The Riches of Gods Love

M ^r GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20.

IT is indeed the judgment of some Learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer such, or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogisticall or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass. But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration. If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to pass in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be, (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be) must be, yea, and this necessarily. For (doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave natural causes, generally, to their natural and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, then ever they will do, or shall do. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire shall burn, what combustible matter soever it shall take hold of, or that shall be cast into it, that one spark of it falling into a barrel of dried Gunpowder, should suddenly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore everything that is combustible in the world, shall be burnt with fire; or that every barrel of dry Gun-powder shall be blown up with sparks of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lord's of Keilah to deliver up David into Saul's hand, in case he had stayed in their Citty, till Saul's coming to demand him: this is evident from the Text. But it did not follow from this permissive decree of God, that therefore these Lord's must necessarily deliver up David into Saul's hand: for we know they did it not. So likewise, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I mean, in respect of a natural power to do the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder, or destroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatsoever, which is simply and purely permissive, doth import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of the thing so decreed. God permitted Adam to eat of every tree in the garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of good and evil only excepted) & therefore certainly had decreed, or intended this permission: yet was not Adam any ways necessitated by any virtue or influence of this decree upon him, to eat of every of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eat of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that, which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this garden following so suddenly after this patent, or permission granted unto him. The reason why no decree of God, that is purely and barely permissive, either induceth or supposeth any necessity of the coming to pass, of what is only so decreed, is this. First, because no such decree doth any ways interesse God to any manner of interposall, either by his wisdom, power, or providence in what kind soever, towards the effecting or bringing to pass of what is so decreed. So that such events, which are no otherwise decreed by God, then thus, are in the same posture of contingency, in the same possibility of being, or not being, wherein they would have been, had there been no such decree at all concerning them. Secondly, neither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary for the bringing of things, so decreed, to pass, which will actually bring them to pass. Though God hath decreed, that a spark, or coal of fire falling, i. e. in case it shall fall into a barrel of Gun-powder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such spark or coal, shall fall into it, without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this powder, will not come to pass. Or if he said, that God hath decreed that such a spark, or coal, shall fall into the said barrel of powder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which engageth the decreer to interpose effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to pass. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature we deny to be in God.

IEANES.

DR Twisse doth grant, that God's permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of God's providence, doth infer the things permitted: And what he saith of God's actual permission in time, is appliable unto his permissive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, so his permissions are suitable unto his permissive decrees. But now that he anywhere affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, do import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of what is only so decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been so well versed in D. Twisse, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digression, professedly impugneth; for which, you may see, how he is taxed (though very modestly) by M. Rutherford, in a Scholastical disputation of his, De Divinâ providentiâ cap. 8. D. Twisse in the third Digression of the second Book of his Vindiciae &c. examineth that proposition of Perkins: Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to pass, because God doth not hinder it, (i.) because he doth permit it: where he not only professeth his dislike of it, but also refutes it. This Section then might very well have been spared for in it you fight but with your own shadow, and do not at all oppose the opinion of D. Twisse, who fully accords with you in this particular; That God's simple and sole permissions, and consequently his decrees, that are simply, purely, and barely permissive, are not illative of those things which are only so decreed, and permitted.

To clear this I shall give you an abstract of this Digression.

He examineth the truth of this proposition. 1. In the matter, or object of an act natural. 2. In the matter, or object of an act moral, good or bad.

1. First, as concerning natural actions, he hinteth a distinction, between a proper permission of them, and a permission of them improperly so called; that is opposed unto a natural, real, or Physical restraint, this unto a moral restraint, which is by way of disuasion.

First then if we take permission properly, as it is opposed, unto a natural, real, and Physical restraint, and denoteth a suspension thereof, D. Twisse is so far from affirming, that they come to pass, upon God's single, sole, and bare permission, as that he maketh God's positive effection (whether by way of predetermination, or concurrence, he leaves to be discussed in another place) requisite unto the existence of them, without which they never can exist; for God is the principal and immediate cause of all beings and entities, and therefore of all natural actions.

And again afterwards.

Secondly, if we take permission as it is opposed unto, and denoteth a suspension of, a restraint improperly so called; a moral restraint by way of disuasion; so D. Twisse is express in denial of any necessity to be inferred, from such a permission of the coming to pass, of what is so. permitted. Ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permissio not at suspensionem actionis moralis in suadendo aut dissuadendo positae, sic non sequitur, quicquid permititur illud fit. Ne{que} enim quod suadetur quocun{que} modo, & quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut fiat, nec quod dissuadetur quocun{que} modo quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut non fiat; Ergo multo minus ex co quod permititur aliquid fieri, vel non fieri, sequitur necessario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri.

Secondly, from natural actions he proceeds on to moral, and he begineth with good and gracious actions; in which he resolveth that natural permission, hoc est, non in genere morali sed Physico, can have no place, for (saith he) this would suppose, that the creature can be carried unto actions truly good, without any special supply or assistance of God's spirit and grace, which we deny can be in the state of nature entire and pure, how much less is it possible in the state of nature corrupted: whence also (saith he) it would follow, that God doth not antecedently work and cause every act truly good, and that by a special supply, aid, or assistance.

As for God's permission of good actions in genere morali, he referreth to what he hath spoken touching the like permission of natural actions, only he addeth, that God always concurreth unto an act truly good by a special assistance & that both as a Physical and Morrall agent: wherefore (saith he) in this gracious administration of things there is no place at all for permission, as it is opposed unto effection or farthering; for God worketh, causeth, and promoteth every good work in his children; although permission may have room there, as it simply signifieth non-hindrance, for questionless God doth not hinder the good works of his people, which he himself causeth and worketh. Thus you see, that by D. Twisse his opinion, good works do not follow upon God's bare, single, and sole permission, for they cannot be performed without the powerful operation of God's holy spirit, which worketh in us both the will and the deed.

Lastly, as touching evil or sinful actions, in them divine permission challengeth a proper and peculiar place, both as permission is opposed unto efficiency, as also unto restraint.

First, as 'tis opposed unto efficiency, for the obliquity of them being a privation, is not capable of an efficient cause.

Secondly, as 'tis opposed unto restraint, for God doth not hinder sinful actions many times, though it be always in his power.

But now if we speak of the permission of sinful actions, in genere morali, or suasorio; so all unanimously affirm, that God persuadeth or exhorteth none unto evil: for if God should interpose his authority, by commanding, advising, or exhorting, whatsoever should be done hereupon, would be lawfully done.

But though God himself doth not exhort or persuade unto sin, yet he gives way many times, and that justly, unto the temptations of Satan, and his instruments; nay, he himself by his providence, lays before men outward objects and occasions, suitable unto their inward corruptions; as a goodly Babylonish garment, two hundred sheckles of silver, and a wedge of Gold of fifty sheckles weight, before the covetous eyes of Achan: beautiful and naked Bathsheba before the lustful eyes of David. Next he suffereth those corruptions, that is, either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace, or he doth not bridle them by his restraining grace, but lets them have their full swinge, without check or control: In his children he doth not actuate and rouse their graces, but lets them lie as it were in a deep sleep, &c. Besides, he concurreth unto those motions of the soul, (as touching the entity of them) unto which men are stirred, by view of objects, that are agreeable unto either their unsubdued or unbridled lusts. From the complication of all these, a particular obduration, and sinful action followeth, so that you take in also, the concourse of God, so far as concerns the substance, or matter of such a sinful action. Now from this variety of providences going before a sinful action, D. Twisse draws this following conclusion. Ex quib us manifestum videtur, ex solâ permissione nequaquam consequi, quod fiat aliquid; & proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinsei, Quicquid Deus non impedit; ideo fit, quia Deus non impedit. From which it seems manifest, that it in no ways followeth, that a thing cometh to pass upon God's sole permission, and therefore that of Perkins seems not to be true, whatsoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to pass, because God doth not hinder it.

In the next place he bringeth in, and answereth objections.

First, This is the opinion not only of Perkins but of Piscator also.

Secondly, our adversaries (by name Vorstius and Arminius) grant it, and their concession should be embraced, as making much for the defense of our opinion.

Thirdly, there is a reason, which at the first blush seems convincing, unto which not only Vorstius, but also Piscator yieldeth, and 'tis drawn from the nature of Relatives: For, seeing permission and the thing permitted are Relatives, it seems necessary, that they exist together: upon supposal then of the permission of the coming to pass of such a thing it seems necessary, that that which is so permitted, do come to pass. Unto these he dispatcheth an answer severally, in the same order as they were propounded.

First, as for our Divines, he acknowledgeth, that they have so thought, but truth is to be preferred before any testimony; Amicus Socrates, Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas: For 'tis but reason that we should have regard unto, and care of, only truth, that so we may (with the Apostle) say, we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth.

Secondly, he showeth, how that for the existence of a thing, Piscator doth not acquiesce in God's sole permission, but flieth unto God's government, and that so powerful, as that it bows, bends, and turns the wills of men whither he pleaseth.

As for the concessions of Arminius and Vorstius, seeing they are erroneous, a patronage of our opinio • drawn from them is not to be valued so much, as to be built upon. Verum tanti non est hujusmodi patrocinium, ut errone is quantumvis propitiis innitamur assertionibus.

As for the reason, that is of no force or strength, for we may as well conclude, that because God did from eternal will or decree to create the World, therefore the World from eternal was created; or because God from eternal foreknew that the World should be, therefore the World did exist from eternal: for there is no less relation, between the willing of a thing, and the thing willed; the decree of a thing, and the thing decreed; the foreknowledge of a thing, and the thing foreknown; than there is, between the permission of a thing, and the thing permitted. And there is between them as a relation, so also a reciprocation: whereupon it followeth, that if God willeth or decreeth a thing, it is willed or decreed; if he foreknowes a thing, it is foreknown; if he permits a thing it is permitted: but as it doth not follow, a thing is willed or decreed, therefore 'tis actually existent; a thing is foreknown, therefore it is; In like manner it doth not follow, a thing is permitted, therefore it is actually: and indeed if God's mere permission did infer the existence of a thing upon this ground, because permission and the thing permitted are relatives, it would hold as well concerning the permission of man, as God; But 'tis manifest, that it followeth not upon man's permission, that whatsoever he permitteth, cometh to pass.

But it may be objected, it is necessary that whatsoever is willed by God, do at some time or other, come to pass, therefore we may say the same of what is permitted by God.

He denieth the consequence, and he giveth this reason for his denial, because God's permission is not so effectual unto the existence of a thing, as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of consequence is true in natural causes, but this is not in regard only of permission, but from the determination of a natural cause to work, unless it be hindered: as concerning rational and free agents, this consequence, a thing is permitted to come to pass, therefore it doth come to pass, is of no force at all.

The last and principal objection is concerning the permission of sin in particular; without grace sin cannot be avoided, and the permission of sin stands in the denial of grace: it is clear therefore that upon the permission of sin, sin necessarily ensueth.

First, he answereth, this in no-wise followeth from the nature of permission in general (as some Divines, have thought) but from a peculiar manner of God's permission, standing in a constant denial of grace without which sin can be shunned by none.

Secondly he distinguisheth of a twofold consideration of sin, indefinite or definite, and that either in regard of sorts and kinds, or else particular actions.

First, he grants, that upon the permission of sin, that is, the denial of grace, sin followeth indefinitely, and in general; so that as long as God with-holds his grace, a man sins, either in doing what is forbidden, or else in doing what is commanded in a wrong way or manner. He also sins in omitting what is commanded, or in abstaining from what is forbidden in an unholy, and ungracious way or manner. And this he exemplifieth both in the unregenerate and regenerate.

First, whiles God denies to, or withholds from, an unregenerate man, his habitual grace, or grace of regeneration; whilst he suffereth his spiritual diseases to go uncured, his corruptions unsubdued, and unmortified, so long he cannot but sin in all his rational and deliberate, both actions and omissions.

First, all his actions are sins of commission, either a doing of what is forbidden, or a sinful performance of what is commanded, not out of right principles, nor for the due and requisite end.

Secondly all his omissions are sinful, for they are either of what is enjoined, or else if they be of what is prohibited, they are not sanctified, proceeding from the love of God, and directed unto the glory of God above all.

Next as for the regenerate, if God deny unto, or withhold from them, never so little a while, his actual grace, the actual supply, and assistance of his spirit, they sin in whatsoever they perform, or forbear; And indeed it is no wonder, that upon God's suspending the aide of his actual grace, the regenerate break out into sin, in whom there is a flesh always lusting against the spirit, whose graces are imperfect, and corruptions natural, and therefore active, upon removal of impediments; For sin in Adam followed upon the sole suspension of actual assistance to will that good, unto which he had an habitual fitness; and yet in him propension unto good was perfect, without any mixture of inclination unto evil.

Secondly, he denieth, that upon the bare permission of sin, sin followeth definitely, either for sorts and kinds, or particular actions. But here first, he implieth an exception of general, and comprehensive sins, that either lie at the root of, or are concomitant unto every sin, as inordinate self-love &c. Forte dici potest, ex carentià justitiae originalis, sequi necessario, ut creatura feratur in amorem sui inordinate, adeo ut quicquid operatur, illud faciat propter se, non autem propter Deum.

Secondly he desireth, chiefly to be understood concerning the imperate or external actions of sin, and such actions of the will, as are of efficacy, purposes, resolutions, &c. For upon God's permission, that is, not curing, or healing, not subduing of particular sinful habits. v. g. Covetousness, luxury, there do necessarily follow such sinful actions of the will, as are styled usually to be of complacency, that do, quoad specificationem, for their sort and kind, answer such habits, to wit, velleities, desires, wouldings, and wishings, likeings, approbations, &c. A covetous man whilst under the reign of covetousness, cannot but love, like, and covet after things which he judgeth to be gainful; a luxurious voluptuary cannot but love, approve, and long after things which he knoweth to be pleasant and delightful unto his senses. Omnino videtur Deum non posse impedire, ne avarus velit & concupiscat ea, quae videntur utilia; vel libidinosus ea, quae titillant tanquam jucunda: nam velle & concupiscere, nihil aliud est, quam desiderare; at avarus quà avarus necessario talia desiderat & concupiscit, aliàs non esset avarus, & libidinosus quà libidinosus talia desiderat, alias minime dicendus esset libidinosus. Lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 15. For habits work ad modum naturae necessarily. A covetous person, as covetous, necessarily desireth and coveteth things profitable; a lustful or unclean person necessarily desireth such objects and actions as are unclean, &c. And yet of these too, we cannot say that they follow merely upon his permission, secluding his concourse.

These limitations premised; let us return to consider what he denieth, to wit, that upon the bare permission of sin, sin doth not follow definitely for sorts or kinds, or particular actions. Sine gratiâ (saith he) abstineri potest a peccato definite quo ad certam speciem, vel etiam in individuo consideratam. There is no particular sin, especially of commission, but may be abstained from without grace: And therefore upon the mere and bare denial or with-holding of grace, this or that particular sin doth not follow.

For first, those that are destitute of habitual grace, the grace of regeneration, may yet be free from diverse particular sinful habits. v. g. Covetousness, Luxury, &c.

Secondly, in those that have such particular sinful habits; those habits are not actuated, especially by outward actions, upon God's bare and single permission, his sole denial of grace. This he proves by reason and Scripture.

First by reason, because the subject of an actual sin of commission, is a natural act, and unto the performance of a natural act, God's bare permission is not sufficient, Malum (quod dicitur) semper habitat in alieno fundo; & peccatum omne quod in commissione versatur, semper habet actum aliquem naturalem substratum; adeo ut ejusmodi peccatum aliquod nunquam exeat in actum ex solâ negatione gratiae, nisi etiam aliqua alia rerum administratio siat, secundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur, quae sit propria materia ta lis deformitatis.

Secondly by Scripture, in which God's wonderful providence working and prostituting men unto sin, is never set forth unto us, by a sole and single permission: But he is said, sometimes to give men up unto vile affections, unto a reprobate mind, unto strong delusions, to send an evil spirit between men, to put a lying spirit in their mouths, to mingle a perverse spirit in them, &c. He told David, that he would take away his concubines, and give them unto his Son Absalom; He told Jeroboam, that he would rent the Kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, and give ten tribes unto Jeroboam, which was done by their defection, and revolt from the house of Judah. Now they who think that all these things might be dispatched, and accomplished by God's sole and single permission, take I confess (saith he) a short cut, but they send away the Reader, that is desirous to find out the truth, empty and void of all satisfaction. Upon this he concludes, that as often as anything comes to pass according to God's permission, so often God's permission is not solitary or single, but hath another government of things, another administration of divine providence, accompanying it; which he explaineth at large touching sin: unto the performance of this or that particular sinful action, there are required a leading into temptation, an affording of objects, occasions, and opportunities, a letting loose of Satan, the concourse of God by way of previous motion unto the matter, or subject of the action, a removal of all impediments, whether holy and gracious, or else but merely natural. The explanation of all which, you may there see at large in this digression.

Out of this he inferreth a distinction of permission, into efficacious and unefficacious, and concludes that the permission of sin is not so much efficacious of it self, as in regard of that either obduration, or excecation, or both, concerning either temporal, or spiritual good things, with which it is conjoined. Hinc constare poterit permissionem peccati particularis commode dividendam esse, in permissionem efficacem & inefficacem, & permissionem efficacem non tam ex sese efficacem esse, quam proratione ejus, cum quâ semper conjuncta est, obdurationis, excaecationis, aut utrius{que}, sive quoad bona spiritualia, sieve quoad bona temporalia.

But I shall trouble neither the Reader, nor you, with transcribing anymore out of this digression. And indeed this is enough to satisfy him, and convince you, that you have wronged D. Twisse, in pinning upon him such an opinion, which he opposeth with far greater strength of argument, then you yourself. This is sufficient to answer this whole section; But I shall examine whatsoever is considerable in it.

The proposition you charge upon D. Twisse is this, That the purpose or intent of God, to permit, or suffer such or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogisticall or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass.

He that is acquainted with the works of D. Twisse, knoweth, that this proposition is to be understood. 1. Concerning only the permission of evil. 2. Concerning not only God's act, the permission of evil, but also the being of evil by God's permission. 3. Concerning not a single, sole, and bare permission, but an efficacious permission, that hath several acts of God's providence accompanying it.

First, it is to be understood only concerning the permission of evil, and that as touching the Formal, the pravity or obliquity of it, which being a privation is uncapable of being an object of an effective decree. This I might clear from most of those places, wherein this distinction between an effective and permissive decree is propounded; but I shall spare to name them at this present, and content myself, with the alleging of one place, where he expressly puts this limitation upon the proposition we speak of, De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 133. col. 2. Non pauci sunt, non modo ex nostris, sed & ex Theologis nobis oppositis, tam Pontificiis, quam Arminianis, qui putant, infallibiter futurum esse, quicquid &c. Deus permittere decreverit, hoc est autem, duntaxat in genere mali. Nam quae fiunt bona, ea fieri decrevit Deus non tam ipso permittente, quam faciente, in quocun{que} genere bona fuerint, sive in genere boni moralis, sive naturalis sive supernaturalis; summa, sive in genere entis bonum fuit, sive in genere moris. And by this it is apparent, that your instance in God's decree to permit fire to burn combustible matter, is altogether impertinent, for that is quid bonum in genere entis.

Secondly, he makes God's permissive decree to be, not only concerning God's act, the permission of evil, but also the being of evil by his permission; so that not only the permission of evil is the object of his will, but the being of it also. Sententia Perkinsei nostrorum{que} Theologorum est, lapsum Adami evenisse voluntate Dei transeunte, non duntaxat in suam permissionem, sed etiam in rem permissam, hoc est, Deum voluisse, ut Adamus laberetur, ipso permittente. Vindic. l. 2. part. 1. pag. 127. What he speaks of God's will, to permit Adams fall, may be accommodated to his permissive will or decree, of any other sin.

Lastly, that he speaks of not a bare, but efficacious permission, so termed, not Formally, but by way of concomitancy, the Digression which I have abbreviated is a proof of undeniable evidence; And I am so confident of your ingenuity, as that I doubt not, but you will acknowledge as much: and therefore your objection, which runs only concerning a decree that is simply, barely, and purely permissive, is nothing at all to the purpose.

Well then, take this proposition, (the purpose or intend of God, to permit or suffer, such or such a thing to be done, inferreth a necessity of the coming of it to pass) in the sense and meaning of D. Twisse, to wit, concerning an efficacious permission of evil; and if you can accommodate your objection unto it, I will confess that you can work a miracle in Logic.

MR GOODWIN.

BUt that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be; or at least, ten thousand things more, than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily,

IEANES.

IF you supply the propositions that are wanting, and make this a complete Syllogism, it will be in secundo modo Syllogismi connexi, qui tollit consequence, ut tollat antecedens. And then your conclusion, if your Syllogism be true for form, will be, Therefore whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass. And then if in your Syllogism there be not committed that fallacy, which is called Ignoratio elenchi, never Syllogism framed in this world, was sick of this disease; for the conclusion you infer, is no-wise opposite unto anything in D. Twisse. Can you (dare you) say, that D. Twisse anywhere affirmeth, that whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass? Consult all his books that are extant, whether in Latin or English; and if you can prove any such passage to be in them, either in express terms, or by just consequence, I will acknowledge that I have wronged you, in as shameful and public a manner as you will prescribe: and if you cannot make good, that D. Twisse hath said any such thing, it will be very agreeable unto justice, that you make a retraction of your mistake.

The palpable grossness of the injury that you do D. Twisse, will the better appear, if you compare the conclusion which you father upon him, with the example you bring a little after. God intendeth, and hath decreed to permit, that fire shall burn what combustible matter soever it shall take hold off, or that shall be cast into it, that one spark of it, falling into a barrel of dry Gun-powder, should suddenly fire it; but it doth not follow from hence, that therefore everything that is combustible in the World, shall be burnt with fire, or that every barrel of dried Gun-powder, shall be blown up with sparks of fire falling into them. Here you make as if the permissive decree D. Twisse speaks of, were concerning God's permission of things to come to pass, not absolutely but conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, upon such a supposition; and as if he affirmed, that whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to pass, only conditionally, should by virtue of such a decree come to pass absolutely, and necessarily. This is one of the absurdest assertions that ever dropt from the pen of a rational man, and in D. Twisse there is nothing sounding like it: you do very ill therefore (that I say no more) to asperse him with it. Nay D. Twisse is so far from making a bare, permissive * conditional decree, to be illative of the absolute existence of whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to pass conditionally, as that he denieth any such inference to be made from an effective conditional decree. Though it were very strange (saith he against Cotton pag. 97.) that anything should not be accomplished which God doth will absolutely, yet surely, it is nothing strange, that that should not be accomplished, which God doth will to come to pass only upon a condition, for the condition failing, there is no reason why we should expect the accomplishment thereof: How often doth he tell you, that for God to decree the salvation of all men, only conditionally, in case they believe and repent, is no more to decree their salvation, than their damnation; for as he hath purposed salvation to men upon condition of faith, and repentance; so on the other side, it is as undoubtedly true, that God hath ordained, that whosoever, coming to ripe years, shall not believe and repent, shall be damned: and as to decree the salvation of all men only conditionally, is no more to decree their salvation than their damnation; so to decree to permit a thing to come to pass only conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, upon such a supposition, is no more to decree the permission of it, than the not permission of it to come to pass: what is said of conditional propositions, is true of conditional purposes, both effective and permissive, Nihil ponunt in esse, sc. absolute & simpliciter, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

To go one step farther, D. Twisse is very unlikely to conclude from God's decree, barely to permit a thing to come to pass conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, or upon such a supposition, that therefore the thing so decreed, shall absolutely come to pass, because if we speak of positive things, he is clearly and constantly of the opinion, that we cannot say truly, that they shall come to pass, so much as conditionally in such a case, upon such terms, &c. Unless God decree not barely to permit, but to work and effect the thing conditionated, upon supposal of such conditions, De Scientià Medià. p. 430. Ad eundem modum concedimus omnem enunciationem conditionatam de futuris conditionatis esse necessariam, modo Deus decreverit, posità tali conditione, rem ipsam conditionatam effectam dare: quod nisi ponamus Deum decrevisse, prorsus praeter omnem Analogiam disserit Suarez; dum prophetiarum comminantium & promittentium eandem rationem esse vult, at{que} propositionum de futuris contingentibus conditionatarum qualiumcun{que}, quas etiam prophetias appellate Suarez. Now if he will not allow us to make any inference of the conditional futurition of positive things, from a decree that is barely permissive, and conditional, it would be very strange, if he himself should make such a permissive conditional decree, to be illative of the absolute futurition of whatsoever is so decreed.

And thus have I done with your conclusion, which I affirm not to be opposite unto any proposition in D. Twisse his Books, and I hope you will pardon me, if I presume so far, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.

In the next place, I shall make bold, to question the truth of the consequence of your Major proposition, which is this, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or deeree necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be, &c. must be, yea, and this necessarily. And the reason why I question it, is because I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass conditionally, in some case, upon some terms, or upon some supposition or other, all things whatsoever, that are possible, all things (I say) that are possible, (whether unto all natural or necessary, or else all free and rational agents) that is not only such as do exist, have existed, or shall exist for the future, but also all that are in any possibility of existence, whose existence implieth no contradiction.

And that your satisfaction unto this, may be the fuller and distincter, I shall branch it into some particulars, which I shall entreat you to clear up unto me.

First, there are many things that are merely possible, numberless millions of men and Angels, which have not, never had, never shall have actual existence: and unto these there is possible, as great a variety of both actions and sufferings, which that God hath decreed to permit to come to pass conditionally, in some case, upon some terms, upon some supposition or other, is not (I confess) within the compass of my Creed; but yet I shall be willing to be instructed by you, provided that you prove what you undertake to teach me.

Now that I am not much to be blamed for making a doubt of this, will (I hope) be confessed by you, if you please to consider.

First, that Didacus Alvarez (a very learned man) holds it to be the more probable opinion that there are not in God conditional decrees, concerning all future conditional contingents, which may be framed by our understandings in infinite combinations, as well concerning things actually existent, as also things possible, but only in comparison of those future conditionalls, which are revealed by God, Christ, or the Prophets, &c. And he insinuates this reason out of Ledesma, because other conditional decrees would be in vain, impertinent, and no ways conducing unto God's providence, and government of the World: which reason is as well appliable unto conditional permissive, as conditional effective decrees.

M. Rutherford (I know) argueth somewhat against this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer.

Secondly, that D. Twisse not only affirmeth but proveth, that things merely possible, are not the object of God's decree, in his Book against Jackson p. 283. 333. & 394. Look we (saith he) upon the decrees of men, the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done, they make choice to decree the doing of such courses, as seem most convenient: things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God, which he can do, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to pass; As for example, before the World was made, it was possible that the World should be made; was this by virtue of God's decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no. His arguments are appliable unto God's permissive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditional, as well as absolute decrees. From agents merely possible, pass we on unto such as do exist in some difference of time or other, and unto them some things are possible only in regard of an obediential power, some things are possible in regard of a natural power.

First some things are possible, and that unto all sorts of second agents, only in regard of an obediential power; thus 'tis possible for ten thousand Asses besides Balaam's to speak, for ten thousand pieces of iron (besides that mentioned 2 Kings 6.) to swim; 'tis possible for wine to be made of ten thousand pots of water &c. Besides those six we read of John. 2. It is possible of stones to have children raised up unto Abraham: Now that God hath decreed to permit all things thus possible to come to pass conditionally, in some case, is as I take it false, and I shall give you my reason out of D. Twisse his Digression, De naturà permissionis. lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 16. col. 2. Irrationalia dicuntur permitti, quoties sinuntur ferri secundùm naturam suam, quemadmodum cum lapis sinitur ferri deorsum; ignis sinitur grassari in domas hominum: ita{que} circa agentia naturalia dum versatur permissio, palam est praesupponi, non modo propensionem, sed & determinationem ad agendum; non sic, quoties versatur circa agentia rationalia; nam & rationales substantiae, quando permittuntur agere, sinuntur etiam ferri secundum naturam suam; aut alia esset ratio permissionis rerum rationalium, quam irrationalium, quod minime videtur. Irrationall agents are said to be permitted as often as they are suffered to be carried according to their natures; as when a stone is suffered to move downward, fire to rage upon the houses of men: So also rational substances when they are permitted to act, they are suffered to be moved, or carried agreeably unto their natures, quoties permittuntur sibi pro domesticae inclinationis ration quà libet feruntur, ib. pag. 11. c. 1. or otherwise the nature of the permission of things rational and irrational, would differ in regard of form, where as the difference between them is only in respect of the matter about which each is conversant, as he showeth presently after the words quoted.

Again of those things which are possible unto all sorts and kinds of agents, there are some which God hath absolutely decreed to effect, or bring to pass by his operation, some which he hath absolutely decreed to hinder or restrain. Now whatsoever God worketh or effecteth, he doth not permit, as permission is opposed unto effection, and therefore it cannot be the object of a bare permissive decree, but of an operative or effective. Secondly, what he hindereth or restraineth either immediately by himself, or mediately by second causes, he cannot be at all said to permit, and therefore he never decreed to permit it; more briefly, God cannot be said to decree the bare and naked permission of that whose effection or working he hath decreed; he cannot be said to decree the permission of that, whose hindrance or restraint he hath intended, but of things possible, he hath decreed the effection of some, the restraint and hindrance of others: and therefore there are many things possible, which he hath not decreed barely to permit.

I but perhaps you will say, that though whatsoever God hath absolutely decreed to effect or hinder, he hath not decreed to permit to come to pass absolutely, yet he hath decreed it shall come to pass conditionally, in such cases, upon such terms, and upon such a supposition. But this is spoken gratis, and therefore I do beseech you to evidence it by dint of argument, unto which if convincing, I hope I shall submit.

But I imagine I see a back-door, at which you intend to run away, and save yourself the labor of meddling with that work, which I have here cut out for you, and that is the clause which you have added by way of Parenthesis in your consequent (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be (Here your consequent hath two propositions in it, one universal, then all things possible must be, yea and this necessarily; another particular, at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, and this necessarily. And these two propositions are propounded in a disjunctive manner, so that if the first be routed and miscarry, the other may serve as a reserve to fly unto, this is the shift of a diffident and fearful disputant, that knows not well what to say or hold: and therefore beneath that acumen, which I may justly expect from a man of your great Wit and Learning: how commendable it is, will appear, if you take your consequent by it self, and sever it from the antecedent, and then parralell it with others of the like nature which no man can deny to be absurd and ridiculous; as all men are white, or at least ten thousand times more then are black: all men are unregenerate, or at least more then are regenerate: all men are healthy and sound, or at least more then are sick.

But you pretend unto a proof of the consequence of your Major, we will hear what you say.

M ^r GOODWIN.

FOr doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave natural causes generally, to their natural and proper operations and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, than ever they will do or shall do.

IEANES.

YOur Major is, If whatsoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be, or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily. Now how the consequence hereof is proved by this your proposition (I confess) passeth my skill. The readiest way to examine the consequence in a connexe Syllogism, is to reduce it unto a Categoricall, and the way of that, every ordinary Logic will inform you is, by giving a reason of the consequence by a Categoricall proposition, and placing it in the room of the Major in your Categoricall Syllogism. Now take the proof that you bring of the consequence, or sequel of your major proposition, (for doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave natural causes generally, to their natural, and proper operations, and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty, to act ten thousand times more then ever they will do or shall do) and let it be placed in the room of your major, and then in what Mood and Figure will you infer your conclusion, viz. Whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass.

And thus you see how weakly you impugn that proposition which is only of your own setting up.

But let us look upon this passage in it self, setting aside the reference it carrieth of a proof unto the foregoing words, if you understand God's leaving of natural causes unto their natural and proper operations, &c. And so also his leaving voluntary causes under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more then ever they will do or shall do, so as to make it exclusive of that influence which is by way of previous motion of second causes themselves, whether natural or voluntary unto all their operations, why your doubtless will not carry it, as long as the arguments, by which D. Twisse lib. 2. Digres. 7. proves, that God moves all second causes unto their operations, remain unanswered by you, and you bring no proof to the contrary, but your bare word.

MR GOODWIN.

SO likewise God hath decreed, to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I mean in respect of a natural power, to do the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder or destroy the life of his brother that cometh in his way.

IEANES.

UNto this I oppose these following arguments. First, God withholds many bloody minded men from actual murder, as well as he did Abimelech from committing adultery, and unto him cannot be permitted the doing of a thing, who is restrained therefrom; for permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore cannot be found in the same subject at once, in regard of the same action.

Secondly, permission of the sin of murder essentially implieth, a withholding of grace effectual and necessary, for the avoidance of the sin of murder: but God doth not withhold from every man that grace, which is effectual and necessary for avoidance of the sin of murder; And therefore he doth not permit every man to commit it.

Thirdly, permission of outward and imperate acts (as well as restraint, unto which it is privatively opposed) supposeth a propension or inclination unto them, a purpose or desire of them in the agents unto whom they are permitted: but there is not in every man a propension or inclination, a purpose or desire to murder everyone that cometh in his way; Therefore God doth not permit every mā to murder everyone that cometh in his way. The Major is a principle with Arminius in his Tractate de permissione; in personâ cui permittitur, duo ponenda, actus istius respectu, Primo, vires sufficientes ad actum praestandum, intellige, nisi impediatur: Secundo, propensio ad actum producendum, citra hanc enim frustrà permittitur actus, citra illas omnino non permittitur; nam necessario ad actus praestationem requiruntur: utut adsint illae, nisi propendeat persona, cui permittitur actus, ad actum ipsum, nullo fine & in vagum permittitur. Imo nec recte dici potest, quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illius praestandi affectu nullo tenetur.

But this Testimony perhaps may be of small authority with you, however his reason deserves your consideration. D. Twisse indeed dissents from him, as touching the permission of the elicit acts of the will, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and imperate acts thereof, Hear his own words. Circa irrationalia agentia si versetur permissio, praesupponit, fateor, ejusmodi propensionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permissio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipsorum imperatos: Ne{que} enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, nisi praesupponatur hoc ipsum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus it aque agnosco propensionem quandam ad agendum praecedaneam esse permissioni.

Unto what Arminius and D. Twisse say, I shall add this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not anything deaf, blind, or dumb, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrained from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrained from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrained unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Banns saith) as it is not nuda negatio, sed privatio.

By this time the Reader, I suppose, is satisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murder or destroy the life of everyone that cometh in his way; and therefore consequently, he hath not decreed or intended any such permission. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your assertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have proved the assertion to be false in it self, by arguments, that fear not the light of your trial or examination: and false assertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatsoever; so much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm. System. Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid subjecto limitative tribuitur, id vere tribuitur. But suppose this assertion were justifiable, by some limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; because this natural power to do the execution, (as you speak) is insufficient to denominate the permission of murder; because 'tis consistent with the opposite of such a permission, restraint from murder, &c.

First, because 'tis insufficient to denominate the permission of murder: A natural power to perform an action is essentially requisite unto the permission thereof, but it is not only the essential requisite thereunto, and therefore an insufficient ground for the affirmation of it. If it be lawful to affirm a predicate of a subject in respect of the presence of one essential requisite unto the said predicate, when there are wanting any other things essentially required thereunto also, as absurd propositions as are imagineable, will be hence justified: As that beasts and plants are men, and Men beasts; for of beasts and plants there are affirmed diverse things, which do agree unto man essentially; and so on the other side, diverse things are predicated of men essentially, which are also essential unto beasts and plants.

Secondly, a natural power to destroy the life of another, is consistent with the opposite of such a permission, to wit, restraint from the murder of him: a power to produce an act may be hindered majoris aut aequalis saltem potentiae oppositione, saith your Arminius, by opposall of a greater, or at least an equal power: though a man have not only a power, but a will, a desire, and purpose to take away the life of another, yet he may be restrained, not only by fear of punishment, dictates of a natural conscience within, but also by opposition of a greater or equal power without. Now permission and restraint are privatively opposed, and therefore we cannot say, that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permission and restraint, and may be found, as well when an action is restrained, as when it is permitted. If I should say that a blind man sees, in respect of the first natural power of seeing; that a deaf man hears, in respect of the first natural power of hearing; you would say that my limitation were absurd and ridiculous: because this natural first power of seeing is found both in the blind and the seeing; and we may say the same of the first power of hearing. Yet this limitation is as justifiable as yours; for the natural power you speak of, to do the execution, is found as well in the restraint, as in the permission of murder

MR GOODWIN.

GOD permitted Adam to eat of every tree in the Garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of Good and evil only excepted, Gen. 2. 16, 17.) and therefore certainly had decreed, or intended, this permission: yet was not Adam any ways necessitated by any virtue, or influence of this decree upon him, to eat of everyone of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eat of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this Garden following so suddenly after this patent, or permission granted unto him.

IEANES.

THE permission spoken of, Gen. 2. 16. was Moral or Legal, in genere officii, not natural or Physical, in genere facti, and therefore nothing at all to the purpose.

Mr GOODWIN.

NEither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes, simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things, so decreed, to pass, which will actually bring them to pass: though God hath decreed that a spark, or coal of fire, falling i. e. in case it shall fall, into a barrel of Gunpowder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such spark, or coal shall fall into it; without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this Powder will not come to pass.

IEANES.

FIrst, Arminius tells you, that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint. Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra, sufficient ad ejus impedimentum unius causae necessariae absentiâ. And if this be true, then permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things so permitted to pass, which will actually bring them to pass if they be not hindered; and consequently a permissive decree doth, though not suppose (that's not our language) yet, infer the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes.

Besides Secondly, Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44. out of Zabarell acquaints us, how restraint is sometimes taken privatively, pro privatione actionis inferendae, and absence not only of one requisite and necessary cause, but also of one necessary condition is sufficient to denominate such a restraint: Sic distantia loci (saith he) impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quasi distantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, sed solum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & passionis in calefactibili. In regard of this acception of restraint, fire cannot be said to be permitted to burn combustible matter, unless there be an approximation of the fire unto the said combustible matter, for distance of place hinders the fire from burning: distance of place between fire and a barrel of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrel of Gunpowder, if you take hindrance or restraint in such a sense as Scheibler speaks of: Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrel of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is such a distance.

M ^r GOODWIN.

OR if it be said, that God hath decreed, that such a spark or coal, shall fall into the said barrel of Gunpowder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which engageth the decreer to interpose effectually, for the bringing of the thing decreed to pass. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature, we deny to be in God.

IEANES.

IF By matters of that nature you mean, in such contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrel of Gunpowder; why, Doctor Twisse hath an argument which he takes to be unanswerable, clearly evincing, that whatsoever thing comes to pass, that is good with a transcendentall goodness, or Metaphysical, God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree. You have it in his examination of M. Cottons Treatise &c. p. 68, 69. As also in his Consideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of Tilenus, viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice. p. 18, 19. Nay I say more, (saith he) that everything, which cometh to pass, in the revolution of times, was decreed by God; which I prove by such an argument, for answer whereunto, I challenge the whole nations of both Arminans and Jesuits. It cannot be denied, but God foresaw from everlasting, whatsoever in time should come to pass, therefore everything was future from everlasting, otherwise God could not foresee it as future. Now let us soberly inquire, how these things which we call future, came to be future, being in their own nature merely possible, and indifferent, as well not at all to be future, as to be future. Of this transmigration of things, out of the condition of things merely possible (such as they were of themselves) into the condition of things future, there must needs be some outward cause. Now I demand, what was the cause of this transmigration? And seeing nothing, without the nature of God, could be the cause hereof (for this transmigration was from everlasting, but nothing without God was everlasting) therefore something within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cause hereof.

And what may that be? Not the knowledge of God, for that rather presupposeth things future, and so knowable in the kind of things future, then makes them future: therefore it remains, that the mere decree and will of God, is that which makes them future. If to shift off this, it be said, that the essence of God is the cause hereof; I farther demand, whether the essence of God be the cause hereof, as working necessarily, or as working freely; If as working necessarily, then the most contingent things became future by necessity of the Divine nature, and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature, which is Atheistical: therefore it remains, that the Essence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and consequently, the mere will and decree of God is the cause of the futurition of all things.

He speaks indeed of God's will and decree indefinitely, but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree, is undeniable. But the force of this reason, you may think easily to evade, by your denial of God's fore-knowledge: your reasons for which denial, I shall in the next place proceed to examine.

Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.

THat Prescience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in God, is the constant assertion, both of ancient and moderne Divinity The learned Assertours of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolmen, and Papists, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of Judgment about such a point as this; even between those, who have many Irons of contention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious, and near at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But unpossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it. 2 ^lie If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a fore-knowledge in him today, by the morrow, suppose the thing, or event fore-known, should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease, and be changed; in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being res futura somewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with anything which is in God. The reason is; because then, there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are unpossible. But if Praescience or fore-knowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the same, with somewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge, properly so called, in God.

IEANES.

DIverse Heathen Philosophers I have found censured for denying of God's Prescience or foreknowledge, as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ. Dei cap. 9. Seneca by Aureolus 1. distin. 38. Aristotle by Vasquez and others. But that Christian Divines either ancient or moderne, (unless you will appropriate that name unto Socinians) are so unanimous in impugning of God's foreknowledge, is great news unto me, and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe, that have read anything in either ancient, or Moderne Divinity. Jerome in his third book Adversus Pelagianos, teacheth (as Franciscus Amicus informs me) that he who takes away Prescience from God, takes away the Godhead: Eum qui a Deo praescientiam tollit, divinitatem tollere. As for Austin, whom you quote in the Margent against this Prescience of God; let any one read that place but now quoted. Lib. 5. De Civ. Dei. cap. 9. and he must needs confess, that he is a zealous Assertor of God's foreknowledge against Cicero, who opposeth it in favor of the liberty of man's will. And so saith Austin. Dum vult facere homines liberos, facit sacrilegos: multo sunt autem tolerabiliores (saith he) qui vel sydera fata constituunt, quam iste, qui tollit praescientiam futurorum. Nam & consiteri esse Deum, & negare praescium futurorum, apertissima insania est. They who make the stars the fates of men, are more tolerable then he, who taketh away the foreknowledge of things to come. For to confess that there is a God, & to deny him to be foreknowing of things future, is a most open madness. And again in the same place. Sed quoquomodo se habent tortuosissimae concertationes, & disputationes Philosophorum; nos ut confitemur summum, & verum Deum, ita voluntatem, summam{que} potestatem ac praescientiam ejus confitemur. Afterwards again. Religiosus autē animus utrum{que} eligit, utrum{que} confitetur, & fide pietatis utrū{que} confirmat; that is, both the liberty of the will, & God's prescience. Quod vero Cicero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei praescientiae notissimum, plus eum, quam Stoici, detestamur. Aut enim Deum esse negat, &c. Aut si esse confitetur Deū, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quàm ill, dixit insipiens in cord suo, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est uti{que} Deus. To confess that there is a God, and to deny his foreknowledge, is to say with the fool in his heart, that there is no God: For he, who doth not foreknow things to come, is not God. Other testimonies you may see quoted in Suarez lib. 1. De scientià futurorum contingentium absoluta. cap. 2. Out of other places of Austin, as also out of Fulgentius, and Anselm. But I may very well spare this labor of citing the Ancients, seeing M. Hord, or M. Mason (I know not well which) tells us that the Fathers did generally make sin an object of God's prescience, and therefore they maintained, That there was prescience in God. As for the Schoolmen they in their Commentaries upon Aquinas. Sum. 1. p. Q. 14. Art. 13. And on Lombard lib. 1. dist. 38. 39. do generally resolve, nemine contradicente, (that I know) That God's foreknowledge of things to come, is a point certain de fide. And amongst those that are called Protestants, I know none that oppose it, save the Socinians; against whom, in this particular, you may read Stagman Photinianis: disp. 13. And Johannes Junius in refutat: praelect. Fausti Socini, cap. 8. 9. 10. 11. The Arminians, however now some of them walk in the clouds, and will not speak out, yet at first the Ringleaders did not stick to profess, that election was upon foresight of perseverance in faith, and reprobation upon foreknowledge of perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. D. Twisse tells us, That God's foreknowledge of things future, is a point assented unto by, and uncontroverted amongst all Christians; De Scientia Media, p. 245. Extra controversiam est apud Christianos omnes, futura omnia, quantumvis contingentia, Deo not a fuisse, id{que} ab aeterno; neque mirum, cum nihil positivum aut sit, aut futurum sit in rerum naturà, cujus productionem non operetur ipse Deus, idque in genere causae efficientis, consequenter{que} cujus productionem non ab aeterno decreverit, quá de re nulla fere inter Christianos hodie, saltem eruditiores, viget Controversia. And hereupon it is that he censureth the proofs brought by Suarez for the confirmation of it, to be needless. Pergit Suarez in confirmatione ejus, de quo Christianus nullus dubitat abidem. And again in his book against M. Cotton p. 69. he saith, That for men with Cicero to deny, that God foreknowes things to come, is to turn Atheist.

But against this cloud of witnesses I foresee that you will take sanctuary in those two terms, Formally and Properly, though none save Atheists, and Socinians deny the Prescience of God; yet notwithstanding this, it is, say you, the constant assertion both of Ancient and moderne Divinity, That Prescience or foreknowledge are not Formally or Properly in God. To make this good, you only quote Austin in your Margent and Gregory, unto whose sayings alleged by you, every Schoolman almost, that dissenteth from the Dominicans about the presence of things in eternity, gives an answer, of which if you be ignorant, you must needs be a very great stranger to School Divinity. You tell us next, that the Learned assertors of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Schoolmen, and Papists in this assertion, That prescience or foreknowledge are not properly, or formally in God. This is a thing which those, that dissent from you, would in all likelihood question, and yet you bring not so much as one instance out of either Protestant or Papist to make it good. That there is such a peace and concurrence of judgment about this, between Protestants and Papists, I never read or heard of before. And if you can prove it by an induction, I will confess my ignorance. If any such unwary passages, as you here speak of, have dropt from the pens of either Protestants or Papists, I suppose they are to be qualified, and understood in the like manner, that Suarez understands, and qualifieth the speech of those, who deny knowledge to be properly and formally in God.

They take (saith he) knowledge as signifying a quality or habit produced by some power or knowledge, gained or gotten by way of discourse or inference, or including some such like imperfection. In like manner if any either Protestants, or Papists, have denied foreknowledge to be properly and formally in God, they are to be understood concerning such a foreknowledge, as is found in men, in whom 'tis clothed with many imperfections, from which 'tis abstracted, as it is ascribed unto God. But I shall take a more particular and distinct notice of these two terms Formally and Properly in reference unto the attribution of foreknowledge unto God.

And first let us inquire whether foreknowledge can formally be ascribed unto God.

The term Formally may be opposed unto either Eminently, or Extrinsical denominations.

First unto Eminently. Perfections are either secundum quid, in certo genere, after a sort, in such a kind, or else simply such.

The former do so essentially imply some imperfection, limitation, or composition, as that they cannot possibly be abstracted therefrom, and therefore are ascribed unto God only eminently or virtually.

But now the latter do include no imperfection, or repugnancy with, or opposition unto any greater, or equal perfection. And these perfections are ascribed unto God Formally, as you may see proved by Suarez Met. Disp: 30. Sect. 1. num. 8. 9. De perfectionibus ergo simpliciter dicendum est, omnes esse in Deo formaliter, quia in suo formali conceptu nullam imperfectionem, sed puram perfectionem involvunt, neque inter se repugnantiam includunt, unde sic illas habere, id est, formaliter, melius est, quam aliquà earum carere, & ideo de ration Entis sum perfecti in totâ latitudine Entis est, ut has omnes perfectiones formaliter includat. Add in his perfectionibus non posse cogitari altiorem modum continendi illas, quam formaliter, quia intra suam formalem rationem, nec limitationem, nec imperfectionem includunt, neque altior gradus Entis excogitari potest, quam ill, ad quem hae formales perfectiones pertinent, qualia sunt vivere, sapere & alia hujusmodi.

Now foreknowledge is to be ranked amongst the perfections of this latter sort; because it may be sequestered or abstracted from all those imperfections, as it is found in Men or Angels. You think indeed that it will necessarily infer mutability, but that is an imputation from which I will anon easily free it. Besides, a perfection simply such, is defined by Anselm in Monolog. cap. 14. Quae in unoquo{que} est melior ipsa quam non ipsa; that is, as Scotus expounds it in 1. dist. 8. q. 1. Ad. 1. quolibet suo incompossibili. Now the light of nature evidenceth that the knowledge of things to come is better, and a more noble attribution then anything whatsoever is repugnant unto such foreknowledge, and therefore this foreknowledge (in such an abstract notion as we speak of) may formally be ascribed unto God.

But now this I would have to be understood as Suarez speaks of such kind of perfections in general.

And again afterwards.

They are not in God formally in such a sense, or after such a manner, as they are in the Creatures, but they are in him formally, in a higher way and manner, which excludes all imperfections whatsoever of the Creatures.

Secondly, formal attributions may be opposed unto extrinsical denominations. Now the word foreknowledge, signifieth something that agreeth unto God formally, and something that is ascribed unto him only by extrinsical denomination.

For the understanding of which we must observe, that it is one and the same undivided knowledge, by which God without any the least alteration, understands things whilst future, when present, when past, and this I affirm to be ascribed unto God formally, because 'tis in him, and that by way of real identity with his Essence, and all his other attributes.

But now this knowledge undergoes several appellations, which are attributed unto it by extrinsical denomination, from the various condition of the things known, so long as the things themselves are to come, it is called Fore-knowledge, when they come, co-knowledge, after they are gone and past, after-knowledge: D. Twisse against Jackson pag. 313, 314. I deny not then, but that the formal denomination of foreknowledge is extrinsical. God's knowledge is so denominated in regard of its preexistence unto the thing known: but that which is affirmed of a thing only by way of extrinsical denomination, may be ascribed thereunto properly, which brings me unto a second Quaere.

Whether Foreknowledge is, or may be ascribed unto God properly?

The learned Assertors of the Protestant cause, you say, are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Papists in this, That prescience, or foreknowledge, are not formally or properly in God. You will not deny D. Twisse to be a learned Protestant, and how he dissents from this assertion which you father upon all Protestants, you may read in his book against Doctor Jackson p. 316. The question only was (saith he) whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God, in respect of things to come: now I see no reason (saith he) but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man. Amongst the Papists Suarez comes behind few moderne Schoolmen, and whether he thinks foreknowledge not to be properly in God, let his own words inform you. Lib. 1. De Scientia futurorum absolute cap. 7. In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum, duratione antecedere omnium rerum creatarum existentiam. But Suarez is not herein singular. For the Schoolmen generally in their Commentaries upon Aquinas, and Lombard in the places but now quoted, having propounded this Question, An in Deo sit scientia futurorum &c. Resolve it affirmatively: And as at other times, so especially in determinations, and resolutions of questions, that Rule hath place: Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori analogato; if a word have two significations, one proper, another improper or Metaphoricall, and it be put by it self without anything to determine, or limit it unto the improper acception thereof, it must be taken properly. This to be the meaning of that rule Scheibler instructed me, when I was a Puny in Philosophy. Met. lib. 2. cap. 6. num. 17. Respondeo, illam propositionem, Analogum per se positum, hoc est, sine aliquo addito, stat pro famosiori, valere solum de analogo proportionis, hoc est, quod de uno praedicatur proprie, de alio improprie, per similitudinem, vel metaphoram, id positum sine addito significat suum principale analogatum, veluti cum de risu loquor, intelligo eum de risu hominis, non de risu prati. Austin in lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 9. Censures the denial of God's foreknowledge as a madness, as a blasphemous, and Atheistical speech &c. And this he would never have done, if he had thought as you, that foreknowledge is not properly in God: For that which is ascribed unto God only improperly, metaphorically, & by an Anthropopathy, as hands, eyes, ears, repentance, grief, &c. may without madness, blasphemy, or Atheism, be denied of God in propriety of speech.

How have the Schoolmen toil'd themselves, and puzzled their readers, about the reconciliation of God's foreknowledge of future Contingents, with the liberty of man's will, and the contingency of things? This was a point that Armachanus studied for twenty years space . Now had those men been so well read in ancient and Moderne Divinity as you, they would have eased themselves of this labor. For you assure us, that it is the constant assertion both of ancient and Moderne Divinity, that prescience or foreknowledge are not properly in God. That this was reputed in the days of Jeffery Chawcer, a difficult, nice, and controverted matter, which no one but an Austin or a Bradwardine could thoroughly discuss, or bolt unto the branne, appears by the verses of the said Chawcer, related by S ^r Henry Savill, in his Epistle prefixed to Bradwardine, which I shall here insert.

Had you lived in those times, you could easily have put an end to all this great altercation; provided that they would have received that which you take here for a principle, that fore-knowledge is not properly in God. For if this be so, then all disputation concerning the reconciling of God's fore-knowledge with liberty and contingency is frivolous, and to no purpose.

What anxious disputes have been amongst the Schoolmen for many hundred years continuance touching the manner or the ground of God's foreknowing future contingents? Bonaventure maintained that God did foreknow future contingents by the Idea's of them in his mind. Aquinas made the ground of God's foreknowing them to be their presence or existence in eternity. Scotus his opinion was, that God foreknows them by seeing the determination of his own will touching their coming to pass. Other grounds of God's foreknowledge of future contingents are assigned by others, which you may find mentioned almost in every Schoolman. Bellarm. l. 4. de grat: & libero Arbitrio, and before him Occam and Ariminensis were of an opinion, that the way, or manner of God's foreknowing future contingents, is a point that is incomprehensible, & inexpressible in this life. Were you called to be an Umpier between these great Schoolmen in this thorny, and knotty Question, you, instead of unloosing or untying this Gordian knot, would like another Alexander have cut it in pieces, and have told them that they disputed like a company of Buzzards concerning the ground or manner of that which may in propriety of speech be denied of God. Your opinion you see doth not so fully accord with ancient and Moderne Divinity, as you pretend, & how dissonant it is from the truth will soon be manifested, by bringing it unto the rule of Theological truth, the Scriptures, in which the infallible prediction of things to come, do clearly and abundantly witness, that foreknowledge is properly in God: for prediction presupposeth prescience, it being utterly impossible to foretell infallibly what one doth not foreknow certainly. Hereupon it was that Tertullian said Deum, quot fecit Prophet as, tot habere testes praescientiae suae lib. 2. contra Marcion. c. 5. That God hath so many witnesses of his prescience, as he hath made Prophets. This infallible prediction of things to come is so proper & peculiar unto God, as that thereby he distinguisheth himself from all false God's. Isaiah 41. 21, 22, 23. Produce your cause, saith the Lord (unto the Idols of the Gentiles) bring forth your strong reasons saith the King of Jacob; let them bring forth & show us what shall happen. Let thē show the former things what they he, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them or declare us things for to • ome: show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are God's. He that is God can show the things that are to come hereafter, and therefore he foreknowes them; for that cannot be foretold, which is not foreknown. And that without a Metaphor, or any other Trope.

From Scripture go we to natural reason, and that will prove, that foreknowledge agrees properly unto God. Arguments of this sort may be drawn, First from the nature of foreknowledge. Secondly from several attributes of God. Thirdly from his actual providence or efficiency.

First, from the nature of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is a knowledge of things before their existence. And in God there is a knowledge of things before their existence. Thou understandest (saith David) my thoughts a far off. Psal. 139. 2. This argument you may find in D. Twisse against Jackson. p. 314. Till things do coexist with God, his knowledge of them, saith he, is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue; for if they did coexist with God, then they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. much less is it after them, for if so, then their coexistence with God were past: but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once be both past, and also to come. You have it also in Suarez in the place before quoted. In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum duratione antecedere omnium rerum creat arum existentiam. It is most certain that the knowledge of God, as well as God himself, doth properly or in all propriety of speech antecede in duration the existence of all created things whatsoever, and therefore it is properly foreknowledge. Unto Suarez who is no enemy unto Arminianism, I shall add D. Jackson a professed Arminian arguing after the like manner in his Treatise of the Divine essence and Attributes Sect. 2. Cap. 8. p. 105. If God (saith he) as all grant, be before all worlds, his knowledge being coeternal to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Austin himself grants a scientia a science, or knowledge in God most infallible, of all things that have been, are, or shall be, before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternal to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the World it self, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet present, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or fore-decree them. And seeing God from eternity hath both known, and decreed the things that then were not, he is said; to have foreknown and fore-decreed them.

Secondly, Arguments proving foreknowledge to be properly in God may be taken from God's Attributes; from his infinite perfection, from his infinite happiness, or blessedness, from his unchangeableness.

First, from his infinite perfection: He is of all beings the best, and most perfect, Deus optimus maximus was a title that the ancient Romans by the light of nature gave him. Nothing then can so much as be imagined to be better then God. But 'tis better to know things to come, then to be ignorant of them, And therefore we must either deny that there is a God, or else ascribe unto him the knowledge of things to come. This is Doctor Twisse his argument De scientiâ media pag. 246. Verum, si Deus is sit, quo nihil melius excogitari potest, & melius sit cognoscere futura, & quicquid co gnoscibile est, quam ignorare; videtur hinc sequi, aut Deum prorsus negandum esse, aut scientiam futurorum contingentium ei tribuendam.

Secondly, from his infinite blessedness or happiness, which is such as that he hath all things desirable. But if he should not have known things to come he should be without a perfection, desirable by every intelligent or rational nature. This was Bradwardines argument; Si Deus quaedam vera nesciret, posset desiderare & velle scire illa; omnis enim rationals natura naturaliter scire desiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem, posset illa scire & non noviter; quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus, scientissimus, perfectissimus, beatissimus, & immutailis penitus, contra tertiam partem & sextam: necessario ergo aeternaliter omnia vera novit.

Thirdly, from his unchangeableness, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and consequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilst they were to come, it would by actual existence of them be enlarged, and so changed. This argument is urged by Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez, and others. God knows thing whiles present, for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angels know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwise by the presence of them, something de novo should accrue unto God's knowledge, which cannot be without a change.

Suarez also argueth to the same purpose.

The last sort of arguments which I shall mention, are drawn from God's actual providence or efficiency. God is the cause of all things, of him (saith the Apostle) are all things, Rom. 11. 36. Now he is the cause of all things by his knowledge, and by his will.

First by his knowledge, and that practical, which is resembled unto that of an Artificer, who hath a foreknowledge of what artificial works he resolves upon; for he hath samplers and patterns of them in his mind.

Rada propounds this argument very briefly.

Secondly, the will of God is the cause of all things, as is demonstrated by Bradwardine and by Aquinas and such as Comment upon him, in prim. part. Q. 19. Art. 4. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within and irresistible from without, and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknown. Bradwardine (from Isaiah. 46. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my Counsel shall stand) infers the infallibility of God's prediction from the firmness, immutability, and unresistiblenesse of his will. The Prophet signifies, saith he, that he can therefore declare the things that are not done, because his Counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure: Quasi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vei annuntiare possit ab exordio novissimum, quia omne suum consilium & volunt as immutabiliter stabit, & siet. De causa Dei. lib. 1. cap. 218. pag. 224. This argument Cumel enforceth by comparison with man's foreknowledge of things in their causes. A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipse of the Sun or Moon in its cause, and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will.

As for the testimonies you bring in the Margent, they and diverse others are alleged generally by the Dominicans, to prove the existence of things in Eternity, and it is very strange unto me that you take no notice of the common answers that are usually given unto them. The place out of Gregory is misquoted, but that might be an escape of the Printer; in my book it is, Moral. lib. 20. cap. 25. And a little after he gives the reason why prescience is not properly in God. Praescire dicitur qui unamquamque rem, antequam veniat, videt: Et id quod futurum est, priusquam praesens fiat, praevide • : Deus ergo quomodo est praescius dum nulla nisi quae futura sunt, praesciantur? Et scim •• quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos praeterita nulla sunt: praesentia non transeunt, futura non veni, uni: Quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospectu praesto est: Et omne quod praesensest, scire potest potius quam praescire. The ground upon which both Austin and Gregory deny foreknowledge to be in God is, because nothing is future but all things are present unto God.

Unto all these and diverse other Testimonies which occur in the Dominicans, I shall rehearse the answers of several men.

First, Rada, Par. prim. controv. triges. Art. 2. pag. 493. Adomnes authoritaies unica solutione sit satis. Dico enim quod non intelligent sancti, omnia esse Deo secundum rem praesentia sed secundum esse objectivum & cognitum: omnia enim in seipso videt & intu • tur.

Secondly, Suarez gives the same answer, but he explains himself more fully: The Fathers (saith he) speak by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactness of that knowledge which God hath of things to come, for he knows them so distinctly, and accurately, with all their circumstances, as if they did exist actually present. This knowledge of them therefore is not so much abstractive as intuitive, not so much prescience as science.

Thirdly, D. Twisse De scientia media pag. 390. gives the same answer that Bradwardine did unto the like saying out of Boetius and Anselm above 200 years ago, to wit, That all things are present unto God in esse volito as decreed by him, sunt ei praesentia, id est per suam insuperabilem & immutabilem voluntatem, praesentialiter determinata, & decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura. And this you may see how he clears both out of Austin, and Gregory.

Fourthly, Becanus gives another answer which I take to be the more satisfying: And 'tis, that the scope of both Austin, and Gregory is to show, That there is not such a prescience or fore knowledge in God, as there is in us, viz imperfect, and conjectural. &c.

From your Testimonies I come to the examination of your Reasons.

M ^r GOODWIN.

NOR is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of judgment about such a point as this, even between those who have many Irons of co •• ention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious and near at hand the truth herein is. For 1. if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things, be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are in the Letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But unpossible it is, that there should be any plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his Nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it:

IEANES.

YOur Argument with open mouth gainsayeth that which nobody will affirm, but is mute in the proof of that which only will be called for, to wit, That whatsoever is properly and formally ascribed unto God, is really distinguished from God's Essence, and his other attributes. If you think I do you any wrong by this censure, reduce your Argument unto Categoricall Syllogisms, and make the best of it you can.

Mr GOODWIN.

SEcondly, if foreknowledge were properly or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him today, by the morrow, suppose the thing or event foreknown, should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease, and be changed, in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the propriety of it) being res futura, somewhat that is to come.

IEANES.

SEverall answers unto this trite and bafled argument you may read in Schoolmen commenting in primam partem summae. Q. 14. Art. 15. I will not trouble you with the rehearsal of them, but shall only propound that which I take to be most plain and obvious unto even an ordinary capacity. We must distinguish betwixt God's knowledge considered in it self, and the extrinsical denominations thereof. God's knowledge in it self is not changed by any variation of its objects, which are one while future, and then present, and anon after past and gone, but 'tis one and the same knowledge without any the least alteration (ex parte Dei cognoscentis) by which he knows things whiles future, when present, when past; for he knows and sees them in esse volito pro certo aut tali tempore, as decreed to existant such a time. And to know a thing as decreed to exist at such a time, is to know that it shall be future until that time come; that it shall be present as soon as that time comes, and as long as it lasts; that it shall be past as soon as that time is gone and ceaseth to be: Quare licet aliter at{que} aliter cognoscat res futuras & praesentes ex parte rerum cognitarum, non tamen aliter at{que} aliter ex parte cognoscentis. Nam videre aliquid apud Deum in esse volito pro certo tempore, est & videre illud futurum esse, donec tempus illud advenerit, & praesens esse cum primum advenerit, & praeteritum esse simulatque tempus illud elapsum fuerit. D. Twisse De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 389. And again, pag. 26. Praesertim cum sub notione ista, esse voliti pro certo tempore, caeterae notiones quales sunt esse praesens, esse praeteritum, esse futurum, mirabiliter uniantur, & amicissime conspirent; quippe cum esse volitum apud Deum pro certo tempore sit & esse futurum, donec illud tempus advenerit; & esse praesens simulatque advenerit & quamdin duraverit; & denique esse praeteritum, quam primum tempus illud esse desierit. So then you see these various considerations of the objects of God's knowledge in regard of futurition, presence, preterition, are admirably united in esse volito pro certo tempore, and therefore can be no prejudice unto the immutability of his knowledge; whence it is become a proverb in School Divinity, that God non aliter novit facta, quam stenda. But though God's knowledge be in it self immutable, notwithstanding the succession that is in the coexistence of objects with it, as a rock in a river, stands immovable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it, yet this is no hindrance, but that there may be and is a change in the extrinsical denominations of God's knowledge from the variation of the objects thereof; so long as these objects are to come, God's knowledge of them is termed foreknowledge; when they actually exist, then it looseth the denomination of foreknowledge, and may be called co-knowledge; and so when they are past and cease to be, it may be called after-knowledge. Now a change of these extrinsical denominations do not import any change in God's knowledge in it self, because as Vasquez tells us, Vera mutatio non accidit nisi per veram receptionem, aut amissionem formae realis in ipsa re existentis. A real change is by a true and real either receipt, or loss of a real form existing in a thing it self.

Mr GOODWIN.

THirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the creature univocally and formally the same with anything which is in God. The reason is, because then there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the creature: both which are impossible. But if prescience or foreknowledge (being properly and formally in the creature) shall be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with somewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly so called, in God.

IEANES.

THe Minor of this Argument reduced into form, which you place first, will be denied by the Scotists; The Major which you put in the second place, will be denied generally by the Thomists.

As for the Minor of this Argument put in the first place, There is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same with anything which is in God. This the Scotists deny, as you may see in Scotus himself lib. 1. Distinct. 3. Q. 1. Distinct. 8. Q. 3. Rada part. 1. Controver. 21. Faber Faventinus Philosoph. Natural. Theorem. 95. And they bring such subtle reasons as you will confess, when you read them, to be worthy of an answer. As for your reason, they are not within Gun-shot of it. For these attributes which they affirm to be in the Creature univocally the same with those in God, are to be understood quoad communes non proprias rations, quoad conceptum convenientiae non discrepantiae, In such a notion and consideration as is abstracted from finite and infinite, and so more general then either God or the creature. Conceptus communis (saith Scotus) est ex se formaliter neuter respectu eorum quibus est communis: But the objective conceit of these attributes, which denominate God and the creature, is common unto God and the creature, and therefore formally neither finite nor infinite, but abstracting from both. But perhaps my dullness cannot pierce into the depth of this argument. You may do well for my conviction to improve it unto the utmost, and yet, if I be not mistaken, the uttermost that you can prove thereby is, that which will not be denied unto you by the Scotists, to wit, that nothing, no not Fns, of all predicates one of the most abstract and transcendentall, can be affirmed of God and the creature univocally, in regard of a physical univocation. Rada part. 1. Controv. 21. Art. 1. pag. 328. 333. and that these attributes which denominate God and the creature are predicated equivocally; if we speak of a Physical equivocation, it is manifest.

First, because the objective conceit of them, as denominating both God and the Creature is one and the same, only by the abstraction of the understanding, and not Physically or a parte rei. This you have yielded unto by Scotus in answer unto the objection of Henricus, that Primo diversa in nullo convenient, sed Deus est primo diversus a quacun{que} creatura &c. Unto this Scotus answers lib. 1. distinct. 8. Q. 3. Deus & Creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus; tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate, quia in nullà realitate convenient. Et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientiâ in re vel in realitate, in sequenti dicetur. Deus & Creatura (saith Rada a famous Scotist) sunt primo diversa subjective, quia scilicet in nulla realitate per differentias contrahibili convenient, sed non sunt primo diversa objective & quoad intellectum, sicut nec decem praedicamenta, quia Ens de eis praedicatur in quid. part. 1. controver. 21. Art. 2. pag. 214.

Secondly, Physically and a parte rei, there is a greater distance between God and the creature, then there is between any creatures; for 'tis an infinite distance. This is all which is proved by that reason of Banns in 1. par. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. That all created perfections in comparison of uncreated, are but painted and umbratick, the best of created beings in comparison of God are but shadows and pictures, Isaiah 40. 17. All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less then nothing. Omnis perfectio creata comparatione ad increatam perfectionem, est quasi depicta & umbratica, Ergo &c.

The major of your Syllogism put into form, and placed in the second place, to wit, (If prescience or foreknowledge being properly and formally in the creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the creature univocally & formally the same with somewhat that is in God) will generally be denied by Thomists, who will acquaint you with a middle kind of predication, betwixt equivocal and univocall, to wit, analogical, according unto which they affirm those attributes to be predicated, which denominate both God and the creature. In 1. part. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. They instance in Ens, which is properly and formally predicated of God and the creature, and yet neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, analogià quae est per attributionem intrinsecam, and not only analogia proportionis, as laughter is affirmed of a man and a green or flourishing meadow; nor yet only analogia attributionis quae fit per extrinsecam denominationem, as when health is predicated of a sensitive creature in the first place, as the subject in which it is seated, and of meats, drinks, medicaments, urines, secondarily, in reference unto, and by extrinsical denomination from that health which is in a sensitive creature, unto which they are referred either as causes or tokens of it: see Suarez, Scheibler, Morisanus, Logic: Mexic.

To make this matter more plain, I shall distinguish of a twofold acception of Univocall; one Logical, the other Metaphysical.

First Logical, in which 'tis adequately opposed unto equivocal, and so every predicate is univocall, that is, not purely, & merely equivocal, which imparts only its name, and not any common signification thereof. Predicates thus Univocall, are said to be Logically univocall, because this kind of univocation is sufficient as to Logical ends and purposes, as for the framing a contradiction, and to be the middle term in a demonstration.

Secondly, there is a Metaphysical acception of Univocall, in which 'tis inadequately opposed unto Equivocall, that is, partly unto Equivocall, and partly unto Analogical. An Equivocall predicate only imparts its name, and not any common signification thereof. An Analogical predicate imparts both its name and signification unto the things of which it is predicated, but unequally, in regard of that inequality, which is of essential dependency, secundum prius & posterius, as they say; so Ens is predicated of substance, and Accident; analogically of substance in the first place, and primarily, as its principal analogate; of Accident in the second place, with attribution, order, or reference unto, and dependence upon substance.

These things thus premised, I lay down these two conclusions, against which whatsoever you object I shall be ready to answer.

The first conclusion, Diverse attributes, which denominate God, and the Creature, are predicated of them univocally in a Logical acception of Univocall, as it is adequately opposed unto Equivocall; that is, they are not predicated of God, and the Creature, merely and purely Equivocally.

For first, not only the bare words, but a common and abstracted signification of them is found both in God and the Creature, I might instance in Ens, substance, goodness, wisdom, justice, &c.

Secondly, because otherwise nothing can be known, or demonstrated of God by, or from the creatures, but still there would be the fallacy of equivocation, Ex cognition unius aequivocati nihil potest cognosci alterius: And this is as well against the Philosopher, who proveth many things demonstratively of God; as against the Apostle Rom. 1. 20. saying, The invisible things of him from the creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power, and Godhead, so that they are without excuse. This is a reason given by Aquinas. p. 1. q. 13. art. 5. Nomina quae dicuntur de Deo & creaturis, non dicuntur pure aequivoce ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nil possit cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis, & hoc est tam contra Philosophum 8. Phys. 12. Metaph. qui multa demonstrative de Deo probat, quam etiam contra Apostolum dicentem. Roman. 1. Invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellect a conspiciuntur.

This is all that the Scotists can prove by their arguments, which they bring to prove the Univocation of Ens, as predicated of God and the creature; and this they fully and strongly prove. And indeed if the matter be well looked into, the contention here between the Thomists and the Scotists, is a mere strife of words, de modo loquendi.

The second conclusion, No attribute whatsoever denominating God and the creature, is predicated of them univocally, as Univocall is opposed unto Analogical: for those attibutes which do agree unto God most properly, are predicated of God, & the creature unequally, in point of essential order; of God primarily, & independently, of the creature secondarily, & dependently, with relation unto God. In God they are by his Essence, in the creatures but by participation. This I might exemplify by instancing in that which is under debate, infallible knowledge of things to come, that are contingent, is affirmed of God chiefly, & in the first place; of the creature only dependently upon, & derivedly frō God: whereupon an infallible, underived, & independent foreknowledge of future contingents is incommunicable unto any creature. James 4. 14. You know not, saith James, what shall be on the morrow.

Before I take my leave of this section, I shall desire you, that whereas I affirm, that what words are attributable unto God properly, dicuntur de Deo prius quam de creaturis, you would be pleased to understand it in regard of the things, or perfections signified by those words, and not barely in regard of their imposition. This limitation Aquinas puts unto the Question. p. 1. Q. 13. art. 6. Nomina, quae proprie de Deo praedicantur, quantum ad rem significatam per prius dicuntur de Deo, quàm de creaturis, quia a Deo hujusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; sed quantum ad impositionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus, unde & modum fignificandi habent.

Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.

IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge; I answer

True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formal notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned do infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soul, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himself, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appear in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formal conception of it, includes or supposeth a liableness to a change or expiration (viz. upon the coming to pass of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to pass in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetual, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.

IEANES.

HEre you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us: for you have not so much as the shadow of an argument to prove, that knowledge is not in God, according to the precise and formal notion of knowledge: but you spend a whole Section in the proof of that, wherein you are sure to meet with no adversary at all, viz. that there is no knowledge in God in such a sense, wherein it is found in men; why Sir, the concession of this will no ways advantage you, or prejudice us: 'tis the first part of your disjunctive proposition that calls for proof, in which, why you are so silent, I cannot guess, unless it be, that you are conscious of the falsehood of it, & therefore dared not to propound it Categorically, but only disjunctively; & the truth of disjunctive propositions is salved, if but one part of thē be true. So thē perhaps you thought, how ever the World went you would be safe and secure, as having two strings unto your bow. I will say no more of this, but that it is very unlike M. Goodwin, thus to decline the combat, and run unto the maintenance of a fort, where you could not reasonably expect so much as one assaylant. If you be pleased to return into the field again, and come up roundly to a charge, I mean a proof of that which you have not yet so much as offered, or pretended to prove, viz. That there is no knowledge in God according to the precise and formal notion of knowledge, I shall be willing and ready to encounter you, and I do hope that by God's assistance I shall be able to stand the shock of all your Argumentation.

M ^R GOODWIN pag. 105, 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14.

IT is the sense of one of the greatest Patrons of the adverse cause, that the precept, or injunction of God, is not properly the will of God; because (saith he) he doth not hereby so much signify what himself willeth to be done, as what is our duty to do. I confess that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth, or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to do, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier: but yet that will, wherewith, or out of which, God willeth or commandeth us to do, that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth, or decreeth things to be done. My will, or desire, that my Child should obey me, or, that he should prosper in the world, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose, to show the respects of a father unto him in providing for him; being as proper, natural, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within m • , whereby I will the latter, as that act it self of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the Principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by virtue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being natural, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper, and others less; though some may be better, and others worse, But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. Therefore if the precept, or preceptive will of God, be not properly his will; neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly such. If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or enjoineth faith and repentance, and consequently, salvation, unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man. Therefore if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of All men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enter-fear, and contradict the one the other. Nor will that distinction of the late mentioned Author salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth, between the Decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth, may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the thing which he commandeth; though the decree it self cannot be repugnant to the Command . The vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that Acts are differenced and distinguished by their Objects. Therefore if the object of God's decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed, or commanded by him, unpossible it is but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other, the other, should digladiate, and one fight against the other. Therefore certainly there is no such pair, or combination of wills in God, as the distinction of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti (as applied in the question in hand) doth suppose. It is unpossible that I should inwardly and seriously will, or desire, the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and enjoin the Physician to do the best to recover him.

IEANES.

D. Twisse is not singular herein, diverse great Schoolmen, Aquinas, Durand, Cajetan, Banns, Gregory de Valentia, and many others, say the same of not only God's command, but all other signs of the will of his purpose or good pleasure. The words of some few of them, shall for the satisfaction of the reader be inserted in the Margent; and the rather, because you in the 16 Section of this Chapter, tell us, that the Schoolmen were the first coyners of this distinction of God's will in Voluntatem signi, & voluntatem beneplaciti: and how their interpretation thereof, holds intelligence (as you speak) with that sense of D. Twisse which you here impugn, the Reader may see Vindic. Lib. 1. pag. 173, 174.

Some of them profess in terminis, that the will of sign or signification, is called the will of God only improperly, and metaphorically by way of similitude or proportion, and therefore the distribution of God's will into a will of sign and will of purpose or good pleasure is not real, but only verbal, divisio vocis; from whom they do not dissent, who say that 'tis divisio Analogi in analogata. For as Scheibler a Lutheran, and of your opinion for the main in these controversies, observeth, that they are to be understood of such an analogy which is by extrinsical reference and denomination. Intelligunt enim eam analogiam, quae est per extrinsecam habitudinem & denominationem. Voluntas enim signi vocatur voluntas extrinseca denominatione, in quantum scilicet significat beneplacitum divinum, quod absolute est voluntas Dei, ad eum modum quo multa dicuntur sana, per habitudinem ad santitatem animalis, quae primo talis est: Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 3. tit. 15. art. 4. punct. 2. n. 535.

For the will of sign is called will by extrinsical denomination, as it signifieth God's good pleasure or decree (which absolutely is the will of God) after the same manner that many things are said to be healthy or wholesome, in regard of reference unto the health of a sensitive creature, unto whom health is in the first place properly and intrinsically attributed.

Unto these suffrages of the Schoolmen, I shall add reasons drawn from three attributes of God's will properly so called; It is internal, eternal, irresistible, and God's precept or injunction is external, temporary, and resistible.

1. God's will properly so called is internal in God, really undistinguished from his Essence, whereas God's precepts or injunctions, are external without him, really distinguished from him.

2. The proper will of God was from eternal, the commands of God are given in time.

From the Eternity of God's will, I shall also draw this following Argument.

The will of God properly so called is uncapable of interruption, reiteration, and multiplication, for in eternity there is a most absolute and perfect unity and indivisibility without any succession of parts, but now the Commands of God may be very often reiterated and multiplied, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line. Isaiah 28. 10. Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together. Math. 23. 37.

3. The will of God properly so called is irresistible, Who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9. 19. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in heaven and in earth, in the Sea and all deep places. Psal. 135. 6. The Counsel of the Lord must stand and cannot be withstood. By all the powers of the World and darkness my counsel (saith the Lord) shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure Isaiah 46. 10. But now God's precepts and prohibitions are every day violated, broken and resisted by wicked men.

Unto these reasons I might add your own confession, I confess (say you) that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to do, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier.

But now I subjoin, God's precept or injunction is only a sign of his will, and therefore however it be usually termed in Scripture the will of God Mat. 6. 10. Mat. 7. 21. Rom. 12. 2. 1 Thess. 4. 3. It is to be understood only improperly and Tropically; and that first Metaphorically, 2. Metonymically.

First Metaphorically, and by an Anthrop • pathy, when God commands a thing, he carrieth himself as men do, when they purpose, will, desire, and determine that such a thing should come to pass; for amongst men usually their commands are manifestations and declarations of their purposes and desires; I say usually, because sometimes superiors enjoin some things to inferiors only for trial, and, upon their readiness to obey, recall and revoke such commands. How God's commandments and other signs of his will, are the will of God Metaphorically, Aquinas illustrates in the place but now quoted; seeing passions are ascribed unto God only Metaphorically, hence the signs of such passions in us, when ascribed unto God, are called by the names of the passions themselves. Punishment is with us a sign of Anger, and therefore God's punishments are termed his wrath or anger; so our commands are signs usually of our wills, of our desires, and intentions, and therefore the commands of God are termed in Scripture the will of God.

But I think with D. Ames, that the commandments of God are termed the will of God, not only Metaphorically, but also Metonymically, because they are signs of a proper will of God. Media illa (saith Ames) per quae voluntas ista r •• elatur, recte vocantur voluntas signi, non tantum Metaphorice, quia solent inter homines indicare quid velint: sed etiam Metonymice, quia sunt vel effecta, vel adjuncta, propriam Dei voluntatem ex parte indicantia. Medul. lib. 1. c. 7. 53. And this also is observed by D. Twisse, in his consideration of the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice, p. 54. Now we say, even God's commandment notes the will of God also in proper speech, to wit, what shall be our duty to do; for undoubtedly whatsoever God commands us, it is his will in proper speech, that it shall be our duty to do it. However then, it is the sense of D. Twisse, that the commandment of God cannot properly be said to be his will, yet he doth not deny that it signifieth or betokeneth the will of God properly so called, in which regard it is termed the revealed will of God, because it revealeth God's will: all the Question is, what will of God it revealeth or signifieth. D. Twisse (you see) roundly expresseth himself, that it signifieth, or revealeth God's will of obligation, what he will oblige and bind men unto; what he will have to be their duty: but it doth not at all signify the will of God's purpose concerning what shall come to pass actually; it doth not signify God's will of operation or permission, i. e. it doth not reveal what good God hath decreed to work, what evil he hath decreed to suffer or permit in all those to whom his commands are given; briefly, it signifieth or revealeth man's duty, and God's will of obliging unto it. Mic. 6. 8. He hath shown thee O man what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. Obad. 12. 13. 14. It doth not reveal the event or issue of things what shall actually be, by God's working or permitting providence; This you have asserted by Durand an ancient Schoolman,