The Riches of Gods Love
This Author grants Remigius to be a Patron of absolute reprobation: But these words of his, this Author saith, cannot stand with absolute Reprobation: Remigius undoubtedly thought they could; otherwise he must have renounced the Doctrine of absolute reprobation and the Patronage thereof, which yet he did not; as this Author acknoledgeth: Now is it enough for this Author, to say that these words cannot stand with absolute Reprobation and barely to say it, without proving ought? and truly I have found such to be the imperious carriage of this Author in manuscript, now I see it in print; But let us endeavor to clear Remigius, by proving the Contrary: endeavor to clear Remigius, by proving the contrary. Therefore it is well known that the Terme absolute stand's in opposition to Conditional. Now this distinction of will absolute and will Conditional Gerardus Vossius doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God, and gives instance of God's will of saving, which he saith is conditional: forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any, but such as believe, faith being by God's ordinance the Condition of obtaining Salvation. In like sort Doctor Jackson in his book of Providence acknowledgeth the distinction of voluntas antecedens, and consequence is to be understood not on the part of God willing, but on the part of things willed: Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation, are two, contrary to things willed in Election: For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace, and the conferring of salvation; soe in Reprobation God doth will the denial of grace and inflicting of damnation: Now Remigius in the passages here produced, speaks altogether of God's will to inflict damnation, and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on any man absolutely, but only conditionally (to wit) in case of final perseverance in sin, and so say we with Remigius: But as touching God's will to deny grace, we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition, for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof, but sin either original or actual. And if upon such a condition grace should be denied, it should be denied to all seeing before grace is given, all are found to be under sin actual or original, and consequently all should be Reprobates, even every mothers son. 2. And if to avoid this, it be said: although all be sinners, yet grace is denied to none, but such as want a certain particular obedience; Then upon the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred; this is as much as to say that Grace is conferred according unto works; which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians. Now the Apostle clearly makes for us in this, professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now though there passages produced out of Remigius carry some show against absolute reprobation from glory, or unto damnation; yet have they no color or show of opposing absolute reprobation from grace; As for necessity of perishing, that is merely conditional (to wit) in case of final continuance in sin without repentance; And as for necessity of sinning, that we confess is found in all, in state of nature, Corvinus confesseth it to be the doctrine of Arminius that, all men naturally are cast upon a necessity of sinning. And Doctor Potter proposeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that, in a natural man there is no libertas a peccato, liberty from sinning; which yet is to be understood aright, not but that it is in his power to abstain from any particular sinful act; for no supernatural act is or can be sinful, every sinful act must needs be an act natural; and power either to do or to abstain from any natural Act, is not to be denied to any natural man. But it is impossible that any natural man should abstain from any sin, or do any natural good act (so commonly accounted) in a gracious manner, until grace comes, so to season the heart of man as to love God, even to the contempt of himself, and out of his love to do that good which he doth, and to abstain from that evil, from which he abstaineth. 2. But if the question be of the manner how this necessity of sinning is brought upon the nature of man; we say, it is not by the pleasure of God: But by the sin of Adam, according to that of the Apostle, Rom: 5. By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: for man by reason of sin was justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and begetting children in this Condition, he begets them after his own Image and likeness, that is bereaved of the Spirit of God. And we hold it impossible for a man bereaved of God's Spirit, either to do that which is good, or abstain from doing that which is evil in a gracious manner.
2. Secondly, I come to the Synod of Valense, when they say, the wicked not perish because they could not do good, but because they would not. These words may seem to imply that even the wicked could do good if they would; and truly I see no cause to deny this: But that we may safely say with Augustine; that, omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere, si velint: Believe God if they will, and from the love of all things temporal convert themselves to the keeping of God's Commandments if they will; for if a man would go to Church but cannot, because he is lame, would read in God's word, but cannot, because he is blind: These impotencies are natural not moral: but the impotency brought upon mankind by the sin of Adam is moral not natural. Now moral impotency is found no where but in the will, or at least is chiefly there, and secondly in the understanding also, as touching knowledge practical; and accordingly when Scriptures testify that they who are in the flesh cannot please God, Rom: 8: cannot repent, Rom: 24: cannot believe John: 12. This impotency consist's chiefly in the corruption of their wills, noted by the hardness of heart, Rom: 2. 4. Eph: 4. 18. Again I have already shown out of Remigius, that a wicked man can do that which is good, but by what means? (to wit) by grace, not otherwise. The words are these; Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero been uti potest arbitrio esset Catholicus; had he said generally, not any man can use his free will without grace, he were Catholic. And pag. 36: the same Remigius hath these words, In infidelibus ipsum liberum arbitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest; free will so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead works, in living works it cannot: Yet pag. 174: thus he distinguisheth, answerably to the passage alleged by this Author. De reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimamus, non quia non possunt homines de malo ad bonum commutari, ac de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in melius mutari noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus us{que} ad finem perseverare voluerunt. And pag. 143. Florus of the Church of Lions where Remigius was Bishop, sets down the same truth more at large, thus, Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo voluntate propria inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium, quo potest assurgere ad bonum, ut autem assurgat ad bonum non est propriae virtutis sed gratiae Dei miserantis; Nam & qui mortuus est, potest dici posse vivere, non tamen sua virtute, sed Dei, Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen sua virtute sed gratia miserantis Dei, & ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum: ut verbo extrinsecus admonente & intus Deo suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant: Man hath after that damnation (to wit) such as followed after Adam's fall) free will, so that of his own will he can be inclined and is inclined to evil, he hath free will whereby he may rise unto a good condition: but that he doth arise to that good condition, is not in his own power; but of the grace of God compassionating him; for of him also who is dead, it may be said that he may live, yet not by his own power but by the power of God. Soe man's free will also being once wounded, once dead may be restored, not by his own power, but by God's grace pitying him and therefore all men are admonished, to all the word is preached, because they have this that they may believe, they may be converted unto God, that by the word outwardly admonishing & God inwardly raising, they which hear may revive. As touching the last, condemning those who say that any should be so predestinated to evil by God, that they cannot be otherwise, this Author would fain insinuate into his Reader an opinion; That wicked men may change from evil to good of themselves; But neither doth the Council of Valens, or Remigius a chief man therein, intimate any such thing; But only that it is in God's power by his grace to change them, and so hath changed and will change the hearts of many, namely of all his Elect, but not of one other.
That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of, among the common people, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of, among'st the Judicious and Learned, who as the threshing Oxen who are to beat the corn out of the Huske, are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures. That the doctrine which is loath to abide the trial even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falsehood, the heathen Orator shall witness for me; who to Epicurus seeing that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people; who might happily take offense at that, answereth thus. Declare thy opinion in the place of Judgment, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare that in the Senate amongst those grave and judicious Persons. Thou wilt never do it, and why? but because it is a fowl and dishonest opinion. True religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing guilded over but gold it self: the more it is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and so is the truth. Vives de Verbo sidei, lib. 1. pag. 16. Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can; let us not fear therefore (saith he) lest our faith when it is laid open appear filthy to the beholders. Id ib: Let fa se and superstitious religions in which there is no soundness be afraid of this.
The Jew is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law: And the Turk is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their religions are brittle like glasie broken with the least touch, Vives lib. 4. pag. 479. But the Christian who is confident of the goodness of his faith feareth no examination; but rather as much as may be, solliciteth and provoketh his adversary to the Cumbate. Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best when it is uncovered.
Of the five considerations proposed in this discourse, as it was first penned and transmitted to a friend, the fifth is changed and in the place thereof this incerted, and it concerns the third instance given of the Synodical Divines in the Synod of Dort. Now it is already shown in the answer to the former discourse how immodestly the Author carrieth himself, in charging that Synod with unwillingness to come to the trial, who justified their proceedings in the judgment of all the foreign Divines there present, for whereas the Remonstrants did once and again profess that they could not in conscience any longer stay in the Synod, unless it were provided for, that they might treat of Election and reprobation. And that after that manner which they had set down in their Theses and writings exhibited to the Synod; hereupon the Sinod to give them satisfaction herein ordered, that their opinion not only concerning Election, but also concerning reprobation should be weighed and examined: soe far forth as they in conscience should judge to be sufficient, for the glory of God, for the edifying and quieting of the Church and all men's consciences; but as touching the manner of proceeding herein, it pertained to them to consider and ordain as they thought good. And it became not those who where cited to appear, to prescribe unto the Sinod. This decree being read the 40 session contains the altercation here abouts, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod, de modo agendi; The Synod must not unto them.
The Synod hereupon entreats the judgment of foreign divines. And they all with one consent profess that the Synod had granted the Remonstrants as much liberty for the defense of their cause, as in Equity could be granted and could well stand with the honor of the Synod. And therefore there is no cause why the decree of the Synod should be altered, or why the Remonstrants should complain or decline the Authority of the Synod; that nothing was put upon them burden some to their consciences: And therefore it was in vain to pretend scruples of Conscience, as in the Session 42 there is a representation made of their unreasonable demand; namely in the first place to deal upon reprobation &c: whereupon the opinion of foreign divines was required; as whether it was fit to yield unto them in this, and to treat of reprobation before they treated of Election, who declared by concurring suffrages that course (proposed by them) to be most unreasonable: now let the reader judge how unshamefast that crimination is, which this Author chargeth that Synod with, and consequently all the the foreign divines therein assembled, who justified those Synodical proceedings with their unanimous consent. Surely this Author hath an high opinion of himself, and his own sufficiencies, who thinks this Bolt of his soon shot, more worth then the concurrent verdict of all those divines, Chosen as eminent persons by their several Churches, and sentunto that Sinod from many places of Christendom. Now he who in the progress of his unshamefast discourse, spares not thus to Tax a Synod and all the foreign Divines that assembled therein, no mervell if he forbear not to charge the Contra Remonstrants in the Hague conference with the same Crimination, though never so injuriously; Thus indeed the Remonstrants in the Synod of Dort, Criminate their adversaries as appears in the Synodalia Dodcacena pag: 136. In the conference at Hague the Contra-Remonstrants deprecated that they might not be put to deal on Reprobation, and more at large pag: 159. in the same writings; We read how Festus Hommius one of the Contra-Remonstrants in that conference at the Hague, hereupon stood up, Exposuitque paucis quod non bona fide haec de illis dicerentur, how unfaithfully this relation was made, se libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos ne de reprobatione ageretur; That they did not in their supplication entreat that no disputation should be had of reprobation▪ and therewithal the truth of the matter as formerly I have set down in answer to the former discourse, and as for Beza in the conferrence with Jacobus Andreas in the point of predestination: It is true at the first motion he declyned it, and he gives his reasons, 1. namely that thy were not called by the prince of Mompelgard to dispute on this Article but on another which was expressed in the princes letters, as Jacobus Andreas acknowledgeth: 2 and accordingly they had Commission from their Church that sent them, to dispute on that whereunto they were called and not on any other. 3. and soe they came provided to dispute on that which was expressed in the Princes letters who invited them. 4. Then again it was in a Lutheran assembly. 5. neither would Andeas yield to Beza's motions that the conference might be transacted by writing. 6. nor that which was to be delivered by them should be taken by notaries. 7. Yet they offered to propose their doctrine on that Argument before the Prince, and to hear what Jacobus Andreas had to say against it and promised to return him an answer thereunto; Thirdly, consider it was not predestination alone, whereof they were unwilling at that time and in that place to confer about, But two other Articles also, namely as concerning Baptism, and Images in Churches; why then, doth not this Author plead as well for Images in Churches, as for the conditional nature of reprobation: as well he may upon the same ground? Fourthly, what sottishness possesseth this Author to conclude, that because Beza at such a time, and in such a place, and upon such and such terms, did refuse to dispute thereon; Therefore all that profess the same doctrine with Beza do refuse to come to trial there abouts, and consequently that doctrine is suspectable of untruth; whereas it cannot be concluded of Beza simply that he refused to come to a trial, because once at a certain time and in a certain place, and in a conference upon certain terms he did refuse to come to a trial: For my part, I refuse not to come to a trial with any of them upon any particular: But I no way think fit to entertain a conferrence here about by words of mouth, but rather by writing; so it will be more quietly carried, so it will be more free from aliene discourse; so each party shall have time both duly to weigh the Adversaries Argument and with due consideration to put in his answer thereunto; And is it not far more decent that the holy things of God should be handled premeditately, rather then subitaneously? Fistly, what if Beza were of opinion that God hath chosen some unto eternal life, and passed by others without any respect had to the personal goodness of the one, or naughtiness of the other, and that this is Saint Paul's doctrine, Rom: 9. This was Saint Austin's opinion also as Vossius acknowledgeth in his history of Pelagian heresies p. 655. Now will any man think him well in his wits who discourseth after this manner; surely Austin's doctrine concerning election and reprobation is suspectable of untruth; Because Beza maintaining the same doctrine some 1200 years after, was unwilling to come to a trial thereabouts at a certain time in a certain place, namely at Mompelgard before the Duke of Wirtenberg? Lastly, observe the strange inconsiderations of this Author; for the Author of the former discourse promised the Gentleman his friend to whom he wrote, to give him the reason of his change in opinion, not in this point only of reprobation, but in the other points also, for he perceived he was become an Arminian: Now whereas he gives him the reason of his change in one point only, declining all the rest, doth he not manifest his unwillingness to deal on all the other 4 points? And may not we conclude after this Authors manner, that this betrays no small suspicion, that certainly his cause is weak and ill grounded in all the rest? In like manner doth this Achates carry himself, he that helps of the other to make his task for him. It is his usual course to deal only upon the point of reprobation, as in this place; so in a writing of his to a certain Scholar, and as I have seen under his hand; It seems he is well conceited of his sufficiency on this point: And truly I am very glad to see what he can say for himself, even on the point of reprobation That which follows is to little purpose, save to show the plerofphorie of his common place-book: and how easily it is for him to abound, not only in things necessary, but in things unnecessary also: Therefore he tells us what Cicero writes of Epicurus, which may with a far better grace be retorted upon himself then upon Beza, or the Contra-Remonstrants at the Hague conferrence; or the Fathers of Dort, how unfacetiously it is applied unto them I have already shown, and further it is well known both by Calvin's, and Beza's writings, and by that which was done in the Synod of Dort, set forth to the veiwe of all the world, that they have not concealed their opinions from the world on those points controverted; All that are able to read and understand Latin, may soon come accquainted with them: And M. Hord dealing only upon reprobation which is but a part of one of the five Articles, and forbearing to meddle with Election or any other of the five, contrary to the promise made by him unto his friend, doth he not hereby bewray consciousness of his own insufficiency to meddle thereon? And like enough he hath learned this wisdom from his Abettor (and this is his course) who loves to deal in hugger mugger, and sets others on work, contented to blow the coals; yet walks gloriously at the light of his own fire, and the sparks that he hath kindled, vaunting (as I hear) that his piece cannot be answered, and in such terms he commends it unto the Country.
In like manner let the indifferent Reader judge, whether, that which he produceth out of Lodovicus Vives be more against us, then against the Author himself that produceth it; for both Calvin, and Beza and generally our Divines have publicly professed their opinions, not on predestination only, but on reprobation also, and upon all other points controverted between us and the Arminians; whereas this Auhour skulks and pulls in his horns as if he dared not to be seen on other points; only declares himself upon the point of reprobation; I mean M. Horde; but as for the other which blows quick-silver into him, he is loath to be known, as if his occupation were with Brontes{que} Steropes{que} & nudus membra Pyracmon, to take pains to make thunder-bolts for Jupiter, or for Mercury rather; for he is content another should be the chief speaker. 5ly. The Jew he saith, is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law, and the Turk is forbidden to speak of his Alcoran; But have I shown myself loath to reason with this Brontes, in any particular difference between us, or with any among'st them that wears a head upon his shoulders? I trust, I never shall, as long as I breath, As for this Author, the world is witness how deeply guilty he is in this kind, contrary to his own promise: But he may thank his prompter that he deals in this, and he indeed had made no such promise to to confine him, but out of his fox-like carriage, makes choice to deal only on this, where he hopes to meet with a favorable wind from vulgar and popular conceits, to to fill his fails to carry him prosperously into their affections, be his Arguments never so weak: never so insipid. Now it is well known unto him, that my answer to the former discourse hath now been in the the hands of others for the space of two years and a half, and not the smallest passage thereof do I find answered here. And this seconds conscience knoweth whether he hath not been full well acquainted with it, before this piece of his did see the light of the press: Now because this alone might justly prove notoriously prejudicial to the whole, see what a dog-trick hath been played, to antedate the edition thereof, as if it were printed Anno 1633, when it hath been but a few months since this hath been known unto the world, that the Reader may imagine if it please him, that this was printed before my answer was returned to the former discourse. And to what purpose is the discourse brought to the Bulk, which that hath at present, so many odd things being inserted thereunto; but to provide for their indemnity that shall say, This was never it answered, whereat I wounder not a little, namely at the cunning and crafty carriage of this second, who for good reason may be accounted the first, in as much as he useth the other but as a stalking-horse to promote his own game, I say I may, and do wounder not a little at this, for he both carrieth himself and others boast of him, as if he were some formidable Creature, and Lyon like to affright all others that should deal with him, when in very truth all his performances savor far more of the Fox then of the Lyon.
And it is also disstastfull to all the Greek Churches; Moulin in his Anotomy speaking of the Supralapsarian doctrine; saith, if it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sin, or hath ordained them to sin. Yet it is the part of a wise man to conceal these things, or not to know them rather then to utter them: because, when they are taught and defended they fill men's heads with sceuples, and give occasion to the adversaries to the defaming the true religion.
The same may as truly be said of the Sublapsarian way, for as I have said, they are in substance all one; And Sir Edwin Sandes is of the same mind too; for in his most excellent book called A survey of the State of Religion, in the western part of the world; speaking of the deadly division between the Luthernas and the Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words; that, though • he Palsgrave and Lansgrave have with great judgment and wisdom, to slake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the Charity and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwise; for both the Lutheran Preachers rail as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation; not forbearing to profess openly, that they will return to the Papacie rather then ever admit that Sacrementary and predestinary Pestilence. And as for the Grecians, we learn also by Sir Edwin Sandes his relation, that they do mightily dissent from the doctrines touching the eternal Counsels of God, which Calvin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and some of his friends and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodness of God, and directly immediately opposite to his very nature, In regard of which, on of their Bishops hath written a book against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there received.
And to say on thing more, besides this infamy among Christians, it is very probable that among the too many scandals given to the Jews by Christians among whom they dwell; This doctrine is not on of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they think it a bad opinion (saith the same judicious and learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreme misery of any of his Creatures, for the showing of his justice and severity in tormenting them, or that the calamity, casting a way and damnation of some, should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory then the felicity of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodness and happiness, and hath no affinity with rigor and misery.
And secondly the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means that preceeds the end, as if a man before determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sin else he could not be damned.
As touching this paticular of M. Moulyn: I have addressed an answer puctually thereunto in my Vindiciae amongst my degressions touching predestination, yet I am content to say something concerning the point it self and his judgment thereupon. Reprobation hath two parts, which this Author most judiciously confounds, the one is God's decree to deny grace, the other is his decree to inflict damnation; As touching the first, the very execution thereof proceeds merely according to God's pleasure, howmuch more the decree it self, which is eternal, and cannot possibly have any precedaneous thereunto; whereas the execution is temporal, and temporal things may have somewhat precedaneous thereunto. Now that the execution thereof is merely according to God's good pleasure is apparent; the execution thereof being no other then the denial of grace; And as God of his mere pleasure gives faith and repentance to whom he will; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others; otherwise grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine, Pelagius himself subscribing thereunto above 1200 years ago, and all along afterwards it was condemned in divers Synods gatherd together for suppressing of the Pelagian Heresy. Now did M. Moulin think it no wise part to publish this doctrine, That grace is not given according unto works; but according to the mere pleasure of God? Nothing less; Saint Paul plainly professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. Come we to reprobation as it signifies God's decree to inflict damnation without consideration of sin, our adversaries would fain shape our opinions thus, and none more eager this way, then this Author, I mean him that is thought to be the suggester at first, and since the Interpolator and Promotor of all this; But this is a most notorious untruth; nay how can we maintain this, who embrace the definition of reprobation given by Aquinas, where he saith, that repobation includes a will to permit sin, and to infer damnation for sin, so doth M. Perkins, and him have I justified against Arminius in my Vindiciae; And not any one of our Divines doth maintain that God intends to damn any man but for sin, and final perseverance therein without repentance. And the former point concerning the first act of reprobation, being granted, which neither Sir Edwin Sandes, nor any Lutheran that I know, denies; the doctrine concerning this latter act of reprobation will be found to contain no difficulty at all, forasmuch as we utterly deny that God either doth inflict, or ever did decree to inflict damnation according to his mere pleasure; but merely for final continuance in sin without repentance. Now let every sober Reader consider, whether there be any harshness in all this: But as M. Moulin discourseth here, so did the Massilienses of old concerning Austin's doctrine, as which they would not have at all broached, as appears in the Epistle of Prosper.— Yet I commend this Author for his ingenuous confession, that the same may be said of the Sublapsarian way. But to our prejudice he tells us that Sir Ed: Sandes is of the same mind, and therefore considering the excellency of the book, written by him, whereunto we may add the excellency of the discourse written by this Author; let us for the credit and transcendent sufficiency of these two, renounce not Calvin and Beza only, (poor Snakes as they were) but the whole Synod of Dort; and all the outlandish divines assembled there, and manifesting their concurrence in opinion with those Synodical Divines, yea and Fulke and Whitaker, and the University of Cambridge as they were then affected, when they drave Barret to a recantation; Yet Sir Edwin Sandes in the place produced, betrays not his own judgment, but makes relation of the bitterness of Lutherans in opposing Calvinists: In like manner both Jews and Gentiles did oppose Christians even unto blood, for preaching Christ crucified, which was a scandal to the one, foolishness unto the other. And shall the truth of Christianity be any whit the worse thought of for this? why then shall our Doctrine of predestination and reprobation be suspected as untrue, because the Lutheran party, do also bitterly oppose it? especially considering, that we with Augustine no otherwise maintain predestination then as it depends and is grounded upon this, that grace is not given according unto works, as Augustine professeth to have been his opinion, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 14. And we are ready to renounce whatsoever contradicteth this: and the Lutherans themselves profess concurrently with us, that grace is not given according unto works. And by the way observe the Lutheran spleen is exercised not only against the predestinary pestilence, (as they call it) but the Sacramentarie pestilence also. That is, against their doctrine who oppose their ubiquitie and consubstantiation, yet in the very next page the same Knight affirms, that all the Lutherans are not carried with the same stern humor, but they only who are called Lutherani rigidi, & that the greater part perhaps which are the molles Lutherani, are quiet enough, neither accompt they otherwise of the Calvinists, then as of erring brethren; whom the rigids have (as is said) threatened to excomunicate as Schismitiques and Heretics.— 3 The Grecians are said to oppose the doctrine of Calvin in the point of predestination; yet we know our English Divines subscribed unto the same Doctrine in the Synod of Dort; together with all the foreign Divines there assembled, and the sum thereof is but this, that God, both in the election of some, and preterition of others, had no respect to the personal goodness of the one, and personal naughtiness of the other. And that this was the very doctrine of Augustine, and of Saint Paul also in the opinion of Augustine, Vossius acknowledeth, and Augustine professeth that this doctrine herein is shaped merely according to the rule so generally received in the Church of God against Pelagians, that grace is not given according unto merits, de bono perseve: cap. 15.—4. Concerning the Jews, this doctrine of ours, this judicious (not Sir Edwin Sandes) thinks it probable that doth hinder their conversation: And indeed that learned Knight doth profess, that they are opposite to the doctrine here recited by this Author, and in the same sentence he professeth them in like manner opposite to our doctrine, in maintaining that the devil and his Angels shall be cast into everlasting fire; for thus goes Sir Edwin's relation, as they think it a bad opinion which some men seem to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute power should affect the extreme misery of any of his Creatures as here it lies, so contrary wise, they think with Origen, that Hell in the ende shall utterly be abolished; and that the devils themselves after a long course of bitter repentance, and punishment shall find mercy at his hands, that did create them: But as touching our difference from this in this particular; This Author doth not express ought so much as probable, to hinder their conversion; as touching the former he hath; for that served his turn, this doth not, and his wit and wisdom being so nere of kin, no marvel if he makes the one to perform service of love to the other But let me say something concerning the opinion it self here related, as in the first place; That God doth not effect the extreme misery of his creatures in his absolute pleasure, what is the doctrine opposite hereunto but this, namely that God decrees to damn no man but for sin, and not according to his absolute pleasure? Now what one of our Divines was ever known to contradict this; and to affirm that God intends to damn many of his creatures not for their sins, but of his own absolute pleasure? for my part I never read any that maintained this: But we generally say that God in electing some and passing by others, as touching the conferring of grace, proceeded and decreed, and that from everlasting to proceed, not according to men's works, but according to his absolute pleasure; now this was Austin's judgment as well as ours; and Saint Paul's too, in the opinion of Augustine, as Vossius acknowledgeth in the place formerly cited. And Saint Paul speaks plainly, when he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, and as plainly in saying, That, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, that election might stand not of works but of him that calleth, it is said that the elder shall serve the younger, As it is written Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, Rom: 9. 11, 12. And I durst appeal to every sober man's consciencewhether one of these Jews in reading this would not as redily condemn Saint Paul himself, as they condemn us: As for the other part of the doctrine here proposed, namely that the damnation of some should redound more to God's glory, then the felicity of them all. I answer that it is as clear as the light, that the glory of God in the way of vindicative justice had not at all appeared, if all had been saved, no nor the riches of his glory upon the Vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, if God had not suffered with long patience some vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, if we believe Saint Paul Rom: 9 22, 23: rather then the Jews: and it is apparent that the Lord God, who made allthings for himself, took this course, namely, to make even the wicked against the day of evil, and accordingly as to show mercy on whom he will, so to harden whom he will, also Rom: 9. 18: otherwise as I have often said, grace should be conferred according to merits, that is according unto works, which is expressly contradictory both to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit. 3. 5. And to the decrees of Synods and Councils, all along against the Pelagians. • 5. I willingly grant that the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means, that not only precede but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sin is the means of damnation, we say rather that permission of sin is the means, whence notwithstanding it follows, not that sin shall come to pass unavoidably, but rather avoidably; whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinful act is a natural thing, and undoubtetdly man hath free will as to do, so to abstain from doing any particular Act: and albeit God hath determined that these particular sinful Acts (instance the particular outrages committed against the holy Son of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, Acts 5. 28.) shall come to pass by his permission; yet seeing withal he hath ordained thē to come to pass contingently that follows that they shall come to pass in such a manner, as joined with a possibility of not cōing to pass, otherwise they should come to pass, not contingently, but necessarily. But it is grown to be this Authors natural genius miserably to overreach; while he keeps himself to his own forms inshaping the opinion of his adversaries, impatient to be beaten out of them and to have his veteres avias à pulmone repelli, oldgrandmothers vain conceits to be pulled out of Lastly this Author shapeth us to make damnation an end intended by God, which we conceive to be a very shallow project; we know nothing but God's own glory that can be this end: And therefore even there where Solomon professeth that God made the wicked against the day of Evil: herewithal acknowledgeth that God made all things forhimselfe.
At length we have gotten clear aboard to come acquainted with this Authors full discourse, and not by patches, as hitherto we have done. For here he promiseth to acquaint us with the reasons that have convinced him of the untruth of absolute Reprobation as it is carried the upper way and like a Martialist, a man at arms, he tells us they fight against it, and thus the interpolator discourseth.
The first part of the first Argument against the supralapsarians.
sect: 1.
They are drawn ab incommodo from the greater evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two main heads. 1 The dishonor of God. 2 The overthrow of religion and government.
It dishououreth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, (no ways agreeable to his nature.) 1 Men's Eternal torments in Hell. 2 Their sins on Earth.
First It chargeth him with Men's eternal torments in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principal, 2nd invincible cause of the damnation of Millions of miserable souls: The prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his own voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the Principal and invincible cause, because it maketh the Damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable thorough God's absolute and uncontrollable decree; and soe necessary that they can no more escape it then poor Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him down from the Tower of Troy.
Now this is an neavy charge, contrary to scripture, God's nature, and sound Reason. 1 To Scripture, which makes man the Principal, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruin. Thy destruction is of thyself ô Israel, but in me is thine help. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked &c. Turn ye, turn ye, why will ye die He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the Children of men. To which speech for likeneile sake I will join one of Prospers. God's predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling. 2 It is contrary to God's nature, who sets forth himself to be a God merciful, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodness &c. And he is acknowledged to be soe by King David. Thou Lord art good and merciful, and of great Kindnesse to all them that call upon thee: And by the Prophets Joel, Jonah, and Michah. He is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great Kindnesse. And who saith Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity &c. He retaineth not his wrath forever because mercy pleaseth him.
3 'It is contrary also to sound reason, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extreme cruelty and consequently remove it from the father of mercies. We cannot in reason think that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himself to marry and beget Children, that after they be borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear thir flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones, with burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by thus torturing them he may show what his Authority and power is over them. Much less can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so far forget himself as out of his absolute pleasure to ordain such infinite multitudes of his Children, made after his own image, to everlasting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to show his power and sovereignty over them. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked, temporally, be such a piece of injustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an Absit, wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be far from thee O Lord. shall not the judge of all the world do right? How deeply (may we think) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent souls eternally in hell fire.
Here this Author carrieth himself like another Ptolomeus Ceraunus; or as if he had some chief place in the lightning legion, not by his prayers, but by his discourse, he seems to thunder and to lighten all along. When the Lord appeared to Elias, he was neither in the mighty wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in the still and soft voice. I hope to prove all this to be but Ignis fatuus; Mountebancks use to make great ostentation and crackes, but commonly they end in mere impostures, and it is no hing strange, when men opposing the grace of God, loose their own wits, and please themselves in the confusion of their own senses. For when men are in love with their own errors, they hate the light; yea the very light of nature in the distinct notice of it, would be an offense unto them. Can this Author be ignorant of that which every mean Sophister knows, that there be four kinds of causes, Material, Formal, Efficient, Final; that he should expatiate thus in speaking of a cause without all distinction? Is it strange that God should be a prime cause, and principal in execution of vengeance? Doth he not profess saying vengeance is mine, and I will repay? Is he not called the God to whom vengeance belongeth? And are not his magistrates his Ministers to execute vengeance temporal here in this world? And can any sober man dout whether God be invincible whom the Apostle pronounceth to be irresistable? Again an efficient cause admits farther distinction; for it is either Physical or Moral: Physical is that which really works or executes anything: as every tradesman hath his work, which his hands do make; so God hath his work, which he executes, and his work is judgment as well as mercy. I am the Lord which show mercy and judgment and righteousness; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord; and he would have us when we do glory, glory in this, that we do understand and know him to be such a God. A Moral efficient is twofold, being only of a moving nature, to move others to do somewhat; as namely either by persuading, or by meriting or deserving: He that persuades
Well let us proceed to observe how well he performs what he undertakes. And here he saith. 1. That the Scripture makes man the principal, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruin. We answer, the Scripture makes man the only cause of his own ruin in the meritorious cause; thus man's destruction is of himself; But this nothing hinders God from being the cause why vengeance, destruction and damnation are executed upon man; for he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, & he delights as well in showing judgment, as in showing mercy. Indeed did we maintain that God damns the Reprobate whether man or Angels of his mere pleasure, this Argument of his were seasonable. We know full well that God of his free grace shows mercy; but judgment only upon provocation, and herein he proceeds slowly too; for he is slow to wrath, and easy to be entreated. Yet God's afflicting is not always for sin; neither doth it always proceed in the way of punishment: when we suffer for Christ we have cause to rejoice that he counts us worthy to suffer for his name; neither were the afflictions of Job brought upon him for his sins, but for the trial of his faith, and to make him an example of patience to all succeeding generations; and as for that of Ezech: I will not the death of the wicked; It is the usual course of men of this Authors spirit thus to render the words, whereas our last English translation renders them thus, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked. Now as a man may will that wherein he takes no pleasure; as a sick-man takes a bitter potion sometimes for the recovery of his health; so God may will that wherein he takes no delight. And whether it be meant of first or second death it cannot be denied but God wills it; for he works all things according to the council of his own will. Then again if we consider the infliction of death as an execution of judgment, God not only willeth this, but delights therein also, as it is expressed. That of Prosper is nothing to the present purpose, we treating here of the cause of damnation, not of sinning; we say God is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, not to whom sin belongeth. Besides sin, as sin, hath no efficient cause at all, but defficient, as Augustine hath delivered many hundred years ago. It is true, it is in God's power to preserve any man from any sin; it is in his power to take any man off from any sinful course by repentance, if he will; but he is bound to none, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and in all this he is not culpable.
In the next place he tells us; It is contrary to God's nature but what? To damn men for their sins neverbroken offby repentance? for all our divines maintain that God is Author of damnation to none but such; and to such God is not merciful nor gracious, nor suffers them any longer, nor shows any goodness towards them; while they lived he did; yea much long suffering and patience, inviting them thereby to repentance; yea and by his; word also inviting many; but after they die in sin, therewithal an end is set to the dispensation of God's gracious proceedings with them. Much less do we deny him to be good and merciful and of great kindness to all that call upon him. For God's mercy doth not exercise it self by necessity of nature, but by freedom of will; yet he heareth the cry of Ravens and not a Sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly father, and the very Lions roaring after thir prey, do seek their meat at the hands of God: These mercies are temporal; but as for spiritual mercies, for the working and cherishing of Sanctification these are not extended unto all, but to some only, even to whom he will. And accordingly the elect of God are called vessels of mercy. Yet to the execution of damnation on any he proceeds not till after death, and stays no longer; so slow to wrath he is towards the worst, and no more slow to the best of them. Who is a God like unto thee, saith Micah, that taketh away iniquity? here this Author out of wisdom maketh a stop, leaving out that which followeth and passing by the transgressions of the remnant of his heretage: That restriction belike he did not so well brook; but having leapt over that; he is content to take in that which followeth, he retaineth not his wrath forever, because mercy pleaseth him: to wit, towards the remnant of his heritage, of his people. But I hope naught of this can hinder God from being the Author of damnation to all that die in sin without repentance without any prejudice to his holiness, though he retaineth wrath forever against them.
We come to his reason which he calls sound, saying that it cannot but argue such a decree of extreme cruelty. But what decree? of that whereby he hath decreed to damn all that continue in sin without repentance? For to none other hath God decreed damnation in the opinion of any of our divines. But that which he commends as sound let us examine. We cannot in reason think, saith he, that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature as to resolve with himself to marry & beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by thus torturing them, he may show what his authority and power is over thē. Much less can we believe that God should ordain infinite multitudes of his Children to everlasting fire. Is it credible that this Author himself doth not believe that very doctrine which here he impugneth Doth he not believe that God hath ordained infinite multitudes of those whō he calls God's Childrē to everlasting fire? doth he not I say believe this as well as we? Doth he not believe that whosoever dieth in sin without repentance shall be damned? doth he not believe that God of his mere pleasure hath made such a decree? It is increedible he should not be of the same faith in this. Are not all God's ordinances made of his mere pleasure? could he not both ordain and execute the annihilation of sinners if it pleased him? and that either immediately upon the committing of sin, or after some certain years enduring the punishment of hell fire. And as for hell fire it self, could not he qualify or increase the tormenting nature thereof as he should think good? All this I nothing doubt but he believes, unless with Origen and the Jews, he be of opinion that the fire provided for the devil and his angels is not everlasting: what madness then, what phrensy possesseth him so to dispute against us, as to dispute against himsefe? Vndoubtedly this Author would have his Reader so propitious unto him, as to understand and interpret him beyond that which his own words do import; as namely thus, That God hath not only of his absolute pleasure made such an ordinance, that all who die in sin without repentance shall be damned; but rather thus; That God hath ordained that Infinite multitudes of his children shall be damned, not for their own sins, but only out of his absolute pleasure. For this is generally the unshamefast carriage of men of this Authors spirit. Now what one divine of ours can he show to have maintained this? Yet this is the imputation he chargeth upon us, that by our doctrine God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soul, eternally in hell fire. Yet this is a very Amphibologious expression. For when were they innocent in his meaning? when they were damned? If this be in his meaning, can he name any divine of ours that affirms this? Or doth he mean they were innocent when God entertaind this resolution? And doth not he as well as we maintain that there was a time, when Angels were innocent though afterwards they became devils; yet both then and from all eternity God had entertained such a resolution; For his decrees were everlasting as we say; neither hath he hitherto manifested his opinion to the contrary; whether he maintaineth such an opinion secretly in his breast, I know not; If he doth, and shames to declare it let him pull himself by the nose; in the passages he produceth out of Cicero concerning Epicurus, and out of Virus concerning such like pag: 9. Yet we do not say they were innocent when God made his decree of Reprobation. I should show myself an Ignoramus to say so, We say they were neither innocent nor nocent then, forasmuch as till the Creation no Creature had any being but God's decree of Election (and consequently of Reprobation also) had its being before the foundation of the world. 2 This manner of reasoning which this Author calleth sound, I have found long a go in Castalio, as superficiary a Divine as ever put pen to paper. And by the way observe, all the Devils and Damned men he calls God's Children: this is the language of their Court. Now what one Divine of ours maintains that any of God's children are destinated to eternal fires? S. Paul tells us We are all the sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus: and because we are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his son into our hearts crying Abba Father; And that as many as are led by the spirit of God. And if we are children we are also heirs, even the heirs of God. and heirs annexed with Christ. And this distinction to wit the children of God, and children of the Devil, hath been ever since the fall of man, as S. John signifieth where he saith. In this are the children of God known, and the children of the Devil, whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother. And anon after he giveth instance in Cain and Abel. Yea & our Savior gives us to understand the same, where he saith to the Jews, Ye are of your father, the Devil, and the lusts of the father ye will do. And whereas we read that in the days of Enoch men began to call upon the name of the Lord; forthwith we read c. 6. 2. (For the 5. chap. coming in between contains only the Genealogy of the world from Adam) of the distinction between the sons of God and daughters of men, thus, the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and they took, them wives of that they liked. It it is true, Adam is called the son of God in reference to creation; And no marvel; For he was created in the state of grace: so likewise the Angels for the same reason. When the stars of the morning praised them, and all the Children of God rejoiced. It is true we thus read, Have we not all one father? hath not one God made us? Piscator interprets these two interrogatories into one: As if God in the first place were represented as a common father unto all; but our Geneva Divines do not, but the name of father in this place they refer to Abraham. And in not referring it unto God they have the consent of the Jewish Rabbin's Ibn Ezra and David Kimhi; who yet more hansomly do refer it to their common father Jacob, then to Abraham, the Covenant of God including all the Sons of Jacob; not so all the Sons of Abraham, no nor the Sons of Isaac but Jacob only. 3. Consider is it decent to conform the courses of God with the courses of men? May not we consider in like manner against the Lord's foreknowledge, as well as against his decree, & reason thus: what man of common humanity would resolve with himself to marry and beget children, did he foresee their wicked courses, and what will become of them for it, namely, to be condemned to everlasting fire with the Devil and his Angels? what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked ways and ungodly courses of all Reprobates, that they would continue in them and die in their sins without all faith in Christ and true repentance towards God? And if he did foresee what would be the ends of them in case he did create them and bring them forth into the world, yet seeing he would nevertheless create them and bring them forth into the world, one after another in their several times and ages, shall we brand the holy name of God, and reproach him for unnaturallnesse, and barbarous cruelty? Rather I will say what means this Auhour so unconscionably to corrupt the state of the question, by mentioning only the shortness of their life, and utterly concealing the wickedness of their life, the only meritorious cause of their torments which they suffer, and accordingly to shape the ends intended by God, to be only the demonstration of his power and Soveraingtie over them, without all mention of his justice; whereas we say that in the inflicting of damnation, the chief glory which, God manifests is only the glory of his justice proceeding herein according to a law which himself hath made (as most fit it is the Creator should give laws to his creature) and the law is this, whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved, whosoever dieth in sin without repentance shall be damned. Not one of our Divines (that I know) maintains, that inflicting damnation, the Lord proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will, in the communicating of faith and repentance, we willingly confess the Lord proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will; and it is express Pelagianism to affirm that grace is given according unto works. And herein this Author is very well content to walk in the dark and conceal his most corrupt opinion most opposite to the grace of God. But that damnation should be inflicted without respect to sin as the meritorious cause thereof what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth? Yet thus he is pleased to disguise our opinion (when he finds the poverty of his strength to wage fair war) and so expose it to the hatred of me; as if God ordained to damn men not for their sins, but of his own mere pleasure. Thus of old the enemies of the Gospel dealt with Christians: for first they would clothe them with bear skins, and then set dogs upon them. All that he hath to say to excuse his shameless crimination (though so much he doth not express here) is only this, that our Divines maintain the decree of damnation to precede the foresight of sin. Yet this is untrue of the most part of them, who premit both the foresight of sin original before reprobation from grace, and of sin actual before the decree of damnation; I willingly confess for my part, that I concur with neither; and if I should, I should withal make the decree of permitting of sin to precede the decree of damnation, for which I see no reason; but yet I do not make the decree of permitting sin to follow the decree of damnation. I hold these decrees to besimultaneous, thus, that God at once decrees both to create men, and suffer them all to fall in Adam, and to bring them forth in their several generations into the world, and to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon the one, and so to save them, and to deny the same grace unto others, finally permitting them in their sinful courses, and so to damn them for sin; and all to manifest the glory of his mercy to the one, and the glory of his justice on the other, yea and his sovereignty too, but wherein? not in rewarding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other; but only in giving grace to the one, and not to the other. And all the difference between our Divines is merely in apice Logico, a point of Logic To wit, as touching the right ordering of decrees, concerning ends, and means tending to the ends; all concurring in this, that, God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and whom he will he hardeneth, in denying the same graces unto others. Now when this Author shall fairly prove that according to our opinion, God destroyeth the righteous with the wicked; then and not till then, shall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of Abraham. What Divine of ours was ever known to affirm that God damneth any one that dieth in repentance? Yet it cannot be denied but that temporal judgments befall the righteous, as well as the wicked. When the Lord swept away 70 thousand with a three days pestilence in the land of Israel; was it not possible thinks this Author, that any of God's dear children should perish by that pestilence? To be carried away into captivity by an heathenish nation, I should think is a greater calamity then to die of the pestilence; yet those who were carried away into Babylon with King Iechoniah, the Lord represents by the basket of good figs; and those the Lord professeth that he had sent them away into Babylon for their good. Were all damned will this Author say, that perished in the flood? Saint Peter seems to be of another opinion, where he saith, To this purpose was the Gospel preached, also to the end that they might be condemned also to men in the flesh, but might live according to God in the spirit. Truly I do not say so much of them that perished in the conspiracy of Corah, when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up the conspirators, nor them only but their wives and children also, especially considering that inter pontem & fontem, mercy may be sought and mercy may be found.
Sect. 2. Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto.
But God say some is sovereign Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his own. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and do with his own what he will?
The question is not what an almighty sovereign power can do to poor vassals, but what a power that is just and good may do. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole mass of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or sovereignty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actual power of his, which is always clothed with goodness and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternal mind.
It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendering to everyone his due; and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. God is good, saith Saint Augustine, and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot without evil deserving condemn any man, because he is just. In another place also he saith, If God be believed to condemn any man that by sin deserves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injustice. 2. Nor is it compatible with goodness which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himself unto his creatures, as far as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himself without any motive in the reasonable creature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it.
As touching the Objection I hope this Author will say so too. As touching the first, namely, that he is the sovereign Lord of all creatures; and our Savior Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, that it is lawful for him to do what he will with his own. But I find no need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his former vain discourse: for he may see plainly that I have made no use of these principles: but they have their place to justify God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing children for the sin of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporal; as in the conflagration of Sodom, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant children of heathen men dying in original sin unremitted; as M. Mason in his lectures at Magdalene Hall maintained, that, the punishment of original sin unremitted was eternal damnation. And M. Hord confesseth as much in his preface, Sect: 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soul of Christ the holy Son of God an offering for the sins of others. But consider we his answer.
To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintain that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sin? They do not, and therefore this Authors discourse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The distinction which here he makes is the distinction of Arminius, who maintained that God can do that per potentiam, by power, which he cannot do per justitiam, by justice, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my Vindiciae; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Author once offer to answer. And this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to do that which is unjust. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both Suarez and Vasquez opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, do yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and ordinance as I have shown. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the justice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Inocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much less annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict Arminius. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell pains on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternal mind, then either Christ suffered not the pains of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those pains upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of belief at his pleasure.
1 By what right is vengeance due to the obstinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it please him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleased to punish it, cannot he punish it as well by annihilation of the obstinate (so to set an end unto his sin as to himself) as by condemnation of him? That of Augustine is spoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evil deservings he shall not be condemned (yet Christ suffered hell pains without any evil deservings) In respect of the like law, he shall be unjust, if he he should not reward them, who die in faith and repentance, with everlasting life. This is only in respect of potentia ordinata, such a power as is ordained by his will. But as for potentia ahsoluta, power absolute, all confess that God can annihilate the holy Angels.
2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by necessity of nature, or freedom of will? Philosophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that Bonum est sui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate it self, yea naturally and necessarily: And therefore God being optimus the best, as well as maximus the greatest, was most communicative, and that naturally and necessarily. If the same be this Authors opinion, he is as Atheistical as they: But if by freedom of will he communicates his goodness, then he communicates his goodness, as when he will, so likewise how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint Paul expreslely professeth saying, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, of such places as these this Author takes no notice, but so much the more Atheologically. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that God is good to all; And so he is in doing them good, many and sundry ways; in maintaining their being, But he is not in such sort good to all as he is said to be good to Israel. For he hath not dealt so with any nation, as with them. 2. 'It is untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himself: for the good which is in himself is of a more transcendent nature, then to be communicable unto creatures; such conceits are Manichaicall. God is essentally whatsoever he is: But the goodness this Author speaks of, is of an accidental nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transform the essence of God into an accident, that so it might be communicated to the creature.
3. If God's goodness incline him to communicate goodness unto the creature, as far as he can without wronging justice, then it inclines him to communicate holiness unto all to preserve all from sin, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and so to save all. For how could his justice be wronged in this?
4. When he saith, tha God of himself cannot without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries; observe what an hungry proposition this is; for will he say tht God can provide for any creature the greatest misery save one, though not the greatest of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can so provide the greatest save one, why not the greatest of all? What color of reason to put any difference in this! And if the greatest save two, why not the greatest save one? And so we may go on till we come to the least misery, thereby to convince the unreasonableness of this assertion. For in clear evidence of truth, reason cannot discover where to make a stand.
5. And what is the motive he means, but the motive of sin? And what sin did God the Father see in Christ the Son, that moved him to ordain his dear Son to the suffering of hell pains?
6. And as he alledgeth Augustine to little purpose, so to the contrary what he writes de predestinatione & gratia is well known. Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs constat ex nihilo; sine debito mortis nasceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic. If mankind which is well known, at first to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and sin; Yet if the Almighty Creator, would damn some of them to eternal destruction, who would say to the Almighty Creator, why hast thou done so? And observe his reason, Qui enim cum non essent, esse donaverat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem For he that gave them being when formerly they had no being had power to dispose to what end they should be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confess that that this book though it go under Austin's name, yet it is thought to be none of Austin's, and that amongst other considerations, by reason of this very sentence in particular, which seems unto me very harsh, and contrary to Austin's doctrine in other places. But Raynaudus hath discovered at large the vanity of this reason, and shows by variety of testimonies the concurrence of Antiquity in bearing witness to the same truth. And albeit he confesseth the book not to be Austin's, yet he proves that Fulgentius was the Author of it, always accounted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of Austin's.
Sect: 3. Containing a Reply to the second Objection, and Answer thereunto.
It is further objected, that we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoint as many of us as he pleaseth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be just and good to notwithstanding. For there is a greater disproportion between God and us, then there is between us and beasts.
1 For answering hereunto we are first to premise thus much, namely that our slaughtering of Beasts for our daily use is by God's ordinance, and appointment. We had not the authority of ourselves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see Gen: 9. 2, 3. Where we may observe, 1 That God delivereth up all creatures, Beasts, Birds, and Fishes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth so, is that they might be meat for men, and consequently they might be slain. Which being so, our slaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our daily use is to be accounted God's doing, rather then ours. And therefore the objection should be made this. God may without any breach of goodness or justice appoint brute creatures to be slain for man's use, therefore he may ordain men to be cast into hell torments for his own use, that is for the declaration of his sovereignty.
2 This being premised I answer further that this comparison holds not, For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and less between the acts.
1 There is but small proportion between the Objects Beasts and Men creatures of a different nature and made for a different end Beasts are void of reason and liberty in their actions; creatures whose being svanish with their breath, made only for the use and service of men upon earth But men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to discern between good and evil, they are the very Image of God's purity and eternity and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts It followeth not therefore that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for man's use. he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction, for his own use We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifice, but not one man The first borne of other creatures he challenged for burnt offerings (except they were unclean beasts) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed. Which showeth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beast. Besides in the 9 of Genesis he gives men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures; but he straightly forbids them to shed man's blood, and gives this reason of the prohibition, Man is the Image of God; so that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the Ob • ects compared-men, and Beasts in respect of this Act of killing and slaughrering. 2 There is far less or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared Killing and eternal tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vex and torture it, to show what power and soverainty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not, I say, but God may kill a man of his own free pleasure; yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keep him alive forever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to show his sovereignty. For this is to inflict an infinite evil upon a guiltless creature, to whom he had given but a finite good: And so is the comparison most unequal too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth just nothing.
Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authors acute observations out of Gen: 9. 2. 3. (For he would not seem to be any of the blunter sort) do sin as often as they kill a chicke to feed upon, though beasts of prey do as much as this comes to, and more without all sin. 2 Yet M Perkins thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawful, without enquiring whence this authority proceeds And no Christian doubts, but our very bodies, and souls and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beasts for meat? Or hath not man power to slaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Author find this in Gen: May we not kill Lions, Bears, wolves, unless we eat them forthwith, or powder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? so of snakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that Libya brings forth? 4 I deny that our slaughtering of oxen is in this respect, or in any respect to be accounted God's doing rather then ours. For God's appointment in this, is but of the nature of a permission, not of a command. We may live by fruits and herbs and Marmalads and sucketts, or butter, milk and cheese, if we think good. Were it a Commandment, yet would it not follow that it is God's work rather then ours. For he commands good works and forbids evil works. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good works are rather God's works then ours. I trow he will not 5 Therefore we keep to our own argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty case, if we should suffer our adversaries to shape our Arguments If they once have the grinding of our Tooles, no marvel if they soon grind out all the edge of them. We say it is lawful for man to do all this that is spoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and shall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apostle himself dispute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equal to the power which the Potter hath over the work of his own hands and over the clay also. Shall the thing formed say to it that formed it why hast thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawful power to inflict pain upon another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greatest pain upon us, and that without all respect to sin? And that this God can do as Lord of life and death, both Vasquez the Jesuit acknowledgeth, and Medina pronounceth ex concordi Theologorum sententiâ, by the unanimous consent of all Divines, as elsewhere I have shown and proved by variety of demonstration; like as Raynaudus confirms it by the concurrant testimony of the Ancients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his answer, and saith that the comparison holds not. And I commend this Authors wisdom in troubling himself with no more objections, then he thought himself able to Master. For who would not keep his shinns whole the best he can? But I wounder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of such adversaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with.
1. Little proportion will serve turn; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and surely there is less proportion between the Creator and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet sure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble then a creature without life, such as a Potters vessel is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his vessel; the Apostle tells us that God hath the same power over his creature man. Secondly, the Author was sensible of the weakness of this bowstring, and seeing it would not hold, therefore he relies upon another, and thats his own deforming and disfiguring our argument, drawing it from the comparison of man's power over his fellow creatures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creator hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's grant hath power over his fellow creatures. From this due course of comparison which we propose, this Author draws us to a wild comparison of the power of God over beasts, with the power of God over man; which is not ours, but an immodest and unshamefast fiction of this Author; and that grounded upon immodest foundations as before hath been shown. Thirdly, yet why not so great a difference between God and man, as between God and beasts? Is not the distance infinite? Is it possible to be less, seeing man is but finite, and God infiinte? For still the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfection is of a transcendent nature it being uncreat: which when School-men have considered, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be measured not by approximation to God who is, ens primum, the first being, but by their remotion rather à non esse, from not being; As I remember to have read long ago in Paulus Venetus, and which then seemed to me most congruous, nither to this day do I see any just cause to oppose it. 2. I come to the second answer; And here I find this discourse to breath the spirit of Arminius, as truly as if it were spit out of his own mouth. Now Arminius on this point I have answered at large, as this Author well knows: he is content to pass that by, and keep himself still like a Sow in beans, without raising any noise of solving ought hath been delivered in proof hereof. But though he lets pass that wich I have delivered without answer, renewing only Arminius his objection; yet I will not let this his answer to his own objection pass without a reply.
1. Therefore whereas he saith there is no proportion between killing and eternal tormenting. Imarke his cunning carriage, he doth not say there is no proportion between killing and tormenting wich are two acts; and acts are somewhat capable of proportion. And surely if he had, killing would appear to be the worst of the two; since to kill is to torment and somewhat more, even to destroy the being of a man. Therefore the comparison which he shapes is between killing and eternal tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pretends to from the comparison, but between one act, and the eternal duration of another act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, such is this Authors juggling. Yet notwithstanding the disproportion of these things, hence it follows not, that killing is the more desirable of the two; considering that many apain there is which man would be content to endure, rather then to loose his life? So far is it from being worse, and that beyond all proportion. Augustine somewhere professing of infants pain in hell, that is poena mitissima, the mildest pain, & such as they had rather endure then to have no being at all. 2. But take it for an intolerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternal tormenting; whereas there is some proportion between man and beast, then it were reasonable for any man to desire to be turned into a beast rather then to be eternally tormented: now let every reasonable creature consider, the sobriety of such a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, then it is not to be denied, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thousand or ten thousand years may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternal torment cannot. Yea and so ten thousand to an hundred thousand years, and so forwards until it comes to be eternal, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impossible to attain from a beginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantity, Aristole hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impossible that the whole consisting of finite parts can be infinite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Author will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the least sin committed by man. And this was it that I proposed in my answer to M. Hord, to show the power of God in such a kind, wherein it were abominable cruelty in man to exercise his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of Tiberius is set forth by them that write the history of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to resolve how it can stand with justice divine thus to deal with a creature, though a sinner. Yet I know many courses are taken to solve this difficulty, and the best that I have met with is this in my judgment; That a man dying in sin, his sin continueth eternal (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flaws, and will not satisfy. So that the best and final resolution is to have recourse to God's absolute power, as a Creator over his creatures. And that absolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature as over a creature nocent. And it were very strange to affirm that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beasts, namely to put them to pain, to do us service. Now if it be lawful to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reason can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if so why not three, and so ascending to the highest degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict such a pain for an hour, he may as well for two hours; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two days, yea for a week▪ 1 for a week he may as well for a month, and if for a month, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for six; and if for six, as well for twelve; and if for a year, as well for two; and as well for four, and so in infinitum; from tenns to hundreds, and from hundreds to thousands For no reason can possibly make evidence where we ought to make a stand; in such sort as that an afliction in such a degree is lawful, and immediately after increasing becomes unlawful. 2. Yet consider we speak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the objection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execution, sin may intercede by God's permission, and that necessarily thereupon as Arminius himself confesseth. But now to the point whereon we are in present, we suppose the person to be most holy, even as holy as the Son of God; on whom notwithstanding were inflicted, as all confess, either hell pains, or that which was equivalent to hell pains. 3. Yet this evil thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, still it continueth finite, though in infinitum; it being utterly impossible by addition to make that which is finite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authors caution would help us against the Author himself. For the good which God hath given such a creature, is also infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preserve that creature from sin, which by Arminius his cofession, makes a man more miserable, then hell pains it self. Lastly that there is such an absolute power in God Raynaudus justifies both out of the twelvth of wisdoome. Cum sis justus, juste omnia disponis. Ipsum quoque qui non debet punire condemnare externum existimas à tuâ virtute. This reading he professeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading ought to be this, Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas. And shows that this reading is followed by Austin, q. 53. and Saint Grigory. 3. Moral: cap. 11. This also he justifies to be Orthodox by the testimony of the Ancients. Macarius homil. 15. Deus sui juris est, quod vult facit. Si velit pro potestate & jure suo mittit justos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum. Out of Chrysostomt l. 2. De compunctione cordis sub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum est conjicii jubeat Dominus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi potestas. Out of Augustine in Psal. 70. in the beginning Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia justus est; Amor quia misericors est. Quis enim diceret ei quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia ejus est, ut justificet injustum? Then he represents the School-men maintaining the same. Ariminenses, Camariacenses, Medina, Secarius in cap. 7. Iosuae à 39. and Lorinus in cap. 12. Sap: v. 12. Yet is not Raynaudus of their opinion who maintains reprobation to be before the foresight of evil works; nevertheless he is peremptory in justifying this; And Fulgentius whom he conceives to be the Author of that book de praedest. & gratia, which goes under Austin's name, in a little treatise of his entitled Censura inofficiosae censurae, which is added to his Valerianus integrae vitae labis{que} purus.
Sect. 4.
I am glad to see my name so often remembered by this Author in his margent; for a long time I desired to know his way by certain evidence; for I would not suffer myself to be carried away with rumors; and withal I found some contradiction in the relations I received from different persons, but at length I was so happy as to see it under his own hand, and there to observe not his judgment only, but the strength of his affections also. Now let the Reader observe the cunning carriage of this Author, and how far off it is from all ingenuity. For what I discourse, being drawn thereunto by Arminius his excursions, that this Author obtrudes upon me, as if the defense of the cause I took in hand had drawn me thereunto, notwithstanding that I have professed the contrary. For thus I write l. 1. pag. 1. De electione Sect: 4. pag. 127. In the canvasing of this section Arminius runs out at large, saving that most of these things which here he heaps up are aliena, and nothing pertinent to the present purpose; as pertaining rather to the decree of reprobation, then to the decree of election. And a little after I write thus; Hence it is that Arminius expatiates and transfers his disputation from the point of election, to the point of Reprobation too unseasonably: Yet wisely affecting the incolumity of his wavering cause. By that right (saith he) which God hath over his creature, he cannot ordain any man to the suffering of pain without the foresight of sinnne. To wit that his cause might stand upright, and that this examiner might omit nothing that tends to the making of his opinion plausible with his propitious reader, it was needful that he should make use of some such transition, though never so unreasonable but seeing such are the wiles and artifices of our Adversaries to confound all Scholastical method, it shall not be unseasonable for me to weigh what he delivers as briefly as I can. Therefore after I had refused Arminius on that point, where he denies, that God can do that injustice, which he can do by power; after this manner I enter upon a new digression concerning this point. Hitherto have I followed Arminius in his extravagants. For M. Perkins hath not proceeded so far; as to affirm that God hath power to afflict an innocent creature, neither hath his Adversaries objected any such thing unto him, as justly inferred from ought delivered by him. So that all such have well hardened their foreheads, who fain that our opinion cannot well subsist without the help of so horrid and so harsh an assertion, to wit, That it is better to be miserable, then not to be at all. It is true, some may conceive that though this were a truth, it were to be suppressed, rather then affirmed by reason of the harshness of it. Let everyone consider aright that I undertake the defense of M. Perkins, and it is he that hath uttered this harsh assertion, (namely, That God can inflict hell pains without any demerit in the creature) out of Cameracensis: And it stood me upon to defend M. Perkins so far as I had reason for it. Now finding the main argument whereby Arminius maintains the contrary (to that other, yet more harsh proposition) to be most unsound; and even this assertion which sounds most harsh in the ears of many, not only to be maintained by Augustine himself and and divres School-Divines, but answered by many arguments, the solution whereof was never expedited by any; have I deserved so sharply to be censured for representing all this in the way of justifying M. Perkins, whose defense I undertook against Arminius?
1. My words are these translated, God can annihilate the holiest creature, which Arminius confesseth, how much more is it in his power to afflict an innocent creature, and that forever, considering that not only according to School-divines, but also according to Augustine, yea according to the truth it self, it is more to be desired to have being under any pain, then to have no being at all. And afterwards I propose not one argument of mine own for the justifying of this, but only represent the discourse of Augustine hereupon, as it is analized by Durand that School Divine. Now why are not the School-men censured, as men speaking unreasonably and against common sense? Nay why is not Augustine censured as one that had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense; then lay down the conclusion which he hath once undertaken to maintain, as well as myself? Yea and much more considering that the discourse proving this, is Saint Austin's; and had I not added on the by these four words etiam secundum ipsam veritatem, there had been no place at all for any censure to be past upon me. If a man finding himself convicted by Austin's discourse shall confess that what he writes is true, is it equity to censure him as one who had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense, then lay down the conclusions which formerly he hath undertaken to maintain. When in the mean time no censure is at all passed upon Augustine, who alone is the player of the game, he that stands by professing only in his judgment, he plays his game well.
2. If Augustine hath spoken unreasonably and against common sense, how comes it to pass that this censurer hath not taken the pains to represent unto the world the unreasonableness of his argument? This author spends his mouth frankly in censuring, but takes no pains to free his Reader from error, by solving arguments produced by Austin for the proof of that wich this Author conceives to be an error.
3. Nay he doth not so much as answer that one argument, which here is proposed by me. An argument which the Scoole-men use as sufficiently convincing the truth, as Durand and Ricardus. Yet considering the unreasonable condition of such adversaries, who take no course to convince or confute their opposites, but imperiously to cry them down; I have taken the pains to call to an account both Austin's arguments and others proposed by School-Divines, and to devise with myself what answer might be made unto them, so to perform that for my adversaries, which they show no heart to perform for themselves, and I was borne in hand that such a digression of mine should be extant long ere this.
4 Yet by the way I wonder not a little that one thing is pretermitted. For if I mistake not, this very Author is the man that heretofore hath been very full mouthed in censuring, not so much the doctrine it self, as a certain answer I made to an argument brought out of Scripture against it; namely from those words of our Savior, It had been better for that man if he had never been born. My answer was, that it was spoken according to the judgment of man, though indeed erroneous; and that after this manner phraseologies of Scripture do proceed I there shown. Now this Author hereupon spared not to profess, that if this were true he would turn Atheist. I wisht that Friend of mine to whom he spake this, to persuade him the next time he met with him, to inquire and consider well, whether Maldonado the Jesuit doth not embrace the same interpretation. And indeed if such protestations would carry it, this Author would prove a very potent and formidable adversary, I have seen the like under his own hand, namely this, As Plutarch said of the old heathens who sacrificed men that they might pacify their gods: that it had been better with Diagoras to say, There is no god, then to think that God is such a one that delights in the blood of men: And hereupon he adds this Protestation, I protest unto you I think it less dishonorable to the blessed Trinity, to say with the Atheist, there is no god, then to feign such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants maketh him to be. This man I find is resorted unto and consulted with by the Arminians, as if his judgment were an oracle; and I willingly confess he deserves to be in some great place unto them: and no place in my judgmentmore fit then to be unto the, à protestationibus. Yet I do not prescribe but leave it to their discretion to prefer him as they think good: but how comes it to pass, that here he is silent in reviving the reproaches he cast upō my answer to the Scripture before mentioned? Is it because Maldonado the Jesuit hath been since found by him to embrace the same interpretation? And he is loath to fall so foul in censuring such as he is? Yet here he falls foul on me for professing my approbation, not of School-men but of Austin's discourse. This makes me call to mind what was delivered of him sometimes by a London Minister; as that he should persuade a young Divine to study Bellarmine; as also what censures others have passed upon some writings of his. And it hath been my hap to see under his own hand such a counsel as this givē to a friend of his. These things have I represented unto you the rather, because I would give you occasion to learn that in your younger days, which I have learned by late and long experience in myself, and that in these two things. First in reading Bellarmine and other adversaies to our Church; I have divers times noted such speeches in them, as to my thinking involved contradiction, or had show of absurdity, or might either give advantage to ourselves, or breed prejudice unto them; but when afterward I came in cooler blood to weigh the words better, and to consider the circumstances more narrowly. I found that I did mistake their meaning, and that an itching desire to find an advantage, made me to take shadows for substance. And the like mistake in myself I observed, when I read the fathers, or the Scriptures, ready to interpret everything either in favor of mine own cause, or in prejudice of the adversaries: And concludes sententiously thus; Nimirum ita est ingenium nostrum, facile credimus, quae nimium volumus. If such be the genius of this Author, though he thinks not good to spare me for Austin's sake, yet methinks he should spare me for Richardus sake, or at the least for Maldonado's sake. This calls to my remembrance an Epigramme which D. Hoskins my chamber-fellow in New-College sometimes made upon the fleas, (that sore troubled him as he lay in his bed.) And the conclusion was thus;
So we proceed.
Sect. 5.
M. Mason went great bellied with these choice conceits, and therefore he will bring them in though it be by the cares, in spite of his own friends: like as Arminius did before him, to vent a certain argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy issue to the betraying of the Authors nakedness most shamefully; and his argument was this, To be happy is better thē simply to be; therefore to be miserable, is worse then simply not to be; now the consequence is most inconsequent. For therefore to be happy is better then simply to be; because, to be happy, includes being, & adds hapines thereunto. And one good added to another good must needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, If to be miserable doth include the evil of not being and add another evil thereunto, the whole compound must needs be worse. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, to be miserable doth not include the evil of not being, but the good of being rather; and consequently there is no just proportion between misery and happiness, And therefore though to be happy is better then simply to be (as including being, and some good thing more) yet thence it follows not, that to be miserable, is worse then not to be; for as much as, To be miserable, doth not include the evil of not being and add some evil more to it. Now the first that affirmed this harsh position, namely, that to be miserable is not worse then not to be at all, was Austin, and he not only affirms it, but disputes it, and proves it by variety of arguments, not one whereof is answered by this Author or by any friend that I know. And from Austin the School-men have taken it, and added this one argument to confirm it over and above those of Augustine's, To turn a man into nothing is to destroy a man's universal being; but to inflict torment upon him doth destroy only particular being, to wit, his being in ease and pleasure. Now to have a man's particular being destroyed is not so bad, as to have a man's universal being destroyed. Now I come to consider how this Author carrieth himself in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the position impugned by bim, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of Austin and of divers School-men) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an answer made by us to any of our Adversaries objections (as this Author doth) as if we stood in need o • any such aide is a mere fiction. And first he states it at pleasure to serve his own turn, of being in hell to be more desirable, whereas the Author whom he opposeth delivers it of, esse mi erum to be miserable and misery is as well in respect of sin, as in respect of bodily torment Nay it is confessed by Arminius himself, That the misery of sin is greater, then the misery of torment. So, that if it be uncouth to say, that to be under the torment of hell is better then not to be at all; it ought to seem more uncouth to say, that it is better for a man to be guilty of sin, then to have no being at all. Now I do not find that this Author in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into consideration. Again when it is said. That to be miserable is better thē not to be, this is to be understood aright, not as if misery it self were desirable, but being only, though with the adjunct of misery thus, to have a being though in misery is more desirable, then to have no being at all And so if it beapplyed to the misery of torment, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, To have a being though in hell is more desirable then to have no being at all. And it is apparent, that in not being at all, there is nothing at all desirable, but in being; though under the greatest pain there is something desirable, to wit, being. Now I consider his reasons.
He objecteth the saying of our Savior to Judas. Woe be to that man by whom the son of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born: and indeed the betraying of the Son of God his Lord and master, was a most facinorous act, especially being committed by the way of a kiss, & with sweet words saying Hayle Master. And Schoolmen do distinguish between, the misery of sin, and the misery of pain, in such sort that albeit they deny the latter to be worse then not being, yet they do not reason so of the former. But because Judas was not so sensible of the miserable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Savior sets forth the woeful condition of that state whereof he, and generally all are most sensible. Whence we may well argue, that our Savior speaks in conformly to man's sense and judgment, and it was not long ere the terrors of a guilty conscience took hold of him, and he went forth and hanged himself. Yet our Savior saith not, It had been good for Judas if he had never received any being, but only this, If he had never been borne▪ now being is not received in a man's birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if Judas had perished in his mothers womb it had been much better for him. As Arch-bishop Whitgift sometimes in the Court of high commission said, of one that was accused and convicied o • some foul crime committed by him in the very house of God That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the first, then that he should live to be o • scandalous to the Church of God And yet as if our Savior's words were not enough for this Author in saying, It had been good for that man; therefore he patcheth it out with a supplement of his own, thus, It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being. So that whereas Aristotle made happiness to consist in an aggregation of all good things this Author with his divinity thinks good to mend Aristtotl's Philosophy, by placing happiness in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciously. Vulcan who made thunder-bolts for Jupiter, when he was cast out of heaven had a shrewd fall, and contracted such lameness as stuck by him ever after. So this Author who forgeth thunder-bolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon opposition to the prerogative of God's grace and his Sovereignty over all creatures; no marvel if his logic and philosophy halteth; and his infirmity so contracted may increase so far, as in the end to bereave him of commō sense. He contents himsele as his manner is with saying, that Interpreters do generally expound it as he doth; some few he confesseth understand it other wise, but most concur with him, to wit, that, it is delivered in earnest; what a jest is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to say, that our Savour spake not in earnest. Neither do I know any that interpreteth the place as he shapes it, as if our Savior spake according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any such difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet speaks of the stoutest, as well as the weakest, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be strong in the day that I have to deal with thee, or the Lord rather by the Prophet. The School-men suppose without difference, that the damned wish they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into passionate expressions in the time of their extremity; Maldonado on this place gives instance in many; but the question is whether these proceed from the judgment of right reason; or erroneous rather, through the vehemēcy of passion, whose course is as Aquinas observes, extinguere rationem, to extinguish reason. And it is one of the three things as Aristotle observes in his books De Animâ, that hinders the mind in her judgment. The other two are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Disease, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sleep; the third is passion; how much more when passion is stirred up by the sorest disease of all other the torments of hell fire?
1. But if I am glad to see the issue whereto he drives his discourse. For he grants that the scripture speaks sometimes according to men's opinions: but without reason to fasten such an expression upon any Scripture, is to do as Dunses do &c. he gives no instance; I will supply the want thereof, and that out of one of those dunses a follower of John Duns an eminet school-man, from whose name school-men are called dunses, whom this Author was wont to magnify; Lychetus a Minorite is the man, who is the first that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpose of election of any particular man may cease; and the purpose of reprobating the same may come in the place thereof. So the purpose of reprobating Judas may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a days grows in request Penotus hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And Franciscus à sanctâ Clarâ after him, and some of our Arminians I find enamored with it. Now this Lychetus, when he is charged with the doctrine of Scotus as directly opposite hereunto, his answer is in part that he speaks according to the opinion of others. Now I desire not upon better terms to contend with M. Mason. For Augustine hath given many reasons to prove that simply and absolutely not to be, is not a thing desirable, above being, though joined with never so great misery of pain. And the School-men acknowledge that Augustine herein delivers his judgment, and withal they concur with him as Scot, Biel, Durand, Maldonado. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an universal destruction of being; so is not inflicting of punishment, as both Durand and Maldonado argue the case. And saying that not to have any being at all is better for Judas then to be in torment, here is something affirmed of a subject that makes him of a better condition then otherwise, which hath no place, but upon supposition of a subjects existence, & that in distinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which constitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reason of being nothing, should be better the something, is one of the wildest expressions, I think that hath been heard of since the world began; And therewithal creatures began to have a being. Again consider, take Gabriel the Arch-Angel most holy as a creature, and let every sober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I should think that albeit God should torment me with hell fiire yet if he should preserve my soul from sin & in the love of him out of the sense of his love towards me, I should have infinitely more cause to rejoice then to complain, how weak soever I am at this present. Thirdly, if it be better and more desirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be uderstood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in respect of everlastingness, then it follows it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man shall not everlastingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thousand years, not only twice told; but a thousand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically, and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to suffer hell torments so long, then it is better to have no being at all, then to suffer hell torments half so long: For no reason can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to suffer hell torments one hour, or half an hour, or a quarter, or a minute, or half a minute. For no reason can define the bounds within which it will be better to suffer the pains of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worse. But M. Mason saith secondly. This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded: And he gives his reason for it: Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the greatness or truth of the misery of Judas: and I pray let every sober man judge, whether this be not a sufficient amplification of that misery, that they shall wish they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather then suffer such torments. How many prefer death before this worlds misery, and so go on to destroy themselves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it should be an utter abolition of man, is not so bad as to suffer the miseries of this world. The mistake of a damned person wishing not to be, consists not in conceiving his torments to be unsufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he should have ease, which is a most absurd conceit, arising merely from distraction of mind throug extremity of anguish. So that all things rightly considered, here is no encouragement for men to become Atheists & Epicures, unless this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain shall be so extreme and unsufferable, as to make them desire, and utter they know not what, such distraction of mind and and perturbation of judgment shall surprise them. A false persuasion that men's souls shall die with their bodies, and that they shall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleasures while he may; whether this delight and pleasure be taken in courses vicious, or in courses virtuous, because death sets an end, as to them; so to their pleasures and delights. But if their greatest happiness, or misery doth begin in joy, or sorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: sober reason doth suggest unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happiness, and declining that unhappiness, above all other, according to that Ladies resolution in Sophocles, and that upon this ground 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , there I shall continue forever. But when he saith the wicked will the more eagerly pursue their carnal and sinful delights, because after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgment of any lewd person throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to sinful courses from this; that albeit he shall be cast with the devil and his Angels into hell fire that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, then not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition consists only in this, that being is better then not being; not in this, that he hath any ease, or is less obnoxious to torment and sorrow, which shall be so unsufferable, as to provoke him to wish, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing.
And is he well in his wits that talks of a thousand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with such like wild discourses, even to run out of common sense at last. Yet all this that he discourseth of, for the substance of it is no other, then Augustine hath taken notice of in his very argument; and shows the vanity of it, and the error of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of ease and rest from sorrow & pain; again ask the same men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogs, wolves, snakes, toads, rather then to be under the torments of hell fire; ask again whether they would not be content, to be turned into devils, so they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Ask the Adulterour whether he would not be content to lie with another man's wife all his days, rather then to suffer (shall I say) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather then die possessed of the joys of heaven. Ask this Author whether he would not be content to maintain stiffly, that grace is given according to works, and that a man is justified by his works, rather then suffer the pains of hell fire, yea though it were against his own conscience. As for me were I a damned creature, yet according to this judgment which God hath given me considering that the glory of God's justice is manifested in my condemnation, though extremity of pain would transport me into as wild wishes, as this Author justifies; yet according to right reason I should rather be content to suffer, then wish that I were turned into a brute beast, or into a devil, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of sober divines would justify me in this undoubtedly God is able to work me or any man to this resolution without sin.
2. If, because men through fear of hell and expectation of eternal vengeance do with Job curse their birth day once, and wish they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the same reason, because they do no other then Job did, it must follow, that it was better for Job to be nothing, then to be under such torments. But if Job's desire was an unsober and unreasonable desire in this, why might not their desire be as unsober and unreasonable also, proceeding not so much from calm reason, as from the strength of passion inflamed and disordered through extremity of torment. We know that men upon the rack do sometimes make confessions, even against the light of their own consciences. And fear of evil sometimes distracts as much as the sense thereof; as in him who hearing the sentence of death passed against him at Paris, fell into a sweat of blood. And it was wont to be said, that pejor est malo, timor ipse mali. Francis Spira in the time of his distraction confessed as much of hell it self. And if one desire, once having course, prove unreasonable, why should the renewing of it a thousand times over prove less unreasonable. And let the judicious observe the hand of God, in striking this Author with such giddiness even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantageous to his cause) so as at every turn to supplant himself, and to betray the shameful nakedness of his discourse. As first, in talking of a thousand nothings. Secondly, In putting the case of some cursing their birth day, but how? as Job did. Now will any sober man make the like collection of Job's cursing his birth day, as this Author doth from others cursing theirs. Thirdly, and lastly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who seeth not that this proceeds in reference to such things, which as they are feared, soe they may be felt; and supposing a subject existing, as to fear it before it comes, so to feel it when it is come but such is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feignes us to conform to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilation to be a thing feared, he pleaseth himself in his own fictions. He nowhere finds me to speak of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more then I speak of it as of a thing that is to be felt. Only I say that it is a condition no way desirable by a reasonable creature, no more then the suffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be suffered of any unless he hath a being, here is something found desirable, to wit the continuance of being. But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found anything to be a fit Object of man's desire.
We know that death to such as Job was, is not only better then extreme pains, but better then all the joys of this world; by how much to be present with the Lord Christ, is better then to be absent from him; and we know, saith Paul, to the unspeakable comfort of all true Christians, that when the earthly house of this our tabernacle is dissolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternal in the heavens. So that I wonder not a little at these wild discourses of this Author. When he saith that even the stoutest and hardest spirits would choose rather to have no bodies at all, then bodies tormented with the stone or gout, what other is this then to desire that they were impassible; would they not desire to have no souls too? and to be without sense like stocks and stones? But let every sober man judge whether this be a reasonable desire; what Christian justifies Job in cursing the day of his birth? What Martyr hath not rejoiced in suffering, not natural diseases, but the cruellest torments that most cruel, and spiteful Tyrants could devise to be inflicted upon them? And even to suffer other evils by course of nature brought upon us with patience, acknowledging the hand of God therein, and submitting unto his will, justifying him as righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, and condemning ourselves: even this long a go hath been accounted for Martirdome in the judgment of Chrysostom. It is true such proverbs have had their course in most nations. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , praestat semel quam semper mori. And amongst us. Better eye out then always aking, better one dead then always dying. But shall we take this hand over head without a difference between a Christian & unchristian, and heathenish interpretation? As many as had an opinion of the immortal condition of the soul, and withal of different conditions of men in joy, or sorrow, according to the condition of their life spent in their courses virtuous, or vicious, if they were well persuaded of their life past, they might accordingly think it better for them to die then live; And it is no less desirable to them, who had no comfort in their life past. Bradwardine hath such a meditation. Mallem non esse quàm te offender, I had rather have no being at all then to offend thee, speaking unto God. Yet in sinning against him we are matter of his glory, which we are not, when we have no being at all. Matter of his glory I say, either in pardoning sin, or in punishing it, or both. But what sober man will justify such a saying, I had rather have no being at all then be troubled with the stone, or gout? Is not this the proper place for patience to have its perfect work. And if it be urged that this holds true only in evils tolerable, not in case they prove intolerable. I answer that surely the pain of stone or gout is not intolerable, not any in the judgment of Paul, whose profession was this I am able to do all things (his meaning is to suffer all things) by the power of Christ that enableth me: and when upon his prayer that the messenger of Satan might be removed from him, he received this answer from the Lord, My grace is sufficient for thee, and my power is made perfect in thy weakness, What is Paul's resolution hereupon, though in himself a very weak creature? I will gladly therefore rejoice in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecution, in anguish, for Christ's sake. For when I am weak then I am strong. Doth not this extend to the very torments of hell suffered by our Savior for our sakes. Undoubtedly, if the glory of heaven possess the soul, though the pains of hell seize upon the body, such a one shall have more cause to rejoice then to complain. These courses of Tiberius I had cause to take notice of in mine answer to M. Hord. For, whereas he slandered our doctrine concerning the absoluteness of God's decrees, and conforming them to the cruel courses of Tiberius: whereupon I shown, that if such comparisons were not odious, but allowable, we might in like manner compare God's courses in punishing sin temporal with torment eternal, with courses of Tiberius here specified. And because nothing hath a greater show of cruelty in Tiberius then such courses of his as these. Hence they may with the same liberty conclude, that the divine Majesty is cruel (which is a horrible thing to utter) and unjust in punishing men everlasting in hell fire, for sins committed by them for a very short space in the course of their lives. But let this Author consider, were heathen Princes more exasperate against any then against Christians, or were more cruel courses taken against any then the servants of God. Yet did these Christians prevent their bloody and barbarous desires by murdering their selves? Did they not rejoice in tribulation? Yet death they might well prefer before the sweetest life. That they might enjoy the Lord Christ And Augustine hath long ago in this very argument shown, that even in destroying themselves they aimed at being at a state of freedom from sorrows. So far were they from affecting to have no being at all. And first, he distinguishes of the will as it signifies an appetite natural; or as it signifies an absolute desire. As it signifies nature or appetite natural; so by no means can it desire to have no being. All natural desire being for rest, but nature finds no rest in its destruction: Rest of nature supposeth its being, and adds somewhat over and above thereunto, namely freedom from trouble, unde siquis dicat vellem non esse, magis quàm miserum esse; respondebo, mentiris, quia cum miserum nolis esse tamen vis. Thus Durand analizeth Austin's discourse hereupon. Then he proceeds to show that the deliberative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evil, save only according to erroneous reason. All which this Author takes no notice of, but pleaseth himself in his own confusion. All creatures have in them, vestigia Dei, saith Luther, to wit, in respect of their being; But man is, Imago Dei. Shall right reason suggest the destroying of this for pain's sake? Durand proceeds & shows how according to erroneous reason a man may destroy himself, by reason of some present miserable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he shall arrive to some secret existence wherein he shall be free, as from the good things, so from the evil things of this world. Unde Agustinus ubi supra dicit, quod aliqui urgente miseriâ sese interimūt, eo quod confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint. A second manner is this, the vehemency of evil suffered may so over-cloud and trouble reason, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better then to be in misery, which is absurd, saith he; for as much as the privation of evil is not good, but by reason of obtaining of the contrary good; but no such good can be obtained in being nothing, howsoever men through error of judgment may fain it otherwise. In which case he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of something) and consequently his election is erroneous, as Augustine concludeth. But Seneca is the best flower in this Authors present discourse; and the censure which he passeth upon one Mecaenas, who, so he might live, would not care what torments he suffered. Where by the way I observed; that albeit this Author represents the common sense of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the same mind. Secondly, I observe that Seneca who censureth him did look for an immortal condition after death, which it seems was no part of Mecaenas his Creed. And upon this ground his censure might proceed. And indeed otherwise it is very strange that he should censure him for effeminatenes, in respect of a resolute mind to endure tortures, which we know full well is usually accounted virile aliquid, rather then muliebre, the part of a man, more then the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in Augustine, that this was the opinion of Varro and the Stoics, that it became a man to destroy himself, rather then to endure some evils, and in this doctrine of theirs, he finds some contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, Hanc esse naturae primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, This is the first and greatest voice of nature, that man should be at one with himself, and therefore naturally flieth death. And herein Augustine himself acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now consider, is a man at one with himself when he destroys himself? Is he not rather at odds with himself in making a man's fortitude to be a self destroyer? If so be that deserves to be called fortitude, as there Augustine speaks: Or how can the duty of preserving a man's self, be the greatest voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature countermanding it, and commanding a man to kill himself? In suffering evils there is place for the exercise of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter destruction of nature there is no place for the exercise of any virtue: which virtue was so far advanced by the Stoics, as touching the power of it, as to be able to descend into Phalaris his Bull, as Cicero discourseth in the last of his Tusculane questions Yet not only great evils, for the insufferable nature of them did urge them to destroy themselves, but meaner evils most unreasonably. What moved Cato to destroy himself, but because he would not come under Caesar? His stout spirit could not endure subjection. Yet he read over Plato's discourse of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his sword, which some censure as an argument of some pusillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipt through Paris never changed his pace, affecting to maintain the reputation of spanish gravity and resoluteness, though he smarted the more for it. And shall not our being in the likeness and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with any dolorous suffering: when this Author will have no being, to be a lighter and lesser evil then hell pains; doth he not most manifestly signify that it is a burden more easy to be borne? Thus ere he is aware most contradictiously he supposeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it possible that an evil can be borne, and that with more ease then some other evil, by him who hath no being at all. But let him strain his wits to devise where first pain begins to be so great, that a man's utter destruction is to be preferred before it, seeing it is apparent that all pain is not such.
The 6. Sect:
To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is melius est esse, quàm non esse. It is better to be, then to have no being. I answer that it is a Sophism or, a fallacy a non distributo ad distributum. To be in it self is better then not to be, but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again it is true in some cases, & ex hypothesi, si caetera sint paria; If there be any equality in the Adjuncts, It is so far from being simply true; that our Savior limiteth it, and putteth a case wherein it is not true but the contrary to it is true: That is the case of Judas of which we have said somewhat before. It had been good &c. Which words St. Jerome expounding saith; it is simply and plainly averred by our Savior, that it is better to have no being, then an evil being. This was the judgment too of Job. Why died I not saith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I suck the breasts? For now should I have lain still, and been quiet, and should have slept then and been at rest. In which words he plainly implieth, that he thought it better to have had no birth and being, then such a painful and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon. So I returned saith he, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter &c. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive. Yea better is he, then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil works that are done under the sun. The words do clearly show that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, then to be oppressed by the mighty, and to be without comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournful being.
Indeed so Jerome saith, but that is not all he saith. For he labors to prevent suspicion that Judas had some being before he was borne: which was the error of Origen. And the words of our Savior seems to favor it as Jansen observes. Quibus verbis Origenianum quid significare videtur, quasi homo ill fuerit antequam nasceretur, quia nulli potest been esse nisi ei qui fuerit. And Jerome himself upon Eccles. 4. 3. writes that some were of that opinion; namely, Arminas nostras antequam ad nostra corpora ista descendant versari apud superos, & tam diu beatas esse, quamdiu coelesti Jerusalem & choro perfruantur Angelico. Neither doth Jerome there pass any censure upon the Authors of such an opinion. Here indeed upon Mat. 26. 24, he saith, We must not hereupon think that Judas had a being before he were born, because a well being can agree to none but such as have a being. Which argument Jerome doth not answer. For when he adds, sed simpliciter dictum est, multo melius esse non subsistere quàm male subsistere. This rather confirms the antecedent, namely, that it had been well for Judas, if he had not been; then gives any tolerable or colorable answer to the consequence made therehence. And is not the authourity of Augustine as good as the authourity of Jerome in this? Jansen embraceth Jerome's exposition; but Maldonado doth not, but at large disputes for another interpretation, the very same which I delivered before I were aware of Maldonates exposition. And Jansen though he follows Jerome in expounding this place, yet he professeth, that both Euthymius of old, and Cajetan of late do understand this place in the same manner that Durand doth, namely, de nativitate ex utero, of Judas his bringing forth into the world, distinguishing his birth from his conception, ut sit sensus, after this meaning, Bonum erat vel fuisset ei, si cum erat in utero matris suae non fuisset editus in lucem, sed mortuus tunc fuisset; & sepulchrum ipsius uterus matris extitisset; si enim tunc mortuus fuisset non incidisset in tantam & talem condemnationem, quantam & qualem natus propter immensum perditionis scelus erat excepturus. It had been good for him, if being conceived in his Mothers womb he had never been brought forth, but then had died, and his Mothers womb had been his grave. For had he then died his condemnation had been nothing like so heavy, as now it is. Let me add here Maldonado's interpretation of this place which is memorable. Of this passage some dispute subtelly more then enough how it could be better for Judas not to have been, whereas not to be is no good; to be damned is some good (meaning in respect of being) For he that is damned is somewhat and everything that is, as it hath a being is good. Jerome signifies that some though Judas had a being before he was born; and that Christ of purpose said not, it were better for that man, if he had never been; but if he had never been born, to signify that though he had not been born; yet he should have had a being, and so to have had natural good things without evil. I imagine that Jerome herein noted the Originists, whose opinion was that as souls were from the beginning created, and each according to his merit either to remain without a body, or to be cast into a body as into a prison. And indeed Origen so writes on this place, as he seems not to be far off from such an opinion. After the same manner almost doth Euthinius interpret this. But such like phrases of speech are not to be accommodated to the subtillty of the Schools. For they speak proverbial speeches and vulgar, which commonly are somewhat hyperbollicall, as Job 3. 11. Why hast thou brought me out of the womb? would I had perished, that the eye might not see me, that I had been as if I had not been, from the womb carried to the grave. And Ier: 20 14, 15, and chap: 33. Let the day perish wherein I was born. For all these proceed not from any deliberate judgment of the mind; but by way of complaint, whose course is to amplify evils. Christ therefore in like manner speaks of Judas, as it was to be thought he would speak of himself being in torment. Now it was very credible that he would say; I would I had never been born, it had been better for me never to have been born, then to suffer these pains: considering that Job and Jeremy most holy men have uttered the like speeches, under far less sufferings. Add to this that Christ saith not, It had been better that Judas had not been born born; but that it had been better to him, to wit, in his opinion and judgment: As we see it befalls many suffering bitter evils, to prefer death before life, sorrow & pain before judgment, whereas without doubt to live is better then to die.
In the next place this Author saith, this was also the opinion of Solomon. Better is he then both they, which hath not yet been; The words, saith he, do clearly show that Solomon didthinke it better to be dead and deprived of being, then to be oppressed of the mighty, and to have no comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournful being. Surely Solomon was not ignorant that of them that are dead there are two conditions; some in the state of damnation; others in the state of salvation. To be with God in the state of salvation, we make no question but that it is a better condition, then to be living here on the earth in the greatest happiness that the world can afford. But to be dead and in the state of damnation, can it enter into the heart of any sober Christian, to believe that Solomon ever thought such a condition to be better then to live here on earth, in the most afflicted condition that is incident to the sons of men? And doth this Author well in coupling death with deprivation of being, as if everyone, or any one that is dead were deprived of being? Surely all the dead are not deprived of all kind of living. For God is the Father of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; And he is not the God of the dead but of the living. Again consider who are more oppressed by the men of this world then the Children of God? For as our Savior told his disciples The world will love her own, but because ye are not of the world, and I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution, saith Paul, and through manifold temptations we must enter into the kingdom of God. And our Savior forewarned his disciples, Ye shall be hated of all men for my names sake. Now is it credible, that, this Author should believe or conceive that ever King Solomon was of such an opinion, as to profess, that it is better for the Children of God to be deprived of being then to live in oppression? Consider farther, the words chiefly pertinent to this Authors purpose alleged out of King Solomon are these, Better then they both is he which hath not yet been. Now I presume this is spoken not of such an one, who as yet hath not been; though hereafter he shall be. For such an one may be in as great oppression when his time comes, as any other is, or hath been, amongst those that have lived before him▪ But rather of such an one as never yet hath been, nor never shall be Now judge whether this can admit any sober sense, unless in a vulgar phrase, according to the intemperate expressions which in time of oppression are uttered by men wherein as Maldonado observes, there is always something hyperbolical, and such as must not be examinedaccording to the subtlety of the Schools. For consider, is there but one such that never yet was, nor evershall be; or are there many such? If many such, how come they to differ, who have nothing wherein to differ? What a vain imagination is it to talk of particulars that never had, or shall have existence, to ascribe unto them a better condition then is found in them, that have not being only but life also? We know Cicero hath professed & that according to the opinion of Stoics, that a virtuous man may descend into Phallaris his Bull without any destruction of his happy condition. I have consulted Solomo Iarhi upon this place, and he tells us what he hath seen in the Jews Midrach, namely, that there are 974 generations which have grown old and wrinkled from the creation, who yet never were created, and belike the Authors thereof conceive that Solomon spake of one of these. Rabbi Ibn Ezra, proposeth the question, how can any better condition be said to be unto him, who was never created. And his answer is, that we must not wonder at such a speech of Solomon; for such speeches have their course. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by reason of the shortness or streightnes of the languages; and therefore we must express ourselves figuratively, and to speak hyperbollically is to speak figuratively. I betake me to Mercer hereupon to acquaint myself with his judgment upon this place. Hoc autem dicitur; saith he, semper magnitudine aerumnarum hujus vitae considerata. Coeterum Christus aliâ ration habitâ beatos pronunciat, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam maxim & Dei nomen; quia spiritualia & coelestia considerat repositam illis coronam gloriae in futurum. Noster Solomon externa tantum & praesentis vitae incommoda perpendit quae vere hydra est. Thus he speaks always having his eyes fixed upon the greatness of the miseries of this life, but Christ in another respect pronounceth them blessed who suffer persecution for righteousness sake, especially and for the cause of God, because he considers spiritual and heavenly things, the Crown of Glory laid up for them against the time to come. Our Solomon considers only outward things and the incommodities of this life present, which indeed is as it were a Serpent with seven heads. This is the first expression of Mercer in his interpretation of this place, which is as much as to say, that, Solomon speakesherein according to the judgment of a natural man. But Mercer hath yet a farther reach then this, which followeth by way of instance or exemplification thus, Sienim earum ratio habeatur ab eo qui illas perfert, mortem peroptat, aut etiam nunquam fuisse. For when he that suffers these miseries shall consider the weight & heaviness of thē he will be ready to wish he were dead, or that he had never been; & no marvel: For as Maldonado observeth, even holy men of God such as Job & Jeremiah, have broken forth into such imprecations, judicio dolore corrupto, as he speaks, the pain which they suffer corrupting their judgment, this is to speak not only according to the judgment of a natural man, but according to the judgmet of a man himself that suffers such miseries. Furthermore Mercer taketh notice of the School-men's discourses to the contrary, juxta Scholarum subtilitatem, according to accurate judgmment, as Maldonado speaketh. Sophisticantur nostrorum nonnulli, praestare adhuc male esse, quàm omnino non esse. Some of ours dispute that it is better to be in an ill case, then to have no being at all. Now doth Mercer oppose this? Nothing less he rather admits it, and without contradiction thereunto, proceeds in his interpretation Sed ut ut sit, vis malorū consideratur. Buthowsoever that be, the force of the evil is considered, to wit, as before hath been shown. 1. As in the judgment of a natural man looking no farther then to the evils of this world. And 2ly, according to the sense & judgment of him that suffers them, Quomodo & Christus dicebat de Judah, melius fuerat homini illi si nunquam natus fuisset gravitatem praevidens tormentorum illius. After which manner Christ said of Judas, It had been better for that man if he had never been borne, foreseeing the greivousnesse of his torments. The Antient Greeks and Latins used the like proverb, Optimum non nasci, aut ubi natus sis, quam ocyssime aboleri. Graecum epigramma inquit
The best condition was not to be borne; the next to die soonest. Such were the conceits of natural men in consideration of the evils of this world. And Cicero is full of such passages in the first of his Tusculans questions. In the last place I meet with a fair translation of this passage of Solomon in Piscator, who sets his translation on the other side to the translationns of Junius, & thus it runs. Sed beatiorē ut ris{que} judicabam eū, qui non videt facta ista mala quae fiunt sub sole. But more hapy then both I judged him that hath not seen the evil works that are done under the Sun. For albeit in the Hebrew something more there is, which is not here expressed, to wit, which hath not been. Yet he conceives the last words to contain the fuil sense of them; and therefore he interprets these words of those who have perished in their Mothers womb, or in their infancy or childhood, not of those who never had any being, perceiving manifestly the foul absurdity of such a speech according to accurate calculation. And Mercer himself professeth that both these expressions are of the same force in Solomon, and so that is more plainly set down in the latter, which is more obscurely expressed in the former, which is a very usual course in Scripture.
To this assenteth Sir Fran • s Bacon in his Colours of good and evil; where against this Mathematical position (as he caus it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing, and that the before the degree of privation 〈◊〉 eater then the degree of diminution; he excepteth that it is fall • e in sundry cases, and among the est in 〈◊〉 ; namely, when the degree o • diminution is more •••• tive then the degree of privation In this case at 〈◊〉 〈…〉 much better then a diminution. Hence the 〈…〉 forms of speech. Better eye out l • e 〈…〉 Make or mar &c Some evils o • pains (perhaps) either for their lightness because they may be well end • e • ; or for their 〈…〉 because they are quickly over; are less: hen resolution into nothing And a man had better for a wh ••• 〈…〉 them, then loose 〈…〉 to be •• d of them: because his being may afford 〈◊〉 presently, or afterward such and • o many 〈…〉 things, as will more then recomp • nc • 〈◊〉 pain • s. But when his pains a •• so many and violent, 〈…〉 no other good then a poor being, or to • inch him, that he cannot enjoy or Joy in the good • that remain, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being; and such a • e the pains of 〈◊〉 ▪ which for the • greatness are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and waitings & •••• ning of teeth all symptoms of intolerable greifes, and for their • eng •• eternal. The woe • me never •• eth, the fi • c is never quenched but the breath of the Lord as a river ofbr •• ▪stone doth kindle it forever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in th • se torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of, much less by that poor little 〈◊〉 good, which is all the good the damned enjoy in hell.
This Sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like sert notwithstanding. I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damna ••• n of so many mi •• ions, cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice & cruelty which may in no wise be imputed unto God. Plutar • h speaking of the Pagans, who to pacify the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and woe • men; it had been much better with Di • gor is and his fellows to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to think he delights in the blood of men. How much rather may we say it were better to be an Atheist and deny God, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Souls of men? The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruel and merc •• es gods of the Pagans, doubtless, saith he, if there were any footstep or spark of goodness in them for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to do good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice and take a care of men. And being such how could they delight in their sl • ughter &c. Yea he concludeth that they were devils or evil spirits; and not God's or good spirits, because if they were good they would do good; whereas those that are evil use to do hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper, God indeed is the Creator of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned an th • r.
The Authority of S. Francis Bacon is most aliene from the present purpose, according to the instance given by him, which is only of a destruction of a member, as Better eye out then always akeing. Yet this holds not, save of such an akeing, as is more evil and dangerous, then the sight is beneficial, but we speak of the universal destruction of the creature. The same appears by the generality of the exception given, as in case the decree of diminution be more sensible (for so I conceive it should be, and not sensitive) then the decree of privation. Whereby it is manifest that he speaks of such a privation whereof the creature is sensible, though sensible with less smart and pain then the decree of diminnion. Otherwise if it be taken in comparison of no sense of the one, and some sense of the other, it would follow herehence that death is to be preferred before a pain: For every man is sensitive of the one, no man is sensitive of the other. I desire no fairer way to come to an issue in this particular, then that which is here proposed by this Author. He grants that some evil & pains, either for lightness or shortness are less then resolution into nothing. Yet with a perhaps only As if by reason of a pain in his back, he were in doubt to resolve whether it were better for him to be turned into nothing, then to endure it. Is this man yet resolved whether it be better for him to suffer Martyrdom for Christ, then to be (I do not say resolved; for as I know no composition of nothing; so neither do I know any resolution into nothing) turned into nothing? • t is not credibile: How then cōes in this parenthesis of a perhaps, was it to set a good face, upon his argument? or was it because he saw the dangerous con • equence of this his concession, being direct & absolute? For I find him more cunning then solid throughout like a crafty Crowder For seeing himself confesseth that some pains & Sorrows are willingly to be suffered by every reasonable man, rather then that he should be turned into nothing. Let us divide the latitude of pains & sorrows into a thousand degrees, if he think good: And then let him set down unto us at which degree it begins to make a mā more miserable, thē to be turned into nothing. In like manner as touching the durance of these sorrows; if he saith that the suffering of hell pains for an hour, for a day, for a year doth not make a mā worse, thē to be turned into nothing. Let him define ūnto us where that proportiō of time in suffering hell begins, which makes a mā more miserable thē to be turned into nothing Divers Divines maintain that Christ suffered hell pains for us: Will this Author say that this made him more miserable thē to be turned into nothing? Had he suffered thē to this very day, what helhound will dare to say it had been better for him to be turned into nothing? If S. Austin prayed, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quod vis. Lord give me grace to do what thou cōmmādest, & thē command what thou wilt. Pelagius spighted Austin for this.) May we not in like manner pray Lord give us grace to bear what thou layest upon us, & then lay upon us what thou wilt? Nay is it not Austin's profession that the punish̄nt of infants dying in Original sin is mitissima & such as they thenselves would not choose to be turned into nothing, to be freed frō it? And is it not in the power of God to give a mā strength to bear the very pains of hell & that without sin? Did not Christ suffer thē without sin, even such sorrows as the Greek Church professed in their Liturgy to be unknown sorrows, as Bishop Andrew's sometims observed in a passiō sermō of his? And if it be in the power of God to enable a mā to bear the pains of hell for an hour, a day, a year; is it not in his power to enable thē to hold out in suffering thē, & that without sin for the space of ten thousand years, & that in infinitū? Again all this while this Author takes no notice of the misery of sin, which Arminius (his well beloved) professeth to be greater thē the misery of punish̄nt. And he gives his reason for it, becuse illud bono divino, hoc humano oppositū est. That is opposit to a divine, this to ā human good? Will he say that it is better for a mā to be turned into nothing, then to rob, steal, take the name of God in vain, profane the Lord's Sabbath, to lie with another man's wife, to oppose truth against his knowledge & conscience? If this be his opiniō can he plead the common consent of the world, or the cōmō sense of mā for this? See by the way how he virifies the being of mā which he calls a poor little entitative good God looked upon all things that he had made, & behold they were very good, not the least fly, or ēmet, or worm is excepted frō the cōmendatio, yet mā was made after the Image & likeness of God. In other creatures are found vestigia Dei, footsteps of God, as Martin Luther observes out of the Ancients, but mā is Imago Dei the very Image of God; Yet this Author calls it a poor little ētitative good; & barely saith it, & when he hath done, wipes his lips frō all sophisticatiō, & claps that upon the back of his adversaries very authoritatively. Then the question is only of Miseria paenae, whether it makes a mā worse then annihilatiō, not in a cōplicate condition with sin, which is the condition of the damned. Yet thus he carrieth it to serve his turn; whereas in Arminius his opinion, the sinful condition of the damned, makes them more miserable then thir torments. But if the torments of hell in thenselves are able to make a man in a worse condition then to be turned into nothing, then an holy Angel or Saint should choose rather to be turned into nothing, thē to suffer the torēnts of hell. And the School divines dispute severally of the misery of sin, and the misery of torēnt, & that with such different resolutions upon the point, as to maintain, that albeit the misery of torment is not so bad as utter annihilation, yet the misery of sin, is. Yet therein I willingly profess I am not of their mind. For what? are not the Children of God sinners? Now what sober Christian will affirm, that it were better for them to be annihilated, then to be sinners. If you say, therefore it is not better for God's children to be annihilated then to be sinners; because they are not only sinners, but they are in the state of grace. I proceed farther, and demand whether God's Elect before their calling, being yet in the state of sin, as Manasseh and Saul before their vocation, were better to be annihilated, then to be as they are. What if I am a sinner, yet while I have any being I may mourn for my sin, I may serve God, I may enjoy his favor in the pardoning of my sin, is not this a better condition then not to be, which is a condition conjunct as well with the destruction of sanctity as of sin?
But the former argument, which he takes so much pains to enervate, he calls a sophistical evasion, and adds that so are all others of the like sort, very magisterially and resolutely. But what those others are he doth not so much as name. Not so much as one of Austin's, whose discourse alone I proposed on this point; together with an argument of Durand's, neither of all which doth he touch, yet I am the mark set up by him to shoot at, not Durand, not any one of the School-men, not Austin whose discourses alone I proposed. And as for the argument here mentioned, melius est esse, quam non esse; It is better to be then to have no being, therefore it is better to be in hell torment then not to be. This is neither argument, nor any of those that I proposed out of Durand and Austin. Durand's argument is, To be annihilated is an universal destruction of man's nature, not only of his well being, but of being: but hell pains is the destruction only of his well being not of his being. Neither is it answerable to the argument formerly mentioned by him p. 19. which was this. He that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell hath a being, and by consequence something that is good. Now this argument cometh nerest to Maldonats discourse upon that of our Savior, speaking of Judas. It had been good for that man he had not been borne. Some, saith he, dispute subtly more then enough, how it could be better for Judas, not to have been; whereas not to be is no good, to be damned is some good. For he that is damned is somewhat; And everything that is, as it hath a being, is good. And we know that man's being is no common good but a special one, as being made after God's own Image and likeness. And look with what judgment this Author extenuates, being human, calling it a poor, little entitative good; with the same judgment he might extenuate Angelical being. For even among Angels some have their portion in hell fire. But now he comes to his first proposition, that unavoidable damnation of so many millions cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice and cruelty. The question is of the suffering of hell pains, whether it be worse then to be annihilated? This Author runs upon the term damnation, which is a civil and judicial act. Is there no difference between these? They that say Christ suffered the pains of hell, do they say Christ was damned? Then to speak with a fuller mouth he puts in the damnation of so many millions, whereas if the damnation of one may be intended by God without injustice after what manner soever, undoubtedly the damnation of never so many millions may. Then he helps himself with the Epithite of unavoidable added to damnation, and the term absolutely affixed to God's intention, to no purpose that I know, but to abuse himself and others by confusion; for fear least the truth should break forth to their conviction. To intend damnation avoidable, what is it but to intend it conditionally. And to intend damnation not absolutely, is all one with to intend it conditionally. Now to intend the damnation of any man conditionally is with this Author as much, to intend his salvation as his damnation. Yet this he calls the intention of damnation. And Bradwardine hath long ago maintained and demonstated by evidence of reason, that there is no conditionate will of God: And this Author will not say (I suppose) that God did intend that Christ should suffer hell pains conditionately, or that if he did intend it absolutely, he was unjust in so doing. Now both D. Jackson expressly confesseth, that the distinction of will antecedent and consequent in God▪ is to be understood, not as touching the act of willing, but as touching the thing willed. And Gerardus Vossius acknowledgeth that after the same manner must the conditionate will, which is ascribed unto God, be interpreted. Now we willingly confess that the thing willed and intended by God to Reprobates, namely, damnation, befalls none, but in case they die in sin without repentance. And as already I have shown not any of our Divines maintain that God intended to damn any man but for sin. Only the main point of difference between us is, as touching the conferring & denying grace, even the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance. Herein we willingly confess that God carrieth himself merely according to the pleasure of his own will, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now on this point this Author keeps himself close, and earthes himself within his own concealements, lest he should betray the bitter Leven of Pelagianism, in maintaining that grace is conferred according unto works, which cannot be avoided by him, if once he comes to deal on this Argument. He thinks he hath great advantage in the point of Reprobation, and very free he is here, but declines the point of election, and point of conferring grace, which argueth a naughty disposition, practicing by indirect courses to circumvent and suppress the truth, rather then confer anything for the clearing of it: yet see his confused carriage in the very point. For when he speaks of damnation avoidable and unavoidable, he takes no pains to manifest in what sense he takes it to be avoidable; as whether by power of nature, or power of grace. Is it his meaning that any man's damnation is avoidable by grace? We deny it not. Or is it his meaning that it is avoidable by nature? we utterly deny this. But this man counts it his wisdom not to speak distinctly, but work his advantage upon confusion of things that differ; but let all such take heed, least utter confusion be their end. But if it be his meaning that all men have power to avoid damnation if they will, to wit, in as much as they have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will: I would he would deal fairly once, and come to this. The Scripture is express, That they that are in the flesh cannot please God, that the natural man discerneth not the things of God, that they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. That, they cannot believe, cannot repent. Of the Children of Israel in the wilderness that, God had not given them eyes to see, ears to hear, nor hearts to perceive forty years. And truly we take faith and repentance to be the gift of God. And the habits of them not to be a power to believe and repent if a man would, but an habitual and moral inclination of them to believe, to repent. And habits (as it was wont to be said) Agunt ad modum naturae, do work after the manner of nature. And it is very strang that supernatural grace should not. And long ago I have learnt in Austin, that to do good, and obey God if a man will, is rather nature then grace. For the will alone is all in all as touching acts moral, good or evil; and till the will be changed, we are as far off as ever, from performing anything that is pleasing in the sight of God. This is the peculiar glory of God's grace, To make us perfect to every good work, and to work in us that with is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, and this he doth according to his good pleasure. For grace is not conferred according unto works. That was condemned as a pestilent doctrine long ago in the Synod of Palestine, and all along in divers Councils against the Pelagians. How gladly should I embrace any delineation of this Authors opinion in the point of grace and free will, the rather, because I seem to smell who he is by this which followeth. For I remember sometime under whose hand I read it; namely, that, Plutarch speaking of the Pagans, who to pacify the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women, should say, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellows to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God, to think he delights in the blood of men. But allbeit this supercilious and confident professor be of Plutarch's mind in this, I willingly profess I am not. I know no natural reason why he should delight more or less in the blood of beasts, then in the blood of men. Only it pleased him by the blood of Bulls and Goats to represent the delight he took in the satisfaction made in the blood of his own Son. We know in what errand the Lord sent Abraham three days journey, namely, to sacrifice his Son upon mount Moriah; had not God hindered him it had been done; Abraham knew no other but that it should be done, when he answered his Son saying, My God will provide himself of a burnt offering. Abraham did not break forth in this man's language, to say he would rather deny there was any God, then believe he delights in blood; neither had he delighted in blood, though Isaac had been sacrificed, but in the obedience of his servants. Nor had Isaac received any loss by this. For Abraham knew that God was able to raise him from the dead. Did not Samson sacrifice himself. Christ was content to shed his precious blood for us, and we by his grace shall be content to shed our blood for him, & that according to his good will and pleasure. Let heathens thus discourse who are nothing acquainted with the powers of the world to come; but a foul shame it is for Christians to comply with them. But, how much rather, saith this Author, may we say it were better to be an Atheist, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the souls of men. Yet I cannot be persuaded it is better to be an Atheist then to belive even this. For I must not give ground to a confident Theologue for his bare protestation sake. What is it I pray for God to be a devourer of the souls of men? Is it any other then to be a tormenter of of them in hell fire? Now doth not this man believe that God deals so with millions of souls? Doth not he profess, that, the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone doth kindle that fire? what out recuydance hath possessed the spirit of this Cavaliere that he should flaunt it to the world in this manner? It seems his atcheivements known so well to the world have puffed him up, that he swells with the conceit of it: And 'tis enough for him now to brave it with protestations instead of arguments, wherein having known him so well heretofore, I cannot but wonder at the poverty of his spirit; he will battle so long upon his credit and reputation with the world, that it will crack at length; and he prove bankrupt: So that protest what he will no man will trust him for a groat. Now in that manuscript of his, which it was my hap sometime to have a view of, his protestation upon the book of that saying of Plutarch was somewhat different, thus. I protest unto you, I think it was less dishonor able to the blessed Trinity to say with the Atheist there is no God, then to form such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants, maketh him to be. This protestation though it had course in private, yet here it is changed that it might not see the light of the Press. For it is well known that this toucheth nearly a whole Synod of the Church reformed; and that countenanced by King James and divers worthy Divines of this Kingdom subscribing to it, some yet living, and two of them in Apice Episcopali, in Episcopal dignity. Yet what is that doctrine of the Contraremonstrants that he pincheth upon? It is well known that their general tenet is that God ordains no man to damnation but for sin; some difference there hath been, and is about the ordering of God's decrees, which is merely apex Logicus, & what my opinion is thereabouts is well known; namely that in no moment of time or reason doth God ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin, more particularly thus; that all besides the Elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to their selves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin, and lastly to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the Glory of his Justice on them, & of the greater mercy on the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory; inasmuch as he hath of his free grace provided better for them, then for millions of others. Only as touching the grace of regeneration, of faith and of repentance; he did not only ordain of his mere pleasure to bestow that on his Elect, and not on Reprobates; but in time he doth of his mere pleasure confer that grace on some; denying it to others. This doctrine is so dishonorable to the Trinity in this Authors judgment, as that to deny there is any God at all, he thinks to be less dishonorable: A prodigious assertion! We have the less cause to be moved, when he preferred the annihilation of our natures, before the suffering of hell pains. When he seems to prefer the annihilating of the blessed Trinity, before the renouncing of his own vile fancies. As for that of Eusebius, true it is, the god's of Paynims sought only the destruction of those that served them, and that not of their bodies but their souls also. The true God put Abraham once upon the sacrificing of his Son, for the trial of his faith and obedience, but perceiving his obsequious readiness, took a course to restrain him. Of him it it is true, He saveth both man and beast, and the eyes of all do wait upon him, and he gives them meat in due season, he heareth the cry of Ravens, and not a sparrow lights upon the ground without his providence; The very Lions roaring after their prey do seek their meat at (the hands of) God. Yet if he be pleased to save our souls, we have reason to submit unto him in doing what he will with our bodies, which yet one day he will raise, glorious bodies, when mortality shall be swallowed up of life. We acknowledge no other end of man's creation, and of all other Divine Acts of God, but his own glory. For even there where Solomon professeth, God hath made even the wicked against the day of evil, he withal acknowledgeth, that both them and all things, he hath made for himself. God of his mere pleasure created all, but of his mere pleasure he damneth none. But everyone that is damned is damned for his sin, & that willfully committed & contumaciously continued by them that come to ripe years. For as Austin saith Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia: Liberty without grace, is not liberty, but willfulness or contumacy. I come to the second part of his first argument.
The second part of the Argument.
Sect. 1.
Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with men's sins on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the sin only that entered by Adam into the world, but of all other sins, that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end. No murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of God Almightys decrees. The Scripture I am sure teaches us another lesson. Thou art not a God, saith David that hast pleasure in wickedness. And the Prophet Isaiah tells the people, that when they did evil in the sight of the Lord, they did choose the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence. And St. John when he had referred all the sins of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; tells us that, they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me add the speech of Stracides (though not of the same authority.) Say not thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath caused me to err; for he hath no need of the sinful man.
2. Pious antiquity hath constantly said the same, and pressed it with sundry reasons; some of which are these as follow. If God be the Author of sin, then he is worse then the Devil; because the devil doth only tempt and persuade to sin, and his action may be resisted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted. This is Prospers argument, who to some objecting that by St. Austin's doctrine, when Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sons, Servants murder their masters, & men commit any horrible villainies, it cometh to pass because God hath so decreed. Answereth that if this were laid to the Devils charge, he might in some sort clear himself of the imputation. Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen sc non intulisse vim criminum. Because though he be delighted with man's sins yet he doth not, he cannot compel men to sin: What a madness therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be justly fathered upon the Devil.
2. He cannot be a punisher of sin: For none can justly punish those effences of which they are the Authors. This is Prospers argument too. It is against reason to say that he wich is the damner of the Devil would have any one to be the devils Servant. This reason Fulgentius useth likewise illius rei Deus ultor est, cujus Auhor non est. Tertullian also before them hath said. He is not to be accounted the Author of sin, who is the forbidder yea and the condemner of it.
3. He cannot be God, because he should not be just, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties essential to God. And this is Basil's reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. It is all one (saith he) to say that God is the Author of sin, and to say he is not God.
3 Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the sins of men, is neither good nor true.
It is first laid to the charge of our Divines that by this their opinion, they make God the Author of sin; not of the first only that entered by Adam into the world, but of all other sins, that have been, are, or shall be committed in the world, as murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations. But in all these wasteful discourses not a word of proof. The charge is made in the first place, the proof last. All that he labors to prove here is, that God is not the Author of sin. Bellarmine hath bestowed, or rather cast away a whole book on this crimination, to him Arminius refers Perkins, telling him that he should have answered Bellarmine. I have taken some pains to perform that task upon that motion of Arminius. I would I could receive from this Author a reply to any material particular thereof, the rather because I understand in part his Zeal for Bellarmine in his age, correcting the harsh exceptions he hath made against him in his younger days. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Authors discourse, with that discourse of Bellarmine, and judge indifferently what an hungry piece this is in comparison to that of Bellarmine's; And whether his pains had not been better bestowed in replying upō my answer thereunto, then to add such scraps as these to that full table of Bellarmine's provision; and whether these deserve any answer, that whole discourse of Bellarmine being refuted throughout. Bradwardine disputes the question, Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum. I say he disputes it indifferently on both sides; and let every Scholar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argument, and consider well his resolution, and where he differrs anything from our Divines in this Calvin observing how frequent the Scripture is in testifying God's hand to be operative in abominable courses, thereupon writes a Treatise. De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo; in all which he exactly conforms himself to Scripture expressions. And these and such like vile Criminators may as well tax God's word for making God the Author of sin, as Calvin; who most accurately conforms himself to the testimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a disputation sometimes at Heidelburg on this Argument, where Copenius the President or Moderator made manifest, that look upon what grounds they criminated Calvin for making God the Author of sin; upon the same grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of sin. For Calvin throughout in his expressions conforms himself to the language of the holy Ghost. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, God takes pleasure in sin. Piscator confesseth that, God taketh no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, upon that place in Ezekiel; how much less in wickedness. And he illustrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denied, but that God willeth the death of him that dieth. For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth; yet he takes no pleasure in it. Like as a sick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleasure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel go; and as the Apostle speaks, hardeneth whom he will. Whereby it comes to pass infallibly that they do not obey the Gospel, as appeareth by the objection following. Why then doth he complain. For who hath resisted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expostulate with him in this manner; Why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts against thy fear? Yet we know that God takes no pleasure in disobedience, or in the hardness of any man's heart, nor can be the Author of evil, with Sir Francis Bacons distinction in the book formerly mentioned by this Author. Non quià non Author, sed quià non mali. So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto disobedience, & in the prophet Isaiah’s phrase causeth men to err from his ways. Yet the Lord himself we know is righteous in all his ways, & holy in all his works, though we are not able to dive into the gulf, and search out the bottom of his judgments, and no marvel. For they are unsearchable; Yet we make no question but through God's mercy convenient satisfaction may be found without any such shāefull course of dismēbring scripture, and taking notice only of such passages as represent God's displeasure against sin & sinners, and dissembling all other passages which drave Austin to confess, occulto Dei judicio, by the secret judgment of God, fieri perversitatem cordis, the perversity of man's heart hath its course, much less by setting thē together by the ears. And I nothing doubt but the issue will be on the part of such, as are of this Authors spirit, either wholly to deny original sin, or so to emasculate the vigor of it, as to profess that it is in the power of mā to cure it; or notwithstanding the strength of it, to believe & reap̄t if he will; which though they pretend to be wrought by a certain universal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we shall be able to prove that such a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it so that wicked men in their wicked courses do chose the things that God would not, Who would think that this Author, who makes such a flourish should content himself with such beggarly arguments; or that the world should be so simple as to be terrified with such scarcrowes? For is it not apparent that in scripture phrase there is voluntas praecepti, a will of commandment, as well as voluntas propositi, a will signifying God's purpose and decree? So thē though they choose the things that God willed not in reference to his will of commandment; yet it might be God's will, that is his purpose that even such sins should come to pass. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh should not let Israel go for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpose that so he might make himself known in the land of Egypt by his judgments? & did he not reveal this to Moses to the comfort of the childrē of Israel, & keep thē from despair in contēplation of the obstinacy of Pharaoh's spirit, when they were assured that God had an hand in hardening Pharaoh to stand out? And doth not Bellarmine profess that malū fieri permit sin & Deo bonū est, it is good that evil should cō to pass by God's permission? And shall it be unbecōing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he opposeth the same Doctrine of ours which this Author doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Author betrayeth, and withal carrieth himself with far more ingenuity. For he takes notice of those places of Scripture whereupon our Divines do build, and accommodates himself to aswer them by some intepretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Author doth not 2. But what if there be no such text as this Author builds upon? For look what the word is, used in the original Ps. 5. 4. the same is used Es. 66 4 Now that in Ps. 5. 4 This Author renders not that wouldest not iniquity, but that hast no pleasure in iniquity And why then shall not that Es. 66. 4. be accordingly rendered thus. They choose the things wherein I had no pleasure, or wherein I had no delight, and not as he expresseth it the things that I would not. Hereupon I imagined our Enlish tranlation had thus rendered it, but consulting that, I found the contrary. For thus they render it. They choose the things wherein I delighted not. It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to prefer and follow the Geneva translation before the last and most authentical translation of the Church of England? In like manner the practice of Geneva must be of authority to cry us down in the point of the morality of the fourth commandment. Were not the man well known to be sound at heart, his favorites might well suspect him to praevaricate, in making so great a cry, and yet yielding so little wool. In the next place he allegeth that of James. Let no man say when he is tempted that he is temptedof God. For God tempteth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence Now Peter Martyr on the first to the Romans deals at large upon this place, and disputes strangely indiscoursing of God's providence in evil. I would this Author had taken the pains to answer him at least, that he might perform somewhat tanto dignum hiatu, worthy of the great gaping he makes. It is true Bellarmine hath taken him to task after a sort in his eight chapter of his second book de Amiss. gratiae & statu peccati. And I have replied upon Bellarmine at large in my Vindiciae, in that large digression wherein I take Bellarmine to task in that book of his, whereunto I refer the Reader. Yet to say somewhat of this place before I pass. It is apparent that the Apostle in this place doth not so put off from God the works of tempting as to cast it upon Satan; but only so as to show, that whatsoever the divine providence is there about, either by the ministry of Satan (who is God's minister in hardening men to precip • tate courses (I Kings the last) or otherwise, yet still the sinner is inexcusable; for as much as he is then only tempted (effectually) For so it is to be understood; otherwise it were not true, as it appears in the case of Joseph tempted by his Mistress) when he is drawn away by his own concupiscence. It is true, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world, they are the members of that body of sin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by natural generation. Holy Jacob the Son of holy Isaac a Patriach, & of holy Rebekah a Prophetess was borne in sin as well as Esau; and Seth as well as Cain, and this seemeth to be called the image of Adam, after his fall Behold I was shapen in wickedness, saith David, and in sin hath my Mother conceived me. And except a man be borne again he cannot see the kingdom of God. This, though a mystery, yet is nothing strange to us, whom God in mercy hath reserved unto these times or grace; But it was very strange to Nicodemus a Ruler in Israel. This hath been the condition of man ever since the fall of Adam; and arising merely from the withdrawing of God's spirit from him, and that most justly upon their first sin in tasting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the sin of our first parents in the way of a meritorious cause, so from the just judgment of God taking his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to do, as appears by this, that by virtue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in Christ, he doth not take his spirit from us, though too often we sin againsthim. No not from David, notwithstanding those foul sins committed by him, at appears by his prayer unto God; that, he would restore him to the joy of his salvation, signifying therereby that he had lost that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifesting hereby that still he retained that. And considering that God proceeded with Adam herein in the way of judgment, Augustine acknowledgeth Concupiscence to be a punishment of sin, as well as sin, and a cause of other sins, in his fifth book against Julian the Pelagian cap. 3 As for that of Siracides, say not thou, God hath caused me to err. As it is true that no man must cast the blame of sinning upon God, & think himself blameless: So it is as true that in consideratiō of our own inability to stand of ourselves & prones to fall (evē to fall away like water spilled upō the ground that cannot be recovered; contain it self it cannot, but it may easily becontained) the Church doth sometimes expostulate with God (such is the liberty and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which he vouchsafeth unto his Children) in an holy manner saying, Wherefore hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts against thy fear; Not that this he doth, infundendo malitiam, by infusing malice into them but, non infundendo gratiam, by not infusing such grace into them as to preserve them from sin For as Martha said unto Jesus, Lord if thou hadst been here our brother Lazarus had not died. So may we say if the strength of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not sined in this or that particular. It is true God hath not need of the sinful ma: much less of his salvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleasure manifest his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of justice punishing, he must permit sin to enter into the world, & forbear that providence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angels, so he might have kept man also from sinning. As for the reasons of p • o • s Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Author of sin, they are very needless in this controversy between us & our adversaries, the question between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adversaries so denying him to be the Author of evil, as withal they deny him to be the Author of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, so to maintain that God is not the Author of sin, that withal we maintain that he is the Author of all good, both moral and natural, and much more supernatural. Yet as I have considered the seven reasons of Bellarmine to this purpose collected out of the Ancients; so I am content to take into consideration the three reasons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the first to manifest how superficiarily and absurdly he carrieth himself therein, observe the wildness of his reasoning besides all rules of sobriety. If God (saith he) be the Author of sin, then he is worse then the Devil, because the Devil doth only tempt and persuade to sin, and his action may be resisted. Let all the Universities of the world be judge between us of the shameful irregularity of this discourse. His syllogism is hypothetical; for the first proposition is hypothetical and conditional. Now all such syllogisms by the rule of all Schools must proceed either from the negation of the consequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the consequent; but no such process is made here. And indeed it should be framed thus to infer the proposition undertaken to be proved. If God be the Author of sin, then he is worse then the Devil; but God is not worse then the Devil; therefore he is not the Author of sin. But this Author disputes after no such manner. But his affection carrying him all along to cast some foul aspersion on our Doctrine in some particular or other, and being withal in heat of passion, he doth most shamefully involve and entangle himself And indeed quite besides his present purpose, he aims only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerful and effectual decree, doth more make God the Author of sin then the Devil, which is utterly aliene from that he proposed in this place. Yet I am willing to do him this favor, to help a lame Dog over the style, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he cannot so dext'rously deliver himself though quite besides the purpose. Thus therefore the argument should proceed according to his irregular intention. If God doth will and procure sins by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted, then is God worse then the Devil. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure sins by a powerful and effectual decree which cannot be resisted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worse then the Devil. Thus have I endeavored to bring this argument to some shape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me show the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may discern what spirit he breathes, that is the Author of it in a mixture both of ignorance and abominable profaneness. And first I begin with the major proposition. And here first let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authors opinion, that, God doth will and procure sin by some decree, though not by a powerful and effectual decree that cannot be resisted. For otherwise did he acknowledge every will of God as it signifies his decree, to be powerful, and effctuall and irresistable, what need he cumber his Reader with such unnecessary Epithites, cast in like lumber only to trouble the course of disputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree sin by a powerful and effectual decree. 1. He must contradict himself. For formerly he cited, Es. 66. 4, to prove that men in wicked courses, do choose the things that God would not. 2. If God doth will it, but not by a powerful and effectual, & irresistable decree, let him show what that decree is, whereby he wills sins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditional; and let him speak plainly then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure sin in the world, and I am verily persuaded he is to seek what to answer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it cannot be avoided, but it must be, by a powerful and effectual decree which cannot be resisted; seeing the Apostle saith plainly speaking of his decree, that it cannot be resisted. Upon these considerations I am persuaded, that this Author doth utterly deny that God doth at all will sin, or decree that any such thing shall come to pass in the world, & that these attributes of powerful, and effectual, & irresistable, are used by him not for distinction sake, but merely for amplification, that so he might speak with a full mouth. Now having brought this Author home to himself, and delivering himself and his meaning plainly, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having so fully disputed the point in a certain digression in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digrees. 4. The title whereof is this, Whether the holy one of Israel without any blot to his Majesty may be said to will sin. And forthwith I answer, that, God may be said thus far to will sin, in as much as he will have sin to come to pass. And for explication sake it is added, that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether natural, moral, or spiritual come to pass by his working of them: Only evil things he will have come to pass by his permitting them. But this Author affects to work upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their brains with answering my reasons, least thereby he should raise many spirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this discourse of M. Hord's some of that sect thought good to have it coppied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and so more fit to promote their edificatiō in the plausible way of Arminian religion: well therefore in the proof of this tenet, namely, that God will have sin come to pass by his permission. I prove first by Scripture. God hath put in their hearts (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) to fulfill his will. Now mark what is the object of God's will, in the words following, and to agree, and give their kingdomes unto the beast until the words of God shall be fulfilled: now by giving their Kingdoms unto the beast, is not to depose or dethrone themselves, or to part with their Kingdoms, but only to submit their regal authority to the executiō of the beasts wrath against the Saints of God. Like as in the days of Popery, when the Saints of God were by Popish Prelates condemned for heresies, then they were delivered into the hands of the secular powers, the sherifes to burn thē at a stake. Now this the holy Ghost makes the object of God's will, and their agreement thus to execute the Popes Antichristian pleasure is said to be God's work. For God is said to put it into their hearts to do this evil of his. Of disobedient persons the Apostle professeth that they are ordained to stūble at God's word, wherein undoubtedly they sin. Paul likewise testified of some that God sends thē strong delusions, that they should believe a lie. of others that God gave them up to uncleanes through the lusts of their own hearts to dishonor their own bodies between thenselves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient. Now let every sober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardened the harts of the other, it were not his will, that those foul things which were committed by them should come to pass by his permissiō. Then consider what the Apostles with one consent testify concerning those abominable acts committed against the holy son of God, namely that both Herod & Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Israel, were gathered together to do what God's hand & his counsel had before determined to be done. This the Apostles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditations. And let every Christian consider, whether it the Scripture had not made mention of this, & any one of us had used the like prayer & meditatiō, this Author & all that are of his spirit, would not have been ready to spit in our faces & cry us down for notorious blasphemers. Yet the Apostles endued with the spirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lord's holiness in all this. Hence I proceeded to the passages of the Old Testament for the confirmation of the same truth. As namely that whereas the desolatiō of the holy Land begun by the Assyrians, finished by the Babylonians, could not come to pass without many enormous sins. Who can deny, that it was God's will that these things should come to pass, considering that Assur himself is acknowledged by God to be the rod of his wrath and the staff of his indignation, whom God would send against an hypocritical nation, & against the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the spoil, & to take the prey, & to tread them down like the mire in the streets? Hence I proceeded to show how that it is God's usual course to punish sin with sin. Now when God exerciseth his judgments, shall not those things justly be said to come to pass by his will, which are punishments of foregoing sins? See the judgment of God denounced against Amaziah the Priest of Bethel. Thou sayst prophecy not against Israel, & drop not thy word against the house of Isaac. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot in the Cities, & thy sons & thy daughters shall fall by the sword. And in like manner Solomon saith The mouth of a strange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lordshall fall therein. The incest of Absalom defiling his fathers cōcubines in a shameless manner, came it not to pass by the will of God, whose word is this; Behold I will raise up evil against thee, out of thine own house, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbor, & he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun? The defection of the ten tribes frō the house of David, came it not to pass by the will of God, when God himself testifies that it was his work, & not his will only? Thus saith the Lord the God of Israel, I will rent the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee, speaking to Jeroboam; here we have God's will for it. And again the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God saying, speak to Rehoboā the son of Solomon King of Judah, & unto all the house of Judah & Benjamin, & to the remnant of the people, saying, Thus saith the Lotd, ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren, the children ef Israel; return every man to his house; for this thing is from me. Here we have God's word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of Pharohs heart, that he should not let Israel go; the selling of Joseph