The Riches of Gods Love

TWISSE. Consideration.

WOrthy Sir, according to your desire to take into Consideration this writing directed unto you, at length I have gotten some leisure from other employments, to address myself to give you satisfaction in this particular.

1 That I may show myself answerable to that respect which you have deserved at my hands; and not so only, but to my zeal of God's truth, which hath deserved much more at the hands of us both.

2 That you may the better discern which of us two, whom you put to confer, doth maintain the cause of God's truth, and hath the best reasons on his side.

As for the change of Opinion here mentioned, such Professions are nothing strange. But whether such a Profession be in truth, or in pretence, and rather liberty taken to manifest that Opinion, which formerly hath been cherished: as also with what conscience void of all carnal respects, such a change or manifestation is made, it belongs not unto us to judge, but to leave that unto God, who trieth the hearts and reins. Sure we are, the heart of man is full of deceitfulness, both to deceive others, yea and to deceive ourselves, the more need there is to be jealous over ourselves, and to carry a watchful eye over our own souls, and whether we have changed a former way, or at the first chose one or other way, and continue to embrace that, whereof we have been at first informed; not to despise, but in the fear of God, to practice that holy counsel of the Apostle given to the Corinthians, a famous Church, and such as were destitute of no spiritual gift. Prove yourselves, whether you are in the Faith, examine yourselves: know ye not your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be Reprobates? as also to consider how indifferently we carry ourselves, in using means to inform ourselves in the way of truth, and whether they be not such as do discover our chief care hath been to bring our judgments about, to the embracing of that way (whether Truth or Error) which formerly we did effect. Certain it is, that Heresies must be, and that to this end, that they that are approved may be made manifest. And Illusions shall have their course, when the truth of God is not embraced with love, whatsoever be the pretence of our disaffecting it, whether harshnes to affections, or discrepancy to carnal reason. And when such judgments have their course, Who are privileged from being seduced? Let our Savior speak in this, So that if it were possible men should deceive the very elect. Upon what may we be assured to stand firm in time of such temptation? Let the Apostle answer us in this, when after the effectual working of Satan in them that perish, he comes near to them to whom he writes in the way of comfort thus, But we ought to give thanks always to God, for you Brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto salvation through sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. Like as before he did conclude unto himself their election, from observation of the work of their Faith, the labor of their Love, and the patience of their Hope. And the greater is the comfort which hereby is ministered unto us, the greater should be our care, to inform ourselves aright, in the doctrine thereof, and especially to have an eye unto it, that we do not shape it in such a manner, that like as it is impossible we should have any assurance thereof, so it will prove equally impossible we should draw any comfort from thence.

1. But is it so, as here it is put upon you, that you knew very well indeed, that the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered?

I assure you, if you knew this, you know more then I do. I had thought rather that the resolution of the Point concerning Predestination, had depended upon the resolution of the Point touching Grace efficacious, then the contrary. As namely, if Faith be confessed to be the gift of God, and that not with respect to anything in man, it followeth herehence, that Predestination unto faith, and reprobation from faith, must proceed mecrely upon the good pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of ought in man.

There was a time when Austin thought, that God elected some to bestow the Holy Ghost upon them, that by working that which is good, they might obtain everlasting life: and who were those whom he thus elected? namely such as whom he foresaw would believe: and what was his reason for it? surely this; Quod ergo credimus nostrum est, quod autem bona operamur, Illius est, qui Credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum; quod profecio non dicerem, si jam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter dei munera reperiri quae dantur in eodem spiritu. Mark I pray the manner of his Retractation, I would not have said (so) if at that time I had known Faith to have been amongst the gifts of God, which are given in the same spirit. So then as soon as Austin came to acknowledge, that Faith it self was the gift of God, he therewithal came off from affirming, that Quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret ut bona operando etiam vitam aeternam consequeretur. And like as before he maintained, that God elected some (to wit, Believers) to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that by working good works, they might obtain also everlasting life; so now having found that Faith also, is the gift of God, he was accordingly to maintain, that God elected some to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that both by believing, and working good works, they might obtain everlasting life: so that no longer was the foresight of Faith, to precede election in Austin's opinion, to wit, after once he knew Faith to be the gift of God. And accordingly in his Book De Praedestin. Sanctorum, addressing himself to the rectifying of the Massilienses in the point of Predestination, wherein they did not as yet discern the truth of God: Adhuc in quaestione caligant de Praedestinatione sanctorum. Cap. 1. And again, Si quid de Praedestinatione Sanctorum aliter sapiunt (Deus) illis hoc quo{que} revelabit. Ibid. Mark I pray you what course he takes to rectify them herein. cap. 2. Priùs ita{que} fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum dei esse debemus ostendere: and whereas he had performed this task very sufficiently before, manifesting by divers pregnant passages of holy Scripture, that Faith was the gift of God, and the Massilienses did elude them by such a distinction as this, Faith may be considered two ways, either as touching Initium, the first beginning of it; or as touching Incrementum the augmentation thereof; and accommodating this distinction said, The passages of Scripture alleged by Austin proceeded as touching the Augmentation of it, which they willingly granted to be the work of God; but not as touching the initiation of it, which they still maintained to be the work of man. Therefore Austin addresseth himself in that discourse of his, to prove that the very Initiation of Faith, is the work of God, and not the Augmentation only. His words are these, Sed nunc iis respondendum esse video, qui divina testimonia, quae de hâc re adhibuïmus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo: tanquam fides non ab ipso donetur nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis ex merito quo coepit à nobis. And likewise in the 19. cap. of the same Book, having propounded the opinion of the Pelagians, namely that because God foresaw that we would be holy and unblameable before him in love, therefore he elected and predestinated us in Christ, before the foundation of the World; and showed how this opinion, contradicts that of the Apostle Ephes. 1. 4, 5. where it is said, that, God elected us in Christ, and predestinated us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love: and perceiving withal how the Massilians did avoid this as nothing contrary to their Tenent (though contrary to the Pelagian Tenent) forasmuch as they maintained not, that God foresaw anything but our Faith, and therefore God elected us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love, (for these were their words) Nos autem dicimus nostram Deum non praescisse nisi fidem & ideo nos elegisse—ut etiam sancti & immaculati gratia atque opere ejus essemus; what course doth Austin take to beat them off but this, namely to prove, that, Like as Holines so Faith also, and that as touching the Initiation thereof, is the work of God. thus: Sed audiant ipsi in hoc testimonio, ubi dicit, sortem consecuti simus, praedestinati secundum propositum qui universa operatur. Ipse ergo ut credere incipiamus operatur qui universa operatur. So that it is clear in the opinion of Austin, that to take both himself and others off from premising the foresight of Faith unto God's election, it is sufficient to prove that Faith is the gift of God, the work of God both touching the augmentation, and touching the first introduction thereof. And thus evincing the condition of Predestination, as excluding all foresight of Faith, from the condition of Predestination, as being throughout the work of God in man, rather then taking a contrary course, as if the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 were, what is the condition of God's decree of Predestination, as here it is pretended and supposed. And albeit it is commonly received of all sides (as if it were without question) that Faith is the gift of God: yet we find practices on foot, for the working of a manifest innovation herein. For not to speak of their interpretations of their own meanings, as, in what sense they say God works Faith in us; it is apparent the Remonstrants now a days, do as good as profess, that Faith is not bestowed upon us for Christ's sake, in as much as they deny that Christ merited Faith for us. For when the Author of the Censure passed upon the Remonstrants Confession, disputeth thus, At si hoc tantum meritus est Christus tum Christus nobis non est meritus fidem nec regenerationem: the Remonstrants in the Answer hereunto, forthwith confess it in these words, Sane ita est. Nihil ineptius, nihil vanius est quàm hoc Christi merito tribuere. Si enim Christus nobis meritus dicatur fidem & regenerationem, tum fides conditio esse non poterit, quam a peccatoribus Deus sub comminatione mortis aeternae exigeret. And by the way mark, I pray, that not any difference is put between Faith and Regeneration; manifestly signifying thereby, that as they grant it to be the work of man to believe, so we are commanded to make ourselves a new heart.

And as for ordering of the decrees, which here is added to complete the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as here is pretended that in my opinion, is so far off from being the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as that it is not to be accounted any 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 at all Theological, but merely Logical. Let the condition of the decrees be rightly explicated according to Divinity, and we shall have no need at all of Divinity for the right ordering of them. A mere Logical faculty by light of nature, will serve for this. For the decrees whereof we treat, are merely Intentiones rerum gerendarum. Now for the ordering of these in what kind soever, we have received Rules of the Schools, never yet that I know contradicted by any; namely, that they are to be ordered according to the condition of the things intended, which are but two, to wit, the end and the means; and all do attribute priority to the intention of the end, and posteriority to the intention of the means. It is true, men may err, in designing the right end, as also, in designing the right means, and these errors are to be discovered, and the truth cleared by that science, whereunto the consideration of the end and means belong, and not by Logic. But agreement being made concerning the end and means, there is no doubt to be made, but that according to the most received Rules of Schools, the end must be acknowledged both first in intention, and last in execution, and contrarily the means last in intention and first in execution.

2. But come we to the Decrees themselves, & the different opinions thereabouts, which follow in the next place. Now here I looked for different opinions about decrees, in the plural number, but I find the relation extends no farther then to one decree, and that of Reprobation. So at the first entrance reasons are promised, even in this writing, to be exhibited of change of opinion in certain controversies in the plural number, when in the issue, all comes but to one controversy, and that about Reprobation. Yet the Scripture speaketh fully of Election, sparingly of Reprobation in most places, leaving us to judge thereof, by consequence from the doctrine of Election Yet some passages we have (I confess) that give light and evidence to both alike. For like as it is said Acts 2. last. that God added daily to the Church such as should be saved. so 2 Cor. 4. 3. it is said, If our Gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost, and as it is signified Math. 24 24. that It is impossible seducers should prevail over the elect. so 2 Thes. 2. both as much is signified ver. 13. and also expressed ver. 10. 11. that they shall prevail among them that perish: and the 1 Cor. 1. 18. we are given to understand jointly, that the preaching of the Cross is to them that perish foolishness: but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. and Rom. 9. 18. that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardeneth whom he will. And like as Acts 13. 48. we read that, as many believed as were ordained to eternal life; which phrase of ordaining to eternal life, I conceive (under correction) to be all one with the phrase of Writing our names in Heaven. Luke 10. 20. and writing us in heaven. Hebr. 12. 23. and this phrase I take to be all one with the writing of us in the Book of life. So on the other side we read, that Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the World should wonder when they beheld the Be • st, and not so only but worship him also. But give we every vessel leave to vent that liquor whereof it is full.

I come to the consideration of the different opinions here proposed, concerning the decree of Reprobation; and herein, I will endeavor to open a clear way to the right understanding of the truth, that your judgment may have the more free course in discerning it, and withal, to represent unto you, the unreasonable carriage of our Adversaries in the setting down of our Tenent, whereby you may guess, what you are to expect from them prosecuting against it. And herein I will insist upon these particulars. The first shall be the Things Decreed. The second the Cause of this decree. The third, the Persons on whom this Decree doth pass. The fourth shall be that claw of Unavoydable Sin, and Damnation.

1. The Things Decreed are here said to be, The casting off from grace and glory, and the shutting of men up under Damnation.

Now I pray observe here in the first place, that, by casting off from grace and glory, we mean no other thing, then the not giving of grace and glory; and by grace, we mean the grace of Faith and Repentance, the grace of Regeneration. For like as in Election God purposeth (we say) to give this grace unto some, which is the same with showing mercy on them. Rom. 9. 18. as we suppose; so on the other side, God purposeth to deny this grace unto others, which in Scripture phrase is to harden them, that being made opposite to God's showing mercy. Rom. 9. 18. And for the farther clearing of the terms we say, that God by giving Faith and Repentance, doth cure that infidelity and impenitency, which is natural unto all, as being borne in sin: and by not giving this grace of Faith and Repentance unto others, God leaves their natural infidelity and impenitency uncured. And if this Author means ought else by shutting up under sin, then the not curing of their natural infidelity and impenitency, he doth us wrong, and what he means thereby I know not. As for shutting up under damnation, that is not our phrase, but we love to speak in plain terms, and say, that God doth purpose to inflict damnation on them whom he Reprobates.

Thus much for the clearing of the terms, as touching the things Decreed.

Secondly, observe I pray, which is of principal consideration, that here we have no cause at all specified, why he refuseth to give them grace; cunningly leaving it to an improvident Reader to conceive, that the cause of the decree, which is here specified, to be the mere pleasure of God's will, is indifferently appliable to the not giving of grace and glory, and to the shutting up under damnation as the cause thereof, which is a notorious imposture, yet I do not think this Author guilty of it, but others rather, who abuse their wits by cunning courses, to deceive the hearts of the simple. Amongst the Fallacies observed by Aristotle, there is one called Fallacia plurium interrogationum, as when many things are put together, and an answer is required to be made, either affirmatively or negatively to them all, as if they were but one; when indeed the answer cannot be made aright, without distinction of the things demanded, the one whereof perhaps requires an answer affirmative, the other negative. As for example, to instance as touching one of the Controversies here declined: We are often demanded, whether everyone that heareth the Gospel, be not bound to believe that Christ died for him? Now I say this phrase Christ died for me includes many things, as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ, may be conceived to be many. But let these benefits be distinguished, and we shall readily answer to the question made, and that perhaps differently, as namely, affirmatively to some, negatively to others; as thus. Do you speak of Christ's dying for me, that is, for the pardon of my sins, and for the salvation of my soul: I answer affirmatively and say, I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner, as God hath ordained, to wit, not absolutely but conditionally, to wit, in case I do believe and repent. For God hath not otherwise ordained, that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation, by virtue of Christ's Death and Passion, unless I believe in him and repent. But if question be made, whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me, to procure faith and repentance unto me; I do not say, that I am bound, or that everyone who hears the Gospel, is bound to believe this.

Nay the Remonstrants now a days, deny in express terms, that Christ merited this for any at all. I am not of their opinion in this; but I see clearly a reason manifesting, that Christ merited not this for all, no not for all and everyone, that hears the Gospel. For if he had, then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally. Not absolutely, for then all and everyone of them should believe de facto, which is untrue; for the Apostle saith, Fides non est Omnium: Nor conditionally, for what condition I pray can be devised, upon the performance whereof, God for Christ's sake should give us faith, and repentance? In like sort, if I am demanded whether God did decree, of the mere pleasure of his will, to refuse to give grace and glory unto some, and to inflict upon them damnation. To this I cannot answer at once, there being a Fallacy in the demand. But distinguish them, I answer and say, that, as touching the point of denying grace, God doth that of his mere pleasure; but as touching the denial of glory, and the inflicting of damnation, he doth not decree to do these of mere pleasure, but rather merely for sin, to wit, for their infidelity and impenitency, and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them. So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated, is the decree of God partly to deny unto some, and that of his mere pleasure, the grace of Faith and Repentance, for the curing of that infidelity and hardness of heart, which is natural unto all, and partly to deprive them of glory, and to inflict damnation upon them, not of his mere pleasure, but merely for their final continuance in sin, to wit, in infidelity and impenitency, and all the fruits that proceed therehence.

2. Now as for the cause of this decree, as likewise of all the decrees of God, when any of our Divines say, that it is the mere pleasure of God, as in some places it is expressed of some decrees, let them be understood aright; not as if they distinguished between the decree of God, and the good pleasure of his will; for we know full well, that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will, what decree soever it be: but hereby we only exclude, all causes from without, moving God to make any such decree; like as when it is said, Deuteron. 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number then any people, but because the Lord loved you, as much as to say, The Lord loved you, because he loved you. Where we cannot soberly devise any distinction between love and love, as between the cause and the effect; only hereby is excluded all cause from without. Now we are ready with open face to profess, that of the Will and decree of God, there neither is, nor can be any cause from without: all things from without being temporal, and the Will of God being eternal, and the Will of God quoad actum Volentis, being the very Essence of God; For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One, whereby he is said to Be whatsoever he is, as we do conceive variety of perfections in God, yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God; and by this one indivisible Act, he both knows all that he knows, and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth. Man when he willeth anything, as likewise an Angel when he willeth ought, they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object: but it is not so with God, in whom there is no accident. And therefore Aquinas was bold to profess, that never any man was so mad, as to profess that merits were the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating: and why so? why surely upon this ground, because predestination is the will of God: and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God, as touching the act of willing, so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. His words are these in the same place; Sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis. dictum est autem suprà, quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi. But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestows, like as Jansen interprets that place John. 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father, to wit, of the effect of the Fathers love; and we commonly say, that Passions are attributed unto God not quoad Affectum, but quoad Effectum: in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed, as 1 Thes. 4. 3. This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that is, this is willed by him. Therefore Aquinas distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God, one quoad actum volentis, and so it hath no cause from without; another quoad res volitas, and so it may have a cause. So likewise in predestination as considering it either quoad actum Praedestinantis, and so it hath no cause, or quoad effectum Praedestinationis, and so it may have a cause, as there he professeth, both touching the will of God in general, and touching Predestination in special. Of the will of God in general, thus; Non est assignare causam voluntatis divinae ex parte actus volendi, sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. And of predestination in special, thus; Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam; & hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliqua merita. Now thus we acknowledge of predestination, both in the way of a meritorious cause on Christ's part, and in the way of a disposing cause on our part. For God we say, hath predestinated to bestow upon us, both grace and glory for Christ's sake; where Christ is made a meritorious cause of grace and glory, but not of the act of predestination. And farther we say, that God hath predestinated to bestow glory upon us, as a reward of grace, as a reward of faith, repentance, and good works: and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace, doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light, Coloss. 1. 12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any, we say there is no cause thereof on man's part, For he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom. 9. 18. and he hath called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace. 2 Timoth. 1. 9.

Now let us apply this to reprobation, which is the will of God, as well as predestination, and if there can be no cause of predestination quoad actum Praedestinantis, because there can be no cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis; Who seeth not, that by the same reason, there can be no cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis? And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestination quoad actum praedestinantis; it must be as mad a thing to maintain, that any merits of the creature, can be the cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And this doctrine Aquinas applies expressly to Reprobation it self, upon the 9. Rom. Lect. 2 ^da , at the end of these words Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis: but how? ex parte actus reprobantis? nothing less, but rather ex parte effectus; and what effect? not the denying of grace, but only as touching the inflicting of punishment: thus, Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à seipsis habent non à Deo.

And farther we prove this, both by clear evidence of Scripture, and clear evidence of reason, and thirdly by as clear a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine, and particularly of the Author of this discourse.

First by clear evidence of Scripture. Rom. 9. 11. Where the Apostle proves, that Election stands not of good works, by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time, when that Oracle, The elder shall serve the younger, was delivered; together with the present condition of Jacob and Esau, answerable to that time; thus, Before the children were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said to Rebecca, The Elder shall serve the Younger, Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good works. Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election, by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation, in proportion, thus, Before the Children were borne, or had done Good or Evil, it was said to Rebecca The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation, stands not of evil works: that is, like as good works are not the cause of Election, so evil works are not the cause of Reprobation, to wit, quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the very act and eternal decree of God it self.

Secondly, observe, I pray, whether my reason be not as clear; If God upon the foresight of sin, doth ordain a man unto damnation; (thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner) then this is done either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God: Not by necessity of nature, as it is confessed; and the cause is evident, for undoubtedly he could annihilate them, and so he can the holiest creature that lives, as all sides confess. Therefore it must be by the constitution of God: but neither can this hold. For if so, then God did constitute, that is ordain, that upon the foresight of sin, he would ordain men unto damnation. Where observe that the act of divine ordination, is made the object of divine ordination: as much as to say, he did ordain to ordain, or he did decree to decree: Whereas the objects of God's decrees are always things temporal; as for example, We say well, God did decree to create the world, to make man out of the earth, to send Christ into the World, to preserve us, to redeem us, sanctify us, save us. But God's ordination or decree is an act eternal, and cannot be the object of his decree or ordination. I challenge all the Powers of darkness to answer this, and to vindicate the Tenent, which I impugn, from that absurdity, which I charge upon it, if they can.

O but some will say, it's very harsh to say, that God of his mere pleasure doth ordain men unto damnation.

I am content to do my endeavor, to remove this scandal out of the way of honest hearts, yea and out of the way of others also.

First therefore consider, is it fit to resist the evidence of divine truth, because it is harsh to men's affections?

Secondly, Wherein consists this harshness? Is it in this, that nothing is the cause of God's decree? and will nothing temper the harshnes of it, unless a thing temporal as sin, be made the cause of God's will, which is eternal and even God himself? But let us deal plainly, and tell me in truth, whether the harshnes doth not consist in this, That the mere pleasure of God's will, seems to be made the cause, not of God's decree only, but of damnation also; as if God did damn men, not for sin, but of his mere pleasure. And this I confess is wondrous harsh, and yet no more harsh then it is untrue, though in this juggling world, things are so carried by some, who will both shuffle, and cut, and deal themselves, as if we made God of mere pleasure to damn men, and not for sin, which is a thing utterly impossible: damnation being such a notion, as hath essential reference unto sin. But if God damn no man but for sin, and decreed to damn no man but for sin, what if the mere pleasure of God be the cause of this decree; what harshnes I say is this? As for example, Zimri or Cosby perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together, so going as it were quick to Hell, never fearing the judgments of God, until they felt them. If we say, God decreed they should be cut off in this sin of theirs, and be damned for it, What hatshnes I pray in this, though God made this decree of mere pleasure? For is it not manifest he did? For could he not if it had pleased him, have caused them to outlive this sin of theirs, and given them space for repentance, and not space only, but grace also for repentance, seeing as Austin saith, Quantamlibet praebuerit Patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis aget Paenitentiam.

Now I pray, what is become of the harshnes of this our Tenent as is pretended? And the truth is, the harshnes lieth not here, though our Adversaries would fain draw it hither, but rather on the other part of reprobation, as it denotes God's purpose for the denying of grace, to wit, the grace of Regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance: but on this part, they are not very forward to cry out upon our Tenent, as savouring of harshnes, but themselves rather driven to such straits, as either to deny faith and repentaince to be the gift of God (wherein the Remonstrants now a days, are come so far as clearly to profess, that Christ merited not faith and Regeneration for any; whence it followeth, that if God doth give faith and repentance unto any, yet it is not for Christ's sake that he gives it,) Or being demanded how it comes to pass, that God gives it not to all, if his mere pleasure be not the cause of this difference, as namely in showing mercy unto some, when he hardens others, they are put upon this shift to say, that if they would believe, God would give them faith, if they would repent God would give them repentance▪ and one that I have had to deal with, on this very argument, spares not to profess that God doth work in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, credere, & resipiscere, mode Velit.

One thing I had almost pretermitted, and that was, to represent the infatuate condition of this declaration, to wit, as touching the Authors Tenet in opposition to ours, as in saying, that God's decree to cast off men forever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbelief; For this continuance must be understood of final continuance therein, least otherwise the contradiction to our Tenent be not duly expressed. Now the foresight hereof is made to precede God's casting men off forever: but from what? surely from grace and glory, in contradiction to our Tenent as here it is shaped; and consequently in election, the foresight of final perseverance in faith and repentance, must be shaped to precede God's giving grace, to wit, in another world, as if the other world were appointed for the giving of grace to some, and denying it another; and that the giving of the grace of faith and repentance, and denying it unto others, was after the one hath persevered in faith and repentance, and the other in infidelity and impenitency unto the end in this World. For this is it we mean by grace, when we say, God in Election destinates it to one, and in Reprobation decrees to deny it unto the other; and in contradicting us it is fit they should use our terms in our meaning, unless they express the contrary, and give a reason of it.

3. As for the Persons on whom this decree passeth, and the aggravation there mentioned, namely of shutting up the greater part of men, even of those that are called, under sin and damnation, This is confessed on all hands, That the greatest part of men are reprobated, even of those that are called; and our Savior hath expressly given us to understand, That many are called but few are chosen. And it is without question, that if it be lawful for God to deal thus with one, it is as lawful to deal so with the greatest part, yea with all. And experience justifieth that the greatest part of them that are called do not perform true faith and repentance: and if they did and die therein, then the greatest part of them that are called, should be chosen. Whereby it is manifest, that God doth not give Faith and Repentance unto the greatest part of them that are called; and consequently, it is nothing strange, that he shuts up the greatest part of them that are called under Damnation. So that in true account there is no weight at all of aggravation in this. Like as you have read in News from Parnassus, that when the French and the Spaniard weighed their powers in the balance, and the French being found to weigh 25 Millions, and the Spaniard but 20: He thinking to help the matter, and to make himself as weighty as the French, clapped into the scale the Kingdom of Naples and the Dukedom of Milan; but beyond his expectation, the scale proved never a whit the more weighty then before, but lighter rather.

4. As for the last claw, to help the matter with a couple of Epethetes of invincible sin and unavoidable damnation; one of these might have sufficed to be expressed, seeing undoubtedly Damnation is no otherwise avoidable by man, then by avoiding sin the cause thereof. For it is undeniable that man dying in sin, his damnation is unavoidable by the whole power of nature.

But as for the avoydablenes of sin, the Author of this Discourse acknowledgeth it no otherwise then by grace; and we willingly profess, that all sin is avoydable by grace. But by the way it is implied, that such a grace is afforded unto all reprobates, whereby they may avoid that infidelity and impenitency for which they are damned. But this we deny. For if this were true then all Reprobates were enabled to believe, to repent, to please God, to discern the things of God, to be subject to the Law of God; but to say this, is directly to contradict the Word of God, which professeth of some, that They could not believe John. 12. 39. of others that They cannot repent, Rom. 2. 5. Of all natural men, that They cannot discern the things of God, as which seem foolishness unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. of them that are in the flesh, that They cannot please God, Rom. 8. 8. of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the affection of the flesh, that 'tis enmity against God, and it is not subject to the Law of God, nor can be, Rom. 8. 7. And of the Israelites in the Wilderness for forty years together, God had not given them eyes to see, nor ears to hear, nor an heart to perceive, Deutron. 29. 4.

TWISSE. Consideration.

THis Authors pretence being only to oppose that Tenent, which maintains that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not presuppose the foresight of final perseverance in sin, you may well marvel to what purpose this comes in about the different condition of man, considered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in Adam, it being a question of another nature and merely Logical, to wit, about the ordering of God's decrees of Creation, Permission of the fall of Adam, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The resolution whereof, depends upon the right distinction of these decrees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Resolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, must consequently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schools, namely thus, The intention of the end is first, then the intention of the means: so that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permission of Adams Fall and Raising therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it must be confessed, that the decree of Salvation must be first, then the decree of Creation, permission of sin, and of raising out of sin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permission of sin, and of final perseverance therein be the means; it must be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, &c. But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permission of all to sin in Adam, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of God's glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with manifest reason doth justify. For God being the supreme efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even there where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evil, it doth therewithal give to understand, that what is signified by, To the day of evil, doth not denote the end of God's actions (that before being expressed to be God himself, God made all things for himself, not for acquiring ought unto himself, for he is so perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but for the manifesting of his own most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixed with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifestable without this) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a mere man, is capable of. And herehence we conclude, that in case the end is such as hath been specified, and all these actions following, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting God's glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one formal notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the several parts thereof bespeaks them all; and consequently they are all to be considered, as making up the object of one formal decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is first intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angel, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission of sin, and Damnation unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formal decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creatures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sin.

And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrel about the different consideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a School point only, touching the right stateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of God's decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blasphemies, nothing can free them; but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any such confidence, able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conscience of it, yet if it do, that is more than I know. And only to these two ends doth this aliene discourse of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; namely, to show the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to those aspersions of blasphemy on the first way, as also to make way for a third in part, which comes to be considered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the second way.

Yet Arminius in his Conference with Junius, might have informed him of three opinions concerning the object of Predestination, dividing the fruit of these into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being considerable two ways, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call the Mass created, but not yet corrupted; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation also, which we commonly call the Mass not yet created, or Mankind not yet created. As touching the most harsh way of these three, upon examination of Arminius his twenty arguments against it, I find nothing worth the speaking of, but mere suggestion of flesh and blood, which yet being duly pondered, do discover most shameful nakedness.

His arguments against the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of predestination, I have proposed and answered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, lib. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I shall be ready to consider what he saith, as God shall give opportunity.

And in Junius you shall find, how he laboreth to reconcile them, but very obscurely. Piscator also sets hand to the same work, and carrieth himself therein (as his manner is) very clearly, by distinguishing three acts in Predestination. The first whereof he will have to presuppose Mankind not created; for it is the decree of creating man to different ends. The second, he will have to presuppose Mankind created, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting Adam to fall, and all Mankind in him. The third and last he will have to presuppose Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raising some out of sin, wherein they are conceived and borne, and leaving some therein. As for the Angels it is without question, that election and reprobation divine had course concerning them, as well as concerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Mass could be the object of divine Predestination in their election and reprobation.

As for Arminius his ordering of God's decrees in opposition to these ways taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, pag 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in Adam, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in Adam, he takes into consideration only, the divine decrees of saving sinful man.

1. The first whereof is, Whereby he decreed to make his Son Christ a Mediator, Redeemer, Savior, Priest and King, by his death to abolish sin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly lost) and by his power to communicate it. And this decree he saith is absolute.

2. The second is, Whereby he decreed to receive into grace such as believe and repent, and those persevering unto the end, to save in Christ, for and by Christ: but such as believe and repent not, to leave under sin and wrath, and to damn as aliene from Christ. Where observe, 1. This decree of saving such as believe and repent, he calleth a decree absolute, yet this decree passeth upon no particular persons: such a decree is reserved for the last place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favor, unless they believe and repent: Whereby it is manifest, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of God's grace and favor: for they must be performed before they are received into God's grace and favor.

3. The third is, Where by he decreed sufficiently and efficaciously to administer the means which are necessary to faith and repentance. This decree whether he conceives it to be absolute or no, he doth not specify; nor whether he decreed to administer them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angels, nor whether by means he understands the Gospel only, and we have cause to doubt thereof. And lastly, which is most obscure, he doth not explicate what he means, by sufficient and efficacious administration. Only he adds, that in this administration, he carries himself according, 1. To his Wisdom, which shows what becomes his mercy andseverity, and 2 ^lie to his Justice, whereby he is ready to follow the prescript of his Wisdom.

4. The fourth and last is, Whereby he decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. Now whereas our Divines generally, what way soever they took, had a care out of their Logic and Philosophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of some end, or of some means tending to an end, this seems to have been no part of Arminius his care. This order of his, I have ransaked in my Vindiciae. lib. 3. digress. 2. And if this Author think good, he may answer thereunto, and do his best to qualify the absurdities wherewith I charge that order of his.

But as touching the embracers of this first way, whose names he expresseth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwise of Calvin, and they represent their reasons for it, out of his own words such as these, De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione. pag. 970. speaking of Pighius. Augustinum ridet (saith he) ejus{que} similes hoc est pios emnes, qui deum imaginantur postquam universalem Generis humani Ruinam in personâ Adae praesciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum destinasse, & pag. 710. Cùm de praedestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordiendum esse constanter semper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in more relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt atque damnati.

As for Beza, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predestination, but can this Author represent unto us, any place out of Beza, wherein he should affirm, that God doth decree to damn any man but for sin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predestination to death? In his Questions and Answers he professeth the contrary. pag. 111. Postremo non dixi exitium istorum (he speaks of Reprobates) esse finem deo decernenti propositum, sed gloriam ipsius. Neque etiam simpliciter dixi istos esse exitio destinatos, sed justo exitio destinatos dixi. And in his Book De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione contrà Sebastian. Castell: ad argument. Castell. 2. pag. 346. Quamobrem etiam illud quoque probavimus, nos ita loqui non solere, & quanquam à Deo simpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, sed idcirco ut ipsius justa condemnatione Dominus justitiam suam patefaciat.

As for Zanchi; Peter Baro, that caused such perturbation in Cambridge about this very argument, he denies this to have been the opinion of Zanchi, In summa trium de Praedestinatione sententiarum; his words are these, Altera sententia est Augustini, posterior etiam Sohnii Heydelbergensis Theology Professoris, & aliorum quorundam Protestantium, ut Zanchii, atque etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter se consentientes, ut sit praedestinatio ab Adami tantum lapsu accipienda.

And as touching Piscator, he handles the question about the object of Predestination in a small Treatise, annexed to an answer of his to Hemingius, De Universali Gratiâ; and inquires whether the object thereof be Humanum genus nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or both conditum and corruptum; and his resolution is, that in the decree of Predestination, there is place for all these considerations, according to three several acts comprised therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and so draws into one all three opinious.

As touching Gomarus in the last place, I have seen little or nothing of his; but when Lubbertus in his Book Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorstii pag. 807. had professed, Massam consideratam esse a Deo, non ut integram, sed ut corruptam; and was charged by Vostius as delivering that which was contrary to the doctrine of Calvin, Beza, and Gomarus, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but saith he, Illorum dict a quae quibusdam asperiuscula videntur, lenio, & in commodissimum sensum interpretor.

But be it so, that all of them made Humanum genus, not corruptum, no nor integrum, but nondum conditum the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that do so; and was not D ^r Whitaker also, whom very wisely this Author conceals? This renowned Professor in the University of Cambridge, in a Public exercise, his Concio ad Clerum, professeth, what Paul speaks De luto & sigulo non posse melius exponi quàm de Massâ incorruptâ: and that Bucer understands it thus, Bucerus per Massam intelligit primam humani ganeris originem ex quá homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus est. And he disputes at large, that there is no cause of reprobation, and that neither sin actual, nor sin original is the cause thereof, and professeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a days we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papists and School Divines, this great light of Cambridge, spares not to make honorable mention of Schoolemens solid discourse on this point, saying, Hanc sententiam Scholastici si ullam egregie solid{que} pertractarum praeserùm qui insigniores saniores{que} habiti sunt. Lombardus ait, ut praedestinationis nulla merita sunt, ità nec reprobationis. Now the doctrine which he saith the Schoolmen handle so solidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author seems here to impugn, as when he saith, some make the will of God without any consideration of sin in men, original, or actual, to be the cause of their eternal Rejection; for D ^r Whitaker expresseth it thus, His igitur isto modo explicatis, sequitur tertiam opinionem solummodo & necessario veram esse, aeque reprobationis ac praedestinationis causam esse dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiae divinae munus est omnia ad fines istos certa ration certis{que} mediis ordinare. Only as touching the end here mentioned, That so he might show his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaseth, that I find not in D ^r Whitaker. He saith plainly that God predestinated unto death, whom he would, and because he would: Deus igitur ad mortem praedestinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit: (which phrase I willingly confess I like not so well) but that the end thereof is to manifest his absolute and unlimited dominion and power, he saith not; and Beza in the places before mentioned, refers it to the manifestation of God's justice, as the end thereof. And like as he saith, certissimum est damnationem nunquam nisi propter Peccatum infligi; so I should think it nothing less certain, that God doth not ordain any man to be damned, but for sin, especially cosidering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an essential reference to sin.

Now since I have found such a Champion as D ^r Whitaker for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cause to fear the sharp censures of any professors in the Country? Were he alive, I presume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of making God, the Prime and Principal cause of men's everlasting ruin; he would I think require a little more learning in the Criminator, then to express himself so crudely. For without all question, God is the prime and principal cause, nay the sole cause of man's everlasting ruin in genere causae efficient is, though this excludes not a meritorious cause of his own damnation on the creatures part, as D ^r Whitaker professeth in the words formerly alleging, acknowledged, Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum.

And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to justify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predestination and reprobation, yet no man's reprobation is made by God, citra considerationem Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and of final perseverance therein, and lastly of damnation for sin, are not decrees subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the same end, which is the manifestation of God's glory, in the way of vindicative justice.

And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the first sin and of all sins; As I find by D ^r Whitaker's discourse in his Cygnaea Concio, that were he alive he would answer hereunto, That this Author takes his aim much amiss, considering, that the effect of Reprobation is not sin, but the permission of sin, and God's means to the end intended by him, to wit, the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, is not sin, but the Permission of sin; according to that of Aquinas, alleged by the foresaid Doctor thus, Sicut Praedestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpâ. And as I discern no unholiness in God's permitting of sin, so neither do I discern any cruelty therein. But D ^r Whitaker well perceived that this course of God's counsels, would seem injurious; and therefore after he had proposed his last argument drawn from that of the Apostle, Rom. 11. ô altitudo! thus, Vltimo illa Apostoli exclamatio, ô altitudo, hanc sententiam confirmat. Ne{que} enim tantae altitudinis est ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odisse homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati sunt; immo rationi convenientissimum est ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod est naturae suae contrarium. But mark wherein the depth the Apostle speaks of, consists in his judgment; Ib i demùm infinitum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & Abyssus est divinae discretionis, quando sine peccati ration quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & faelicitatem praedestinantur, ut omnis ratio discretionis ad solam dei voluntatem referatur. And because he knew full well that this mysterious depth of God's counsel, would seem very harsh to carnal affections, as savouring of cruel and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes express notice of it, and that in Austin's language, saying, Iniquum videtur (Augustinus ait) ut sine ullis bonorum malorum{que} operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiat{que} alterum; whence he concludes according to Austin thus, Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumque odit sine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malorum. Hoc videri possit alicui iniquum, sed est aequissimum, quia sic Deo visum est. Ne{que} Augustinus affirmare veritus est, eos Apostoli verbum evacuare qui judicium divinae discretionis ad opera reducunt praevisa aut praeterita; and so concludes the main point he insists on, thus, Non est igitur peccatum original causa aeternae reprobationis, nedum actual. So that both Austin and D ^r Whitaker, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harsh an accent this truth sounds in the ears of men; yet because the word of God doth testify this truth unto us, it becomes all Christian hearts to submit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reason of it: Though I know full well, some are so violently carried with the zeal of their own way, that they spare not to profess, that they will sooner deny that there is a God, then yield to that which the Contra-Remonstrants teach; which for ought I know, is no other then this which D ^r Whitaker taught and Preached publicly in the University of Cambridge, being at that time Professor Regius. And seeing we acknowledge the seeming harshnes of it, as well as our Adversaries, yet because we find it revealed in God's word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therehence conclude that it is aequissimum. Doth it become any one to take the course this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this course of God, and the courses of Tiberius, as also by a saying of Zeno's servant, to cry it down as iniquissimum, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not teach it? Is this a Christian course? is this Theological? is this Scholastical? Yet in my judgment the harshnes lieth not here, to wit, in the point of God's purpose to inflict damnation; considering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintain that God did ever purpose to inflict damnation, but for sin. Or if there be any harshnes therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree of punishment and everlastingness thereof, God holding them everlastingly as it were upon the rack and in quick sense of torment. And yet we maintain without contradiction amongst Christians, that it is just with God to do so for one act of drunkenness or adultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of punishment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harshnes in my opinion, is most pregnant to bring forth distaste on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpose of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of mere pleasure; for like as he shows mercy on whom he will, so the Scripture testifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only Austin and D ^r Whitaker and our Divines generally do take notice, how unsavory this doctrine is in the judgment of flesh and blood, especially in comparing it with God's ordinary course of complaining of men for their disobedience, even of those whom himself hath hardened, but the holy Apostle also Rom. 9. 19. Thou wilt say then, and is it so, doth God harden whom he will? Why then doth he yet complain? For who hath resisted his will? Now in this case, how doth the Apostle stop the mouths of such, but thus; O man, who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?

But let us come to the consideration of the Parallel here made between the counsels of Tiberius and the counsels of God. This consists of two parts, according to a double story of Tiberius taken out of Suetonius.

The first is his dealing with Drusus and Nero, the two sons of Germanicus, these varia fraud induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, he used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. What these cunning contrivances are, it is specified by Suetonius; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it stands him upon, to represent what those cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes unto God, to draw them to sin against God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from sin (as he did the Angels that stood, when their fellows became Apostates, the cause whereof Austin resolves into amplius Adjutorium given by God, either in their creation or after: De Civit. Dei. lib. 12. cap. 9. Isti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se nunquàm casuros certissimi fierent, pervenerunt,) so likewise that God's permission is enough to prostitute any man unto sin. And not our Divines only, but Arminius also and others. Arminius Exam. pag. 152. Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, secùs permissio non fieret. And Pag. 157. thus he defines the permission of sin, Permissio peccati est suspensio omnium impedimentorum quibus positis peccatum non fieret. Now let any sober man judge, whether herehence it it followeth not necessarily necessitate consequenti • & suppositionis, that sin shall be, to wit, upon the removing of all those impediments upon the position whereof sin could not be; considering that an impediment of sin in this case and in Arminius his phrase is everything quo posito peccatum non fuerit. Vorstius in like manner, in Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. Fateor quidem permissione jam positâ in actu necessario etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, id{que} ob necessariam talium relatorum ad se invicem habitudinem, at{que} in arguendo mutuam quandam 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quae ferre non potest ut unum sine altero reipsâ sit, nedum ut alterum extra se quidquam vere agat, altero ne quidem adhuc existente, nedum vere patiente, aut contra. Navarettus in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 9. §. 2. maintains, Posita permissione infallibiliter sequi quod permittitur. Austin himself supposeth as much where he saith, Ad omnipotentissimam suam bonitatem pertinere, potiùs bona ex malis elicere, quam mala esse non sinere. For hereby he gives to understand, that God permits sin with a purpose to work good out of evil. Now this manifestly implies, that upon God's permission of sin, sin shall exist. Nay how can this be avoided, unless we deny that God alone, is he that keeps us from running into sin, and maintain that man can do this of himself, without that special grace of God, whereby he keeps us from sin: yet in the Council of Palestine, it was concluded, that God's grace was required to every act, and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe thereunto, and to anathematize those that denied. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is necessarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, I will cause them to walk in my statutes, and keep my judgments and do them: Ezech. 36. 28. or whether it be only such a Cooperate grace, as some now a days blush not to profess as whereby God works in us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle bonum modo Velimus, this I can show under the hand of a zealous Partizan for Arminius. Now I hope there is no such cunning contrivance in the permission of sin.

Farther, there are certain occasions & opportunities offered for the committing of sin in the course of the World: We willingly ascribe unto God the administratiō of these, and so doth Arminius; and that not of Occasions only, but of Arguments also inciting unto sin, Dispute. Pub. Thes. 9. De Iustitiâ & Efficaciâ providentiae Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipsum tum vitiositatem ejus. Efficientia quae circa initium consideratur vel impeditio vel permissio est; cui addimus administrationem argumentorum & occasionum ad peccatum incitantium.

Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto sin then all these, & that is by the practices of Satan, who goeth about like a roaring Lyon seeking whō he may devour. How coms he to have such liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thousand years and more if it please him? The Devils sometime besought our Savior, that he would not send them into the deep; surely they acknowledged thereby his power to send them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like so many roaring lions, to devour the souls of men by provoking unto sin. As for those that Tiberius set about Drusus and Nero to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devil and his Angels for the practicing of provoking courses? But Tiberius bid his servants to provoke Drusus and Nero and not to spare: but can any say truly that we maintain that God bids the Devil to provoke this Author, or any such Arminian spirit to make such parallels as these? Yet 1 Kings 22. we read when a wicked spirit offers his service to God to entice Ahab that he might go and fall at Ramoth-Gilead, & that by becoming a lying spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, saying, Go forth and do so; but also tells him, thou shalt entice him, and shalt also prevail. That was a great deal more then was in the power of Tiberius, or his instigators, or the Devils themselves. And did not Ahab deserve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellows, have deserved so much at the hands of God, as to have a lying spirit put in the mouths of them, on whom they depend for resolution in points of Divinity, and that they prevail with them also? And why may not he also be thus given over to illusions to believe lies? Nay, what do we talk of desert in this? Did not the Devil provoke Eve and Adam to sin against God in Paradise? Could not God have kept the Devil off? Why did he not? Cur non intercessit & circumscriptorem colubrum cohibuit? to speak in Tertullian's phrase. Doth it not manifestly appear, that it was God's will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto sin? & why not? Is it lawful for a man to lay a bait of gold and silver in his servants way to try his fidelity, and whether such a provocation will make a breach upon his honesty; and shall not such a course be lawful unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of transgressing. And to serve God while we are not tempted to sin against him, is a poor commendation: If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small, saith Solomon. Job. 1. 11. Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and see if he will not blaspheme thee to thy face; as much as to say, Let but Job be in this manner provoked, and see whether he will not blaspheme. What is the Lord's answer? Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himself shalt thou not stretch out thine hand. Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One messenger comes and brings tidings, saying, The Oxen were plowing, and the Asses feeding in their places, and the Sabaeans came violently and took them, yea, they have slain thy servants with the edge of the sword, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee: Upon the neck of him comes another, saying, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy sheep and thy servants, and devoured them, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Upon the back of him comes a third saying, The Chaldeans set out three bands, and fell upon the Camells and have taken them and slain thy servants with the edge of the sword, & I only am escaped alone to tell thee. After all these coms a fourth, saying, Thy sons and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brothers house, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wilderness, and smote the four corners of the house which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have Job's uprightness thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing so upright as Job (whatsoever be the consequents thereof) unto transgression, though it be even to the cursing of their King and their God? as Is. 8. 21. He that is afflicted and famished, shall go to and fro in it, and when he shall be hungry he shall even fret himself and curse his King and his gods and shall look upward: and Revelations 16. 21. There fell a great hail like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blasphemed God because of the Plague of the hail, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. Yet Job continued in his uprightness, his wicked Wife perceived it, though she her self was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to sin against God, then Joseph was by the temptation of his wanton Mistress: though David fell fowlly and shamefully, provoked thereunto by the sight of Bathsheba, and did not God by his providence bring him to the sight of Bathsheba, as he brought Shimei and David after this together, as Arminius and his complices confess, when Shimei railed on him? A great provocation to so great a Person as David, if not to bid, yet at least to suffer Abishai to cut off that dogs head, as he called him; yet David would not suffer him, and why? Let David himself answer; The Lord, saith he, hath bidden him to curse David. It may be the Lord will render unto me good, for his cursing this day. He fell not foul upon God, though acknowledging his just providence herein. And to make a Parallele between the courses of God, and the courses of Tiberius that monster of men, in taking a course with Drusus and Nero to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might destroy them: Thus David was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as Drusus and Nero were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he fare the worse for this, but no doubt found cause to bless God for his grace, in restraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or spirit, like as formerly he blessed God for the good counsel of Abigail, whereby he was restrained from shedding blood, and that his own hand did not save him. And if it be not lawful for us to provoke another unto sin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawful for God to provoke? One is provoked by prosperity to corrupt his ways, another by adversity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blasphemy? What then? shall not God be acknowledged to be the Author both of prosperity and adversity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before profess what should be his providence towards the Jews? and that in this very kind of provoking them. Deutron. 32. 21. They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealousy with those that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish Nation.

But let us consider more distinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it consists, that we may be the better able to judge in what case we may safely attribute it unto God, and in what case not, that so we may neither ascribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both these courses being equally blasphemous, and so reputed among School Divines.

Now Provocation in the most usual phrase of Scripture is by way of exasperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwise taken when man is said to provoke God. And in the same sense it is delivered in the particular fact of Tiberius here mentioned. But when a resemblance is here made between the particular course of Tiberius and the courses of God, God's provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of sin, whether it be by way of exasperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the several passions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved several ways to sin, amongst which the passion anger is but one. And as it is said of the wrath of man, that it works not the righteousness of God; so it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the 1 Chron. 24. 1. it is said that Satan provoked David to number Israel. That was not by way of exasperation and moving in him the passion of anger, by the working upon some other passion, whether pride or curiosity: and therefore though it be rendered by the word, Provoked, yet in the Original the word used signifieth properly to tempt. But consider we provocation according to the propriety thereof in the first place, by way of exasperation.

Now consider, I pray, whether the Ministers of Tiberius did more exasperate Drusus and Nero, then God exasperated Jonah. Jonah. 4. 7. For having prepared a Gourd and made it to come up over Jonah, that it might he a shadow over his head, and deliver him from his grief; & Jonah being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worm when the morning rose the next day and it smote the Gourd that it withered. And God proceeded farther then this. For when the Sun did arise, God prepared also a fervent east wind, and the Sun heat upon the head of Jonah, that he fainted and wished in his heart to die, and said it is better for me to die then to live. And not only so, but justified himself in this his impatience. For when the Lord said unto him, doest thou well to be angry for the Gourd? Jonah stoutly answered, I do well to be angry to the death. It's true, Jonah brake not forth into blasphemies against God, as it seems Drusus and Nero did against Tiberius. Jonah was better brought up under the wings of God then so. God's grace preserved him from such excess, but that the Ministers Tiberius set about them, did more provoke them by exasperating courses, then God did in like manner provoke Jonah, it doth not appear: but had Jonah hereupon broken forth into blasphemies, had Jonah's sin been excusable or God's course blameable? Revel. 16. 21. we read of a great hail that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blasphemed God because of the plague of the hail, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. And Isai 8. 21. The Lord prophesieth, that, He that is afflicted and famished, shall go to and fro, and when he shall be hungry, he shall even fret himself, and curse his King and his God's and look upward. such plagues are the work of God, for there is no evil in the city but the Lord hath done it. Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occasion to blaspheme. And Tentatio probationis was never yet that I know denied unto God, to try whether they will blaspheme God or no. To this end Satan desired to have an hand on Job, yet not so much to try whether he would blaspheme or no, but being confident he should bring him to blaspheme. Job. 1. 11. stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. The Lord gave him leave, and Job acknowledgeth the Lord's hand in all that Satan did, saying, The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job sinned not nor charged God foolishly. Satan desires yet farther liberty, saying skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but save his life. So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and smote Job with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown, and he took him a potshard to scrape himself withal, and he sat down among the ashes, Then said his Wife unto him, Doest thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curse God and die. She manifested the inward corruption of her irreligious heart. Job might have brought her to a form of godliness by his pious courses in his family, but little power of godliness doth appear upon her. For as Solomon saith, If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small. It seems her heart was soured with Atheism, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather then by divine providence, and consequently it was all one, whether a man did bless God, or curse God, and a madness to make a conscience of walking in integrity, and that in Job's case at this time, whether he did bless God he must die, or whether he did curse God he could but die, and better it was for him thus impoverished, thus afflicted, to die then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it seems she never had but a taste of them, and that taste never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a sore temptation, the very gates of hell playing upon him with their greatest Ordinance to batter (if it were possible) his shield of faith. But what is Job's answer. Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What shall we receive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evil? In all this did not Job sin with his lips. The work of Satan in the impoverishing of Job's estate, and afflicting his person, cannot be denied to be God's work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan sin in all this? As our Savior saith that he was a murderer from the beginning, and as S ^t Peter saith, The devil goes about like a roaring Lyon seeking whom he may devour; so who can make doubt but these courses practiced against Job, were fruits of his murthering and devouring disposition? And all sides now a days confess, that the act of the most flagitious sin committed by man or Angel, is the work of God in the way of a principal efficient cause, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the sinfulness of the act, either of the Devil or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt Job: but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheistical proposed by his Wife, this was the greatest danger in the consideration thereof to corrupt his soul, for that is it alone that works upon the will to incline it. And as for their sinning herein, that proceeded from the want of God's fear, according to that of Abraham. Genes. 20. 10. I said surely the fear of God is not in this place, therefore they will slay me for my Wives sake. And albeit God engageth himself towards some, for the putting of his fear in their hearts, that they shall never depart away from him. Ierim. 36. 40. yet he hath not engaged himself thus far towards all. For the Apostle plainly professeth, that, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth Rom. 9. 18. and hardening we know is denying the fear of God, either as touching the habitual infusion thereof, or as touching the actual excitation thereof after it is infused. Yet I deny not but obduration and excaecation are sometimes promiscuously used, the one for the other, because of the strict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, Austin spares not to profess, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his secret providence lib. 9. Confess. cap. 8. Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? nonne protulisti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis & uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti? And whereas Bellarmine endeavoreth to blast the evidence of this place giving testimony unto God's secret providence in evil, I have endeavored to show the vanity of his discourse in my Vind. Grat. Dei lib. 2. Crim. 3. digress. 2. cap. 13. And in what congruity can it be said, that God bid Shimei to curse David, but that in the same analogy of faith, it may be said, that God bid Iobes Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greatest provocation, Tiberius his Ministers Provocation of Drusus and Nero; or Shimei's provocation of David railing on him to his face, the Subject blaspheaming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was nothing inferior, only here was the difference; Tiberius gave such commandment to his Ministers so to provoke Drusus and Nero, God gave no such commandment (in proper speech) unto Shimei, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people. But God's secret providence, whereby he makes use of all his creatures in what condition soever he finds them, even of Devils and wicked men, to serve his turn by them, either in the way of judgment, or in the way of mercy, and sometimes for trial of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phrase called God's bidding or commanding. And indeed it is far more effectual then his commandment. And Austin by pregnant passages of holy Scripture convicted of this truth, spareth not to profess as much in these words, His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, satis quantum existimo manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti{que} suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap. 21. And touching this particular case of Shimei, inquiring about the interpretation of it, see I pray, how he resolves concerning it. Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis sapiens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si jubenti obtemper asset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato posteà novimus esse punitum. And he proceeds farther to show the reason of this divine providence. Nec causa tacita est, cur ei Deus justo modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc est, Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die isto. And hereupon concludes. Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at{que} adjumentum bonorum. Sic usus est Judah tradente Christum. Sic usus est Iudaeis crucifigentibus Christum, & quanta inde bona praestitit populis credituris? Qui & ipso utitur diabolo pessimo, sed optime ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non sibi, quia omnia scit antequam fiant, sed nobis quibus erat necessarium, ut eo modo ageretur nobiscum.

But let us proceed to provocations unto other sins, not in the way of exasperation, but in the way of allurements. Achan was a covetous person, at the sacking of Jericho, it was his hap to light among the spoil, upon a goodly Babylonish garment, and two hundred shekells of silver, and a wedge of gold of fifty shekells weight. Was not so fair a prey, a sore temptation to a covetous person? How was Demosthenes taken with a rich bowle that was shown him by Harpalus, but there was great danger in it, I confess, yet if desire of prey doth sometimes overrun the sent, may it not as well overcome the fear of danger, especially considering the opportunity of secrecy to convey it closely into his Tent and hide it there? I saw, saith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lie hid in the earth in the midst of my Tent, and the silver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and consequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to provoke 1 Chron. 21. 1. And is it not just with God, to bring any man into such temptations of what kind, or in what degree soever (seeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Savior to teach his Disciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that He will not lead us into temptation? And what cause hath Achan to complain of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himself? Was this prey that he ceazed on, the only spoil of that great Citty? Were there no Babylonish garments but that one, no more silver or wedges of gold, but that Achan lighted on? Yet they refrained, some out of the fear of God, that restrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from sinning against him: others though not out out of a fear of God, yet out of the fear of punishment, were moved to beware how they transgressed. For albeit, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia, as * Austin writes, yet fear of punishment ofttimes restrains from committing capital crimes, though this restraint be not gracious; and considerations of less force then these do prevail many times with carnal men, both to abstain from evil, and to do that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Gospel of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor reverenced man, yet he would do the Widow justice to ease himself of her importunate solicitations where with she molested him.

Come we to provocations unto sin of another nature, in satisfying the concupiscence of the flesh. David arising out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the Kings Palace, from the roof he saw a Woman washing her self: and the Woman was very beautiful to look upon: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not just with God, it were in vain for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not fear any such temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of God's justice in the course of his providence. Paul the Apostle, least he should be exalted out of measure, through the abundance of revelations (made unto him, which were very dangerous to puff a man up, and make him swell in the conceit of his own worthiness being admitted into the secrets of God) was sometimes exercised with a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him. But the fear of God was alive in him, and stirred up his faith to pray unto God three times that it might depart from him: and the Lord made him a gracious answer, not as yet to deliver him, but to support him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord said unto him, my grace is sufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weakness. This answer put heart into Paul; Therefore, saith he, will I very gladly rejoice rather in mine infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Mark I pray, Rahter, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exercising him, but rather rejoice to be thus exercised, for as much as this same should do him no harm; for by virtue of Christ's power dwelling in him he should have the victory. Secondly, it should do him good in preserving him from being exalted out of measure through the abundance of revelations. Therefore, saith he, I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in anguishes for Christ's sake; for when I am weak then am I strong. And had not Joseph as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchaste motions of his wanton Mistress, should be provoked unto unclean courses, as David had to persuade himself, that it was God's will by the railing of Shimei he should be provoked unto revenge; that so by the power of his grace, strengthening them against such provocations, they might come forth of their several temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more resplendent then before? Joseph was a fair person and well favored Genes. 39. 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustful eye. Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either Praedonem alienae castitatis or Praedam suae. But Joseph had a gracious and a chaste heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chastity, but being a congruous bait to the lustful appetite of his Mistress, it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon. And as Austin said of God's providence concerning Shimei, ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Who seeth not, that the like may be said of God's dealing with Joseph's Mistress? and that without all aspersion of unholiness unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts, what will be the issue but uncleanness: Rom. 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? even their Women did change their natural use into that which was against nature, verse. 27. and likewise also the Men left their natural use of the Women, and burned in their lust one toward another; and Man with Man wrought filthiness, and received in themselves such recompense of their error as was meet. Here we have a strange course of God's providence in punishing sin with sin. For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another, in a most unnatural and abominable manner, are said to receive such recompense for their error as was meet. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any sin? Is it to do that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to do that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked Paul, as a fool to loast himself, as himself expresseth it, for he adds, ye have compelled me. But this cannot be affirmed of Tiberius his ministers in provoking Drusus and Nero. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much less can it be said, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither do I think that any of our adversaries (as malevolent as they are) dares impute any such crimination unto us, as if we attributed any such discourse unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke unto sin? Is it to do somewhat upon the consideration whereof, men's passions being moved, they cannot but sin. But this in like sort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of those provocations which were made upon Drusus and Nero by the practices of Tiberius. Or is it the doing of somewhat, whereupon occasion is taken to sin, to blaspheme? this hath no color of truth in it. For even man without all transgression may do many things, whereupon occasion is taken of doing evil, and therefore we distinguish of Scandalum datum & Acceptum. Nay, though man knows offense will be taken upon the doing of some things, yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he must do them, what occasion soever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I must abstain from the doing of them, in case I know offense will be taken thereat, and that thereby I shall lay a stumbling block in the way of my Brother. For Paul professeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother. But no such obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how some will abuse his mercies, others grow worse and worse by his judgments, breaking forth into blasphemy thereupon: yet no wise man will say that God is the more unholy in the showing of mercy, and in the execution of judgment. He professeth in plain terms, that to them who fear him he will be a sanctuary, but as a stumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel, and as a snare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of Jerusalem, Isai. 8. 14.

As for the last clause of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of Tiberius his course in this, namely that so he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of justice. Undoubtedly I should think the putting of them to death was just in case they did convitiate their Prince whatsoever their provocations were. For hereby they deserved death, yea everlasting death and damnation. His sin was in causing them to be provoked hereunto, and so also it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that fame necavit, he famished them. I know Tiberius was cruel enough, but by the story it seems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; first to intend their deaths because he saw the affections of the people towards them, belike for Germanicus his sake, a worthy man according to those times. For when he found that in the beginning of the year, vows were made on their behalf, to wit, for their preservation he dealt with the Senate, that such rewards ought not to be tendered, but towards such who were of experience and of ripeness of age: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being discovered, he laid them open to every man's criminations, varia{que} fraud inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, accusavit per literas, amarissime congestis etiam probris, & judicatos hosts fame necavit. And anon after, the same Author discovers the reason of all this, to wit, that seeing Germanicus was but his adopted Son, and one Drusus by name was his natural son, and his own son Drusus being dead, leaving a son Tiberius behind him, he desired to make him as his natural son his successor in the Empire. Aelium Sejanum ad summam potentiam non tàm benevolentia provexer at quàm ut esset cujus ministerio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotem{que} suum ex Druso filium naturalem ad successionem Imperii confirmaret. Sure we are God hath no need of any such politique courses; neither hath he need of any pretext of justice to take a man's life from him. It is confessed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holiest Angel by power absolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from sin, as I think no wise man will deny, surely it is in his power to refuse to keep any reasonable creature from sin. For certainly though Adam were created in innocence, yet he preserved him not in innocence, but left him to himself, having exposed him to Satan's temptations. The Angels had no Satan to tempt them; God preserved the elect Angels from sinning, and how? let Austin speak in this particular; either by giving them majorem amoris divini mensuram in their creation then their fellows; or by giving them amplius adjutorium after their creation. And in particular concerning Adam, the same Author professeth that God gave him, Posse si voluit, but he gave him not, Velle quod potuit. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the denial of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entering of sin into the World, and that wonderful work of the incarnation of the son of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as also for the manifestation of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of sin, and in the way of justice by the punishing of sin. Let Arminius be heard in this, Who confesseth that God in the storehouse of his wisdom and power, hath not only sufficient impediments of sin, but efficacious also, by the use whereof, sin would certainly and infallibly be hindered. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia, impedimenta etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae thesauro, quibus productis certô & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the sin of Adam, as of hindering any man's sin else from the time of Adams fall. And as certain it is that God would not make use of any of these impediments, though it is apparent these impediments Arminius speaks of, are of such a nature as whereby sin would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedom of man's will, as appears by all his instances following of this kind, showing how God did efficaciously hinder the sins of many. And indeed it is evident in reason and such as cannot be denied, unless a man will say, that whatsoever course had been taken by God to preserve him from sin, without prejudice to the freedom of his will, yet nevertheless he would have sinned: which is in so high a degree absurd, as manifestly to contradict the very light of nature. For seeing Adam in the state of innocence was naturally indifferent, as well to stand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to stand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in respect of this indifferency it cannot be said, that upon every occasion or temptation unto sin, he would have yielded thereunto. For such a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philosophers acknowledge that of three sorts of contingents, one sort is of such which they call, Contingentia aequaliter, that is, such as fall out as often one way as another. And what are these? surely all such and none but such as are subject to a man's free will. And even of Esau borne in sin (so was not Adam) Austin thinks it strange, that any man should deny, but that there was a course to have called him as effectually, as he called Jacob, had he been pleased to have used it. Now hereby it manifestly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courses, exasperating courses to draw them unto sin, let him but withhold those efficacious impediments of sin, which are in the storehouse of his wisdom and power, as Arminius acknowledgeth, and sin hereupon shall enter. For the permission of sin (by Arminius his distinction of it) is the suspension of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a safe course to judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we should conclude even of permission of sin, that like as it becometh not us to permit sin if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the same manner it becometh not God to permit any sin, seeing it lieth in his power to hinder it. Sed judicia ejus (saith Austin) multa abyssus. Nos certe, si eos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus: quàm vero innumerabilia ill permittit fieri ante oculos suos, quae uti{que} si voluisset nulla ration permitteret. In the 2 Kings 2. 26, 27. we read of a desperate course of the King of Moab, that finding the battle to be sore against him, first tried with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his steed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the sight of which barbarous part of his struck grief into the hearts of the children of Israel, so that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore shall we condemn God, for sending Abraham to sacrifice his son, his only son, his son Isaac? In the 16 Judge. we read a strange story of Sampson whose faith is commended Hebr. 11. For there we read how he dies, his heart flaming with desire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prays unto God to assist him, that he might be avenged of the Philistines for his two eyes. O Lord God I pray thee think upon me, O God I beseech thee strengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistines for my two eyes. And again, Let me loose my life with the Philistines: & he bowed himself with all his might, and the house fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; so that the men that he slew at his death, were more then they which he had slain in his life. For both the house it self was full, and upon the roof of it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a strange massacre wrought by Sampson an Israelite upon the Philistines, at that time when the Israelites were in subjection to the Philistines who were their Lord's, as sometimes Pharaoh was. For the men of Judah admonished him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind Sampson. Knowest thou not (say they) that the Philistines are rulers over us? Wherefore then hast thou done thus unto us? to wit, in taking such courses as might well provoke the Philistines to root out the Israelites. Yet nevertheless he comes sparkling with zeal to destroy many thousands of them, yea the Princes with the rest, and well pleased to destroy himself with them, to be avenged of them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without some special & prophetical instigation & animation received from the spirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawful? which without God's warrant, could be no less then abominable & most damnable sins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate Herod, & Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel to do what they did against our Savior, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein such things are prohibited. And nevertheless the Apostles in their pious meditation with one voice profess, that, All these were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do those things which God's hand, and God's council had predestinated to be done: and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the most barbarous facts committed by Tiberius, or any other monster of nature, I know no reason. And as touching shameful courses, no less abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as these here mentioned of Tiberius were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apostle professeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the lusts of their own hearts, to the committing of such abominations, and also that herein they received such recompense of their error as was meet; and the error which God avenged in this manner what was it, but such wherein Tiberius was as deep, as those whom the Apostle speaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beasts, and of creeping things. And they were but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 into which God delivered up Tiberius, and to such God delivered up them of whom the Apostle speaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , into which God gave them up, that so they might receive that recompense of their error as was meet.

I come to the second instance here made of Tiberius his cruelty, which he compares to those courses, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himself. Now this hath long ago been objected by Bertius, in his Preface to the Conference of Arminius with Junius; I say objected by him unto Piscator, & thereunto Piscator also hath answered long ago. And whereas Bertius hath replied and allowed Piscator a year for putting in his answer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would interpret it as a confession of his insufficiency, to make good the cause maintained by him. Piscator answers, that he had no need of so long a time as he prescribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the space of two or three days he addressed himself to an answer thereunto, and within a month finished it. Now if the Author of this discourse were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuse him, if otherwise he might have, with more credit, occupied himself in the answering, at the least, of some chief particulars, whereupon Piscator stands, for the justifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, then hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years a go proposed and set forth to the judgment of the world. But I am content to take into consideration, how Scholastically and judiciously he carrieth himself in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, because it may be that this odious comparison he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which follows with the more propitious affectiō) then he doth of the strength of ought that follows, whatsoever he doth or may pretend to the contrary to the point thē.

Tiberius commanded the Virgins to be deflowered, that they might be strangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were disposed to strangle any, certainly he hath no need to have thē deflowered first. For it is now a days confessed even by Arminius himself, that God can lawfully annihilate the holiest creature that lives, and that without all respect to sin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more then strangulation; this causing only a dissolution between the body and soul, but annihilation, setting an utter end to body & soul by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had Tiberius only permitted the deflowering of them, whē he might have hindered it, though this were a foul part in him, yet I hope no Christian will say, it is a foul part in God, to permit any act never so flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; especially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of man's will: and that this is in God's power Arminius acknowledgeth and supposeth at large in his Examen and Treatise there De Permissione. But Tiberius commanded the Hangman to defloure them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the ravishing of any, the murthering of any, or any other sin whatsoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under penalty of everlasting death? yet it is true, the word of God expressly professeth out of the mouth of David, that God bad Shimei to curse David, and that he bid the evil spirit to seduce Ahab, that he might go up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be strangled I confess, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be slain there. But this is a figurative speech, and signifies not properly any command of God, but rather denotes the secret operation of God's providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for those as well as Devils, God knows how to make use of, to serve his own turn. And Austin professeth, Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun{que} voluerit, sive ad bona, pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum judicio uti{que} suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo: And, touching the particular of Shimei, writes thus, ejus voluntatem proprio suo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo, & occulto inclinavit. As for Tiberius his causing the little maids to be deflowered, that might be done without their sin, they might be ravished, and in that case, that might be their sorrow but not their sin. And as for the hangmans fault, in this, he was not excusable by Tiberius his causing him to defloure them; For Tiberius his causation herein extended no farther then to command them. And I hope it was no just excuse for the people of Israel in their Idolatrous courses, that therein they did but keep the statutes of Omri, and all the manner of the house of Ahab, Mic. 6. Yet neither doth God command any man to do that which his Law forbids, or to sin against him. And farther we acknowledge with Austin, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expose any man to sin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to everything that is pleasing in his sight. Heb. 13. 20. to cause us to walk in his statutes, and judgments, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 28. yea, to keep us from presumptious sins, and that they get not the dominion over us. Psal. 19. 14. yea, to deliver us from every evil work, 2 Timoth. 4. 18.

But perhaps some may say; Our doctrine is that God willeth sin to be committed for which men may and shall be punished; like as Tiberius would the Virgins should be deflowered, that they might be strangled.

And I answer, that Arminius himself professeth that, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere, God would have Ahab fill up the measure of his sin, that he might be condignly punished. And why may we not say as well, that God would have Tiberius to fill up the measure of his sins? And yet like as Tiberius would have the Virgins to be deflowered that they might be strangled; so Ahab would have Naboth accused of blasphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and so put to death and stoned; and all these things were done under color of Religion. Yet Arminius in reference to these very courses, spares not to profess, that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sins, yet doth not Bertius upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Again, the same Arminius professeth that in their ignominious handling of Christ, God would have the Jews, progredi quous{que} progressi sunt, proceed so far as they did proceed. And was it not God's will in like manner, that the Gentiles should proceed as far as they did in the same business? Now we know full well by the story Evangelical, how far they went in their mischievous courses against the Son of God. For Judas betrayed him, and the high Priests both hired Judas hereunto, and suborned false witnesses against him; and both the Herodians and Soldiers mocked him, and the people urged Pilate to crucify him, and to dismiss 〈◊〉 , and Pilate yielded to the people's desire, took order to have him first scourged, then crucified. And if it may be truly and piously said, that in these ignominious usages of the Son of God, they went as far as God would have them to go; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that Tiberius also in these his barbarous courses, went as far as God would have him? Neither doth Arminius give himself to qualify the harshness of these his affirmations. We say that whatsoever comes to pass, it is God's will it should come to pass, as Austin expressly professeth, Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profess the same. But withal we explicate it as Austin dothin the words following, by adding the different manner, how they shall come to pass by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to pass, namely good or evil; thus, Vult fieri, but how? vel sinendo ut fiat (to wit in case they are evil) vel ipse faciendo (to wit, in case they are good. So then good things God will have come to pass by his effection, evil things only by his permission. And Bellarmine opposing our Divines to the uttermost of his power in this particular, being convicted in conscience by the evidence of truth is driven to confess; Bonum esse ut malum fiat Deo permittente, It is good that evil should come to pass by God's permission, or God's permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins should be deflowered and impiously he willed it. God willed that David's Concubines should be deflowered, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbor, and he shall lie with them in the sight of all Israel and before the sun. And this constupration of David's Concubines served for the chastising of David, as Arminius professeth, Inserviit castigando Davidi; & omnes paenae habent Deum authorem, All punishments have God for their author; they are the words of the same Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cause the Virgins to be deflowered and strangled But what Christian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for causing the Children of the Sodomites, some in their Mothers womb, some hanging upon their Mothers breasts, to be consumed with fire and brimstone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflowering of those Virgins, that they might be strangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sin, that so he might accumulate unto himself wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I presume, he would not have ascribed any such will unto God, as he doth in express terms. Although he well knew the vast difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporal, but God's power extends to the execution of vengeance eternal. Now I find a story immediately following this very story alleged by this Author out of Suetonius expressing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would destroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi, when they desired to die, he caused them to live by force; Nam mortem adeo leve supplicium putabat ut cum audisset unum e reis anticipasse eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evasit, For he accounted death so light a punishment that when he heard one of the condemned persons to have anticipated it, he cried out Carnutius hath escaped me; for that was the condemned persons name. And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one desired to suffer betimes, he answered him, Nondum tecum in gratiam redii. I do not as yet bear these so much good will. Now, why may not some Atheistical person track the steps of this Author, and in this particular exaggerate the heinousness of God's holy courses as savouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, because he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternal torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courses in Tiberius inferior unto these are accounted abominable, cruel, and impious; how much more (if this Authors argumentation be of force) those courses which the word of God hath informed us to be the courses divine, infinitely beyond the courses of Tiberius in the way of severity and rigor? As for the power of God in producing sin, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years ago it was delivered by Austin, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient only. But when the creature sinneth, he sinneth in doing that he ought not to do; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to do; or in not doing what he ought to do, or not in what manner he ought to do it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and human is found only about the act substrate unto sin; and all sides now a days acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concourse, though difference there is about the manner of the concourse: and particularly these; Arminius will have God's concourse to an evil act, to be every way as much as his concourse to a good, and that he concurs to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evil act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a double concourse to every good act that is not supernatural, as touching the substance of the act; One to the producing of the substance of the act, another to the producing the goodness thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a natural man may abstain from lying, stealing, whoring, blaspheaming; but no natural man can abstain from these in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God and that such a love as is, Amor Dei us{que} ad contemptum sui, the love of God to the contempt of himself: For this manner of performing it is supernatural.

Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concourse, to the substance of any natural act. We say God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the first cause to move the second, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves natural agents to do that which they do, necessarily; so he moves all rational agents to do that which they do, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian tenent to the contrary, namely this, that God works in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle modo velit, as absurd an assertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in speaking of the secret providence of God in evil, do express themselves in phrases of a very harsh accent in the judgment of flesh and blood, but herein they do nothing exceed sobriety, forasmuch as usually they contemper themselves to Scripture phrase rather within the compass thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blasphemy is usually imputed unto them without all fear or wit; not considering, that herein they impute blasphemy to the language of the Holy Ghost. As for example.

What an horrible sin is it for Kings and Princes to employ their power and authority, not for the supporting of the Kingdom of Christ, by whom Kings reign, but for the supporting and establishing of the kingdom of Antichrist, as in the Martyrdom of God's Saints, delivered over to the secular power, to that end, and that by censures Ecclesiastical? Now if we should say that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to employ their power for the supporting of Antichrist, we should be censured for blasphemers. Yet the Holy Ghost spares not to profess, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their Kingdom to the Beast, until the words of God be fulfilled.

In like sort, from the first Preaching of the Gospel unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are disobedient unto it, and stumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we should say that they who thus disobey, and stumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, such as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blaspheamers, and to profess that they will rather deny that there is a God, then hold with the Contra-Remonstrants. Yet S. Peter budgeth not to profess, that Christ is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense, even to them which stumble at the word of God, being disobedient, whereunto also they were ordained.

When we profess that not anything in the world comes to pass but Deo volente, God willing it, We are censured as Blasphemers, in professing that God doth will that which is evil, and sin; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profess as much, and Austin Enchir. 95. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit: but the Apostles with one voice (as touching the contumelious usages of the Son of God, both by Jews and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their picus meditation poured forth before the face of God, profess, that, Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which God's hand and God's council had before determined to be done.

In like sort, when we speak of God's giving men over to illusions to believe lies, others to vile affections, and to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their own bodies between themselves, which consisted in this, that, The Women did change their natural use into that which is against nature; and likewise the men, leaving the natural use of the Women, burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves the recompense of their error which was meet: and observe herehence, that it is just with God to punish sin with sin. And as it hath been observed before us, from the days of Austin, who when Julian the Pelagian said, this was done, deserendo, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but profess that God doth thus, the Scripture expressly testifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, deserendo, or alio modo sive explicabili, sive inexplicabili, it matters not. An Arminian spirit spares not to join himself with Julian the Pelagian in affronting Austin thus discoursing out of the word of God, and to profess, that that doctrine of God's punishing sin with sin is a common error; whereas the Apostle professeth in express terms, that, Herein they received such recompense of their error as was meet: and what is recompense here but punishment? and wherein consisted it, but in defiling themselves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly testifies, saying, Men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves such recompense of their error, as was meet. And Arminius spares not to profess, that, Omnis paena Deum authorem habet. Wherein yet we concur not with Arminius. We deny that Omnis paena habet Deum authorem. It is true that Paena positiva, not of all punishment that consists in privation, such as sin is; For Malum, as Austin long ago pronounced, non habet causam efficientem but deficientem. Yet we confess that God could keep any man from any sin, but if he will not, this is not sufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of sin; that is, when he fails of doing that which he ought to do. But God is bound to none to preserve him from sin, any otherwise then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and so also on the other side, He hardeneth whom he will.

Yet I have given no instances in any passages of the Old Testament, which give plentiful testimony of God's secret providence of evil; the evidence whereof did wring from Austin this confession. Contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia commemorare possemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto judicio Dei fieri perversitatem cordis ut non audiatur quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & si • ipsum peccatum praecedentis paena peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati uti{que} peccatum est. Venit tamen ab eâ caecitate cordis, quae occulto judicio Dei, sed tamen justo, etiam paena peccati monstratur. And in his Book De Grat & lib. arbitr. cap. 20. inquiring how it is said that the Lord bid Shimei to curse David; Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis sapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curse David? Who is wise and he shall understand? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malum in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si jubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quàm puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea novimus esse punitum. Neither saith he, is the cause concealed, why God thus dealt with Shimei, Hoc est cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit (I express it rather in Austin's words then mine own, because the adversaries of God's truth, think it enough to pass the censure of blasphemy upon ought that we deliver herein.) Now the cause was, Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die isto, That God may see my humility saith David, and recompense me good for his cursing this day. Ecce quomodo probatur (thus Austin goes on) Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at{que} adjumentum honorum. Thus, (saith he) he used Judas betraying Christ, thus he used the Jews crucifying Christ: and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that should at any time believe? Who also useth the Devil himself, though most wicked, yet he useth him optime most holily, for the exercising and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himself who knows all things before they come to pass, but to us, who had need that after such manner God should proceed with us. The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of Absalom to confound the counsel of Achitophel, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. Who would not tremble at the consideration of these judgments divine, whereby God works even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendering unto them according to their deserts. Then making mention of Rehoboam his despising the counsel of the Ancients, as also that 2 Chron. 1. how God stirred up the spirit of the Philistines and Arabians against Joram, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it wast. Here, saith Austin, it is manifest that God doth raise up enemies to lay such countries wast, whom he judgeth worthy of such punishments. But yet, saith he, will you say they came not up by their own will, or did they so come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture saith, namely, that God stirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God stirred up their spirits to come; which also, saith he, may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God stirred up their spirit, and also they came up by their own will. Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum: For the Almighty doth work in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth not how to work anything unjustly. Unto these he addeth variety of other testimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, quantum existimo minifestetur, Operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun{que} voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti{que} suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo.

TWISSE Consideration.

THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the first place in the 16 ^th reason of Arminius; whereby he laboreth to disprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predestination to be the Mass of mankind not created; as appears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, &c. and it is the first particular of six, mentioned in that sixteenth reason of his. And why should he divide it from the rest, and not clap them together, into this rank of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and add Arminius his other ninteen reasons hereunto to the same purpose; if himself be privy to the cause thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will consider it. Now it proceedeth upon supposition, that such a necessity of sinning is brought upon man by this decree, as stands in opposition unto liberty. Whereunto I answer.

1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no necessity at all of sinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not cureing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that natural infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being conjecti in necessitatem peccandi, through the sin of Adam, as Corvinus confesseth, they being his own words. Now let every sober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God finds in a man uncured, be to bring a necessity of sinning upon him.

2. Secondly, we answer, that notwithstanding that necessity of sinning whereupon all are cast, as Cornivus speaketh, yet there is no sin committed by a natural and carnal man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blaspheaming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkenness, gluttony, railing, and in general, every sinful act being freely committed, by everyone by whom it is committed, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of these sinful acts, but is forborne by divers natural and carnal men, and therein they do abstain from the committing of it freely. And yet we say, that even in abstaining from these acts, they do not abstain from sin, for as much as they do not abstain from them in a gracious manner, and all by reason of that original corruption which remains uncured in them, until such time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration.

3. But because I imagine this Author lets fly at random, and keeps not himself to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing profess with Austin that, Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, Enchir. 95. Therefore I answer in the third Place, That the necessity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudicial to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their several operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a days it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries, very confidently to presume and presuppose, that upon the will of God, passing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a necessity, standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rational agents; and no marvel, for sic factitavit Hercules, Arminius the great Champion of their cause, his learning served him to do so before them. As if the contumelious usages of our Savior by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were not performed freely, but by mere necessity opposite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all these were gathered together against the holy son of God, to do what God's hand and God's counsel had predestinated to be done. Acts 4. 28. And in like sort, they that through disobedience stumbled at the word of God, did not freely disobey the Word, because Peter professeth of them in express terms, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the same manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdoms to the Beast, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghost saith, that God put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to consent and give their Kingdom to the Beast.

Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles set forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having professed that, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; to prevent such like objections as this Author fashioneth, forthwith add, Yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. And Austin in his Book De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. where he speaks as freely of God's effectual Providence working in evil, as nowhere more, in so much as our Adversaries take great exceptions against his speeches (such as formerly delivered) and that in express terms: His main drift notwithstanding, and scope in that Book is to prove, that notwithstanding the divine operation, in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the less free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather then too little, unto that which is evil; according to that he writes also elsewhere, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia. And if God's operation prejudiceth not the liberty of the creature, much less the will of God. For though not anything comes to pass unless God willeth it, whether it be good or evil, yet with this difference as Austin in the same place professeth, He will have that which is good come to pass by the effecting of it, but evil only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo.

But though Austin and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragaedian, as this Author saith, could see the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of these saw. And is not this a pretty Comaedy, that a Tragaedian and Zeno's servant must be brought in, and that in a confidentiary supposition to out face, not Divines only both ancient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forsooth, that what comes to pass by the will of God, and by the effectual operation of God, doth not come to pass freely; and consequently, that the doctrine (which maintains that evil comes to pass by the will of God, as the crucifying of Christ by the predestination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, so as not to let Israel go, God professeth to be his work) takes away all conscience of sin? All this I say is as clear (if we believe this Author) as that Seneca's Tragaedies are the Oracles of God. And I pray consider, must it not take away as well all conscience of righteousness, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedience; unless we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unless we deny that God is he, Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight, that God is he that putteth his own spirit in us, and causeth us to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgments and do them?

Yet what doth Seneca speak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tragaedian under the term of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine administration of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? Austin I am sure thought otherwise in more places then one, in Psalm. 31. on these words, Pronunciabo adversum me, He blames those who when they are found in their sins say, Fatum mihi fecit, stellae meae fecêrunt, But saith he, Quid est fatum? Quae sunt stellae? certe istae quas in Coelo conspicimus; & Qui ease fecit? Deus. Quis ease ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluisti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem: Then he tells of others, who said that Mars facit Homicidam, Venus Adulterum. So that Fatum with them were second causes, which we all know in their operations, do both work by necessity of nature, and have no power to maintain the free will of man; and in Psalm. 91. Quaeris ab illo quid sit Fatum, & dicit stellae malae. Quaeris ab illo, quis fecit stellas, quis ordinavit stellas; non habet quid tibi respondeat nisi Deus. It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto Austin, as if his doctrine favored of it; and what doth he answer thereunto? Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.

Yet because we are to give the Devil his right; With what conscience could this Author profess of this Fatum of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conscience of sin, seeing it did not take away the conscience of sin in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the same Author within a few lines after. For there she professeth, that if God the creator of all, should make his wrath break forth against her, and strike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no sufficient punishment for her sins. Queen Iocastas word are these.

She justifies God and condemns her self, notwithstanding her former words used only as it seems, to pacify the furious mood of her Son and Husband Oaedipus. Will not such one day, rise up in judgment against many Christians, who unless themselves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are so apt to condemn God of injustice, and justify themselves, as needing not to have any conscience of sin? And which is most strange, they acknowledge Fate in this case to be such, as that it necessitated even God himself; as appears by the last Chorus.

But as I said before, whatsoever they conceived of Fate, and howsoever they fashioned it, their opinion thereof did not expectorate all conscience of sin in them, or urge them to justify or excuse themselves in their courses. For it appears both of Oaedipus and Iocasta, that they not only condemned themselves, but became self executioners of punishment upon themselves for their foul crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himself unworthy to see the light; and the other destroying herself. Though whatsoever they or the Poets that set them forth conceived of Fate, in this case of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devils, and his illusions that abused them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt most justly; when in a wicked curiosity they desire to know, what shall become of them and their children: the Devil gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards sets his wits on work to accomplish them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himself, and so much the more forcibly holds them in his snares.

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sin, which is as much as to say, all desert of sin on the one side; so it may be extended to show, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Jerome saith, that where such necessity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona est But Austin hath spent an whole Book in proof of this, namely; that grace consists with freedom of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with freedom of will unto that which is evil. But that in the state of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a servant unto sin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unless withal he deny Original sin with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of Grevincovius that great Arminian, that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & testibus convinci potest. And indeed this Authors discourse bears strongly this way, whatsoever Protestation in show of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his discourse stands for freedom of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evil. And albeit there is so little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conscience of sin) that it seems to be added only to make way for this sentence of Jerome, which yet is nothing to the purpose, unless he can prove, that God's decrees do bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himself herein and in far different manner from Jerome's expression, though he placeth Corona in opposition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of sin preceding: but the other, to wit, Corona, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author sticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one side, as well as to evil actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteousness, as evil actions are of damnation. And withal he will have no more to decree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, then he doth the infidelity, and impenitency, and disobedience of another, least this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chain, of necessity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wisdom thinks it fit, they should be left to their own choice, whetherthey will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very considently presume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and do any good work; which is as good, as in express terms to profess, that there is no original sin at all; Notwithstanding so many express testimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, John 12. of some that, They could not believe. Rom. 2. of others that, They could not repent. Rom. 8. of all that are in the flesh, that, They cannot please God. 1 Cor. 2. of the natural man that, He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them; of the Israelites in the Wilderness, that, God had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto that day. Deutr. 29. 4. But these passages of holy Scripture, seem to have no place in this Authors consideration, if so be they have in his Creed. This bed is something too short for him to stretch himself thereon; and therefore he desires to change his lodging, and to pass from the desert of good actions, to the desert of evil actions, which he formerly insisted upon, and he tells a story of Zeno's servant most suitable to his Iambick taken out of Seneca, though he quotes the place of neither.

Well, Zeno's servant, he saith, when he was punished by his Master for a fault that he had done, told his Master out of his own grounds, that he was unjustly beaten, because he was, Fato coactus peccare: and hereupon making his reckoning without his host, concludes that, Certainly if Malefactors could not choose but play their rude pranks, they could not be justly punished for them: Wherein he tells us what the servant said; but what the Master answered, thereof he saith just nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant said? Nothing less, but shapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lie thereon more softly. If we may believe Diogenes Laertius who reports the story, the Servants answer was not Fato coactus sum peccare, but Fatale mihi erat furari. For he took his ser •••• laying the thief, & though the servant took advantage from his Masters do •••• of Fate, to frame an Apology for himself, yet would not Zeno permit him to 〈◊〉 thereby any privilege from stripes. For, servum in furto deprehensum verberavit. A manifest evidence that even in his opinion, the destiny he maintained was no just excuse for sin. And to meet him in his own plea, when he said. Fatale mihi erat furari, & caedi inquit: this was the answer he made to his servant, which answer of his this Author either conceals, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed Chrysippus the Stoic, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall, yet denied not the liberty of men's wills, as appears in Cicero de Fato, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And Plutarch likewise in his book De Fato professeth as much. Fatum omnia continet, sicut etiam videtur, ne{que} tamen proptereà omnia necessario eveniunt, sed unumquod{que} suo naturae modo. Neither did Zeno conceive hereby all place to be taken away for persuasion, as appears by his answer to Crates, when he took him by the cloak to draw him away from Stilpo, saying, O Crates, commodissime auribus Philosophum teneas. Cum igitur persuaseris, tum illum trahe. Nam si per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud te, sed animus apud Stilponem erit. Neither were any Philosophers more studious of Morality then the Stoics, They wrote De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, de{que} primâ aestimatione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus, as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Austin de Civit. Dei cap. 9. professeth of the Stoics, that, though Omnia Fato fieri contenderent, yet, Non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent. And more then this, whereas the Stoics were so jealous of maintaining the liberty of men's wills, that they denied them of all other things to be subject to necessity. Austin professeth that their fear, of subjecting the wills of men unto necessity, in this respect was a causeless fear. Ibid. cap. 10. Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt, causas rerum ita distinguere ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent; at{que} in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. And then proceeds to show, that there is a certain necessity nothing prejudicial to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in subjection thereunto. And that necessity he describes to be this, as when we say, that, Necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat; his words are these; Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est, ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Herein Austin professeth to go beyond the Stoics, in acknowledging a necessity whereunto the will of man is subject, and that without detriment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgment, it would better become a Christian Divine, to inform both himself and others out of the Word of God, and rest thereon for the discovery of the nature of Providence and Predestination divine, then to go a forraging among Poets and Stoics, for the justification of his own, in point of Christian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Opposites.

TWISSE Consideration.

HEre breaks out the main reason, that moved this Author to represent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predestination, that so a way might be opened unto him at pleasure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proof of his criminations, he might the better ease himself of the burden thereof, by showing the dissent of other Devines of the same profession from the former in this particular, making choice rather to shape the object of Predestination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, lying in the mass corrupt by the fall of Adam. For surely it is to be presupposed, that they did not dissent from their former friends without some reason, and this Author makes bold to insinuate, that these absurdities mentioned by him were the reasons: As when he saith, These absurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the same side willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices do leave that way. But that these were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor so much as adventureth upon the proof thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to supply that by his forwardness, to take it upon trust; as if this discourser by his moral carriage, might win the opinion of so much worthiness, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the dark, quicum in tenebris mices. And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a middle opinion between these; namely, of those who make the object of predestination the mass of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon Junius, and appeals to his Theses, as giving evident testimony thereunto. Now there is no show or color of reason, why, to avoid the absurdities premised by this Author, any man should decline the first way, and embrace the second, which is the way of Junius. And this I conceive to be the main reason, why this second way is altogether dissembled by this Author, or by the spirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every sorry consideration to serve his turn in the way of motive, learning to represent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongst our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the justification of his absurdities charged upon the first way, from the mouths or practice of our Divines, at least in appearance: and some color hereof he finds by declining the first way and falling upon the third; but no color at all by declining the first way and falling upon the second. Therefore he thought it a part of his wisdom altogether to dissemble the second, and to represent the opinion of those Divines who decline the first (yea and second too) and fall upon the third. But suppose Junius had preferred the third way and not the second, Had he done it out of a desire to decline the absurdities here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he set not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintains all these considerations to have their place in Predestination, and therefore makes Hominem communiter consideratum the object of predestination, which as it is a notion abstract from all the three special notions of nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or deni{que} corruptum, so it is indifferently appliable unto them all. And indeed Piscator resolves the question about the object of Predestination, namely, that as Predestination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, so the object must necessarily be mankind not yet created; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, so the object (as he thinks) must be mankind created, but not yet corrupted; and lastly as it includes the decree of choosing some out of that corrupt mass, and refusing others or leaving them in it. so the object of his judgment must be mankind both created and corrupted. And Arminius himself professeth, that the twenty reasons wherewith he disputeth against the first way, may also be accommodated against the other ways. And albeit the followers of the second and third way do think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the absurdities wherewith the other ways are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of Junius, as before I mentioned. Moulin indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subsist in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Mass the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes God's decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of final impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concur with him, we should nothing trouble ourselves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that particular of reprobation. And we of the first way are willing to profess, that God neither damns nor decrees to damn any man, but for sin and final perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain terms to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth God's intention of damnation precede the consideration of sin, and final impenitency; though we do not make the consideration of sin to precede the intention of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, do presuppose sin. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Junius, produceth five reasons against the first way, no less then four of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiā & justitiā: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars providentiae administrantis & gubernātis humanū genus; ergo posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominē, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4 ^th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio supernaturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationē prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo creatio prior est praedestinatione. To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. in several chapters. Only the second argument of Arminius insisteth upon God's ordination of man's fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the first and second way, and embarking ourselves in the third. But how freed? surely only so far, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, supposing Adams fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning Adams fall. But nevertheless it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted Adam to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the first way, acknowledge no other Providence divine concerning the ingress of sin, as sin, into the world, but in the way of permission. Sin as sin admitting no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is utterly impossible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in forbearing to do what he doth not, should in any culpable, or justly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon God's permission it followeth, that sin shall be committed by the creature; We readily profess it doth. This Vorstius acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himself deliver it expressly, where he saith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum? This he delivers without all qualification of the necessity mentioned, which we do not. And this also Navarettus a Papist professeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jesuit that opposeth him in this. And if any man infer herehence, that then God determining to permit sin, did determine that sin should enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did so ordain namely, that sin should come to pass by his permission. Non aliquid fit (saith Austin) nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. And Bellarmine professeth, that, Bonum est mala fieri Deo permittente: so that herein God doth not will evil, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of Bellarmine; and that in the heat of his opposition against our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is express in saying, Voluit Deus Achabum mensuram scelerum implere. And what is this but, Peccata peccatis cumulare? And though the Jesuits and Arminians do with all their force resist, yet it evidently follows from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of sin, dictated by Arminius himself. For efficacious grace with the Jesuits, consists in the congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof consists in this, that God foreseeth that upon the confession thereof sin will be avoided. Now what is the reason why God grants such a grace, whereupon he seeth sin will not be avoided; and denies such a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knows full well that sin would be avoided; but because his pleasure is, that sin shall be committed by his permission, and not be avoided, although he hath given them grace sufficient to avoid it, as they say, and it was most true of Adam in the state of innocence. In like sort doth Arminius distinguish of, Peceati impedimentum sufficiens & efficax, Efficacious hindrance of sin, is that whereby God seeth sin will be avoided; sufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withal he confesseth, that God in the Promptuary of his wisdom, hath not only such impediments as are sufficient to the avoiding of any sin, but such also, as whereby any sin would indeed be avoided, were he pleased to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit sin, he doth not grant such impediments. And is not this a manifest evidence, that it is God's will, that sin shall come to pass (to wit, as often as it doth come to pass) by his permission? But suppose all our Divines that embrace the third way, do imagine the absurdities here spoken of, to be justly chargeable upon the first way. Yet as he thinks them in an error, while they conceive they can with ease avoid these absurdities by their third way, let him be pleased to conceive, they may as well be in an error, in thinking them justly chargeable upon the first way; and consequently their opinion is nothing sufficient to justify, that they are unremovable by them that embrace the first way.

It is true there is no cause of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I shown in my digressions De Praedestinatione Digress. 1. seeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of God's grace, or of his sovereignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and consequently, to make whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessels of wrath; but equally they stand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of God's decrees of creation, permission of the fall of Adam, giving grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it to others, and finally saving some and damning others, whereupon only arise the different opinions, as touching the object of predestination and reprobation, it is merely Apex Logicus, a point of Logic. And were it not a mere madness, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, merely upon a point of Logic? Thus have I justified the improbability and utter unlikelihood, that ever any schism will be made in the Church of God, upon these nice and mere Logical differences, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a passage that hereafter he representeth therehence, and that farther into the Book then these my digressions are upon the point of predestination, but is content to take no notice thereof, least it might hinder the course of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are said unanimously to agree, and which he calls maxima gravamina. It is true they do agree herein, but it may be in a far other sense, then he is willing should be taken notice of. For as for the first,

1. That the moving cause of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man original or actual.

1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election, but only the will of God; so no sin or evil work of man is the cause of reprobation, but only the will of God.

1. That so it is of election, the Apostle both

1. Saith, Election is not of Works but of him that calleth.

2. And proveth thus, Before Esau and Jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said, The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Works (that is of good works) but of him that calleth.

2. That so it is of reprobation, I prove by the same argument of the Apostle, thus, Before Esau and Jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore reprobation stands not of works (that is of evil works) but of the mere pleasure of God.

1. And like as this is farther evident by God's course of calling in the point of Election, as the Apostle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon them. For as the Apostle afterwards professeth, He hath mercy on whom he will.

2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the same Apostle professeth, saying, that God hardeneth whom he will.

2. And this doctrine we do explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversaries desire to confound, least their cheating carriage should be discovered, as formerly I have shown.

For Predestination and Reprobation, may be considered either quoad Praedestinantis & Reprobantis actum; or quoad Praedestinationis & Reprobationis terminum, as much as to say, quoad res praedestinatione & reprobatione praeparatas, that is, either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man (saith Aquinas) was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination. And why so? Because the act of predestination is the act of God's will, and formerly (saith he) I have shown, that there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act also of God's will? This cannot be denied: and herehence it follows, that like as there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, so there can be no cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgment to say, that merits were the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so it is no less madness in his judgment, to maintain that either sin original or actual, can be the meritorious cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.

And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity? Why surely these. 1. Predestination and Reprobation are eternal, but good works and evil works of the creature are temporal; but impossible it is, that a thing temporal, can be the cause of that which is eternal. 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of God's will, and the act of God's will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very essence of God even God himself; and therefore to introduce a cause of God's will, is to bring in a cause of God himself. 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election, then either they are so of their own nature, or by the mere constitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the constitution of God: but this cannot stand neither. For if by the constitution of God, then it would follow, that God did constitute, that upon foresight of man's faith he would elect him, that is, ordain him to salvation. And what I pray is to constitute? Is it any other then to ordain? And herehence it followeth, God did ordain that upon foresight of man's faith, he would ordain him unto salvation: Whereby the eternal ordination of God, is made the object of his eternal ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporal, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternal. In like sort I dispute of reprobation: if sin be the cause thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cause thereof, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confess: if you say by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordain, that upon the foresight of man's sin, he would ordain him unto damnation. For reprobation is God's ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to consider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and shown that thus they can have no cause.

But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas professeth and we profess with him. As for example to begin with election.

The things decreed or destinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both these may have a cause: For both Grace is the cause of glory; and Christ's merits are the cause both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly understood. For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurk, thereby to shut their eyes against the evidence of truth. For no marvel if men be in love with their own errors; and in proportion to the love of error, such is their hatred of Divine truth opposite thereunto. Now by grace, we understand the grace of regeneration, whereby that natural corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindness of mind and hardness of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through original sin, is in part cured. More distinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our natural infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we say God bestows on whom he will, finding all equal in infidelity and impenitency. For so the Apostle tells us, that, God hath mercy on whom he will. And as God bestows it on whom he will, not finding any cause in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine constitution, moving him to bestow this grace on any. So the Apostle 2 Timoth. 1. 9. God hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace. And indeed we being all found dead in sin, what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and repentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then should grace be bestowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraise (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years ago, in the Synod of Palestine: and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise they had condemned him also.

But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not bestow this on whom he will, finding men equal without any moving cause thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cause in man by constitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some, and not on others. For God hath made a gracious promise, that whosoever believeth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and repentance unto death shall be saved, and whosoever believeth not and repenteth not shall be damned. So then though men are equal in original sin, and in natural corruption, and God bestows faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when, he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equal in moral condition; and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner, to bestow glory & solvation on whō he will; For he hath tied himself by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none, but such as die in thestate of grace. Yet, I confess, some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & bestows these graces on whō he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phraise of bestowing this or that on whom he will. For when God bestows faith and repentance, he finds them on whom he will bestow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the bestowing of glory he finds them, on whom he bestows that, far better them others.

Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and these are two.

1. The denial of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and repentance, whereby man's natural infidelity and impenitency is cured.

2. The denial of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The first of these, to wit, the denial of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it must needs be so, in ease God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apostle professeth, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth whom he will. And as God denies this grace to whom he will, so did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a difference considerable: For albeit God hardeneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithstanding, like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that sin whether original or actual, wherein he finds them, when the ministry of the word is afforded them: so likewise it cannot be denied to be just with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet because God hath not made any such constitution, namely, that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, shall be so left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly said, as to cure it in whom he will, so to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equal in original sin, and consequently lying equally in this their natural infidelity and impenitencv. So we may justly say, there is no cause at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the mere pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference. And if any list to contend hereabouts, we shall be willing to entertain him, and confer our strength of argumentation on this point.

2. But as touching the denial of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the second thing decreed in reprobation, there is always found a cause motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denial of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the mere pleasure of his will, & that by reason of his own constitution, having ordained that whosoever continueth finally in infidelity, in profane courses, and impenitency shall be damned. And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sense (as formerly I have shown) that God saves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he bestows on whom he will; yet in no congruous sense can he be said to damn whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of sin, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he works, but sin and the evil thereof he only permits, not causeth it. And lastly, as God doth not damn whom he will, but those only whom he finds finally to have persevered in sin without repentance: so neither did he decree to damn, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sin without repentance.

Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the sin of man original or actual: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We say that reprobation doth signify, either a purpose of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpose of inflicting damnation. And each may be considered, either as touching the act of God's decree, or as touching the things decreed. We show how the Article holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.

1. As touching the things decreed,

1. As touching the denial of grace, We say, That God decreed of his mere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that natural infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any motive cause hereunto found in one more then in another.

2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We say, That God decreed to inflict damnation on some, not of his mere pleasure, but merely for their final perseverance in sin without repentance.

2. As touching the very act of God's decree, We say, Nothing in man could be the cause hereof, but the mere pleasure of God, as Aquinas professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, & as I have shown, because both are eternal and the act of God's will, which is God himself: and withal to devise a cause hereof, is to cast ourselves upon an unavoidable absurdity, as namely to say, That God did ordain that upon the foresight of this or that in men, he would ordain some of them to solvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harshness of the Tenent, consists chiefly in confounding these different considerations, whereby a color is cast, as if we maintained that God did decree to damn men of his mere pleasure and not for sin.

2. As touching the second which is this, That the final impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary, and unavoidable by God's absolute decree. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoidable by God's absolute decree; whereas it is without all question, that supposing impenitency to be final, damnation is unavoidable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whosoever dies in impenitency shall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that original corruption wherein all are borne? I persuade myself they do not. Corvinus professeth of all, That by the sin of Adam, they are, conjecti in necessitatem peccandi. Then again doth he maintain that any is able to cure this but God. It seems he doth not by that which followeth, where he signifieth that God (in his opinion) did not absolutely intend to leave men to that woeful estate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If so, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impossible God should not do that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of justice. But nothing more manifest, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certainly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is man's fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to say, if man would do somewhat which he may do, then God would give him repentance. Here is good stuff towards; and undoubtedly, this is the critical point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how careful the greatest Rabbies amongst the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifestly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given secundum merita, according to some good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago; Nay what will you say, if their doctrine hereabouts in the issue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere; modo Velit, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle resipiscere, modo Velit, as I can show it under the hand of one? and I have cause to suspect that it comes also from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deal with. And in this case it shall not be true that God shows mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he shall show mercy on whom man will. And like as when a question is made, why such a man is rewarded by the Magistrate, no wise man will answer because it is the pleasure of the Magistrate so to reward him, but rather represent the cause on man's part, why he was reward: so if God shows mercy in giving repentance according to some preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it shall not be said, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reason on man's part is to be represented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet these Petitions he calls maxima gravamina on the part of Reprobation.

And will he not give us leave to propose in proportion hereunto, our maxima gravamina, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the mere pleasure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreseen, that is the moving cause of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and repent, and no man hath more cause to be thankful unto God; for giving him anymore grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I speak of reprobate men, but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angels. And as touching that which they call grace subsequent, which is only God's concurrence, seeing God affords that to any sinful act, they may thank themselves, rather then God for that, like as for God's concurrence unto any act of sin. These doctrines are no gravamina to the tender consciences of our Adversaries.

The doctrine opposite to this which here he dislikes must needs be this, God hath not absolutely purposed from eternity of his mere will and pleasure, but upon consideration of actual continuance in sin and unbelief, to cast off men from grace and glory. Now this actual continuance in unbelief I presume must be final; and upon the consideration hereof, God casts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? surely from the grace of faith; otherwise it stands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the issue comes to this, Whom God foresees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they shall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foresees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they shall not repent unto death. This is the sober and savoury doctrine of these impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a spirit of giddiness possesseth them in this.

It is without question (I think) that God leaves many in that woeful estate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any specification wherein it consists) the guilt whereof is eternal death; and seeing that if he so leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended so to leave them. All the question is, Whether God did absolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he professeth his dislike of God's absolve intention hereof, so dealt clearly, and shown how he did intend so to leave some, as namely upon what condition, or upon foresight whereof, and withal given some proof of his assertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we say, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this state. For the term, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he speaks of some or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woeful state, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expressly called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Reprobates, I do not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And Austin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. speaking of the Non praedestinati: Illorum neminem (saith he) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualem{que} paenitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat: and if not unto repentance, then certainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then again, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turks and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woeful estate. If none are left but all are saved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternal death, for which not any suffers? And you may guess by this whether this Authors Pretence of acknowledgement of natural corruption be not only from the teeth outward: If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this woeful estate, and suffer eternal death for that natural corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this woeful estate absolutely or no. For I profess willingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Divine foresight of anything in them, to put a difference between some and others.

DISCOURSE. SECT. I.

THe Reasons of the first sort are these four which follow.

1. The Novelty of it. I cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stourest defenders of grace among them against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 years after Christ: nor the Lower way till the time of S. Austin, which was above 400 years after him.

They did all generally agree upon the contrary Conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved, and to have repented which repented not, and that there was no decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any son of Adam.

This that I say M. Calvin himself doth ingeniously acknowledge, speaking of election, and reprobation, according to God's foreknowledge, Ne{que} haec vulgo recepta opinio solius vulgi est, habuit enim saeculis omnibu magnes Authores; The Opinion of a conditional decree hath had great Authors in all ages.

Reverend Beza speaking likewise of the same opinion, speaks to the same effect in these words; In quem errorem sane turpissimum. Origen's Veteres pleros{que} tum Graecos, tum Latinos adegit,