our doctrine, God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth so govern and work upon the wills of Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue of avoiding their sins, but must of necessity commit them To this I answer, that no other power is requisite for the effecting of all this; then 1. To suffer all men to fall in Adam, 2. To bring forth all men in original sin, which alone deserves damnation as Mr. Hoord confesseth, and as this Author sometimes read in his Lectures at Magdelen Hall. 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates, but to suffer them finally to persevere in their ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance. 2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actual sins: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sin original, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt mass. But as for actual sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a natural manner. My reason is because though a good work may be an act supernatural; yet a sinful work cannot be so, but every actual sin is an act natural for the ground and substance of it But every natural & carnal man hath power freely, either to do any act natural or to abstain from doing it, though when they abstain from doing it, as from committing murder, adultery, theft, slander, or the like, they never abstain from it in a gracious manner: Like as any moral good work, they have liberty to do, but they cannot do it in a gracious manner. This proceeds merely from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestows upon any Reprobate.

Sect: 3.

After two leaves spent, first in the charge; and secondly in proving that God is not the Author of sin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Divines at pleasure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appear, that by just consequence they make God the Author of sin, as he saith, will plainly appear by certain considerations following: which in few words come but to this in general, namely, that God doth more then the Devil, or wicked counselors in alluring and advizing others to sin, more then wicked persons in acting of their own sins. But by this discourse of his, he is as far off as ever from proving that we make God the Author of sin. For consider, either by doing more he understands, that God doth the same which the Devil & wicked mē do; & more: or though he does not the same, yet he doth that which is more then that. If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devil & wicked men do, this is notoriously untrue, considering thē as tempters, & advizers, and persuaders unto sin. For God on the contrary forbids sin, persuades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his spirit; and indeed the spirit works not, but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit; All holiness of life is comprised within the compass of ten commandments; these were given by the Lord frō mount Sinai, pronounced by the sound of a trumpet; to these the Lord calls his people saying, stand in the ways and behold, and ask for the old way, which is the good way and walk therein & ye shall find rest unto your souls. For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with thē, Hear ô heavens and hearken ô earth, I have nourished and brought up a people, & they have rebelled against me. Whē they have gone astray he exhorts the, and that most pathetically to return by repentance, by promise of salvation, and threatening judgment if they do not repent. O Jerusalem wash thine heart from wickedness, that thou mayest be saved, how long shall thy wicked thoughts remain within thee? I have seen thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthiness of thy whoredom on the hills, in the fields, and thine abominations. Woe unto thee ô Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean? When shall it once be? And to provoak them the rather unto repentance, he represents himself unto them as easy to be entreated, as slow to wrath, and one that by his patience and long suffering leads them to repentance. And to this end he gives charge to his Ministers, namely, by representing the gracious nature of God to admonish them of their sins, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpose to represent his promises which he hath annexed unto godliness, both the promises of this life, and the promises of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats also both of judgments in the world to come, to the casting both of body and soul into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to fear him above all others. And judgments of this world, as, famine, pestilence, and the sword of the enemy, To deliver them over into the hands of beastly people, skillful to destroy; To send Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that shall sting them; and that without all mercy. Surely these are not the courses of Satan or wicked counselors. Therefore they do not as God doth, neither doth God do that which they do and more also. 2. If it be said that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devil doth, and wicked men do in persuading them to sin; yet he doth that which is more then this. I answer, that nevertheless he cannot be accounted the Author of sin, in case the doing of this alone doth constitute an Agent the Author of sin. Now as formerly I have shown this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto, and of the Divines of Salamancha: yea and Vasquez the Jesuit professeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Again if to do more then this, be to become the Author of sin; both this Author and all that are of his Spirit do maintain as well we, that God doth that which is far more then this. For I presume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth support our natures in the committing of sin; & who maintains our senses in their vigor and quickness, without which we could take no pleasure in sin, and that concurs to every act of sin, in the way of cause efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Author of sin, by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned; but physically and naturally, which no creature can do, namely become a natural coefficient cause to the act of another man's will. Nay which is most considerable, I presume this Author hath so much accuratenes in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devil tempts us, or wicked counselors do tempt us to sin, God concurs with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cause efficient physical. For in him we live and move and have our being; what is it to have our being from him, but that he is the Author of it in the kind of a cause efficient? In the same sense do we live in him, and in the same sense do we move in him. It stands us upon as much to maintain this, as to maintain that God is our Creator. For unless all things do subsist in him neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deal more then to persuade. For a weak man is able to persuade, but no creature is able to perform these parts which God doth in the act of everything created by by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the discourse is as far off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Author of sin, anymore then he is constituted the Author of sin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he proposeth particularly and severely.

1. The Devil, saith he, doth only allure men by inward suggestions, and outward temptations to fall into sin: But God doth much more if he do necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerful and secret working in the souls of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin. For to determine is infinitely more then to persuade. Now to this I have already answered by showing. 1. That albeit God doth more then this, yet seeing he doth not this: if the doing of this alone constitutes one the Author of sin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; still God is free from being the Author of sin. This Author barely supposing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himself confesseth that God concurs to the act of every sin, and that in the kind of a cause efficient natural. And I may be as bold as to say of this, that it is infinitely more then to persuade; like as he saith of God's determining the will and necessitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his discourse. And here first I wonder not a little at this Author's distinction of the Devil's inward suggestion from his outward temptations. For I confess freely I know no outward temptation of Satan, distinct from his inward suggestions. Outward occasions and provocations to sin I know none wrought by Satan, any farther then as he in some cases is 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 God's instrument, as in afflicting Job. For surely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the government of Satan; this is in his own hand still; and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himself in sinful courses, either in the way of profit, or satisfying his unclean lusts. And Arminius confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions, which provoke to such an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without sin, if not by God's intention, yet at least according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that arise therehence. This administration, I say Arminius confesseth, doth belong to the Divine providence. And these arguments, he saith, are objected & there to the mind (of man,) or to his senses outward or inward; and that either by the mediate work of the creatures coming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine administration is to make trial whether the creature will abstain from sin, even then, when it is provoked thereunto. As, for the trial of David, was Bathsheba going • o • th to wash her self objected to David, whereupon he was inflamed with lusts Joseph was not, though far more strongly solicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistress. Secondly, to necessitate the will or determine the will are no phrases of our Divines. The first is used only by Bradwardine (as at present I remember) sometimes Arch-Bishop elect of Canterbury; The other is that phrase of the Dominicans. Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves. Why doth not this Author answer a chapter or two in Bradwardine, a chapter or two in Alvarez, where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively. Surely hereby he should perform a work more worthy of a Scholastical Divine, then by so hungry a discourse as this. Secondly, consider neither Bradwardine maintains that God necessitates; nor Alvarez that God determines the will to sin, but to every natural act, in which kind of acts sin is to be found: Why then should this Auhour carry himself thus in his crimination? We know sin is merely privative in the formal notion thereof; an obliquity such as concerning which, Augustine hath long ago delivered, that it hath no efficient cause, but deficient only. And divers ways Divines have shown how God may be the author of the act, yet not the Author o • the sin, and illustrated it by various similitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horse, he makes him go, but doth not make him halt. The sun shining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it stink. The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their favors as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory, is frō the nature of things themselves on which the sun beats. In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toads & snakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food; yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physic. And God knows how to make good use even of the sins of men. and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underw-heel being out of his place, the upper wheel in a jacke or clock will set him going in a wrong way, as well as all the rest in a right way; his motion is from the upper whele, his irregular motion from himself. A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry work The writing is from himself, the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper on this very question whether the act of sin be from God, Aquinas maintaining the affirmative, illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame leg; the motion, saith he, is from the soul, the 〈◊〉 is frō the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmity of the leg. Yet this Author carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Author of the action, were to be the sin; not considering that himself maintains, that God is the Author of the action, and that in the kind of a cause efficient natural. Thirdly, when Bradwardine maintains that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof, he withal professeth that he necessitates it ad liberum actum suum that is to work every act thereof, freely. Soe when Alvarerz maintains that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he withal maintains that God determines the will to work free ye and so Aquinas. For when he works upon contingent causes, he moves thē to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he works upon necessary causes, he moves them to produce their effects necessarily. And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently, is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary. Soe to move free causes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he saith, that sin must needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Author's judgment, that it must needs follow upon God's cōcurrence to this act. If he say that this concur̄ce is necessary to every act, I answer, it is necessary to the substance of every act, but not at all required to the sin; though this Author carrieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, so say we is determination required to the substance of every act. And God's concourse with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurs with another in moving a timber logge, which is the expression of the Jesuits, thereby manifesting the vileness of their opinion, as we can demonstrate, and that more ways then one by evident demonstration, as I have already shown in my Vindiciae. Let this Author answer those digressions if he can, I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the Arminians. We know God is the first cause, and all other are but second causes in comparison to him. Yet we willingly confess that the providence of God is wonderful and of a mysterious nature in this; but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimony, as scarce to anything more. So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evil, wherein indeed it is most wonderful; and he takes unto himself the hardening of men's hearts, and blinding of their minds, and prostituting them to abominable courses, even to vile affections and thereby to punish sin with sin, as Rom: 1. Therein saith the Apostle, they received the recompense of their error. This hath Augustine also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book. De gratiâ & Libero arbitrio in two large chap: & likewise in his fifth book against Julian the Pelagian & third chap: this also the Adversaries have been driven to confess in a strange manner, as to give instance first in Bellarmine whose words are these. God saith he, praesidet ipsis voluntatibus ease{que} regit & gubernat, torquet & fl • ctit in iis invisibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malae sint, tamen à divina providentia ad unum potius malum quàm ad aliud, non positive, sed permissive ordinentur. God is president over the Wills, and so rules and governs, wrests & turns them, working invisibly in them, that albeit through their own fault they are evil, yet by the divine providence they are ordered to one evil rather then to another, not positively but permissively What one of our Divines hath said more then this comes to, or so much, professing that God rules and governs the wills of men by his invisible operation, ordering them to one evil rather then to another which St. Augustine calls inclining them? And the Prophet David we know prays, that God would incline his heart unto his testimonies and not to covetousness, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to covetousness. But Bellarmine saith more then this, in saying that, God wrestes and bends them, torquet & flectit; those are his words; although he seems to blast all this in the end by saying that this is done permissive, by permission, in flat contradiction to himself, whose express purpose is to show that God doth not only suffer wicked men to perform evil acts, and to desert the godly, but somewhat else also, namely, to rule and govern their w • lls, to wrest and bend them by an invisible working in them, to commit one ev ••• rather then another. Secondly consider their general doctrine of congruous grace, standing in a necessary conformity and correspondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concerning the foreknowledge of God, called by them Scientia media By this doctrine of theirs God foresees in what ease and by what motives man being moved to abstain from this or that sin, he will abstain from it: And again in what case and after what manner being moved to abstain from sin, he will not abstain from it And God makes choice at his pleasure how to move him, whether after such a manner in which case he foresees he will abstain from sin; or after another manner in which case he foresees he will not ab •• aine. Now who is so blind as not to observe, that as often as a man sinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God he shall sin, by the very grounds received by our Adversaries. Thus much as touching my first answer concerning the necessary con • equence of sin upon God's operation to be acknowledged by our Adversaries, according to the tenor of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My second answer is this. Albeit God determines the will to any virtuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing some moral good, or in the way of abstaining from some motall evil; yet unless God give man some faith and love, as fountains out of which every moral work must proceed, that it may be acceptable with God; such an one shall necessarily sin, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither perform any moral good work, nor abstain from any moral evil work in a gracious manner. Now let every sober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preserving a man from sin in general, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evil. In each of which God determines the will only to the substance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the substance of the act or no, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or no; still there will be a necessary consequence of sin to every act of man, if God doth not bestow the spirit of regeneration upon him, which spirit of God we know was given to our first parents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were justly bereaved upon the first sin committed by them; And because all we have been derived from them since their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue until such time as it pleaseth God for Christ sake, to restore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and lastly upon the very permission of sin, it follows necessarily that sin shall be, by the doctrine not of Piscator only, but of Vorstius and Arminius also; yea and of the learned amongst the Papists, as Navarettus and Penottus: And the very definition of Permission of sin by Arminians justifies it; as also the Jesuits doctrine concerning gratia congruâ. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abstain from sin, as God well knows; but such a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abstain from sin, which also is well known unto God; doth • t not manifestly follow that such a one shall sin, though not sin necessarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are esteemed Authors of their offenses: Now by the way this is not so; To be a sinner is one thing to be an Author of sin is another thing. And to be an Author of sin is in reference rather to another's sin, then to ones own. And Martinius tells me that, Author est cujus autoritate & sententiâ aliquid fit, cujus testimonio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Ita{que} authorem & dissuasorem Cicero opponit. He is the author by whose authority and judgment a thing is done, by whose testimony we are induced to believe ought; who exhorts to the doing of ought. And therefore Cicero makes Author and disswader opposite. But to proceed with this Author who set the Printer on work for the edition of this piece. Men, he saith, do plot purpose, choose and commit offenses, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overuleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion, proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way, so as they cannot choose but do, as they do, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. To which I answer, that it becomes every man to give the Devil his right, & and not make him worse then he is, nor wicked men neither. Now no wicked man doth will or choose sin as sin Nemo vult esse incontinens, saith Aristotle, although they do such things as do sufficiently evidence their incontinent disposition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can anything be willed by man, but, sub ration boni, under the show of good: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleasure, or in the kind of honesty. So Lucretia when she killed her self, she did it for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that she consented not unto Tarquinius; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they do or choose to do for some motive or other, which whether it be pleasure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act sinful, but only that it is against some law or other, forbidding it And this act, (all sides confess) is the work of God, as well as the work of man; as in whom we move, like as in him we live, and have our being. And Bradwardine maintains that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the creature it self, who • e act it is. This he proves of the creatures conservation, of the creatures action, of the creatures motiō; & to this he proceeds by certain degrees. And in all this God doth not transgress any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a natural act, and only in performing acts natural is sin committed, never in performing any act supernatural; all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes, otherwise then as when accepting their intentions he will not have them put such in execution because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time & person. As when David was purposed to build God an house, & was encouraged therein by Nathan: yet the Lord sent Nathan shortly unto David to give him to understand, that he reserved that work for Solomon his Son; yet so well accepting David's purpose that he promised to build his house. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men, whether good or evil, let us bless him rather for this then curse him; by cursing them that maintain this good providence. Yet in overruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the ministry of his good Angels; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Author dreameth. For that is not the way to work agreeably to the reasonable nature of man (though so he work also by general influence affoarded common to all agents) but by representing to the understanding congruous motives to divert them from that they do intend; whether in a gracious manner, as he diverted David from his purpose to massacre the whole house of Nabal; or only in a natural way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly designs, by representing the danger thereof, to make them fear, & so to restrain them. Will the Devil himself be over prone to blaspheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devil or man can do; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth cooperate to every design and execution of the creature, be it never so abominable; which neither man, nor Angels can do. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully then any Devil can do. The Devil could not say with truth that He would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let Israel go. Nor when he had let them go, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, to bring them back. The Devil could not say in truth, as the Lord did to David, I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of the sun. Nor as he said to Jeroboam, Behold I will rent the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. Nay the very permissiō of sin so as whereby it shall infallibly come to pass, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And shall it follow, that because God doth more, both as touching the act it self, and touching the sinful condition of it, then any creature can do, therefore God is the Author of sin? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good moral works, whether in doing that which is virtuous, or abstaining from that which is vicious, this man shall certainly sin, though not in so great a degree, unless God be pleased over and above to regenerate him, and to bestow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this case, though he do an act virtuous, yet shall he not do it in a gracious manner. & though he do abstain frō an act vicious yet he shall not abstain frō it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintain (if he thinks good) that except God doth bestow the spirit of regeneration upon all and everyone throughout the world, he is the Author of sin, not only when he moves them to such acts which are evil, but also when he moves them to the doing of such as are virtuous, or to the abstaining from those that are vicious. As for his phrases no wise man will regard them, but only such as are content to feed on husks for want of better food. As, when he talks of motion uncontrollable, which makes a noise, as if men's wills would control his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the first mover moves the creature most congruously unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noises makes the phrase immutable decree; as empty things many times give the greatest sound: whereas by virtue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwise be; then that as necessary things cannot but come to pass necessarily; so contingent things cannot but come to pass contingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifest's how he licks his lips, at a Mutable decree of God, even of that God with whom, as St. James speaketh, there is no variableness, nor shadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintain, potentiam in se liberam; but then he saith, we do not maintain, liberum usum; a most absurd distinction. For no power deserves to be styled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirm, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgment of all to consider, whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it self, and maketh them do those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he lays not this to the charge of Papist's: Noah nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for saying that God doth not only rule, and govern, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evil rather then to another. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases, it is no other then they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuits oppose the Dominicans in this. This Author sides with the Jesuits, but why doth he not take to task any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and clear reason doth justify. And the ground of the Jesuits in opposing, is merely an invention of their own, concerning a certain knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature merely possible; and consequently cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now no cause can be devised hereof with any color of reason, but the will of God. For first, the cause hereof must be eternal, seeing the thing it self, of the cause whereof we dispute, is eternal to wit, the fruition of anything. This I say was eternal, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is no eternal cause to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cause why things merely possible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlasting, must be found in God alone. Therefore it must either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and seeing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future, then makes them so; what remains but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof? Nay consider whether the Jesuits themselves do not manifest more ingenuity by far, then this boisterous Theologue, that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words, the resolution of whose arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confessed principle of reason. Whereas not the greatest, Angel of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse. For did we grant, that God by his Almighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills. Yet Suarez confesseth that so to work, doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Almighty power of God: Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concourse without subordination of the second causes to the first, implies flat contradiction We say the wills determination of it self is the work of God, otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the work of God. Again the wills determination of it self, is no other then the wills operation; and this Author that opposeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the work of God. But what School divine can he produce that delivers himself in so absurd a manner; as to say that God first determines the will, and that afterwards the will determines it self; especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of it self, we say, is the work of God moving the creature agreeably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried necessarily to that which is it's end, and appears to be good in genere convenientis: and freely to the means, which appear to be good, in genere conducentis, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confessing (Durand excepted) that God works the act; the question whether he works the act absolutely, the will a second agent subordinate unto God, as to it's Creator? Or conditionally, modo vellimus, provided that we will it, God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature? This Author will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependence upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we say is most absurd First because thus the first agent is made subordinate to the second agent, which is most unaturall. Secondly, observe a manifest contradiction. For the question is about, actus volendi, the act of willing, in man. Now if God produce this act upon supposition, that man produceth this act, then the same act is produced by God upon supposition, that it is produced by man. If it be produced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement? Thirdly, by this means the thing is made the condition of it self. For hereby it is said, this act is made upon condition that it doth exist; & so the self same thing shall be before & after it self. 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be no work of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any natural act, in this Authors opinion. Fifthly, It is not possible the will can produce the act unless God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unless the will doth produce it, in this case there shall be no act produced. For if I go not to London unless you go with me; nor you go to London unless I go with you; here is no going at all till one saith I say I go, and his resolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon. 6 Whereas to help at a dead lift the Jesuitical doctrine of, Scientia media, middle knowledge, is called in after this manner; God foreseing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act, if God be pleased to concur; and upon this foreknowled • e God resolves to concur This doctrine I have already confounded by showing the apparent falsity of this supposition. For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant, is a thing merly possible in it's own nature, & no more future then not future; It is impossible that this should pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the conditiō of a thing future without a cause: And no cause hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It follows that the wills producing such an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced, then on the contrary, that God's producing such an act, depends upon the creature's will to produce it. As for that which follows of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over it's action (I presume he means independent) it sounds more like the voice of the Devil, then of a sober Christian. Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himself challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himself; If he doth, I know no greater sin that he or the creature can be guilty of; unless in case gross ignorance doth excuse it. To deny God to be▪ the first Agent is to deny his God-head; and if he be, primum agens, he must be primum liberum too, the first free agent. And to make ourselves to be prima libera, the first free agents, what is other then to advance ourselves into the very Throne of God's Soveraigntie; and do we not fear least his wrath smoke us thence. And if all this that he contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere necessity were found in the motion of men's wills; yet Suarez will justify us from speaking contradiction, or delivering ought that exceeds the compass of God's omnipotency. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God should not be unjust in casting the most innocent creature into hell fire; as Medina professeth, and that by the unanimous consent of Divines, and Vasquez the Jesuit acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the last chapter of the book, de praedestinatione & gratiâ which goes under Austin's name, there is an express passage to justify it. And albeit that work be not Austin's, yet it is lately justified to be the work of a great follower of Austin 's, and as Orthodox as he; namely, the work of Fulgentius as Raynaudus the Jesuit hath lately proved, and justified that passage also; together with that which is usually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth chapter of Wisdom, and shows the right reading, as followed by Austin and Gregory. And withal represents a pregnant passage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of Macarius to the same purpose. And out of Chrysostom in his 2. De compunctione cordis, about the end thereof. And out of Austin upon Psalm the seventieth, about the beginning. And to these he addeth Ariminensis, Cameracensis, Serarius, and Lorinus, all maintaining the same. And this is evident by consideration of the power, which it pleased the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our blessed Savior, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I say, if all that he contends for were granted, should rather be concluded therehence, namely, that in this case the creature should be innocent, then that God should be the Author of sin; especially considering that God performs in all this no other thing then belongs unto him of necessity; as without which his moving of the second causes, it were impossible the creature should work at all, which we have made good, by showing the manifest absurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintain a bare concourse Divine either in subordination unto the agency of the creature, or without subordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Divine. But we do subordinate it, as without which the second cause could not work at all, and by virtue whereof it doth work, and that freely, so far forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature; but not so as to make the creature compeere with his Creator. Let man be a second free Agent, but set our God that made us evermore be the first free Agent; least otherwise we shall deny him the same power over his creatures, that the Potter hath over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor. This power in my maker, the Lord hath given me eyes to discern as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to submit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worst actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humor against his hand; though I think it lawful for us in an holy manner to expostulate with God sometimes in the Prophets language and say, Lord why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways and hardened our hearts against thy fear? Which yet I confess he brings to pass at no time, infundendo malitiam, by infusing any malice into me, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, non infundendo gratiam, not quickening in me that holy fear, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confess willingly, I have a great deal less then I desire, though the least measure of it is a great deal more then I do or can deserve. Neither shall I ever learn of this Author after his manner to blaspheme God if at any time he shall harden my heart against his fear. Though this Author speaks commonly with a full and foul mouth, yet his arguments are lank and lean; and of no substance but words. As when he saith that, God over-rules men's wills by our opinion. Now to overrule • a man is to carry him in despite of his teeth. We say no such thing but that God moves every creature to work agreeably to it's nature, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to pass by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangeable counsel hath determined to come to pass. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth profess by the unanimous consent of the ArchBishop, Bishops and Clergy of that Kingdom, when those Articles were made. So I speak warily and circumspectly, the rather because one Doctor Heylin doth in a book entitled, The History of the Sabbath, profess, Chapter 8. page 259. That, that whole book of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdom. Anno 1631. A thing I willingly confess at first sight seemed incredible unto me; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the days, of King James, should be revoked in the days of King Charles; but expect to hear the truth of that relation. For the Author thereof hath never as yet deserved so much credit at my hands, as to be believed in such a particular as this. But to return, this Authors text is nothing answerable to the margent. For first, imperare to command, is one thing, and to over-rule is another thing: though he that doth, imperare command ought, is commonly accounted the Author thereof, as a cause Moral, from whom comes the beginning of such a work. But utterly deny that God commands evil, and the truth is we acknowledge no other notion of evil then such as the Apostle expresseth in calling it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an incongruitie to the law of God, which law commands some things and forbids other things. I come to his third reason. 3. I grant wicked counselors and persuaders are deservedly accounted the Authors of sin: The common use and acception of the words as I shown in answer to the first, is observed to denote such. Therefore Cicero makes Author and disswader opposite; and by law they are punishable in the same degree with the Actors. But God is no counselor or persuader to any lewd course, but forbids it, and dissuades it, and that with denunciation of the greatest judgments among trangressours. 2. I willingly confess that councelling is far inferior to enforcing; yet in Scripture phrase earnest entreaty, or command is oftentimes expressed by compelling as Mat, 14. 22. Mark: 6. 45. Luk: 14. 23. Gala: 6. 12, and 2. 14. 1 Sam: 28. 23. 2 Chron: 21. 11. And no marvel for hereby many times men are drawn full sore against their wills to do that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be resisted, but neither hath any man any will to resist that motion of God whereby he works agreeable to their natures, then indeed there were place for resisting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous person, such as Achan to covet a wedge of gold and a Babylonish garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away secretly, and hide it in his tent, what resistance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this less agreeably to his covetous disposition, then to the disposition of Toads and Adders, when he moves them according to their nature to sting and poison? So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to sting a wicked people. Do not the Scriptures plainly profess that God did send them? Is not Assur in this respect called, the Rod of God's wrath and the staff in his hand? Was it not called the Lord's indignation? Is he not compared to an axe and a saw, shall the axe boast it self against him that heweth therewith? Or shall the saw extol it self against him that moveth it? Still he confounds the act with the sinfulness thereof, speaking of God's producing sins; whereas sin is never produced, it being only an obliquity consequent unto the act of such a worker as is subject to a law. And our Adversaries confess that God is the cause of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to profess that in producing the act he produceth the sin. As for that which he speaks of Inforcing, we may well pity him, that when he wants strength of reason, he supplies that by phrases. We deny that God enforceth any man's will. Nay it is the general rule of Schools, that, voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced: We maintain that every act of the will, especially in natural things (such as a sinful act must needs be: for only gracious acts are supernatural) is not only voluntary (which is sufficient to preserve it from being forced) but free also, by as much liberty as the creature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is primum liberum, a first free agent, that is the prerogative of God alone, the first mover of all, and the supreme Agent thus: I have dispatched my answer to his first reason consisting of three parts I come unto the second.

Sect: 4.

If a King should carry himself as God did in hardening Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel go; and when he had let Israel go, to harden his heart that he should follow after them; we would acknowledge such a one, not to be man but God. And then surely whatsoever our Arminians would think of such a one, we would think no otherwise then Solomon did of him of whom he professed, that, he made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. If God doth but permit a man to will this or that, necesse est, saith Arminius, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument shall persuade such one to abstain from willing it. And I hope Arminius hath as great auhority with this Author, as Mr. Moulin deserves to have with us. Noah King hath power to dispense any such providence as this. St. Paul tells us plainly, that, God hath ordained some unto wrath; and as he hath made of the same lump some vessels unto honor, so hath he made other vessels unto dishonor. The Lord professeth that he kept Abimelech from sinning against him. Thus the Lord could deal with all if it pleased him; Why doth he not? is it not for the manifestation of his own glory? For to this purpose he hath made all things. And that, he suffers with long patience vessels of wrath prepared to destruction. And what to do doth he suffer them? But to continue and persevere in their sinful courses without repentance; the Apostle plainly tells us that it is, to declare his wrath and make his power known. This is not the voice of any Doctor of ours now a days, but of St. Paul. And shall Mr. Moulin be brought in to affront St. Paul? For recompense let the Jesuits be heard to whom the nation of the Arminians are beholden for their principal grounds; Wherefore doth God give effectual grace unto one and not unto another, but because he hath elected the one and rejected the other? And I appeal to every sober Christian, whether the absoluteness of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the absoluteness of Election. But touching Mr. Moulin, I have heard that Doctor Ames sometimes wished that he had never meddled in this argument. I am not of Doctor Ames his mind in this; though it were I think most fit everyone should exercise himself in those questions, wherein by the course of his studies he hath been most conversant; so should the Church of God enjoy, plus dapis & rixae multo minus, invidiae{que}. I do admire Mr. Moulin in his conference with Cayer as also upon the Eucharist, and on Purgatory, he hath my heart when I read his consolalations to his Brethren of the Church of France; as also entreating of the love of God. I would willingly learn French to understand him only, and have along time desired, & still to get anything that he hath written. I highly esteem him in his Anatomy though I do not like all and every passage; yet but few are the passages wherein I differ from his opinion. I have been very sory to observe how by his doctrine in the point of reprobation he overthrows his own Orthodox Doctrine in the point of Election. I would he would answer Sylvester who hath replied to his admirable letters written to Monsieur Balzak. I could be well content, were I once free, to supply what is wanting to Waleus his Apology for him against Corvinus. But to the point, the passage here proposed by him is I willingly confess somewhat harsh. I will have this man hanged, and that I may hang him justly I will have him murder or steal. But compare it with that of St. Paul formerly mentioned, God suffers the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, that he may declare his wrath, and make his power known. And that of Eli's children, They obeyed not the voice of their Father, because the Lord would slay them. And that Amaziah would not hear: For it was of the Lord that he might deliver them into his hands, because they sought the God's of Edom. And that of Jeremiah Doubtless because the wrath of the Lord was against Jerusalem and Judah, till he had cast them out of his presence, therefore Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babel. And observe how near Mr. Moulin is to expose these holy passages of Scripture and the doctrine contained in them in like manner unto scorn, ere he is aware. And let him soberly consider, and without any humor of complying with our Adversaries out of a desire to charm them who will not be charmed, to what end God doth finally permit some to persevere in sin, and can he find any other but this, for the manifestation of the glory of his vindicative justice in their condemnation? And without any desire to charm, I have shown plainly, that God doth not permit any man to sin, and finally to persevere in sin to the end that he may damnethem: But that he both permits them finally in sin, and damns them for their sin, for the declaration of his wrath and power on them; and also that he may declare the riches of his glory, upon the vessels of his mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory: If he put a difference between permission of sin, and a will that they shall sin; I would entreat him not to stumble at this. For what difference between God's will to permit man to sin, and to will that man shall sin by his permission: And the tragical acts committed on the holy Son of God by Herod and Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, the Apostles say not they were permitted by God, but that they were predetermined by the hand and counsel of God. Mr. Moulin's care is to avoid harsh expressions; & it is a commendable care. For why should we causelessly expose the truth of God to be the worse thought of, and provoke men to stumble at it by unnecessary harshness? Yet I find the Scripture it self delivered by the holy Prophets and Apostles is nothing so scrupulous. Malim dicere, saith Mr. Moulin, I had rather say, Deum non decrevisse dare alicui gratiam, quâ convertatur & credat; that God hath decreed not to give someone grace whereby to be converted and believe; quâm dicere eum decrevisse ut homo sit incredulus & impoenitens, then to say God hath decreed that man should be incredulous and impenitent. And he gives his reason thus. Vox enim decernendi aptior est ad ea designanda, quae Deus statuit facere, quàm ea quibus statuit non mederi. For to decree is fitter to denote such things as God hath purposed to do, then such things as he hath purposed not to cure. And indeed the Ancients in this sense take the word predestination, to be only of such things as God himself purposed to work; as Grace and Glory, and the damnation of impenitent sinners. But if God decrees not to cure impenitency and infidelity in some; judge whether upon this ground. it may not well be said, that God decrees that the impenitency and infidelity of some shall continue uncured And Mr. Monlin confesseth that God decreed that the Jews should put Christ to death. His words are these, Deus vetuit homicidium, idem tamen decrevitut Iudaei Christum morte afficerent. God forbad murder yet he decreed that the Jews should kill Christ. Yet by the way consider, God hath no need of the sin of man, that he may put him to death justly. For undoubtedly God could annihilate any creature that he hath made, the most holy Angels without any blemish to his justice. Yea by power absolute he could cast the most innocent creature into hell fire, and continue yet just still, as formerly hath been shown, and Raynaudus justifies, and represents variety of testimonies for this, not only of School-divines, one of whom professeth that it is concors omnium Theologorum sententia, the common opinion of Divines; but of the Ancient Fathers also. And therefore though to strangle Virgins was not lawful for Tiberius; yet a greater & more severe work then this is lawful for God. Neither doth God command any impure course to any, but under pain of eternal damnatiō forbids it. But as he hardened Pharaoh 's heart that he should not let I srael go; so can he harden any man's heart to do as foul a work as this. And St. Paul testifies that he gave up the heathens to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes, to defile their own bodies between themselves, which turned the truth of God into a lie, & worshipped & served the creature forsaking the Creator, who is blessed forever amen For this cause God gave them up to vile affections; for even the women, did change the natural use into that which is against nature. And likewise the men left the natural use of the women, and burned in their lusts one toward another, and man with man wrought filthiness. And this is noted by the Apostle to have been a work of judgment. For it follows, they received in themselves such recompense of their errors as was meet. I grant Tiberius was the principal Author of deflowering those Maides. For he commanded it, and that, as I have shown, makes a man the Author of a crime, both out of School-divines, and out of Orators; but God gave no such command to these heathens thus to defile themselves. And this Author doubts not, but God cooperates to the substance of every act; notwithstanding the absoute dominion of the will over her actions, for which he pleads. And it cannot be denied unless the word of God be therewithal denied, that, in him we move, as well as in him we live and have our being. And though God gave not commandment to Absalom. to defile his Fathers Concubines, yet he tells David saying; I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this Sun. For thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the Sun. It is utterly untrue which this Author obtrudes upon us, as if we thought it unlawful, for God by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame. Was anymore innocent then the Son of God? yet he gave him to suffer somewhat more then the death for the sins of men. Neither must we be gull'd with his phrases of the Devils deflowering of men, when by him they are carried away into abominable courses, so as to oppose Scripture & blaspheme God, the language of the holy Ghost being this that all the outrages committed upon the holy Son of God by Herod and Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, were such as, God's hand and counsel had before determined to be done. And the like cruelties or worse were executed upon the Saints of God by their Kings, who employed their sovereign power in executiō of the beast's behests; yet this is called the will of God. God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree to give their kingdoms to the beast until the word of God be fulfilled. And the truth is if God permit such abominable courses and hardens men's hearts, occasion being offered they will commit them, according to the common proverb. He must needs go whom the Devil drives. And the very definition of the permission of sin given by Arminius doth convince this, though he carrieth himself very superficiarily explicating God's providence in this, and the nature of obduration; which I have prosecuted at large in my Vindiciae, in answer to Bellarmine, especially where I treat of the abduration of Pharaoh chap: 11. Neither do we make damnation the end whereunto God permits sin; but both permisson for sin and damnation for sin, we make the means tending to another end, namely, the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called the declaration of his wrath. And to make God the Author of sin by these courses, is clearly to charge the holy Ghost with blasphemy, seeing the holy Ghost gives clear testimony to all this in the word of God.

Sect. 5.

Observe the false carriage of this Author, That God is the Author of men's salvation and conversion, he saith, all sides grant; as if there were no difference between Arminians, and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We say God works faith and regeneration in us, and that for Christ's sake. The Remonstrants in their Censura censurae, in express terms deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the gift of God. Or when they do in terms profess this (as Epicurus, verbis Deos posuit, re sustulit) whether they do not equivocate. Ask this Author in what sense he makes God to be the Author of man's conversiō, whether any otherwise thē, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In persuading unto faith & repentance. 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the first, that mere nature & not grace, Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere omnes possint si velint, saith Austin, All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of temporal things convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandments. Now this is no more, then, posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, to be capable of faith of charity, and this is, naturae hominum, of the nature of man; As Austin testifies in another place, where he saith posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, naturae est hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, gratiae est fidelium. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithful. Consider in reason; supernatural grace is not in reason to be accounted inferior to a moral virtue; but so it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For moral virtue doth not give a man a power only to do good if he will, but it inclines and disposeth the will unto virtuous actions. So justice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be just or no; but it makes him just, and so disposoth him to just courses. Again if grace supernatural doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to believe; as well not to reap̄t, as to repent. For liberty is always to act opposite; whence it will follow that by virtue of supernatural grace a man is disposed not more to faith, then to infidelity, not more to repentance then to hardness of heart and Impenitency. 4. Consider, a man hath no need of supernatural grace to enable him to refuse to repent, seeing naturally he is sufficiently disposed hereunto; & necessarily by reason of that natural corruption which is hereditary unto him. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by supernatural grace, is not a free power working freely; but rather a necessary power working necessarily; like unto the condition of a moral virtue, which restrains man's natural indifferency to good or evil, and disposeth him only to good. And consequently as many as maintain no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deal like Pelagians, who called that which was merely natural, prevenient grace. Lastly if God be the Author of man's conversion, because he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Author of non conversion, and perseverance in sin, because God gives power not to convert, and to persevere in sin, if he will. 2. As touching the second, If God be the Author of man's conversion, because he persuades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Author of sin, because he persuades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Author of conversion, because he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well said to be the Author of every sinful act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confident this Author will not deny. Now I could earnestly entreat the Judicious Reader to examine well this Author's opinion in these particulars, and compare them with his former discourse, that he may have a clear way opened unto him to judge with what conscience he carried himself in his former discourse, imputing unto us that we make God the Author of sin; albeit in treating of God's providence in evil, we generally have the express word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof do rather qualify the seeming harshness thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenor of his discourse, look upon what grounds he denies God to be the Author of sin, he must withal deny God to be the Author of faith, of repentance, of conversion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Author of conversion; upon the same grounds he must make God the Author of sin: As in case to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Author: Or if only upon persuading us to believe, God is said to be the Author of faith; then it follows as a sufficient Apology for us, that we make not God to be the Author of sin; seeing none of us conceive him to be a persuader of any sinful act; but rather a disswader and forbidder thereof and that upon pain of eternal damnation. But on the contrary we make a vast difference between God's operations in sinful actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As first, every sinful act is always within the compass of acts natural; no supernatural act is or can be a sin. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithstanding his corruption hath in him a natural power. But there is no natural power in man to the performing of an act supernatural. God must inspire him with a new life called in Scripture, the life of God; and make him after a sort partaker of the divine nature; and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in such sort, that, being crucified with Christ, we hence forth live no more, but Christ liveth in us. These supernatural acts are but few according to the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, & Charity, whose offsprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of ourselves hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worst it can do unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devil. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a double influence; one common as they are acts natural, touching the substance of them; another special as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evil acts, he hath no influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the substance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilness of them, the reason whereof is that which was delivered by Austin long ago. Malū non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem, Evil hath no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creator cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & consequently of a frail condition. And it is received general as a rule in Schools, that a creature cannot be made, impeccabilis per naturam, that is such a one, as by nature cannot sin. This was delivered long ago by Anselm one of the first of School-divines; In evil things God doth work, quod sunt, that they are; non quod mala sunt, not that they are evil; But in good things God doth work, Et quod sunt, & quod bona sunt, both that they are and that they are good. Here this Author sets down our opinion concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleasure. We say with Austin that, predestination is the preparation of grace, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and all confess, it is also the decree of conferring glory. And because in making of this decree, God had respect unto some only, not to all, both men and Angels, therefore in this consideration it is called the decree of Election, in distinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace custodient from sin, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angels, called in holy Scripture, The elect Angels; or grace healing, after men have sinned, and the decreee of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called God's Elect, in reference unto this. It is farther to be observed that Austin grounds the Orthodox doctrine of predestination and election upon the Orthodox doctrine concerning grace. And the absoluteness of the one he built upon the freeness of the other, in not being given according unto men's merits. As it appears, de bono perseverantiae cap. 15. Where having proposed some exceptions of the Massilienses made against his doctrine of predestination, coming to make answer thereunto, he begins thus, Ista cum dicuntur, saith he. ita nos à confitenda Dei gratia, id est, quae non secundum merita nostra datur, & a confitenda secundum eam predestinatione sanctorum deterrere non debent When these things are objected, they must not deter us from confessing God's grace, I mean such a grace as is not given accordiog unto works; nor from confessing the predestination of Saints according thereunto. Now if the absoluteness of predestination be grounded upon this, that, grace is not given according unto merits, (the scripture phrase denies it to be given according unto works. But Bellarmine acknowledgeth that in this Argument, merits and works are taken by the Ancients in one and the same sense.) it followeth that as many as deny the absoluteness of predestination must therewithal maintain, that, Grace is given according to men's merits or works. And the reason is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleasure decreed to give grace unto some, and not upon consideration of their works. And this is to elect absolutely, and antecedently without the foresight of any deserving, yea of any works; though by that expression which this Author useth he doth sufficienty manifest, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upō the foresight of men's, works but upon the foresight of men's deservings. It is farther considerable to prevent the reaches of such crafty foxes as we have to deal with, whose course is in joining the decree of conversion and salvation together, to translate that which belongs unto one, unto the other most unreasonably: For albeit God proceeds according to the mere pleasure, and without all respect to works, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to confer it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleasure, and without all respect of works in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, whosoever believeth shall be saved, and accordingly he bestows the kingdom of heaven by way of reward for faith, repentance, and good works. This hath Christ deserved at the hands of his Father that our weak performances should be thus rewarded. Lastly, it is farther to be considered that God, as he thus bestoweth salvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance &c so from everlasting he did decree to bestow salvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good works, any or all of these were the cause (least of all the deserving cause) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleasure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to bestow eternal life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clearly divers ways. 1. By the Apostle's discourse; where he discourseth after this manner, Before Esau and Jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said that the Elder shall serve the younger; therefore election is not of works: But if election did proceeed upon the foresight of faith, repentance, and good works, or any of them, then it might justly be said, that it were of faith, repentance, or good works or of all of them; And the force of the Apostles argument extends to conclude, that election is no more of faith or of repentance, then of works; not only because faith and repentance are works, and so accounted in Scripture phrase, as it appears. Io: 6. 29. But chiefly because before men are borne, they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good works. 2. If faith were a motive cause unto election, then either it were so of it's own nature, or by constitution Divine: not of it's own nature as it is apparent. If by constitution divine, mark what strange absurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordain, that upon the fore sight of faith, he would ordain men unto salvation, whereby God's eternal ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's decrees are always things temporal, never anything that is eternal. 3. It cannot be said that God giveth salvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may far more congruously be said, that God gives faith to the end that he may save them; therefore the intention of salvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, then the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving salvation. Or better thus, if God foresee faith before he decrees salvation, then the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foresee faith) is before the intention of giving salvation; and consequently the giving of faith should be the last in execution; that is men shall first be saved, and aferwards have faith bestowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by sight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation; the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predestination. The first is permission of sin, the second is, Damnation for sin, according to that of Aquinas, Reprobatio includit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpâ. Reprobation includes a will to permit sin, and to inflict damnation for sin. The first object of reprobation I say is, permission of sin; not Sin as this Author would have it, but permission of sin: Because these decrees, to wit, of permitting sin, and inferring damnation for sin, are decrees of means conducing to a certain end. For like as in election God decreeth to bestow faith, repentance, and obedience on some, and to reward it with everlasting life for the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy mixed with justice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to sin, and finally to persevere therein, and to damn them for their sin to manifest his glory in the way of vindicative justice. Now whosoever intends an end must also be the Auhour of the means conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Author of permission of sin, yet he cannot be the Author of sin: Albeit upon God's permission of sin it followeth that sin shall exist. Now to permit sin is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Custodient to preserve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their sin, and healing it by faith and repentance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleasure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto some; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others. And so in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleasure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance, whereby alone sin is cured, and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to persevere in sin, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himself of mere pleasure without all respect to men's works; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, whosoever believeth not, and repenteth not, shall be damned. And like as God damns no man but for his final perseverance in sin. So from everlasting he did decree to damn no man, but for his final perseverance in sin. So that by virtue of the Divine decree of reprobation, sin and final perseverance therein is constituted the cause of damnation; but by no means is it constituted the cause of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foresight of sin precede it. For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto works, the absoluteness of predestination is grounded in the judgment of Augustine as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's works, as necessarily followeth the absoluteness of Reprobation. Secondly, look by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good works, namely because, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Yonger; by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evil works, because, before they were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger, Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to Jacob his younger, as Jacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother. 3. If sin be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sin, had it pleased him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordain that upon foresight of sin, he would ordain men unto damnation. 4. If foresight of sin precedes the decree of damning them for sin, then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damn them for it, as without which there can be no foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in another world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be no cause of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much less can a temporal thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternal. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth, Never any man was so mad, as to say that anything might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintain that anything can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike; the will of God being alike uncapable of a cause in both, whereas this Author saith, that, God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from sin to sin; 'tis mere bumbast. All men being borne in sin must needs persevere in sin, unless God gives grace to regenerate them. For whether they do that which is morally good, they do it not in a gracious manner; or whether they abstain from evil, they do it not in a gracious manner. He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not saith our Savior, because ye are not of God. Arminius acknowledgeth and Corvinus after him, that all men by reason of Adam's sin are cast upon a necessity of sinning. He asks what difference is there in the course which God taketh for the conversion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates; and I have already shown a vast difference; and here in brief I show a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he shows not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themselves; as touching the evil acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cause efficient to the act which for the substance of it is naturally good. For ens & bonum convertuntur, everything that is an entity so far is good, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evil, as which indeed can admit no efficiency, as Austin hath delivered of old, Man himself is only a deficient cause of sin, as sin, and that in a culpable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurs two manner of ways & that in the nature of a positive efficient cause in both, namely, to the substance of the act by influence general, and to the goodness of it by influence special and supernatural.

It is true the Fathers made sin the object of prescience, not of predestination; the reason was because they took predestination to be only of such things which God did effect in time; Now sin is none of those things that come to pass by God's effection, but only by God's permission. And that such was the notion of predestination with the Fathers, I prove first out of Austin. In sua quae falli mutari{que} non potest praescientiâ opera sua futura disponere, illud omnino nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare In his foreknowledge, which can neither be deceived nor changed to dispose his own works, that is to predestinate and nothing else. And sin, not being the work of God, no marvel if it come not under predestination. Secondly, out of the Synod of Valens, Praedestinatione autem Deum ea tantum statuisse dicimus quae ipse vel gratuita misericordiâ, vel justo judicio facturus erat. We say that God by predestination ordained only such things as himself would work, either of his free mercy, or in just judgment. Again it is as true that they made even sin it self the Object of God's will, witness that of Austin. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not anything comes to pass but God Almighty willing it, either by permitting it or working it. So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So Arminius Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum implere, God would have Ahab to fulfill the measure of his sins. So scripture often mentioned. And Austin gives the reason of it, malum fieri bonū est, it is good that evil should be. Bellarmine confesseth as much, namely that, Mala fieri Deo permittente bonum est, It is good that evils should come to pass by God's permission. And shall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he saith of the Ancients, that, They refuted this foul assertion of an absolute, irresistable and necessitating decree as he could easily show, but that he fears to be overlong. It is nothing but froth; It is not the first time I have had experience of such like Pyrgopolinices eloquence of his. Bradwardine hath demonstrated that the will of God is absolute throughout speaking of his decree, and none conditional and his demonstration is this, If there be any will of God conditional, then the condition whereupon it proceds must be willed by God or no; to say it is not, is to acknowledge some things to exist in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath no hand, which is generally disclaimed; And Durand, who affirms some such thing, is opposed generally, and indeed his arguments are very sleight. But if God doth will that condition; then either he wills it absolutely or conditionally; If absolutely, then the cause is gained. For then that which was first willed, was willed also absolutely not conditionally. As for example, if God wills a man's salvation upon condition of faith, if withal God's will be, and that absolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's salvation, and that absolutely. If it be answered that the condition is willed not absolutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I inquire whether God willed it or no. If no, then something is produced in the world, in the production whereof God, hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that also, I farther demand whether he willed it absolutely or conditionally? If absolutely then all that depended thereupon were absolutely willed, and so the cause is obtained. If you say this condition was willed also conditionally, so a way is made to a progression in infinitum, which is a thing unsufferable by the consent of all. And as many as are put to give instance will forthwith manifest the nakedness of their cause. This demonstration of Bradwardine I sometimes represented to this very Author in our private walking and communication, and he professed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other term Irresistable this manifests this Author's meaning, that some will of God, speaking of his decree, is of a resistible nature. Whereas St. Paul to the contrary plainly gives us to understand that God's will is irresistable; & the Psalmist saith, that the counsel of the Lord shall stand. And my counsel shall stand, and I will do whatsoever I will. And therefore his decrees are resembled to mountains of brass. As for the lost term necessitating. For the Gentleman pays us in words, for want of better coin, not considering that words are but wind, he would cheat his Reader by this, presuming he would be so simple, as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and Bradwardine who peculiarly useth this phrase, understands hereby no other necessity then upon supposition, which Alvarez shows by general concurrence of School-Divines, that it may well stand with absolute contingency and liberty, it being no other necessity, then that which is called, secundum quid, in some respect; And such a necessity Arminius maketh consequent to permission: & Bradwardine is express that God necessitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from Aquinas his doctrine, where he maintains that God's will imposeth no necessity upon the creatures will; because he ordains both necessary things come to pass, necessarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a possibility to the contrary; & likewise free actions freely, that is with a free active power in the Agent to do otherwise. But come we to the consideration of the passages produced out of the Ancients. For I presume they are the choicest. For though he feared to be overlong, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behooved him to represent the best. And I believe he could produce more of this nature. For I have been an eye witness of it under his hand now four years ago. And though he produce them not, I hope to do it for him ere we part, to show how little I fear his concealements, and somewhat of the Predestinarians also, being glad of such an opportunity to discover the wildness and precipitation of his judgment touching that which is called the predestinarian heresy here touched by him.

The first is a passage taken out of the Church of Lions, denying that God hath laid a necessity of sinning on any man. Another out of Remigius; both represented (yea & many more of this nature) by that most reverend and most learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh Doctor Usher in his history of Goteschalk, 138. and 173. To these I answer. First these Ancients are about 850 years after Christ; yet marvelous orthodox considering those times in the point of predestination. And let no man think that they deny a necessity of sinning laid upon all by original corruption, the consequent of Adam's prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, should it become us to follow them in this? Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that libertas à peccato, liberty from sin, is not incident to a natural man; it is true he desires to quash it by saying there is yet in man, Libertas à necessitate, à liberty from necessity; but from what necessity? From the necessity of sinning? If so, why should he then deny a liberty from sin; yet he never taketh any pains to clear this from contradiction, but blindfoldly follows Bernard, without caring much to understand him. And he looks to be pardoned because Vossius did so before him. M. Fulke, in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, usually distinguisheth between libertas à peccato, & libertas à coactione, liberty from sin, and liberty from constraint; and denying all liberty from sin to a natural man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken some pains to show Doctor Potter's superficiary carriage in this, and to clear Bernard; which it may be I will add to this by the reason of the homogeneous nature of it. In the mean time liberty from sin is utterly denied to a natural man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And no marvel seeing Arminius himself, and Corvinus, those great patrons of natures power, do acknowledge this, as before I mentioned; only they say God is ready to remove this necessity of sinning from all, and everyone.

2. But the meaning of Remigius and the Church of Lions is the same with that of Prosper formerly mentioned, in his answer to the objection of Vincentius, where he confesseth, Hominem non redemptum Diabolo esse captivum, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan; and that, creatura peccatrix poenalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relicto vero domino) sponte se vendidit. The creature sinning deservedly suffers the dominion of Satan by way of punishment, as to whom he sold him self voluntarily. Haec quippe servitus non institutio est Dei sed judicium. This slavery of man to Satan is not God's institution but judgment; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleasure, but in the way of judgment. Like as Austin in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiscense to be, not sin only, but the punishment of sin also. So Remigius and the Church of Lions say; that God imposed it not on Adam but man falling from God brought a necessity of sinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon justly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him.

2. Why he should allege the first passage under the name of the Church of Lions, I know not; The reverend Bishop acknowledgeth Florus to be the Author thereof, a Deacon of Lions pag. 126. Although the same Reverend Bishop acknowledgeth that other book also that goes under the name of the Church of Lions now extant in the Bibliothecâ Sanctorum Patrum; and wherehence Vossius communicateth unto us his excerpta, was written by the same Florus pag. 115. He had more reason to father his next passage, which he produceth out of Remigius upon the Church of Lions. For albeit Maldonado cites the book entitled Liber de tribus Episcoporum epistolis (whence this passage is taken under the name of Remigius) yet he who set it forth ascribes it to the Church of Lions, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of Nicholas Faber, as appears Goteschalc: hist: 170. But none do I find to ascribe this work of Florus to the Church of Lions, though the Author of another book under that title, the Bishop acknowledgeth to be Florus.

3. Florus acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a necessity of sin in a sort, p. 149. In Sanctis licet sit liberum arbitrium jam Christi gratiâ liberatum at{que} Sanctum; tamen tanta est illa sanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt sine peccato esse non possint, & cum velint at{que} desiderent non peccare non possūt tamen non peccare. In the Saints of God though there be freedom of will, as freed by the grace of Christ, and made holy, yet this health is such, that as long as they carry this mortal body about thē they cannot be without sin: and though they would and desire to be without sin, yet they cannot be without sin. This I conceive is spoken in respect of the flesh lusting against the Spirit; & of the law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of sin. How much more are the wicked in bondage to sin and Satan, as the same Florus showeth pag. 142? For whereas Scotus taught, that a man had not lost his liberty, but only the power and vigor of his liberty. Florus opposeth him thus, Non recte dicit, quia nec sentit, he saith not well, because he thinks not well; sed sicut vigorem & potestatem libertatis, ita ipsam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipse ad verum bonum unde cecidit liber esse non possit. As he hath lost the vigor and power of his liberty; so he hath lost liberty it self, insomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, until he be freed by the grace of Christ. In like manner Remigius discourseth also, grāting free will only to evil, p. 36. In infidelibus id ipsum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest. In infidels free will it self, so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead works, cannot be free in living works that is, is not free to produce works belonging to a spiritual life. So that they unanimously confess that in respect of original sin, there is a necessity of sinning, but this is rightly to be understood; namely thus, that true good they cannot do, so that whatsoever they do is evil, only that it is free unto them to do this or that evil, which is most true. Secondly, thus far they qualify this necessity of sinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, so as to sin whether they will or no. For albeit Rabanus charged them, whom he opposed herewith, pag. 53. Si enim secundum ipsos qui talia sentiunt, Dei praedestinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus justo judicio, damnat peccantem, cum ill non voluntate, sed necessitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who think such things, God's predestination makes a man to sin against his will; how doth God in his just judgment damn him that sinneth, when he sinned not voluntarily but necessarily? Thus they criminated their adversaries: but Remigius answers on their behalf, who were thus falsely accused Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei predestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate, sed divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur. No man so thinks or speaks, that God's predestination makes a man to sin against his will; so that a man should seem to sin, not by the perversitie of his own will, but by the necessity of divine predestination. But this is the work of Divine predestination, that he who sins willingly, & perseveres willingly in his sins, shall against his will be punished. And the truth is taking predestination as it signifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to confer this, rather God's not predestinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cause why a man sinneth, according to that of our Savior. He that is of God heareth God's words▪ ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God. Yet this is rightly to be understood. for God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cause why their natural corruption is not cured, thē that they go on in their sinful courses: for naturally carnal men are prone enough to sin, and in this course they necessarily continue, until God changeth their hearts; necessarily I say, but not against their wills. For sin is as a sweet morsel, which they roll under their tongue. This may suffice for answer unto these passages, and withal to represent the vanity of this Author's discourse, endeavoring to brand our doctrine with making God the Author of sin; more of this hereafter; For I am acquainted with that which he here conceals, and with certain adjuncts thereunto, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lions concerning falling from grace; as also this Authors bold adventure in two particulars in justifying Vossius, citing the confession of Pelagius as one of Austin's sermons; as also defending him in the point of the predestinarian heresy, which Doctor Usher maintains to be a mere fiction of the Semi-Pelagians to bring Austin's doctrine thereby into disgrace. But Vossius conceives that there was indeed such an heresy, and that the Monks of Adrumetum were the Authors of it. And this Interpolatour takes Vossius his part, and labors by certain arguments to make it good against he judicious observations of that most reverend and learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh. It may be I shall represent my answer thereunto by wa • •• digression; but first I must dispatch my answer to this I have in hand.

Sect: 6.

Here we have a very demure discourse proceeding in a positive manner, proceeding from one that takes upon him to be a Master and dictator of sentences; wherein there is little or nothing sound that he delivers of his own; or to purpose that he delivers of others. Nothing of any color of pertinency, besides what he delivers in the last place touching our opinion of the nature of permission of sin. And I willingly confess, The divine permission of sin is a very obscure point, and in my judgment most come short in the explication thereof Arminius hath a large digression upon this place of Permission in general, and of permission of sin in special: It was the first piece of Arminius, the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to search after satisfaction therein. And finding no content therein, I gave myself to inquire thereof in a positive manner; wherein I proceeded very far, setting down in foul papers, as they came to hand, whatsoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then set myself upon preconceived grounds reasonably well disscurssed by me, to deal with Arminius some five Sections after the beginning of his discourse on this argument, which five first Sections I took not into examination, until I had dispatched the whole. And having an occasion to deal upon this argument when I came to the defense of M. Perkins his answer to the third crimination, whereupon I deal in the second book of my Vindiciae, I thought good to digress after the second Section, & to call a certain proposition of M. Perkins to account, which was this, Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. It is the third Digression of the second book, the title whereof is this, Propositio illa Perkinsii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) sub examen revocatur. There is no digression throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philosophical and Theological contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permission. First, in things natural. Secondly, in things moral. And these first in good things. Secondly, in evil things. In the course whereof many obscurities and difficulties do offer themselves to be cleared, & solved by distinction; where coming to an end, I deliver myself in this manner. I perceive in how slippery an argument I exercise myself, too much exposed to the calumny of adversaries, and too apt to incur the dislike of good men; whereas in all my labor I aim at nothing else, then according to my power to explicate the mystery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderful manner; And to dissemble nothing, but represent all difficulties that do occur, that both my adversaries may have at hand what to impugn; Our Divines wherein to take pains, either by way of explication of what yet remains obscure; or by confirmation of what they shall find to be sound yet unsufficiently proved. Now that Digression of mine being so large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And so may others too when they shall consider against whom this man's stomach works most. For he cannot be ignorant of my answer to M. Hoord his proselyte, if not therein to himself. Again, the exception here in the last place taken against our doctrine of permission, is exactly the same with Arminius his exception against Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have answered at large, and that in such manner, that I willingly profess, I was utterly to seek at this time, of what I had there delivered; so that upon my consulting the place, the things I there met with, seemed new unto me, in discovering many ways the inconsequence of Arminius his discourse, which yet is the very same with this of Mr. Mason's. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the second Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for no better then an idle discourse (yet an answer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to convince the justness of that exception made by Arminius, by sound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the least authority to confirm it; And though on the contrary I have divers and sundry ways manifested the falseness thereof: well I am not resolved to suffer him to pass unanswered, how idle soever his discourse may appear to be. Four distinctions of ours he proposeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his answer unto Perkins, nor any part of that his answer pretermitted by me. But this is written in English for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was said of M. Hoord's discourse; namely, that it was fit to be coppied out, and communicated unto the Country. He saith these distinctions are, delusions of the simple; when he proves it, then it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas, he saith, they give no true satisfaction to the understanding, this is rightly to be understood, to wit, in reference to an Arminian understanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagidnisme. Yet is he not privy to the understanding of all, so much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But suppose they do not. The distinctions used by School-Divines to accommodate God's predestination with man's free will, are many and learned, but Cajetan professeth of them all that they do not, quietare intellectum, satisfy the understanding; but what follows; Therefore saith he, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith to wit, because Scripture is evident for both: And why should it seem strange that God's providence in governing the world should be of a mysterious nature. And however this Author may censure Caietane in this, yet Alvarez professeth that herein, doctissime, & piissime loquitur; he speaks most learnedly and most piously. Yet permission, in the judgment of Suarez, is not merely a negation of prohibition, but conjunct with a positive operation in concurring to the act of sin; which Aquinas hath proved to be à Deo, from God, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himself is not operative in sin, otherwise then as touching the substance of the act. For sin, as sin hath no cause efficient, but deficient only, as Austin hath long ago delivered; neither hath he been opposed herein by any that I know. Observe how with him to hinder, and absolutely to hinder is made all one; yet to will, and absolutely to will in God, is not all one in his opinion. I do not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counsel. For he forbade him to eat of the forbidden fruit, which is somewhat more then to dissuade from it. And yet to persuade or dissuade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counsels. For it is to impart unto him another counsel. Yet though we dissuade a brother, and so not leave him in the hand of his own counsel; yet we still leave him to his own free will. Both these I have insisted upon more at large in the second book in my Vindiciae, Sect: 2. Digres. 3. It is true God hath no need of setting forth his own glory, no more then he hath need of making the world; but the existence of sin may be and is necessarily required to the setting forth of God's glory in some attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appear in pardoning sin, nor the glory of his vindicative justice, (called in Scripture his wrath, Rom: 9. 23.) in punishing sin, unless there be sin to be pardoned, and sin to be punished: Nor the glory of his power and wisdom in working good out of evil, unless God give way to the committing of Evil. And if upon God's permission of sin, it be not necessary that sin exist, then it is not in the Almighty power of God infallibly to procure the manifestation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of justice punishing it. But seeing these reasons are not considerable with this supercilious Theologue, it should seem likely, that look what he substitutes in the place thereof, will prove substantial, and satisfy such understandings as his own: And that he represents out of Tertullian, namely, because man is made by God a free creature. This reason was represented by Arminius before him, and that out of Tertullian, Arminius his husks are pleasing to him. Such was the condition of the prodigal child when he forsook his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to perform natural acts as well as moral; and moral good as well as evil? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Christ to the performance of actions spiritual? What therefore must God only permit them to perform them, and by no means work them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience; yea and keep them from sinning against him, as he kept Abimelech, Gen: 20? See how this Author displaies himself ere he was aware; and withal what the reason is why he affects to deal upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace least his vile opinion miserably defacing the glory of God's grace might appear with open face in 'its proper colors. Yet it breaks forth more then he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sin, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to work their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to do what they will; if they will sin to permit them; if they would do any good work whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good work, or to abstain from sin, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath no more hand in working a man to any good work (excepting the act of commanding and persuading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evil. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to do what they will, whether it be good or evil: otherwise God should nullify his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both Arminians and Jesuits. For Arminius maintains that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sin without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like do the Jesuits maintain in their doctrine of grace effectual in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good work, and accordingly preserve him from any sin by virtue of grace effectual, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be no way prejudicial to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullian's authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himself in so shameful a manner. Yet Tertullian will not serve his turn anymore, then it doth serve Arminius his turn, as I have shown in my answer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedest. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the contradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vain. For 1, the decree operative is extrinsical to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sin (as which admits no efficient cause thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Author will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sin follows of necessity, as well as upon the position of the decree operative; that is of necessity, by supposition, not necessity absolute. For as Aquinas hath delivered and proved, not only the things themselves come to pass by virtue of God's decree, but, modi rerum, several conditions of them. As for example, necessary things, necessarily; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permitted do always come to pass, not only Piscator with our Divines, as Mr. Perkins, Doctor Whitaker and Pareus do avouch, but Vorstius also and Arminius, as I have shown in my Vindiciae, lib. 2. digres. 3. Arminius his words are these, if God permits a man to will this or that, necesse est, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument move him to will it. Navarettus the Dominican professeth the same, in quaest. 19. pag. prima art. 6. pag. 65. col: 1.

1. That this destinction is rejected by our Divines this Author brings no tolerable evidence. As for Beza here it is confessed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit sin, and whereas he adds that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit sin (speaking of permission divine) is to will that sin shall come to pass by God's permission. And Austin hath professed of those things that come to pass by God's permission, that they come to pass, Deo volente, God willing them. And the Scripture acknowledgeth as much, that the Kings in prostituting their Royal authority, to the executing the pleasure of the Beast, did herein fulfill the will of God. So that God's permissive decree is as effectual in its kind, as the operative decree in 'its kind; thus far, that like as what God means to work shall come to pass; so look what God means to permit, that also shall come to pass. Neither do I know any Arminian or Jesuit, that denies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of sin, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When Calvin will have the evil of sin come to pass, Deo volente, God willing it, he denies not anymore then Beza doth, that it comes to pass by God's permission of it. But Calvin rests not in a bare permissions and no marvel. For the Scripture saith not, that God permitted Pharaoh to refuse to let Israel go, but plainly and energetically thus; I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let Israel go, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, I will rent the Kingdom from Solomon; not I will permit it to be rented; and so throughout. Bellarmine himself contents not himself with a bare permission, but farther saith, God doth rule and govern the wills of wicked men; yea, torquet & flectit, he wrests and bends them. And Austin often saith, he inclines them unto evil. And whereas it is farther added out of Calvin that a man is blind, volente & jubente Deo, God willing and commanding it. Is it not express Scripture, Es. 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes. So that Calvin doth but accomodate himself to Scripture phrase. But when we come to the explication of this either in Christian reason, or by comparing one place of Scripture with another, we say that to Make their hearts fat, their ears heavy, and to shut their eyes: And to give them the Spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; Is no more then, not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear. Yet where Calvin saith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is so disturbed; but I guess the Author would refer us to lib. 1. Institut. cap. 18. prima & secunda Sect: But I find no such thing there, but speaking of God's providence in blinding Ahab, thus he writes, Vult Deus perfidum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived. This is plain out of the 1 Kings 22. 20. Who shall entice Ahab that he may go, and fall at Ramoth Gilead; operam suam offert Diabolus ad eam rem, The Devil offers his service for this, saith Calvin. And doth not the Scripture expressly testify as much? There came forth a Spirit and stood before the Lord, and said I will entice him; And the Lord said unto him, wherewith? And he said, I will go out and be a false Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets. Calvin goes on, Mittitur cum certo mandato, ut sit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum; God sends him with a certain command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all Ahab's Prophets. This also the Scripture testifies as expressly, as the former; Then the Lord said, thou shalt entice him and prevail also; Go forth and do so. Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Author might not as well calumniate the Holy Ghost the Inditer of this Scripture, as Calvin who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every sober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifestly appear, Excoecari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devil, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it; but this taken apart from the instance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might suspect his meaning were, that God commands a man to shut his own eyes, & blind himself. And judge I pray whether to say, that this whole providence of God concerning Ahab, was no more then permission, deserves not to be called, figmentum, a fiction, as indeed Calvin calleth it. To this he adds the joint profession of the Apostles touching God's providence in crucifying of Christ; in Absalom's incest, the Chaldees bloody execution in the land of Judah, and the Assyrians before them, which in Scripture is called the work of God &c. And concludes it to be manifest, Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentiae Dei nudam permissionem substituunt, that they do but toy and trifle, who in place of God's providence substitute a naked permission. And this Author doth but calumniate Calvin's expression, in rendering the word ineptire, by playing the fool. Ineptire in the propriety thereof, is in this case to fail of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not justly tax those who understand such Scriptures, as speak of God's smiting men with the Spirit of slumber and giddiness, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts of a permission, and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened? I had thought common sense might have justified him in this; taking Calvin aright, who denies not permission in all this, but nudam permissionem, naked permission; as much as to say these Scripture passages do signify more then permission; And as I have said before Bellarmine himself doth not satisfy himself with a naked permission in such like providence divine as here is mentioned. I think he may justly say that to explicate excecation and obduration by permission is such an explication as will satisfy no sober man, and that such a solution is too frivolous. And as for God's prescience, it is apparent that the horrible outrages committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture testifies not to have been foreknowen only by God, but by the hand and counsel of God predetermined also; & more then this, clear reason doth justify that the ground of God's foreknowing ought, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonstration.

2. Who mistakes the nature of permission most, we or this censurer, let the indifferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permission human, and permission Divine. Sure I am Suarez requires to permission divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more then that both Scotus of old without question, and the Dominicans of late, and Bradwardine before them maintain this concurrence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all these mistake the nature of permission, if we believe this Author upon his word wherein he carrieth himself very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reason for it, though with manifest contradiction to himself, but let us consider it.

1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom &c. Most untrue, and manifestly convictable of untruth by that which himself delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he said, It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sin; for otherwise there would be none. By this it is manifest that whensoever sin is committed, there had place God's permission of sin, otherwise there would have been no sin, therefore permission had place in the very first sin that was committed by man, and Angels. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to censure and correct the mistakes of others about permission. As Austin sometimes said of one opposing him, noverit se esse obduratum; so mayest thou not say of this Author in this discourse of his, noverit se esse excaecatum, let him take notice how himself is blinded? The Lord giving Israel up to their own hearts lusts; he like a resolute Doctor will have to proceed by way of mere permission. Yet the Lord saith not, he permitted them to their own lusts; and Rom: 1. 24, 26, 28. Observe, first look what he permitted came to pass throughout, even to abominable courses. Secondly, observe, the judgment of God is noted herein. They received the recompense of their own error as was meet. What? And are God's judgments executed only by God's permission, and that by the hands of them that are judged and punished? Such is the accuratenes of this Authors divinity coming to correct the mistakes of others about permission. And for the proof of all this we have this Author's bare word without any reason or authority represented by him. As for that of Ezekiel not chap: 18. 39, but chap: 20. 39 Go and serve everyone his Idels; this hath the form of a command, rather then of a permission; but the Lord hereby signifies, that in serving him, while they serve other God's, they do but profane his holy name in serving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, then the heathens who served not him at all, but other God's only. So that the Lord seems to signify, that he had rather, they should not serve him at all, as Revelations 3. I would thou wer'st either hot or cold, but seeing thou art luke-warm, I will spew thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Author would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former disobedience was it not a consequent of God's permission? For if God had not permitted their disobedience, surely it had not been by the Authors discourse in the beginning of this Section. As touching that Revelations 22. 11. I hope by the same rule of this positive Theologue, not only their continuing to be unjust, was by God's permission, but their first being and beginning to be unjust was by God's permission also. And surely if this man's word be of any credit, all sinners were first permitted to sin, otherwise they had never sinned, and not the obstinate and willful only. Were not the Angels innocent before their first sin? was not Adam innocent before his first sin? and did not God permit both Angels and men to sin their first sin? If not; what truth is in this author's word, when he said, God hath decreed to suffer sin? for otherwise there would be none. And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is cracked, and deserves not to be believed in ought.

2. We have been more beholding unto this Author, since he came to meet with our distinctions, then throughout all his former discourse; as I have shown already in part, & shall discover more by God's help (not his permission only) ere we part from this. He seems to be conscious of something and fearful of giving too much advantage, as appears by his expressiō, when he saith that permission (of sin; for so he should say) supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning. Now this is nothing congruous to his former expressions whereby it was made to suppose that, a man is able to stand. For to be able to stand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to stand; but to have a possibility of standing, or not sinning is not so. For though a man hath no power in himself to stand or to abstain from sin, yet if there be a power in God to makehim stand, and to preserve him from falling, this is sufficient to make good, that a man hath a possibility of standing and abstaining from sin. And we are willing to confess that God is able not only to preserve any man that stands from falling, but also to raise any man that is fallen; and to make him stand. Thus Florus, Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo propriâ voluntate inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo possit assurgere ad bonum; Ut autem assurgat ad bonum, non est propriae virtutis, sed gratiae Dei miserantis. Nam & qui mortuus est dici potest posse vivere, non tamen suâ virtute, sed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen suâ virtute, sed gratiâ miserantis Dei. Et ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinsecus admonente, & Deo intus suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant. After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evil, he hath free will whereby he may arise unto that which is good; but to arise unto Good is not of his own power, but of God's grace commiserating. For of him also who is dead, it may be said, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by 'its own power, but by the grace of God showing mercy. And therefore all men are admonished, the word is preached unto all, because this they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admonishing outwardly, and God stirring them up inwardly, they which hear may be revived. Observe by the way a manifest incongruity in saying that permission is a not hindering them from falling, who are able to stand For they who are permitted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are supposed to stand, and not only to be able to stand. It seems this Author cannot endure that Permission of sin, should consist in the withholding of a grace needful, to abstain from sin. Whence it followeth evidently that in this Author's opinion, either God's permission of sin is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of such a grace, without which nevertheless man may keep himself from sin; and consequently, though such a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to sin, as well as to abstain from sin; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it follows that like as when a man sins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abstains from sin, it is not by virtue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells King Abimelech expressly I kept thee from sinning against me. If he pretends that some grace is withheld whensoever a man sinneth, but will not say that is was necessary for the avoiding of sin it followeth that when man is permitted to sin, he is no more apt to sin, then while such grace was denied him, and consequently no more apt to abstain from sin when such a grace is granted him, and consequently in granting such a grace he permits him still to sin, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to do good, as much as in granting it; So that still it is not God that keepeth a man from sin, as often as he abstaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Author as well denies, that God is the Author of any good, as that he is the Author of any evil: But man is Author of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be denied, but that the power of doing evil is from God. He will grant likewise that God is ready to concur to any good act if man will, and I presume he will not deny, but that God concurs also to the substance of every evil act. The only difference that remains is this; God persuades only to good, and dissuades only that which is evil. Now this third and last assertion we grant as well as he. Yet he lays to our charge that we make God the Author of evil, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Author of any good in the actions of men, and makes no place for any grace save such, as is hortatory, which is performed usually by the ministry of men. Yet consider what Bradwardine sometimes Arch-Bishop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind before Luther or Calvin were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his second book is this. That free will being tempted cannot of his own strength without the help of God and his grace overcome any temptation. Of the first this, that free will strengthened with what created grace soever cannot without another special succor of God overcome any temptation. of the sixth this, that, That special succor of God is the unconquerable grace of God. Of the seventh this; That no man though not tempted, can by the strength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great soever it be, without the special assistance of God avoid any sin: & all these propositions he demonstrates with variety of argument. Behold the ingenuity of this Author; He flies in the face of Calvin and Beza, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unless God by his grace keep and preserve a man effectually from sinning, it cannot be that he should abstain from sin. Bradwardine maintained the same before any of these were borne yet he saith nothing to him, lets all his arguments alone; but upbraides us for maintaining the same doctrine, without giving any reason to convict us of our error. Add to this, which I have omitted, the Corolary of that seventh chapter in Bradwardine formerly mentioned is this, That it is the will of God, which preserves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from sin. Not one of the arguments whereby he confirms any of these positions, doth this Author go about to answer. In like manner Alvarez. Positâ permissione divinâ infallibiliter peccat homo; upon supposition of God's permission, man sins infallibly. The proposition he intends to prove in that disputation is this, Therefore a man is not converted because he is not aided of God.