The Riches of Gods Love

Section. 2.

It is a usual course with this Author to lay unto our charge, that God hath immutably decreed this or that; So that if we had said that all this were decreed by God not immutably, but mutably, we should not incur the danger of his displeasure so immutably, and unavoidably as we do. Now to decree not immutably, but mutably, is a phrase that I nowhere meet with, but among men of this Authors spirit; the congruity whereof I willingly profess, is so far from mine understanding, as no phrase more. If they would in the name of common sense expound themselves unto us, then we should soon consider what Answer we are to give in. We willingly profess, that all God's decrees are unchangeable, but of decreeing a thing unchangeably, not any of our Divines discourse, that I know of. We say that God decreeth some things to come to pass necessarily, and some things to come to pass contingently; so doth Aquinas: and we understand his language right well, and approve his doctrine in this particular. We willingly confess that as God hath chosen some, whom he means to deliver from that bondage of sin, and Satan, whereinto all are cast by the transgression of Adam. And how to deliver them? Surely by bestowing the spirit of grace, and regeneration upon them, so to open their eyes and bring them out of darkness into light, and from the power of Satan unto God; In few words by bestowing faith and repentance upon them. All others he hath from everlasting determined not to show the like grace and favor unto. For we see by experience that to many he gives not faith and repentance. And look how he carrieth himself towards any persons in time, after the same manner he determined to carry himself from everlasting. And the Scripture expressly tells us that even of them that are called, but few are chosen; and consequently the number of reprobates must needs be far greater, then the number of the elect. Now as many as God hath decreed to deny faith and repentance unto, we hold it impossible for them, upon this supposition, to be recovered out of the bondage of sin and Satan; because the Scripture in divers places expressly tells us, that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; and therefore to whomsoever he will not be so gracious, as to give faith, and repentance, we judge it a thing impossible upon this supposition, that any of them should believe, should repent. And more then this, as touching every particular here delivered, we account it so apparently, testified in holy Scripture, that we wonder not a little with what face this Author can deny it. Nay, we verily believe that he belives all these as well as we. And the true point of Substantial difference between us is concealed by him all along, which is an argument of no ingenuity; but yet I bear with him in following Lysanders counsel, when the Lions skin will not hold out, to piece it out with a fox skin; least otherwise his Pelagian tenet would be discovered in a most palpable and gross manner. For undoubtedly he believes that faith is the gift of God; as also that it is impossible, that they should believe, to whom God will not give faith. But his tenet is, that God is ready and willing to give faith to all, not absolutely, but conditionally; to wit, in case they make themselves fit for it, by performing somewhat on their parts. Now this is as good as in express terms to profess, that Grace is conferred according to merits, or according unto works: For between works and merits in this controversy there is no difference, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth; And in the Epistle of Prosper to Austin they are taken promiscuously, as of the same force and signification. Now this doctrine is expressly contradictory to the word of God. God hath saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our own works but according to his own purpose and grace. The like we have, Tit. 3. 5. And in like manner this doctrine hat: been condemned in the Church of God, as the sour leaven of Pelagianism, from the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago all along; and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe to the Canons of that Synod of Palestine, wherein Anathema was pronounced upon them, that do, or shall maintain, that Grace is conferred according unto works.

If God hath decreed not to bestow faith upon a man, if he hath not decreed to bestow upon him the gift of charity, it is impossible, that any work can be done by such a one proceeding from faith and love, and consequently such a one hath no liberty from sin, and that no such liberty is found in a natural man, in an unregenerate, is the doctrine of our Church by D. Potters confession, a Cathedral Divine, I do not say by the constant doctrine of D. Fulke in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, and if no liberty from sin be found in such a one, it follows that such a one remains under a necessity of sinning, not that every sin, whether of lying, stealing, whoring, murder, or in any other kind is necessarily committed by him; For a natural man may be as moral as any heathen hath been, many of whom have been very famous and renowned in the world for their morality; But whether they are exercised in virtuous actions, or in abstaining from actions vicious, yet still they sin, forasmuch as they neither perform the one, nor abstain from the other in a gracious manner, out of faith and love. And therefore Austin was somewhere bold to style them Splendida peccata glorious sins. For novimus non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes, Virtues are to be discerned not by their offices, but by their ends. The Helen we fight for is nothing but the word of God, and the truth manifestly contained therein; namely concerning the prerogative of his grace, as effectual to every good work, and most Freely given to some and denied to others, not according to men's works, according to that of S. Paul God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. This is a part of God's sovereignty; And it stands all true subjects upon to maintain the lawful Sovereignty of their Princes; how much more doth it become the creature to stand for the lawful prerogative and Sovereignty of his Creator, especially when he proceeds herein according to the tenor of God's word, clear reason and the unanimous consent of all the orthodox in the Church of God clearly opposing Pelagius herein from the Synod of Palestine 1200. years ago to this day.

The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation, amongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush. For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall, other then a denial of that grace and glory, which is prepared in the decree of election to the sons of God, though indeed neither of them make it a denial, which is done in time, but rather God's decree to deny it. For do not the latter Divines maintain it to be peremptory, as well as the former? For what difference doth he devise between a flat denial, and a peremptory denial; and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned, namely a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell do not the latter Divines acknowledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also? Only they profess that God preordaines none to eternal torments in hell but for their sins actual as well as original, of as many as live to ripeness of age. Now I would fain know what Divine of ours maintains the contrary.

1. Our Divines in saying, Reprobation is, Decretum quo statuit non misereri do manifest, that not denying grace, but the decree of denying it, is Reprobation. Walaeus speaketh of no common endowments, though that be a truth, which here is attributed unto them; else how should they be called common endowments.

2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace, and consequently under that necessity of sinning into which all are cast by the sin of Adam; it is nothing strange, I think that God should accordingly leave them therein; though in a different manner, the Lord prostituting some to their own lost's and to the power of Satan, more then others, and making some even by the ministry of the Gospel, proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur; as Austin some where speaketh. If God's decree cannot be frustrated, as here is avouched; I wonder he should charge us with teaching, that God decreeth this, or that immutably. For if he should change any of his decrees, they should undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed we do not say, that God decrees Hypothetically to give grace, to wit upon condition, that men will make themselves fit for it, and for failing herein to deny them grace. And I am very glad to observe so good correspondence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the Synod of Dort, and our English also with them.

Sect: 3.

That God of his mere pleasure showeth mercy on some, and hardeneth others is the express word of God. Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now to show mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience, as appears by the opposition of it to obduration, which is such as whereupon followeth disobedience; as appears by the objection following hereupon; Thou wilt say then why doth yet cōplain, For who hath resisted his will? Now God complaineth of nothing but disobedience. Again to give faith, is to show mercy. For to have faith is to obtain mercy. Heretofore ye have not believed, but now have obtained mercy through their unbelief. Where to believe & to obtain mercy are made equipollent, & of the same signification. And in reason, if God did deny faith, because of some unpreparedness in the creature, then God did expect that the creature should first prepare himself, and make himself fit for faith, that so God might bestow it upon him; & so grace should be confer'd according to works; which is contradictious to express testimony of holy scripture, testifying that God hath saved us & called us with an holy calling, not according to our works but according to his own purpose and grace; & all along hath been condened in the Church of God for Pelagianism. Thus we have been entertained with a discourse containing nothing, but the opinion of our Divines, which none of us deny: Yet in the proposing hereof he hath wasted a whole leaf and more Now he comes to his argument drawn from these two laid together.

1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.

2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity. Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates sins; But this we utterly deny. Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reasons.

1. Because the cause of the cause is the cause of its effect, if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect. But God is the chief or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sins of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernatural grace. For answer whereunto I say, first beginning with the minor. 1. That the want of supernatural grace is not the immediate cause of the sins of Reprobates, nor the chief cause; much less the sole cause. And I prove it evidently. Let instance be given in any sin committed by a Reprobate; let it be the sin of murder, or of fornication, or of theft, or of lying! For if it were, then every reprobate should be guilty of murder, of fornication, of lying, of stealing For, positâ causâ principali & immediatâ ponitur effectus; Where a principal and immediate cause doth exist, there the effect must needs exist. But it is apparent, that albeit every reprobate doth want supernatural grace, yet every reprobate is not guilty of murder, of fornication, lying, and stealing. Secondly, If the want of supernatural grace were the immediate and principal cause of all the sins of reprobates; then not only every Reprobate should be guilty of committing all the sins formerly mentioned, but at all times everyone of these sins should be committed by them; Because at all times they want supernatural grace. And the truth is, everyone of these sins may be abstained from without supernatural grace, and for carnal respects: Only without supernatural grace they cannot be abstained from, in a gracious manner; as namely out of faith in God, and love to God. He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abstain from these vile courses out of faith and love. In like sort, heathen men in their generations have been exceeding virtuous, according to the worlds account of virtue, in moderating their passions, and ordering their conversation aright one towards another; and all this hath been performed by them without supernatural grace. Thirdly, The immediate cause of all their sins rather of the two, is their natural corruption, whereby they are habitually turned away from God; and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner. Like as the immediate cause actionis laesae, of a natural function of the body imperfect, is the disease or infirmity that hath seised upon some part of the body; And the Physician who is able to cure it, and will not; is the cause why it continueth uncured: But no wise man will say, he is the cause why this or that member in a sick man's body doth not perform its operation as it should. In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the soul, the want of supernatural grace is the cause, why those vicious actions continue uncured, because God alone by his grace can cure them; but no sober man that is well in his wits, should say that is the cause of vicious actions; but acknowledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cause of these vicious actions. And indeed all moral philosophy refers the cause of every vicious action, unto the vicious habit depraving the will, and inclining it to vicious courses. Fourthly, Yet farther to represent the wildness of this Authors discourse. The vicious habit it self is not the sole cause; no nor the principal and immediate cause of a vicious action in particular. For if it were, then that particular vicious action should always be committed by it; So that an impure person should always commit fornication; a Lyar should always lie; a Thief should always steal; a Murtheret should always commit murder. For it is a rule generally received, that the immediate and principal cause being existent, the effect must needs exist also. And indeed albeit, habits, whether good or evil, do work after the manner of nature inclining and swaying the will to the accomplishment of them; Yet the will of man being a free, and not necessary Agent, proceeds not to work, but according unto judgment and occasions and opportunityes from without. And albeit a purser that maintain himself by robbery hath a fair opportunity offered him to advantage himself to take a purse; yet if upon consideration he finds himself too weak to go through with it, or that he cannot do it safely, he will forbear. For albeit a vicious habit doth naturally, and necessarily incline him to a naughty end, yet in the choice of the means conducing to this end, he is free. How much more plainly doth it appear, that the want of supernatural grace is far off from being either the sole cause, or the immediate, or the principal cause of any sin committed by a Reprobate. Rather of the two the intestine corruption of the Reprobate is the cause of his sins, and the want of grace is the cause why this corruption is not cured. Now albeit a Physician may sin in not curing a sick person, when it lies in his power to cure him: For we are in charity bound to do to others, as we would have others do unto us; yet God is bound to none, I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.

2. Observe how sluttishly he carrieth himself in the next reason taken from removens prohibens. His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which being present would hinder an event. But he gives instance only in withdrawing, as in cutting a string whereon a stone • hangs; which who so doth, is the cause of the falling of the stone: And in withdrawing a pillar upholding an house, which who so doth, is the cause of the fall of that house: which is most true in natural things, yet not the immediate cause, that is to be referred to the nature of the stone, and house; which being heavy things do naturally move downwards. But this Author contents not himself with conforming the condition of Agents voluntary to the conditions of Agents natural and necessary; but changeth his terms also, and puts the phrass of withdrawing, into the place of the former phrase, which was withholding. Now it is true God withholds that grace from Reprobates, which he gives to his Elect; but he withdraws and takes no inward grace from them. Yet this phrase of withholding is very improper; For it signifies a forcible restraint of that which was going; Whereas God being Master of his own grace, gives it to whom he will, and denies it to whom he will; For he is bound to none. And is it not lawful for him to do what he will with his own? But albeit he carry himself very sluttishly in opposing us, yet I willingly confess he carrieth the matter very clearly in contradicting himself; as when he concludeth, that God in withholding that power (that is that grace) which would keep them from sin (for this alone is our Tenet) hereby becomes a true moral cause of their sin. I say, herein he contradicts himself very handsomely. For himself confesseth that God could hinder any man from sin, but he doth not: And doth it not herehence evidently follow, that God hereby becomes the Author of sin, yea of every sin that is committed in the world? But I see what he will reply by the face of his discourse, namely this; He saith not that God by withholding that grace which would keep him from sin, becomes the Author of sin; but only by withholding that grace which might keep him from sin. And indeed so he doth; but mark therewithal how sluttishly he carrieth himself in 2 particulars. 1. In deviating from his confirmity to his own instances. For each instance given is in such a thing withdrawn whereupon the event absolutely followeth; and which not being withdrawn the contrary event not only might be, but would be; as if a string holding a stone being not broken, the stone not only might be held, but would be held. So if the not been withdrawn, not only the house might have been held up, but would have pillar had been held up. But upon granting grace he doth not say the creature would have been kept from sin, but might have been kept from falling into sin. Now what Legerdeimaine is this? And could he presume his Reader would prove so simple and Sottish, as not to observe this incongruity? 2. He deviates from our tenet. For we do not say, that upon granting grace supernatural the creature may abstain from sin, if he will, but that hereby is wrought in him a will to abstain from sin, a desire to do that which is pleasing in the sight of God, though not in such perfection, as to work out all natural corruption that is found within us; but that still there is sin dwelling in us; still there is a flesh fighting against the spirit; Yea, a law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, and leading us captive to the law of sin. Hence proceed the manifold and daily sins even of the children of God; but God's spirit is prevalent with them to renew their repentance, even for sins of weakness, and sins of improvidence and inconsideratnesse; and to keep from presumptuous sins, that they may not prevail over them; That it may not be said of them, as it was of too many among the Israelites, in the wilderness, Their spots are not the spots of thy children. Nay, which is more, consider; Arminius confesseth that God doth hinder sin in such a manner, as by granting such a grace, whereupon they not only may, but will and do abstain from sin; but he doth not thus hinder it in all. What therefore? shall he be accounted the Author of such sins. Yet I willingly confess, Arminius and this Author shake hands in this, that the Reprobates have such a grace, as whereby they may abstain from sin, if they will. Yet holy Paul confesseth of himself, even then, when he was in a better condition (I trow) then that of Reprobates, to wit, when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans, saying, What I would that do I not, but what I hate that do I. And again, To will is present with me, but I find no means to perform that which is good: For I do not the good thing which I would; but the evil which I would not, that do I. But we deny that a Reprobate hath so much as a will to do good; For such a will undoutedly pleaseth God. But they that are in the flesh cannot please God.

As for the solution which he feignes to himself of his own argument, by distinction of an accidental cause, and a proper and direct cause; that is none of ours. This is a gambell of his own, to delude his reader. God we say is the direct and proper cause of that sanctification which is found in his children to the subduing of their lusts, an inordinate affections; and as direct and proper a cause of leaving their natural corruption uncured in others: Nor so only but of prostituting men unto their lusts, and giving them over to their vile affections, to commit abominable things, not affording them so much as a natural restraint from such vicious courses, which he could, and that without any supernatural grace. And by this postitution of them, he knows how to pay them home for their other ungodly courses, in such sort, as they shall receive thereby such recompense of their error as is meet; as Saint Paul hath told us Rom. 1. But this Author takes little notice of God's word thereby to inform himself of God's providence; but roves whithin the sphere of his own imagination, and rational discourse, (yet as corrupt as well beseems him who opposeth the free grace of God) as if he would coin unto us new oracles, the devises of his own addle brains. And as for Tertullian's rule, which this Author insists upon. In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done. Observe whether this Author doth not make God the Author of every sin that is committed in the world, as well as we. For himself, in the 6. Sect. of the second inconvenience, confesseth that if God had not decreed to suffer sin, there would be none; and adds Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder. So then undoubtedly it is in God's power, that sin be not done. For he can hinder it; what followeth then? but that to him sin is to be imputed, when it is done, by Tertullian's rule, approved by this Author, quite contrary to the judgment and doctrine of Austin, putting this difference between man and God, the creature and the Creator; that if we suffer others to sin, when we can hinder them, rei cum ipsis erimus; but how many sins (saith he) do we see committed in the world, which could never come to pass if God would hinder them.

Showing how our doctrine opposeth God's mercy according to his conceit, and coming to deliver things more closely, as he saith, and comprehending that which he hath to say under 4. particulars: The 2. whereof this; That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation, as I have shown, but by God's own voluntary imputation. The proof whereof and the confirmation of it out of M. Calvin being set down at large in some 13. lines or more in M. Hords discourse, is here utterly left out, which will be the more remarkable by comparing it with what he delivers, concerning another attribute of God here inserted; and which he pretends, also to be impugned by our doctrine, p. 54. where he seems to sup up that which here he delivered.

The 8. objection of the Galles was this That God will not have all men to be saved, but a certain number of persons predestinate. Now Prospers answer hereunto is very large, and it begines thus, If about the salvation of all mankind, and calling them unto the knowledge of his truth, the will of God is maintained to be so indifferent throughout all ages, that God may be shown to have neglected no man altogether; the unsearchable depth of God's judgment is hereby assaulted. For why did God suffer all nations in ages past, to walk in their own ways when the Lord chose Jacob to himself, and dealt not so with every nation? And why are they now become God's people, which before were no people of God, &c? All this makes nothing for this Author. The next is directly against him, not only at large; but in this very particular, wherein he alleadeth Prosper not in his answer to this 8. objection, but in his sentence proposed afterwards upon it. For what is this Authors meaning, (in citeing him to affirm, that God not only willeth their salvation whom he hath predestinated, but all men also; or at least that such as say the contrary, do speak more harshly then we ought to speaks of the depth of God's inscrutable grace) but to cast a color that Prosper concurs with him; and judgeth that God is indifferunt to save all. But the reason why he only saves some, and not others, is, because some prepare themselves for grace, and accordingly he bestows it upon them: Others do not prepare themselves, and accordingly God doth not bestow it upon them. Now prosper directly contests against all such, as maintain this opinion, and that in two particulars. 1. In taking upon them to give the reason of God's judgments, and that drawn from the wills and actions of men; and which is no less impiety, in thinking that grace is bestowed by way of reward for good works; Or restrained from men by reason of their evil works. His words translated run thus, But whosoever referreth the causes of God's works and judgments throughout to the wills and actions of men, and will have God's dispensations varied according to the changeable condition of man's free will; such a one professeth the judgments of God to be scrutable, and his ways such, as may be found out. And that which Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles durst not touch, this man thinks he can unlock and make known. And that which is a fruit of no less impiety, the very grace of God whereby we are saved, is given by the way of reward for good works, and denied, or restrained for evil works. So that in each particular Prosper is directly contrary this Authors tenet. Now seeing the most part of men have not the grace of salvation, that is, such a grace as is of saving nature. And the reason by God doth not give it them, is not in consideration of their evil works; let any other sober and judicious Aminian be judge, whether God can be said to will their salvation (in such a sense as we speak of it) when he denieth them the grace of salvation, and that not for their evil works sake, but (which necessarily followeth hereupon) merely according to the good pleasure of his will. And indeed in Prospers large answer to this eighth objectionto the Galles, which taketh up almost a whole columne in Austin, this Author finds nothing at all to fasten upon for his advantage. But yet you will say in his eighth sentence which he proposeth, it is as this author allegeth: I grant it; but observe his censure well; The inscrutable depth of God's grace may suffice to keep us from speaking so rashly, as to say that God wills not all to be saved, but only a certain number of persons predestinate. Where observe, first, he counts it an harsh speech to say, that God willeth not, that all men shall be saved; the reason whereof undoutedly is this, because it is expressly contradictory to a text in Scripture. But then if we object, how can God be said to will their salvation whom he hath not predestinated, to whom he will not give the grace of salvation, & that not for their evil works sake; but according to the mere pleasure of his will. Now Prospers answer in my judgment is this, The depth of God's inscrutable grace will bear us out in it; so that we need not cast ourselves upon so harsh an expression, as to deny that God will have all men to be saved, which is contradictious to the letter of God's word. In effect it is, as if he should say; It is a secret. This I take to be Prospers meaning, and herein I remit myself to the judicious; But sure I am that Prosper is directly contrary to that opinion whereunto this Author, by virtue of this sentence of his, desires to draw him. In like manner the Author of the book, De vocatione Gentium, which is commonly thought to be Prospers, though Vossius affects to entitle it unto another upon no other ground, but because he conceits that Author, not to be so rigorous in the doctrine of predestination, as Prosper. But let the judicious compare Prospers carriage in this particular, with that Authors, and observe whether they do not exactly agree For that Author holds up that text of Paul, God will have all to be saved, as Prosper doth, without assaying to clear it by interpretation as Austin doth, and will have it go for a secret; and withal he expressly concurs with Prosper in expressing first, that God doth not give grace for men's good works sake, nor denies it for their evil works. For the ages wherein God so plentifully communicated his grace were no better then the former. Observe farther that Austin himself in his Enchiridion treating of this place of Paul, God will have all to be saved, after he hath given two interpretations thereof, the last whereof interpreting it of genera singulorum, not singula generum, is most generally received, as most congruous both to Scripture phrase in general, and in special unto this very text of Paul, as Piscator observes, and Vossius against himself improvidently confesseth. Yet see the ingenuity of this great light in God's Church. If any man can give any other convenient interpretation, let him, provided we be not driven to deny the first article of Creed, whereby we confess that God is omnipotent. And this I conceive proceeded out of a desire to hold up the meaning of that text to the uttermost, that the very letter of it may be applied so we might not be driwen to so foul an inconvenience, as to say that God willeth that man's salvation, which is never saved; which is as much as to say, that such a one therefore is not saved, because God cannot save him. Observe farther; in the days of Hincmarus and Remigius, these controversies being revived in the cause of Goteschalk, the church of Lions writes a book wherein it treats of the meaning of this place of Paul, whereof he gives four expositions according to the ancient fathers. First, That it is to be understood of genera singulorum, not singula generum; of all sorts of men, not of all men of all sorts. Secondly, That none is saved but by the will of God. Thirdly, That God works in us a will or a desire that all may be saved. Fourthly, That God will have all men to be saved, if they will; Then they propose their judgment concerning these four expositions distinguishing between the three, first, and the last, thus, In the three first expositions of these words, wherein it is said, that God willeth all men to be saved, no absurdity is to be found, no repugnancy unto faith. But as touching the fourth and the last; here we are to take heed, for it gives occasion to the Pelegian pravity, in as much as it affirms, that God, that he may save men; doth expect the wills of men: (Now this Pelagian pravity, is the very substance of our Authors orthodoxy whom I deal with.) Against this error, (saith the Church of Lions) we read Definitions have been made in the ancient counsels of the fathers. This I take out of the extracts, which Vossius hath made out of that book, which goes under the name of the Church of Lions, in his Pelagian history. l. 7. c. 4. p. 755, 756. there is an addition of some few lines in the third Sect: concerning God's justice, but they add no moment at all to the rest; and therefore the answer made in that third Sect: to M. Hord may suffice. And in the same sect: and subsection subordinate to the second assertion, which he obtrudes upon the maintainers of the lower way; which was this, God hath determined for the sin of Adam to cast away the greatest part of mankind forever; this Interpolation is inserted.

As touching the assertion it self here charged upon our Divines, namely that God hath determined for the sin of Adame to cast away the greatest part of mankind. I have thereunto answered at large in my consideration of M. Hords discourse: Yet let me add something by way of an apt accommodation of that before delivered to clear the ambiguous phrase of this Author, as touching the phrase of casting away. For it may well be doubted whether by casting away (which he makes the Object of God's determination) he means the act of damnation, or the act of denying grace. If the act of damnation, it is most untrue. For Reprobates are not damned for original sin only, but for all the actual sins that have been committed by them; And as they are, and shall be damned for them; So God from everlasting decreed they should be damned for them. Secondly, According to my Tenet, in no moment of nature is God's decree of damning reprobates, before the prescience, not of original sin only, but also of all their actual sins. Indeed I do not make the prescience of sin to go before the decree of damnation; Nor do I make the decree of damnation to go before the prescience of sin, but I conceive them to be simultaneous. It is true many infants we say perish in original sin only, not living to be guilty of any actual sin of their persons; why should this seem strange, when M. Hord himself professeth in his preface sect. 4. That all mankind are involved in the guilt of eternal death? If all are guilty of eternal death, then it were just with God to inflict eternal death upon all for original sin; How much more is it just to inflict eternal death upon some few, being guilty of it. Therefore observe the foxlike carriage of this Author. For this former free acknowledgement of the guilt of eternal death adherent to original sin in M Hords discourse, is quite left out in this, though there it was professed with this asseveration, I confidently believe it. For he well perceived, that this position utterly infatuates the strength of his discourse in this place. And I have still looked when these men will come to a plain denial of Original sin. Now if God may justly cast all mankind away for sin original, and that as touching the inflicting of damnation upon them for it; how much more evident is it to be just with God to cast away all mankind for original sin, as touching the denial of grace unto them? Now let us proceed to that which is here inserted out of Calvin and Maccovius. Now Calvin saith not that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter; He speaks not at all of God's decree of damnation, he speaks only of God's decree that Adam suâ defectione periret, by his fall should be obnoxious to destruction And he proves it by their acknowledgment, that it was by the counsel of God, that all à salute exciderent unius parentis culpâ, should incur the loss of salvation by the fault of one parent. Hereupon he demands saying, What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men. And a little after, It is too absurd that those kind patrons of God's justice should thus stick at a straw and leap • over a block And whereas Calvin saith, as he relates him, that All men are made guilty of Adams sin by God's absolute decree alone. First, This is untrue; No where doth he say, that this came to pass by God's absolute decree alone. If he had, I had thought this Author would have justified him, as well as M. Hord, who in this very place professeth that Original sin is a sin made ours only by God's appointment. Indeed as M. Hord is now set forth in print, this passage is not found: but in M. Hord 's own copy thus it ran; M. Mason belike hath gelded him; Yet that of M. Hord's was accounted the quintessence of M. Mason's strength in this argument; and he took upon him the propagating of the manuscripts thereof as myself know in some particulars. Likewise the involving of men in the guilt of Adam's sin and of eternal death, is M. Hord's phrase in one place, as before I have shown out of the fourth Section of his preface; and that by the only decree of God, did he express in this place. The same argument is used by Maccovius applied to purpose (so was not that of Calvin's. As for that saying of Maccovius, that God may ordain men to destruction without respect to any sin of his that is so ordained, is not this manifest. 1. In the case of annihilation? For doth not Arminius confess that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is? 2ly, As touching the suffering of hell pains. For did not Christ suffer them by the ordinance of his Father? Or was this suffering of his for any sin of his own? This have I proved more then once in my Vindiciae to be in the power of God: And Medina professeth as much, and that ex concordi omnium Theologorum sententiâ; And Vasquez the Jesuit concurs with Medina in the same opinion. And lately Raynaudus in his justification of Valerianus; who proves this to have been the confession of many of the ancient Fathers, and particularly of Fulgentius in that book of his De praedestinatione & gratiâ, which goes under Austin's name. And is it not evident by M. Hord's acknowledgment, when he saith that men are made guilty of Adam's sin, and of eternal death only by God's decree? Which passage of M. Hord's this Author hath razed out, and wipeth his lips, as if he had done no iniquity with his Index expurgatorius; not that he hath changed his opinion, as I verily think; but because he saw what a funestous blow it gave unto his cause in this particular: Yet is he magnified as a man unanswerable, none daring to take the bucklers against such a Don Quixot; But let the judicious consider this his practice well, & whether he be a man of such authority, as deserving that they should pin their faith on his sleeve, especially considering that he takes no notice of what I have answered to M. Hord, to reply thereupon; and that there is scarce anything in all this which I have not answered in my Vindiciae; Yet he continues to clamour still; at least by other Jack a Lents whom he sets up, but answers nothing, but that which is of his own shaping, that making his own bed he may lie the more softly. But let The Reader seriously consider this, that will not be gulled and cheated of his faith, as Pope Caelestinus was of his Popedom; and remember what Austin sometimes said, Si lupi concilium fecerunt, ut pastoribus non responderent cur oves consilium perdiderunt, ut ad luporum speluncas accederent? If the wolves have consulted together, and resolved not to make answer to the shepherds; why have the sheep so far lost all good counsel, as to come to the dens of wolves?

Pag: 67. Sub-Sect: 2: concerning God's justice there is a passage inserted out of M. Perkins, but it is of no more moment then the rest. In the same sub-section, the three causes why repobates cannot in justice be bound to believe, are much changed from that they were in M. Hord's discourse, sent unto his friend, which Copy was sent unto me. Yet upon better consideration I find it is not so much changed, as at first sight I conceived. The order of the two first reasons is changed; only in the first here some similes of exageration are wanting, which are not wanting in the second of M. Hord's.

The second here is most altered. For whereas in M. Hord's first discourse which he tendered to a Freind of his, the reason ran thus; Because it is God's will they shall not believe; To wit, in our opinion it is altered here thus, from an affirmative to a negative, It is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe; Yet himself lays the same thing to our charge in an affirmative manner pag: 78: treating of God's truth sub-sect: 2: the very last words which I answer apart, all that page almost not being found in M. Hord's first discourse. The words are these, Can God speak thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent? &c. And in this very place at length he riseth to this affirmative, thus, It may rather be said, it is God's unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe. So that I need not to trouble myself with adding any farther answer to this, more then I have to M. Hord and to that page 78 concerning God's truth, Sub-sect: 3.

Pag: 69, and Sub-sect: 4. In dealing on God's attribute of justice; After the Author had proposed his reasons which moved him to think that our doctrine of God▪s absolute decree is repugnant to God's justice; he proposeth our answers thereunto, which formerly were but two; but now are enlarged with the addition of a third. The first whereof is, for the form of it, changed throughout. The comparison of the ways of God with the mysterious attributes of God is changed, not only as touching the form, but as touching the matter; here is no pleading for a reasonable service of God, as there was.

His making man's understanding purged from prejudice and false principles, as it was proposed there, purged from prejudices, corrupt affections, and customs, as it is proposed, to be the Tribunal, according to whose judgment interpretations of Scripture concerning what is just in the courses of God must be allowed or disallowed, I have sufficiently canvased there; Let the Reader be pleased to turn to it, and compare my answer to this Sub-section, and observe how little spirit he had, so much as to question against any one piece of my answer. Here he adds a reason of his former uncouth paradox, to wit that, Justice in men and God are for substance but one, and the same thing, though different in degree, as the greater and lesser light. I have sufficiently profligated this in the first Section concerning God's attributes. For this very rule he premiseth in general to the ensuing discourse of his, most congruously; wild premises and grounds to wild discourses.

The difference he puts between the ways of God & the mysteries of godliness I have there also refuted, showing that albeit some ways of God's justice are agreeable to the judgment of man, as these mentioned, Es: 5. and Ezek: 18, yet all are not, as there I show at large.

And lastly because he likes rational discourse so well, I am contented to deal with him at his own weapon, by six rational demonstrations justifying the absoluteness of God's decrees, in answer whereunto, he is content to carry himself very judiciously, even as mute as a fish.

Doth not this Author observe the contradictious nature of this proposition God's will is a rule of justice to himself. For a rule of justice to any one is a rule to his will, to be regusated thereby; & can the will be said to be the rule of justice to the will without contradiction? The rule propounded was this, God's will is the rule of all righteousness; but the other rule is the rule corrupted by this Author, when he talks of a will, as a rule of justice to the will. 2. But whether things are therefore just, because God wills them; or that therefore God willeth them, because they are just; undoubtedly that which here is proposed is a truth, namely that whatsoever the Scripture sets down to be the will of God, that must needs be just. Neither have we any need to improve it any farther then thus. For it is well known, that our Divines in their doctrine of predestination, and reprobation do depend on nothing so much, as the evidence of God's word; As this Author throughout this discourse of his depends on nothing less. And therefore he hath cast himself upon a strange practice in the former passage, namely to evacuate all our reasons drawn out of the word of God to confirm our doctrine, pleading that the interpretations we make of Scripture are all false, because the contrary doctrine which he maintains, is justified before the tribunal of human reason purged from prejudice, and false principles, corrupt affections and customs; Which is as much as to profess in plain terms, that to find out the truth concerning the decrees of predestination and reprobation, we must leave the oracles of God, and hearken to the oracles of reason, provided that it be purged from prejudice and false principles; from corrupt affections and customs. Now I had thought that the spirit of God alone could purge us from such prejudice and false principles; corrupt affections and customs; And that this spirit of God worketh only by the word herein, which is called in Scripture the sword of the spirit; Yet this Author tells us not, where this reason thus purged is to be found; save that in general he saith; that is just or unjust which is so esteemed in the judgment both of best and worst that stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truth, as is to be seen in the former reason according to M. Hord's discourse. Now who these best are but the Arminians in this Authors fancy; & the worst, but Anabaptists or heathens; or both I know not; Sure we are none of them in his understanding purged from false principles and prejudice, from corrupt affections and customs; because we do not stand indifferent to the entertainment of his tenets, which he calls Truths. 3. Where can he show that I have made use of any such principles to answer any argument of his against us. I do not find that anywhere he can drive me to this though this be the Apostles course, as we may see Ro: 9. Is there any injustice with God? God forbid, how doth he prove it, but thus, because the Scripture attributes such a course to God; I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion, on whom I will have compassion. 4. But where hath he learnt to be so audacious as to say that, Things are not therefore just because God wills them, but that his justice is rather a rule of his will and works? Before he told us, that justice in man, and God were of the same nature; Now that justice which is the rule of our will is, Justitia obligans, justice binding us to do this or that; and is God's justice obligatory likewise to bind him? In making the world, I do not doubt, but God did that which was just; but was there any justice in God obliging him to the making of the world? who seeth not, what an Atheistical conclusion followeth herehence, namely that the world was from everlasting, if not necessarily by necessity of nature; yet necessarily by obligation of justice? otherwise for an infinite space of time wherein the world was not made (which must needs have been if the world were not, from everlasting) God had been and continued to be unjust. The Schools have taught me that there is a justice of condecency consequent to all the actions of God, no justice of obligation precedent to it. And whereas St. Paul tells us that God works all things according to the counsel of his will, both Alvarez and Suarez though School, Divines of opposite families, yet concur in this that this Counsel is, à libera voluntate acceptum, accepted of God's free will. And it is observable, that the Apostle calls it not the Counsel of his understanding, but the counsel of his will And Vasqu • z and Suarez both Jesuits, but very opposite about the nature of justice in God; yet both concur, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of the determination of God's will. It is most true that supposing the end which God intends, the wisdom of God directs in the right use of congruous means; and no other justice then this his wisdom doth Aquinas acknowledge in the Divine nature. And great is the wisdom which God manifests in the government of this world, yet the same wisdom as great as it is doth not equal the infinite wisdom of God. But of this I have disputed more at large in my Vindiciae. Where this question is discussed. Whether the will of God be circumscribed or regulated by justice? To no parcel whereof do I find the least savor of an answer in this Author. But let us examine how well he proves his own Tenet; And that is first by the authority of Jerome in his preface to his commentaries on Hosea. 2. By the authority of Zanchi; whereto I answer. 1. That if the interpretations of Scripture must be judged of before the Tribunal of reason purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; must not the opinions of such as Jerome and Zanchi be judged of before the same tribunal also? 2ly, touching Jerome himself. 1. It is true Jerome in that preface understands that command given Hosea to be only in a Type, and for the reason here mentioned; but in his Commentary he interpreteth it secundum historiam, literally. Neither was the Prophet as he saith, to be blamed in this. For he was not the worse, but he made her the better. Praesertim especially he was not to be blamed, because he did this not luxuriously or lustfully, or of his own will, but in obedience to the command of God. Now let the indifferent judge whether Jerome be not as much for us upon the text, as for our adversary in the preface. 2. Observe that Jerome is nothing for him in the preface. For Jerome speaks there of God's will of command, but we treat of God's will as it signifies not his command given to man, but his own purpose and decree to do this or that himself. Judge of the extravagancy of this Author by this, and whether his understanding be sufficiently purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; as to make the last resolution of our faith concerning the ways of God thereunto, or the understanding of such as he is, whether best or worst, or of both sizes upon a mere pretence of their indifferency for the entertainment of truths.

We willingly grant with Zanchi that God can will nothing which is not just; Not that hereby we make any justice to precede the will of God; but because he hath a lawful power to do what he will; And there is a justice of condency consequent to all his actions. It is otherwise, I confess, with a man though the greatest of men, as wise as Solomon; though vessels after God's own heart, as David: But hence it followeth not, that because in an earthly King there is a justice antecedent to his will, therefore it is so in the King of heaven and earth. If this Author think otherwise, let him know I am not yet sufficiently convicted of the purity of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles &c. as thereinto to make the last resolution of my faith.

Yet I confess he carrieth himself magnificently as if he had attained to this purgation, as when he saith, That these absolute decrees of salvation and damnation, are not part of God's revealed will; But where hath he proved the conditional decrees that he stands for, are any part of God's revealed will. Where doth he find that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance upon a man, because of some good works of his, or deny it to others for failing of some good work? As for salvation and damnation we plainly profess, that God intended not to damn any man, but for sin, nor to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth not he beg the question all along, whē he carrieth his conditional decrees in a confidentiary manner, without once offering to prove the by any one place of Scripture? Here Iexpected he would not beg the question, when he chargeth us to beg the question most insipidly; When it is well known that our Divines are frequent in proving their doctrine out of Scripture; which if it fail of sound proof in the judgment of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles; yet with no modesty; whatsoever their judgment be) can he tax them for begging the question. For to beg the question is not once to offer to prove what they say; which is this Author's discourse all along. But to supply the place of arguments, he usually foist's in a phrase at pleasure in expressing our Tenet of God's decrees; as of Decreeing immutably and unavoidably; Or as here he speaks of Damnation and salvation inevitable; whereas we do not use to clog our own expressions, or our Readers apprehensions with any such bugheares. We rather say that God decrees all things to come to pass, that do come to pass, and that agreeably to their natures, as necessary things necessarily; and contingent things to come to pass contingently. And surely for doctrines of faith, I think every sober Christian hath cause to entitle the King to be the Author of them, this Author doth not so much for his: Nay the Scripture to him seemed so evidently to make for us (which I desire every wise Reader well to observe) that this drave him to such a sluttish shift, as to except against our interpretations of Scripture upon no other ground but this, that the Doctrine confirmed thereby is not consonant to the understanding of men purged from prejudice and false principles, corrupt affections and customs, in the designing of what is just, and what is unjust; And let every indifferent man judge whether this be not a desperate course, carrying with it a secret acknowledgment that the Scripture indeed doth favor the way we take in the Doctrine of predestination and reprobation. And indeed the ninth to the Romans Gerardus Vossius calls Gorgons head whereby we think (so evident is the Apostles meaning on our side) to turn all our opposites into stones, though such vants are none of ours; but himself it seems had been stupefied by it, had he not timely taken hold of Scientia media, the Jesuits invention, and as vile an invention as ever reasonable men conceived.

3. Lastly he tells us like a resolute Sir, that absolute reprobation can be no part of God's revealed will; and his reason is; because it is odious to right reason. He doth not show how it is contrariant to God's word; but bravely presumes that his reason is right, as if he were of the number of that synedrion whose understandings are purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; and ere he is aware bewrays what he means by reason, when he attributes hatred unto it; And I verily believe his best reason is the strength of his affection. By the way let the Reader observe, that he is as opposite to absolute election, as to absolute reprobation; only he dischargeth his right reason and the spleen thereof against absolute reprobation, not against absolute election. We may easily guess the true notion of his right reason in this; his whole discourse savouring far more throughout of the foxes, then of the Lions skin. Now I have given him six reasons for the absoluteness of reprobation, because he appeals to reason purged from prejudice and false principles, and not one of them hath he answered, though they went out of my hands now full three years ago. I will adventure to give him some reasons for it also out of God's word. For I desire to follow the crooked serpent which way soever he winds and turns. Therefore thus I dispute, Predestination is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. For if reprobation be not absolute, but proceeds according to men's evil works, then predestination is not absolute, but proceeds according to men's good works, whether faith or other obedience; according to that of Austin. If Esau be hated for the merit of unrighteousness, incipit & Jacob justitiae merito deligi, Jacob begins to be beloved for the merit of his righteousness; and a little before. Si enim quia praesciebat Deus futura Esaui opera mala, propterea eum praedestinavit, ut serviret minori; propterea praedestinavit & Jacob ut ei major serviret, quia futura ejus bona opera praesciebat, & falsum est jam quod ait, non ex operibus. For if therefore the Lord predestinated Esau that he should serve the younger, because he foresaw his evil works. For the same reason he predestinated Jacob that he should rule over the Elder because he foresaw his good works; and so false is that which the Apostle saith, not of works. Now that predestination is absolute I prove thus. It is not upon the foresight of faith, much less of works, therefore it is absolute. The anteceedent I prove thus; That which proceeds according to the good pleasure of the Lord's will, is not upon the foresight of faith; But predestination proceeds upon the good pleasure of God's will; ergo, The Major proposition I prove thus. This phrase, according to the pleasure of God 's will excludes all outward causes; And no wise man will refer the cause of a man's absolution to the good pleasure of the judge, when a man's innocence is the cause of it. For that is the cause of a thing, whereby answer is made to the question, why such a thing is done; And this is the perpetual phrase of Scripture; as, Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? And, All these things worketh the same spirit, distributing to every man severally as he will; and, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. It pleased the father that in him should all fullness dwell. It is so ô father because thy good pleasure was such. It is God that worketh in you both the will and the deed according to his good, pleasure. The Lord loved you because he loved you. Deut: 7. 7. They inherited not the land by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them, but thy right hand, and thine arm. and the light of they countenance because thou diddest favor them.

2. My second argument is, Therefore God gives faith because he did predestinate them; As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life; and God added daily to the Church such as should be saved. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in this place is as much as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; as appears by the equipollency of both sentences. Now hence I infer; Therefore God gives not faith because he hath not ordained them to everlasting life. For if the affirmation because of the affirmation; the negation is cause of the negation. And the Scripture as ordinarily subjoineth the denial of grace to reprobation, as the granting of grace to predestination. For as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , such as perish, is opposite to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , such as shall be saved; And as the consequent of the one is said to be Faith; so the consequent to the other is the denial of the same or like grace. As for example, All they that are of God hear God's word; so others hear them not because they are not of God; as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Such as shall be saved are added to God's Church: so in whom is the Gospel hid? only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in them that perish. Among whom doth Antichrist prevail by all deceivableness? only in them that perish. Like as for the Elect on the contrary 'tis not possible they should be seduced. Mat: 24. 24, and 2 Thes: 2. 13

3. If predestination were upon the foresight of faith, then it should be only upon the foresight of such a faith as perseveres to the end; whence two inconveniences follow 1. That no man can be assured of his election until his death, which is quite contrary unto Scripture. For Paul was assured of the election of the Thessalonians by observation of the works of their faith, the labor of their love, and the patience of their hope, 2. In this case none can be strengthened against the power of temptation by the assurance of their election; But thus we are strengthened by Christ. Mat: 24. 24. by St. Paul. Rom: 8. 29. 2 Thes: 2. 13.

4. Election is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. The antecedent I prove; If it be neither of faith nor of works, then it is absolute, but it is neither of faith, nor works. Not of works, expressly; Not of faith as appeates by the same reason whereby Paul proves it is not of works. For the reason is this, Before the children were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the younger; Therefore election is not of works. Now say I we may as well conclude therehence, therefore it is not of faith; forasmuch as before they were borne, they were as uncapable of faith as of works. The consequence I prove thus; Look by what reason St. Paul proves, that the election of Jacob was not of good works, because before they were borne 'twas said, The Elder shall serve the younger; by the same reason it is evident that the reprobation of Esau was not of evil works; the subjection of Esau unto his younger brother, as lively representing his reprobation, as the dominion of Jacob over his elder brother represents his election.

5. Predestination is defined by Austin to be Praeparatio gratiae, the preparation of grace, therefore reprobation which is opposite thereunto must be the not preparation of grace; that is God's decree not to give grace, like as the opposite is God's decree to give grace. Now God gives grace not according to works. For he hath mercy on whom he will And hereupon Austin builds his doctrine of predestination. Now by his doctrine predestination is absolute as Gerardus Vossius confesseth in his preface to his history of the heresy of Pelagius; How can it be otherwise? For if God confers grace not according to men's works; but according to his own purpose and grace. How much more did he decree to give it not upon any foresight of works, but of his mere pleasure. And the Scripture as clearly testifies, that as God hath mercy on whom he will; so whom he will he hardeneth; that is of mere pleasure he denieth grace to some, as of mere pleasure he grants it unto others; And therefore reprobation grounded hereupon must needs be as absolute, as predestination grounded upon the other.

6. Like as in Scripture phrase Faith is said to be the faith of God's elect, election is not said to be of those that are foreseen to to believe; So the worshippers of the Beast are said to be those. Whose names are not written in the book of life; They that are not written in the book of life, are described to be such that admire and worship the beast. And the not writing of men's names in the book of life doth as significantly represent their reprobation; as the writing of men's names in heaven. Luc: 10. 20. Rev: 20. 12: doth represent their election. Thus as formerly I gave six reasons to justify the absoluteness of reprobation, because he pretended the absoluteness thereof was repugnant to reason; so here I have given six more derived out of the word of God, to prove that this doctrine is the revealed will of God, to stop his empty mouth that clamoureth and only clamoureth that it is no part of God's revealed will. And that this doctrine is not only conformable to right reason, but by convincing arguments in right reason demonstrable I have already shown; And that all the absurdities this Author blatters of, they prove to be no better then the mere imagination of a vain thing. That which here he discourseth of a reasonable service, comes out of it's place, it belonged to the former reason in M. Hord's treatise, and there I have answered it, and shown the absurd interpretation that he makes of it.

He vaunts that he hath proved reprobation absolute to be unjust, when he hath performed nothing less; But making only a great crack, he goes out like a squib; and throughout meddles not with one argument that our Divines bring out of Scripture, or reason to justify their doctrine concerning the absoluteness of reprobation. And it is apparent that he denies the absoluteness of election, as well as the absoluteness of reprobation, and consequently must necessarily maintain that grace is given according to works; whereupon it was that Austin grounded his doctrine concerning the absoluteness of Predestination: And upon the like ground have we as good cause to ground our doctrine concerning the absoluteness of reprobation, it being every way as evident, that Grace is not denied according unto works, as that it is not granted according to men's works; And the Scripture is equally as express concerning both, where it is said that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also whom he will he hardeneth.

Pag: 75. 76. Treating of God's sincerity Sub-sect: 1. There are two passages inserted taken out of Piscator, before the passages alleged out of Zanchi and Bucer. For having said that, Now God's meaning is (by this doctrine) that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither; forthwith he gives instance in Piscator thus.

This treatise of Piscator De praedestinatione against Schaffman I have the second editition printed at Herborne Anno 1598. But these words according to their quotations here, are not to be found; the several distinct passages are distinguished by numbers, which in all editions hold the same, not so the pages. Yet the latter passage quoted p. 143. I meet with in mine p. 128. According to the like difference I try whether I can find out the other, but in vain. But yet I meet with such matter of discourse as whereunto this passage is very congruous to be there delivered if anywhere; yet no such thing is there delivered as num: 74. Schaffman's argument is this, If God calls all to salvation then he will save all. To this Piscator answereth, The proposition is false; But he calls with, animo simplici atque vero, a simple mind and true. Sane saith Piscator, as much as to say, I grant that; but so as that he calls them with condition of repentance and faith; Therefore as he promiseth salvation seriously unto them that perform this condition, and therefore performs this promise. So on the contrary he doth seriously threaten death and damnation to them who do not fulfill the condition, and performs unto him that commination. Then, though God be not capable of hypocrisy yet he doth not always will that what he commands shall be always performed by him to whom he gives that command; Whether by commanding he means to prove a man; as to prove Abraham, he commanded him to sacrifice his Son; or because to him whom he commandeth, he will not give grace to perform that command, as he deals with reprobates. And num: 120. To Schaffman's objection which was this; God is no hypocrite, he answers thus; But yet he gives not grace to all to perform what he commands thē. For promiscuously he commands as well reprobates as elect to believe; as many as he calls by the preaching of the gospel; but he gives this grace to his elect alone according to that, To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. So that undoubtedly God offers grace (to wit pardon of sin) with a purpose to communicate it to all that shall believe, according to the judgment of Piscator, neither doth he offer it with a purpose to communicate it to any unless they believe. But the grace of faith is not offered to any with a purpose to communicate it upon a condition. For then grace should be conferred according unto works, which is manifest Pelagianism. As for the other which I meet with p: 128. num: 120: take it at full, and not as it is dismembered by this Author, who cares not how he calumniates, so he might advantage his own cause. Schaffman's objection was, Deus est unius & linguae & voluntatis, God is both of the same tongue and will. Whereto Piscator answers thus, Your meaning is that God, look what he professeth with his tongue, that he willeth; But this (saith he) is not always true, nor in all particulars. For by his tongue that is by speech uttered, he professed that he would have Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac; yet he would not have him sacrificed. With his tongue he professed by his servant Jonah that he would destroy Nineveh within forty days, yet he would not so do. With his tongue by the ministers of the Gospel he professeth that he would have the reprobates to whom he speaketh among his Elect, to believe the Gospel, in as much as he commands them so to do; yet he would not have them to believe, in as much as he will not give them the grace of believing, without will no man can believe. What therefore is God an Hypocrite? Away with such a blasphemy. He alone is to be accounted an Hypocrite, who counterfeits holiness when he has none; Such counterfeiting is not incident to God. And let the Reader observe well the immodest carriage of this Author. Piscator when he saith that God in words professeth he will have Reprobates to believe, he shows withal in what respect he doth so, to wit, quatenus mandat ut credant, in as much as he commands them to believe. And indeed God's command is usually called God's will, and by none more then by these our opposites. But this Author draws this to the signification of God's will simply so called, which is the will of purpose; And to that purpose leaves out the words whereby Piscator explicates himself. Who knows not that God commanded Pharaoh by his servant Moses to let Israel go? this is to profess with the tongue in Piscator's phrase, that God would have Pharaoh to let Israel go. And God's commandment is called God's will in Scripture. This is the will of God even your sanctification. But to speak properly it is but the signification of God's will of good pleasure (properly called the will of God) that it should be Pharaoh's duty to let Israel go, but withal he revealed to Moses that he would harden Pharaoh▪s heart, that he should not let Israel go. Now let the indifferent judge what this Author hath gotten by these passages of Piscator, save only the displaying of his own immodest and calumniating courses▪ then he thinks to please his Reader with the story of Tantalus; wherein there is no congruity to that whereunto it is applied, For Tantalus à labris sitiens fugientia captat Flumina,—He was an hungered, and would fain eat but could not: He was a thirst, and would fain drink but could not. God deals so with no man; neither reprobate Jews, nor Gentiles had any desire to be partakers of the mercies of God offered them in Christ. The Gospel was a scandal to the one, and foolishness to the other; But to them that are called it is the power of God and wisdom of God And as they hunger and thirst after God's righteousness in his dear Son; so are they satisfied therewith, Let him that is a thirst come and drink of the water of life freely. And He everyone that is a thirst, come ye to the waters, and ye that have no silver, come buy and eat; come I say buy wine and milk without silver and without money: Wherefore do ye lay out your silver, and not for bread? and your labor without being satisfied? Hearken diligently unto me, hear and your souls shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David. Here is no sending of them away empty, which thirst after these waters of life; They all shall draw waters of the wells of salvation. So that here is no such dealing with them, as the Poets feign was their God's dealing with Tantalus. My answer to that which he produceth out of Zanchi and Bucer the Reader shall find in my answer to M. Hord.

Pag. 76. 77. In the point of threats and comminations; after these words, We never read that threats are thundered out against us for original sin. In M. Hord's discourse it is added, Or for that corruption of nature which we brought with us into the world: But this Author leaves it quite out, with what mind let the Reader judge, and whether he can well brook that original sin should be styled a corruption of nature which we bring with us into the world.

Pag. 78. In the same second sub-section after that of Abslaon's feast, Joab's congy, the kiss of Judas, and the Hyaena's tears &c. There is a good passage left out which followeth in M. Hord; and in the place thereof this, which here followeth, foisted in; Let the Reader consider with himself, wherefore that was left out; it seems he was ashamed of that calumniation. But thus it follows here.

Judge indifferent Reader whether ever more passion were shown with less common sense. For let the enforcements be never so great and serious in the ministry of the word, under which all the expressions here mentioned are comprehended, yet is it possible, that men can yield unto them obedience by faith and repentance, unless God gives faith and repentance? For doth not the Scripture clearly testify that faith is the gift of God. To you it is given both to believe in him, & to suffer for him: that it is the work of grace. Act. 18. 27. What hast thou that thou hast not received? And doth not the Apostle accordingly pray on the behalf of the Ephesians, not for peace only, but for faith and love also from God the father and our Lord Jesus Christ? Is not repentance also the gift of God? Him God raised to be a Prince and a Savior to give repentance unto Israel & forgiveness of sins. Then hath God also unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life. If so be God may give them repentance. What then? Shall this Author's not Logic, but Rhetoric whereinto his Logic is transformed to the wonder of all that know him in the University, like some Medusa's head, turn us into stones, and in spite of Scripture evidence drive us to deny, that either faith, or repentance, is the gift of God? For if it be the gift of God, is not somewhat else required to the working of faith in us over and above all these enforcements? Not one Arminian hitherto have I found daring to deny that faith is the gift of God: Yet ever since I read them in their Censura Censurae to deny that Christ hath merited faith and regeneration for us, I looked when they would come to deal seriously and sincerely; And if they have any such meaning, clearly to profess as much, namely that faith is not the gift of God. But if this Author's meaning be that God gives it to all that have it, and is also ready to give it to them that have it not, próvided, that they will do their own part, seeing he chargeth us to make God's ways void of truth and sincerity, how comes it to pass that this Author carrieth himself so subdolously & shows so little sincerity and clearness in dealing plainly, & telling us that this is his meaning? Is it because we are ready to conclude upon him that he is as errand a Pelagian, as ever was, in maintaining that grace is conferred according to works? Why doth he carry himself and his opinions in huggar muggar if he be of that mind, and doth not plainly show himself to be a Pelagian, and prove to the world that Pelagianismus est verus Christianismus, Pelagianism is true Christianity? and in the next place oppose Paul also in saying that God saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace; and that he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth?

2ly, Consider further the strange infatuation of this Author, more ways then one. For 1, inquire of him, whether after all this work of the ministry performed by him unto reprobates, he thinks not himself bound to pray unto God for a blessing upon his labors, whereby it may become effectual unto them, and that upon this ground, because Paul may plant, and Apollo may water, but God is he who gives the increase. And let him express what the increase is, which he beggeth at the hand of God, whether it be not the performance of those duties whereunto he hath exhorted them in the most emphatical manner, that the word of God doth afford any example of. And if no more be required for the working of man's will to that which is good (having as this Author supposeth a power to perform obedience if they will) then these enforcements which he so much amplifies; whereto tend his prayers after all these enforcements are used? is it that God will afford his concourse to the act? Why is this a work of grace? Doth not God afford this to the most sinful act that is, without all prayers? And is it decent to maintain that God of himself is forward enough to afford concourse to such acts as are evil, be they never so abominable; but to concur with us to that which is good, he stands off and must be entreated and solicited by our prayers earnest and fervent, otherwise he will be slack to concur to that which is good, though nothing slack to concur to that which is evil? Nay is it possible that man should will ought, or do ought, and God not concur with him, to the producing both of the will and the deed? Now I had thought prayers tended to the procuring of works of grace, such as concourse is not, as which is performed of God 1. To sinful acts, as well as to pious acts. 2. And that necessarily upon supposition that the reasonable creature doth ought. Consider farther, if his prayers tend only to the procuring of God's concurrence, and this concurrence is upon supposition of man's concurrence; let the indifferent, I say, consider the genius of this man's prayers. For albeit the form of them runs thus, that God will convert his hearers to faith, to repentance, and to work in them that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ; yea to work in them both the will, and the deed, according to his good pleasure, to circumcise their hearts, to love the Lord their God with all their hearts, & with all their souls, to heal their backslidings; yea as he seeth all their ways, so to heal them, to cause them to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgments, and to do them; yea to put his fear in their hearts, that they may never depart away from him. (For thus he must pray, if he pray in faith built upon God's promises, we having special promises for all these particulars;) yet his meaning is no more then this, that as many of his Auditors as he finds willing to do ought of this, that God will concur with them to make them willing; And as many as do perform it, he will concur to the performance of it; as for those that are unwilling, he will not pray that God will make them willing, though that hath been ever the Lord's course towards some, as Austin often professeth, And as for that prayer of Austin, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quid vis, Lord give me to do what thou commandest, and then command what thou will. Like enough he spights it as much as ever Pelagius did. But if any are forward to hate & to despite God's word, or the professors of his truth, he will not pray unto God to concur with them thereunto. For he knows God's forwardness to concur to the performance of every abominable act without his prayers: Nay in despite of any prayers to the contrary: And doth he not think it in vain for the holiest man that ever was to pray for this? 3. Again observe he saith that by our doctrine the whole ministry is a mere imposture, & why? because it is in show hearty and serious, but in truth nothing so. But what moves him to say this, doth not God procure hereby the conversion & salvation of millions? vea of many of those who have crucified the Son of God; who have persecuted his Church? Do we not believe that a time shall come wherein the Jews shall be converted in spite of all their former obstinacy, & in despite of all their blasphemies poured forth against the Son of God? But he will say, that grace is shown only to the Elect by our opinion. But here let every indifferent person judge between us of the equity of this his discourse. The whole ministry is a mere imposture; because all the inforcements wherewith the tender of salvation unto Reprobates is accompanied is in show most hearty & serious, but endued nothing so. For what? have the elect of God no part in the ministry? Or dates he say that by our doctrine these insorcements are nothing hearty & serious to them? Thou wilt say the Author's meaning is, that the whole ministry is a mere imposture towards reprobates; but he saith not so; but thus, The whole ministry is a mere imposture; and afterwards in giving his reason for it, he pleads, that inforcements in show hearty & serious made to reprobates are nothing so; & hence he concludes that the whole ministry is a mere imposture without any distinctiō of persons, to whom it is a mere imposture 4. Yet I willingly confess that it is foul enough, that God's courses should be courses of imposture towards any even towards reprobates. But how doth he prove, that God takes any such course with reprobates? To whom hath God sent his word & vouchsafed the ministry hereof according to all the enforcements mentioned accompanying his tender of salvation unto them? is it not unto his Church? What is the preserment of the Jew above the Gentile? much every way, saith Paul, chiefly because unto thē were committed the Oracles of God. And was the Church of Jews, a Church of reprobates, Were they not the City of God, but the city of the Devil? If these enforcements had been used to the Nativites, there had been some color for such an imputation; but seeing 〈…〉 of God's word in all these enforcements is used to the people of God, his precious people, chosen out of the world to put his name among'st them; shall this ministry be so carried, as concerning reprobates? All that he hath to say for this is no other, but that a great part, or the most part of the people to whom he sends his prophets are reprobates. Be it so, but how doth he prove that God intends this ministry; for the salvation of reprobates; or that he intends it at all for them? If God commands them, as he commanded Jeremiah saying, Go & cry in the ears of Jerusalem, Thus saith the Lord; they must do so without difference. For they are not able to put a difference between the Elect and Reprobate, to know who are the one, and who are the other. Austin was willing to pray for all, but yet he professeth, that if they knew who they were, whō God had ordained unto damnation, they would pray no more for them, then for the Devil himself; so that either the Prophets were not of Austin's mind, or else that they thought that their ministry in God's purpose and appointment tended to the salvatiō only of God's elect: But because they knew not, who they are, therefore they prayed for all, and used their ministerial enforcements indifferently towards all. But like enough this Author will deny, that the Prophets were of Austin's mind; Therefore I will prove they were in this; The Prophets were undoubtedly of St. Paul's mind; but St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind in this therefore the Prophets also were of St. Austin's mind. Now that St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind, and that his ministry, though performed towards all, yet was intended for the salvation only of God's elect, I prove thus, Though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself a servant unto all men that I might win the more. Observe, he doth not say that he might win all; Again, I became all things to all men that I might save some. Who are these some at whose salvation he aims? I answer they are God's elect, and none but they; and this I prove out of those words of his where he saith, Therefore I suffer all things for the elects sake that they might also obtain salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory. Now if his sufferings were for their sakes, undoubtedly his whole ministry was for their sakes; for this alone brought his sufferings upon him. The holy Ghost witnesseth in every City saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me; But I pass not at all, neither is my life dear unto myself, so that I may fulfill my course with joy and the ministration that I have received to testify the Gospel of the grace of God. 5. But be it, that God intends it for Reprobates also, yet not for their salvation; But first to take away excuse from them, as to this purpose he sent Ezekiel. Son of man I send thee to a rebellious nation For they are impudent children; I do send thee unto them, and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; but surely they will not hear neither indeed will they cease; for they are a rebellious house, yet shall they know that there hath been a Prophet among them. Or otherwise as Austin hath observed, ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur, that they may profit to an outward amendment of their lives, that their punishment may be the less. And consider whether in all this he doth not openly invade, not so muchour doctrine, as the manifest evidence of God's word. For it is apparent that God gives commands to those whose hearts he means to harden, that they shall not obey those commands, though those commands were not made in a cold manner but with strongest enforcements. Thou shalt say to Praraoh, thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first borne, wherefore I say to thee, let my son go that he may serve me. If thou refuse to let him go, behold I will slay thy son, even, thy first borne. Yet before this he told Moses saying, I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people go. And after this, The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had said to Moses. And hereupon the Lord deals with him in the way of greater enforcement then before. For the Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, let my people go that they may serve me, For I will at this time send all mine plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people, that thou mayest know that there is none like me in all the earth. For now will I stretch out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt perish from the earth. And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to show my power in thee, & to declare my name throughout all the world; Yet thou exaltest thyself against my people, and lettest thē not go. Behold tomorrow this time I will cause to rain, a mighty great hail, such as was not in Egypt since the foundation of it was laid. And The lord said unto Moses, Go to Pharach; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might work these my miracles in the midst of his realm. Here we have plain enforcements & those of great power used by the Lord, yet still the Lord continues to harden Pharaoh's heart, and professeth as much, not fearing the censure of any vile wretch to cast upon him the imputation of imposture throughout the whole course of his ministry. And the truth is all the learned concur in distinguishing between, Voluntas praecepti, & voluntas propositi; and count it absurd to infer the purpose of God, or his will to have such a thing done from his commanding it, though this command be joined with exhortation, expostulations, wishes, or whatsoever other emphatical expressions; all which the learned conclude under Praeceptum, as a sign of God's will: And the Pelagians of old urged it no farther then as God's precept backed with what exhortations and enforcements soever, thence to conclude that man had power to yield obedience, but not to conclude, it was God's will it should come to pass; and to impute desires unto God in proper speech, which never are accomplished, what an unscholasticall course is it? even as much as to deny him to be God, and to bereave him of his blessed condition, by frustrating him of his desires: Whereas the time shall come, that the Elect of God shall be so blessed, as to have no desire of theirs in vain. Neither doth the objectour introduced by St. Paul break forth into any such blasphemy, as to charge God with any imposture in hardening whom he will; when nevertheless the ministry of the word hath course with them as well as with any other; but rather proposeth it as a thing unreasonable, that God should complain of men's disobedince, when himself hath hardened their hearts, whereby it comes to pass that it cannot be that they should obey God as they ought. For who hath resisted his will. Yet we know what answer the Apostle maketh to stop the mouths of all such, as call God to an account for his proceedings. But ô man who art thou who disputest with God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? And wilt not thou allow as much power unto God over thee, or over the matter whereof thou wast made, as the Potter hath power over the clay? Proud man thinks himself able enough to believe, to repent. Now God by his passionate expressions in the Prophets discovereth the vanity of this proud conceit, and laboreth by their little profiting by all these pathetical moving courses to manifest the strength of man's corruption; And when they will not learn and receive this instruction by his works; he tells them the plain truth of it to their faces. Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and all his servants, and unto all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen, those great miracles and wonders: Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day. Is this the course of imposture, when he tells them to their faces, that albeit he commands them, exhorts them, expostulates with them, and expresses forms of desire of their obedience in his word; yet except God gives them an heart, they cannot perceive; except God gives them eyes, they cannot see; except the Lord gives them ears they cannot hear: What can be more plain dealing then this? Like as our Savior no less plainly told the Jews to their face; He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God; Yet was he earnest and pathetical enough in exhorting them to repentance by the ministry of John the Baptist; by his own ministry. Jerusalem, Jerusalem that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together as an hen gathereth her chicken under her wings, and ye would not. Behold your habitation is left unto you desolate. For I say unto you ye shall not see me henceforth, till that ye say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. I come to this Author's Prosopopey; for the truth is his Rhetoric surmounts his Logic, whereat I wonder not a little.

O ye Reprobates, once most dearly beloved in your father Adam. But where hath he found in any of our Divines that Reprobates were at all beloved in our father Adam? We all hold Reprobation to be as ancient as election, which St. Paul testifies to have been before the foundation of the world. And to ordain to damnation I should think is to hate rather then to love; and this ordination divine was from everlasting. And the Scripture hath taught us that the divine nature is without variableness or shadow of change. He speaks in the language of his own Court, when he talks of sealing up under invincible sin and misery. The Scripture speaks of sealing unto the day of redemption by God's holy spirit which gives them assurance, that they are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation; That God will deliver them from every evil work, & preserve them to his heavenly kinngdome. But no such spirit is given to Reprobates to assure them of their damnation, so to seal them up under invincible sin & misery. They are under the power of Satan; but he hath neither power nor authority to assure them of their damnation. And albeit this Author fashions a discourse to reprobates, as if they were a sect well known; Yet we are so far from knowing who they are, that they are (in our opinion) neither known to themselves, nor known to Satan, no nor to God's holy Angels, unless he reveal it unto them. If we should have any cause to address ourselves to Reprobates (which kind of case and occasion is incomprehensible by me) we should describe them no otherwise then thus; O ye who are not only for the present under the power of Satan (and so are all God's elect before the time of regeneration) but will continue vassals unto him, even unto death, going on from sin, to sin and never breaking them off by repentance, but continuing to despise the goodness of God leading thereunto. Now this being only in reference to the time to come; I cannot speak to any in present under this form absolutely, but hypothetically. For none are Reprobates to us, but such who finally persevere in impenitency; Therefore I cannot exhort them to amend their lives under the style of Reprobates, but as such, who although they are under the power of sin and Satan, may for ought I know belong to God's election, and in good time come out of the snare of Satan; And because the ministry of the word is the only means whereby God brings men unto repentance, and that by instruction, admonition and exhortation; therefore I do instruct them in the knowledge of God that made them after his own Image; and how this image of God came to be defaced in them, to wit, by the sin of our first parents, and how hereupon we became to be shapen in sin, and borne in sin, and therewithal children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse; then I represent unto them the mercy of God towards man in giving us his Son to bear our sins in his body upon the tree, and suffer a shameful and bitter death upon the cross for them; and that for this his Son's sake he offers unto us the pardon of all our sins upon our repentance, and faith in Christ, and thereupon I exhort them unto repentance: We farther say that God takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but takes pleasure in a man's repentance. We do not say, neither doth the word of God say, that he willeth not the death of him that dieth. For undoubtedly he willeth the damnation of all them that die in their sins without repentance. We do not say that God would have no man to perish, but all come to repentance. Neither doth the Scripture say any such thing; For that were to deny God's omnipotency. For seeing many there be that perish; if this were contrary to God's will, then God's will should be resistible, and we should be driven to deny the first Article of our Creed; As Augustine hath long ago argued the case. But indeed Peter writing to them, who had obtained like precious faith with the Apostles themselves; and such as were Elect unto sanctification of the spirit; and were begotten again to a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead; to them he writes saying, The Lord of that promise is not slack, but is patient towards us (not to us Reprobates; God forbid that we should so corrupt the interpretation of his words; but rather to us Elect, to us called, to us begotten of God) not willing any to perish (to wit of us) but all come to repentance, to wit all of us, whensoever through our frailty we turn out of the good ways of the Lord. God cries unto you by us, and calls upon you by us; and hath along time shown great patience, and long suffering, and hereby led you unto repentance; & by his word stands knocking at the doors of your hearts, and calling upon you to open unto him. And the more to move you, he is pleased to express himself in the affections of a weak man, who is not able to accomplish his desires, O that there were an heart in you to fear me and keep my commandments; and with great passionatnesse crieth out unto you, What shall I do unto you, how shall I entreat you? As if he were to seek what course to take, and willing to use every provocation to excite you and stir you up, sometimes by gracious promises, as Come and let us reason together, though thy sins were as scarlet &c. Sometimes by threatenings, Woe unto thee ô Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean, when shall it once be. And withal he gives us to understand, & requires us to preach as much unto you also, even to acquaint you with the whole counsel of God, & tell you, that as many as are ordained unto eternal life, as many as to whom the arm of the Lord is revealed; as many as are of God, they obey this calling, they believe, they hear God's words, and turn unto him by true repentance sooner or later; They that do not, it is because they are not of God. And albeit those words are the words of Moses, O that there were an heart in you to fear me! speaking to them in the name of the Lord; yet the same Moses tells the same people plainly that The Lord had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto that Day. And albeit the Lord professeth in like manner by his Prophet Isaiah, O that thou hadst hearkened unto my commandments, then had thy prosperity been as the flood, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea. Yet this very disobedience of theirs was consequent to the Lord's obduration of them, as appears Es: 6. 9. Go say unto this people ye shall hear indeed, but ye shall not understand; ye shall plainly see & not perceive. Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and convert, and he heal them. Then said the Lord how long? (should this obduration continue) And he answered until the Cities be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate; And the Lord have removed men far away, and there be a great desolation in the midst of the land; Yet I dare not say of any of you, that ye are Reprobates. For God may open your eyes before you die to see your sins, and touch your hearts that ye may bewail them. And whensoever this blessed condition doth befall you, I will stir you up to give God the glory of it, who alone it is, that worketh in us that, which is pleasing in his sight; Yea both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure. If he never works any such thing in you, the more inexcusable are you, who presuming of your own power to believe, to repent; yet are nothing moved with such passionate expressions, unto repentance. If you do believe there is such impotency in you to good, and that it must needs continue in you, while God continueth to harden you by denying his grace, and thereupon ye except against God's course in complaining of their disobedience, whom he hath hardened saying Why then doth he complain; For who hath resisted his will? I put all such over to St. Paul to receive answer from him Rom: 9. 20. 21. 22. As touching this Author's conclusion; Dares he himself say that by God's decree Reprobates shall ever repent or be saved? What then is his meaning? why doth he not express himself in this particular; but most unshamefastly earthes himself like a fox, unwilling to bring his vile opinion to the light, which I take to be no other then this, that God's decree of giving faith is not absolute but conditional; namely to give faith to as many, as shall prepare themselves for it; And to deny it to none, but such as fail to prepare for it; as much as in plain terms to profess that Grace is given according unto works, The very filth of Pelagianism: Yet hath he nowhere discovered wherein this preparation consists; that he keeps to himself, and to his own Muses.

P. 80. I find another addition to the third Sub-section in these words.

M. Hord's discourse at the first went no farther then to prove, that In substance it is all one to offer a courtesy under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all. Here this Author adds that it is in circumstance a great deal worse. For he saith it is a denial joined with a scoff and derision, as was that of the Jebusites. In my answer to the former part in M. Hord I have shown that the reason why Salvation is proposed in scripture to be obtained upon a condition to be performed by man, is because God intends to save those, whom he doth save after a manner a greable to their reasonable natures; Namely by instruction, in a law of works, in a law of faith, by admonition and exhortation strengthened with promises to the obedient, with threatenings to the disobedient. And albeit men are not able to perform this obedience of themselves, being disabled by that natural corruption, which they have drawn from the Loynes of our father, in whom our natures received a mortal blow, through his disobedience, and became disabled to perform anything acceptable in the sight of God (for they that are in the flesh cannot please God) therefore the Lord is ready according to the covenant of grace to circumcise the hearts of some, namely of his Elect, To love the Lord with all their hearts, and with all their souls, to put his spirit within them, to cause them to walk in his statutes, to keep his judgments and do them. It is true this offer of salvation is proposed to all within the Church, whether Elect or Reprobate; and no marvel. For the Ministers of God's word are not acquainted with the counsels of God, as touching the election or reprobation of any man in particular: therefore they preach unto all, but knowing full well that this their ministry shall be effectual only to God's elect, as touching their salvation. Therefore as they endure all things for the elect sake. So for the elects sake it is that they preach the whole counsel of God, according as the Lord himself instructed Paul saying, Fear not, but speak & hold not thy peace; for I am with thee, and none shall lay hold on thee for to hurt thee. For I have much people in this City. Who are this people but the Elect of God. Yet God makes this use of preaching his word to all, that hereby excuse is taken from thē. For hereby it is made known unto them That a Prophet hath been among them. As for the point of derision. First this Author prescribes unto God very demurely, that he must not deride him. Yet will he think it lawful full for himself to mock a dog offering to give some what unto him, when he means nothing less; but man is grown so proud that he will take it in scorn to be mocked of any, yea of God himself, little thinking that he may well deserve to be derided and mocked. Yet the Scripture may teach us this, and that God will mock some, and therein deal with them according to their works; Because I have called and ye refused; I have stretched out mine hand and none would regard: But ye have despised all my counsel and would none of my correction, I will also laugh at your destruction, and mock when your fear cometh. Secondly I answer that man naturally is presumptuous of his own strength to believe, to repent; and shall God then be censured for mocking him, when he calls upon him to believe, to repent? Dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem, saith Austin, This is the course of man's pride to say had I known it, I had done it. If they are sensible of this impotency, can they not say with Austin, Da Domine quod jubes, & jube quod vis; Lord give what thou biddest, and then bid what thou wilt? Again if God commands nothing, but what he hath power to command, as namely to believe what he saith, and to do what he enjoins; why should this be censured mockery in reference to man's disability to perform it, when this disability is brought upon him by the sin of Adam, in whom we all were, and in him we have all sinned? And which is more; what means this Author to carry the matter thus hand over head, as to talk of an impossible condition without all distinction? Dares he say, that faith and repentance are possible by power of nature? Or doth any of us deny it to be possible by grace? If this be so it followeth that all the question between us should be drawn to this issue; whether God gives the grace of faith and repentance unto all; Yet indeed the truth herein deserves to be put out of all question, it being apparent that, Fides non est omnium, all men do not believe. Nay it is called in Scripture the Faith of God's elect: So that the, question is about the nature of that grace, without which faith and repentance cannot be performed. Why doth not this Author express his meaning in this, and clearly profess what that grace is whereby the conditions of faith & repentance are made conditions possible? His subdolous carriage throughout in concealing his Tenet is sufficient to disparage his cause with all that are indifferent and judicious. The Scripture plainly professeth that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; But as he carrieth the matter nothing less appears, then that this is his opinion. Yet I know he dares not in plain terms oppose the clear evidence of Scripture in this. Now if faith be the gift of God, & withal he gives it without difference to all thē all must believe, which is notoriously & palpably untrue. If he gives it only to some, thē all the rest are mocked by God according to this Authors discourse; as often as he saith unto them believe, and ye shall be saved. And to whom he saith this, to them he saith also, Oh that there were such an heart in them to fear me &c. If he saith, he gives faith absolutely to none, but conditionally, and upon the same condition he is ready to give to all; this is clearly to confess that the grace of God is given according to man's works. Again 'tis God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure, if according to his good pleasure, How can it be said that it is according to the preparation of the creature? Then what condition can be devised whereupon God works in us the will? If he say the grace which God gives to all, and whereby to believe, to repent is made a thing possible unto all (For thus we must proceed groaping after his meaning, he affecting nothing more then to sculke and earth himself in his concealements) I answer first; The Scripture makes no mention of any such power given to any; but to the contrary professeth of all persons unregenerate, that they cannot please God; that They cannot discern the things of God. 1 Co: 2. 14: that They cannot believe, that They cannot repent Ro: 24: that they are not subject to the law of God nor can be. 2ly. The Scripture plainly saith that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; It doth not say that the power to believe if they will is the gift of God. If he saith by faith is meant such a power, whereby a man may believe if he will, I prove the contrary; then all men should have faith. For in this man's opinion, all men are endued with this power: But the Apostle plainly saith that, All men have not faith. Again faith is described to be, The faith of God's Elect; but a power to believe if we will, this Author makes common to the Elect with Reprobates. Moreover if to give power to believe if a man will, be to give him faith, then in as much as God gives power to sin if he will, he may be said as well, that God gives sin. Add to this that to have power to believe, if one will; is rather nature then grace. For it is no more then posse fidem habere; and this is the nature of man as Austin testifies. Posse fidem habere naturae est hominum, fidem habere gratiae est fidelium; 'It is the nature of man that he may have faith, but it is of the grace of the faithful, that a man hath faith. And indeed if faith given us of God, did only enable us to believe, if we will; it were far inferior to a moral virtue, which doth not give man power to be virtuous, if he will; or to perform a virtuous act if he will: but makes him virtuous, and disposeth the will to virtuous acts only, and leaves him not indifferent, whether he will perform virtuous acts, or no. To return then, if no other grace be required to free God from mocking and deriding his creature; surely we are as free as our adversaries from making God to deride and mock his creature. For we are ready to grant that all men may believe if they will, repent if they will with Austin l. 1. de Gen: cont: Man: cap: 3. & De spiritu & liter â ad Marcellin. cap: 32. & De praedest. in: Sanct: cap: 5. And our reason is this. Not to be able to do that which a man will do, is impotency merely natural; but the impotency that we speak of, which is hereditary to all mankind by reason of the fall, is impotency moral, and resident in the will of man. For who doubts but that the will to believe, is to believe? For credimus si volumus: So the will to repent is to repent. For repentance in the root thereof is nothing else but the change of the will. And Pelagius of three things proposed. Posse, Velle, & Agere; he willingly granted the first, to wit, Posse bonum, to be from God; but he denied the other two to be the works of God; but of our free wills; which if he had acknowledged to be the works of God, as well as the first Austin tells him that, ab Apostolicâ doctrinâ abhorrere non videretur; he should not seem to vary from the doctrine of the Apostles. And for ought I see this Author goes not one step beyond Pelagius. He acknowledgeth that God doth persuade and exhort to believe; so did Pelagius. ibid. cap. 10. He saith also that God doth concur to the act; but so he doth in his opinion to every sinful act; so that this is but a general concourse: and what Pelagian was ever known to deny, but that God might have as great an hand in any good act, as in any natural act? Now since we acknowledge all this as well as he; what color hath he to impute unto us, that we by our doctrine so fashion God's providence, as to make him deride and mock miserable people. Though the Jebusites did mock David, as this Author gives his word for it, (though I do not find that Ribbi David Kimhi, or Piscator count it any derision, but a plain representation of their confidence, that David was never able to take it, such was the strength of the tower • , that the weakest, even the blind and the lame were sufficient to defend it.) Though withal Kimhi acquaints us with a strange story out of the Jews Darashe, of a Covenant made between Abraham and King Abimelech, and that concerning not him alone, but his Son and his Nephew, to suffer them quietly to enjoy their own; And that the Nephew of that Abimelech was alive at that time when David came to besiege that fort: And that therein the Jebusites had erected two Images, the one blind to represent I saack who in his old age was blind; and the other lame representing Jacob, who by wrestling with God became lame, and in the mouths of these Images was kept the Covenant which was made between Abraham and Abimelech. The instance he gives of a proclamation which takes up the greatest part of this supplement (as a great part of this Author's discourse, is spent in such insicete representations) is most incongruous, not only to the matter whereunto it is applied, but to the parts of it self. 1. To the matter whereunto it is applied. For it is proposed in such a case, as men could not obtain a certain incorporation, though they much desired it. Now such a thing is not incident to Reprobates, namely that they cannot believe though they would For had they a will to believe, undoubtedly that would be accepted of God. Then. 2 it is incongruous to the parts of the Simile it self. For incorporation only is precluded unto Germans by the unrepealable law, he feignes without common understanding. For undoubtedly all laws of men are repealable by the same authority, whereby they are made. And afterwards the condition of obtaining certain bountiful gratuities, by virtue of the foresaid incorporation, is proposed most undecently, not of their being incorporated into that society, but of their will to be incorporated. Now it is apparent that by the case feigned their incorporation only is precluded unto them, not their will to be incorporated. In the accommodation he saith, God hath made a decree (by our doctrine) that such men shall never believe. Now what one of our Divines can be produce to justify this? We say God hath decreed not to give them grace to work them unto faith, but to leave them unto themselves. And is not this Author of the same opinion? Nay doth he not extend it farther then we do, even to the Elect, as well as Reprobates? We say not so, but that his elect he doth not leave unto themselves to work out their faith if they can, but works them by his grace and holy Spirit thereunto. Himself seems to be conscious of the falsehood of this his imputation dealing upon the point of God's justice. Sub-sect. 2. For having there proposed three causes why Reprobates cannot justly be bound to believe; The second of them was this in M. Hord's discourse, Because it is impossible that they should believe; because God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe till their dying day. This reason is changed in this Author's refining of that discourse (as indeed all these reasons are changed by him more or less without replying upon ought that I have answered thereunto, but only putting out, or putting in at his pleasure, to cast a show that the former discourse of M. Hord's is not answered; such is his subdolous carriage to undermine that truth, which he is not able to oppose in a fair manner with any sound reason; least of all by evidence of Scripture, that flying in his face at every turn; and therefore his best wisdom is to shut his eyes against it.) And here he saith not in representing his second reason, that God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe, to their dying day; but thus rather; Because it is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe. But now again in this supplement of his, he returns to the first, and saith that by our doctrine, God hath made a decree that such men shall never believe. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo. But I confess it is an honor to God's truth, that it cannot be opposed, but in so vile a manner. Yet I have already shown, that we deny not unto reprobates a power to believe if they will. We deny not the ministry of the word unto them, exhorting them to believe. We deny not but that whosoever hath a will to believe, or doth believe, God must necessarily concur to the producing of that will, and that act of his. All this we grant, which is the uttermost whereunto this Author comes; but over and above we say, that God doth not only give his elect a power to believe if they will, and persuade them to believe; but that also he works them to believe, and not only concurs with them in producing gracious acts, but makes them to concur with him also; this is the grace, and this alone that he denies to reprobates.

Pag. 85. Treating of the use and end of God's gifts, the Author hath an addition of some seven lines concerning the Lord's supper, but nothing at all to purpose.

Pag. 87. Of the fifth Section next following; The passages out of the suffrages of our Britain Divines in the Synod of Dort quoted by M. Hord, here they are expressed, namely that there are certain internal works preparing a man to justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified, such as are the knowledge of God's will, and sense of sin, fear of punishment. Now I have shown that these our British Divines go much farther; and yet in their fifth Article and fourth position, they profess of all such as are none of God's Elect, that it is manifest they never really and truly attain that change and renovation of the mind and affections, which accompanieth justification; nay nor that which doth immediately prepare, and dispose unto justification. And therefore the preparation that this Author speaks of as out of them, must needs be a remote preparation. And withal they add, that They never seriously repent, they are never affected with hearty sorrow for offending God, for sinning, neither do they come to any humble contrition of heart, nor conceive a firm resolution not to offend anymore. Now let every sober person judge, whether God proceeding no farther with them then this, can be said to intend their conversion and salvation. The other position of theirs is this, Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth unto conversion. I make no question, but whom God calleth, he calleth seriously, and whom he inviteth unto conversion, that is as I take it, unto repentance, he inviteth truly & seriously thereunto. But that God intendeth either their conversion or salvation, I utterly deny. For did he intend it, undoubtedly he would work it; For certainly this is in his power. Faith is his gift, and repentance is his gift, and perseverance in both is his gift. And unless he gives faith and repentance we hold it impossible that any man should believe or repent. And what a monster is it in Divinity to maintain, that God's intentions are frustrated, which cannot be maintained without denying God's omnipotency? For no man's intentions are frustrated, but because it lieth not in his power to bring to pass the things intended by him.

Pag. 88. In the next section following is inserted a sentence of Prosper which no man denies. It is this They that have despised God's inviting will, shall feel his revenging will, but it is rightly to be understood, namely of despising his inviting will all along; and finally; Otherwise if they break of their contempt by repentance, there is mercy enough in store with God to pardon them, and his revengeful hand shall not be felt by them.

Pag. 89. And seventh section, concerning the use and end of God's gifts; divers passages of our Divines are mentioned, showing the end of God's providence in affording his word unto reprobates. As first out of Calvin, Behold he directs his voice unto them that they may be the more deaf; He kindles a light, but that they may be made more blind; He giveth them a remedy; that they might not be healed. Now Calvin herein points to that of Isaiah. Go and say to the children of Israel, hearing hear but understand not, seeing, see but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat (or obstinate) and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, & convert and be healed And Calvin doth but relate what the Lord saith to Isaiah: Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit. Behold (by this place of the prophet Isaiah) to what end the Lord sends his prophet to speak unto them. Now if Calvin doth herein misinterpret that place of the prophet Isaiah, it became this Author to except against his interpretation, and discover the unsoundnes of it; But taking no such course, and consequently by his silence (being an adversary) justifying his interpretation; while he reproacheth Calvin in this particular, he reproacheth the Holy Ghost, whose words he represents delivered unto his prophet.

The next passage is taken out of Beza in his Praelud. on the 9. to the Rom: p. 434. where he saith It ought not to seem absurd, that God unto Reprobates, living in his Church, doth offer grace in his word and Sacraments. For he doth it not to this end, that they may be saved, but that they may have less excuse then others, and at length be more greviously punished. And indeed why should this seem aliene from the course of God's providence revealed in his word, testifying that the invisible things of God, to wit his eternal power and Godhead are made manifest by his works, to the ena, men might be without excuse. And what this excuse is. S. Austin tells us saying, It is spoken of such an excuse, as men in their pride are wont to pretend saying, Si scissem fecissem; had I known it, I would have done it. And Eze: 2. 5. The Lord manifests the same end of his sending Ezech: unto the Jews. For he told him, They would not hear. For they were a rebellious house, vet saith he, they shall know that there hath been a prophet among them. And let every indifferent man judge whether the very place in John. (If I had not come and spoken unto them, they should not have had sin, but now have they no cloak for their sin,) doth not justifye that conclusion which Maccovius draws therehence, namely that Therefore God sent his son unto them, that by the contempt and hatred of his son they might procure unto themselves the greater damnation. For he professeth that by his coming and speaking unto them, all excuse was taken from them. And let everyone judge whether contempt in such a manner doth not procure greater damnation. And old Simeon professeth that Christ should be set up, as to the rising of some; so to the falling of others: And long before the Lord professeth that he should be as a net, and a snare to both houses of Israel. Yet I am not of Maccovius his mind in saying, that God proposeth his word unto Reprobates to no other end, but this: But certainly he proposeth it not unto them to the end that they should be saved by it. And let every sober man judge whether it be not better to ascribe such intentions unto the divine nature as are fulfilled, rather then such as are not fulfilled.

P. 94. Where he lays to our charge that our doctrine hinders piety and godly life Sect: 2. he hath this passage inserted.

Although that which I have said upon this Section in answer to M. Hord be sufficient to show the absurdity of this Authors discourse, yet I think good to accommodate what there I have delivered to this also, especially to the particular instance of Devils. And first it is a thing worthy our consideration that he saith. It is absolutely decreed that Devils shall be damned, Now if this be true, then the divine decree concerning the damnation of Devils is an absolute decree, now this decree is not temporal but eternal. Now if the eternal decree of God concerning the damnation of Devils be absolute, why should not God's eternal decree of the damnation of men be absolute also: let him mumble upon this argument and acquaint us with his answer thereunto when he thinks good. When he discourseth of the fruitless nature of the Devils prayers and tears and endeavors to alter this decree, he seems to me to suppose that the Devils are not bereaved of their free-will to pray, and which were more then wonderful in their state of innocence, to shed tears and to perform holy endeavors; and if this were true it were unreasonable for us to deny that Arminians had the like power left unto them. But if they have no such freedom of will, what totter took this Author to discourse of the fruitless exercise of such a power. Would he not think our brain were cracked, if we should tell him how fruitless his course would be to clamber up into the world of the Moon, seeing it is as possible for him to be Lunatick here, as well as there. Yet if the Devils have any such freedom of will left them whereby they may attain to holiness, their endeavors that way though fruitless in respect of the altering of God's decree, yet surely would not be fruitless in another respect. For better it were by far, I should think for them to repent and submit to the will of God in suffering Hell pains, then to blaspheme in suffering them. But be it so, that not only God's decree be absolute concerning their damnation; but that their first sin did put them quite out of the way, and is to them as death to men. Yet such is not the condition of men. And albeit the decree of damnation both of Devils and men be absolute, yet neither the one nor the other was decreed to be brought upon them absolutely, but upon the Angels, in case they kept not their own habitation: upon men in case they did not only sin, but finally persevere in sin without repentance: Though in this respect there is no place for the repentance of Angels, yet place there is for the repentance of men, and by repentance to avoid the wrath to come. And lastly, the Devil knows his condition to be irrecoverable, No man on earth knows his estate to be so. For albeit according to our doctrine a man may be assured of his election: yet by our doctrine no man can be assured of his reprobation. Add this hereunto, Although a man did know he were reprobated to damnation, yet not knowing to what degree and measure of damnation he is ordained, there is place to use his best endeavors in the way of civility and morality, that his damnation may be the less. In case he did know this also, yet place still remains to be as moral as he can. For damnation joined with a condition of better morallity, is better then damnation joined with a condition of less morality. This may suffice as an answer to the other instances, which are far more wild then the first: as touching the immortality of the soul which he saith is simply decreed; and it is decreed to be immortal without any course to be taken by man to promote the immortality thereof: But do any of our Divines maintain that God hath decreed our salvation in such sort, as to be brought to pass without any course to be taken by men of ripe years to promote their salvation? What proportion is there beetween immortality & salvation. God intends salvation to no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth God bestow immortality upon the soul by way of reward? Was not the soul of man immortal as soon as it was created? Is such the salvation of God's elect? And what giddiness possessed the spirit of this Author when he discourseth of the vain labor of any man, that should use means that his soul should be annihilated? Supposing that such means there are, and may be used, by the form of his speech, when he saith, that it is labor in vain for any man to use such means. As for that which followeth of the Sun and Moon. An instance of the same nature hath been given in this very Section and an answer thereunto accommodated in my refutation of M Hords discourse, which this Author could not be ignorant of, as appears by his altering and changing it almost throughout yet takes no notice thereof to reply thereunto, but keeps himself as still as a sow in beans, thinking it his safest course to be silent. The truth is, God (we say) bestowing salvation and inflicting damnation proceeds according to a law, which he hath given unto man: but not so in the giving or denying grace, not so in showing mercy on some and hardening others, but according to the me • e pleasure of his will. It were far more congruous to accommodate the instances he gives to the divine proceedings in this particular. But here he dares not budge, least his Pelagian spirit should be manifested to all the world, in maintaining that not only in conterring salvation, and inflicting damnation, he proceeds according to men's works, but also in giving and denying grace.

P. 96. Two lines are inserted a little above the Latin verses, but of no moment distinct from the rest.

P. 97. Section the 4. of the crimination last save one, where he saith that three things are usually answered to vindicate our opinion from this crimination, but he conceals who they be, that thus answer: yet would not be thought to feign it. And the first of these is this That many of them which believe and defend this doctrine are holy and good men, &c. Now here comes in that which he inserts.

I nothing doubt, but this Author pleased himself well in this comparison, and others likewise of his own sect. For like lettice, like lips, yet all this is carried with a show of charity, in acknowledging the holiness forsooth, and goodness of their oposites; but it ends in this comparison, right Epicurus like, whose morality (forsooth) was pleaded to countenance his sensual and swinish doctrine. But whatsoever our life's be, for testimony whereof we nothing desire to be beholding to the charity of our opposites; Yet surely our doctrine concerning the absoluteness both of election, grounded upon no other foundation then this, that Grace is not conferred according unto works, as Austin testifies; and of reprobation grounded accordingly upon no other foundation then this, that grace is not denied according unto works; shall be found no swinish doctrine, but the very truth of God. And let them that oppose it look well to their ways, least they be not found goatish together with their doctrine at the day of judgment. But how comes this Author to be so stupid in reading Cicero, and so little understanding him; as in these words to conceive, that he professeth himself to have a good opinion of Epicurus? I confess I marked it the more diligently, because I remember well the comparison that Plutarch makes between the virtuous gloriation of Epaminondas his mother, and the vile gloriation of Epicurus his mother, professing she never saw an happier day, then when she saw her Son Epicurus generating, cum Cyzezena meretriculâ, operis cum Polyano divisis; unless this were the morality of her Son, wherein she gloried that he was not so jealous, but that he could admit a corrival in the satisfaction of his filthy lusts. And indeed I had also observed other where, that he was a very temperate man, but to this end, that he might take the greater pleasure in the flesh, his senses being the more quick, when they were not clogged and overcome with surfeit. But come we to Cicero his judgment. He takes notice that Epicurus was commended as Comis in amicitiis tuendis, a man of a fair nature in maintaining friendship; yet (saith he) though these things were true (for I affirm nothing) he was not acute enough. I think this is spoken in reference to his doctrine nothing answerable to this commendation of him. For he measured friendship by profit, as in that very book Cicero relateth. Then he takes notice of another commendation given of him, in these words, At multis se probavit, he approved himself to many; Et quidem jure fortasse, and truly for good cause perhaps. This is Cicero his concession with a perhaps. But observe what he brings in upon the back of this; Sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis; but the testimony of the multitude (the many) is not most weighty, or most considerable. For in every art or study, or any science, or in virtue it self, everything that is best, is most rare. Then follow the words which this Author alseadgeth not, Ac mihi quidem videtur, quod ipse vir bonus fuit. And to me truly it seems that he was a good man; This had been to contradict himself, having formerly said, Nihil affirmo, I affirm nothing; he takes into consideration what others said of him, but as for him, he would say nothing of him neither in commendation, nor vituperation. But his words run thus, Ac mihi quidem, quod & ipse bonus vir fuit, & multi epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles (For it seems indeed that he and Polyaenus cum Cyziz • n • meretriculà were very faithful one to the other) & in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed consilio officia moderantes; hoc videtur, (here comes in videtur and not till now) major vis honestatis & minor voluptatis. He still affirms nothing of the life of Epicurus, but taking that which others affirmed of him, and admitting it, saith hoc videtur major vis honestatis & miner voluptatis: this testimony of others concerning these particulars did argue more force of honesty, & less of pleasure. Ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorū vita probetur refellatur oratio For so some do live, that their life is approved, but their opinions condemned And on this point only (to wit concerning his opinion) had Cicero to deal with Epicurus at this time; Atque ut caeteri existimantur dicere melius, quàm facere: Sic • i mihi videntur facere melius, quàm dicere. And as others are thought to speak better then they live; So these seem to me to live better then they speak. By these he means not Epicurus, or Epicureans, but those some, of whom he spake immediately before. And whether this be not the true meaning of Cicero, I appeal to the judgment of every sober man, that shall consider his words. And to requite this Author, and pay him in his own coin; I will not tell him what one of his own Sect hath given forth concerning one that preached in a great place, namely that his Auditory should profess, that the Author must needs be an Arminian, he preached so honest a sermon; Though on the contrary I have heard of a great Arminian of Cambridge, that he should profess to a friend of his, coming to him to confer with him, and take him off from his opinion, if it might be, saying in the close that it was not for the honesty of their conversation who maintained the same, that he was of the same mind; and gave his reason for it out of his own experience, which I will not mention. But I will make bold to represent what I have read of the Pelagians, to answer this Author, and so to recompense him in the way of charity. For Chrysostom placeth Pelagius inter viros pie ac sancte magna{que} cum tolerantiâ viventes, amongst men living piously and holily, and with great patience; as Vossius observes cap: 3. hist: Pelag: and Claudius Menardus before him in his notes upon Austin's book against Julian the Pelagian. Austin in his 106 epistle acknowledgeth Paulinus to have loved him as the servant of God. And in his retractions he professeth saying, Pelagii ipsius nomen non sine laude posui, quia vita ejus à multis praedicabatur: I made mention of Pelagius his name not without commendation; for as much as his life was magnified by many. Amd in his third book De peccat: meritis & remiss: c: 1. he saith, the report that went of him was as of an holy man, and one that had profited much in Christianity. I find likewise good commendations given of Coelestius also and Julian the Pelagian: And I make no question but an honest and pious man may be soured with the leaven of Pelagianism, in that way of Arminianism ere he is aware, but God may take them off from it ere they die: Though the eager opposers of God's truth this way, even by such as were termed Semi-Pelagians, Prosper spares not to call Vasa irae, vessels of wrath, in his Epistle to Ruffinus; And the exiled Bishops of Africa in their Synodical Epistle, style them no better then Vasa irae, vessels of wrath. And upon the conclusion of the Synod of Palestine what tumults were raised, and what abominable acts were committed by the party of Pelagius, is set down in part both by Austin, in the end of his book De gestis Pelagii, and in a certain epistle of Innocentius Pope of Rome.

To conclude; Leviathan God's enemy is represented in Scripture, as a crooked Serpent. It pleased King James to style Arminius sometimes the enemy of God. And Austin I am sure stiles the Pelagians, Inimici gratiae Dei; The enemies of God's grace. And no marvel if they carry themselves like crooked Serpents, turning and winding for their advantage. I have labored to find out the Meanders of this Author, which I little suspected at the first, and to meet with him. everywhere, and encounter him in his greatest fastnesse: And let the indifferent judge whether everywhere he be not found to hold a lie in his right hand. I would to God his eyes were opened, that he might see how he forsakes his own mercies, by forsaking the fountain of living waters, to dignity unto himself pits, even broken pits that can hold no water. While he looks to be saved by no other grace inherent, then such as whereby he hath power to believe if he will, repent if he will. A lamentable condition, that a man of understanding, and knowledge, and good morality should be thus blinded, nothing perceiving that this is mere nature, and not grace. But what infatuation hath seized upon the Christian world, when such discourses are magnified as sound and excellent; yea rare pieces, and unanswerable? Let us give God the glory of keeping us in our right wits and senses; otherwise even Flies with us shall go for Elephants, and the very illusions of Satan shall be advanced, as strange performances, not only of sober speculations; when they are equally estranged both from soundness and sobriety; such as all along look a squint upon God's word; yet seldom take notice thereof, or are conformed thereunto; but rather proceed in manifest opposition thereunto, and withal are found clearly devoid of all sound reason, though thereof Pelagians have always vaunted most, but these vaunts are but wind, and prove no more substantial, then the imagination of a vain thing.

I.

Concerning the first, I will endeavor to satisfy you my way; and if that succeeds not, to gratify you your own way.

My conceit of a decree indefinite, proposed digress. 3. cap. 6. you prefer as more suitable to my manner of ordering God's decrees. Three reasons there I proposed why I durst not embrace that conceit.

1. The first was, because it seems to be of a more imperfect nature then is fit to be attributed to God.

To this is answered, that we need not to attribute any such decree to God, but only to resolve a definite decree of God into two conceits, according to our apprehension, whereof the one is indefinite, the other definite; As in God's purpose to make Peter and Paul vessels of mercy, there are included two conceits in our apprehension; the one indefinite, to wit, to make some vessels of mercy; the other definite, to wit, that Peter and Paul shall be two of them. You seem to approve of this.

Now I have cause to doubt of the soundness of this, for these reasons, 1. If no such decree can be attributed to God, then in vain do we discourse of the priority thereof before other decrees of God, which indeed are attributed to him, and that decently. And indeed all the decrees whereof we dispute are truly attributed unto God, though they have not that distinction one from another in God as the like decrees are distinguished in man. And an indefinite decree, relishing of imperfection, both in that respect cannot be decently attributed unto God, as also because it doth imply an indefinite and confuse knowledge in God. 2. The priority of decrees in God, is only secundum rationem, and this Durand expounds most clearly in this manner, quando ratio unius sumitur ab altero, in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. so ratio mediorum sumitur à ration finis. But ratio decreti definiti non sumitur a ration deoreti indefiniti. Because God intends such an end, therefore God doth appoint such and such means: but it cannot be said, that, because God doth intend to make some indefinitely to be vessels of mercy, therefore he doth intend that Peter and Paul shall be two of them.

2. My two other objections are these, Indefinites are before definites only in such sort as communia are priora specialibus, and this is only prioritate naturae generantis, non intendentis; and we speak of priority in intention, not in the way of generation. And again, that which is first in the way of generation, is last in intention; and therefore this makes rather against it, than for it.

To this you answer, that rather on the contrary Universalia are priora singularibus, non tam natura generante, quam intendente. For Homo prius intenditur quam Socrates: Non enim species est propter Individuum, sed Individuum propter speciem. Or, if this be not true in universalibus physicis, yet is it in politicis sive aggregatis, which have a more resemblance to our present matter.

To this I answer, 1. The comparison we speak of between a decree indefinite and definite, is not the same with a comparison between the species and the singular; but only as between singulars and singulars; singulars indefinitely proposed as aliqui, and singulars proposed definitely, as Hic & ill, Peter and Paul. Now though individuum be propter speciem, as that which nature intends principally; and individua for the maintenance of the species: yet is it not so congruous to say, that particulars definite are for particulars indefinite, &c. The instance I gave in reducing it to a comparison between generalia and specialia, was to bring it, as near as I could, to such a State wherein the evidence of truth might plead for it self. As indeed it is manifest, that generalia are only priora specialibus quoad naturam generantem, specialia priora generalibus quoad naturam intendentem; which I delivered out of the remembrance of my old Philosophy, as a thing which I conceived to be without question. Zabarell de methodis lib. 1. cap. 6. Ordo naturae non unus est, sed multiplex, vel saltem duplex: Non solum enim simplicia sunt naturae priora compositis, sed etiam composita simplicibus, ut ex Aristotele colligimus, in cap. 1. lib. 2. de partibus animalium: si namque ordinem naturae intelligamus habita ration generationis naturae, elementa sunt priora misto, mistum animali, animal homine; quod si per ordinem naturae intelligamus ordinem perfectionis seu ordinem scopi & intentionis naturae, homo est natura prior animali, animal misto, & mistum elementis. But I confess the case is different between a species and the particulars thereof, whether we consider nature particular, or nature universal: For, as for nature particular, though it intends and works only for a particular like it self; yet, whereas particulars may be infinite, and it is found to have no power to produce one particular rather then another; this consideration hath puzzled many in enquiring how it comes to pass that this particular agent brings forth this particular effect at such a time; whereas he was indifferent to have brought forth any one particular of many thousands in that kind. And, after Suarez in his Metaphysics hath tried many ways hereabouts, at length resolves upon Ariminensis his invention, who reduceth it to the determination of God's will: and this conceit, after Suarez, is embraced with great approbation by Hurtado de Mendoza. Which because it concerneth a manner of God's concourse, and that a very strange one, as they expound it; I have taken occasion to consider it in a peculiar digression. So that in that case the particular produced is not intended by nature at all (as being indifferent to any) but left to be determined by the will of God. And as for nature universal, whose end is the maintenance of the universe in the several kinds of the parts thereof; it likewise, so there be particulars succeeding whereby the species rerum are maintained, regards not at all, whether these particulars be produced or others. But these intentions are not answerable to the intentions of God, which are altogether of particulars, whereupon man's understanding works in drawing therehence unities specifical and genericall, according to that of Aristotle, Animal aut nibil est aut posterius est. And Navarrettus, writing of divine concourse; suppo • endum est id quod solent Logici & Metaphysici dicere de unitate universa •• quae non est unitas positiva sed negativa: Non enim universal est positive unum in multis sed cum reperiatur plurificatum in multis, & non magis determinatum ad unum quam ad alterum, habet in se quandam indifferentiam, non quidem positivam respectu multorum, atque adeo non habet unit atem positivam; sed negative se habet ad illa multa, & consequenter, est unum negative in multis, hoc est, habet unitatem quae non magis reperitur in uno inferiorum quam in altero. But yet the case I say in present consists not in comparison between a species and the singulars thereof, but between particulars and particulars; either as indefinitely considered under the notion of aliqui, or definitely under the notions of Hic & ill.

But you think in universalibus Politicis, as in the gathering of an Army, or erecting of a College, the truth you speak of is more apparent, and the resemblance more congruous to the matter in hand. Let us consider them. A certain number of Soldiers for completing of an army I confess is intended first, afterwards a choice of persons: so the maintenance of a certain number of Scholars is intended first, and afterwards they proceed to the election of Scholars. Here is totum per aggregationem, but it is by aggregation of parts in a certain kind, which is of greatest consideration, to wit, of parts succeeding one another, as a river is said to be one by succession of parts which never return. All which parts are impossible to be subject to the consideration of the Founder or General, because the College continueth long after the Founder is dead, and so may the Army also, one General succeeding another by the appointment of the State. A more proper resemblance is found in a man purposing to distribute a sum of money to a certain numbr of persons: as, put the case, twenty pound to forty persons, as a Gentleman hath dealt with our town. The choice of such persons as are most necessitous he leaveth to some persons of trust. Now, if the Gentleman himself knew of himself every person in the Town, and their necessitous condition; from the first undoubtedly he would appoint, not a certain number indefinitely to receive it, but assign rather such persons particularly on whom it should be bestowed. And in like sort a General were it in his power to leavy whom he list, and withal knew for certain every man's sufficiency, he would from the first resolve upon and design, not only such a number, but such particular persons also for that service: And, that in the ordinary course it is otherwise, this proceeds from such an imperfection as is not incident unto God. And last of all, both the General and the Founder have respect to fitness in them whom they choose, which it is not in their power to procure. But God hath power to provide himself both of fitness and of persons also to that service whereto he is pleased to design them. Yet Didacus Alvarez seems to acknowledge such an indefinite decree, and he is gravis author I confess: And he plainly professeth, that permissio peccati prop • r quod quis damnatur est effectus reprobationis. Whence it manifestly followeth, First, that the reprobation of Infants as many as die in original sin in their infancy, cannot premise the foresight of original sin, because they undergo condemnation only for original sin. Secondly, that no man's Reprobation can premise original sin, because every man that undergoes condemnation, undergoes it not for actual sins only, but original also: yet this tenet of his he delivereth not obiter, but maintains it eagerly by argument. As for this of an indefinite degree, he toucheth only by the way, without so much as explication of his meaning therein. And again in that discourse of his he hath some other strange conceits, as I have shown in my first digression upon election: in the perusing whereof at this time it seems, you are. As for Beza, that which I there delivered is merely by collection: but what his opinion was, may appear by his own expression, De praedestinatione, in 9. ad Rom. in these words, Denique verbum istud [Faciendi] & nomen [Luti] ac [Massae] adhue informis, manifest mihi quidem videtur declarare, Deum in hac similitudine nobis preponi, de humanototo genere in primo illo homine, protoplasto propterea vocato, condendo statuentem; unde Singuli homines ad finem usque seculorum propagarentur, eo jam tum consilio, ut in unis quidem, quos jam tum in libro vitae suis temporibus nascituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, justificandos, glorificandos describebat, ad salutis decus per gratiam in Christo evebendis: in aliis vero per contrarios gradus in aeterni exitii dedecus juste praecipitandis, gloriam suam patefaceret. In like sort Piscator in his disputation de objecto praedestinationis, defines predestination this, Praedestinatio est aeternum Dei decretum quo constituit condere homines ad diversos fines speciales, nempe alios ad fruendum salute aeterna, alios vero ad sentiendum cruciatus aeternos, seu ad aeternum exitium: itemque constituit permittere, ut isti omnes, integri conditi, in peccatum laberentur; idque propterea, ut quos conditurus erat ad salutem servaret ex misericordia; quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex justitia: & denique constituit ex lapsis illos quos conditurus erat ad salutem, servaret ex misericordia, quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex justitia: (all which cannot be understood but of persons definite) & denique constituit exlapsis illos quos ad salutem conditurus erat, eligere ad hoe, ut eos ex misericordia servaret; quos vero ad exitium, reprobare ad hoc, ut eos ex justitia puniret: (this likewise cannot be understood but of persons definite) atque ita omnibus istis modis gloriam tum misericordiae suae parcentis, tum justitiae punientis, tum vero imprimis potestatis suae summae patefacere. And by these passages appears the error of my construction both of Beza and Piscators meaning; for it was grounded upon supposal that election in them both signified an internal act in God, the very decree of God, which is eternal: But here it appears they took Election for an external and temporal act, and yet distinct from vocation: of which opinion of Piscator I have considered. digress. 2. de praedestinatione. And here it appears that Beza had entertained some such conceit, as when he saith nasoituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, justificandos, &c. And indeed I well remember him to distinguish between electio & decretum eligendi.

Yet now, to gratify you your own way: I am content to leave that which I have said in that Digress. 3. of an indefinite decree as it lieth; and to propose the reasons alleged against it only by way of disputation, not by way of assertion, and leave it indifferent unto the Reader to judge as he shall think most agreeably. And to confess a truth unto you, it is but lately I came to this order; following the rigorous Tenet before as seemeth most consonant to reason, though harsh to men's affections; and being but lately fallen upon it, I am apt to conceive, that something may be wanting to the full clearing of the truth in this point; a way whereunto I hope I have opened: yet if you shall think it inconvenient, I shall be content to pretermit it wholly, and leave out all my digressions of this argument, or any other.

II.

Now touching Angels, I pray let not ought that I have written make you sorry for ought that you have delivered touching the election of Angels: And do not you conceive of me amiss, as if I did conceive you to harbor any ill opinion thereabouts: For I profess I do not, neither have you given me any cause; yet from nine years of age I have known you. The first time I wrote of that, I only said, it seemed strange unto me; my reason was, because I never knew any, either by writing or otherwise, Protestant, or Papist, sound in maintaining man's election by grace, but that in like sort he maintained the election of Angels to be of grace. And whereas you professed otherwise only as an opponent: I conceived you did it but as myself or any other Scholar will do, to try the uttermost of another's strength with whom we dispute.

But when the second time you wrote hereon, you professed to doubt whether Arminius acknowledged any election at all of Angels; that seemed to me as strange, because I am persuaded that no Arminian or Lutheran denieth the election of Angels: though like enough they are apt to fashion it according to their opinion of the election of men. As for the construction of that place in Timothy touching the elect Angels, I could not ascertain myself in what sense it might be conceived to proceed without acknowledging their election, and I was loath to divine at random. Now as you express yourself herein more particularly; so will I particularly make answer.

First, I grant that a conditional decree is no election. But seeing it is impossible but God should foresee, on whose part the condition would be performed, and on whose part not; herehence it followeth, that God must accordingly Elect the one, and Reprobate the other: and so there must be acknowledged even an election of Angels after their manner. Like as the Arminians, beside that conditional predestination of men you speak of, do acknowledge a precise election of some upon foresight of their obedience, and reprobation of the other upon foresight of their disobedience.

Touching the exposition of that, 1 Tim. 5. 21. I have consulted Hemingius, a man as erroneous in the point of election as any Lutheran; yet he interpreteth the place thus, Hos Electos ad discrimen Reproborum vocat. I grant it denotes the dignity of their persons, but still in respect of choice: as when we say a choice Book, a choice Jewell, as much as to say, which a man would make choice of, and prefer before many: so the Elect Angels are so called in respect of choice, which choice to my understanding can have no congruous reference, but to the choice of God.

It is true we have, nothing like, such Scripture evidence touching the election and reprobation of Angels, as of Men. But whereas in these points both Scripture evidence and light of Christian reason do concur; so the light of Christian reason doth make it as evident on the part of Angels, as on the part of man; namely, that nothing can possibly be the cause of God's will or predestination quoad actum volentis, or praedestinantis. And Aquinas, as you have heard, professeth, That never any man was so mad as to profess, that anything without God could be the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis; and herein you yourself agree.

Now touching Austin; I am glad you have lighted upon him. I do • b • not but he shall persuade you in this point, though I could not. And first I will accommodate an answer to your allegations; Secondly, I will endeavor to show clearly his opinion in this point.

Your first allegation is, Caeteri autem per ipsum liberum arbitrium in veritate steterunt; but yourself perceive it might be answered, that this might be delivered inclusa gratia specially. And it may be proved that this phrase of speech doth not exclude special grace: for in the same Chapter it is afterwards said of man thus, In quo statu recto ac sine vitio, si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset. Here you must not exclude special grace in this case; For si manere voluisset, undoubtedly this will of his had been wrought by special grace, as Austin manifesteth in the chapter following: For he distinguisheth of two graces or two adjutories, the one was, ut posset pernianere si vellet, the other was, ut vellet quod potuit; his words are these, est in nobis per hane Dei gratiam, in bono recipiendo & perseveranter tenendo, non solum posse quod volumus, veruns etiam velle quod possumus: Quod non fuit in homine primo, unum enim horum in illo fuit, alterum non fuit. Namque ut reciperet bonum, gratiâ non egedat, quia nondum perdider at: ut autem in eo permaneret, egebat adjutorio gratiae, sine quo iâ emnino non posset: & acceperat posse si vellet, sed non habuit velle quod posset: nam si babuisset perseverasset. But you bring a second place to prove that Angels could have stood by their free-will, secluding special grace, and that is this, Credimus Dominum Deum—sie ordinasse Angelorum & hominum vitam ut in ea prius ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. I grant the Angels had power to stand if they would, and power to fall if they would; and this power was manifested in the standing of the one, and in the fall of the other. But herehence it followeth not, that therefore the act of standing was not of God's grace. But you will say the benefit of grace was afterwards manifested: And I answer, that grace was the grace of confirmation, opposite to the Obduration of the evil Angels; which grace of confirmation, though it were manifested after the obedience of the good Angels, consisting in assurance that they shall never fall; yet herehence it followeth not, that their standing was not by grace, though that grace whereby they stood was different from that grace whereby they were confirmed: for before their obedience, so they stood, as that withal they might fall; but since their obedience they now so stand, that they cannot fall.

Now for Austin's opinion hereabouts, it is plain enough from other places. De civ. dei, lib. 12. cap 9. aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem pervenerunt. So that he doth manifestly acknowledge, that the good Angels had such an adjutorium which the wicked had not: whereupon Leonardus Coquaeus, neither Jesuit nor Dominican, but an Augustinian, commenting, writes in this manner: ea ration intelligitur majus beneficium collatum Angels honis quam malis, etsi enim gratiam aequalem habitualem ab initio sint consecuti, it a tamen efficax fuit motio divina et auxilium dei speciale in Angels sanctis, ut in Deunt toti converterentur, persisterent in bono, et beatitudinem eandem assequerentur; non ex vi libertatis arbitrii certe factum est, ut it a differenter afficerentur, et quod gratia fuerit efficax in his et non in istis, Deo maxim tribuendum; et ex duobus bominibus aequaliter affectis, si unus salvetur, alius vero damnetur, intelligo semper majus auxilium gratiae collatum ei qui fit salvets, idque cum Augustino hoc loco, & passim, ubi de hac materia disputat, neque totum id refero in libertatem arbitrii, quod unus velit consentire et respondere gratiae, alius non; facit enim etiam ut velimus, et consentiamus: neque infallibilem illam nostram consensionem puto tantum ex infallibili praescientia Dei; imo si per impossible secludamus omnem praescientiam dei, ipsa gratia ex se infallibiliter movet hominem vel etiam Angelum, ut, licet non necessitate coactionis, necessitate tamen immutabilitatis efficax ex se sit, et gratia dei magis in uno quam in altero; et quod unus convertatur, alius non, quod uni detur auxilium efficax, in alio sit quidem sufficiens, minime tamen consequatur suum effectum, mysterium esse ubique docet Augustinus, at si posita aequali gratia qua unus converteretur, alius non, id ex solo consensu vel d • ssensu liberi arbitrii penderet, nullum certe mysterium in • sse mihi videretur. Neque hic reddit Augustinus causam eur ex Angels alij salvati fuerint, alij minime, quod hos deus praescierit salvandos vel cooperaturos suae gratiae, alios minime cooperaturos; sed quia qui salvati sunt, vel majorem acceperunt divini amoris gratiam, vel certe si aequaliter boni creati sunt, id est, in aequali gratia, illi amplius adjuti fuerint: adeo ut negotium salutis Angelorum benorum in majus auxilium gratiae referat; ut, quod alij cadant et non respondeant gratiae divinae, eique non cooperentur; id quidem ascribendum sit libero horum arbitrio: quod vero in aliis gratia sit efficax, ade • que illi cooperentur, ipsi deo potissimum tribuendum sit. Than which I never found a more illustrious testimony for the prerogative of God's grace in, and sovereignty over his creatures in any Thomist or Dominican, that at this day hath maintained the cause of God, (as Bradwardine calls it) against the Jesuits. Neither did I ever take notice of the place before, but by occasion of this present search to give you satisfaction concerning the opinion of Austin; only rested contented with that which I supposed to be the common opinion of all, that the case is the same as touching the operation of God's grace both in Angels and men, and Christ in Scripture is accounted the head of Angels as well as of men. But that whole Chapter in Austin, lib. 12. de civit. dei. cap. 9, is worth any man's reading, where he disputes the case at large, where he hath another sentence more illustrious then the former, this; et cumid egit eorum voluntas bona ut non ad seipsos, qui minus erant, sed ad illum qui sum est, converteretur (hence is taken I guess that conceit of Master Hookers, that the fall of Angels was the converting the contemplation of their mind from God upon themselves) eique adbaerentes magis essent, ejusque participatione sapienter beat que viverent, quid aliud estenditur nisi volunt atem quamlibet bonam, inopem fuisse in solo desiderio remansuram (inopem remansuram, a pretty phrase unable to remain) nisi ill qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex seipso feceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem. If you get anything by my conference I am glad, I assure you I get by yours, both touching the clearing of Austin's opinion hereabouts, and others concurrence also, wherein I do much rejoice; and the rather, because, as you may observe, I have hitherto proceeded thereupon, rather by supposition than of confirmation. Another place to this purpose I find alleged out of his Enchirid. cap. 100. Hac sunt magna opera domini exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus; et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cum Angelica et humana natura peccasset, id est, non quod ill, sed quod veluit ipsa, fecisset, etiam per eandem creature voluntatem (qua factum est quod creator noluit) impleret ipse quod voluit, ben • utens et malis tanquam sum bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos juste praedectinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem quas benign praedestinavit ad gratiam. But this hath but a touch, and that subject to ambiguous interpretation, the other is more full and clear. I come unto the Theses.

You desire I would show you in a word where your error is in these, but you may remember what one professed sometimes, namely that ad quaestionem longam od • rat responsionem brevem, yet I will endeavor to satisfy you in this also first, and afterwards so to satisfy as I may satisfy myself also.

First therefore, my brief satisfaction as it were in a word shall consist in two points.

1. You have but nine Theses, and the eighth is as a succinct recapitulation of all that went before, and the conclusion there mentioned is no more than that which everyone grants, namely this; that God did decree first to produce that subject, and afterward to work such an effect thereupon: And indeed it is an ordinary course to confound the order of execution with the order of intention. Zanchius his definition of predestination I do exceedingly approve of, answerable to this of yours, for thus it lieth, Generalis, bocest, omnium hominum praedestinatio est aeternum &c. Dei decretum, quo apud se ab aterno decrevit, primum quidem omnes homines tum creare ad sui imaginem justos, tum ut in peccatum a Satana tentati suo libero arbitrio labe entur, permittere: deinde b •• rum alios liberare, et liberatos spiritu suo comitari, et tandem aeterna vita donari; alios tum indurare, tum aeterno exitio perdere; idque ut in illis divina bonitas et misericordia, in istis autem divina potentia et justitia declaretur, atque ita in omnibus deus glorificetur. Where, if you mark it well, you shall find he makes no order between the decrees of creation, permission of sin, liberation and salvation on the one side, of induration and damnation on the other side, but only between creation it self and permission of sin, and liberation it self and salvation on the one side, and dereliction and damnation on the other side, all which he considers as means, and in the last place notes the end of all to be the patefaction of God's glory in goodness and mercy on the one side, and of his power and justice on the other.

2. Again, in your first Thesis containing the main body of your tenet, you will have the foresight of the subject, or occasion, whereupon anything is decreed absolutely to be wrought, always to go before the decree it self, as well as the decree of the end goeth before the decree of the means. The irregularity whereof as touching God (though as touching man's decrees I confess it is right that you speak) I will show as briefly as I can before I answer your reason brought for confirmation of it.

1. If the foresight of the subject and occasion goes before the decree of working upon the subject; then much more must the decree of making the subject, as also of making or permitting the occasion, go before the decree of working upon the subject, and upon such an occasion, (for no subject whereupon God works can be without God's making, but it is nothing so with man, who finds subjects whereupon to work rather than makes them) Now this is a thing impossible. For,

1. First, nothing is first in intention but the end, and 'tis not possible that the subject or occasion should be the end whereunto God works upon the subject thus or thus:

2. Secondly, that which is first in intention is last in execution. And therefore if the making of the subject, and permitting of the occasion whereupon God means to work, were first in intention, it should be last in execution, that is, God should first work upon the subject before he had made the subject, or permitted the occasion whereupon he works.

But yet I confess if you have a reason for what you say, unless you may receive some satisfactory answer unto that reason of yours, it will be a very hard matter to satisfy you; Therefore I come to the consideration of your reason, which is this.

The foresight of a thing is nothing but the consideration of it tanquam reipsa & certo futurum.

But whoso will resolve absolutely to work such an effect upon such a definite subject, or to make such an use of such a particular event, must consider that subject and that event tanquam reipsa futurum: for else his decree will be but conditional. To this, I answer,

1. First, according to their opinion, that are accounted the most rigid interpreters of predestination.

1. Your proposition is most sound.

2. As for your assumption, which you suppose to be true, they suppose to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the most general rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And Alphonsus Mendoza takes upon him to prove at large, that the supernaturals of Peter and Paul were intended before their naturals.

2. The only reason (saving the plausibility of the proposition it self) to justify it, seems to be this, God cannot work upon a subject, unless the subject first be, and that occasion also whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a subject unless first he intend to produce that subject, and permit (at least) the occasion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to say, because I cannot ride to London without a horse, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unless first I intend to get me a horse. Whence it manifestly followeth, that in execution I must first ride to London, and afterward get me an horse to that purpose. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, seems to be the cause why this proposition of yours seems to be so plausible.

2. Now I will answer your proposition, according to my own Tenet in ordering God's decrees, which is likely to give you better satisfaction in the way of your own apprehension. Now I grant your proposition; acknowledging that in this case so it falls out, that he must needs consider the subject as reipsa & certo futurum. But how, non tanquam praecedaneum (whereto your discourse tends) but tanquam conjunctum; the reason is, because I make the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and raising out of sin, not subordinata, but coordinata & conjuncta. So I say in like manner, God doth jointly decree to give both grace and glory; I do not say God doth decree jointly to give them, but he jointly decreeth to give both grace and glory. And so Austin defines predestination to be praeparationem gratiae & gloriae. So that in the same moment that he decreeth glory, he considers grace not as praecedaneum in intention, but conjunctum. So on the other side God doth jointly decree final dereliction of some in sin and damnation for sin, as Aquinas professeth of reprobation, that it includes voluntatem permittendi culpam, & damnationem inferendi pro culpa: so that in the same moment that he decreeth damnation, he considereth their final impenitency non tanquam quiddam antecedaneum, but tanquam conjunctum. And judge you what force this hath to qualify the harshness of Tenets hereabouts, and what disadvantage to our opposites the Arminians, who upon the subordination of these decrees cry out upon our Tenets and expose them to obloquy, saying that we maintain that God doth first decree to damn men, and then to this purpose he exposeth them to sin those sins for which they are damned. And herewith they charge the Authors of Massa corrupta for the object of election and reprobation, as well as the Authors of Massa nondum condita, or condita, but nondum corrupta. And the twenty reasons which Arminius hath given against the Authors of Massa nondum condita; he professeth that with little difference they may be accommodated against the Fautors of Massa corrupta. All which notwithstanding, I have considered, and I hope refuted also, both the one way against Arminius, and the other way against Corvinus, in a Digression by it self, which contains a whole quire of paper, one of them; but that is in my answer to Corvinus, which is not yet perfected. Doctor Jackson my ancient friend, partly by his traditionary writings that pass in hugger-mugger from hand to hand, four pieces whereof as many as I could come by, I have answered; and partly by his treatise of divine essence, withdrawing my studies another away: yet an answer to that I hope to smith by Whitsuntide; and then to return: For in the second part which is newly come forth I find little considerable save some few chapters touching contingency: My greatest business about him is to understand his language. Now to draw to an end; as your first Thesis is an acknowledgement of the eternity of God's decrees; so the second, of their unity both in time and nature, God willing all things uno & eodem actu. Now judge I pray whether of the two opinions is most suitable hereunto; that which makes the decrees of God before spoken of, coordinata & conjuncta, or that which makes such a concatenation of them by consequents after consequents: as for example, God's decree of raising men out of sin presupposeth the foresight of sin; the foresight of sin presupposeth the decree to permit sin; the decree to permit sin supposeth the foresight of the futurition of the creature; and the foresight thereof supposeth the decree of creation: especially considering Aquinas his argument, whereby he proves that praedestinatio Christi cannot be the cause praedestinationis nostrae, to wit, because God by one and the same act predestinates both Christ and us. And withal considering that praerequisitum will as much hinder the unity of God's decrees as Causa. I had thought to have gone over your Theses more exactly, but seeing the length already spun out, I resolve to be the briefer.

3. Whereas in your third, you conceive the order of God's decrees is to be understood 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : I judge rather Durands instruction to be more sound, before mentiotioned; to wit, that there is only prioritas