The Riches of Gods Love

WHo are these Authors of this Doctrine, who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard? Is Beza those Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the mere pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of man's faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years ago, and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foresight of sin, but of the mere pleasure of God? Is this Author so ignorant, as not to know what are the conclusions of Alvarez in the question, Whether there be any cause of reprobation on man's part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. disc. 110. pag. 866.

1. His first Conclusion is this, Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some everlasting life, and to permit their sin, is not conditionate, but absolute: neither doth it presuppose in God, foresight of the deserts of reprobates, or of their perseverance in sin unto the last period of their life.

2. His next Conclusion is, In the Angels that fell, there is no cause of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foresight of their future sin, God, pro sua Voluntate, of his mere will, did reprobate some of them, and suffered them to fall into sin.

3. The third, Infants departing in Original sin alone, there is no cause on their part of reprobation, if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years.

4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation. Therefore neither sin actual, nor original, nor both of them foreseen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proof hereof he prosecutes at large.

5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof, presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sin original, or actual, for which a reprobate is damned. Mark it well, He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cause for which a reprobate is damned. And Aquinas (whose followers the Dominicans are) expresseth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez. Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata, &c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Prescience of sins may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment, to wit, in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sins. Where sin is evidently made the cause of damnation, and that by virtue of God's purpose, but by no means the cause of the decree it self. And the same Aquinas elsewhere professeth that, No man was so mad as to affirm that merits are the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cause thereof, he proves, because nothing can be the cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The same doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the same distinction to reprobation it self. Odium aeternum, saith he, implies two things, Principale significatum & connotatum &c. & primum non est ex meritis, sed secundum. This he explicates in the words following, Quod patet si resolvatur, quia Odium est propositum puniendi: Propositum autem nullus meretur sed paenam, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is God's purpose to punish: Of this divine purpose there is no meritorious cause, but only of the punishment. The same was the Opinion of Gandavensis, Scotus, Halensis, as I have shown in my Vindiciae.

Now judge I pray with how little judgment, or modesty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of absolute reprobation. Perhaps he will say his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predestination mankind not yet created. But to this I answer, that Beza doth so indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and consequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be understood of this nice and Logical point, as touching the object of reprobation. The main question is, whether there be any cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongst School-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that those I have named did shrink in their heads or decline the trial thereof? What a silly thing is it then to infer, that because Beza at such a time, did decline the disputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonstrants at another time, therefore it is suspectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his instances.

Beza he saith did decline the sifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predestination) (for on that they were moved to dispute.) I doubt this Author speaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the story hereof, either in Osiander or in Beza, but transcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Osianders History, that they did confer thereof. It is true he stood off at the first, and gave reasons for it, but at length he and his fellows, condescended to the instance and importunity of their Adversaries, and so came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are these. Praefat. in 2. part. Response. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quo evasura essent reliqua satis prospiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata sententia Illustriss. Principe salutato, in reliquam sequentem Collationem consensimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paschae Festum, ea disceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae declamationes rursum processimus.

Was it this point alone the sifting whereof, as this Author phraseth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no less then three Points. This appears by the second part of Beza's answer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as also by the answer of Jacobus Andreae, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they list not De Tribus illis confer, yet he thought it fit that Theses written by them on those three Articles should be rehearsed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellows might take home with them to address an answer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And these three Articles were concerning, Predestination, Baptism, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reasons, why he thought it fit they should entertain farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes answer in his Praeface to that second part of his Answer Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg. It is true, this reason Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publicly to dispute thereof, to wit, of predestination, Quod haec gravissima quaestio publice in illo caetu allatis utrin{que} contrariis sententiis disceptari abs{que} nonnullorum offendiculo non posse videretur. For both the mysterious nature of it is such, as few are capable of it; the Massilienses professed as much, as appears in Prospers Epistle unto Austin, De his taceri exigunt (saith Prosper) quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit. And to the same purpose, even they who durst not dislike Austin's doctrine thereof professed as much, as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Austin. Consentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non advent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujusmodi disputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari? Then again it was in a Lutheran Assembly, and amongst many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exasperated. Causas verum tacendi tongum est omnes quaerere (saith Austin) quarum tamen est & haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligent. No wise man, saith our Savior, putteth new wine into old bottles. Quanto minus sapit, saith Beza in that Preface of his, qui de praest antissimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc, & vappa obsitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet. Lastly, Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas standing upon a place of advantage, to urge them to confer upon such a point, the truth whereof is most harsh to carnal affections, that so he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what Jacobus Andreas was, I know not, but Beza sets him forth as a man of a most malevolent disposition to the French Protestants: and our Savior hath admonished us, Not to give that which is holy unto dogs, or to cast pearl before swine. Yet Andreas to serve his turn, and to draw them into a snare, pleads that the doctrine of Predestination, is not so to be put over in the Schools, ut non opus sit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere; yet Hunnius a man of the same profession, is so far different from Jacobus Andreas, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of prescience divine, but very sparingly; how much less would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predestination divine? De Praedest. quest. & respons. pag. 394. his words are these, Interim hoc repeto quod supra monui rudioribus (quibus Apostolus vult lac propinari, non cibum solidum apponi) non esse multum de praescientiâ Dei disputandum, hâc solummodo de causa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quae alias in Scholis in Disputationibus contra adversarios, &, ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei astrui solent. Coram rudioribus ergo simplicior loquendi ratio & ipsorum captui accommodatior est si dicamus, Deum ad haereditatem regni caelestis elegisse & certo salvare decrevisse eos omnes qui resipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt. Its well known what order King James took in his time, in the restraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Dean, and counseled the States likewise to forbid the preaching of those controversial points amongst them. And if it were wisdom in them to take this course, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why should Beza's with-holding from conference hereupon, be anything prejudicial thereto.

But were there not other causes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceals, and which Beza proposeth in the first place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Missive, alleged no other cause of that meeting, but Infaelicem de Coenâ Domini controversiam, that unhappy Controversy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Cities sent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cause, but to confer thereabours. This Jacobus Andreas acknowledgeth, and giveth a reason why in those Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of those three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to confer, to wit, quod illos in istis quo{que} dissidere non intellexerat Princeps Illustrissimus. And thirdly, because the Feast of Easter approached, and they desired to be at home in their own Cities by that time.

Lastly, doth if follow, that because they declined the sifting the truth of these points (as this Author phraiseth it) after such a manner, to wit, by public disputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the sifting of it? They made this offer to propose their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if Jacobus Andreas were pleased to propose any Theses against it, they would take them along with them and upon consideration to address a convenient Answer thereunto; This Beza sets down in that Preface: Let D. Andrew's show if he can, saith Beza, hanc Christianae doctrinae partem aut à nostris sive scribendo sive concionando praetermissam, aut a suis rectius & acuratius quàm a nostris pertractatam. And truly for my part, I no way like such conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither such strength of memory as to command a present use of my knowledge in these points upon all occasions, nor such command of my passions, as to keep them from breaking forth in such sort as might be obnoxious to censures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I fear not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almost omitted out of Beza, in his Preface to the First Part of his Answer to these Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things passing between them on both sides, might be set down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this course I confess I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to confer with any. But this so fair a motion was rejected by Andreas; He would confer rather by word of mouth then by writing. A second motion proposed by Beza was this, that what was spoken on both sides, might be set down in writing by Notaries chosen and appointed thereunto by common consent. But neither would Andreas admit of this. Petivimus, saith Beza, initio ut utrin{que} omnia scriptis propria Collocutorum manu subsignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreae non placuisset qui verbis agi malebat (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the most part) postulavi ut utrin{que} dicta à probatis & utrius{que} partis consensu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quae deinde cui{que} parti recognoscere & addita subscriptione confirmare liceret. Haec enim erat profecto justa & sincera colloquendi ratio ut sic falsationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, &c. Now let any indifferent person that is not soured with partial affections, judge whose carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudicial to their cause, the carriage of Andreas, or the carriage of Beza.

I come to the Contra-Remonstrants unwillingness to confer upon the point of reprobation. What their reasons were I know not. But this I am sure of, the Scripture is free in speaking of election, and express; not so of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its opposition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Austin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, speaks liberally of predestination, but very sparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing less mysterious then that of election; so it is far more harsh to carnal affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, Barnavelt that ruled the roast amongst the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.

But, what boldness doth this Author take in passing his suspicious censures upon a doctrine, because some defenders of it, at some time have been loath to come to entertain a public Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonstrants would not be brought to give their reasons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Austin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the absoluteness both of Predestination on the one side, and of preterition on the other (as Vossius acknowledgeth) is to be suspended of untruth? And if my readiness to come to the trial hereon doth nothing credit the cause as maintained by others; why should others unwillingness to come to the same trial, be any disparagement to the same cause, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that Peter Moulin, concurring with us in the point of absolute predestination, maintains reprobation to proceed upon the divine foresight of final perseverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the M ^r Moulin doth, and acknowledged the mere pleasure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I do not think any friend of his would think any whit the worse of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, considering how many worthy Divines opposite to the Arminians, do either conceive, or at least seem to conceive that the purpose of God to damn, doth presuppose in signo rationis the foresight of final impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and so brought forth into the world in damnatâ Massà, as Austin calleth it. God of his mere pleasure cures this natural corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in some, by regenerating them and bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refusing to regegenerate them, to bestow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Christian fellowship, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithstanding some nice differences, which in the issue I hope, will prove to be merely Logical, and nothing Theological.

Lastly, however this point of unwillingness in some, to come to confer in the point of reprobation, might cast some color of suspicion to the prejudicing of their cause; yet least of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, considering that it is his own case, as who declineth not one point only, but all the rest in this his discourse, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing answerably (I presume) to your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be anything answerable to the promise he made unto you, yourself are best acquainted therewith. Yet because the Remonstrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonstrants declining this Controversy) have taken liberty to oppose the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants in this point, so far forth, as they made construction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not spare even here, to digress so far, as to take notice what they delivered, and to address an answer hereunto, the rather because I find this discourse of theirs inserted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.

Now, whereas first, by a long deduction upon consideration of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine in the point of election, they do infer Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, so infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this consequence we utterly deny. It only follows herehence, that like as faith, whereby man's natural infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, so the denial of faith, that is, the not curing of man's infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed considering the means must be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in man's election, the means tending thereunto must be God's work, as namely, faith; in like sort, whatsoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, must be his work, which cannot be infidelity or sin, but the permission of sin rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is natural unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propose two things to be questioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants. 1. Utrumne Fides in consilio & decreto Dei de electione ad salutem, eam ipsam electionem ordine praecedat an vero consequatur? 2, Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Consilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipsam reprobationem ordine praecedat an sequatur? The latter of these is only pertinent to our present purpose; yet seeing they handle them both, so far as to dispute against the opinion of their opposites in both, and carry themselves herein Magnificentissime, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the balance of Scholastical consideration, least some such as this Author, should affect to seem judicious in suspecting my declining of them to savor of some inability to encounter them.

Thus therefore they begin.

If faith follows election unto salvation, then also the decree of sending Christ as a Savior into the World, must necessarily follow that election; But this consequent is absurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Christ.

To this I answer. First out of mine own opinion, Thus.

Faith is supposed to follow Election unto salvation, upon no other ground then because the intention of giving faith, is supposed to follow the intention of giving salvation. But this I should deny, and that for this reason, because this subordination is grounded only upon supposition, that salvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. First, because the end of God's actions, is not the salvation of man, but the manifestation of his own glory. For he made all things for himself, Pov. 16. 4. and reason justifies it. For God being the supreme efficient, must be the supreme end; and being Optimus as well as Maximus, he must needs be both most lovely and most loving, of that which is most lovely, that is, of himself. But because some may conceive that though God's glory be the supreme end, yet man's salvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I answer; First, let such show then what is the glory of God, which salvation of the creature setteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be stated right, it will appear, that not salvation alone, but something else is required to be joined with it; as namely, the mission of Christ, yea and faith in Christ, to complete that means, which tend to the procurement of such an end, that is, to the setting forth of such a glory. Secondly, the end whether supreme or intermediate is always such as being rightly understood, doth break such a means; but salvation is not so in respect of faith; for it doth not bespeak it, as is apparent in the salvation of Angels, of Infants; as also in this, that it was absolutely possible for God to save even sinners without Christ, as may be demonstrated and I have demonstrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reasons.

In a word, if God's supreme end, were the manifestation of his glory on some considered, as merely possible in doing them good in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixed with justice, and that ex Condigno & ex Congruo; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and bespoken hereby, is a body consisting of divers particulars, all together completing the integral means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they must be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifested upon them and permitted to sin, otherwise God could not do them good in the way of mercy, which supposeth misery, but also that a Savior must be sent, and he no less then the Son of God, to deserve the pardon of their sin and salvation, otherwise it could not be in the way of mercy mixed with justice de Condigno: and faith and repentance must be bestowed on them, otherwise the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and lastly, salvation, otherwise good could not be done them in the highest degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predestination of Christ either before or after the Predestination of man; as our British Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predestinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as Aquinas maintained Christ's predestination, and our predestination to be one act in God, and consequently neither could be the cause of another.

Thus have I dispatched mine answer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But supposing the method of the Contra-Remonstrants sound, in making salvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both man's faith in Christ, and Christ's Mission to be intended as means. We deny this to be absurd or ignominious unto Christ. Lets hear how they prove it, thus; If the decree of sending Christ be posterior to the electing of singular persons unto salvation, then the intention of man's salvation was posterior to God's intention of satisfaction to his justice, which say they is absurd and foolish, to wit, to decree the salvation of sinners, unless first he decree satisfaction to his justice. But I answer according to the form of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine: First, by proving their order to be sound: Secondly, by showing the invalidity of the Remonstrants discourse.

First therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, then such as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order most received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Witts consider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of these two, Mans salvation, and Christ's Mission to satisfy for the sin of man. Was ever any man known to be so brainsick as to affirm, that the salvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the sending of Christ into the World to satisfy for the sin of man? On the other side, how fair and plausible is it to affirm, that Christ was sent into the world, to satisfy for man's sin, to this end, that man might be saved? whence it followeth evidently by the most approved rules of Schools, that the intention of man's salvation is in signo rationis, before the intention of sending Christ into the world, to make satisfaction for sin. Again, if Christ's sending into the world to make satisfaction for sin, be first in intention, then it should be last in execution, by rules undeniable, and such as are manifest by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man should be first saved and after that Christ sent into the World, that, by his sufferings, God's justice might be satisfied.

Now I come to the consideration of the Remonstrants argument. The Consequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vain thing for them to cry out, that it is absurd and foolish to say, that the intention of salvation, precedes the intention of satisfying God's justice; for words must not carry it: and it is well known that the most empty vessels give the greatest sound. I have shown how absurd it is to conceive, that man was saved to this end, that God's justice may be satisfied, and that 'tis far more probable to say, That by Christ's sufferings, God's justice was satisfied to this end, that man might be saved. For the salvation of man we say, was not intended by God simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice; which end doth not presuppose the permission of sin, as these Remonstrants shape the matter to varnish over their consequence, with some color of probability: but rather it bespeaks, both the permission of sin, and satisfaction to be made for sin, to the end that so man might be saved, not simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice. But suppose they were considered as sinners, Why should the Remonstrants look strangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God should intend the salvation of sinners in signo rationis, before he intended that his justice should be satisfied? For do not they maintain, that God by power absolute, can pardon sin without all satisfaction? But supposing that God will not pardon sin without satisfaction, in this case they may contend, that God must first intend to take a course, that such satisfaction may be made, and then intend to save. And let them contend but in the name of reason, and not of clamours, and content themselves, with the infatuation of themselves, with such senseless conceits, and not spread this scab unto others also. My reason to the contrary is still the same, namely, that if God be pleased to save sinners in despite of sin, in the way of mercy mixed with justice, the case is clear, that satisfaction for sin, is rather a means of man's salvation, then man's salvation is a means tending to the procurement of satisfaction for sin, and consequently the intention of salvation of sinners, is in reason to precede the intention of procuring satisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet say these Remonstrants, if a man will be so obstinate, as (notwithstanding the felicity of these Remonstranticall wits in fruitful inventions and subtle argumentations) still to deny that there is any absurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have run themselves out of breath. If, say they, the decree of Christ a Savior, be after the election of particular persons unto salvation, it followeth that God did decree some particular men's salvation, before he ordained Christ's merits to procure their salvation; but this is foolish and absurd.

I answer, No more foolish and absurd then the former: and indeed everyone of these consequences for the expressing whereof, they affect to seem very inventious, do savor of no invention at all; the Consequents do so evidently, even everyone of them appear as clearly in the Antecedent, as a man's face in a glass, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much less do they relish of any subtlety of wit. So that all this while, they seem to be in travel with nothing but wind, or sick of the disease called Tenasmus, striving mightily to do somewhat, when indeed they do nothing at all. And our former argument still hath place, and here also applied, doth manifest, that seeing the merits of the son of God are the means of man's salvation, then man's salvation is the end of Christ's merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of man's salvation, as the intention of the end, should precede the intention of sending Christ to merit as the means, rather then to be subordinate unto it. And indeed if the sending of Christ into the World to merit, should be first in intention, then should it be last in execution; that is, All the elect should first be saved, and then Christ should be sent into the world to merit their salvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is so silly as not to perceive, that if the consideration of Christ's obedience, as satisfactory, will not serve their turn, surely neither will the consideration of his obedience as meritorious, stand them in any stead) they put into this Consequence another clause, without all art, and without all honesty, pretending, that hereby we make salvation destinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this case between destination and decree, or as if we make salvation destinated to a man hereby, before it is destinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is salvation) intended before the merits of Christ (which are the means of salvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right wits, say this is to make salvation destinated to a man before it is destinated to him? Farther, it is to be observed, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermost of their strength, and the rather, because it will notably discover either their ignorance, or which is most likely, (for as much as they do not directly insist, as they might upon a new argument far more plausible with the ignorant) their unconscionablenesse. For they signify that hence it will come to pass, that the intention of salvation, being before the intention of finding of Christ to merit, salvation shall exist, being decreed as present to God, before Christ is considered as he that by his Cross hath deserved it. Now had they said before Christ hath deserved it, I should readily have granted it. For I hope none of thē would deny, that the salvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, existed not only before God, but actually and really before Christ was crucified. To prevent this elusion of their argument, they express it thus, Before Christ was considered as he that hath deserved it. Yet here they fall foul upon an indecent expression. For I will be bold to deny, that Christ was considered by God, as one that had deserved man's salvation, before he had deserved it. For before he had deserved it by his Cross, to say, that God considered him as one that had deserved it, is either to err or to feign, neither of which is incident unto God. God considered him from everlasting, as one that in the fullness of time should deserve it, by suffering upon the Cross, not as one that had deserved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amiss. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their salvation were decreed before Christ's merits, then their salvation did exist as present with God before Christ's merits did exist, as present with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to discover their ignorance, which they betray in this. First, neither God's prescience, nor God's decree doth make things to exist, otherwise then in Esse cognito & in esse velito; but this is not to exist. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, ut praesens Deo; which indeed is Terminus diminuens in this case. For it is present to God by virtue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alo • e is to exist. But let this Peccadillio pass. Secondly, Who seeth not that this argument tends to the utter destruction of all distinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any such distinct intentions in God, the one must be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Lets go no farther then the manifestation of God's power and wisdom as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintnesse of this argumentation, that the manifestation of God's wisdom and power in creating the world did exist, as present with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici.

Thirdly, to draw nearer to the discovery of their ignorance. I grant it shall first exist; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no such priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though such a priority in this case is found in man. What then? I will tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you do not apply it to any of the two kinds of priority of nature mentioned by Aristotle. For try if you please, and you shall find that none of them can possibly serve the turn; What then is this priority of nature so called? I answer, it is only Prioritas rationis: And so I formerly said, that the intention of the end is in signo rationis, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this Prioritas rationis consist? I answer out of Durand, it consists in this, that, Ratio unius petitur a ration alterius, and so indeed, Ratio mediorum petitur a ration finis. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For always the nature of the end duly considered, doth bespeak what shall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of existence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly so called, but only such a subordination between them, that the reason of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any sober man judge, Whether the salvation of man be required to the procuring of Christ's merits, and not rather, Christ's merits are required to the procuring of man's salvation; which yet is not true of salvation considered simply, but only as to be bestowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of justice, and by way of satisfaction made for sin, that so a man may be saved by grace in despite of sin. In the close of all they signify that this of theirs in the last place seriously considered will make it appear, that this doctrine of their Adversaries, tends notably to the diminution of Christ's honor, and to the annihilation of Christ's merits, to wit, unless Christ's merits be acknowledged the end of man's salvation, and not man's salvation the end of Christ's merits, Christ shall be dishonored, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be supplied by the serious (they should say ignorant) consideration of their Proselytes. They presume this color of dishonor redounding hereby to Christ, will be sufficient to blow up their Adversaries, though it prove of no more force then a squibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the English at Delfe, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Soldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes house, and another being a Goldsmith, told him and another consort of theirs, he had a devise to put money in all their purses, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence sylver, and in that Widdowes house they would ply their business very securely. To work they went, and casting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of those Dolars, and stamping them full and fair, this Gold-smith, with the quantity of three pence silver, sylvered them over very fairly, and, least they should seem too light, hangs them up in the chimny in a bag, that the smoke might bring them to the sadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is employed as a Merchant-man to go to the Staple of Cloth, and he lays out their coin in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good silver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe, in one of these Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray some suspicious gestures and interpretations upon the coin. That was a fair warning to an intelligent man of arms; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all speed; and home they come, and make themselves merry with the relation. In like sort these Remonstrants show a great deal of Tinne and trash in these argumentations, and they have not so much as three pence silver to color it therewithal to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the color of some dishonor by their adversaries doctrine redounding unto Christ, will be taken for a piece at least of good silver. I confess, I am somewhat the more merrily disposed at this time, For being taken off from the midst of a sentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inn: He was pleased to entertain me with such good discourse, that it did not a little refresh my spirits. His reaches were after new discoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrinated me more in one half hour, then seventeen years study in the University. For whereas I never learned there, more causes then four, he was pleased to acquaint me with nine; which I took some pains to learn without book, and they were these, Matter, Form, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And most courteously offered himself to enlarge on everyone of them; but having left off at a broken sentence, I was desirous to return to my studies Theological, and to let those Philosophical progresses alone. But I protested unto him seriously, that he had informed me more in the number of causes in a short space, then Oxford had done in many years; he entreated I would consider of them, and I promised I would, and confer of them too, with all the Scholars I companied with; which he took in very goo part; and so I took my leave. And finding my spirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I resolved, forbearing my usual time of supper, to follow these studies close that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of those causes being found out, otherwise called, Invention (as for Judgment, I do not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made use of it very happily in finding out, or discovery of the foppery of these Remonstranticall argumentations.

Now I proceed to the second Question, as more seasonable to the present occasion. And here first they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, answerable to faith on the part of election, which is most untrue, as formerly I shown: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to reprobation; as the curing of natural infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to election. But they go on, as in shaping our Tenent at pleasure, so in basting it with their very liberal censures, as absurd and execrable, in such sort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be sufficient to represent the horror of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgment of all the faithful of Christ. And indeed their best strength lieth in setting forth their Adversaries doctrine in such colors, as the Devil is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adversaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is so little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in sin, and corrupted and estranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as natural and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuse to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a vessel of wrath, that so God's glory may be manifested upon him, in the way of justice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.

1. The first is this. If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto destruction, then God cannot in justice destroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injustice, then to destroy a man for that, that followeth necessarily upon reprobation which is the work of God. To this I answer.

1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent in ordering them.

1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the state of Original sin, of leaving this original sin uncured in them, and last of all, of damning them for their sins; are decrees not subordinate, but coördinate, as decrees de Mediis, tending jointly to one supreme end, which is the manifestation of God's glory upon them in the way of justice vindicative; as also to show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding in others that miserable condition, which through God's mere grace and goodness they have escaped.

2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent, I answer,

1. Many of them do not maintain that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foresight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the British Divines their Theses De Reprobatione; and Alvarez professeth the same. The denial of grace, and so the permitting of natural infidelity to remain uncured, they make consequent (as it seems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foresight of infidelity subsequent; and this foresight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it signifies the decree of damnation. And thus far I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or sign of reason did God ordain any man to damnation, but for sin; and consequently in no moment of nature, or sign of reason, did the decree of damnation go before the foresight of sin or infidelity.

2. But suppose, as these Remonstrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all points proportionable to the decree of salvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be subordinate to the decree of salvation; so the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein consists the just proportion, and not as they feign it, between faith on the one side, and infidelity on the other) is with them made subordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I answer,

1. Their Consequence should be this, If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in justice damn them for Infidelity. Now here is no color of good Consequence.

2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon God's permiting of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence.

Resp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence: but then consider.

1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the consequution of infidelity, simply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the necessary consequution thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Consequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above most illogically.

2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary consequution of sin in general, or infidelity in special, upon God's permitting of it.

So that whether God's decree to permit the sin of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus; If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon God's permitting of it, then God cannot in justice damn a man for Infidelity; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damn a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is God's work.

Resp. I answer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is cashierd as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himself to bear us out in this our denial. Who expressly professeth, That in case God permits a man, Velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could add Vorstius also, herein concurring with Piscator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expressly in this as any other; as also in subordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed recte intellectam: He laboreth to charm this inconvenient grant of his, but no charm will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We ourselves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of suasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoever believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Son to be a Propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessefully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectual: this effectual suasion, he confesseth to be administered by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withal he accounts it always ineffectual, yet he saith it is administered by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, that is such a grace as whereupon he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeal to the judgment of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Esau. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord foreseeth which of them will prove effectual with Paul, and which ineffectual; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he foreseeth will prove effectual. Again he foreseeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectual with Esau and which ineffectual, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knows will prove ineffectual. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to show his mercy in the salvation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressly to profess, That by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, he found himself in a streit upon his distinction of grace sufficient and effectual, and the description of each; he drew his breath very short; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of air, he concluded that discourse with, Haec ex Augustini sententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hisce autem ita explicatis ex mente Augustini & forte Scripturae sensu. But, What, a mischief, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? First, that he willingly grants that, Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well understood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex sententiâ & mente Augustini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae sensu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) most prejudicial to his own Tenent at first fight, and much more by the distinction following of Gratia sufficiens & efficax; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Austin's back to bear the burden of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. Primo, de Gratiâ sufficient & efficaci. Secundo, de utrius{que} dispensatione, dispensationis{que} Causis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tolerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well consider this, that talks so much of our Divines unwillingness to come to trial in the point of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectual, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectual grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectual grace, doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he works in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Credere, modo Credat, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Resipiscere modo Resipiscat. This that I speak, I can show under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgment. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Authors Discourse, and that others I have had to deal withal, is but as a smoke, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney.

4. Let the argument stand as it doth, let infidelity by God's permission follow upon the decree of damnation, and that necessarily. Yet consider.

1. God's permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that natural corruption wherein all were borne, as all confess, as many as concur against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Original sin. By God's permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actual sin is there in the World, or habitual sin arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawful for him to punish it, where he finds the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

2. Suppose all men had power to do any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod possunt (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocence, and gave the Angels that stood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to pass, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall we say in this case, is it possible that they should Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apostle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall we hereupon say, they do not sin freely? What shift have they to avoid this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, or by saying that God doth work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, modo Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The self same act, being made before and after itself; for the condition is always before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to God's pleasure, or according to man's good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evil act therefore comes not to pass freely, because it comes to pass necessarily, upon supposition of God's denial of grace, to refrain from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought freely by us, because God by his grace works us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in God's power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evil works are not done the less freely, because God denies special and effectual grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingness unto that which is evil, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Austin saith, that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulnesse.

4. The Schools teach, that liberty of will consists only, in electione mediorum, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Gospel is preached to a carnal man, whose ends are only carnal, as the Apostle saith, Philip. 3. 20. They mind earthly things; so far forth as he shall find it serviceable to his carnal ends, he may believe it and make profession of it, as many times Hypocrites do, and sometimes in such sort, as it is hard to distinguish, between a true and an Hypocriticall professor. This moved the Apostle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themselves, and prove themselves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in faith unfeigned. For there is not only a gross Hypocrisy, whereunto a man's own heart is privy, but a secret Hypocrisy whereof the man himself is nothing conscious; yet such a faith undoubtedly is performable by a natural man. Now when a man rejects the Gospel, the faith and profession whereof he finds nothing serviceable to his carnal ends, doth he not judiciously and deliberately, yea and wisely too (according to the wisdom of flesh and blood) reject it?

5. Austin professeth Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will, and justifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averse from believing, We justly say, such a man cannot believe; as our Savior saith, How can you believe that receive honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh of God alone. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Moral only, which is to be distinguished from impotency Natural. For notwithstanding this, it may be truly said, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein consists the natural liberty of the will. The Moral liberty consists, rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of sin and Satan; then in a power to do good if they will, and not otherwise. But I never find that Arminians do distinguish these.

6. It is not sufficient for Arminians to conclude, that such a thing upon supposition comes to pass necessarily, therefore it comes not to pass freely.

1. For upon supposition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to pass necessarily; yet simply the World was made by God freely.

2. In like sort, upon God's foreknowledge that such a man will not believe it followeth necessarily, that such a one will not believe; and so the like may be said of the most free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?

3. In like sort upon the denial of an effectual impediment of sin, unto a man it followeth necessarily, that such a man will sin, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular sin whatsoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that such a sin is not committed freely? nonothing less.

2. The Remonstrants second argument is this.

What God cannot perform that God cannot will. But God cannot damn a man for infidelity flowing from such a decree of Reprobation.

Resp. 1. But who saith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but Piscator upon these words, Ye therefore hear not my words, because ye are not of God. But understand him aright, it is as if he should say, Therefore such a man goeth lame, because the Physician will not cure him: yet it is well known the cause of his lameness is from within, and perhaps procured by some distemper of his own: yet in case a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be said to be the cause of lameness; but how? per modum non removentis. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cause whereof notice is taken in Natural Philosophy. And in this sense and no other, it is well known that Piscator makes God the cause of infidelity, and that according to the express Word of God. But in my judgment Piscator mistakes the phrase, To be of God, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to say, ye therefore he are not my words, because God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that natural infidelity which is in you.

2. But take the argument according to the former expression, God cannot damn a man for that infidelity which is consequent to reprobation; And then my Answer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this.

3. The Third followeth. If Infidelity flows from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor seriously offer salvation unto them, but necessarily counterfeit. For it is manifest Hypocrisy, to invite those unto faith and salvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.

Resp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flows from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstranes, but the not curing of man's natural infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.

2. I say, There is no simulation at all of God in this. For that wich he proposeth is but this, that, Whosoever believeth shall be saved, and Whosoever believeth not shall be damned. He sends his Ministers to Preach this, and to Beseech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whose sake? Not for the reprobates sake, but for the elects sake, Who because they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Ministers, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he should, many of the Ministers themselves, even of those that not only prophesied in his name, but cast out Devils, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commission should be general to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apostles themselves take notice of this? Doth not Paul profess that, He became all things to all that he may save some? And who were those some, but the very elect of God, as the same Apostle elsewhere professeth, saying, I suffer all things for the elects sake. And doth not Austin profess that if we knew who were reprobate, we would no more pray for them, then for the Devils? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24.

4. The Fourth and last. If Incredulity follows the decree of reprobation, then God considered the reprobates in his counsel of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocence, or as fallen into Original sin. Sed falsa sunt haec omnia. All these things are false. And these things, he saith, are delivered, contra absurdam, detestabilem, at{que} abominabilem sententiam.

Resp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry discourse for substance of argumentation throughout.

1. Yet as I said, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintain that God of his mere pleasure, hath mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance (considering all in the corrupt Mass) and of his mere pleasure hardens others (no worse in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation signifies the decree of damnation, do permit thereunto the foresight of final perseverance in sin.

2. According to my Ordering of God's decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all God's decrees, they being eternal, and but one act in God, and that act his very Essence, and all other things being temporal. I do not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reason, before the consideration of man's final impenitency. As neither do I conceive it to be after this, but both simultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, together with the decree of final leaving some therein, and the decree of damning them for sin, I take not to be subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous.

3. Whether we take the First-way for shaping the object of predestination, or the Second, or the Third, I Answer.

1. The difference hereabout is in my judgment merely Logical, nothing Theological; the resolution whereof according to general rules, is easily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is God's end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto those ends.

2. Which way soever we take of the Three, I never found any reason given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have justified in my Vindiciae, as touching the First-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Answer to Corvinus against Tilenus, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I trust, routed and profligated the 20 Reasons of Arminius, proposed against the First and Last-way, but chiefly against the First, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.

Now I return to the Author of this discourse, and to the remainder of his second Motive, from whence I have digressed.

I was here passing over unto the third instance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the History thereof, to prepare myself for an answer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reasons of that the Contra-Remonstrants motion to be spared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here cast upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be spared from conferring upon the point of reprobation. But whereas the Remonstrants had encumbered the point of election and reprobation with seven Questions, which pertained not to the state of the Controversy concerning the first Article, and being also imperfect and intricate for the most part, and proposed to this end, to draw their Adversaries away from the true state of the Question; They desired to be spared from answering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleased the States, that leaving those thorny questions, they should come to the handling of the Articles. This is set down in the Preface to those Acta Synodalia, set forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the proposing of these two questions to the Remonstrants, as touching the decree of Predestination. 1. Whether the entire decree of Predestination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlasting decree to save believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perseverance therein, did precede election, as the Causes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonstrants had answered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their seven, for the most part, intricate questions. Reponebant deinde septem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, questiones, ad quas a Pastoribus à Classibus deputatis responderi volebant. Quae cum ad controversiae de primo articulo statum non spectarent, etiam mutilae at{que} intricatae plerae{que} essent; eum{que} in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a praecipuo controversiae statu recta{que} agendi ration, in ambages ad ducerent. Pastores expositâ per Libellum supplicem Illust. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ration, non quidem deprecati sunt, ne de reprobatione sententiam suam manifestarent (uti Remonstrantes improbe saepius ipsis objectarunt) sed diserte sententiam suam quantum ad Ecclesiarum pacem at{que} aedificationem sufficere existimarent, non tantum vivâ voice sed & scripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum aeternum electionis singularium personarum decretum ponunt, simul quo{que} ponere aeternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam singularium personarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut sit electio, quin simul quo{que} sit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quaestiones temere excutere, nihil aliud esse quam inutilibus disputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Ecclesiam replere, ejus{que} pacem perturbare. Declarationem suam hanc Libello supplice expressam, moderatis omnibus, pace • {que} amantibus ingeniis, sufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipsis, Deum neminem condemnare, imo vero ne statuisse quidem condemnare quenquam nisi juste propter propria ipsius peccata: Placuit ita{que} Illust. Ordd. ut missis illis spinosis quaestionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection proposed by the Remonstrants in these words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghiensi Libello supplice Illust. Hollandiae & Westfriziae Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati sunt Contra-Remonstrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipsi Contra-Remonstrantes cum in Colloquio Haghiensi jussi essent, ad interrogata quaedam nostra de reprobatione respondere Magistratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, us{que} adeo ut Collationem caeptam abrumpere se malle profiterentur quàm ut summarum Potestatum imperio se constringi paterentur, nihil aliud conscientiae suae praetexentes quam quod Ecclesiae aedificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157. Festus Hominus, one present in that Conference, stands up and answers, Exposuit{que} paucis quàm non bonâ fide haec de illis dicerentur. Se Libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: caeterùm quia Remonstrantes subdole in ipso Collationis initio, septem questionibus spinosis ac minime necessariis non tantum ad reprobationis, sed electionis quoque doctrinam spectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonstrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonstrantes Libello supplice apud Illust-Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ration conquestos fuisse at{que} ut Remonstrantibus mandaretur, ne extra justam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiisse. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonstrantes quantum ad aedificationem satis erat, sententiam suam clare ibidem explicasse uti scriptorum editorum fide probari potest. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctissimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipse huic interfuerat Collationi, suo praesens comprobabat testimonio.

Now I come to the Synod of Dort.

4. This Author saith the Remonstronts were there warned by the President of the Synod, Ut de electione potius quàm de odiosâ reprobationis materiâtagerent. And truly at first I wondered not a little, that the President of that Synod should account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to say, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly signify hereby, such a doctrine as deserves to be hated; but I thought withal, that they might express rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of those, that submit their judgments to the word of God; but rather of those, and of those only, who follow the judgment of flesh and blood. Yet I thought good to inquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonstrants themselves do express this, even as here it is expressed, thus, A Reverendo Praeside moniti sumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abstineremus & de electione potius quàm odiosâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus. Yet I confess this did not satisfy me; For why should this Author make choice to express it in the Remonstrants terms, rather then in the words of the President himself. Therefore I turn to the beginning of that Session, being Sess. 32. There I find this particular, Submonuit & Praeses ut potius quaestionibus illis inhaererent, quae circa suavem de electione doctrinam versarentur, quàm ut d • odiose doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent. Now I find a great deal of difference between professing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admonishing to spare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their usual course, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, Doctrinam de praedestinatione odiosam reddere conabatur, as it is professed in the Preface to those Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They profess in like manner of the Remonstrants, namely, that in their Remonstrance they endeavored, Illust. Ordd. odiosam reddere doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum, and that not only, de divinâ predestinatione, but also de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perseverantiâ, but all this malâ fide, nec sine apertis, atrocibus{que} calumniis. Moreover I find, Sess. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synod gratifying the Remonstrants, and yielding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, Quoniam Remonstrantes aliquoties professi sunt, se per conscientiam in Synodo subsistere ulterius non posse, nisi prius caveatur ipsis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ration quam in Thesibus & Scriptis suis hactenus exhibitis proposuerunt, in posterùm agatur. Synodus quo magis ipsis fiat satis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, statuisse sese ac statuere sententiam ipsorum, non de electione modo, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere at{que} examinare. Quantum nempe in conscientiâ ad Dei gloriam, aedificationem & tranquillitatem Ecclesiae, omnium{que} conscientiarum posse ac debere satis esse, ipsa judicaret. Ad agendi vero modum, qui hic est servandus & ordinem quod attinet, suum esse de eo dispicere, non autem fratrum Remonstrantium qui huc sunt citati, quicquam praescribere, existimat. This decree being read to the Remonstrants, they refused to give way unto it. The 40 Session contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod de modo Agendi, the Synod must not prescribe to them. And they profess against it Sess. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, Nec satisfit nobis si dicatur Synodum permissuram, ut nostram de reprobatione sententiam tractemus quoad illa ipsa ad gloriam Dei, aedificationem Ecclesiarum, conscientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipsâ restrictione, nobis praeciditur libertas & plenaria sententiae nostrae defensio, & contrariae Impugnatio. Praeterquam quod non levis suspicandi nobis data sit occasio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione disserentes audiverit, nequaquam permissuram ut Contra-Remonstrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione sententiam prout necessarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari. Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgment of Forraine Divines; and they all with one consent profess, Tantam Remonstrantibus libertatem ad defensionem causae suae concessam esse, quantâ ex ration & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi posset. Ac proinde nullam esse causam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonstrantes querelam instituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi subterfugerent. Nihil illis esse imperatum quod ullo modo conscientias ipsorum gravare posset. Ac proinde conscientiae velum frustra pervicaciae obtendi. Abunde iis omnibus{que} modis satisfactum jam esse. Absolutam illam, nullis{que} circumscriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipsis non posse. Aequum esse ut certis sese legibus submittant, quibus, si exorbitent, coërceantur. Nay in the next Session, which is Sess. 42. there is a representation made of their unreasonable demand in these words. Professi sunt sibi agendi modum a Synodo praescriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, sed & circa omnes articulos & Theses, singula{que} argumenta de sententiâ Contra-Remonstrantium, & corum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maxim urgeat. Hereupon the Opinions of the foreign Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yield unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, Qui consentientibus declarabant suffragiis, ab omni ration & methodo esse alienum id quod Remonstrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere sibi liceret. Their judgments hereupon are here represented severally and at large; First of our British Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Hesse, then of the Helvetians, then of those who were of the correspondency of Weteraw, then of those of Geneva, then of those of Breme, and lastly of those of Emden.

5. Upon the former bald and base pretences, as if, Conclusum esset contrà Manichaeos, the Author proceeds crowing magnificentissime, and demanding in this manner.

Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light which makes all things manifest, especially considering these things?

1. That Reprobation is a principal Head of practical Divinity by the well, or ill stating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.

2. That there is such a necessary connection between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.

4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falsehood, and therefore bound in justice to purge it self of the crimination.

5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth. For, Nihil est ad defendendum puritate facilius, saith S ^t Jerome.

Now albeit for the discovery of the vile vanity of this conclusion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any sober man's due consideration of the premises duly examined according to my former answer; yet I think good not to pass it over without such particular consideration as it deserves. First, I pray consider, what is that light that makes all things manifest? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were diverse other things disputed of, besides this of predestination. Now is the truth manifested hereby in all those particulars? If it be, I pray, let him signify on whose side, whether on the part of Jacobus Andreas, or on the part of Beza? To whom is it made manifest? To either side, or only to that side, on whose side this Author conceives the truth to stand? Do you not manifestly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who seeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifest the truth. And such men are able to manifest, as well out of conference in their discourses, either Positive, or Controversiall, as in conference; yea, and far better; Those discourses being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences; especially in case they meet with malignant opposites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that spiritual light, which giveth manifestation to all spiritual truth. And consequently neither are they to be censured as blushing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of these controversies, then to confer about them in some cases; or that prefer conference by the pen as Beza did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleased the lips of Jacobus Andreas. Yet neither Beza did refuse to yield to Andreas his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonstrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuse to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have shown by authentical evidences. But suppose Beza and his fellows, whether two or three had altogether declined to confer at all, as in my judgment they had good reason to refuse, must this be censured their blushing at the light? Austin professeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many causes of forbearing to deliver the truth at sometimes. He little dreamed of exposing the truth thereby to such a censure, as if it blushed at the light. And if some few might be justly censured as blushing at the light, must all for their sakes, by the rules of justice, be made obnoxious to the same censure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine it self? Is it not apparent that a true and sound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and Veritas est temporis filia, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have cracked the crown of this conclusion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the rest.

1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practical Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall point, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erroneous doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blasphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; so is it blasphemy also, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refusing conference thereabouts, I have already spoken sufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpose to subjoin to the end of those five considerations here distinguished, as remarkable ones, if my memory fails me not.

2. A Connection I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of these is to be handled first, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the stating of the other, I should think no sober man would make question. Yet the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally censured by the consent of foreign Divines that assisted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himself, and his own carriage in this business. For he undertakes only the point of reprobation.

3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chief cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himself a strange liberty of discourse. We read and hear of no small stirs in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits; but I never read that the Jesuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cause of any uproar in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jesuits in Rome it self, wherein Valentianus through some heat in disputation, caught a fever whereof he died within three days after; of the relation whereof, made by one Pet (that had been a Priest) in Oxford I was sometimes an ear witness. The Jesuits were rather taxed for their heterodoxy in the point de auxiliis, as Petrus Mattheus in his History reports it. And from D. Jacksons mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard should deliver upon the mention of Molina the Jesuit, namely, that he was the man, qui tantos tumultus excitavit, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Protestant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the stir that was raised by Huberus in the Lutheran Churches, was neither caused nor occasioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. Huberus his cause was, a pertinacious standing for an universal Election. It seems he hath relation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongst the States only, and their particular, or provincial congregations alone (as it seems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us consider, Who made those uproares, were they the Contra-Remonstrants, or the Remonstrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonstrants, let him prove it, least he be justly censured for one of those wild beasts, an Emperor was sometimes warned to beware of, they were the slanderers. If the Remonstrants were the authors of these uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chief cause of them, Were not those Arminians voluntary agents in those uproares? If they conceived their opposites doctrine to be unsound, could they not oppose it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Again, their opposites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till those days? Or was there any uproar made thereupon, 'till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cause of an uproar, which hath no such consequent ensuing until it meets with some turbulent spirits, which begin to stir as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they stirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly so called, they conferred alike? But he saith it was the chief cause, and only saith it, yet Molinaeus professing reprobation to proceed, upon foresight of final impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonstrants professed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damn any man of ripe years, but for final perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally cease or in part? But such criminations are nothing strange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked Ahab saluted the holy Prophet Elijah. Art thou he that troubleth Israel? but he spared not to answer him, I am not he that troubleth Israel, but Thou and thy Fathers house. In the like manner were Paul and Silas entertained Act. 16. 20. when being caught and brought before the Magistrates, heard such an accusation made against them, These men which are Jews trouble our city: and preach Ordinances which are not lawful for us to receive, neither to observe, seeing we are Romans. And no marvel if the Devil roars, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdom is shaken. But because he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a taste of the violent proceedings in those parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. Dordrac. set forth by the authority of the States. And because uproares concern insurrections against government in Church or State; The first particular I observe of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much suspected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain points which hitherto he had declined, saving in a false manner, his protestation in the issue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, soured with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuse to subscribe the Confession of the Catechism, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. Pastores Arminii sententiam amplexi passim in Classibus recusabant mandato Synodi de subscriptione Confession is, ac Catecheseos morem gerere. Here we have the beginning of a manifest schism. Now consider we the progress hereof. Hereupon a resolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a National Synod, in the year 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practices of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the space of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. Arminius himself acknowledgeth, de Heterodoxiâ suâ varios rumores omnes jam ecclesias pervasisse, incendium{que} à se suscitatum ipsa Ecclesiae tecta super are dici. Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpose was, to call a Provincial Synod in October following, and signification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admonished to manifest their considerations in their several Deanaries, that so they might be fairly sent to the Synod that approached. They put this off also. Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quo{que} singuli consuetis tergiversationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt. The like refusal was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themselves (for as for the Provincial Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they should give up their considerations within a Months space, or be obnoxious to Censure Ecclesiastical. Hereupon was means made by Utenbogard, for letters from the States unto those Pastors, to send up unto them their considerations sealed, that so they might reserve them to the Provincial Synod shortly to be held. In these proceedings a man may easily smell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length Arminius his Declaration before the States. In answer whereunto Gomarus riseth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongst other courses of Arminius, makes relation of this, as how Spretis Synodorum Classium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad supremi Magistratus tribunal prima instantia prosiluisse, ibi{que} querelas at{que} accusationes suas adversus Ecclesiarum doctrinam proposuisse, artibus{que} aulicis favorem sibi Ecclesiis vero odium consiliare diligenter studiisse. And hereupon besought the States, that seeing Contentiones gliscerent, Ecclesiae turbarentur, Cives{que} in partes distraherentur, the National Synod which they had promised might be gathered together with the first; which yet by the practice of Utenbogard and others was still delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew so bold, as publicly to Preach against the received Doctrine, as Bertius spared not to declare himself; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, because this Author draws all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon Bertius declared himself, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, De justification hominis coram Deo, De Praedestinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perseverantiâ fidelium; and upon these very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between Arminus and Gomarus before the States. And one Venator spared not publicly to broach Pelagian and Socinian errors. Whereupon he was suspended by the Churches of North-Holland. In spite of whom notwithstanding, he continued his courses of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Pastors in the Deanery of Alomar considering he was lawfully suspended, and withal a man of impure life, refused to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by Utenbogards practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they should admit him. Now when the States considering the present exigent, were easily like to condescend to a Provincial Synod, the Arminians moved, that the Deputies to be sent thither, should not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the usual course, but only by the States, presuming hereby, that either none, but such as favored their cause should be sent, or at least such as were less alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to pass, that the calling, not only of a Provincial Synod, but of the yearly Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, Sine Magistratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. At{que} ibi inter se initâ per subscriptionem nominum confaederatione seu conspiratione, manifestum in Ecclesiis Reformatis Schisma instituunt. That year came forth the Remonstrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonstrants, Vorstius is brought in to be a Professor in the place of Arminius. For as touching the exceptions taken against him, the Remonstrants professed before the States, he had given them good satisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practices for the removing of such Rectors from their Churches, as were their opposites, and obtruding upon the people such as were of their own Party. At Alcmar, Adolphus Venator, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Arms against the Magistrate, whereby he was driven to relinquish his place, and others brought in of Venator his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Pastors, the one having formerly executed his Ministry amongst them for fifty years continuance. Grevincovius in like sort, with the Magistracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there Cornelius Geselius of his Ministry first, and then by their Sergeants to cast him out of the Citty. Utenbogard sends Remonstrants into Utrecht, and amongst others, Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & saevum. Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland also the ordinary and annual Synodical Assemblies were hindered by the practice of Utenbogard, like as still they continued withal their art to hinder the calling of a National Synod, so often promised by the States, and so many years deferred. William of Nassau moved both Utenbogard on the one side, and Festus Hommius on the other side, to consider of a course how these stirs might be pacified. To which motion Festus Hommius makes answer, that in case the Remonstrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a course whereby some peace might be made in the interim, until a National Synod were gathered. This is the more observable, because this Author layeth all the cause of those uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he professeth they had great cause to suspect the Remonstrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And these are afterwards declared to be these, Fol. 14. pag. 1. De perfectâ Christi pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Justification hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originally, de Certitudine salutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ. And whereas, they desired the Remonstrants would deal clearly and make known what their opinion was in those points: Utenbogard having labored to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquisition amongst them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtains of the States, that no such Declaration should be required at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synod by their continual solicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be most prejudicial to their proceedings, they brought it so to pass, that like as formerly their Annual Synods were hindered, so now it was forbidden to the Deputies themselves, thenceforth to take any such style unto them, or perform any such office as whereabout they were then employed. And so the Relator proceeds in setting down their insolent courses until at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Britain, all for the most part, inclined to the convocation of a National Synod, they fell plainly on, upon these desperate Counsels openly professing that the calling of a National Council, would prove prejudicial to the Majesty and Liberty of the Provinces, manifesting themselves hereby utterly averse from such a course; which yet hath been most in use in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions arising in matter of Religion. I profess, I nothing affect to spend time in such searches and relations, I had rather employ it another way, but you see I am driven unto it, to represent the unshamefased condition of this Narration.

4. And whereas he saith, It was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falsehood, it is apparent that the Remonstrants would very well have rested contented with a mutual toleration of one another in their several ways. For when Utenbogard and Festus Hommius were to meet together, and treat upon some fair course of composition, Utenbogard, together with those of his side, professed they knew no other course for settling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; Festus Hommius and others with him on the other side, professed they knew no better course then convocation of a National Synod, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themselves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themselves herein refusing to declare themselves, I have formerly shown. And farther, in the pursuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther storied, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpose from some of the States. And consider farther, If any amongst us should rise up, and confederate themselves and impugn any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuse us for maintaining erroneous doctrine therein, and challenge us for falsehood, if they do it with never so open mouth, shall this be sufficient to justify them and condemn us, if we do not come to a trial with them to dispute the case, though We are the Possessours, They the Intruders and Innovators? We maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority established amongst us, and They which impugn the doctrine received, are they not usually judged amongst us, as such who are rather to be censured then disputed with? And withal consider, that this mutua tolerantia, which the Remonstrants so much pressed and were so glad to enjoy, was with greatest instance stood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Lastly, how often was Arminius himself questioned and called upon to give satisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the first, Motion was made for his surrogation into the place of Junius beind deceased, then the suspicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amsterdam not well liking to let him go from them, amongst whom at that time, he exercised his Ministry; and that because they observed his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an University: at length upon the great instance both of Utenbogard and Arminius himself, way was made for him unto the Chair, upon condition he should confer with Gomarus upon some chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all suspicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a solemn Protestation given his word, that in case he had any singular opinion of his own, he would not spread it. Hereupon he made open profession, that he condemned the chief Pelagian opinions concerning grace natural, the strength of Free-will, Original sin, the perfection of man in this life, and Predestination, and that he approved all those disputes, which Austin and other Fathers had written against them; and that in his judgment the Pelagian errors were rightly refuted by those Fathers, and withal promised, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Professors place in the University. In the beginning whereof he labored by all means to quench all suspicion of Heterodoxy in himself, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, De satisfaction Christi, de Fide justificante, de justification per fidem, de Perseverantiâ vere fidelium, de Certitudine salutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c. all which he afterwards contradicted, as also did his Followers. This I say, he then at the first maintained publicly, contrà sententiam suam (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to say, against his own Conscience) and Corvinus is alleged as in a certain Writing of his set forth in Low-Dutch ingeniously professing as much, Praefat, in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1. But after he had been a year or two in the place, he begins to unmaske himself, and by his Public Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Scholars in private, his heterodoxy discovered it self. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are sent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumors that went of him, praying him that if he disliked ought in the doctrine received, he would sincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive satisfaction, or the whole business might lawfully be put over to the consideration of a Synod. Arminius his answer was, that he never gave any just cause, why such rumour should be spread of him, neither was it wisdom for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that should make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private persons, he refused not to confer with them, provided that in case they differed, no relation hereof should be made unto a Synod. The Church of Leyden also admonished him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he answered he could not yield thereto, without leave from the Gurators of the University, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by such a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Professors and Pastors with great earnestness, that if he had ought to say against the doctrine received in their Confession and Catechism, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promising their endeavors to give him full satisfaction, or if not so, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a fair agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which passed between them should be divulged. The answer he made, was this, It was no wise part for him to yield to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the present meeting being not ordained unto any such purpose, fol. 5. p. 2. Gomarus openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, ne{que} ejusmodi subterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he represents his continual practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are these, Quibus insuper artibus opiniones suas disseminare; Publice scilicet ab Ecclesiis rogatum obtestatum{que}, sententiam suam occultare, privatim vero Pastoribus quos in eam pertrahi posse speraret, ac discipulis suis diligenter eam inculcare; argumenta Nostrorum praecipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa soleret enervare, Jesuitarum vero aliorum{que} Adversariorum, quibus doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinae receptae Veritate dubitationes discipulorum animis ingerere, eandem{que} cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quasi in aequilibrio suspendere, ac deinde prorsus rejicere, nullam hactenus sinceritatis ac consensus in doctrinâ, licet saepius ab Ecclesiis amanter fraterne{que} rogatum Declarationem edere voluisse. Now let any indifferent person compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonstrants, standing for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrays the greater distrust of the integrity of their Cause.

5. As for the easiness of defending it, if it be not, or were not so in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the sifting of it, What is that to the purpose? Then who are they, who say it may so easily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who do not acknowledge a great mystery in the divine providence. And from the days of Anselm unto this present day, it hath ever been accounted (in my observation) a very difficult point to accord predestination divine, with the liberty of men's wills. But put the case it may easily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithstanding, if it be found harsh to men's affections, are they likely to admit it with such ease? I should think it ought to be put out of question, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their natural infidelity and hardness of heart, as also that God hardeneth whom he will, leaving their infidelity and hardness of heart uncured; yet when flesh and blood riseth up against this doctrine thus, Why then doth God complain; (to wit, of man's disobedience) for who hath resisted his will? And the Apostle addresseth hereunto no other answer but this, O man who art thou who disputest with God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor? Is flesh and blood, I pray, apt to rest satisfied with this?

Now as touching the two things I promised to add, they are these.

1. I pray consider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciously pronounce sentence against himself. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promise he made unto you; and I pray consider how answerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controversies, as touching which he professeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles so much agitated between the Remonstrants, and the Contra-Remonstrants? Do you not perceive how he makes choice only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lie close as touching four of them? What is this, but according to his language, the coveting of corners? And what willingness of abiding the trial doth this manifest? Yet he pleaseth himself in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as David was when he offered himself to the Lord's trial, and thereupon advanceth himself to the greater liberty of censuring others, such as Beza, and Musculus, and their Fellowes, together with the Contra-Remonstrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himself, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his shapeing, is void. This is an usual course with those of his spirit, whereof I have had plentiful experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geese are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geese in comparison to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuseth to come to the light, (in his phrase) this is the censure he liberally bestows upon his opposites. For though some of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of those, they are not so willing, but this young Master in Israel, out of the plerophorious conceit of his own integrity and sufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the rest alone. Yet I pray make the scales even, What instance can be given, I do not say of Beza, Musculus, or any one of the Contra-Remonstrants, but of any one of the like condition to himself, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to show the reasons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianism, to the opposite opinions, hath carried himself, as this Author hath done, to give his reasons only on the part of one of them, and yet passeth his censure so prodigally on others for refusing trial, by the way implying, a glorious ostentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of service, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proof from testimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein also as it were purposely, declines all those places, wherein the Scripture speaketh directly of election, predestination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly speaking hereof, he purposely declines, and yet he calls the places he insists upon, pregnant testimonies; and indeed so they are, but nothing at all to the purpose of predestination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvel not he is so well conceited of his achievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, sitting on a Cart-wheel, in a dry summers day, and saying, See what a dust I make. For, because he hath discharged himself so unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deal with Beza, or with any of the Contra-Remonstrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it soon appear, that Heresy and untruth condemns it self (this is the sweet accommodation he makes of that the Apostles 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) to wit, by their refusing the touch-stone, and his readiness backed with all sufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given so plentiful demonstration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with some Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, some reasonable motives, and wise carriages of the matter, but inspired him also with some martial spirit, fit for any encounter, despising his Adversaries, as empty Scholars, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to speak boldly, and show himself in the clear day, when such as Beza make choice to walk in mistrs, and dwell in silence. Besides his care is very Apostolical for the peace of the Church, whereas Beza's was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonstrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of these belike, have been so forward to show themselves unto the World, and upon the stage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at least in the point of reprobation) no not Beza in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find these spirits exceeding busy; and I have been so happy (for so I account it, although I confess my time might be far more profitably bestowed) as to meet with some of their Mysteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lions skins, do smell far more of the Fox then of ehe Lyon.

2. The second is this, Why should their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in these particulars, as any Arminian whatsoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never shall. I heartily wish, time might serve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his Examen, his Conference with Junius, Corvinus his answer unto Tilenus, I have entered upon Vossius his Pelagian History. I desire I might have time and opportunity, for their Synodalia Dordracena, but most of all with the Jesuits; while I deal with them I learn somewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.

3. Let me add one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the seaventeenth is concerning Predestination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, should forbear to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in dispute, may we not justly plead, a fair conformity to the wisdom of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reason, why this author utterly pretermits the prosecuting his opinion concerning Predestination and election, to wit, least thereby he should fall foul upon the doctrine of our Church, so evidently set down in that Article concerning the point of Predestination? The Church of Ireland content themselves, with the very form of that 17 ^th Article of ours concerning Predestination: Only they premise two Theses; the one whereof is this, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Council ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass, yet so, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the second cause is taken away, but established rather; The other this, By the same eternal Counsel, God hath Predestinated some unto life, and Reprobated some unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increased nor diminished.

HIs third Topic place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongst Papists and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhor it. But I pray consider, was not the doctrine of the Gospel infamous at the first, both amongst Jews and Gentiles? What time the Jews were the only people of God, how doth Tacitus out of his worldly wisdom brand them? Doth he not call them Gentem teterrimam, Cenus hominum invisum Diis? And as touching their religious Rites, mark what censure he passeth upon them, Profana illic omnia, quae apud nos sacra, rursus concessa apud illos, quae apud nos incesta, and comparing them with the Rites of Bacchus, saith, Liber festos, laetos{que} ritus posuit, Judaeorum Mos absurdus sordidus{que}. And speaking of the Christians he calls them, Genus hominum propter flagitia invisum. This censure he passeth upon them in the days of holy Paul, who forbad them to do evil that good might come thereof, and commands every soul to be subject to the Higher Powers, even then, when souls were at the best, and powers at worst. And see I pray what the King of Ashurs judgment was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jerusalem, in comparison to the Religions of their Nations, which were heathenish. Isa. 10. 10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idols, seeing their Idols were above Jerusalem, and above Samaria. So that of an heathenish Religion, he had a better estimation then of the Religion of the Jews. Now if some Rabshakeh amongst them should turn heathen (for such a tradition, as I remember is received amongst the Rabbins, namely, that Rabshakeh was a Jew, but turned heathen) and afterwards endeavored to entice the Jews to do as he did, and that because of the infamous nature of their Religion amongst heathens, how deserved such a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be stoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive days of the Church, some Christian should turn Jew or Infidel, and practice to seduce others from the obedience of faith, representing unto them how everywhere it was contradicted, how Christ himself was counted a blaspheamer, a sorcerer, how the Gospel was a scandal to the Jews, foolishness to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apostles, the world thought they did God very good service. Saint Paul himself professing of himself and his fellows, That they were made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things. Did this infamy prevail with Paul, or any other holy servant of God, to remit anything, in the maintenance of his Christian faith? Nay, doth he not profess, saying, I pass not for these things, neither is my life dear unto me, so I may fulfill my course with joy, and the Ministration that I have received to testify the Gospel of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themselves as the Ministers of God by honor and dishonor, by good report and evil report, as deceivers and yet true.

Again, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine should be well spoken of, by such as are opposites and adversaries thereunto? Suppose a rigid Lutheran should by God's providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in justifying himself for the change of his Opinion, should represent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgment of Papists, and in the judgment of Calvinists; I pray consider, How in all likelihood would this plea be entertained? Could he expect any better recompense hereof, then to be cast out of their Synagogues? Suppose a Papist should have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the point of justification, and, being demanded the reason of this change of mind in him, should answer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongst Lutherans and Calvinists is so great, and that such a morsel, which neither Lutherans nor Calvinists can swallow, should therefore (in his judgment) not down very easily with Papists, and without suspicion. Now let any indifferent Reader confider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongst papists. Yet I mean not to quiet myself, or content my Reader with this parallel. Of that which he here delivers of Papists, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawn, for the credit of this assertion. Neither gives he any testimony of Lutherans, their calling us damned Calvenists, and though he had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdom of God for that? And I pray consider, is it not in our power to recompense them, and call them, damned Lutherans, if we list to recompense malice with malice, so to serve our own turns? And all this is delivered by him without distinction of Papists, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jesuits; in like sort without all distinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part.

And first, as for Papists; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. S ^t Paul's prayer was, that they might be delivered from unreasonable men. I think never Sect rose upmore unreasonable then this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had dispatched a large discourse sent unto me from one of same Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads then one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papists. Another with whom I had to do not long before, professeth in plain manner thus; The Jesuits ten of them for one, favor the absolute irrespective decree, following herein as they think S ^t Austin, but especially their S ^t Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzy zealots for the cause; of whose consent some amongst us are not ashamed to brag. If our irrespective decree, be so jointly maintained by both Jesuits, and Dominicans, and that as they think according to Austin, how is it possible our doctrine herein, can be so odious to the Papists? Or what Papists doth he mean, if neither Jesuits nor Dominicans, nor any such as concur with either of them? Or if it be so odious unto them, as one Arminian Proselyte professeth, how can it be so concordantly maintained by them, as another Arminian proselite avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papists, what will these Lutherans gain, by uniting with Papists rather then with us, that is, with the Masters rather then with the Scholars. And if a Lutheran should be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to justify himself should plead; That we Calvinists are ready to protest, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predestination, we had rather unite ourselves with Papists then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author most inconsiderately proposeth, as a point of very ponderous consideration?

But as touching Papists, their dislike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapsarian-way. And indeed that distinction of the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian-way. was brought in merely to get thereby some more elbow room. For if they agree with us in the point of God's absolute and irrespective decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in stating the object of predestination to be humanum genus nondum conditum, will prove odious unto them; considering this is a mere Logical difference, as I have shown in my Vindic. Grat. Dei cap. 1. pag. 1. De Predestinatione digress. 1. Yet as touching the Supralapsarian-way, that opinion is imputed unto Junius by Arminius, as also to Thomas and his Followers. Collat. Armin. cum Juni. pag. 4. and if so, how improbable is it, that such an Opinion should be so odious to the Papists, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And Alphonsus Mendoza spares not to profess, that supernaturalls were intended by God before naturals; and his discourse hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spain, and he was urged as himself professeth, to set it forth in Print. And the Quatuor signa Francisci Mayronis (mentioned by M ^r Perkins De Praedest. Modo & Ordine) do manifest that he took the same way; and these quatuor signa, Franciscus Mayro received from the doctrine of Scotus. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines different in this point, who yet neither hated one another's doctrine nor persons for this difference; like as so it is amongst us, as in the place above mentioned I have shown. Nay it is apparent, that Junius took upon him to reconcile all three opinions there abouts, and Piscator after him, who also hath discharged his part herein, far more clearly then Junius. And no marvel, Junius having first broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they desire, who are in love with error: All the question between these our Divines consists in this, Whether it were the will of God that Adam should fall by his permission, so to make way for God's glorious ends, to wit, the manifestation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Son of God, as also in the way of mercy, in the salvation of some; and in the way of justice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapsarians maintain, that such was the will of God, least otherwise way should be made for the manifestation of God's glorious works by accident, rather then by God's providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapsarian way, had rather decline this nice point as difficult, then oppose it as odious. But say I, the doctrine wherein both Jesuits and Arminians do agree, will abundantly serve us to justify us, in the positive and affirmative part of so nice a point as this. For by their doctrine of Scientia Media, God did foresee, that upon such an administration of his providence about Adam as was used, Adam would fall; and more then this, that God could have brought forth other administrations of his providence in very great variety, some whereof were such, that if God had used, Adam would not have fallen. Now being pleased to make use of such an administration of providence divine, upon the purpose whereof, he foresaw Adam would fall; and not being pleased to use such a providence, upon the purpose whereof, he had foreseen Adam would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifestly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, Adam should fall by his permission.

Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harsh then that of God's determining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the substance thereof. Dares this author betray such ignorance, as hand over head to profess, that this doctrine is odious unto Papists? Whereas the most learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in express terms, whereas our Divines course is, to keep themselves to the phrase of Scriptures. And as for the Jesuits who oppose it, and in the place thereof bring in Scientia Media, and Gratia Congrua, shaped after the genius of Scientia Media. I can show an express acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cause, that between the Gratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans, and Gratia congrua of the Jesuits, there is no such material difference at all, but that the absoluteness of predestination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other.

To conclude, I would this Author would be so wise, as once more to consult with his Oracle, and inquire, Whether Papists are more ready to join with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Christ's Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the point of Reprobation, or of God's concourse. For suppose we held as Suarez is pleased to state our Tenent, namely, Quod Deus omnipotenti voluntate nobis necessitatem imponat; yet the same Suarez saith, that in this very point, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed ought, Quod vel in re ipsâ contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam superet. I presume no Papist is so well conceited in the Lutherans doctrine in the point of Ubiquity.

From that which he affirms of Papists, I come to that which he affirms of Lutherans. And what one instance hath he given of any Lutheran, speaking against our making the corrupt Mass the object of predestination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir Edwin Sands, nor out of Osiander; Nay what cause is there, why either Papist or Lutheran should, in case the object thus stated (or in a more rigid form of the Mass Uncorrupt) doth no way contstrain us to maintain, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of sin; no nor to maintain, that God doth intend the salvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, in final perseverance in faith and repentance, provided God suffer him, to live until the use of reason, as I have shown, and endeavored to justify, and make appear, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, in the digressions concerning Predestination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintain, that God did intend to damn any man but for sin; Neither do I maintain, that God intended to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principal, real (not verbal only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about God's bestowing of faith and repentance, and his purpose thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foresight where of it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto some, and denies it unto others. When Tossanus makes relation of Hunnius his exposition of that place Acts 13. 48. Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam, thus, id est, qui sese ordinarant & disposuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum; Hunnius in his refutation of Tossanus his Theses, cites Tossanus to appear before the tribunal seat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to show in what place of his writings, this is to be found, professing that such doctrine is the very Pelagian Heresy, and that himself never approved it, but disproved it rather, and most constantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known so absurd, as to say, that God worketh in us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modo Velimus? Yet this doctrine I can show in express terms delivered by an Arminian. But come to the consideration of the instances proposed by him.

The first is the Relation of Sir Edwin Sands. And I remember well to have read in him somewhat concerning the Predestinary Pestilence, so called by some. And I might wonder at this Authors wisdom, in pretermitting that passage; but upon search finding it about Fol. 59. though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceased to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cause to commend his wisdom therein, although it expresseth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readiness to return to the Papacy rather then to admit that Predestinary Pestilence. For predestinary pestilence goeth not here alone, but is joined with the Sacramentary pestilence,