The Riches of Gods Love
Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviseth us to revise the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to God's eternal decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigor of some men's opinions thereabouts. For whereas some have subordinated God's decree of permitting sin, to the decree of damnation, I have taken another course, and do maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting final perseverance in sin. Again, I presume this Gentleman's meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching God's eternal decrees. I willingly profess, I desire no better trial of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17 th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, set forth in the days of King James Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth bestow faith and repentance on some, thereby to cure that natural infidelity and hardness of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his mere pleasure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding some moral difference or preparation in one more then in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he shall acknowledge, that God doth show his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his mere pleasure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to profess, that let him state God's eternal decrees after what manner he will, I shall willingly subscribe thereunto; provided it be suitable unto the former ground: and as for the unsuitable nature thereof, if in case it so fall out, let the proof and evident demonstration thereof, lie on me. But if his opinion be, that God bestows faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by some moral preparation, which he finds in one, rather then in another, I appeal to the Lutherans themselves, whether this be not in plain terms no better then Pelagianism.
As for his calling their opinions in this point, speculative opinions (as this Author would have us observe) I am willing to observe it: and withal I think, he doth it with better judgment, then this Author doth in calling them practical.
And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into these opinions of theirs, in opposition to Popish Doctrine, This is so out of season in these days (notwithstanding the raw judgment of this Author) that our Arminians spare not to profess (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have learned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papists. And Grevincovius, against Ames, spares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit follow the Jesuits, then We the Dominicans, considering that the Dominicans are the great Administrators of the Inquisition in Spain. This is delivered as touching the point of grace and Free-will: but as touching the point of election and reprobation absolute, I can show under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no material difference between the Dominicans, and most part of the Jesuits; so little difference there is between the Gratia Praedeterminans of the one, and the Gratia Congrua of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we scandalize the judicious and learned Papists; and what those other Churches are which we scandalize, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Author knows not, or is well content to dissemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socinians and Anabaptists. And how do we more scandalize the Churches Lutheran herein, then they scandalize us? Was it ever known, that by mere differing in Opinion from other Churches, Christian men were said to scandalize them? Or if it were so, must not the scandal in this case, be equal on both sides?
As for the leaving many of our own very ill satisfied, why should that seem strange? What doth Carryer write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the same mind with himself, some Papists, some Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongst the Lutherans, as ill satisfied with the doctrine commonly received amongst them, save that they are far more forward, to excommunicate all such, as soon as they appear, then We? Besides all this, The point of scandal is brought in very unseasonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and profess, if any are scandalized by it, it is a scandal taken, not given: God forbid we should grow so profane, as to account it a scandalous thing to make profession of God's truth; especially this truth we maintain being so near to a clear opposition to Pelagianism, a Heresy condemned by the Church above 1200 years ago.
When Frederick Duke of Woortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The answer of refusal was made by Jacobus Andreas a most bitter enemy, and one whom Beza describes, tanquam virum sanguinarium, and his carriage throughout was most imperious. And it becomes an Arminian spirit well, to make the rancor of his malicious heart, a rule wherebyto cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a far better grace might a Papist cry down our faith, opposite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Popes abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit of hell. For surely it is fit he should be of far more authority then Jacobus Andreas; not to speak of the Anathematization of it in the Council of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papists, in that they deny that we can be saved, many amongst us are of opinion, that a Papist can be saved, therefore better to be a Papist then a Protestant; yet surely it is in the power of our corruption to requite malice with malice, and as much to scorn with our heels their Brotherhood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we do not give ourselves leave to requite their malice, if that be no scandal to themselves, there is no cause why it should be any scandal unto us. In Sir Edwin Sands about Fol. 59. there is such a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker sides in those parts both of Palsgrave and Landsgrave, have with great wisdom and judgment (to aslack those flames) imposed silence on that point, to the Ministers of the one Party, hoping that the charity and discretion of the other sort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwise, that Lutheran Preachers rage hitherto in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that seeing there was so little charity and discretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Conclusions, to show as little charity and discretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they fashion to themselves, will bear them out in this, it being merely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to say in answer hereunto.
The phrase in Osiander is not, errorum teterrimorum, but haerescωn teterrimarum, of which this Author saith, they reckoned this for one. And let him speak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denial of Consubstantiation another? As also the denial of the lawfulness of that Baptism, which was administered by Woemen; (the practice whereof King James reformed in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As also their not concurrence with them in opinion about the Person of Christ, which by their Ubiquitary Chimaera (as Sir Edwin Sands call it) they do miserably deform. These and other such like were the errors, whereof this Author saith, Beza and his Fellowes were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for so I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby sentence tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predestination alone, but de Caenâ Domini, de Personâ Christi, de Imaginibus, de Baptismo, and last of all de Praedestinatione.
Yet I have not done with this. For I beseech you consider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miserably deceived in all this, and that these teterrimae Heresies are not such as Jacobus Andreas with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of Beza and his Brethren, but rather such as Beza and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lutherans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, in Scriptis, so goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; Jacobus Andreas not enduring to give way to Beza's motion as touching the consigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the relation in Osiander runs thus; Ad haec D. Jacobus respondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Bezae & ipsius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternitatis praebeant non ignor are illos quàm horribilium errorum & teterrimarum haereseω • in suis Scriptis coram Fcclesiâ ipsos reos egerint; Ideo{que} se mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut corum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Heresies ab Orco revocent ut Ecclesiae Dei obtendant. Now these words though at first sight they may seem to be referred, either to the Woortenbergers as accusing Beza and his Brethren, of such errors and heresies; yet the words following, Ideo{que} se mirari quamodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Heresies ex Orco revocent: these words I say do far more incline to signify, that Beza and his Brethren, laid these horrible errors and heresies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans wondered, how they could desire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted such horrible Heretics; rather then the Lutheran party, should wonder how they should affect Brotherhood with Beza, seeing they neither did affect any such, and if they had it was not fit they should wonder at their own actions. But that which follows puts it out of all question; where comes in manifestly, what the Lutheran Party conceived of the Doctrine of Beza implying thereby, what Beza and his Fellows conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expressed; the words following are these, Contrà vero in quibus & quàm tetris erroribus ipsi versentur (that is Beza and his company) hac Collatione iis demonstratum esse: In quibus cum adhuc perseverent ipsos intelligere quod eos pro fratribus agnoscere non possint. In which words Andreas gives the reason why he and his Fellowes cannot acknowledge Beza and his fellows for brethren, because they maintained, tetros errores (as he calls them;) for proof whereof he appeals to the present Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very first word, Contra vero, it followeth, that in the former part was set down, the reason why Beza and his fellows, should not desire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, because they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained horrible errors and most pestilent Heresies, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this present Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearly the meaning of Andreas, it is apparent, that the charge laid by Beza and his fellows, upon the Lutherans, was of fouler crimes, by Andreas his relation, then was the charge laid by Andreas upon Beza and his Brethren. For Andreas charged Beza only with, errores tetros; but Beza and his are said to have charged the Lutherans with horribiles errores, & heresies teterrimas. So that this Author doth miserably mistake his own evidences, and shamefully abuseth himself first, and others after him, if they will be abused by him. And whether he hath not taken it from some Achates of his upon trust I know not; and if it be so that some Achates hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved Fidus Achates in this.
In the close, it will not be amiss to show, how M r Mason of S t Andrew's Vndershaft in London, allegeth this carriage of Jacobus Andreas, as a testimony of the Lutheran uncharitableness, in comparison with the charitable condition of their opposites, in a small Treatise of Contentment in God's gifts. pag. 19. And shall their uncharitableness plead for the truth of their way, or be any just argument, of the untruth of our way, in any sober and wise man's judgment.
Of Hemingius his leaving his own side, I never heard or read before, unless that of a Papist he became a Protestant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and these are called by the other Semi-Calviniani. And what I pray hath Hemingius deserved, that his authority should be greater then the authority of Zwingli, Calvin, Junius; Zanchius, Piscator. The Lutherans themselves (I suppose) will hardly think him worthy to be remembered the same day with Martin Luther. And as for Martin Luther's doctrine herein, to my judgment, he is far more express and resolute then Calvin, and I find that Beza in his Conference of Mompelgard, doth sometimes twit his opposites with Luther's Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I do not find they answer anything at all.
When he saith, It is a Morsell, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; What a wild course doth he take in these his Motives. Must we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the most part of Christian Churches do embrace it yea or no? Why should we not then run out in this our search, and inquire, what is the Moscoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Ethiopian, and Abyssine, and so proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preached unto our people also, to their more profound, and substantial edification, if they list to believe us upon our word. But I suppose he looked no farther then to this Western World, secluding the new discoveries within the last hundred years or somewhat more. And very confidently he must exclude all Popish Churches, or presume they are for him in this. Yet as I said, the very last Arminian, I have had to deal with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papists; and another to this purpose, there is no material difference between the Gratia Congrua of the Jesuits, and Cratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans. And secluding Popish Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greatest part of the Christian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Party, then the Churches of the Calvinists (which is more then I find in Sir Edwin Sands his Relation.) Now suppose the number of the Calvinists and their power were greater then that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reasonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turn Calvinist? If it be of no weight to persuade them, why should it be of any moment to prevail with us?
I come now to the Fourth and last of these Motives.
DISCOURSE. The Fourth Motive. Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errors of the Stoics and Manichees.
THe Opinion of the Stoics was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determined, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Stars, which reign at men's births, or by the Concatenation of natural things, and the disposition of the first matters of all things, being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another as it doth, and the Materia Prima being so disposed, that all things cannot successively come to pass otherwise then they do, but must of necessity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they be.
The Manichees held, that all men's actions, good or evil, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evil actions by an Evil God, who was the primum principium malt, the first and principal author of all evil things that were extant in the world.
The Maintainers of the absolute decree, do say one of these two things; either that all actions natural and moral, good and evil, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary, or that all men's ends (at least) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, since, Omnis actio est propter finem, All actions are done for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.
Now in these three Opinions, we may note two things.
1. The substance and formality of them, which is an unavoidablenesse of men's actions and ends whatsoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and insuperable necessity do domineer. And therefore Melancthon doth not slack in many of his common Places, to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labor to bring in the Stoics errors, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melanchthon's to Peucer, where he speaks thus, Scribit ad me Laetius de Stoico Fato us{que} adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Misera Tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur. And Beza too speaking of Melancthon says, Philippus de his rebus itascribere caeperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur.
2. The Circumstances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoics derive this necessity from the Stars or first matter, the Manichees from duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna, and these last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, so that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Stoics and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive the necessity of evil actions, or unhappy events from an evil God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidental to their error.
If it be so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute reprobation be suspected, because these dreams of the Stoics were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cried down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Commonwealth, not so much for anything circumstantial in it, but because it made all things and events necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.
These are my Reasons of the first sort.
OUR Doctrine I see is cried down, not only as infamous, but also as Stoicall, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet observes to fall out sometimes, namely, that,
It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr Bastard sometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbor that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Bastard as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his fight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this point be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoicall, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charge, which was not laid to the charge of Austin, many hundred years ago. This Prosper testifies after Austin's death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunas{que} repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni • ùs submovere & sub gratiae nomine necessitatem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers passages; as Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra •• ae ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in • piraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere. This is the objection; His Answer followeth in these words. Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quis{que} vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei vero gratia non solùm omnia sydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona vero per indebitam gratiam misericordi voluntate largitur: utrum{que} faciens non per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altum{que} consilium. Neutrum ergo pertinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. I am de Gratia & Fato quàm inani alloquuntur ostendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like sort, the Pelagians charged Austin with Manicheisme, De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he answereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, at{que} ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo instituta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.
2. Manichaei carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed natural sit, bonum insuper laudant. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utr • {que} permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem praedicare.
3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & istis dicens, si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis.
4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam justam non quidem particulam, sed creaturam Dei, etiam in istâ corruptibili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, si dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, nosmetipsos seducimus. His morbis inter se contrariis Manichaei Pelagiani{que} confligunt dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, seperati opinione diversâ, sed propinqui mente perversâ. I am vero gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, Baptismum ejus simul evacuant, Carnem ejus simul inhonorant, sed etiam hoc modis causis{que} diversis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus suorum. Utris{que} ergo merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum.
But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.
1. As touching the opinion of the Stoics and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the point of Predestination.
1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the stars, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a show of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jews. Deutr. 4.) no marvel if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligent, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I do not find that the Stoics did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes caelestiall or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference between Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoics, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syderibus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutione & affectione, non tamen idcirco in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoics, Fatum was God himself and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificial and natural Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shows, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriem{que} causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Possidonius (saith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset. And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the stars, for the confirmation of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem error cumulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certe non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum posuisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the four opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of causes necessary knit together, the Third the Stars, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoics, yea with all the Stoics in the judgment of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expressly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoics, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to pass in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentem{que} caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as we call Angels. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistor posse. Quae vero ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labor queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae vero certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni.
That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evil: and that every creature was a substantial part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essential from the supreme Author of evil, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evil, I nowhere read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shameful errors of theirs which he reckons up. The 19 th is this, Voluntatem male agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholics made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shown from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachful comparison which he makes.
2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now address myself. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.
The First whereof is this; That all actions natural and Moral, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.
Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but School Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Son by the Father, and the wonderful Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burn; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sun, Moon, and stars to give light; and the heavens to turn round; all natural Agents in a word distinct from rational are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superior powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes pass that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restrain their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to pass most necessarily, do indeed come to pass merely contingently, in respect of the will of God.
Nevertheless we willingly profess, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to pass; like as upon supposition, that God knows such a thing shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to pass by natural agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to pass, by rational agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schools about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to pass necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents natural for the produceing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rational for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josiah should burn the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jews, to return into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josiah and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christ's bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jews, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbors should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Soldiers did non as freely abstain from breaking Christ's bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstain, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to pass, which yet came to pass as contingently and freely, as ought else. And unless this be granted, that God's determination is nothing prejudicial to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us everything that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God works in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsel of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himself.
Now I come to the second.
2. And that is this. That all men's ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.
1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirm, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of men's wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a days confess) it consequently follows that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsel of God. What should I allege the 11 th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheistical difference between us on one part, but I do not find them willing to show their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporal (not eternal) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheistical belief. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open face profess, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supreme ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them profess, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they profess, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these? If they dare not say, God's will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of God's decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of God's decrees, but of man's ends. And I willingly confess there is not. And I am persuaded, this Author dares not in plain terms profess, that God's decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how men's carnal affections, which are more in love with error then truth, do make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that God's decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devil finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to hear of an alterable condition of God's decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of men's ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appear how the Devil gulls us in this.
Men's ends are either so called, as intended by man himself, or as appointed by God. If this Author speak of men's ends, as intended by man himself, we willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing today, he may intend another thing tomorrow, he intends one thing this hour, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvel, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moon; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an hour may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.
But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of God's purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of God's decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhors to say God's decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-door, yet as it were by a back-door to receive it in, and in the dark and mufled, or veiled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that God's decrees concerning men's ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labor to attain, everyone naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happiness. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guess to be, his final perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this man's salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that God's decrees are as merely temporal as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him someone that breaths the same spirit of opposition to God's truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never binds his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes? especially considering that God hath more wisdom and goodness to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodness is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madness is it to say, that the less power God hath of receiving change, the less power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any man's salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawful authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17 th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this form, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, do say, that God he did not in the time long ago past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.
2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shameful an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of God's decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vain, saith he, is freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedom in actions. For by freedom we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unless God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unless these determinations of his be alterable, Freedom of Will is given in vain; as much as to say, unless we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedom of man's Will is in vain. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rational; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedom of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of God's vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedom of Will in them, who after either way are made useless on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he adds saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concerns the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concerns the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himself, are either supreme or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himself intends. The supreme end of everyone is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all do not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honor, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto ourselves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadful punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good ways of the Lord, and to move us to make strait steps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must go on, in conforming ourselves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aims at, yet can I not believe that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a man's end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not.
3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.
1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidablenesse of men's actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity do domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of God's absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all men's actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that men's ends were unavoidable; which is to infer, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both men's actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of man's actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoics, I nowhere find, that they denied the liberty of men's will, or that it was in man's power, either to forbear the doing of that he doth, or to do the things he forbears to do; but rather the contrary, that they made choice, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentiful manner. Much less do I find by them, that anything came to pass, invito Deo. Though I willingly confess, that such a generation hath risen up in these days, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to pass, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly profess I know not.
But Melancthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with laboring to bring in the Stoics errors, as appears by Melanchthon's Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer.
1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of God's decrees.
2. Beza reports what Melancthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind merely upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato us{que} adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a •• one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Melancthon, whereupon Melancthon saith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.
3. Melancthon died four years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did pass any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in Calvin's days, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon so well known and esteemed by Calvin, that more then once he appeals to Melanchthon's judgment. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Osiander, Hist. Eccles. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the point of Free-will and Predestination, as appears by Calvin's Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he sent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon passeth any censure upon them?
4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, see I pray how Lubbertus answereth him, In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras si ipsam stare pro Remonstrantibus existimas, &c. Idem Melancthon in 9. ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civiliter vivebant quàm nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo opera non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc meminerit Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere, Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (saith Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedestinatione sensisle. Fatetur hoc ipse Melancthon ad Calvinum; suo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmum: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to show, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Predestination. Calvinus, saith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, at{que} inde infert illos perire non posse. Melancthon vero a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quod sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & serio resipisco, ergo sum electus: at{que} ita in ipsâ re consentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.
5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of Melanchthon's unto Calvin, I could not rest satisfied until I had seen the Epistle it self: at length I found it amongst Calvin's, Epist. 49. Therein coming to the point, Ad Quaestionem (saith he) de praedestinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere solebat, se utrum{que} probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se haec conciliare non posse. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melanchthon's also: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give Calvin to understand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of God's providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of God's providence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of God's predestination with the liberty of man's will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he saith, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo (saith Alvarez) doctissime & pi • ssime loquitur. Melancthon goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, saith he, cùm Hypothesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, posteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultro ruere & eundem sentio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actionem. All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately then this, He denies it not: Haec etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur. In the same manner he goes on, Accusemus ipsi nostram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quaeramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (inquit Basilius) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so expressly professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epist. 4. Ab ipso (Deo) est initium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the African Bishops prevail in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodical Epistle write thus (as it is alleged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat sed ipsam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I do not write these things (saith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most expert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things do agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere sed sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , woven with a thicker thread, & ad usum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books sent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predestination.
5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main point, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particulars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of Calvin's, and the words are these. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaestionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sententiae nostrae congruerent. Tametsi enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re tamen ipsâ optime inter nos convenit.
The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoics deriving their necessity from the Stars or first matter; The Manichees from the two supreme causes; And the Authors of the third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoics and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evil actions, or unhappy events, from an evil God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidental to the error.
To this I answer.
1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evil God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evil in the way of punishment? Is there any evil in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it less become him to be the author of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner profess, that he delights in the execution of judgment, as well as of mercy?
2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evil actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turn in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of God's decree, either to work in us anything, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expressly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evil, we willingly profess, that as well upon this, as upon God's foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to pass; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain terms professeth in the point of evil, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evil; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evil comes to pass, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evil actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himself.
1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sin will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdom, hath such store of moral impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sin if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certo & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sin, and impediment effectual. Effectual is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sin will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sin will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choice to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectual, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectual. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is God's will, that sin shall come to pass by his permission? Like as the Scripture is express to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which God's hand, and his counsel, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no less then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Son of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to do his will, and to give their Kingdoms to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regal power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.
2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to pass. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them pass out of the condition of things merely possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things merely possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have existence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confess, that secluding the divine will, God's knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concur with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhor. Nothing remains to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futurition of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confess in express terms, that God's will is the cause thereof: But if they say the divine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it follows, that all things good and evil come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheistical opinions, that these Arminians do improvidently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their wits to overthrow God's providence, as it is carried in the 11 th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.
In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is mere wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the roots of virtue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more virtuous then the Stoics; and how was Zeno himself honored by the Athenians, for his grave and virtuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Jerome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I nowhere find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supreme God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to do this, or that, if he doth anything; or at least, to make God himself a necessary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedom, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of God's working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo • ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio.
And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteems convincing.
THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK, Wherein are Examined those Arguments against the Absoluteness of DIVINE REPROBATION, WHICH M r HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE.
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the University. M. D. C. LIII.
The Second Part of this Discourse, consisting of ARGUMENTS CONVINCING, whereof there are Five sorts.
The First sort of Convincing Reasons Drawn from Scripture.
DISCOURSE.
SECT. I.
T HOSE of the Second sort, by which for the present I stand convinced, that absolute reprobation is no part of God's truth, are drawn from these five following heads,
- 1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it.
- 2. Some principal attributes of God not compatible with it.
- 3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
- 4. Holy and pious endeavors much hindered by it, if not wholly subversed.
- 5. The grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it.
It it contrary to pregnant places of Scripture, even in terminis, as will appear by these instances.
1. Ezech. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but that the wicked turn from his ways and live. And least men should say 'tis true, God wills not the death of a repenting sinner, the Lord doth in another place of the same Prophet, extend the proposition to them also that perish, Ezech. 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. In this Scripture we may note three things.
1. God's affection to men set forth
- 1. Negatively, I have no pleasure in his death that dieth.
- 2. Affirmatively, But that the wicked turn.
2. The persons in whose destruction he delighteth not, wicked men, such as for the rejecting of grace die and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much less in the death of men, either altogether innocent, or tainted only with original sin.
3. The truth of this affection, as I live; cupit sihi credi (saith Tertullian, Lib. de paenit. cap. 4.) God would fain have us to believe him, when he saith I will not the death of him that dieth, and therefore he binds his speech with an oath: O beatos nos quorum causa Deus jurat, O miserrimos si nec juranti Domino credimus. Happy are we for whose sakes the Lord vouchsafeth to swear, but most unhappy if we believe him not when he swears. Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation: for such a kind of decreeing men to everlasting death, is quite opposite to a delight in men's eternal life.
TWISSE Consideration.
TO say that this or that opinion is untrue, because it doth in terminis contradict places of Scripture, is a very superficiary consideration: yet it is not the first time that I have found it to drop from an Arminians pen: But that it is a very superficiary consideration, I prove thus; For to deny God the Son to be equal to the Father, is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, Phil. 2. Where it is expressly said of God the Son, that he thought it no robbery to be equal to the Father: yet notwithstanding it is agreeable to that of our Savior, where he saith, the Father is greater then I; and so vice versâ. In like manner to say that God cannot repent, is in terminis to contradict pregnant places of Scripture: again to say that God can repent, is in terminis to contradict other as pregnant places of Scripture; yet neither of these is unsound; because each phrase is agreeable to Scripture in some place or other. And the reason hereof is, because in terminis only to contradict the Scripture, is not to contradict the Scripture; But when we contradict the meaning of Scripture, then and not till then, are we justly said to contradict the Scripture; And the reason hereof is, because the word of God consists not in the outward bark or bone of the letter, but in the inward pith and marrow of the meaning. And as for contradiction unto Scripture in terminis, it may easily be proved, that to deny God's delight in the destruction of obstinate sinners, is to contradict a very pregnant place of Holy Scripture, as namely Prov. 1. 24, 25, 26. Because I have called and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I will also laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction as a Whirlewind. And yet never a whit the more, is any contradiction found in Scripture for this: because though they contradict each the other in terminis, yet there is no contradiction if we consider the true meaning: As for example, it is both true that the Father is greater then the Son, as touching the Sons Manhood; And the Son equal to the Father as touching his Godhead. So of repentance, it cannot be attributed to God as it signifies change of mind or counsel; but it may be attributed unto God, as it signifies change of sentence; according to that of Gregory, Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. So as touching God's pleasure or delight in the death of a sinner, as it is the destruction of the creature he delighteth not in it; but as it is a just punishment of the impenitent creature, he delights therein: Thus Piscator reconciles it, on Ezech. 18. v. 23, & 32. Surely God delights in the execution of justice, as well as in the execution of mercy, as Jer. 9. 24. I am the Lord which exerciseth loving kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth, for in these things I delight saith the Lord.
2. Here first, the Author declines from the former phrase, of having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, to not willing the death of a sinner; which phrases have no small difference, as Piscator observes upon that in Ezech. 33. 11. for saith he, potest homo velle id quo non delectatur, ut aegrotus potest velle potum amarum, quo non delectatur, potest enim eum velle non perse, sed propter aliud, nempe ad recuper andam valetudinem. And to deny that God willeth the death of as many as die, is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, as where it is said, that God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will, Ephes. 1. 11. And therefore seeing the inflicting of death is God's work he must will it: But this Author is more happy for invention then his fellows: For whereas others of his opinion, work upon the place as it is rendered in the vulgar Latin, Nolo mortem peccatoris: this Author hath found out an argument from the very phrase of our last English translation, to advantage his cause, as when from God's having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, he quaintly infers, therefore God doth not of mere pleasure, will or decree their death; But how superficiary this is also, and how foully it falls in the issue, upon the Author himself (as usually it falleth out with men, that affect new and quaint inventions) I hope to discover in due place.
Farther observe; that place, Ezech. 33. 11. I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, according to our last English translation, and that, Ezech. 18. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, do differently render one and the same phrase in the Hebrew, in the death of the wicked, Ezech. 33. 11. which is word for word according to the Hebrew; that the wicked should die Ezech. 18. 23. which being not according to the precise terms of the original, it followeth that hereby, our Translators did expound the sense of the Hebrew, which is word for word, in the death of the wicked, and so accordingly, that phrase, Ezek. 18. 32. in the death of him that dieth, importeth as much as this, that he who dieth should die.
And as for Tertullian, that which he allegeth out of him, neither makes for him nor against us: we all believe what the Prophet delivereth; but we inquire about the sense of it; But in the same place Tertullian interprets the place not absolutely but comparatively, thus, Vivo inquit Dominus, & paenitentiam malo quam mortem, and indeed thus it is accommodated more then once in the Book of Common prayer, as first in the general absolution; then, in one of the Collects upon Good-Friday: There is a double pleasure, that God may be said to take in the one, but a single pleasure only in the other. For in the death of an impenitent sinner, God delights only in the execution of justice: but in the conversion of such a one that he may live, God delights both in the execution of mercy, which is equivalent to his delight taken in the execution of judgment, and over and above he delights in their repentance; For like as of such as fall from God, it is said, His soul hath no pleasure in them: so of such as turn unto him, it is as true, that his soul hath pleasure in them.
3. But give we him leave to enjoy the interpretation he affecteth, yet consider I pray, whether he doth not enjoy it tanquam Diis iratis, and to his bane: for mark I pray his argument, and consider whether I do not from the same argument, most strongly conclude against him.
1. His argument runs thus, If God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure, take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation. Now from the rule of contraries, I herehence dispute thus; If this be a good consequence which he makes, then on the contrary it follows, that seeing God doth take pleasure and delight in man's eternal life (as this Author expressly acknowledgeth) therefore he did out of his own pleasure, take so many million of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible salvation. Now this conclusion is as directly opposite unto him in the point of election, as his conclusion is opposire to ours in the point of reprobation. And my argument must be of the same force and validity with his; because Contrariorum contraria est ratio. Yet I will not content myself with this answer.
2. Therefore consider I pray in the next place, the true meaning of this phrase I have no pleasure: in these places of the Prophet, the Author himself though he doth not plainly profess what is the meaning of it, as it became him to do, and not to depend upon color of words suitable; yet by his drift he manifests the meaning of it to be this, that God doth not bring death upon a sinner, of mere pleasure, but being provoked thereunto, (and that according to the purport of the first place Ezech. 18.) by the sinner himself; and also, (according to the purport of the second place) only in case of impenitency. And I concur with him in this: And so I conceive it to be delivered in the same sense with that Lament. 3. 32, 33. For though he cause grief (to wit by reason of men's sins v. 39.) yet will he have compassion according to the multitude of his mercies, (to wit, in case he repents Ier. 18. 7. Judge. 10. 16.) For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Mark I pray, not willingly; to wit, in as much as he is provoked thereunto by sin, and by refusal to repent. And this is in the former Scripture phrases, not to take pleasure in the afflicting and grieving of men. For if any work be such, as wherein pleasure is taken; we need not inquire after a cause why it is done, but though no pleasure be taken in it, yet for some benefit redounding thereby, a man may do it, yea though it be grievous and bitter unto him: As a sick man is willing to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health. Now come we to the argument: God takes no pleasure in the death of any; therefore he doth not of pleasure inflict death. We willingly grant it, in as much as he never inflicts eternal death on any, that doth not die in sin unrepented of: And as he doth not inflict death on any of mere pleasure, that is, without just cause on the part of him that dieth, deserving it: So we willingly confess, that God did never decree to inflict death on any without just cause on the Malefactors part deserving death. And this is the uttermost whereunto this Authors argument can be extended. And all our Divines unanimously confess, that God neither decreed to damn any man of his mere pleasure, but for his sin wherein he died without repentance.
3. Observe the cunning of this Disputer, to deceive himself first, and then to abuse his readers: For whereas he should have proceeded in his argument by degrees, thus; God hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, therefore he doth not of his own pleasure inflict death; and thence proceed (if he had thought good) to conclude the like of God's decree, thus; if God doth not of his ownpleasure inflict, then neither doth he of his own pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation: This author leaping over the inflicting of death, as a block in his way (for the last consequence would have betrayed its own nakedness) flieth at first to the application of it, to God's decree: Now I willingly grant, that God's having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, doth signify, that God inflicts death on no man without a cause, for that were of mere pleasure to inflict: But dares he herehence infer, therefore God doth not of mere pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation on man for sin, for to this alone comes all the force of this argument. Now to show the vanity of this consequence, consider I pray.
1. It is as if he should argue thus in plain terms; sin is always the meritorious cause of damnation; therefore sin is the meritorious cause of God's eternal decree of damnation: Now this Enthymeme hath no force any farther, then it may be reduced into a Categoricall Syllogism; and this Enthymeme is reducible into no other Syllogism then this; Damnation is the decree of Damnation, sin is the cause of Damnation, therefore sin is the cause of the decree of damnation. But in this Syllogism the proposition contains a notorious untruth: Or thus, Sin is the cause of damnation; therefore the foresight of sin is the cause of the decree of damnation: But this Enthymeme is not reducible unto any categoricall Syllogism at all, for as much as it consists of four terms; all which must be clapt into the Syllogism whereunto it is reduced, and consequently make that Syllogism consist of four terms, which utterly overthrows the illative form thereof.
2. We may as well dispute thus; Good works as well as faith and repentance are the disposing cause unto salvation, therefore good works as well as faith and repentance (or the foresight of them) are the disposing cause to God's election, or to the decree of salvation.
But shall I tell you, the chief flourish whereupon this Author (and usually the Arminians) doth insist in this his loose argumentation, I conceive it to be this; they hope their credulous readers, unexpert in distinguishing between God's eternal decree, and the temporal execution thereof, will be apt hereupon to conceit, that we maintain, that God doth not only of mere pleasure decree whatsoever he decreeth, but also that he doth decree of mere pleasure to damn men: which yet is utterly contrary (if I be not deceived) to the tenet of all our Divines: all concurring in this, that God in the execution of the decree of damnation, proceeds according to a Law, and not in the execution of reprobation only, but also in the execution of election. And the law is this, Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned, And like as he inflicteth not damnation, but by way of punishment, so he confers not salvation but by way of reward. But in the execution of his decrees of election unto grace, and reprobation from grace; we willingly profess that God proceeds according to no law given unto men, to prepare themselves hereunto, but merely according to his good pleasure, having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will: And this indeed is the critical point of this controversy: But neither this Author nor his complices (some of them of my knowledge) have any heart to deal on this. I come to his Second pregnant place as he calleth it.
DISCOURSE. SECT. II.
GOD hath shut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. Rom. 11. 32. in these words of the Apostle are two [alls] of equal extent; the one standing just against the other; an [all] of unbelievers, and an [all] of objects of mercy; look how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of showing mercy. And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy, And if every man be under mercy, then there is no antecedent precise will in God of shutting up some (and those the most) from all possibility of obtaining mercy; for these two are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 they cannot stand together.
TWISSE Consideration.
I Willingly grant the word [all] in each place is of equal extent, but how? in the Apostles meaning in this place; that is, look in what sense the Apostle takes the word [all] when he saith God hath concluded all under unbelief: in the same sense he takes the word [all] when he saith, that he might have mercy upon all. And accordingly in case when he saith the one he meaneth by the word [all] no more but Jews & Gentiles: it follows that when he saith God hath mercy on all, by the word [all] he understands no more then both Jews and Gentile, and that is, certain nations of men only, not all men of all sorts and conditions; And therefore although it were granted him, that all men of all sorts are unbelievers, yet unless he can prove, that in this sense the Apostle speaketh of [all] in saying God hath concluded all under infidelity, let any one that is indifferent, judge whether this argument be of any force. Thus our Divines understand it, to wit, of Jews and Gentiles: Thus Aquinas and Sasbutius Popish Divines interpret it. Aquinas his words are these, omnia, id est, omne hominum genus, tam Judaeos quam Gentes in incredulitate conclusit, ut omnium misereatur, id est, ut in omni hominum genere misericordia locum habeat; And again; non est extendendum ad omnes homines sigillatim, sed ad omnia genera hominum: Fit enim hic distributio pro generibus singulorum, & non pro singulis generum. So Cajetan. Conclusit permissive omnes tam Judaeos quam Gentes in peccatum infidelitatis. The Text it self doth clearly justify this, as appears by the two verses immediately preceding, wherewith this coheres. v. 30. For even as the Gentiles in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy, through (the Jews) unbelief. 31. Even so now have they (the Jews) not believed, by the mercy shown to you Gentiles, that they also, that is, the Jews, may obtain mercy. This construction was embraced of old by Austin, as appears by Beda upon the Romans, alleging August. de Civit. Dei lib. 21. Conclusit Deus omnes in infidelitate ut omnium misereatur. Quos omnes? nisi de quibus loquebatur, tanquam dicens & vos & illos. Deus ergo & Gentiles & Judaeos, quos praescivit & praedestinavit conforms fieri imagini filii sui, omnes in infidelitate conclusit, & de amaritudine infidelitatis suae paenitendo confusi, & ad dulcedinem misericordiae Dei credendo conversi clamaret &c. And anon after, Omnium ita{que} miseretur vasorum misericordiae: Quid est omnium? & eorum scilicet quos ex Gentibus, & eorum quos ex Judae is praedestinavit.
2. Observe how he hides himself under an ambiguous phrase, least he should come with his foul opinion to the light: As when he saith every man of every condition is under mercy. The Apostles phrase on God's part is misereri, to show mercy; on man's part as partaking hereof is to obtain mercy. v. 30. 31. and to obtain mercy is to believe. v. 30. as appears by the opposition: for to obtain mercy and not to believe, are there made opposite, therefore to obtain mercy and to believe are the same: For to believe and not to believe are formally opposite. Now dares this Author avouch, that every man of every condition doth believe? Again the Apostles word ut misereatur, that he may show mercy, is not spoken of the time present; for as much as for the time present, the Lord had mercy only on the Nations of the Gentiles: But the time should come, that God would also have mercy on the Jews, and consequently on all. But when should this come to pass? Surely not 'till 1600 years after, to wit, when the time cometh which is appointed for the effectual and general calling of the Nation of the Jews.
So that the foundation being most rotten, no marvel if the edifice he builds hereupon must needs totter. For the Jews were thus to be shut up under infidelity, for many hundred years, to wit, until the time came which the Apostle prophesieth of. And so were the Gentiles also before them, 'till the time came of their calling. And thus Sasbutius interpreteth the Apostle in this very place. Sensus est (saith he) sic visum est Deo dispensare utrius{que} populi salutem, Iudaeorum videlicet & Gentium; ut permitteret utrum{que} populum suo vitio concludi, sive constringi, sub incredulitate & damnatione. Concludi, inquam, ne ullâ ration poscit ex incredulitate suâ vinculo se liberare, ut ipsius misericordia gratuita locum habere agnoscatur in utro{que} populo tam Iudaeorum quam Gentium. Thus we see that both his [alls] are not worth a Bodkin; and to give him two [alls] more to increase his store, we may justly say that all this is nothing at all to the purpose.
DISCOURSE. SECT. III.
John 3. 16. God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever &c. God loved the World, that is, the whole lump of Man-kind, therefore God did not absolutely hate the greatest part of Man-kind. God loved it fallen into a guilt of sin and misery, for he so loved them, as to send his Son to redeem them; and a Savior presupposeth sin. He did not therefore hate the most of them considered in the fall, for love and hatred are contrary acts, and cannot be exercised about the same Object. Many expositors (I know) do take World here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the World of believers only, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for, 1. I think there can be no place of Scripture alleged wherein this word World especially with the condition of whole, as in 1 Epist. of John. 2. 2. (which is a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it) I say (I think) no place can be produced where World doth signify only the Elect, or only believers; but it signifies either all men, or at least, the most men, living in some certain place, and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad: or if it be used anywhere more restrainedly, it is applied only to the wicked and Reprobate men, who are wedded in their affections to the World, and the transitory delights thereof, and therefore do most properly deserve this name.
2. Suppose it be granted that World in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect, yet it cannot bear this signification here; because,
1. The words then would have a bad and senseless construction; for thus would they run, God so loved the Elect that whosoever believed in him should not perish &c. And if they run thus, then this would follow, there are two sorts of the Elect, some that do believe, and shall be saved; others that do not believe, and shall be damned, which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinity.
2. Believers and Unbelievers, damned and saved comprehend all Man kind, for there is no man but is one of these. Now World in this place includeth believers and unbelievers, the saved and the damned, (as appears most plainly to him that considers the words;) therefore it signifieth here all Man kind without exception of any. Against this Scripture therefore fights this absolute reprobation and hatred of men.
TWISSE Consideration.
BE it the whole lump of man-kind (if that Lettuce like his lips.) I should think by World, is meant homines in mundo degentes, men at any time living in the World without any restraint: But herehence it followeth not, that God doth not absolutely hate the greatest part of man-kind; which this Author should have proved, but he doth not; therefore I will not only deny it, but disprove it. First therefore consider, this love is only secundum Quid, in reference to men's persons, namely, so far forth as in case they believe, they shall obtain everlasting life through the Son of God: But if there were no farther love of God towards man, they might be damned, yea every Mothers son for all this. Secondly, if faith it self be a gift of God, and God gives it not to all, but to some only, and those but a few; (for even of them that are called few are chosen:) and withal if God hath absolutely decreed to bestow this grace only on a few, and deny it to the greatest part of the World, will it not manifestly follow herehence, that if absolutely to decree the denial of faith be to hate, then surely God absolutely hates the greatest part of men, notwithstanding this love here mentioned, albeit we extend it to all and everyone. Therefore it became this Author to prove, that God is indifferent to give Faith to one as well as to another: and that either absolutely, whence it would follow, that all and everyone, should both believe and be saved; or conditionally, and therewithal represent unto us, what that condition is, whereupon God bestows faith on one, and for the want thereof, he refuseth to bestow faith on another. This is the very critical point about the controversies of God's decrees. Here therefore he should have shown his strength: For as for God's purpose to damn, we willingly profess, that as God damns no man but for sin, so he purposeth to damn no man but for sin. But as for his purpose to give or deny the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, we as readily profess, that not the purpose only, but the very giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of infidelity and hardness of heart in some, and the denying of it unto others, so to leave their natural infidelity and hardness of heart uncured, proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; And by a cloud of testimonies out of Austin we can prove, that in this very sense he understood the Apostle in that place. And indeed no other interpretation of that place, can with any modesty be devised, or obtruded upon us. As for the redeeming of all and everyone by Christ, distinguisheth that which the haters of God's truth do delight to confound. There is a redemption from the guilt of sin, and a redemption from the power of sin: For we are redeemed from our vain conversation. Christ came into the World to dissolve the works of the Devil: No greater works of Satan then blindness of heart, 2 Cor. 4. 3. and hardness of heart, Ephes. 2. 2. and 2 Tim. 2. last. The pardon of sin, and salvation, God bestows only on believers, and upon condition of faith: Now like as God is ready to bestow these benefits on all and everyone, and that for Christ's sake, in case they believe: so Christ hath merited pardon of sin and salvation for all and everyone, in case they believe. Such is the sufficiency of Christ's merit, that if everyone of Adams race should believe, everyone should be saved: and this present Text proceeds upon this, namely, upon the sufficiency of Christ's merits. But inquire farther whether Christ did not merit for us the grace of faith, and if he did, whether absolutely of conditionally; if absolutely then all must believe de facto, and be saved; if conditionally, then faith is a grace, which God bestows on man conditionally. Now let this Author show us what that condition is, upon performance whereof by man, God will give him faith, and let him try whether he can carry himself so warily herein, as not to plunge himself into plain Pelagianism. This point is a break-neck, or Crevecoeur unto all Arminians, they generally avoid the delivering of their minds clearly hereupon, as a man would avoid a precipice. It is true some Divines do interpret the word [World] here, of the Elect, as Piscator; Rolloc doth not, making no mention of the Elect hereupon. And Piscators meaning is no more then this, viz. that this love of God in respect of every gracious effect (I mean in the way of sanctifying grace) determines only upon the Elect; for in all likelihood, he followed Calvin in this, Universalem notam apposuit (saith Calvin) tum ut promiscue omnes ad vitae participationem invitet, tum ut praecidat excusationem incredulis. To the same purpose (saith he) pertains nomen mundi, quo prius usus est. And again, se toti mundo propitium ostendit, quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem vocat: But here he subjoins a caution, thus; Caeterum meminerimus ita communiter promitti omnibus vitam si in Christo crediderint, ut tamen minime communis omnium sit fides. Patet enim omnibus Christus & expositus est, solis tamen Electis oculos Deus aperit & fide ipsum quaerant. So that this gracious promise is general to all and everyone, whosoever believes shall be saved; But yet notwithstanding if it shall appear, that God gives the grace of faith, to none but to a certain number, (which are his Elect) it follows, that the effect of this love of God, to wit, Salvation shall in the issue redound to none but God's Elect.
1. As for the designing a place where the World is taken for the Elect; we need no such place, as I have shown; yet Piscator conceives that so it is taken, John 3. 17. That the World might be saved by him. But what think you of Rom. 11. 15. Where the casting away of the Jews is said to be the reconciliation of the World. And that 2 Cor. 5. 19. God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himself. I say the reconciled World is only God's Elect, for the reconciled are all saved, as I prove by the Apostles argument Rom. 5. If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, how much more being reconciled shall we be saved by his life. John. 1. 29. The Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the World. Are their sins taken away that are damned for them? And John. 6. 33. He gives life to the World; Is life given to any but to the Elect?
2. The second reasons, why in this place it cannot be so taken, are in effect but one, and that a weak one:
1. Because, that they that understand it of the Elect, understand it so in no other sense, but as I have expounded it.
2. If I should say of the twelve Apostles (Judas excluded, and Matthias substituted in his room) that God so loved them, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever of them believed in him, should not perish but have everlasting life; who can deny, but that this was a truth accommodated unto them? but will it here hence follow, that among those Apostles, some were believers some unbelievers? Suppose all the World were Elect, and it pleased God to give them all Faith, should this Doctrine be the less true, whosoever believes shall be saved? yet in this case it would not follow, that amongst the World of men some were believers, and some unbelievers.
But whereas he faines, that some of our Divines should interpret the word [World] here of Believers, that is such a fiction as is incredible. I come to the fourth.
DISCOURSE. SECT. IV.
1. TImoth. 2. 4. Who would have all to be saved and come to the knowledge of his truth. In these words the Apostle delivers two things. 1. That it is God's will, that all men should obtain an happy end, viz. Salvation. 2. That it is his will also, that they should use and enjoy the means, which is the knowledge of his truth, that so they might obtain the end, the salvation of their souls; there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved.
Two answers are usually returned, which give me little satisfaction: The first is, that by All we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in every sort and condition. It is true that [all] is sometimes so used in Scripture, but (I believe) not here: for the very Text shows that we are to understand by it, the Individualls and not the kinds: v. 1. There is a duty enjoined, I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men, and in this verse the motive is annexed, God will have all to be saved; as if he should have said, our charity must reach to all, whom God extends his love to: God will have all to be saved, therefore we must pray for all: Now in the duty All signifies every man, for no man though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our prayers; pray for them (saith our Savior) that persecute you; And pray (saith the Apostle here) for Kings, and all that are in Authority, men in those days (though the greatest) yet the worst, yea very Wolves, and Lions, and Bears of the Church; pray for them, and if for them, then for any other, thus in the duty it signifies every man; and if it do so in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; or else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty. The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his revealed will, have Millions to be damned with his secret will. If this answer stand, then (in my understanding) these inconveniences will follow.
1. That God's words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning, and by consequence are not true; for Oratio quae non est mentis significatio, simulatio est.
2. That there are two contrary willes in God; a secret will, that many Sons of Adam shall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, that all the Sons of Adam may be saved.
3. That one of God's wills must needs be bad, either the secret will, or the revealed; for of contraries if the one be good, the other is bad; and so of God's contrary wills, if the one be good, the other must needs be bad, for malum is contrarium bono.
TWISSE Consideration.
THe Conclusion here is very loose; the Arguments being thus; It is God's will that all should be saved; therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved: and the vanity of this consequence, I will show more ways then one.
1. The Apostle doth not say, It is the absolute will of God that all men shall be saved: nay Vossius interprets this place, and that according to the meaning of the Ancients, of voluntas conditionata, a conditional will in God, not absolute; and he gives instance of it thus; It is the will of God that all shall be saved, in case they believe in Christ. Now albeit it be the conditional will of God that all, and everyone shall be saved in case they believe, yet this hinders not, but that it may be the absolute will of God, that many thousands of men shall never be saved; as in case his will be to deny the grace of faith and repentance to many thousands, as it is clear and undeniable that he doth.
Nay the Remonstrants themselves, and particularly an Arminian that I had to do withal lately, spared not to profess, that Election is absolute; if so, then reprobation also is absolute; and I doubt not but that they will all confess, that howbeit God's will be, that all should be saved, yet thousands are reprobated.
2. Suppose the Apostle had said, it is the absolute will of God, that all men shall be saved, yet I say it follows not herehence, but that by the absolute will of God many might fail of falvation: for it was the absolute will of God, that every four footed beast should be represented to Peter, let down unto him in a linen vessel; yet nevertheless it might be that many thousands were not represented to him, and that by the will of God.
Thus having discovered the vanity of this conclusion; I will now proceed to demonstrate that this place cannot be understood, of God's will in proper speech, viz. willing all and everyone to be saved.
1. Like as it is impossible, that a man at the same time should be saved and damned; so it is impossible, that God should at the same time and duration, both will to save and will to damn the same man: But God from everlasting did will to damn many thousands; therefore it was impossible, that from everlasting he should will to save them.
2. If it be God's will that all and everyone shall be saved; then all and everyone shall be saved, For who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9. 19. And for confirmation hereof, we find in ourselves, that if we will do ought, we do it if we can; and if we do not ought, the reason is, either because we have no will to do it, or because we have no power to do it. In like sort, that God doth not save many thousands, the reason must be, either because he will not, or because he cannot; not because he will not; for these profess that it is his will to save all and everyone; Therefore the reason why he doth not save all, must needs be, because he cannot save them: this was Austin's argument 1200 years ago. Enchirid. cap. 96. and 97. handling this very place of the Apostle.
3. If God did from everlasting will the salvation of all and everyone, then either at this day he doth continue to will the salvation of all and everyone, and shall continue forever to will it, or no; if he doth continue to will it and ever shall, then say that God doth will the salvation of the damned both Men and Devils; albeit it is well known he damns them. If he doth not continue to will it, then is God of a changeable nature; directly contrary to the word of God, as well as to manifest reason: With him (saith James) is no variableness nor shadow of change. I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6. As for that which he thrusts in, to help make weight, saying, that there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, this is a most improper speech; for no man is said (in proper speech) to be let from doing ought, but upon presupposition that he would do it; now we utterly deny that God hindereth any man from believing and repenting, whose will is disposed to believe and repent. But seeing all men have infidelity and hardness of heart natural unto them, as a fruit of that corruption wherein all are borne; we deny that God c •• es it in all, but only in whom he will, according to that of Saint Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And our Savior upon the same ground, is bold to tell the Jews, saying, Ye therefore hear not my words (that is, believe them not) because ye are not of God.
2. The first exposition here mentioned was given by Austin, many hundred years ago. Enchirid. cap. 103. and he proves this his interpretation of the word [all] by the congruity of it to Scripture phrase in other places, as where it is said of the Pharisees, that they tythe every herb; his words are these, I • to locuti • nis modo & Dominus usus est in Evangelio, ubi ait Pharisees, Decimatis mentham, & rutam, & omne olus: ne{que} enim Pharisei quaecun{que} aliena, & omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnium olera decimabant. Sicut ergo hic omne olus, omne olerum genus; it a & illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus, intelligere possumus: yet see the ingenuity of this great light of the Church of God: for forthwith he gives leave to devise any other convenient interpretation; provided that we do not violate God's omnipotency, by saying, that anything that God would have brought to pass, is not brought to pass; his words are these, Et quocun{que} alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credere no cogamur aliquid omnipotentem Deum noluisse fieri, factum{que} non esse; qui sine ullis ambagibus si in caelo & terra (sicut & veritas cantat) omnia quaecun{que} voluit fecit: profecto facere noluit, quaecun{que} non fecit. This interpretation is generally received by our Divines, because of the congruity thereof to the Text it self; for as much as the Apostle having first admonished them in the general to pray for all, forthwith he descends to specialls, as Vossius acknowledgeth, Generi speciem subjicit; now look in what sort the Species is to be understood, after the same manner is the General to be understood. Now the Specialls mentioned, are certain sorts or conditions of men, as Kings, and such as are in authority; therefore the general [all] must in like manner be understood of all sorts, and all conditions of men: upon this consideration also it was that Austin did insist, in the place before alleged: Praeceperat (saith he) Apostolus ut or aretur pro singulis hominibus, & specialiter addiderat pro Regibus, & iis qui in sublimitate sunt, qui putari poterant fastu & superbia seculari a fidei Christianae humilitate abhorrere. Proinde dicens, hoc enim bonum est coram salvatore nostro Deo, id est, ut etiam pro talibus oretur; statim ut desperationem tolleret, addit, qui omnes homines vult salves fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Hoc quippe Deus bonum judicavit, ut orationibus humilium dignaretur, praestare salutem sublimium. Now I come to consider what this Author hath to say against this exposition, for he gives us very gravely to understand, that it gives him little satisfaction: we are therefore to expect some better satisfaction from him.
It is true that [all] is so used in Scripture, not only sometimes, but very frequently; let him come to instance in his sense, we are ready to instance with him for ours. But the Text (saith he) shows we are to understand the individuals and not the kinds. Where first (I doubt) his ignorance, in understanding the distinction aright, is his best ground of opposition. When Austin urgeth for his interpretation, that of the Pharisees tything omne olus, every herb, who doubts but they tythe Individual herbs. In like sort when Peter saw in a vessel let down unto him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 every four footed beast; no question but Individual beasts were let down unto him, not everyone of every kind, but of every kind or of most kinds, or of many kinds some, so that the meaning of the distinction is not to exclude all individuals (as this Author seems to carry the matter,) but only, to exclude a necessity of understanding all individuals of all sorts. It is enough if God will save some of all sorts, that is, of all conditions some individuals. Then, seeing he undertakes out of the very Text, to give us better satisfaction, then either Austin or our Divines have hitherto received, it must needs be a shame for him to leave the present Text, and fetch grounds elsewhere, for the clearing of Paul's meaning here. Now let us observe, how congruously or incongruously to his own undertakings, he carrieth himself in this business: of the duty enjoined, and of the motive annexed, there is no question: but whereas he shapes the coherence thus, and makes Paul in effect to speak after this manner; our charity must reach to all to whom God extends his love to; God will have all to be saved, and therefore we must pray for all. Though all this were granted him, it makes nothing for him: but over and above here are causeless errors more then enough:
For, first, our charity must extend farther then God's love; was not Jacob bound to carry himself charitably towards his brother Esau? though God's hatred of Esau, we know was as ancient as his love to Jacob.
2. We are not bound to extend our charity so far as God extends his love; for many thousands there be in the World, (not to speak of the Elect departed this life) towards whom it may be God extends his love, which yet are unknown to us; & are we bound to pray for we know not whom. Again, God's love, with this Author, is extended as far as his will to save, and that is extended to all and everyone: and unless God be now changed, it must extend to them now after they are damned, and must our charity be extended towards them also? But he proceeds, let us proceed with him. Now (saith he) [all] in the duty signifies every man; but that we deny; he gives his reason, for no man though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our Prayers.
Against this I have two exceptions, (and yet if the whole be granted him, it maketh nothing for him:) my first exception is this; he promised to give us satisfaction out of the Text it self; but who seeth not but that this rule of his, is brought in quite besides the Text: I from the Text have proved, and from the coherence between the general and the special, that the special being certain particular conditions of men, the general [all] must conformably be understood of all conditions.
My second exception is this; he obtrudes upon us, that no man, though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our Prayers. I confess I do not find myself apt to exclude any from my prayers; but I cannot endure, that a bold fellow should obtrude his rules upon us as Oracles. The Apostle Saint John forbids us to pray for them that sin a sin unto death. But let all this be granted, what then? If it extends to everyone in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; but this I deny; he saith, else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty: but this likewise I deny; and show withal, how the motive shall reach home, and have strength enough even to enforce this duty, according to this Authors accommodation of it; albeit God hath a will not to save all and everyone, but of all sorts and all conditions some; of Kings some, of them that are in Authority some; For seeing God saves of all sorts some, why should not every Christian Subject, pray for his Prince and Rulers, seeing it may be they are those some, whom God means to save, even of the rank of Princes, of the rank of Governors, and of men in Authority. For God hath not revealed to us, who they are whom he hath elected, and who they are whom he hath reprobated. If he had, Austin tells us what we should do in that case, De Civit. Dei. lib. 21. cap. 24. Si de aliquibus it a Ecclesia certa esset, ut qui sunt illi etiam nosset, qui licet adhuc in hac vitâ sint constituti, tamen praedestinati sunt in aeternum ignem ire cum Diabolo, tam pro i is non or aret, quam pro ipso. If it shall be farther urged, that we are to pray for all Kings, and all that are in Authority, not only for our own; I answer, that this is nothing agreeable to the end of such prayers here expressed by the Apostle, namely, That under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and honesty. And what have we here in England, to do with the King of Bungo, that we should pray for him, or for the Kings in terrâ australi incognitâ, discovered by Ferdinando de Quir, or for the great Duke of Crapulia?
3. As for the second interpretation; I do not find it so usual with our Divines: Cajetan distinguisheth here between voluntas signi and beneplaciti; so doth Aquinas, and this distinction of voluntas occulta and revelata, is usually reduced to that of voluntas signi and beneplaciti; But voluntas signi, and voluntas revelata, is more congruously applied to the things which God commands, then to the things which God himself worketh; as for example, he commands faith and repentance; and the commandments of God, are usually called the will of God in Scripture, though improperly; and thus the distinction is plain. God commands one thing, but it is not necessary, that he should will, that that which he commands shall come to pass: As for example, God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet he determined that Isaac should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event. In like manner he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, yet withal told Moses he would harden his heart, that he should not let Israel go. But this will of God called voluntas signi and Revelata, cannot so congruously be said to pass upon man's salvation. Yet because God may be said to command salvation, in as much as he commands faith and repentance, that we may be saved; and in this sense, men are exhorted sometimes to save themselves; As, Save yourselves from this froward generation; and Save some out of the fire with fear; and That thou mayest both save thyself and them that hear thee; therefore we are content also to admit of this distinction, and consider with what judgment and sufficiency this Author doth impugn it.
1. By his first opposition, it appears, that mere ignorance bears him out against this distinction; For we do acknowledge, that God's revealed will, and his words revealing it, are true interpretations of his own mind and meaning; though not of such a meaning as he expects should be fashioned. For he conceives that God's will in this case, is only of what shall be done; which is most untrue: Hereby is only signified, what is man's duty to do, although it may be God will not give him effectual grace to do it. As for examples sake, when God commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go; hereby was signified, that God would have it to be Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; though withal he professes to Moses, that he would harden Pharaohs heart, whereupon he should refuse to let them go. So when God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, hereby it was signified, that it was God's will to make it Abraham's duty to sacrifice his Son, albeit God had determined, that when Abraham came to point of execution of that which was enjoined him, he would hold Abraham's hand, and content himself with Abraham's readiness, and good heart to obey God in this.
2. As to the second; it is untrue that any such thing followeth as this Author pretendeth, namely, that two contrary wills shall be found in God; For first there is no contrariety in the wills here shaped by the Author himself; thus, many shall be damned, and those, many may be saved. As for the word irrevocable, wherewith this Author stuffs his proposition, that is no attribute of damnation, or the manner thereof, but rather of God's decrees; wherein still he proceeds and spares not to foam out his own shame, desiring to make God's decrees of a revocable nature. Secondly, he understands not the accommodation of the distinction aright, which is not directly to salvation and immediately, but rather to praecepta, consilia, remedia, (as Aquinas expresseth it) of voluntas signi, which is all one in this case with voluntas revelata.
1. Applyed to God's commandment, joined with a will not to give grace to obey his commandment, thus, it's Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; It is not God's will that Pharaoh shall let Israel go, for he meaneth to harden his heart to the contrary.
2. Applyed to salvation, consequent or not consequent, according as men shall be found to obey or disobey God's commandment: thus, it's my will, that as many as believe and repent shall be saved, and consequently it's true, If thou believest (whoever thou art) and repentest, thou shalt be saved. I will give grace to believe and repent to some only, whereby they may be saved; between those in like manner, there is no contrariety at all.
3. And if there be no contrariety at all, then surely it follows not by this Authors Logic, that if one of them be good, the other must be bad. I say by this Authors Logic; for nowadays men are given so much to Rhetoric, that they forget all good Logic, if ever they learnt any: who I pray gives any such rule, that if one contrary be good, the other must be bad? If heat be good, is cold bad? Or if white be good, is black bad? But as for the case we treat of, if these wills were found to be contrary, one of them should destroy the other, and the other should have no being at all; and in case it hath no being, shall it be said to be bad? Yes, like enough, by the learning of the Arminians. I come to the Fifth.
DISCOURSE. SECT. V.
2. PEter 3. 9. Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance. This Scripture is not so liable to those exceptions, which are made against the former testimonies, for it is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively; and therefore speaks that in plain terms, which is contrary to absolute reprobation.
That which is usually replied is this, that the persons here spoken of, are the Elect only. God is not willing that any of the Elect should perish. But the contrary appears plainly in the Text; for the persons here spoken of, are those towards whom God exerciseth much long suffering and patience; and who are they? Are they the Elect only, or chiefly? No, but the Reprobates rather, that die for their contempt of grace. Reprobates are the proper objects of God's long suffering and patience, as we may see, Rom. 2. 4. where the Apostle speaking of such as go on in sin, and treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, saith that God useth patience towards them, that so he might lead them to repentance: and Rom. 9. 22. He endureth (saith the Text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. Reprobates therefore as well as others doth Peter here speak of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish; if they do perish, it is their own fault and folly, and not God's absolute pleasure, who would have none to perish.
TWISSE. Consideration.
HEre be odd gambolls; as when he saith the proposition here is negative, whereas the propositions are two, and the latter affirmative, as well as the former is negative. As for the taking of it distributively, as he speaks, the Text expresseth the negative distributively; implying belike, that when we interpreted the former place de generibus singulorum, it was not to be taken distributively, which is a very shallow conceit, for it is apparent we distribute it de generibus singulorum; and more then that, of the particulars of each kind, only we do not distribute it of all the particulars. In like manner, though the Text in this place expresseth a distribution, saying, not willing, any to perish, this distribution is not extended to all: Nay, it admits of a greater limitation then the former place did by our interpretation; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here must be referred to that which goes before in these words, God is patient to us ward not willing any to perish, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , any of us to perish, but all to come to repentance, that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all of us; which can admit of no other sense then all such as the Apostle was; he saith it is contrary to absolute reprobation; that is wind; when he proveth it then we will believe it, his word is no oracle.
2. Let us see how he disproves their interpretation, who accommodate it to God's Elect. The persons here mentioned (he saith) are those towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience, and demandeth whether these are the Elect only or chiefly? and answereth himself negatively; saying, that the reprobates are the proper objects of God's long suffering and patience, which he proveth out of Rom. 2. 4. and Rom. 9. 22. and so concludes the argument very learnedly and judiciously Arminian like, ex omnibus affirmativis, in secundâ Figurâ; which of what force it is every weak Logician knoweth; for thus in effect is his argument, They of whom God will have none to perish, are such towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; But the Reprobates are they towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; Therefore the Reprobates are they, of whom God will have none to perish.
2. And whereas the Apostle saith, God is patient towards us, the meaning according to this Authors judicious enlargement is, towards us who are partly elect and partly reprobates: and so likewise when he saith, 2 Pet. 1. 2. To you who have obtained like precious faith with us, that is, with us of whom some are elect and some reprobates. And 1 Pet. 1. 3. God hath begotten us to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, that is, begotten us, some of whom are elect and some reprobates.
3. Now because the Apostle saith plainly and simply, who is patient towards us; this Author desiring to frame it in a suitable manner, to that of the Apostle, Rom. 2. 4. whereunto he hath a hungry desire to reduce it, therefore he makes bold to say, that the persons here mentioned by Saint Peter are such, towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience: Thus again he is willing very obsequiously to follow Lysanders counsel, who advised, when a Lions skin would not serve the turn, to piece it up with a Fox skin. We on the other side, though it cannot be denied, but that God doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 towards such as Saint Peter was, and those to whom he wrote, who had obtained like precious faith with himself and his fellow Apostles, and other believers; which cannot be denied to have been the elect of God, (so he calls them to whom he wrote, 1 Pet. 1. 2.) yet we spare to draw any argument therehence, because we know full well, that God doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and useth long suffering towards the Reprobates also. So that we could not conclude that we would herehence, but either by a Syllogism vicious in the form, as this Author doth, or by a Syllogism, that would be as faulty in the matter, thus; God shows patience to none but Reprobates; they of whom God will have none to perish are such, as towards whom God shows patience; therefore God will not have any Reprobate to perish. And is not this a proper doctrine, that God will not have any Reprobate to perish, both for the overthrowing of God's omnipotency; for is it not a clear case and undeniable, that all Reprobates do perish? As also for the overthrowing of God's immutability; for can it be denied, that when God damns them, he will have them to perish? Which if before he would not, can it be avoided, but that God's will must be changed? And lastly, for the bringing in of manifest contrariety into the will of God; seeing they dare not deny that God did from everlasting ordain every reprobate unto damnation: I say they dare not deny this in plain terms, though their carriage is such, as if their meaning were, that God's will in decreeing their damnation is conditional quoad actum volentis, as touching the very act of willing, whence it followeth that God shall not will their damnation until their death in infidelity and impenitency; for it is fit the condition should exist before the thing conditionated, whose existence depends thereupon. As for that he adds in the close, If they do perish it is their own fault and folly; we make no question hereof, though nevertheless we may well maintain, that it is God's absolute pleasure, not to take them off from their sinful and foolish courses, nor to set an end to these vicious courses of theirs, which he could if it pleased him, as well as he did set an end to the abominable courses of Manasseh, as also to the persecution and bloody courses of Saul; towards whom he did undoubtedly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and exercise much long suffering and patience; though herein there is no difference between them and reprobates, or very little; according to that of Austin, Istorum neminem (non praedestinatorum) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualem{que} paenitentiam, quâ homo Deo reconciliatur in Christo; sive illis ampliorem paenitentiam, sive non imparem praebeat: contrà Julian. Pelagian. lib. 5. cap. 4. I come to the last of this rank.
DISCOURSE. SECT. VI.
TO These testimonies, I may add those conditional speeches, if thou seek him he will be found of thee; but if thou forsake him he will cast thee off, forever, 1 Chron. 28. 9. If ye seek him, he will be found of you; but if you forsake him, he will forsake you. 2 Chron. 15. 2. If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? but if thou dost ill, sin lies at the door. Gen. 4. 7. The just shall live by faith, but if any man withdraw himself, my soul non approbabit eum, shall have no pleasure in him, he shall be a Reprobate. In all these and many other places it is clear (for ought I can see) that God forsakes no man, considered simply in the fall, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsakes God. Now if God reject no man from Salvation in time or in act and deed, till he rejects God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For God's acts in time, are regulated by his decrees before time. Ephes. 1. 11. God worketh all things (saith the Apostle) according to the counsel of his own will; and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between regulam and regulatum, the rule and the thing measured by the rule. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the World, we may know what he purposed to do before the World; and by his actual casting men off, when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before. Besides it is all one in substance, to cast a man off indeed, and to entertain a resolution to do it; our velle and facere are all one in God's account, and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder; much more is God's will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent, and irresistible, and whatsoever he wills directly and absolutely, is certainly done when the time comes.
All these plain Scriptures doth this opinion contradict in terminis, and not only these, but the whole course of Scriptures, by which it is much safer for a man to frame his opinions, then by a few places picked up here and there, and those obscure ones too: What Saint Austin speaks in another place, I may safely say in this, numquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest, quod occultum est? Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? Aug. de bono persevere. c. 14. Secundum plura (saith Tertullian) pauciora sunt intelligenda; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ne unus sermo subvertat alios; secundum omnes potius quam adversum omnes intelligendus erit, A few testimonies must be expounded according to the whole course of Scriptures, and not this according to a few testimonies. This is my first reason.
TWISSE Consideration.
TO the places of Scripture here alleged, I give the interpretation, to prevent the confusion of things that differ, which all affect who prefer the darkness of Error before the light of truth; for it is most advantageous to such, to fish in troubled waters.
To the two first, I say; God is first sought of us before we find him, as touching the obtaining of many blessings at the hands of God according to that, Ezech. 36. 37. I will yet be sought of the house of Israel, to perform it unto them. But as touching the obtaining of an heart to seek him, thus God is found of us before we seek him; according to that, Es. 65. 1. I have been found of them that sought me not: witness Saul marching with a commission from the Priests to Damascus, to bind all that called on the name of Jesus.
To the third I answer, by distinguishing acceptation, as we distinguish love; Love is either complacentiae or beneficentiae; so acceptation is either unto reward, or unto complacency; Rewards always follow our doing well; but grace of doing well is always a fruit of God's favor towards us in Christ.
To the last the just shall live by faith; But there is a grace of God preventing faith; cur ill credat, ill non credat, what is the reason but the mere pleasure of God giving the grace of Faith to one, and denying it to another, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. They that withdraw themselves my soul shall have no pleasure in them; The meaning is, they shall feel the smart of his displeasure; but before they withdrew themselves God took not that pleasure in them, as to give them his custodient grace, to keep them from withdrawing themselves; which grace, and that out of his good pleasure he afforded unto others: But this grace comes in no account throughout with this Author, like unto the Remonstrants, who would have no other notice taken of any other counsel of God, then that whereby he decreeth to save believers and damn unbelievers. But if you call them to inquire of God's decree, to bestow the grace of Faith and repentance upon some, and not on others; as whether it proceeds absolutely or conditionally, they usually lend a deaf ear to this; whereby it is as clear as the Sun, what estimation they make of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of Faith, and of repentance; and after what manner they give God the glory of it. By the way observe I pray, how he makes the state of man in being a reprobate consequent to his withdrawing himself, which undoubtedly is a Temporal act, and accordingly the act of Reprobation, whereby a man is denominated a reprobate, to be merely Temporal; and consequently such an act must election be also, viz. not eternal but Temporal.
Still he keepeth himself in his strength of confusion, as most advantageous for him; as in saying, God forsakes no man, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsaketh God. But albeit God forsaketh no man, as touching the inflicting of punishment, until man commits actual sin, and continueth therein impenitently; yet before this God did forsake him, as touching the denial of this grace custodient from sin; and the denial of the grace of repentance to rise out of sin, which yet he grants to many; as in showing mercy to whom he will, like as whom he will he hardeneth, and so accordingly cures in some, that natural infidely and hardness of heart wherein we are all borne, and leaves it uncured in others. Now consider we his argument following, which is this. If God reject no man from salvation in time, or in act and deed till he reject God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast off God. Now this argument not one of our Divines deny, not only as it is applied to reprobation; but neither do we deny it, applied unto election. For we willingly profess, that like as God bestows salvation on none, but such as he then finds believers, penitent, and given to good works: in like sort we all profess, that God decrees to bestow salvation on none but such as he foreseeth will believe, repent, and become studious of good works. Like enough, many do willfully dissemble the true state of the Question between us: others ignorantly mistake it. The question is not whether God decrees to bestow salvation on such as he foreseeth will believe, and reject those from salvation whom he foreseeeth will not believe; but of the order of reason between these decrees of God, and the foresight of obedience the one side, and disobedience on the other; that is, whether like as faith, repentance, and good works in men of ripe years do precede their salvation, as disposing causes thereunto; so the fore-sight of faith, repentance, and good works, precede election, as disposing causes or prerequisites thereunto. In like manner on the other side, whether, as final perseverance in sin precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; So final perseverance in sin as foreseen by God precedes reprobation as the decree of Damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof: So that the argument here mentioned (which is all his strength in this place) rightly applied must run thus. Faith, repentance, and good works actually existent precede salvation, as the disposing causes thereunto; therefore faith, repentance, and good works foreseen precede election, as the disposing causes thereunto; and what is this, but as good as in express terms to profess, that election is of faith, repentance, and good works: though it be in direct contradiction unto Saint Paul, professing in terminis (to speak in this Divines language) that the purpose of God according to election is not of works. So on the other side, Final perseverance in sin precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; therefore final perseverance in sin foreseen, precedes the decree of damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof. And then what is to make reprobation to be of evil works, if this be not? Whereas Saint Paul, look by what arguments he proves that election is not of good works, viz. because before Jacob and Esau were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said of them the Elder shall serve the Younger: by the same argument it is equally evident that Reprobation is not of evil works. Yet we acknowledge an exact conformity between God's decrees and the execution thereof: because like as God damns no man but for sin, so he decreed to damn no man but for sin: where sin is in each place made the meritorious cause of damnation, not of the decree of damnation. And like as God bestows salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works, so he decreed to bestow salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works; where faith repentance and good works, are in each place made the disposing causes to salvation, but not to election. There was never any so mad (saith Aquinas) as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, and Why? but because so is the cause of predestination to be inquired into, as the cause of God's will is inquired into: but formerly he had shown that there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing: Now let everyone judge whether the act of reprobation, be not as clearly the act of God's will, as the act of predestination; and consequently whether it be not equally as mad a course (in Aquinas his judgment) to devise a cause of reprobation, as to devise a cause of predestination on the part of God's will. And no marvel, for the act of God's will is eternal, all the works of the creature are temporal: Then, the act of God's will is God himself, for there is no accident in God; and therefore they may as well set themselves to devise a cause of God, as a cause of God's will. His phrase of casting off, is ambiguous; if it signifieth the denial of salvation, it followeth disobedience; if it signifieth the denial of grace, it precedes disobedience, in what kind soever.
3. Our velle and facere are both temporal; in God it is otherwise; for his deeds are temporal, and may admit the works of men precedaneous thereunto; but his resolutions are his decrees, and they are all eternal, and can admit no work of man precedaneous thereunto; yet is God as just in the one as in the other. For like as he damns no man but for sin, so he never decreed to damn any man but for sin; But as touching the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, in the granting and denying of this, the Apostle plainly tells us, he proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will; as when he saith, The Lord hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: And here also God is as just in his decrees as in his executions. For if it be just with him, to give this grace to whom he will, and deny it to whom he will; it is as just with him, to decree the giving of it to whom he will, and the denying of it also to whom he will. And why shall not the Lord take liberty to cure infidelity and hardness of heart in whom he will, as he cured it in Manasseh and Saul; and leave it uncured in whom he will, as he left it uncured in many a proud Pharisee, and proud Philosopher, notwithstanding all their Morality they boasted of? Very seasonably he confesseth God's will to be omnipotent and irrefistible, when nevertheless, he makes him to will the salvation of all Reprobates, though not one of them is saved. But by that which follows, by will omnipotent and irrefistible, it seems he understandeth only will absolute, which he distinguisheth from will conditionate, which can be no other (I suppose) then this, my will is that all and everyone shall be saved, in case he believe and repent. Now seeing it is as true, that 'tis God's will that they shall be damned, in case they believe not and repent not, let every sober man judge, whether this deserve to be accounted, a will of saving rather then a will of damning; especially in case all men naturally, are far more prone to infidelity and impenitency, then to faith and repentance. As for a will conditionate in God, like enough this Author carrieth it hand over head without distinction, as he doth many other things besides: whereas no such will is agreeable to the divine nature, quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of willing, as both Bradwardine by clear reason, and Piscator out of the word of God have demonstrated, but only quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed by him.
4. I have shown the poverty of his performances, by the particular examination of every place alleged by him, and made it plain, how he betrays his own nakedness of interpretation of Scripture, and of argumentation throughout; and therewithal, the vanity of this his boast, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, doth contradict these plain Scriptures. But he like a brave fellow well conceited of his achievements, and having thereby gotten some authority to himself, is bold to give his word, that it contradicts also the whole course of Scripture; which I verily believe he is as well able to perform, as he hath performed the former; and very judiciously takes upon him to distinguish between the whole course of Scriptures, and a few places picked up here and there, as if they were no part of the whole course of Scripture: Belike by reason of their obscurity, as he pretends, no matter if they were expunged; like as owls are offended with day-light. Our Savior tells us of some that loved darkness rather then light, because their deeds were evil. None hate the light of God's truth, more then such as are possessed with errors, as with familiar spirits, especially when they have been found to play the Apostates from God's truth. Whether I have dashed myself upon the rocks of Austin's censure, by contradicting any Scripture that he hath brought, or only his corrupt and vile interpretation and accommodation of them, let the indifferent judge. Yet what more plain then this, God's purpose of election is not of works; especially compared with the manner how Saint Paul proves it. What more plain then this? God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. It is apparent he utterly declines the critical point of these controversies, which is as touching God's giving grace, even the grace of faith and repentance; and of what spirit that savoreth let everyone judge. As for interpreting any place, we do not abridge his liberty in interpreting it after what manner he thinks good, but we are ready to weigh it, and if we find it too light, to esteem of it as it deserves: neither do we refuse to take into consideration, what he or any of his complices are pleased to insist upon.
DISCOURSE. The Second sort of Arguments Convincing drawn from God's Attributes.
SECT. I. As touching the General.
SEcondly it fights with some principal Attributes of God, therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own glorious nature, and incompatible with those excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himself to men.
Two things are here to be premised.
1. That God's chief Attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified, which are Mercy, Justice, Truth, &c. For God is more honored by the exercise of these amongst men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and Sovereignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and fair dealing, then for his Dominion and Authority, or anything that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,
1. Power is no virtue, but mercy, justice, and truth are; acts of power are not Morally good of themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants: if they be accompanied with justice, mercy, &c. they are good, if otherwise, they are naught. For justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur.
2. Power and Sovereignty may as well be shown in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. Saul shown his authority and power to the full, in slaying the Lord's Priests, and Nebuchadnezzar in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and Daniel into the Lions Den; but no mercy, nor justice, nor anything else that was good.
2. The second thing that is to be preconsidered is, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature with those virtues in men, though infinitely different in degree (as light in the air, is the same with light in the Sun in nature, not in degrees) and that which is just, merciful, and upright in men, is so in God too. And by these virtues in ourselves, and such acts as are conformable to them, tanquam ex pede Herculem, we may safely measure the same in God: For otherwise these things would follow.
1. The common and received distinction of Divine Attributes, into communicable and incommunicable, would fall to the ground: for against it this night be said, that the mercy, justice, truth, and other virtues that are in us, are not God's perfections in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.
2. Men cannot be truly said, to be made after God's image, Gen. 1. 27. Nor when they are regenerated, to be renewed after the same image, Col. 3. 10. And to be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Pet. 1. 4. That Picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in its parts and lineaments clearly resemble him; nor can we be truly the image of God, in respect of our graces, if in these graces there be not a resemblance of God's Attributes.
3. We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded; Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, Math. 5. 48. and be ye holy as I am holy. Nor when we show forth mercy, justice, and truth in our actions, can we be properly said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God, and in men another.
These two things being thus premised, viz. that God's mercy, justice, and truth, are three of his chief Attributes, in the exercise of which he takes himself to be much glorified, and that we are to measure these Attributes by the same virtues in ourselves. I come to the proof of my second reason against absolute reprobation, which is, that it opposeth some of God's principal Attributes, particularly his justice, mercy, and truth.
TWISSE. Consideration.
I Cannot but wonder at the performances of the true Author of this Discourse, in comparing that which goes before, with that which comes after; His poverty of argumentation out of Scripture, and the exuberancy of his discourse following. Before he was in some straits, but now he seems to have gotten Sea room enough: yet this is my comfort, I seem to perceive out of what chimney all this smoke proceeds, and to be as well acquainted with the spirit that breatheth here, as if I were at his elbow while he penned it. Agnosco veteris vestigia flammae: such like are Doctor Jacksons discourses; and him I have known of old, and his Ephestion also; I profess willingly of Scholar acquaintance, they were my greatest and dearest; But seeing it hath pleased God to put such a difference between us; I would have both them and the World know, I do as little regard them as fear them.
Arminius himself is never more plausible, then in such like extravagant discourses as a positive Theologue: But these inspirations were never derived from him; they are flowers of another garden. These have been shapen in a more Philosophical brain whereof some having gotten the reputation, give Oracles therehence, first to form interpretations of Scriptures, in congruity to these Theorems, as the true Author blusheth not to profess; which when he hath persuaded the World of, I see no cause to the contrary, but he may adventure a degree farther, and persuade the burning of the Bible, so far as it concerneth the Doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation, Grace and Free-will, and content themselves with these magisteriall precepts, as most sufficient and sovereign for the endoctrinations of the Christian World in these points. But he might have spared his pains in proving this consequence, that if our Doctrine of Reprobation be contradictory to God's principal attributes it cannot be true. I say he might have spared the proof hereof, for all that he brings in proof of this is but darkness in comparison of the domestical light, and self-evidence, which this consequence carrieth with it. His premises here, and discourse thereof is like unto the Turks parly before the encounter, when he challenged any one of Skanderbeg's army to a single combat. For as that parley was merely complemental, and to no purpose, save only, as he might conceit, to abate the fervor of his opposite, who longed to be dealing with him; so this introduction, I find to be of no Scholastical use in the world, but merely Politick, to work some impression upon the readers affections, where by it may come to pass, that when he reads of God's mercy and justice, as here it is set forth, he may be the more inclined to judge thereof, according to the genius of human mercy and justice. Yet I am content to give myself to be wrought upon by these pretty contemplations, as far as I shall be convicted of any truth and sobriety in them: though I willingly profess I am very suspicious (for I love to betray my infirmities) that there is little or no truth and sobriety at all in them.
1. Now because he hopes to hatch much advantage unto his cause out of these attributes, and to that purpose he sits very long upon them, though his market may be never the better for all that. He tells us these are God's chief attributes, and as it appeareth by that which followeth, his practice is to disparage his power (which I call the Lord's Sovereignty) in comparison to these; Now it seems they are chief indeed in his opinion, for the furthering of his cause; but as for any absolute chiefty they have in God, I am not as yet acquainted therewith, what I may be by this Authors performances I know not; yet in the next page save one, he professeth expressly, That all God's excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; wherein I do much approve his judgment, as savouring of more depth then this, which yet I think not that he, who pretends to be the Author of this discourse, in respect of his minority, should be likely to broach; as for other respects of principality, I shall be ready to take notice of them in due place. But when he saith, God is most glorified in the manifestation of mercy, justice, and truth, it is a very odd phrase: For it is one thing to be glorious, another thing to be glorified; dare he deny that God is as glorious in his power and sovereignty, as in his mercy, justice, and truth? As for the glorifying of him, that depends upon the will of the creature. It may be some are more thankful unto God, for blessing them with health, and riches, and honor, and preferment; then for bestowing his Gospel upon them; but will it follow herehence, that his goodness in giving riches, &c. is more glorious then his goodness is seen in giving us his Word and Gospel? We read that when God laid the foundations of the earth, the Stars of the morning praised God together, and all the children of God rejoiced, Job. 38. 7. did these Angels glorify God for his mercy, justice, and truth, in the creating of them? We read sometimes of God's power, sometimes of his wisdom manifested in the Creation, as Jer. 10. 11. and 51. 11. and Psal: 136. 5. Jer. 10. 12. &c. But nowhere have I read (that I can remember) he made the World by his mercy, justice, or truth; and Revel. 4. 11. I find the glory of power given unto God in the creation, by the 24 Elders, but neither there, nor anywhere else (that I know) is the glory of his mercy, justice, and truth, given unto God therein. Thou art worthy O Lord, to receive glory, and honor, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy will sake, they have be and are created. And albeit men fail in giving God the glory of his power and wisdom as they should, will it follow herehence, that God is not so much to be glorified for his power and wisdom, as for mercy, justice, and truth? yet who falls in this, that fails not in the use of the Lord's Prayer; the conclusion whereof is this, For thine is the Kingdom, and power, and glory? And indeed albeit Power and Wisdom may be shown other ways, then in the way of mercy, justice, and truth; yet God's mercy, justice, and truth, cannot be shown without the simultaneous demonstration of his power and wisdom: And therefore when God comes to make good his gracious promise, for the delivering of Israel out of Egypt: which cannot be denied to have been a singular work of mercy, justice, and truth; the Lord professeth that then he would make himself known unto them by the name, Jehovah, by which name he was not known before. The Incarnation of the Son of God, was it not an admirable work, as well in the way of power, and wisdom, as in the way of mercy, justice, and truth? I am apt to confound God's justice with his truth, ere I am aware, without having that awful regard to the authority of this writer, as perhaps may seem fit: But I hope it is a pardonable fault, considering my education hitherto in divinity; whereby I have attained only thus far, to the acknowledgement of justice Divine; for justice consisteth, in giving everyone his due; now this due being either in respect of God, or the creature: Justice Divine in giving God his due, Aquinas hath taught me, that it is all one with God's wisdom, promoting his ends by congruous means; justice Divine in giving the creature his due, I have learnt to depend wholly on God's determination, manifested by his promises and threatenings, and this is commonly called justitia fidelitatis, which I take to be all one with truth. But I am very willing to be better informed by this Author, and I give myself to his contemplations, to have my thoughts fashioned by them as they can; and if hitherto they have not transformed me into a new Creed, I cannot help that. Now if it be so that God's power and wisdom accompany the demonstration of his mercy, justice, and truth, I cannot see how God is honored more by the exercise of the one sort, then of the other, but rather on the contrary. So that albeit a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and fair dealing, then for his dominion and authority; yet I do not easily perceive, how God is renowned more for his clemency, equity, &c. then for his power, &c. yet again this seems to me a very poor argument; to conclude Clemency to be a chief attribute of God, because men do more magnify him for that, then for his Power. For consider, a Malefactor going to execution, is called back and saved by the Kings pardon, this man (be sure) will magnify the King more for his clemency in saving him, then he would for his justice in putting him to death: but will it follow herehence, that Clemency is a more chief attribute of a King then justice? Solomon the greatest of Kings hath said, the Throne is established by Justice: and it was wont to be said, fiat justitia, ruat orbis. No such thing is said of Mercy. Then again the King could not do this but by virtue of his prerogative, yet the Malefactor magnifies him not for his prerogative, but for the favorable use of it for his good, for that is all he respects: yet ask I pray any man of judgment, which is the chiefer attribute of a King, and more glorious of the two; his prerogative or his clemency? Clemency is a very vulgar virtue, but the royal prerogative is peculiar to one; A Thief after a robbery committed on the high-way, meeting with a beggar that beggeth a penny, if he astonish him with the gift of twelve pence, the beggar is very likely more highly to magnify him, then any honest man going on the way, that bestows but an half penny upon him; yet, Whose liberality is the greater of the two? Carnal men renown others for the benefit they receive by them; not according to their true worth: yet there is a farther difference; human authority may be abused, and Sovereignty on earth is not always joined with good Morality, much less with Piety; but in case a man could not sin, the more honor and authority is laid upon him, the more glorious should he be; as being backed with the greater power to execute his goodness. Thus it is with God, it is impossible he should abuse his sovereignty; yea his mercy and justice are one and the same reality with his power: what a vanity then is it to discourse as this Author doth, in preferring one attribute of God before another, as if God were more glorious in the one then in the other. But he hath farther reasons for this, let us consider them: 1. Power (saith he) is no virtue, nor morally good, but mercy justice and truth are. I answer: Though it be so, yet who will say, the glory of virtue is greater then the glory of power?
2. Especially considering, that virtue is common to the meanest.
3. A little virtue joined with power, shall bring forth far better fruits, then a great deal of virtue without power.
4. Though it be so in man, whose power may be abused, shall we transfer it to God, whose power cannot be abused, his power and his goodness being all one?
5. Moral virtues denote a goodness removeable where it is, obtainable where it is not; but no such goodness can be found in God, and consequently no Moral virtue in proper speech, whatsoever is in him, that being natural and essential unto him.
6. Lastly, to power only and sovereignty we owe obedience, and not to goodness, and jurisdiction is far more glorious then subjection. Yet by the way it is untrue (in my judgment) that acts of Power are made good by being accompanied with justice, speaking of Moral goodness; as acts of virtue alone they are morally good, not as acts of power. If justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur; then justice if not alone, yet chiefly, shall be that whereby one is renowned: yet herehence it follows, that every act of God's power shall laudem mereri; because it is impossible that anything he doth should be otherwise then just, such a justitia condecentiae followeth all his actions; otherwise we must grant, that God hath power to do that which is unjust.
2. And accordingly, though power human and Angelical, may be shown in barbarous actions: yet power Divine cannot; let him do whatsoever he is able, it shall not be unjust; let God turn all the World into nothing, another manner of destruction then that of Saul's slaying the Lord's Priests, or Netuchadnezzars casting the three Children into the fiery Furnace, yet dares this Author say, that God herein should be unjust.
I come to the second of his premises.
2. We have had a taste of this Authors faculty in roaving at large, and within the Horizon of his own brain, we shall drink a deeper draught of it ere we part. And once again I willingly profess, it cannot enter into my belief, that these conceits have dropt from the fancy of a young Divine; some old beaten Naturalist rather doth employ his brain to do the Arminians this service. I never found hitherto that Arminius, or any of his Batavian followers have thus discoursed, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those virtues in men, though infinitely differing in degree. I conceive Arminius (though wild enough in his 20 reasons, and especially in his reasons drawn from the consideration of God's justice) to be more Orthodox, and far more Scholastical then so; though I nothing doubt, we have a generation amongst us that affect to have all learning in Divinity, to go by their rules of Philosophy, and yet the basest Philosophy I think that ever was devised. And this Author whosoever he be, seems herein to discourse after such a manner, as if he were of the number of those that heard the Devil read Lectures through a grate in the University of Toledo. If justice mercy and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those virtues that are in men, then there is something in man, that is the very essence of God; For undoubtedly whatsoever is in God, is of his essence; yet those are they that attribute Manicheisme unto us. And seeing the virtues of man are accidents, it follows that that, which under the same name is attributed to God, is either an accident in God; or if it be his essence, then the essence of God, is of the same nature with accidents in man.
Thirdly; hence it follows, that the Divine perfections consist of degrees, and consequently must needs be accidental unto him, not substantial; for substance admits no degrees.
Fourthly; if justice human be of the same nature with justice Divine, it followeth, not only that, that which is just in man is just with God, but that it must be after the same manner just; that like as men's justice consisteth in obedience to God's law, implying subjection thereunto: So justice Divine must consist in obedience to God's law implying subjection. And like as man is obliged to be just, in the same manner God is obliged to be just. And consequently like as Soul sinned and became unjust in slaying the Lord's Priests, so had God been unjust in doing the like.
Fifthly; man sinneth in suffering his brother to sin, when it lies in his power to keep him from sin; and consequently, if that which is unjust with man is unjust with God, God sinneth as often as he suffereth any sin to be committed in the world, for undoubtedly he could prevent it. August. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Nos certe, si eos, in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros, perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia illa permitit fieri ante oculos suos; quae uti{que} si voluisset, nullâ ration permitteret, But let us see how he proves this, for he adventures upon it like a tall fellow, and that with variety of demonstration.
1. The first is drawn from the received distinction of divine Attributes, namely into such as are communicable unto the creature, and such as are incommunicable; but here he conceals his Authority. But let him bring forth the testimony of any Divine, that maintains any Attribute Divine to be the same quoad nomen & nominis rationem, with any Attribute human. Yet we may talk of God's Attributes so, as for distinction sake to say, some are such as are also Attributed to man, others are not; without maintaining, that human virtues are of the same nature with Attribute Divine. Life is a Divine Attribute, it is also attributed to man, to a beast, to a plant; But will any wise man say that the life of God is of the same nature with the life of a Man, of a Beast, of a Plant? What more equivocal then the word Canis? Attributed to a Star, to a Fish, to a Four-footed creature on the Earth; I answer much more equivocal is everything in common attributed to God and Man; For whatsoever is in God, is his Essence, but between the Essence of God, and the essence of Man, there is a vaster difference, then between the essence of a Star, of a Fish, of a Dog; how much more difference is there between the Essence of God, and an accident in man, such as his virtues are. In a word, the virtue of Man is of an annihilable condition, and if it be of the same nature with something in the nature of God, why should not something in the nature of God be of an annihilable condition? I marvel not if men of this generation are apt to profess that they will turn Atheists rather then concur in some points with the Contra-Remonstrants; for their discourses breath Atheism in a very high degree. It is a question among Schoolmen, whether Ens (the most abstract notion of all other) be predicated univocally of God and the creature; the Dominicans utterly deny it; Scotus maintains the contrary with some curiosity of argumentation: but his Arguments are answered by the Dominicans and particularly by Versor on the Metaphysics; but never, I think, was it heard of Scotus or any other (till now) that the virtues of man are of the same nature with the Divine Attributes, differing only in degree.
I come to his second Argument.
2. It was wont to be accounted that man was the image of God, not in respect of the qualities of his mind and will only, but even in respect of his Essence also; And some have been anciently condemned for denying this: why then do we not say that the Essence of man is of the same nature with the Essence of God differing only in degree. In the next place the power of understanding and liberty of will in man a bodily creature, brings him nearest to God, of all bodily creatures: it was wont to be said that all other creatures had vestigia Dei, but man was imago Dei; as in whom is represented the Divine Nature as intelligent and free; so far forth, as a compound creature of body and soul can represent him; but who hath ever said that the understanding of God was of the same nature with the understanding of man: and the will of God of the same nature with the will of man? It is well known that the understanding, and will human, are but natural faculties in man; but the understanding and will Divine, is the very essence of God; and if man's essence be not of the same nature with his faculties, doth it become us to profess that the essence of God is of the same nature with the natural faculties of man? As for the graces of God's spirit, what are these but the three Theological virtues; all other are but Moral virtues sanctified by these; Now show me what Faith there is in God of the same nature with our Faith differing only in degree? What hope there is in God of the same nature with our hope, differing only in degree, what charity there is in God of the same nature with our Charity, differing only in degree. These indeed being of all other the most peculiar fruits of regeneration, whereby we are renewed after the image of God, as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures, should have Attributes divine answerable unto them (if any) of the same nature with them, differing only in degree. Yet herein (as I conceive) consists not so much our participation of the Divine Nature, as in that, the Spirit of God the Father, and God the Son is communicated unto us, given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions spiritual in us.
3. And albeit these Attributes, which in common do denominate God and man, are one thing in God, and in man another: yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God; and striving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures; like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator. And that I may represent some authority for my discourse, whereas this Author represents none for his, it is a point generally received in the Schools, that in this weakness of our understanding, we come to know what God is by negation rather then by affirmation. Capreolus upon the first of the Sentences Dist. 2. Quest. 1. rehearseth diverse passages out of Aquinas to this purpose, as out of 1. Contra Gentes cap. 14.
In consideratione Divinae substantiae praecipue utendum est via remotionis. Nam Divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, suâ excedit immensitate. Et sic ipsam apprehendere non pessumus, cognoscendo quid est, sed aliqualiter ejus notitiam habemus, cognoscendo quid non est; tantóque ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum poterimus ab eo removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectiùs cognoscitur, quanto differentias ejus ab alio pleniùs intuemur. Quià in consideratione Divinae substantiae non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus, nec distinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere possumus; eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas. Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo, quia est, & quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens & ab omnibus remotus: & hoc est ultimum & perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vitâ, ut Dionysius dixit. lib. de Mysticâ Theologiâ. Cum Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur, quod quidem contingit, cùm de Deo, quid non sit, cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitùs manet ignotum: unde & ad hujusmodi sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, dicitur de Mose Exod, 20. quod accessit ad caliginem in qua Deus er at.
In the consideration of the Divine Essence, we must chiefly use the way of negation: for the Divine Essence, through its immensity, doth exceed every form that our understanding can conceive: So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is; but after a sort we have the knowledge thereof, by knowing what it is not. And so much nearer do we approach to the knowledge thereof, the more we are able to remove from the nature of God. For everything is known so much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we do behold how it differeth from other things. Now in the consideration of the Divine essence, we cannot take anything as the Genus thereof; neither can we apprehend its distinction from other things, by differences affirmative; and therefore we must apprehend it by differences negative. The same Thomas in his Third Book Contra Gent. cap. 47. By the effects of God (saith he) we may attain to know that God is, and that he is the cause of other things eminent above them, and removed from them all: and this is the last and most perfect degree of our knowledge in this life, as saith Dionysius in his Book of Mystical Divinity: We are conjoined with God as unknown which verily comes to pass, when we know of God what he is not, but what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us; and therefore to demonstrate our ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses Exod. 20. that he came unto the darkness where God was.
The same Capreolus proceeds to show out of Aquinas in 1 Sent. Dist. 8. q. 1. art. 1. ad 4. How we must make progress in our knowledge of God, by way of remotion or negation.
Quando, inquit, in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis, primo negamus corporalia, & Secundo intellectualia, secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas & sapientia, & tunc remanet in intellectu Quod est, & nihil amplius, unde est, sicut in quadam confusion.
When (saith he) we proceed by way of remotion, or negation, in searching out the Divine nature, first we deny of him all corporal things, and secondly we deny of him all intellectual things, after such a sort as they are found in the creatures, as godnesse and wisdom, (mark this well for these and such like are the virtues which this Author saith are of the same nature in God and man differing only in degree) and then there remains in the understanding, id quod est (as much as to say 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ens) and nothing more; and hence the understanding remains as in a certain confusion.
And indeed the notion of entity is most general, most abstract, and if any notion signifies one and the same nature, such as may be affirmed of God and the creature, surely this is it. Now observe Aquinas his judgment concerning this, out of the same Capreolus in these words.
Ad ultimum autem, Essentiam ipsam, secundum quod est in creature is, ab ipso removemus, & tunc remanet (intellectus noster) in quadam tenegrâ ignorantiae; secundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viae pertinet, optime Deo conjungimur, ut Dionysius dicit, & haec est caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur.
To the last (I answer) the very entity or existence in the creatures we remove from God, and then our understanding remains in the darkness of ignorance; according to which ignorance, so far forth as it pertains to our condition (as Viatores) and in the way, we are conjoined with God in the best manner; as Denis saith: and this is the darkness, wherein God is said to dwell.
By this let any man judge, whether this Authors discourse be not as opposite to the discourse of Aquinas, as touching the nature of God in resemblance to ours, as the Antipodes are to us. And withal I do not find throughout his discourse following, that he makes any use of these premises. And indeed there is no need of them at all: For if he cannot prove this Doctrine of ours repugnant either to God's Mercy, or to his Truth, or to his Justice, these premises will stand him in no stead: and if he can prove it to be repugnant to those Attributes of his, his argument shall stand in the same force, as well without these premises as with them.
Now, how well he makes good the repugnancy of our Doctrine to God's mercy, we are in the next place to consider.
DISCOURSE. SECT. II. As touching the First Special. God's Mercy.
1. IT opposeth God's mercy. God is merciful. It is a great part of his Title. Exod. 34. 6. Merciful and gracious. He is mercy in the abstract: 1 John 4. 16. God is love. A Father of mercies, and God of all consolations. 2 Cor. 1. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Savior of men. 1 Tim. 4. 10. Two ways is the mercy of God spoken of in Scripture, 1. absolutely, 2. comparatively. 1. Absolutely; and so it is set out in lofty and stately terms; its called rich mercy. Ephes. 2. 4. Great kindness. John 4. 2. Abundant mercy. 1 Pet. 1. 3. Love without height or depth, breadth or length, or any dimensions: love passing knowledge. Ephes. 3. 18, 19.
2. Comparatively. It is compared with his own justice, and with the love that dwells in the creatures, and is advanced above both.
1. It is sometimes compared with his justice, and advanced above that, not in respect of its essence; for all God's excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; but in other things that concern the expressions of it, particularly in these,
1. In the naturalness and dearness of it unto God. It is said of mercy, Mich. 7. 18. It pleaseth him, or he delights in mercy, but justice and judgment is called his strange work, alienum a naturâ suâ. Isai. 28. 21. He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men. Lam. 3. 33.
2. In the frequent exercise of it self, Exod. 34. 6. He is slow to anger but abundant in goodness. Mercies are bestowed every day, judgments inflicted but now and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy. 2 Chron. 36. 15. All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people. Isai. 65. 2. that is, I have been patient a long time, and in that long day I have not been idle, but employed in exhortations, promises, and many mercies, whereby I might do you good. God waits long for men's conversion, as the Mariner for the turning of the wind.
3. In its amplitude or objects to whom it is extended. Exod 20. 5. Visiting the iniquities of Fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation, but showing mercy to thousands: implying that his mercy is more largely extended then his justice and that look how much three or four come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in exercise of it.
4. In the occasions that move God to exercise them: It is a great matter that moves God to punish, as we may see, Gen. 6. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13. When the wickedness of man was great upon the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way then God thinks of punishment. He would not destroy the Amorites, till their wickedness was full, Gen. 15. 16. Quoties volui (saith Christ to Jerusalem) Math. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered you, that is, I have not taken advantages against you: nor upon the first, second, or third unkindness cast you off, small matters have not moved me to destroy thee O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare man? When God had examined Sodom, and found their sins to be answerable to their cry, yet then for ten righteous men's sakes would he have spared Sodom. Gen 18. 32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet by searching, could have found one man that did execute judgment, and seek the truth Jer. 5. 1. What a small and slender Humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time. 1 King. 21. 29. And the repentance of Neneve, whose wickedness cried to the Lord for vengeance; Jonas • . 2. did easily procure her a pardon.
Thus is God's Mercy advanced above his justice.
2. It is also compared with the affection of a Father to his Son, of a tender mother to her child, and of the most affectionate brute creatures to their young ones, and set above them all. It goes beyond a Fathers affection to his Son. Matth. 7. 11. If you that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him? What doth this [quando magis] imply? but that God's love outstrips a Fathers? and so it doth a Mothers too, Isai. 49. 15. Can a Woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the Son of her womb? yea she may forget, yet will I not forget thee. Women are compassionate towards their Children, because they are the fruit of their wombs, and are a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children to whom they are Nurses, as well as Mothers, to their sucking children: and yet Women may forget their children, their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children. And as if those comparisons were too small to express God's affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther, and compares himself, with one of the most affectionate Females among unreasonable creatures, the [Hen] Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem Jervsalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a Hen gathereth her chicken under her wings? No bird (saith August.) expresseth such tender love to her young ones, as the Hen doth. Videmus nidificare Passeres quoslibet, ante oculos nostros, herundines, circonias, columbas quotidie videmus nidificare, quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parents esse non agnoscimus. Gallina vero sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiamsi ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelliges: Ita fit alis demissis, plumis hispida, voice rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta, ut (quemadmo dum dixi) et si filios non videas matrem tamen intelligas. No Fowls discover themselves to be Mothers, so much as Hennes do: others when we see them in their nest with their young, we know them to be Mothers, but no way else: but the Hen discovers her self to be so, even then when her Chickens do not follow her, her feathers stand up, her wings hang down, she clocks mournfully, and goes feebly; so that we may know her to be a Mother, when yet we cannot see her brood. He hath also such another speech in another place, and concludes it with these Words, Quare ergo Dominus, nisi propter hoc, Gallina esse voluit, in sanctâ Scripturâ dicens. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, quoties volui te congregare ut gallina, &c. Our Lord and Savior did therefore compare himself to a Hen, rather then any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight.
By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of God's mercy, especially in the expressions of it to Mankind; To which testimonies let me add these few more, Psal. 8. 4. Lord what is man that thou art mindful of him, &c. Prov. 8. 31. In the children of men did the wisdom of God delight himself, when the foundations of the earth were appointed. He took not the nature of Angels but the seed of Abraham. Heb. 2. 16. When the bountifulness and love of God our Savior toward man appeared. Tit. 3. 4. ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) the original word is: where do we read of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . More merciful is God to man, then to all other creatures.
With such a mercy cannot stand such a decree; absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me thinks) more properly call God a Father of cruelties, then of mercies, and [hatred then of love:] and the Devils names, [Satan and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] an adversary, a destroyer may be fitter for him then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Savior; which I tremble to think. Doth mercy please him, when he of his own will only hath made such a decree, as shows far more severity towards poor men, then mercy? Is he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men in Hell torments forever, and for one sin once committed, hath shut up the greater part of men under invincible unbelief and damnation? Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend it self farther then justice, when it is tackt up so short, limited to a few chosen ones, when 100 for one at least, (take in all parts of the World) are unavoidably cast away, out of his only will and pleasure? Or doth his love pass knowledge, when we see daily greater love then this in men and other creatures? What Father and Mother (that have not only cast off Fatherhood and Motherhood, but humanity too) (so the Authors Copy hath it) would determine their children to certain death, or to cruel torments worse then death, for one only offense, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and only imputed unto them? How much less would they give themselves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallows, and such like tortures and deaths?
But to deliver things a little more closely. Four things (in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is incompatible with God's mercy.
1. That Adams sin was the sin of man's nature only, and no man's personal transgression but Adams; it was neither committed, nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons.
2. That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation, for then the sins of our Grand-fathers and Fathers, would be our sins also, because we come from them: and they would be our sins so much the more, by how much nearer we are to the stock, from which we do immediately spring, then to the first root and common Father of Mankind. It is the sin of our nature by imputation only, it was God's will that he should stand up for a public person, and that in him all men should stand or fall. This is generally granted by Divines, and particularly by that excellent servant of God M. Calvin. Ne{que} enim factum est (saith he) ut a salute exciderant ommes unius parentis culpâ. And a little after (he saith) Hoc cum naturae nequeat ascribi, ab admirably Dei consilio profectum esse minime obscurum est. And a little after, thus: unde factum est, ut tot gentes uuà cum earum liberis, infantibus, aeterna morte involveret lapsus Adae abs{que} remedio, nisi quia Deo it à visum est.
3. That God did pardon it in Adam, who did actually and voluntarily commit it in his own person.
4. That Christ came into the World to take away peccatum mundi, the sin of the World. John. 1. 29. That God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the blood of the Covenant for all man kind, and without any impeachment to justice, might have opened a way of Salvation to all and every man.
These things being well considered, will make no man (I think) to conclude in his thoughts, that if there be any such decree, God is not merciful to man at all: much less is he more merciful (supposing this decree) to men, then he is to other creatures, but more sharp and severe then he is to other creatures, to the Devils themselves.
1. To other creatures, because the most of men are determined by his omnipotent decree, to such a being, as is a thousand times worse then no being at all; whereas other creatures, even the basest of them, though they perhaps have but a contemptible being, yet they have such a being as is much better then no being at all: it is far better not to be at all, then to be eternally miserable without any possibility of the contrary: for so saith our Savior speaking of Judas: It had been good for that man if he never had been borne. Men would not have accepted of life and being, when first they entered upon possession of it, if they had known upon what hard conditions it was to be tendered, and that it was to be charged with such an interest, as can no ways be recompensed by the benefits of life; or (did men firmly believe this decree) they would at adventure, with Job, curse their birth-day, be willingly released from the right of creatures, and desire that their immortal souls might vanish into nothing. What Minutius saith of Pagans, might be truly affirmed of men in general; Malunt extingui penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari. Nay Parents out of pity to their Children, would wish that they might be borne Snakes and Toads, rather then men; and creatures, whose being shall at last be resolved into nothing, rather then immortal Spirits.
2. Then to the very Devils also, who are set forth in Scripture, to be the greatest spectacles of God's wrath, and ireful severity. In one thing this decree makes most men and Devils equal, Utris{que} desperata salus, they are both sure to be damned; but in three things men are in a far worse condition by it.
1. In their appointment to Hell, not for their own proper personal sins, for which the Devils suffer, but for the sins of another man, made theirs only By God's order and pleasure.
2. In their inevitable destination to destruction, under a show of the contrary. The Devils, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, even those that are appointed unto wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of Salvation, and made to believe that the whole business is put into their hands; so as that if they do perish, it is not [defectu misericordiae] because God hath no mercy on them, but [defeclu voluntatis propriae,] because they will not be saved, when yet there is no such mercy. Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable, then the condition of men in this respect, is made by this decree to be worse then the state of Devils.
3. In their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The Devils, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ, nor is their punishment increased by not believing: but poor men, who (by this decree) can scape Hell no more then the Devils, must yet be tied to believe in Christ, and must have their torments increased if they believe not. These things being so (I think) I may conclude that this decree of absolute reprobation overthrows the mercy of God in general, and toward mankind.
Nor doth that quiet my mind, which is usually answered to these objections; viz. That God by this decree, doth fully manifest his justice and his mercy too; his justice towards the Reprobates, and his mercy toward the chosen vessels: and that it is necessary that his decrees shall be so ordered, as that both these may be clearly manifested by them. This (I say) doth not satisfy; for,
1. God's mercy is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension, and surmounting his justice, in its objects and expressions. Now such a mercy as this, set forth with such glorious titles, clothed with such lovely properties, and exceeding the ability of any man's conception, such a mercy (I say) is not manifested by this decree.
2. Neither is the pure and spotless justice of God set forth by this absolute decree, as I now come to show. this being my second argument, drawn from the Attributes of God, against absolute reprobation.
TWISSE. Consideration.
HEre we have a great deal of noise, and the most wasteful discourse that ever I yet met withal, in the enlarging of a most hungry argument; the answer whereunto himself perceives, and sets down (as he thinks good) in a few words, after three large leaves spent in the enlarging of his opposition; namely to this effect; that whatsoever he can say, in the advancing of God's mercy we willingly acknowledge: but withal we say, this mercy of God which makes God so glorious, is peculiarly manifested towards the vessels of mercy, whom God hath prepared unto glory, in distinction from the vessels of wrath, as we read Rom. 9. 23. and that in a higher degree then he hath mentioned; this being one special end, why God suffereth with long patience, the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, Rom. 9. 22. namely, That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory, v. 23. And after so much froth of words spent to no purpose unless to beguile his reader, and dull him with verbosity, that he might not attend, and observe how accurately he performs in the issue, that which he intends. Consider (I beseech you) what a meager and starveling reply he puts to this. God's mercy (saith he) is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apppehension; we grant all this, and add that it is glorious also; and makes the partakers of it to rejoice, with joy unspeakable and glorious; but this belongs only to them that believe, and to certain who are called vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, Rom. 9. 22, 23. which vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, must needs be the elect only, in distinction from Reprobates: with what face can he deny, that such a mercy is manifested on the Elect by our Doctrine?
2. I farther add that such a mercy is not manifested by his Doctrine as by ours, for the glory of God's mercy consists in this, that it is of free grace pardoning our sins, regenerating us, changing our hearts, giving faith and repentance to some, when he denies it to others; all this I say is of mere grace, by our Doctrine without respect to any preparation or qualification in man; according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: this is not their Doctrine, if it were, I see no cause of any material difference between us.
3. And I find it strange, that men should grow to such a degree of immodesty, as to affect singularity, and to show a dexterity, in such sort to advance God's mercy, as to obscure and deface his grace, as this Author doth; for all along you shall not find him to magnify God's free grace: whereas Mercy shown to one rather then to another, in respect of his being better disposed for the receiving of it more then another, is rather of the nature of justice, then of Mercy distinct from justice.
4. And to this purpose he takes no pains to set down, wherein this mercy consists, which he so much amplifies, but carrieth it throughout in hugger mugger, and in the clouds of generality, that it might appear the more likely, to be indifferently extended to all; and albeit sometimes he expresseth it, to be the love of a Father towards his children, yet it is too too probable, that he extends this to all and everyone, as the children of God by creation; And therefore particulates not wherein it consists, as namely whether in mercy temporal or spiritual; and as touching mercy spiritual, whether this be not the pardoning of men's sins, together with the illumination of the mind, sanctification of the will, change of the heart, and giving of faith, repentance, obedience, and final perseverance therein. For had he particulated those, he had apparently marred his own market, and been driven to loose that in retaile, which he hoped to gain in gross; For these mercies are not extended to all. But their meaning is, God offers these to all, and that any fail of them, it is because man disposeth not himself for the receiving of them. This is the issue of his advancing God's mercy, utterly to disparage the freedom of God's grace. Now of the Divine mercy in this sense, to wit, as freely extended to all, he hath not one word throughout, as I can remember, in so vast premises; all that he speaks of the extension of God's mercy to variety of objects, is dispatched in three lines of these his three large leaves; as where he saith, his mercy is more largely extended then his justice, and that look how much three or four come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it; And upon this poor interpretation, he grounds the only substantial part of his reply, to our answer to this his argument. For to say that God's mercy is rich, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension, is nothing to the purpose. For all this hinders not, but that the application of it may be, and is, made only to certain vessels, who are called vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, Rom. 9. 22. 23. Therefore he adds, That it surmounts his justice in its objects and expressions: wherein what he means by its expressions, I know not. For I find no comparison made by him between God's mercy and his justice in its expressions; but only in respect of the objects, and there the expression of justice, seems more quick then the expression of mercy: And as for the extension of mercy, to more then justice is extended to, he dispatcheth in three lines, as I said, of these three leaves of his discourse. But let us see what force he finds in that comparison to serve his turn. First he saith the comparison is between three and four on the one side, and a thousand on the other, as if the odds were a thousand to three or four: but how doth he prove that? The Text compares three or four generations to thousands; not to a thousand generations, but to thousands: and he boldly conceives it to be understood of thousands of generations; though it be much more then the World consists of, from the beginning of the World to the end of it: For suppose the World shall last seven or eight thousand years; how many years will he allow to a generation? Suppose he allow but twenty, to explode the custom of the Germans of whom Tacitus writes, that Sera virginum venus, which to this day is continued: yet a thousand of such generations must make the World to consist of twenty thousand years: But if it consist but of seven or eight thousand years, you must allow but seven or eight years to a generation, to make up one thousand generations. Then again the World was now two thousand years old when this was delivered, so that it had not above six thousand years to continue, and accordingly but six years was from thenceforth to be allowed to a generation; And all this liberality of allowance, is no more then will make the child a coat, to complete one thousand generations; whereas the Text speaks of thousands in the plural number, and the least of plurality is two thousand; so that to help this, we must allow but three years to a generation, by which account they had need be married at two, and have a child at three, and who then should rock the cradle? But leave we these fooleries, and content ourselves with the plain Text, and not piece it out with our brainsick additions. We know that for Abraham's sake who feared him, and for the covenants sake he made with him, he had mercy on thousands of his posterity, to bring them out of Egypt, six hundred thousand men from twenty years old to threescore, and take them unto him to be his peculiar people, which continued for the space of about 1600 years; and now for 1600 years they have been cast off from being his people. And of the goodness of God towards Abraham, in choosing his seed after him, even many thousands of them, the Jews had sensible experience that very day he spake unto them from Mount Sinai; he did not mean to trouble their brains with any Algebra in counting up a thousand generations. But suppose this were granted him; yet these that fear him, being only within the pale of his Church, what a small handful were these, in comparison to all the world of heathens besides, that hated him? Mark what difference S. Paul puts between the Jews and the Gentiles, when he saith, we Jews by nature, not sinners of the Gentiles. Gal. 2. And the Psalmist before him Psal. 147. He showeth his word unto Jacob, his statutes and ordinances to Israel, he hath not dealt so with every nation, neither have they known his judgments. According whereunto the Apostle having demanded, saying, What is then the preferment of the Jew? or what is the profit of circumcision? Answereth thus, Much every way, and chiefly because unto them were committed the Oracles of God. Rom. 3. 1, 2. And the same Apostle doth not acknowledge the Gentiles to have obtained mercy at the hands of God, until the time of their calling by the Ministry of the Gospel. Rom. 11. 30. in these words: Ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief. This might suffice for answer to this argument, taking it in the full strength thereof. But I am content to run over the whole discourse, and to take every part of it into consideration.
1. He saith, God is mercy in the abstract, and Love. By this it is apparent that the Attributes Divine, are the very Essence Divine, otherwise they could not be predicated thereof in the abstract, and consequently, they can no more be of the same nature with virtues Moral in us, then the Divine Essence can be of the same nature with an accident.
2. He is a Savior of men; true, and it is as true: that he saveth both man and beast: and as for men, though he be a Savior of them all, yet in special sort of them that believe.
3. When he saith of the love of Christ, that it is without height, and depth, and length, and breadth, he doth overlash: for the Apostles prayer is in the place quoted by him on the behalf of the Ephesians, that Christ may dwell in their hearts by Faith, that being rooted and grounded in love, they may be able to comprehend with all Saints, what is the breadth and length, and depth, & height. For though the height of it be such, as is incomprehensible by us in this World, yet the Apostle supposeth an height, depth, length, and breadth thereof, rather then denies it.
4. He saith God's Mercy is advanced above his Justice; not in respect of its essence, for all God's excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; but in things that concern the expressions of it. Here we have words, but can any wise man draw it to any sober sense? What I pray is it to advance mercy above justice, in things that concern the expressions of it?
He saith it is more natural and dear to God then his justice: what reason is there for this, if the one be equally as excellent as the other? To make this good with some color at least; he allegeth Mich. 7. 18. Mercy pleaseth him, or he delights in it. The like we read Jer. 9 24. namely, that God delights in mercy: and in the same place the Lord professeth jointly, that he delights in judgment. But Isaiah 28. 21. Judgment is called his strange work; Now three several times, have I received this, from three several hands of Arminians; each giving the same interpretation of it, as if it were called a strange work, because it is alienum a naturâ Dei. I know none but Papists do justify them in this interpretation; in my judgment a most unreasonable exposition; the Lord taking unto himself the execution of judgment, as his peculiar, saying, vengeance is mine and I will repay; And Magistrates are but God's Ministers for this; And he professeth his delight in this as well as in the execution of mercy. It is true he doth not inflict judgment without cause, for that were not a work of judgment in proper speech, but of power, and absoluteness rather, as in turning a holy and innocent creature into nothing. And in that respect he is said not to afflict willingly; sin always deserving it. Mercy is of another nature, and supposeth free grace, though I find little or no notice this Author takes of this, throughout his discourse; Neither do I find that he or any Arminian acknowledge, that the change of a man's heart is wrought in a man of the mere grace of God, without any motive cause in the creature. Neither do all Papists concur in this interpretation, for Lyra and Burgensis are together by the ears hereabouts; and our Divines as Junius and Piscator do render it, opus insolens & terribile, an unusual and terrible judgment, interpreting it of bringing the Babylonians upon them; so strange a work, that they should wonder at it. And as Moses foretold, that God should bring upon them Wonderful judgments. Deut. 28. So the Prophet Habakkuk sets it forth in like manner. Abak. 1. 5. Behold among the Heathen, and regard and wonder and marvel, for I will work a work in your days; you will not believe it, though it be told you. For loe, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and furious nation, which shall go upon the breadth of the Land to possess the dwelling places that are not theirs. And, Jer. 19. 3. Behold I will bring a plague upon this place which whosoever heareth his ears shall • ingle. For seeing God's laws are strange things unto them. Hos. 8. 12. God would bring such judgments upon them, that should be as strange unto them. And in the same phrase it is said that destruction is to the wicked, and strange punishment to the workers of iniquity. Job. 31. 3. Yet be this granted him, it is nothing to the purpose. For be it never so deer unto God, yet if he restraineth his chief mercy which consists in changing the heart (whereof this Author seems unwilling to take any distinct notice) only to the Elect, called accordingly in Scripture vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, which are the Reprobates, this nothing prejudiceth the absoluteness of reprobation.
And as for the frequent exercise thereof; we read, Zeph. 3. 5. That every morning God bringeth his judgments to light: and as for the mercy which consists in regenerating man, which alone is to the present purpose; it is apparent, that it is far less frequently shown, then the contrary judgment in obduration; And certainly the vessels of mercy are by far fewer then the vessels of wrath: and as for temporal mercies, the more frequent they are, the worse, where the spirit of regeneration is wanting, through the corruption of man, that makes him thereupon the more obdurate.
The vanity of the next, as touching the amplitude of the objects whereto mercy is extended (though this alone is to the present purpose) I have already sufficiently discovered; it being apparent that in Scripture phrase, only the Elect are counted vessels of mercy, and all the rest vessels of wrath.
As there be examples of God's long suffering and patience, so we have fearful examples of the suddainesse of God's judgments, taking Men and Women away in the very act of sin. Thus the Israelites in the Wilderness, when the flesh of Quails was in their mouth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and sent them to the graves of lust. Zimri and Cozbi perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together. Balshazzar a King, cut off in his drunken revells, to make good the Prophecy of Isaiah, The night of my pleasures hath he turned into fear unto me. And in like manner the wrath of God seized upon Herod in his pride. But above all, this appears in God's dealings with his Angels, who sinned once, and fell forever without all hope of recovery. And as for God's sparing a man in case God gives not repentance, what will be the issue, but filling up of the measure of their sins? For to speak in Austin's language, Contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis agit paenitentiam? Now the case is clear, God gives repentance to a very few, who are in Scripture called vessels of mercy; which nothing at all prejudiceth the absoluteness of reprobation.
5. Of the riches of God's mercies to his children, we nothing doubt: but what doth this prejudice the absoluteness of reprobating those whom he never meaneth to make his children? But here it is to be suspected, that this Author accounts all and everyone the children of God; for forthwith he confounds this notion with the notion of creatures, quite contrary to the most general current of Scripture, not of the New Testament only, which teacheth us, that we are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. Gal. 3. and if children then heirs, even heirs of God, and heirs annexed with Christ. Rom. 8. But of the Old Testament also. Gen. 6: 2. The sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, &c. Exod. 4. 22. Thou shalt say to Pharaoh, thus saith the Lord, Israel is my Son, my first borne; wherefore I say, let my Son go that he may serve me: if thou refuse to let him go, behold I will visit thy Son, even thy first borne. Deut. 14. 1. Ye are the children of the Lord your God. 2. Thou art an holy people to the Lord thy God, and the Lord hath chosen thee to be a precious people to himself, above all the people that are upon the earth.
That of the Hen, though we give him liberty to amplify her natural affections, as one of the most affectionate Females among unreasonable creatures, yet doth it nothing profit him for it represents God's love appropriated to his Children, which nothing prejudiceth the absoluteness of his power reprobating others. Nay rather as it justifies his absoluteness in electing them, if we consider the mere grace of God to have made the difference, as the Scripture showeth. Deut. 7. 7. The Lord loved you because he loved you; and Deut. 9. at large he beats them out of all conceit of any righteousness in them, moving the Lord to plant them in the Land of Canaan; so by consequent it justifies the Doctrine of absolute reprobation also: for as much as the Apostle professeth, that like as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardeneth whom he will. Yet hereis much matter made of the Hen; like as D. Jackson hath done it before him, but he betrays no such authority for it out of Austin as this Author doth: to whom he is beholding for it, himself best knoweth; If the pedigree be inquired into, their conceits may be found to be of kin; yet give me leave to say somewhat of this similitude also.
And first, this Author commits a very great Anomaly, in entering upon it with such state, as proves nothing answerable to his own profession anon after, almost in the same breath. Mark the state (I pray) of his entrance hereupon, thus: And as if these comparisons were too small too express God's affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther: now the comparisons preceding were taken from reasonable creatures, as namely from Fatherly and Motherly affections (amongst men) towards their children; and these comparisons he signifies to have been to small, to express God's affections to his creatures: and that therefore the Lord proceeds farther, and compares himself to a Hen, which he saith is one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures; not daring to say, tis more affectionate then creatures reasonable; yet most improvidently carried away with affectation of a Rhetorical flourish, he faignes a gradation from creatures less affectionate, to creatures more affectionate, and presently himself beats out the brains of his invention, (before he is aware) as soon as it is borne.
As for Austin's amplification of the affectionate nature of an Hen above other creatures; we may consider that Austin's Tractates on John, are of the nature of Sermons, and therein the ancients do accommodate themselves to popular amplifications. It is true we do not know Sparrowes, Swallows, Storks, Doves, to be Mothers, but when we see them in their nests; but what is the true reason hereof? Is it not because their young ones are wild, and as soon as they are apt to fly, one flies one way, and another flies another way, they come together no more; it is not so with chickens which are tame creatures, and we see the carriage of the Hen towards them, we do not see the carriage of other fowls towards their young ones.
Yet we read not the like of a Hen, as of a Stork, that when her nest was on fire, out of a desire to save them with her wings from the fire, hath not forsaken her young ones till she was burnt her self; And we have seen also how a Hen hath sometimes peckt her young ones, and driven them from her, when they would have roosted under her.
And in my judgment our Savior doth not represent his tender affection to the Jews, by the general affection of an Hen to hers, but to that particular carriage of hers in desiring to gather her chickens under her wings. Neither do I think that he who invited those mighty men, but unto what? unto a Hen, was to express his singularity of affection towards them: be it that God is more merciful to man then to all other creatures; whence I pray proceeds this? is it not merely from the good pleasure of his own will? and if so, why may he not, out of the mere pleasure of his own will restrain his saving mercy to some few, who are accordingly called in Scripture expressly vessels of mercy; distinguished from all the rest who are called vessels of wrath.
Whereas he saith, that with such a mercy cannot stand such a Decree, as absolute reprobation. We answer; neither do we say any such decree doth stand with such a mercy; it is rather absolute election stands with such a mercy, then any reprobation. The Scripture plainly giving us to understand, that they on whom reprobation passeth, are not vessels of mercy, but vessels of wrath. But like as God though he spared not Angels when they fell, nor left any way open unto them for repentance, whereby to return to his grace and favor, yet he spared man, and left a way open unto him, to return to his grace and favor by faith in Christ. In like sort, though God were pleased absolutely to elect some amongst men, yet this nothing precludes him from dealing as absolutely in reprobating others, that is, in purposing to deny them the spirit of faith and repentance, whereby they might rise after they were fallen; which grace most freely and absolutely he decreed to bestow, and as freely and absolutely he doth bestow on others, according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9. 18. he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. By this I pray judge of the insipid nature of this discourse, yet see the foulness of his mouth; unless God be indifferent unto all, and make all vessels of mercy, he is a Father of Cruelty, and more properly so to be called, then a Father of mercies, and the very name of the Devil (for so he takes upon him to interpret that name in the Revelation 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Destroyer) is good enough for him. And the conscience of his own piety, no doubt expert in Paraphrasing, and shaping some Rhetorical flourishes, and passionate expressions, bears him out with such confidence as to fear no Blasphemy. It is very likely he hath a high conceit of these performances, that he is so bold, as to profess in effect, that if the contrary be true, then will he be guilty of as great Blasphemy, as to have called God Satan; yet see the absurdity (that throughout he may be like himself) of his discourse; whatsoever God be accounted by him in respect of reprobates, doth this any way hinder him from being the Father of mercies towards his elect, who alone in Scripture phrase are called