The Riches of Gods Love
M r GOODWIN.
BUt yet that will wherewith, or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done.
IEANES.
FIrst, here you make to will and to command terms equivalent or Synonimous (as you do afterwards to will and to enjoin) which is very unreasonable, for 'tis the very thing in question, and D. Twisse affirmeth, that to command is to will only improperly, and therefore equivocally. For you then to use to Will and Command, as words of the same import and signification, before you have proved them to be so, serves for nothing but to breed confusion, distract the Reader, and disturb the course of Disputation.
Secondly, I confess that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the same will really, distinguished only ration ratiocinat • , by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your subtlety in the following part of this Section, should object, that acts are differenced, and distinguished by their objects, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, be really distinguished from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, unpossible it is, but that these two wills of his, should be also really distinguished, I shall for answer refer them unto Ferrariensis upon Aquinas contra gentes lib. 1. c. 77. Advert quod ex ista probatione (viz.) (that actus secundum objecta distinguntur) vult habere, S. Tho. quod distinguibile proportionatum objecto est actus; & ideo si plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quaecunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde sensus illius propositionis est, quod actus est id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit. The sense of this proposition, Acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is, that if many, or different objects do infer any plurality or distinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or distinction of objects doth always argue a plurality or distinction of acts.
3. But thirdly, this concession will not in the least degree advantage you; for the inference that you make afterwards, That if the precept of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his be properly such; for no rational and Scholastical Divine will deny God's decree, of things to be done, to be properly his will; and I have made it good, that God's commandment is not properly his will, and you bring nothing like an argument to prove the contrary: but in the next place, you illustrate this by a comparison from the acts of willing, proceeding from the principle, or faculty within man of willing, let us hear what you say.
Mr GOODWIN.
Mr will or desire that my Child should obey me, or that he should prosper in the World, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose to show the respects of a Father unto him in providing for him: being as proper, natural, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act it self of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by virtue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being natural, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper and others less, though some may be better, and others worse, but this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God.
IEANES.
FOr answer, I shall distinguish betwixt the Flicite acts of the will, which proceed from the will, as their only and immediate principle, and such acts of the will as are only imperate, that is, performed at the beck and command of the will, but proceeding immediately from other faculties v. g. the understanding, loco-motive faculty, the parts and members of the body, &c. as walking, speaking, writing, and the like. Now I confess there can be no such difference between the elicit acts of men's wills, which should make some to be more proper, and others less: But yet notwithstanding this I affirm, that the imperate acts of men's wills, such as their injunctions, and precepts, whether by tongue, pen, or otherwise (to give an instance pertinent to the business in hand) are not called properly acts of their wills; and this I shall not dictate, but confirm by these three following arguments.
First, every act of the will properly so called, is voluntary, intrinsically, and of it self, but now these imperate acts of the will are voluntary only extrinsically, by denomination from an act of the will moving, stirring up, and applying the power or faculty from which they proceed unto operation.
2. Those acts which proceed from other faculties, distinguished really from the will, are not properly acts of the will, or acts of willing (as you phrase it) but these imperate acts of the will proceed from other faculties really distinguished from the will, and therefore cannot properly be said to be acts of the will, and of these faculties too.
3. The acts of the will, are not properly objects of acts of the will. The act of willing is not properly a thing willed, a decree is not decreed. Actus (saith Suarez) qui per seipsum est intrinsece voluntarius, non comparatur ut proprium objectum, vel effectus ad illum actum, quo est voluntarius, quia est voluntarius seipso, & non est proprie objectum vel effectus sui ipsius: habet ergo aliud objectum in quod direct tendat, & est effectus potentiae, a qua elicitur, & solum per quandam virtualem reflectionem, quam in se includit, est voluntarius: unde dici solet volitus per modum actus, non per modum objecti. Met. Disp. 19. Sect. 5. n. 17. But these imperate actions of the will are properly objects of the will, and things willed, and therefore cannot in strictness and propriety of speech be said to be acts of the will.
M. GOODWIN.
THerefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will be properly such.
IEANES.
I Have searched for the premises out of which you infer this conclusion, and I must needs profess unto you, that I can find none: it is possible the fault may be in the dullness of my understanding, and you shall find me willing and ready to confess as much, if you will put your argument into Mood and Figure for me, and conclude this proposition out of anything you have delivered in the former part of this Section.
Mr GOODWIN.
IF so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or enjoineth faith and repentance, and consequently salvation unto all men, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man.
IEANES.
FIrst, until you can find a Major and Minor unto your former conclusion, this which is infer'd therehence is presumed and not proved.
2. You here make Willeth and Injoyneth all one, concerning the unreasonableness of which, I have spoken already.
3. I wonder what you mean in talking of an act of will in God, whereby he enjoineth faith and repentance, The injunction or precept of faith and repentance, is an act without God, not in him, and belongs unto his will, not formally, but effectively.
4. Your mentioning of an act of will in God, hath occasioned me to think of something, which for clearing of mine own meaning, and avoiding of mistakes, I shall communicate unto the Reader: And it is carefully to put a distinction betwixt these two expressions, To be properly the will of God, and To be properly an act of the will of God.
That God's decrees are properly the will of God, may be demonstrated out of most Schoolmen; that they are properly acts of God's will I deny, and that for two reasons.
1. If God's decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is ascribed unto God, not as a power distinct from the act, but as an act not elicit but subsisting: And here I shall give you the words and reasons of Suarez, then whom there are few Moderne Schoolmen more rational. He having proved that the will is not in God per modum potentiae secundum rem, sed per modum actus ultimi & puri, he propounds the doubt secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum, wherein hear his resolution. In hoc eodem modo loquendum est, quo de intellectu & scientià locuti sumus, quod scilicet ex parte rei conceptae, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non potest concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi potest quod sit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptae involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere secundum rationem, non est agere, sed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, scilicet virtutem amandi se, ut sic, quam praescindimus ab actuali amore, sicut de actu primo & secundo in scientia diximus.
But here I desire to be understood, as Franciscus Amicus explicates himself touching this particular Curs. Theol. Tom. 1. Disp. 14. Sect. 1. Dupliciter considerari potest potentia vitalis; uno modo, ut dicit distinctionem ab actu; secundo, ut importat positivam perfectionem percipiendi aut tendendi ad objectum; primo modo involvit imperfectionem Deo repugnantem; secundo modo perfectionem Deo convenientem. Quare concedo in Deo esse voluntatem, secundum positivum conceptum potentiae; Nego autem esse potentiam, secundum imperfectionem distinctionis ab actu secundo, quam potentia ut sic per se importat. The power of willing may be considered two manner of ways; First, as it implieth distinction from its act; and so it involveth imperfection repugnant unto God, Secondly, as it importeth a positive perfection of tendency towards its object or thing willed, and so it may be attributed unto God.
2. If God's decrees were properly acts of God's will, then they should be properly Elicite acts, but they are not properly elicit acts, but subsisting. • nunciantur fateor (saith our Author) tanquam actus a Deo eliciti, & sic dici possunt per anthropopathiam, quemadmodum & passions humanae attribuuntur Deo. At eruditi probe norunt omnia decreta Dei esse unicum duntaxat actum volendi in Deo, qui quidem actus volendi non differt realiter ab ipsa voluntate Dei, quae quidem voluntas Dei non differt realiter ab ipso Deo, qui est actus simplicissimus. Vind. lib. 2. p. 2. p. 101. But I return from this digression unto M. Goodwin.
M. GOODWIN.
THerefore if there be any secret, or revealed will of God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enterfeere and contradict one the other.
IEANES.
THis you gather from what you have not at all proved, but only pretended to have proved, viz. that the precept or injunction of faith and repentance, is properly the will of God. And for the contrary I have brought undeniable proofs, and therefore though there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time, when he willeth or enjoineth his faith and repentance, those two wills do not as you say enterfeere or contradict one the other. For unto contradiction it is required, that all the terms must be taken in the same sense and signification; now this condition is not here observed: For that he willeth the destruction of any man, is with a will in proper speech, that he willeth the faith and repentance of all men, unto whom the Gospel is preached, is with a will improperly so called, viz, his commandment.
M r GOODWIN.
NOr will that distinction of the late mentioned Author, salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth betwixt the decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the thing that he commandeth, though the decree it self cannot be repugnant to the command.
IEANES
THis is not barely affirmed, but strongly proved by D. Twisse, and of his proofs you take no notice, but only object against what he saith: This if it be a laudable, is a very easy, and compendious way of handling a controversy, for it would save a man the labor of that, which hath still been accounted the most difficult task in Polemicall Writers, to wit, solution of Arguments; but I shall acquaint the Reader with what you conceal, and I do not doubt, but upon representation thereof, he will acquit the Doctor, and his distinction, from that vanity which you lay to his charge. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare posse dicimus; interea decretum Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus; uirumque demonstramus. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse, sic oftendimus; sacrificatio Isaaci & non-sacrificatic Isaici pugnant inter se, sunt enim termini contradicentes. At harum altera fuit a Deo mandata Abrahamo, uti docet Scriptura, simulque eodem tempore non-sacrificatio fuit à Deo decreta, ut colligitur ex eventu. Nam Deus eam efficaciter impedivit, ne fieret. Quare res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re a Deo decreta. Rursus, dimissio populi Israelitici ex Aegypto, & non-dimissio pugnant inter se, sunt enim sibi invicem contradicentes: at altera, nempe dimissio, fuit a Deo mandata Pharaoni; altera, puta non-dimissio, fuit a Deo eodem tempore decreta. Nam & mandavit Pharaoni per Mosem & Aaronem ut populum dimitteret; simul etiam significavit, se obduraturum cor Pharaonis, ut non dimitteret; ergo res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re à Deo decreta.
That things commanded and decreed by God, may be contradictory, the Doctor proveth by undeniable instances. The sacrificing of Isaac, and the not sacrificing of Isaac, are terms contradictory; but the sacrificing of Isaac was the object of God's command to Abraham. Gen. 22. 2. The not sacrificing of Isaac was the object of God's decree, as appears by the event. v. 11. 12. Therefore the object of God's commandment, and the object of his decree, may be contradictory. Again, the letting of Israel go out of Egypt, and the not letting of Israel go out of Egypt are terms contradictory; but the letting of Israel go was commanded unto Pharaoh, his not letting of Israel go was decreed and determined by God. Exod. 7. 2, 3. and 10. 1, 2. God told Moses that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let Israel go. Therefore a thing commanded by God, and a thing decreed by God, may be contradictory. Concerning the first of these instances, you say something pag. 451, 452. But there is nothing argumentative in what you say, but may receive an answer from your own rule of interpreting Scripture. pag. 92. 99. 108. 109. In the next place the Doctor proves, that the commandments and the decrees of God are not repugnant. Nec tamen decretum pugnare cum mandato, sic probamus. Mandato significat Deus quid sit nostri officii, ut a nobis fieri debeat; decretum vero divinum nihil aliud est, quam propositum divinum de aliquo, ut vel fiat, vel impediatur ne fiat, idque efficaciter. Mandatum docet quid ipse probaturus sit, si modo ab homine fiat, quid improbaturus si non fiat: decretum statuit quid ipse facturus sit, aut impediturus, ne sit. Ista autem non pugnant; tui est officii ut hoc facias, sed non est mei propositi per gratiam efficere ut facias. Pari ration potest Deus mandare alicui fidem, & resipiscentiam, & interea apud se statuere, quod non credat, aut resipiscat, negando scilicet gratiam efficacem, qua sola fieri potest ut credat aut resipiscat.
God by his command signifieth, and showeth what is our duty, what ought to be done, or left undone by us; God's decree is nothing else, but his purpose that things shall come to pass, or not come to pass; the command teacheth, what God will approve or disapprove; his decree determineth, what he himself will do or hinder, &c. Now these are no ways repugnant. It is thy duty to do this, but it is not God's purpose to give thee grace for the doing of it: Thou art bound or obliged to do this, but yet thou shalt never actually do it: faith and repentance are thy duty, and yet thy faith and thy repentance shall never actually exist, or come to pass. By this that the Doctor hath said it is plain, that there is no opposition between God's command to all that hear the Gospel, believe, and repent, and his purpose of denying faith and repentance unto many, nay most of them. And thus you see what the Doctor hath to say for himself, let us next hear what you can say against him.
Mr GOODWIN.
THe vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, therefore if the object of God's decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary unto the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impossible it is, but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other the other, should digladiate and one fight against the other.
IEANES.
FIrst, here again you perplex the disputation with talking of two acts of God's will, but supposing that by one of them you mean God's decree which is in him, and by the other his commandment which is without him, performed usually by the Ministry of the creature, and therefore not his will properly so called, I utterly deny the consequence of your argument, and how just and reasonable this my denial thereof is, will appear, if you please to reduce your Enthymeme into a Categoricall Syllogism, for then you will find the proof of its consequence to depend on this, That whatsoever acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, do digladiate and one fight against the other; and this is a proposition so grossly false, as that I am very confident you cannot back it with so much as one, either testimony or reason. That acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is a common and received rule; but that all acts are opposite, whose objects are repugnant, is an assertion that as yet I never so much as read or heard of in any either Philosopher or Divine; and 'tis this alone will serve your turn to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the Decree and the Command of God from the opposition that D. Twisse admitteth to be between the things Decreed and the things Commanded.
2. If we take opposition and repugnancy as the Ramists, who divide it into disparation and contrariety, we may safely say, that God's decree and his commandment are things opposite, for they are disparate; but this will no wise prejudice D. Twisse, who speaks in the language of the followers of Aristotle, neither will it any ways advantage you, for the opposition or repugnancy that is between things disparate is only as touching an essential predication one of another, we cannot say that Grammar is Logic, or that temperance in a man is fortitude, and so we cannot say that God's decree is his commandment, or his commandment is his decree: not of a denominative or concretive predication of the same subject: the same man may be valiant, and temperate, a Grammarian and a Logician. See Scheibler Top. cap. 14. n. 7. & cap. 15. n. 19.
MR GOODWIN.
IT is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will or desire the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and enjoin the Physician to do his best to recover him.
IEANES.
IF you would hereby insinuate, that we affirm, that God doth inwardly and seriously will or desire the death or damnation of his Children, and yet at the same time also seriously enjoin his Ministers, who are spiritual Physicians, to do their best to recover them out of the snare of the Devil, you do wonderfully misconceive and misreport our opinion; for we say, that unto none hath he given power, right, or privilege to be his Sons, but unto such as believe on his name; and all those who believe, he hath ordained unto eternal life, and will keep by his power unto salvation; but of this see our Author, In the first Book of this Treatise. p. 133. 134. 137.
What hath been said is sufficient to convince him, that will not willfully and obstinately shut his eyes against the light, that the command of all who hear the Gospel to believe and repent, and the purpose of God to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory. I shall, before I discharge myself of this Section, evince as much briefly concerning this latter purpose, and that purpose or decree out of which the command proceedeth, and which is signified thereby.
Here we must premise, that the commandment of God doth signify a decree or decreeing will of God, though not such a decree or will as the Arminians usually shape for themselves. 1. It signifieth the decree of God concerning the commandment it self, 2. Concerning the thing commanded.
First then, the command of God signifieth God's will or decree of the commandment it self, of the external transient act of commanding. Eph. 1. 11. God worketh all things after the Counsel of his own will. God's commanding then of things in time, is a sign that from everlasting he did decree to command them. But secondly, It signifieth a will or decree of God also concerning the thing commanded, viz, as touching the obligation to it, not as touching the existence or non-existence of it, it signifieth, that God from everlasting did decree, that the thing commanded should be man's duty, should be a thing Morally good, but it doth not signify or reveal, that the thing commanded should actually exist, and be performed by everyone unto whom the command is propounded. Indeed the obedience of the elect, for whose salvation only the commands of God are given, was both commanded and decreed, or determined by God Ezek. 36. 26, 27. And hence we may infer, that the command of faith, repentance, obedience, &c. all which God hath determined to be necessary unto salvation, do imply, and reveal in a general, and indefinite way, that God from eternity did purpose to work faith, repentance, and obedience in those, whom he had designed to salvation. But this concession will not satisfy Arminians, who will be contented with nothing, unless we will grant them, that God willeth and desireth the faith, repentance, obedience, and salvation of Reprobates; which we cannot do, but withal we must renounce and disclaim God's omnipotency, and immutability.
These things thus briefly premised, That God's purpose or decree of commanding faith, and repentance unto all that hear the Gospel, and his purpose or decree to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory, is manifest: because God's purpose or decree of commanding faith and repentance, refers unto the thing commanded, faith and repentance, only as concerning the obligation to them, not as touching the existence of them; now to decree and purpose, to bind and oblige all to faith and repentance, and to decree and purpose, that some yet shall never actually believe and repent, cannot be proved by any rules of Logic to be contradictory.
Before I proceed unto the consideration of your next and last passage against D. Twisse, I shall only represent unto you, that our Author, whom you take to be one of the greatest patrons of that cause, which you account adverse, doth dislike the accommodation of that distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti, or a secret and revealed will, unto 1 Tim. 2. 4. (the place which you have under debate,) as well as you, though, I confess, upon different grounds. In his Book against Jackson pag. 534. he informeth us, that neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concur upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years ago. Peter Martyr proposeth it (saith he) amongst diverse others, but embraceth it not, neither do I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations; If you take (saith he speaking to D. Jackson) a liberty to put upon us the opinions, and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not subscribed to the Council of Trent. And again in the next page 535. Neither do I like (saith he) Cajetans interpretation after this manner, when he saith, Est sermo de voluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus homimbus praecepta salutis, doctrinam{que} Evangelii; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospel to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospel to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certain sign that God will have them to believe; like as it is no certain sign that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; For it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance unto all that hear the Gospel, nor to a major part of them; but it is a sign I confess that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe.
The interpretation of this place, which D. Twisse sticks to, is that of Austin, that God will have some of all sorts or conditions to be saved, and he makes it good from the coherence, as here, so in his consideration of the doctrine of the Synod of Arles and Dort &c. p. 61. and p. 62, 63, 64. he gives a full and satisfactory answer unto that which you call more then a Topicke argument against this exposition, unto which why you do not reply, I cannot but wonder, but perhaps you never read it; And yet again 'tis very strange, that you, who have searched so narrowly and thoroughly into these controversies, as you profess, should be unread in all the works of him, whom you confess to be one of the greatest Patrons of the Adverse cause (as you call it) I will lay down that which you call more then a Topicke argument, and compare it with the objection of Tilenus, and then put down D. Twisse his answer unto Tilenus, and refer it unto the Reader, whether it do not fully satisfy, that which you suppose to be a demonstration.
M. GOODWIN. pag. 104.
IF it may be said that God will have all men to be saved, because he will have some of all sorts to be saved, it may more properly & truly be said of him, that he will have all men to be destroyed (at least in their sense, who hold an irreversible reprobation of persons personally considered from eternity) because not simply some, but a very great part of all sorts of men now extant in the world, will in time perish, and that according to the decree or will of God, the tenor whereof is, that all persons dying in impenitency, and unbelief shall perish: yet the Scriptures do nowhere say upon any such account as this, either in terminis, or in substance, that God will have all men to perish, and not to come to the knowledge of the truth which is somewhat more than a Topicke argument, that God is not therefore said to will that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, only because he will have some, some few of all sorts of men to be saved, and to come to this knowledge, but simply because his will is to have all men without exception (viz. as they are men, and whilst they are yet capable of Repentance) to be saved, and in order thereunto to come to the knowledge of the saving truth. (i. e.) The Gospel.
TILENVS.
NOW if this New Evangelist do tell the Infidel that the passages of Scripture, which say that God would have all men to be saved, are to be understood of some of every Nation, and condition, the Infidel will reply that then the Scripture ought with much more reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned; because that in every Nation there are far more of these than of them, and how that in all reason the denomination should be taken from the greatest number.
DR TWISSE upon the Synod of Arles &c. Pag. 62, 63, 64.
I Deny that the Scripture ought with much more reason, or with any reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned, although put the case that in every Nation & condition there be more of these, than of them; and his reason drawn from the denomination to be taken from the major part is nothing to the present purpose. For the question here about the interpretation of Saint Paul's phrase is only this, whether the word All be to be interpreted of all sorts, or of all and everyone; so that the rule of denomination taken from the major part is nothing pertinent to this, The question being only, whether genera singulorum, or singula generum be here meant, not whether some of all sorts, or all and everyone of all sorts. Which being resolved, and that hereby is meant, genera singulorum, it may be farther questioned, whether genera singulorum do imply every particular of these kinds, or only some of them? For it is well known, that the phrase is indifferent to the one as well as the other, and that genera singulorum, are equally preserved entire in some particulars, as in many, or most, or all. Like as the Species of the Sun is maintained exactly as well in that one Sun, which shines by day in the firmament, as if there were twenty Suns.
Secondly, though the reason here given from the denomination to be taken from the greater part, were pertinent, yet were it nothing pertinent to the Apostles purpose in this place, to say, that God would have all men to be damned; For this were no agreeable reason to move them to pray for all, for Kings, and all that are in authority. As if the Apostle should say thus, I will have you to pray for all, for God will have all to be damned; for saith Austin, if God's Church knew who were predestinated to be sent into eternal fire with the Devil and his Angels, they would no more pray for such, than they would pray for the Devil himself.
So that this Author doth miserably overlash in this his subtlety, and betrays more nakedness than any sober and wise Infidel were like to do.
Then again, the instances of Scripture are clearly against him. For when every four-footed beast (as the Scripture speaks) was seen by Peter in a vision; in all likelihood they were not the most part of every kind, but the smallest rather of every kind: and accordingly this Author might conclude, that considering denominations are taken from the major part, therefore it is rather to be said, that every four-footed beast was not seen by Peter, for certainly the major part of every kind was not; yet in this sense to speak of it, in that case was nothing pertinent, but rather contrariant to that which followeth: Rise Peter, kill and eat..
In like sort seeing in all likelihood more people staid at home both in Jerusalem, and in Judea, then were they who went out to John, and according to this Authors rule, it were more fit to say, All Jerusalem and all Judea staid at home, when John the Baptist Preached: yet was it nothing congruous, but contrariant rather to the Evangelists scope to write so; His purpose being to set down of what estimation was the authority of John by the confluence of all people from all parts unto him & therefore when he writes that all Judea, and all Jerusalem went forth unto him, the meaning can be no more than this, namely, that from all parts of Judea and of Jerusalem some flocked unto him.
IEANES.
I come unto the third and last exception in your Book against Doctor Twisse. pag. 245.
Mr GOODWIN.
HAnging upon the Cross he prayed for his enemies, and those that crucified him, that they might be forgiven. May it not as well be inferred from hence, that therefore all his enemies, and all such, who (in any sense) crucify him, shall be forgiven by God; as it is argued from his praying for Peter, that his faith might not fail, that the faith of no true believer shall fail. Doctor Twisses notion upon the case is not so authentic; and though admitted, will not heal the difficulty: Christ (saith he) prayed for his enemies, ex officio hominis privati, i. e. according to the duty of a private man, but for his elect, as Mediator. This is said but not proved, nor indeed probable. For very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by means hereof in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest and duty of a private man; This would argue, that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectualness of desire to obtain what he prayed for. But let it be granted, yet still it follows, that whatsoever Christ prayed for, was not simply, or absolutely granted or done; and if whatsoever Christ prayed for, was absolutely granted, it is not material, as to matter of impetration, whether he prayed as Mediator, or as a private man. But the intent of Christ's Prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sins should be forgiven them, much less that simply and absolutely (i. e. without any intervening of faith and repentance) they should be forgiven (which had been to pray for that which is expressly contrary unto the revealed will of God) but that that particular sin of their crucifying him should be forgivem them i. e. should not be imputed unto them, by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction; or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent.
IEANES.
THis exposition of D. Twisse proceeds upon supposition, (not grant) that Christ prayed for all that had a hand in his crucifying; and taking this supposition to be true, this following argument, for the proof of this exposition, may easily be gathered out of D. Twisse. If Christ prayed for all that crucified him, then either according to the duty of a private person, or by virtue of his office, as he was Mediator; but he prayed not for all his persecutors by virtue of his office, as he was a Mediator: therefore if he prayed for them, it was only in answer of his duty, as he was made under the Law, and a private person. The Minor which is only likely to be questioned, is thus confirmed; some that were guilty of his crucifying, were in all likelihood Reprobates, as is not only confessed, but proved by Arminius. Oravit (saith he) pro iis qui crucifixerunt eum, pro inimicis suis, inter quos & non-electi fuerunt: Pincipes enim saeculi crucifixerunt illum; at plurimis illorum sapientia Dei, & virtus quae est Christus, non est revelata. The Princes of the World crucified the Lord of Glory. 1 Cor. 2. 8. And unto most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, is not revealed. Now in John. 17. 9. where we have the model, rule, or Epitome of Christ's intercession, that is, of his praying as Mediator, he disclaims all prayer, and consequently mediation for Reprobates. I pray not for the World, but for them which thou hast given me. Where World is taken pro turbà Reproborum &c. (saith D. Twisse) for the rout or rabble of Reprobates: and he proves it thus; In his, Mundus opponitur iis qui dantur Christo a Patre; at dari a patre, significat statum electionis. John. 6. 39. Significat enim statum bonum praecedaneum vocationi efficaci; omne quod dat mihi pater, veniet ad me. Venire autem ad Christum, est credere in Christum per vocationem efficacem. Vind. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 181. The World in these words is opposed, unto them which are given unto Christ by the Father; but to be given unto Christ by the Father, signifieth the state of election, for it signifieth a good and happy estate or condition, precedaneous unto effectual vocation. John. 6. 37. All that the Father giveth me shall come unto me; but to come unto Christ, is to believe in Christ, by an effectual vocation. Thus you see, that notwithstanding your pleasure to say otherwise, it is not barely said but proved by him, that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers by virtue of his office as he was Mediator.
In the next place, that Christ according to the duty of a private man, might pray for all that crucified him, even for those of them that were not elect, is rendered probable by two arguments in D. Twisse.
The first is, Christ's subjection unto the Law. Gal. 4. 4. He was made under the Law: and therefore bound to fulfill all righteousness. Math. 3. 15. And one branch of the Law, as is evident, by Christ his own gloss upon it, Math. 5. is to love our enemies, to forgive private & personal wrongs, to pray for them which despitefully use us, and persecute us. this was a point that he pressed much upon his Disciples in his life time, and it being a duty (though of frequent use) yet difficult and harsh unto flesh and blood, it is not unlikely but that he might exemplify it by his own practice at his death.
A second Argument in D. Twisse to prove that it is not improbable that Christ as a private man, affectu humano, prayed on his Cross for all his Crucifyers, even such of them as he knew, not to belong unto the election of grace, is drawn from comparison of such a prayer, with the like prayer, that Christ made in his agony in the Garden, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. Math. 26. 39. Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me. Luk. 22. 42. This bitter cup of his death and Passion, he knew full well that he was to drink up, as a Mediator for his elect, both by his Fathers decree, call, command, as also by his own voluntary undertaking; for to this end and purpose he came into the World, and sanctified himself. John. 17. 19. and therefore though these words were part of a most solemn addressement unto God, yet were they not put up by him in the capacity, and according to the duty and interest of a Mediator for his elect. Twisse Vindic. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. And this is enough to satisfy you, that you are out in passing your censure upon D. Twisse his notion on this place, that it is said not proved, which I am persuaded you would have forborne, if you had so thoroughly perused him, as it was fit you should, before you had in public thus censured him.
Let us see in the next place, with what strength of Argument you oppose his exposition.
M. GOODWIN.
NOr indeed is this probable, for very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in heaven, by means hereof, in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest, and duty of a private man, this would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectuallnesse of desire to obtain what he prayed for.
IEANES.
FIrst, you cannot deny but that in these words of Christ, Father if it be possible, or if it be thy will, let this cup pass from me, Christ prayed not as a Mediator for his elect, for so he was engaged to drink off this Cup; but as a man naturally declining, and abhorring death, and the ignominy of the Cross, as they are in themselves evil: and yet all your arguments, mutatis mutandis, with due change may be applied unto this interpretation, as well as unto D. Twisse his notion (as you call it) upon Luke 23. 34.
Secondly, in answer unto your objections, we may make use of a distinction of prayer, brought by Suarez in tertiam partem Sum. Aquin. q. 21. Art. 4. Prayer is nothing else but an unfolding of the will unto God. Now in Christ's manhood there was a twofold will, one absolute and effectual, another conditional and ineffectual, which may otherwise be termed, a velleity, a will of simple complacency, a will of a thing only secundum quid, in some particular respect, according to some particular consideration: of such a will of his we read. Mar. 7. 24. He entered into an house, and would have no man know it, but he could not be hid. Answerable unto these two acts of the will in Christ, there may be attributed unto Christ two sorts or kinds of prayer; one proceeding from an absolute and effectual will, and this was always heard: the other from a conditional and ineffectual will, and this was not always heard; such was his prayer in his agony, let this cup pass from me: and of this sort or kind of prayer, is that passage, Psal. 22. 2. In reference unto Christ, understood, O my God, I cry in the day time, but thou hearest not, and in the night season and am not silent.
Now to apply this distinction, Christ could not pray as a private man for those of his persecutors, for whom he did not pray as a Mediator, if we speak of that kind of Prayer, which cometh from an absolute and effectual will, which is styled by Gregory de Valentia, Voluntas rationis undequaque deliberatae, because it proceedeth upon regard had to all circumstances: And the reason is, because with this kind of Prayer, he never prayed for anything, but what he knew would be granted; for he never absolutely and effectually willed anything, but what was agreeable unto God's absolute will, the will of his decree or good pleasure, and this is all that your arguments can prove. But yet notwithstanding this, he might pray (taking prayer for a representation of a conditional or ineffectual will) for the pardon of even those of his persecutors, who he knew should be condemned, and for whom therefore he prayed not as Mediator: or more plainly, he might express a velleity, a gracious, merciful, and charitable desire, to have all his crucifiers pardoned, so as it were not contrary unto God's decree, unto which he did submit, and in which he did acquiesce, as he did in his prayer for the removal of his Passion, not my will but thy will be done.
An answer very like unto, if not coincident with this, may be easily gathered out of D. Twisse; and it is, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors, taking prayer for an expression of Christ's antecedent will, not as prayer is a representation of his consequent will.
An Antecedent will, as Alvarez explains it, is the willing of a thing considered absolutely, as it is in it self, abstracting from all other considerations of it: A consequent will, is the willing of a thing considered with all circumstances wherewith it is clothed. Thus a Merchant willeth the preservation of his wares with an antecedent will, as the preservation of his wares is considered in it self; but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as it is considered with this circumstance, as 'tis accompanied with hazard, and danger of his life. Thus also a judge with an antecedent will, willes the life of a Prisoner, because his life is in it self, a thing good and desirable: but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as he is guilty of Murder, incest, or any the like capital crime.
Now D. Twisse, though he reject the application of this distinction to God, with whose simplicity and infinite knowledge several successive considerations of one and the same thing are utterly incompetible, yet he denieth not, but it may have place in the manhood of Christ. Ration diversarum considerationum non nego (saith he) distinctionem istam competere posse in hominem; quippe cui variae considerationes occurrere possunt invicem succedentes: sic Christus naturali sui conservandi desiderio ferebatur, cum a patre peteret, ut calix transiret; at consideratâ voluntate & decreto patris de Calais isto ad bibendum ipsi propinato, eidem se submittere consultum duxit. This distinction in regard of diverse considerations of one and the same thing, may be ascribed unto man, in whom are found several considerations of the same thing succeeding one another: So Christ as man, out of a natural desire of self-preservation, prayed that the cup of his passion might pass from him; but the will or decree, the command of his Father, his own office, and man's salvation being considered, he submitted himself to the drinking up of this cup, even to the very dregs; nevertheless not my will but thy will be done. Luk. 22. 42. If this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, thy will be done. Mat. 26. 42. He did not will his passion with an Antecedent will, but he willed it (you see) with a Consequent will. Joh. 4. 34. And so he prayed against it, as a prayer is a proposal of an Antecedent, not consequent will.
Now that Doctor Twisse resembles this prayer of Christ, for the forgiveness of all his crucifiers, unto Christ's deprecation of his death and passion, and makes it to be as that, an expression only of an antecedent will, a desire of their pardon, considered absolutely in it self, abstracting from God's decree unto the contrary, I shall evidence by giving you D. Twisse his own words. Vind. lib. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. Non dicit Molinaeus istam voluntatem Christi hominis, secundum quam oravit pro crucifigentibus ipsum, contrariam fuisse voluntati divinae; potuit enim fieri cum submissione voluntati Dei tacit factâ, licet non expressà, ad formulam precationis illius: pater transeat a me calix iste; Sed non mea voluntas fiat, sedtua. And again afterwards in the same page. Annon homini sanctissimo convenit, privatam offensam remittere, & palam protestari, se (nisi Deus aliter statuisset) percupere ut ipsis ignosceret; de quibus tamen Deus aliter forsitan constituerit, quod & ipsi forsitan innotescit? Annon petiit salvator, & ardenter obsecravit, ut si possibile esset, calix transiret, cum tamen Deum aliter constituisse, ne scilicet eum transiret calix, ipsi satis constaret? &c. Denique, Christum illis been voluisse, ut homo erat, quos antecedaneo decreto ab omnis boni spe ac possessione absolute exclusit Deus; hoc enim addendum fuit (licet illud fraudulenter nimiùm dissimulet Corvinus) etiam haec sententia quid horrendi, quaeso te inculcat? Praesertim cum non sic voluisse dicamus, consideratâ istâ, de eorum a salute exclusione, voluntate divinâ; sed duntaxat, si per voluntatem Dei aliter constitutum non fuisset, & si penes ipsum esset, ut eligeret, utrum in persecutores ipsius vindictam exerceret, aut suspenderet; pro eâ quam ut homo in omnes (etiam in injuriis remittendis) charitatem exercere debuit, vindictam suspensam mallet quam exercitam.
And this in general unto all your Arguments, I shall say something to each of them apart.
Mr GOODWIN.
FOr very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by means hereof in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity and according to the interest and duty of a private man.
IEANES.
VNlesse variation of Phrases be argumentative, here is nothing but a begging of the question, only it is in state and good language.
MR GOODWIN
This would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart.
IEANES.
IF we understand Prayer in the sense but now mentioned, what absurdity is it to say, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the forgiveness of all his persecutors with his whole heart, that is, as intensely, earnestly, vehemently, and zealously as he could, in the utmost degree possible to an human nature. In Luk. 22. 44. 'tis said, that Christ prayed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 more earnestly, and his Sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground. That this prayer was with the whole heart of Christ, you will not deny, and yet the former part of this prayer (if thou be willing remove this cup from me) was not the prayer of Christ as Mediator, but only an expression of an antecedent or conditional will and desire, like unto this his prayer upon the Cross for the justification of all his persecutors.
There is nothing considerable which can be objected against this, but that hereupon it would follow, that seeing prayer is a representation of the will before God, that therefore in Christ there are two contrary wills, if he prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors as a private man, and did not pray for it, but rather against it, as a Mediator.
But this receives a very easy solution. To will or not to will, or nill one and the same object, are not contrary, unless it be in respect of the same circumstances or considerations. For Christ as a private man, out of human pity to wish and desire the justification of all his crucifiers, as a thing good and desirable, if God had not decreed otherwise; and not to will, but rather nill the justification of some of them, upon consideration that they are not given unto him by the Father, but excluded from salvation by the will of his decree or purpose; these indeed are diverse, but not repugnant acts of the will, because they proceed upon general considerations, and therefore though the object be one materially, yet 'tis formally diversified: Thus between Christ's desire of declining his death, and his willing acceptance thereof, there was a diversity, but no contrariety, because they were not in respect of the same circumstances; he desired to decline it, as it was in it self evil, and contrary to nature; but as the means of man's salvation, he joyfully embraced it.
To clear this farther, I shall propound a distinction of contraries out of Rada. Part. 3. Controv. 10. Art. 2. Contraria sunt in duplici differentiâ, alia absoluta, quae a quibuscun{que} causis causentur contraria sunt; ut calor & frigns, quae non dicunt essentialem ordinem, & dependentiam ad aliquid extrinsecum, exceptâ dependentiâ ad causam: Alia sunt contraria, quae & dicunt ordinem, & dependentiam essentialem, non solum ad suas causas, sed ad alia extrinseca, & objecta; cujusmodi sunt scientia & ignorantia, velle & nolle, gaudium & tristitia; quocirca non erunt contraria nisi ad idem formal objectum comparentur.
MR GOODWIN.
THis would argue that he did not pray for them with an effectualness of desire to obtain what he prayed for.
IEANES.
THis only proves, what will easily be granted, that Christ prayed not for all his persecutors, with a prayer proceeding from an absolute and effectual will. But there is one thing which I shall not dissemble, but freely acquaint the Reader with; And it is, that many great Scholers both Papists and Protestants do deny, that the proposal, expression, or representation of a conditionll and ineffectual will or desire, is properly a prayer: I shall allege but two; the first shall be a Papist, to wit, Becanus Sum. Theol. Tom. 5. cap. 17. q. 3. Licet in Christo (saith he) distingui debeat duplex voluntas; una efficax, altera inefficax: non tamen distingui debet duplex oratio, una procedens ex efficaci voluntate, altera ex inefficaci. Nam oratio si vere oratio est, semper procedit ex absoluta & efficaci voluntate orantis, nunquam ex inefficaci. Qui enim petit aliquid fieri, efficaciter illud desiderat, & ideo adhibet orationem, tanquam medium quoddam ad obtinendum id, quod petit; hinc solet dici, orationem natura sua utilem esse ad impetrandum. Unde sic concludo: qui vult aliquid voluntate inefficaci nullum medium adhibet ad illud obtinendum; quia si adhiberet aliquod medium, jam vellet illud voluntate efficaci: at qui orat, adhibet aliquod medium ad obtinendum, nempe ipsam orationem: ergo qui orat, non vult voluntate inefficaci, sed tantum efficaci. Although in Christ there ought to be distinguished a twofold will, one effectual, another ineffectual; yet notwithstanding, prayer ought not in the like manner to be distinguished: for there are not two sorts or kinds of Prayer, one proceeding from an effectual, the other from an ineffectual will; for prayer, if it be truly prayer, always proceedeth from an absolute and effectual, and never from an ineffectual will of the party praying: For he that petitioneth for the doing of anything, doth effectually desire it, and therefore useth Prayer, as a means for the obtaining of that which he requests: Hence it is wont to be said, that Prayer is in its own nature useful or profitable for obtaining or procuring. Whence I conclude thus; He who willeth anything with an ineffectual will, applieth or useth no means for the procurement thereof; because if he should make use of any means to procure it, he should will it with an effectual will: but he who prayeth, makes use of a means for the obtaining of what he Praye's for, to wit, Prayer it self: therefore he who Prayeth, willeth that he prays for, only with an effectual, and not with an ineffectual will. He goes on in the confirmation of this opinion. Haec sententia est probabilior: pro quâ nota, aliud esse orare; aliud, simplex seu inefficax desiderium proponere: quod facile in nobis ostendi & explicari potest. Nam nostra oratio debet esse conjuncta cum certâ spe seu fiduciâ consequendi id quod petimus. Iacobi 1. 6. postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans. Et Math. 21. 22. Omnia quaecunque petieritis in oratione credentes, accipietis. Quando autem proponimus seu manifestamus alteri simplex seu inefficax desiderium nostrum, non facimus id cum certâ spe, seu fiducia consequendi illud, sed potius cum contrario affectu: ut si dicam,
This opinion is the more probable, for the opening of which we must mark, that it is one thing to pray, another thing to propound a simple or ineffectual desire; which may easily be shown and explained in ourselves; for our Prayer ought to be conjoined with a certain hope or assurance of obtaining that which we pray for. I am. 1. 6. Let him ask in faith nothing wavering or doubting. Math. 21. 22. And all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer believing, ye shall receive. But when we propound or manifest a bare, simple, ineffectual desire, we do not do it with a certain confidence of obtaining what is so desired, but rather with assurance of the contrary.
A seond testimony shall be taken out of Doctor Ames, an acute and learned Protestant. Coron. art. 5. c. 5. Juxta sententiam Arminii &c. nulla propria est oratio, quae non sit absoluta: quae etiam sententia non est temere damnanda, cum inniti videatur rationibus non contemnendis; praesertim illà, quae deducitur ab orationis natura: Oratio enim est submissa repraesentatio voluntatis nostrae apud Deum ut ab ipso perficiatur. Explicatio velleitatis, quâ quid vellemus, si aliud non obsisteret, non est oratio proprie dicta. jam vero nihil volumus proprie, quod non absolute volumus; atque adeo nil petimus quod non absolute petimus, Quamvis in dispositione precantium conditionis ratio virtualiter saepe contineatur. Petimus quidem nonnunquam, ut unum fiat si alterum contingat; cujus quidem consequentis rei futuritio ut conditionata sit rogamus: Sed ipsa tamen petitio est absoluta, quoniam absolute petimus, ut posito uno, ponatur & alterum.
According to the opinion of Arminius, there is no proper prayer, but what is absolute; which opinion is not rashly to be condemned; seeing it seems to be grounded upon considerable reasons, especially that which is drawn from the nature of prayer: for prayer is a submiss and lowly representation of our wills before God, to the end, it may be performed by him. The unfolding of a velleity, whereby we would will a thing if something did not hinder, is not prayer properly so called: But now we will nothing properly, which we do not absolutely will; and therefore we pray for nothing properly, which we do not absolutely petition for, although the nature of a condition be often virtually contained in the disposition of the parties praying, who may be ready to submit their wills unto God's. Indeed we sometimes pray that one thing may be done, if another thing come to pass; and here we pray, that the futurition of the following thing be conditional, but the prayer it self is absolute, because we pray absolutely that one thing do exist upon the positure or existence of another. If this which these men say be true, then Christ prayed for the justification of all his crucifiers, as a private man, only improperly, and not in the proper and strict acception of Prayer; for which improper notion of the word, we have warrant from Scripture, when Christ said, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, Non oravit (saith Becanus) sed simplex naturae desiderium proposuit: He did not pray but propound the simple, bare, and naked desire of his nature: but though this his expression of his natural desire and love of life, be not a prayer in regard of either a critical or Phylosophicall use of the Word, yet you see, tis agreeable enough unto the language of the holy Ghost in scripture, to enlarge the signification of the Word so far, as to apply it thereunto: for Matthew says expressly that he prayed. Math. 26. 39, 42.
But here for mine own part, I must freely profess that I better like Aquinas his interpretation of the place; that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers, but only for those of them, that were predestinate unto the obtaining of eternal life, by and through him.
And of this prayer what a fruitful and plentiful Harvest he reaped, you may read in the 2, 3, and 4. Chapters of the History of the Acts of the Apostles. There you shall read, that the Lord daily added to the Church such as should be saved; at one time three Thousand, and another time five thousand; of whom a great and considerable number denied the Holy one and the just, and desired a murderer to be granted to them, and crucified and killed the Prince of life. Acts 2. 36. Acts 3. 14, 15. Rivet on Psal. 2. quotes a testimony of Austin favoring this gloss: videbat quosdam suos, inter multos alienos: illis jam petebat veniam, a quibus accipiebat injuriam.
In making good this to be the sense and meaning of the place, I shall proceed by degrees: proving first, that it cannot be gathered out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for all that crucified him.
Secondly, That the contrary may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it self, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.
Thirdly, That those of his persecutors for whom he prayed were such as belonged unto the election of grace.
First, All the Logic in the World, though racked never so much, cannot infer out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for the pardon of all his Crucifyers: for out of an indefinite term, a universal cannot be concluded, saith our Author, in defense of Moulin his denial that Christ prayed for all without exception. Vindic. l. 1. part. 2. Digres. 7. p. 136.
Secondly, That Christ prayed not for all his Crucifiers without exception, may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it self, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.
First, From the Text considered in it self; Father forgive them, for they know not what they do: Here Moulin, from the reason adjoined to the Petition, concludes, That he prayed not for all that had a hand in Crucifying him, but only for those who did it out of ignorance; and in all probability some of them, especially some of the rulers, did it out of pure malice. And whereas Corvinus objecteth out of Acts 3. 17. against Moulin; That even the Rulers did it through ignorance: Doctor Twisse upbraideth him with his unskilfullnesse in framing consequences, and making an indefinite proposition equivalent unto an universal. It doth not follow, (saith he) The Rulers did this through ignorance, therefore all the Rulers did it through ignorance. That some did, is certain from that place; and so it is, that some of them were converted, and obedient to the Faith Act. 6. 7.
Besides he adds, that the Rulers, in all likelihood, did it out of affected ignorance, resisting the evidence of the holy Ghost, speaking in, and by Christ, and bearing witness to the divine Authority of his Doctrine by miracles: Whereas 'tis possible that Christ might pray for the executioners, that assisted and acted in his crucifying, perhaps not out of malice, but merely in the simplicity of their hearts, in obedience to their Superiors, not knowing anything. Tum vero ad ignorantiam istam quod attinet, quam populo Iudaico, & primoribus populi vitio vertit Apostolus; quid obstat, quo minus affectata fuerit in multis, (resistendo scilicet evidentiae Spiritus sancti per Christum loquentis, & per miracula doctrinae ipsius testimonium ferentis) praesertim in primoribus. Qui vero ipsum in crucem egerunt, (pro quibus etiam oravit) erant illi ministri, & superiorum mandatis ex officio inserviebant: poterat ergo Christus orasse pro iis, qui non malitia pulsi, Sed cordis simplicitate in Superiorum obsequium ducti Christum in crucem sustulerunt. He also addeth, that he prayed only for them that were present at his Death; and 'tis probable that the Rulers, at least such of them as were not afterwards converted, were not present at his Death. Esto vero, non fuerint conversi, sed & nihilo minus probable est, primores istos non adstitisse presents Christo, qui crucifixionem ipsius promoverent, pro quibus tamen & solis oravit Christus in cruce.
Secondly, that Christ prayed not for all and everyone of his crucifiers, D. Ames confirmeth, from comparison of this text with other places of Scripture. Coron. Art. 2. c. 9. Art. 5. c. 5. Amongst these his enemies there might be some that had committed that great and unpardonable sin against the holy Ghost Math. 12. 24, 31, 32. There were some, by the confession of Arminius himself, that were finally impenitent; and final impenitency in general, and the sin against the holy Ghost, which formally includes final impenitency, are sins unto death, for the pardon of which, if known, prayer is not lawful. 1 John 5. 16. And therefore (saith Austin) if God's Church knew, who were predestinated to be sent into eternal fire, with the Devil, and his Angels, they would no more pray for such then they would pray for the Devil himself. Now Christ knew who had committed the sin against the holy Ghost, and who would be finally impenitent; for he himself knew full well what was in man. John. 2. 28. Yea he knew from the beginning who they were that believed not. John. 6. 64. See the Learned and reverend M. Owen in his Treatise of Universal Redemption. p. 44. 45.
Thirdly, that Christ prayed not for all his crucifiers, may be confirmed by an argument shaped in imitation of that, which Doctor Twisse urgeth against a common and general intercession, which Corvinus ascribeth unto Christ. If Christ prayed, that all who crucified him should be forgiven, then it was either that they should be forgiven absolutely or conditionally; not absolutely, for then all of them were pardoned; if conditionally upon condition, then this condition was either on God's part, or else to be performed on his crucifiers part: it could not be on God's part, modo scilicet ipsi visum fuerit, for then all of them should be pardoned according to your opinion; for you hold, that God truly and unfeignedly desires the salvation, and justification of all and everyone of the Sons of Men: If you say that 'tis a condition on the part of his crucifiers, why this condition can be nothing else but faith and repentance; and then I demand, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance or no? If you answer, that he did not pray for the Faith and Repentance of all and everyone of them, then say I, neither did he pray for their pardon; for he that truly and sincerely prayeth for anything, prayeth also by just & undeniable consequence for all the necessary antecedents and consequents, causes and means, fruits and effects thereof: If you hold, that he prayed for the faith and repentance of all and everyone of his crucifiers, then the argument may be renewed as in the beginning; for I ask you again, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely, then all and everyone of them did believe and repent, which the Remonstrants themselves deny: if conditionally, then this condition is either on God's part, or else on the part of the crucifiers of Christ; if upon condition on the part of God, it can be nothing but this, if he will or please, and then all of them should believe and repent, for (as Arminians gloss that text 1 Tim. 2. 4) God will have not only all sorts and kinds of men, but also all and every individual man to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: if it be a condition on the part of those who crucified him, then pray do you assign that condition, and either I shall drive you upon the same rock of absurdity, upon which Doctor Twisse forceth Corvinus, to wit, that Christ prayed for his Crucifiers, that they should believe and repent, upon condition that they do believe and repent; or else I shall renew the argument, so as that a progress from one condition to another, and that without end, shall be unavoidable.
Lastly, that he prayed only for those of his crucifiers, who belonged to the election of grace, is evident from what hath been already said out of D. Twisse upon John. 17. 9. For thence I have infer'd, that he prayed only for his elect as Mediator, that Chapter being the platform of Christ's intercession, as mediator for his Church: and you affirm it to be improbable, that Christ prayed under the notion and capacity of a private man, for any for whom he did not pray as Mediator.
But now in the last place, let us hear how you expound this prayer of Christ.
Mr GOODWIN.
BVT the intent of Christ's prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sins should be forgiven them, much less, that simply and absolutely, that is, without any intervening of faith and repentance, they should be forgiven; (which had been to pray for that which is expressly contrary to the revealed will of God) but that that particular sin of their crucifying him should be forgiven them, i. e. should not be imputed unto them by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent.
IEANES
FIrst, I say of this your comment, as you did of D. Twisse his notion upon the place, this is said but not proved, Nor indeed probable, because
First, Scripture is a stranger to this acception of remission.
Secondly, 'tis very irrational to take remission in this sense, which by your Doctrine may be consistent with its contrary: to wit condemnation. Though this particular sin of their crucifying him, were not imputed to them by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent. yet according unto what you teach of grace, and ascribe unto the power of man's will, they might notwithstanding all this not believe and repent, but resist the grace of God, and die in final unbelief and impenitency, even for this sin, and so consequently be condemned for it. Christ's prayer might be granted, this particular sin of their crucifying Christ might be forgiven unto them, and yet they might be everlastingly damned for it, and their other sins. How you can reconcile these things passeth my understanding, but I shall not be unwilling to learn.
Lastly, you seem to intimate, that some sins are so foul, as that they are of themselves a bar to repentance, for the desert of which God doth sometimes deny men either time for, or the grace of repentance.
And hereby you entrench upon the freeness of God's grace in man's effectual vocation, which is the free gift of God, and therefore dispensed, not according to men's preceding carriages good or bad, but merely according to the good pleasure of his will: but this argument I shall spare farther to prosecute, and refer you to our Doctor, who hath abundantly labored herein, as in other places, so especially in his examination of M r Cotton his Treatise of Predestination, a pag. 190. usque ad 204. and again, p. 234, 235. &c. usque ad 246.
As for that which followeth, as also that which is in the beginning of this Section, the examination of it is beside my present design, which is to vindicate Doctor Twisse from what you object against him.
Yet if the Reader desire satisfaction thereabouts, he may meet with it in Doctor Ames his Coronis ad Coll. Hag. Art. 5. c. 5. Whither I shall in this hast refer him.
And thus have I done with the defense of Doctor Twisse against your opposition of him: when I consider your fluent Wit, and ready Pen, I may expect from you a very speedy reply, Which may be, as sharp, so specious and Rhetorical enough. I shall desire this favor of the judicious Reader, that he would suspend his censure until he hath my rejoinder, which I shall not defer long, if God grant me his assistance.