The Riches of Gods Love

WIth us Christians there is no doubt or question made of the truth of this, that God is righteous in all his ways: yea though he command Abraham to sacrifice his son; and though he caused not only Achan to be stoned for his trespassing about the excommunicate thing, but his children also with him; and though he visit the sin of Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him. And though in the drowning of the World, he caused Infants to perish with their parents, some in their Mothers womb, some hanging on their Mothers breasts: And so in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah with fire from heaven. And not so only, but the righteous God hath given us power over inferior creatures, to wear them out in serving our turns with them, yea and to knock them in the heads, to cut their throats, and strangle them as we think good: and we are no whit the more unrighteous in executing this power, which God hath given us upon them: yea in giving his own and holy Son to be reviled, blasphemed, betrayed, condemned, crucified, so to make his soul an offering for our sins. In all these ways the Lord is righteous, and holy in all his works, Solomon saith, Prov. 16. 11. That a just weight and balance are the Lord's, all the weights of the bag are his work. And the same Solomon in the same chapter saith, v. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea even the w •• ed against the day of evil. This revives in me the remembrance of a pretty story; An odd fellow came to his Neighbor to borrow a bushel of Malt, saying, the merciful is righteous and lendeth; the other answered him in the same element saying, The ungodly borroweth and payeth not again; Where is that saith the borrower? Where is yours saith the other? Why, saith he, the place I mentioned is in the 37 Psahne. So is mine too, saith the other. But proceed we along with him: Whereas he saith God's judgments are without exception, that is untrue, for we find the Apostle Saint Paul to take notice of exceptions made against the ways of God in some particular casts; as when God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: upon the proposal of this Doctrine the Apostle takes notice of such an exception as this. Thou wilt say then, why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will: and the justification hereof, the Apostle derives from no other consideration then this, that God is our Creator, and we are his creatures: And that as the Potter hath power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor; so hath God. O man (saith Paul) who art thou that disputest with God, shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay? And as the Psalmist saith, That God's judgments are like a great deep: So the Apostle professeth, That his judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out. And in the common opinion this is delivered as touching the depth of God's counsel in reprobation and predestination; and by the coherence of the words, with that which goes before it, appears to be spoken upon God's dispensing and denying grace to whom he will, and when he will; As for example; like as there was a time when God had a Church in the World, without distinction of Jews and Gentiles, so afterwards the providence of God was to display it self after three several ways, the first was in gathering a Church unto himself out of the World, from out of the posterity of Abraham, these were called the Jews, in distinction from the Gentiles, who for a long time had not obtained mercy, as the Apostle speaks, Rom. 11. 30. In as much as they believed not: And this dispensation of grace peculiar unto the Jews, with rejection of the Gentiles, continued for about 1600 years. Then God gathered a Church among the Gentiles, with rejection of the Jews, as the Apostle signifies in the place before alleged, saying, now you have obtained mercy through their unbelief. And this dispensation of God's grace peculiar unto the Gentiles, hath continued now, for about 1600 years. And we believe a time shall come, for the calling of the Jews, and then the Church of God shall consist both of Jews and Gentiles, and the general calling of them, as the Apostle signifies, Rom. 11. 12. If the fall of them be the riches of the World, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fullness: and v. 15. If the casting away of them be the reconciling of the World, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead: and v. 31. Even so have these also now not believed, that through your (Gentiles) mercy, they also (the Jews) might obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all under unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. And hereupon it is, that the Apostle breaks forth into admiration of this various providence of God, and different dispensation of his grace, saying, O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out? So that albeit the justice of God, be apparent to the understanding of man in some of his ways, yet not in all. Neither doth it follow, that because God offers the justice of his courses, to the trial of human understanding in some particulars, therefore he offers it to the same trial in all; or that the understanding of man is able to comprehend it in all. Not only carnal men cry out sometimes, Where is the God of judgment? Mal. 2. 17. Again, it is in vain to serve God, and what profit is it that we have kept his commandments, that we have walked humbly before the Lord of hosts? But even the children of wisdom, which are apt to justify her, are yet sometimes offended through weakness of faith, or want of judgment to comprehend the depth of God's providence, when they have considered the strange prosperity of the wicked, as Job. 21. 6, 7, 8. and David, Psal. 73. and Jeremy, Jer. 12.

But to consider punctually the instances here particulated. First not one of them treats of God's decrees, though this Author boldly claps then in amongst the ways of God: And these places throughout entreat not of the decrees themselves, but of the executions of God's decrees. As that Isaiah 5. 3. Judge I pray you between me and my vineyard; yet this was mere grace and not justice; but the laying of it wast, (as there he threateneth) for the unfruitfulness thereof, was just even in the conscience of man: So likewise the ways of God mentioned, Ezech. 18. 25. are most equal, as namely in rewarding the obedient, and punishing the disobedient. In like sort there is no question to be made of God's decrees, concerning the rewarding the one, and punishing the other. And it is as true, that all this is nothing to the purpose. The main question being touching God's decree, to give the grace of obedience to one, and deny it unto others; and of the execution hereof, in showing mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will. No reason hereof can be devised by man without falling into manifest absurdity, or manifest heresy, or both. It is true God will not slay the righteous with the wicked: for the Infants of wicked Parents, until God be pleased to regenerate them, are not to be accounted righteous, as being borne children of wrath. Ephes. 2. 3. And therefore as in the conflagration of Sodom, God took a course to save righteous Lot, yet the Infant children of the Sodomites were consumed in the same fire with their Parents. And in like manner I answer to that of Moses. Num. 16. 22. Shall one man sin, and wilt thou be angry with all the congregation? You know though Korah might be, and in likelihood he was the principal instigator yet Dathan and Abiram the sons of Eliab, and On, the son of Peleth, the sons of Reuben joined with him in the separation, and with these were joined no less then 250 Captains of the assembly, and they famous in the congregation and men of renown. Nor did those alone perish in this their separation, but their families also. So that whereas when Moses exhorted all the rest to depart from the tents of those wicked men, and thereupon Dathan and Abiram came out and stood in the door of the Tent, with their Wives, and their Sons, and their little Children, all these were swallowed up, and went down quick into the pit: and do you think their little Children were partners with them in this conspiracy? And is not this judgment strange? What can justify this, but the power of God, is Lord over his creature, together with that original corruption that is found in everyone when they come into the world? Guesse, I pray, how happy this Author is in his observations. This makes me remember, how at my first coming into this place, having to deal with certain Brownists, being willed thereunto by our Diocesan: An old man among the rest, was willing to confer, so we would give him liberty to open his mind at full; we willingly condescended unto him, and thereupon he began to allege places of Scripture to justify his separation; and wheresoever he found the word separate, that he took up for an argument on his side (like him that did set down every ship that arrived in the harbor at Athens, as one of his shipps) and amongst the rest, this 16 chapter of Numbers afforded him one authority v. 21. where the Lord speaks unto Moses and Aaron, saying, separate yourselves from among this congregation; whereunto I answered; here indeed is a separation commanded, but from whom? Surely from those who rose up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron: Now if you can prove us to be such, as rise up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron, then, in the name of God separate yourselves from us: But if we are not the men that rise up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron, but you rather, then are not you commanded to separate from us, but we rather are commanded to separate from you; yet we desire only, that you will not separate from us, and all shall be well. But to return, what doth this author think? Was God in a passion, or something precipitate when he said, separate yourselves from among this congregation, that I may consume them all at once, and did Moses moderate him as being more-staid of the two? I hope, if God had done as much as he offered to do, his action had been justifiable, as well in the one as in the other. Certainly God should be just, even in turning his holy Angels into nothing: and was just in exposing his holy Son to tortures unexpressable upon the cross; other manner of proceedings, then were those which were used towards Adonibezek and Mauricius: they justified God from consideration of their former sins: No such course of justification could have place in annihilating Angels, or had course in breaking the Holy Son of God for our iniquities. Yet these instances are remarkable to observe therein, the felicity of this Authors discourse. For first, was it God indeed that executed this judgment upon Adonibezek? Now the Text saith, the children of Judah were they that dealt thus with him: did God then use their free wills, as his instruments for the execution of this judgment? And how was this? Was it by working them hereunto, or only by concurring with them to this act, as foreseeing they would do such an act, and thereupon decreeing to concur to the producing of that act? If God did work them hereunto, then can God work the will of any man to the doing of any free act freely: for who dares say that the children of Israel did not as freely do this as ought else? But if God only concurred with them, to the doing of it modo vellent, and only, upon foresight that they would do it, decreed to concur to the doing of it, calls he this God's execution of judgment, depending merely upon the pleasure of man foreseen by God?

As for the out-rage executed upon Mauricius by Phocas, this was no less then abominable villainy, as committed by him. Yet if God used him as an instrument herein, to execute his judgment, then God by the sinful act of one, can and doth punish the same of another, and consequently God must be the Author of that sinful act, whereby he punisheth another, and that by Arminius his rule, which is this, Omnis paena non permittitur sed infligitur a Deo, & habet Deum authorem. Now I come to consider his accommodation of so impertinent a discourse. He saith absolute reprobation cannot be reconciled with this justice Divine: we say there is no need at all of reconcilement: for what an insipid thing is it, to talk of a course of reconciling them, who were never at odds? But he takes upon him to prove the repugnancy between them by three reasons.

1. The first whereof is this. It makes God to punish the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapsarian way directly. I confess here is a direct somewhat, but whether a direct truth, or a direct lie, let the indifferent judge. He adventureth the proof of it thus: The Supralapsarians present man in his decree of Reprobation considered without sin: that is true I confess, and it is as true that they present him considered without righteousness also; and for good reason, because God's decree was eternal, and the creature at that time had no being & to consider a thing that hath no being, as having being, is not so much considerare, to consider, as errare or fingere, to err or feign, this I have delivered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, and that in the first part of the first book. And this Author pretends he hath read the second, yet he takes no course to refute this or ought else. But let him go on. God (he saith) is made by them to determine the infliction of misery on men without consideration of sin, either Original or actual. First, let it be granted, yet herehence it followeth not, that he is made to be a destroyer of the righteous, or to punish the righteous with the wicked, which was that he affirmed. To determine punishment is one thing, to punish is another thing. Certainly in the opinion of those he speaks of, God punisheth none but the wicked; the very conscience of this Author cannot but convict him of falsehood in this crimination: For certainly by their opinion it doth not follow but that everyone is found wicked, when God doth punish him. I may as well say in most absolute congruity, that by their opinion, God doth punish men, before they have any being by creation: for such they were indeed, and neither wicked nor righteous, when God passed the decree of reprobation upon them. But neither do these Divines maintain, that God did decree to damn any man but for sin. Nay, I go farther: let the object of reprobation be men not yet created, and so considered, as I have proved it to be so, herehence it no way follows, that the decree of reprobration, is in any moment of reason or nature, before the consideration or citra considerationem peccati: and this also have I proved. This Author boldly supposeth the contrary to be true, without any proof, yet pretends he hath read my Vindiciae Gratiae Dei farther off then where I have handled this. I say he pretends it, but I do not know how he comes by this, it may be as Capons come by Chickens.

Hence he proceeds to the Sublapsarians also, the whole Synod of Dort (as 'tis supposed) our Britain Divines, and all; for against their way he hath tied himself to bend his reasons, but so, that as the Pope by his grants, doth never bind his own hands, for this Author hath power to untie himself at pleasure, and to fly out against the Supralapsarians also: as Skanderbeg did against the two Persian challengers; but he was put thereunto, because they contrary to the compact, set both at once on him. But this champion like a tall fellow, and of a brave spirit, as if he should not have his hands full of a whole Synod, lets fly at all: They indeed, I mean the Sublapsarians, consider mankind in original sin; this he may well suppose: but he goes farther, and supposeth also, that this sin is made ours only by God's order and appointment: For so, saith he, they in effect do say.

1. That God did lay upon every man, a necessity of being borne in Original sin. But in this also he speaks at pleasure, quoting no passage of any Author. God may be said to lay upon man a necessity of eternal condemnation, dying in sin unrepented of: yet no sober man will say, that God is the author of a man's condemnation, by God's only order and pleasure; For this implies, that there is no meritorious cause of condemnation in man. God (we say) of mere pleasure, bestows the grace of repentance on whom he will; because he finds all equal in natural corruption, and no difference in any, whereby to move God to bestow grace on him rather then on another. The case is not alike when God comes to bestow salvation and inflict damnation; for some he finds dying in sins, others dying in the Lord: yet we deny not but by power absolute, and secluding the determination of his own will, he could annihilate the righteous as well as the wicked. In like sort the whole course of nature depends merely upon the pleasure of God: yet we say it is natural for a Leprous person, to beget a Leprous person: and so as natural it is, for that which is borne of the flesh to be flesh, though each depends upon the constitution of God. For albeit Adam lost the spirit of God by his transgression, and all supernatural graces wherewith he was endued; yet like as God by regeneration, of his mere pleasure restored them afterwards to Adam, and in due time doth restore them to everyone of his Elect: so in their very conception, if it pleased God, he could for Christ's sake infuse them; notwithstanding the sin of Adam; and consequently it is the free act of God, in refusing after this manner to deal with them. Yet this nothing hinders, but that the propagation of spiritual corruption unto all Adams posterity, may be as natural as the propagation of any hereditary disease from the Father to the child: and over and above, that it is not in the way of mere pleasure, but in the way of justice; for the sin of Adam, which was the sin of our nature, bereaving him of that original righteousness wherein he was • reated: and causing all mankind to be, 1. Derived from him, whereas he could have otherwise provided, 2. And that from Adam after his nature was corrupt with sin, whereas he could have derived posterity from him before his fall, had it pleased him. And therefore I approve the second Canon of the Synod of Dort, whereunto our English Divines with many others subscribed: where they profess, that the corruption derived from Adam to his posterity was, per vitiosae naturae propagationem justo Dei iudicio derivata. This I take to be much different from saying, Adams sin is made ours by mere pleasure, or by imputation only. So the fifteenth Article in the confession Ecclesiarum Belgicarum runs thus; Credimus Adami in obedientiâ, peccatum originis in totum genus humanum diffusum esse: quod est totius naturae corruptio, & vitium haereditarium, quo & ipsi infantes in matris suae utero polluti sunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit; ideo{que} ita foedum & execrabile est coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem sufficiat. Our Britain Divines, in their second Thesis upon the third and fourth Articles, explicate themselves concerning the condition of original sin in this manner. Lapsae voluntati inest non tantum peccandi possibilitas, sed etiam praeceps ad peccandum inclinatio; Nec aliter se potest res habere in homine corrupto, nondum per divinam justitiam restaurato: cùm ea sit natura voluntatis, ut nuda manere nequeat, sed ab uno, cui adhaeserat, objecto excidens, aliud quaerat, quod cupide amplectatur, ideo per spontaneam defectionem habitualiter adversa a Deo creatore, in creaturam effraeni impetu fertur, ac cum ea libidinose ac turpiter fornicatur, semper avida fruendi utendis, ac vetita moliendi ac patrandi. Quid mirum ergo si talis voluntas sit Diaboli maneipium? I find indeed in Corvinus such a profession of his, namely, that ex puro Dei arbitrio, qui Adami peccatum nobis imputare voluit, etiam in nos reatus derivatus est. And Walaeus in answer unto him writes thus; Nec quinto illo ad Rom. Capite, ad quod nos hic Corvinus remittit, quicquam tale dicitur aut innuitur, nempe quod ex mero Dei arbittio pendeat haec primi peccati imputatio.

2. The Second thing he puts upon our Divines is, That God hath determined for that sin, to cast away the far greater part of mankind forever: and so they make God to do that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one. To which I answer, First, that if they say that God doth no more by two acts, then, the other say, God did by one, seeing I have proved that the other do no way maintain that God doth punish the righteous with the wicked, which is his immodest and unshamefacit crimination; no nor do they maintain, that God determined to damn any but for sin, and which is more then that, supposing humanum genus nondum conditum, to be the object of reprobation, yet doth it not follow, that in any moment of nature, the decree of damnation is before the consideration of sin; surely neither will it follow, by the Sublapsarian Doctrine, that God doth not decree to punish any man with damnation, but for those sins wherein he dieth unrepented of; much less that God doth punish the righteous with the wicked, which is the crimination of this Author, proposed, I doubt, against his own conscience. It is true, some perish only in original sin, and that justly: for if they be borne children of wrath, is it strange if they die children of wrath? And is it not just with God to inflict eternal death on them, whom this Author professeth to be guilty of eternal death? only he saith, that God of his mere pleasure, makes them guilty of eternal death: That is his saying, not ours: For though we say original sin makes a man guilty of eternal death, by the free constitution of God; yet we say not, that this free constitution of God was made of his mere pleasure, but justo Dei judicio▪ like as whosoever believes not shall be damned, here damnation is by the free constitution of God, made the portion of unbelievers: but dares this Author infer herehence, that it is not made so justo Dei judicio? indeed God gives grace according to the mere pleasure of his will: but no wise man will say, that he damns men according to the mere pleasure of his will; for this phrase implies, that there is no cause thereof on man's part: And indeed there is no cause on man's part, why God should give him grace, but there is cause enough on man's part, why God should inflict damnation on him, and yet this work of God though just, is never a whit the less free. So in damning for original sin only, though God's constitution hereof be just, yet is it never a whit the less free; and though it be free, yet it is never a whit the less just: And like as damnation is inflicted on final impenitents, sola Dei constitutione, only by virtue of this constitution Divine, whosoever repents not of his sin shall be damned; (for it is apparent, God might have annihilated them, had it so pleased him) yet is it never a whit the less just. In like sort it is by the sole constitution of God, that original sin is propagated to all men, Christ excepted. for God could have derived mankind from another stock after Adams fall: and as he doth regenerate men usually by his word, so he might if it pleased him, in their very conception give them his spirit, and those supernatural graces, whereof Adam was deprived by sin: yet the propagation of sin from Adam to posterity. is never a whit the less just; no nor any whit the less natural; like as the whole course of nature, depends upon the alone constitution of God. But when I say that God can without respect of sin, inflict any torment upon his creature, this is delivered of power absolute. This power the Lord did execute upon his own son: for what was his sin? Was he not the spotless lamb of God? Yet what agonies did he suffer in the garden, what torments and terrors upon the cross, when he cried out My God, my God, Why hast thou forsaken me? But the like power he doth not execute on us, only he gives us authority to exercise the like power over other creatures: if the powder of an Hare burnt alive in an Oven, be found to be wholesome for us, he gives us leave thus to deal with him, and the like: yet have not these creatures sinned either against God, or against us. Of this absolute power of God, I have discoursed more sparingly in the place cited by him, Lib. 1. p. 2. De Electione, digres. 3. If this Author hath any mind to except against it, either in whole or in part, he might have tried his strength, and not contented himself, with showing his teeth only. Yet by his leave, whether those he speaks of, will concur with me in this, it is more then I know, but to serve his turn at this present against those whom he hath tied himself to oppose, as he professeth, he cares little what he avoucheth to save himself of farther pains. By the way let me take notice of one argument more then I dreamt of, for the maintenance of God's absolute power to inflict any pain upon a creature, and that of his mere pleasure, which this Author ere he is aware suggests unto me; And accordingly thus I dispute. If God can out of his mere pleasure make a man guilty of eternal death, surely it seems that of his mere pleasure he may inflict eternal death on any. But God can of his mere pleasure make a man guilty of eternal death, as I prove out of this Author, who professeth that God out of his mere pleasure, made all mankind guilty of eternal death: Now we commonly say, that ab actu ad potentiam valet argumentum. And see farther how miserably he overlasheth. The highest degree whereunto he can improve the harshness of our Doctrine is this, that we should teach, that God doth decree the misery of an innocent man. Now I pray consider, is it not as harsh, that God should decree the death, the agonics, the sorrows, and tortures of an innocent man? And is it not apparent, that God decreed the death and those unspeakable sorrows of his innocent son? Yet we say not that God decreed any other man's death or damnation, but only for sin. But it is all one in his opinion to say, God decrees the misery of an innocent man, and to purpose that he shall be involved in a sin, that so he may be brought to misery. First, I say his opinion is no Oracle, if it were, the world would soon grow wild. Secondly, this sufficeth not to prove his crimination, which was this, that by our Doctrine, we make God to punish the righteous with the wicked, not that we make God to do that which is all one in substance. Thirdly, his best arguments are his phrases, whereby he hopes to season others affections as well as his own; as in saying God purposed man shall be involved in sin: For if he speak of mankind, made guilty of the sin of Adam, he forgets his own Tenet; that God of his mere pleasure makes Adams sin the sin of his posterity, and thereby of his mere pleasure makes them guilty of eternal death. And as touching our Tenet herein, is there any such harshness in saying, that God causeth a leprous child to be borne of Leprous parents? But if he speak it in general of any sin, for which any man is damned, our Doctrine is, that the sins which come to pass, must needs be permitted by God, and for God to permit any sin, is to will that such a sin shall come to pass by God's permission. Arminius himself professing, that if God permit a man to will that which is evil, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. And the Scripture is express as touching the foulest actions that ever were committed by man, to wit, in the most contumelious usages of the son of God, namely that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together, to do what God's hand, and God's Counsel had predetermined to be done. And when Fulgentius saith, that God had been unjust, if he had predestinated stantem ad ruinam; ad ruinam here is ad peccatum, and Predestination in the Fathers sense, is only eorum quae Deus ipse facturus erat, which God himself meant to effect, not what he meant to suffer. That they took predestination in this sense, it appears by Austin. lib. 2. de bono persevere. c. 17. his words are these. In sua quae falli mutari{que} non potest praescientia opera sua futura disponere, illud omnino, nec aliud quicquam est praedestinare. Mark it well, opera sua, his works, now sin is no work of God, but a work of the creature only.

I come to his second reason.

IN this discourse on the point of God's justice, this Author seems to storm, and shows great confidence of bearing down all before him: but the more ridiculous will it prove in the issue, when it shall appear, that all this wind beats down no corn. He takes his rise from a particular opinion of Zanchi, whose opinion is, that all, even Reprobates are bound to believe they are elected in Christ unto salvation, though never they shall believe nor can believe. But doth this Author himself concur with Zanchi in this opinion? If he did, I presume it were upon some better ground then the authority of Zanchi; and in all likelihood we should have heard of those grounds: or doth himself believe, that that passage John. 16. 9. He shall convict the World of sin, because they believed not in me, doth evince as much, or import as much as that is, whereunto Zanchi drives it? If he doth not concur with Zanchi in either of these, why should he tie us to the particular authority of Zanchi? Must we be bound to stand to every interpretation of our Divines, or every particular opinion of theirs, wherein perhaps they were singular? Secondly, suppose this opinion of Zanchi be a truth, and suppose we concur with him herein, will it from this opinion follow, that therefore even Reprobates, have power to believe? Who seeth not that it is a flat contradiction to the antecedent? For the Doctrine of Zanchi as here it is related, is this, that even Reprobates, though they cannot believe, yet are they bound to believe. Now will it herehence follow that therefore they have power to believe? Whereas it is manifestly supposed in the antecedent that they cannot believe. And to my understanding, the distinction of Elect and Reprobate in this case is most unseasonable. For to what end do we Preach unto our hearers, that all sorts of men are bound to believe, but this, to wit, that everyone that heareth us, being privy to his condition, may understand that he, of what condition soever he be, which is supposed to be better known to him, then to the Preacher, or at least as well, is bound to believe. But as for these different conditions of elect and reprobate, no man can be privy to the one, until he doth believe; nor to the other, until final perseverance in unbelief. And if I list, I could allege the opinion of another Divine (who is very peremptory in his way) professing that the Ministers calling upon us to believe, is no commandment at all, but like a Kings gracious Proclamation unto certain malifactors, who are all accused of High Treason, giving them to understand, that in case they will voluntarily confess their sin, and accept of his gracious pardon offered them, he will most graciously pardon them. But if they will not, but stand rather to their trial, presuming to acquit themselves right well, and prove themselves to be true Subjects, let them stand to the adventure, and issue of their trial. And that thus the covenant of grace is offered to be received by them only, who fear to come, and dare not come to the trial of the Covenant of works. But I will not content myself, in putting off Zanchi in this manner; although by the way I cannot but profess, that were I of their opinion, who teach that God gives unto all and everyone, when they come into the World, a certain grace, for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any spiritual good, whereto they shall be excited; I see no reason but that the way is open to everlasting life, as well by the covenant of works, as by the covenant of grace: for let perfect obedience be the spiritual good whereto they are excited, let them but will it, as it is supposed they can; and then God will be ready to concur to the doing of it, like as to the work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 credere, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 resipiscere, modo velimus, so also I should think, to work in us perfect obedience modo velimus. And in this case I pray consider, what need were there of faith in Christ on their part, more then on the part of the Holy Angels; certainly there would be no need of repentance.

Thirdly therefore consider we the constant Doctrine of Divines, not that Reprobates are bound to believe, but that all that hear the Gospel are bound to believe: but in what sense? Piscator saith, as I remember, that the thing, which all such are bound to believe, is the Gospel; according to that Mar. 1. Repent ye and believe the Gospel. Now to believe the Gospel is one thing, the sum whereof is this, That Jesus Christ came into the World to save sinners; but to believe in Christ is another thing, which yet this Author distinguisheth not, though it appears by the course of his argumentation, that he draws to this meaning, and that in a particular sense, which is this, to believe that Christ died for them; as appears expressly in the latter end of this Section. And no marvel if this Author carry himself so confidently in this, being, as he is, armed with such confidence. But I am glad that in one place or other, he springs his meaning, that we may have the fairer flight at him, to pull down his pride, and sweep away his vain confidence: though we deal upon the most plausible argument of the Arminians, and which they think insoluble. My answer is; first, Look in what sense Arminius saith Christ died for us, in the same sense we may be held to say (without prejudice to our Tenet) of absolute reprobation, that all who hear the Gospel are bound to believe that Christ died for them. For the meaning that Arminius makes of Christ's dying for us, is this, Christ died, for this end, that satisfaction being made for sin, the Lord now may pardon sin, upon what condition he will; which indeed is to die for obtaining a possibility of the redemption of all, but for the actual redemption of none at all. Secondly, But I list not to content myself with this; therefore I farther answer, by distinction of the phrase of dying for us, that we may not cheat ourselves by the confounding of things that differ. To die for us, or for all, is to die for our benefit, or for the benefit of all: Now these benefits are of a different nature, whereof some are bestowed upon man only conditionally (though for Christ's sake) and they are the pardon of sin and Salvation of the Soul, and these God doth confer only upon the condition of faith and repentance. Now I am ready to profess, and that, I suppose, as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that everyone who hears the Gospel (without distinction between Elect and Reprobate) is bound to believe that Christ died for him, so far as to procure both the pardon of his sins, and the salvation of his soul, in case he believe and repent. But there are other benefits, which Christ by his obedience hath merited for us, namely, the benefit of faith and repentance. For it pleased the Father, that in him should all fullness dwell, Col. 1. And He hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in Christ, that is, for Christ's sake: and God works in us, that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, and therefore seeing nothing is more pleasing in God's sight on our part, then faith and repentance, even these also, I should think, God works in us through Jesus Christ: and the Apostle prays in the behalf of the Ephesians, for peace, and faith, and love from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ, that is, as I interpret it, from God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as an efficient cause, and from the Lord Jesus Christ, God and Man, as a meritorious cause thereof. Now I demand whether this Author can say truly, that tis the constant opinion of our Divines, that all who hear the Gospel, whether Elect or Reprobate, are bound to believe, that Christ died to procure them faith and repentance. Nay doth any Arminian at this day believe this, or can he name any Arminian that doth avouch this? Nay doth himself believe this? If he doth not, if he cannot show any Arminian that doth, with what face can he charge this opinion upon us, as if we should extend the obligation to believe, much farther then the Arminians do, whereas usually they criminate us, for not extending it so far as we should. And indeed there is a main difference between these benefits and the former: For as touching the former, namely pardon of sin and salvation, God doth not use to confer them, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance. But as for faith and repentance, doth God confer them conditionally also? If so, then let them make known to us, what that condition is on man's part, and whatsoever it be, let them look unto it, how they can avoid the making of grace, to wit, the grace of faith and repentance, to be given according unto works. But if these graces are conferred absolutely, and Christ died for all to this end, that faith and repentance should be conferred absolutely upon all, then it followeth manifestly herehence, that all must believe and repent, and consequently all must be saved. So that not only Election (as Huberus that renegate feigned) must be universal, but Salvation also. Thus have I given in my answer distinctly, to that which he delivered most confusedly. Fourthly I come to the scanning of the particular opinion of Zanchi, namely, that everyone that hears the Gospel, whether elect or reprobate (for so I suppose it proceeds, to wit, only of them, who hear the Gospel, though this Author, takes no consideration of that neither, but hand-over-head, lays about him like a mad man) is bound to believe, that he is elect in Christ; and will try whether I cannot reduce that opinion of his also, to a fair interpretation. And here first I observe, Zanchi is not charged to maintain, that every hearer of the Gospel, is bound to believe, that he is elect in Christ unto faith and repentance, but only to salvation: that puts me in good heart, that Zanchi & I shall shake hands of fellowship in the end, and part good friends. Secondly, I distinguish between absolute-Election unto Salvation, and election unto Salvation-absolute. The first only removes all cause on man's part of election, the latter removes all cause on man's part of salvation. By cause of salvation I mean only a disposing cause, such as faith, repentance, and good works are, as whereby (to express it in the Apostles phrase) we are made meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints of light. Now albeit Zanchi maintains as we do, that all the elect are absolutely elected unto salvation, there being no cause on man's part of his election, as we have learned: yet neither Zanchi nor we do maintain that God doth elect any unto salvation absolute, that is, to bring him to salvation, without any disposing of him thereunto by faith and repentance. Now to accommodate that opinion of Zanchi, I say it may have a good sense, to say that every hearer is bound to believe, both that Christ died to procure Salvation for him, in case he do believe, and that God ordained that he should be saved, in case he do believe; where belief is made the condition only of salvation, not of the Divine ordination; and the confusion of these by the Arminians, doth usually make them confident and insolent, and in a word, Magnas Tragoedias excitare. But take a way the confusion of things that differ, their combes are cut, their locks are shorn, and they are but as another man. Now having shown in what sense every hearer, is bound to believe that Christ died for him, and in what sense not, let us consider of what worth this Authors arguments are, breathing nothing but smoke and fire, I will not say, like the great Potan, but like fell Dragon; but I nothing doubt we shall pare his nails, and make him calm enough ere we have done with him, so that a little child shall be able enough to lead him. Now that they cannot be justly bound to believe, if they be absolute reprobates he takes upon him to prove by three reasons.

1. The first is, because it is God's will that they shall not believe, because it is his peremptory will, that they shall have no power to believe. I answer, it is indeed the will of God's decree, that is, he hath decreed not to give any Reprobate a justifying faith, but hence it followeth not, that therefore they cannot believe thus far the contents of the Gospel, namely, that both Christ hath merited, and God hath ordained, that as many as do believe shall be saved. For this, as I take it, is not usually accounted by our Divines a justifying faith, but rather it comes within the compass of such a faith, as is commonly counted faith historical.

Secondly I answer, it followeth not, that because God hath decreed to deny them the grace of faith, therefore they are not bound to believe; which I prove by Scripture: For was not Pharaoh bound to let Israel go, when Moses was sent to him from the Lord, to command him in the name of the Lord, to let Israel go? Yet the Scripture plainly teacheth us, that the Lord told Moses that he would harden Pharaohs heart, and that he should not let Israel go. What I pray is now become of his reason, compared with the light of Scripture? And what have we to do to inquire into God's counsels, as whether he hath decreed to give us grace or no? Is it not enough to bind us to obedience, for God to command this or that unto us? Did Abraham inquire in his thoughts, whether it were his purpose yea or no, that Isaac should be sacrificed? Nothing less; but upon the Lord's command, he forthwith addresseth himself to the work, rising early in the morning, and going forward in the Lord's business. Then again, we find by common experience, that natural men are too to confident rather, and presumptuous of their power, then diffident, and distrustful; dicere solet humana superbia (saith Austin) si scissem fecissem: it were better for them if they did acknowledge their impotency, and by what means this corruption of theirs is brought upon them, that would bring them nearer to the Kingdom of God. But if I have a debtor, whom I know to be a Bankerupt, but he knows it not, but having many bags of Brasse or Copper pieces, which he takes to be Gold, conceits himself able enough to pay all his debts, and more too: shall I be said to commit any indecent thing, by urging him to pay that he oweth? This argument is as old as Pelagius: but what was Austin his answer? In mandato cognosce quid debeas habere, in corruptione cognosce t uo te vitio non habere, in oratione cognosce unde possis habere.

3. Lastly, if God cannot justly command, and by command bind man to obey, in case he hath no power to obey; in like sort God cannot justly complain of their disobedience, who being hardened by God, cannot obey him: And indeed as this Author argueth against the justice of God's commands in this case, so the Apostle brings in one arguing the injustice of God's complaints in the like case. For having delivered this Doctrine, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: forthwith he brings in one tumultuating against it in this manner. Thou wilt say then why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will? And if any man be not ashamed to argue as he did (saith Austin) let us not be ashamed to answer as the Apostle did: and how was that? Surely only thus: O man who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? And albeit this, I trow, should be sufficient to satisfy a Christian, yet we observe farther, how this Author confounds impotency Moral, which consisteth in the corruption of man's powers natural, and impotency natural, which consisteth in bereaving him of power natural. The Lord tells us by his Prophet Jeremy, that Like as a Blackamore cannot change his skin, nor a Leopard his spotts, no more can they do good, that are accustomed unto evil. Now if a man taken in stealth shall plead thus before a Judge, My Lord, I beseech you have compassion upon me, for I have so long time inured my hands to pilfering, that now I cannot forbear it: will this be accepted as a good plea to save him from the Gallows. Again, it is observed that men are naturally prone to run upon the committing of things forbidden them; Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas: & nitimur in vetitum: yet this is no just excuse. Lastly; as for faith, it is well known that Divines distinguish between fides acquisita, and fides infusa; that we may call a faith naturally acquired, which is found in carnal persons, whether profane or Hypocriticall: and this is a faith inspired by God's spirit. The object of each is all one, and a Man may suffer Martyrdom for the one as well as for the other, which manifesteth the pertinacious adherence thereunto. And it appears that all professions have had their Martyrs; Ucali Fartax a Calabrian borne, endured the Gallies fourteen years, rather then he would turn Turk; yet at length he became a Turk, and only in spleen to be revenged on a Turk, who had given him a box on the ear, and became a great man amongst them: And at the famous battle of Lepanto, he alone maintained his Squadron entire, and beat the Christians. But to return, albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infusâ, yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Gospel fide acquisitâ, which depends partly upon a man's education, and partly upon reason, considering the credibility of the Christian way, by light of natural observations, above all other ways in the World. And when men refuse to embrace the Gospel, not so much because of the credibility of it, but because it is not congruous to their natural affections, as our Savior tells the Jews, Light came into the World, and men loved darkness rather then light, because their deeds are evil: Is there any reason why their condemnation should be any whit the easier for this? Neither have I ever read, or heard it taught by any, that men shall be damned for not believing fide infusâ, which is as much as to say, because God hath not regenerated them; but either because they have refused to believe, or else if they have embraced the Gospel, for not living answerable thereunto, which also is in their power, quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem, though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change their hearts, anymore then it is to illuminate their minds: yet I never read that any man's damnation, was any whit the more increased for not performing these acts. Thus far I have been content to expatiate in the way of reasonable discourse, to meet with this Disputer in his own element; though every sober Christian (I should think) should rest satisfied with the word of God, which both teacheth us that the natural man perceiveth not the things of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned, & that all men are found dead in trespasses and sins, before the spirit of regeneration comes, that men cannot believe, that they cannot repent, that they that are in the flesh cannot please God; and that a man hardened cannot obey; and yet withal, that God doth command faith, repentance, and obedience, and complains of default in performance. And if any man charge such courses as unjust, what is the Apostles course in meeting with such imputations, but either to show, that the word attributes such a course to God, and therefore it cannot be unjust, as Rom. 9. 14. What shall we say then, is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid, for he saith to Moses, I will have compassion on him, on whom I will have compassion, and I will show mercy on him, to whom I will show mecy: or to fly to the consideration of the Lord's dominion over all, as Creator over his creatures. I come to his second reason.

2. And that is, because it is impossible that they should believe, they want power to believe, and must want it still. God hath decreed they shall have none to their dying day. I answer: This argument is the very same with the former, not so much as differently dr • st, or crambe bis cocta, and therefore my former answer will serve in every particular. Yet add this also, this impossibility is only upon supposition of God's Decree, which nothing hinders the liberty of the creature, in doing freely what he doth, and freely leaving undone what he doth not, as appears manifestly by divers instances. For upon supposition of God's decree, that not a bone of Christ should be broken, it was impossible they should be broken: yet who doubts, but that the Soldiers did as freely abstain from the breaking of Christ's bones, as they did freely break the others bones? And the Text notes the reason why they brake not Christ's bones, to wit, because they saw he was dead already. In like sort upon supposition of God's decree, that Josiah by name should burn the Prophets bones upon the Altar: Cyrus by name should build him a Citty, and let go his captives; it was impossible that it should be otherwise: yet I think no wise man doubts but that Josiah did the one, and Cyrus the other, as freely as they did anything in their lives. And therefore this Author doth miserably overlash in the element of his Philosophy, and rational discourse, in saying, a man in justice can be tied to believe no more, then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger. He might as well say, that because God had determined that the Soldiers should not break Christ's bones, therefore they had no more power to break Christ's bones, then they had power to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of their finger. Certainly there is no man but by grace may be enabled to believe: but never was any man known to affirm, that by grace a man may be enabled to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of his finger. If this be not miserably to over-reach, I know not what is. As for his rule, Nemo obligatur ad impossible, judge I pray of the truth of it by this; What if a man by a vicious conversation, hath made it as impossible for him to do good, as it is impossible for a Blackemore to change his skin, or a Leopard his spots; Shall he therefore be obliged no longer to do good? And as by our own sins committed by our persons, so by the sin of Adam, which was the sin of our nature, upon the whole nature of man was this impotency brought, as the Scriptures teach, and none that I know were known in the days of Austin, to deny, but the Plagians.

I come to the Third.

3. Now this depends upon a notorious confusion of things that differ. For I have shown, how the Lord hath given them a sufficient object of that faith, which he requires of them, as touching Christ's dyeing for them; namily, to believe that Christ hath merited the pardon of sin, and salvation for as many as believe in him, in such sort, that if all, and everyone throughout the World should believe in him; they should be saved by him. And this depends merely upon the sufficiency of Christ's merits, and undoubtedly it was the will of God, that Christ's merits should be of such a value, as was sufficient for the salvation of all, and everyone: otherwise it were not true, that if all and everyone should believe in Christ, they should be saved by the virtue of Christ merits. But as for any obligation to believe that Christ died to procure faith and repentance for all and everyone; I never yet heard or read of any Arminian, that he believed it. Nay in their Apologia Remonstrantium, or Censura Censurae, they plainly profess, that Christ died not at all to merit faith, and regeneration for any. In like sort it is not credible to me, that any Arminian believes, that Christ died for any so, as to procure pardon of sin and salvation absolutely for him, whether he believe or no, provided that he live to be capable of faith and repentance, and to enjoy the Gospel, and the Preaching of Christ crucified. And like as it is no lie, but truth, that Christ died to procure salvation, to as many as believe in him, so in being obliged to believe this, or punished for not believing it, is neither to be obliged to the believing of a lie, nor punished for not believing it. Therefore it is false to say there is no such matter. For look in what sense they are bound to believe that Christ died for them, in the same sense it is most true, that Christ died for them; they are bound to believe that Christ died to procure salvation for everyone that believeth: and it is most true, that in like manner, Christ hath procured the salvation of everyone that believes: so that here is a truth to feed upon, and they that oppose it, are strengthened in their vain confidence by a mere mist of confusion, which they raise unto themselves and others, that so they may set the better face upon that lie, which they hold in their right hand, wherewith they are so enamored that they had rather forsake their own mercies, then forgo it. And so I come to the third and last reason in general drawn from God's justice.

I Have already shown how God's decree and impossibility arising upon supposition thereof, doth no way prejudice the liberty of the creature, as by pregnant passages of the Scripture is made plain unto us. And as for the other decree here spoken of; First it is untrue which he supposeth, that, God by a special decree decreed all mankind to be made partakers of Adams sin, and therein to be stripped of all supernatural power, which before the had by God's free grant. For if it were just with God to decree, that Adams nature, upon his sinning, should be bereaved of all supernatural power, which formerly he enjoyed, this and this alone should suffice to bereave all his posterity of supernatural power to do that which is good. For seeing all his posterity did receive their natures from Adam after his fall, they must therewithal necessarily receive their natures from him, bereaved of all supernatural power unto that which is good, until such time, as God be pleased of his free grace to restore it by regeneration. 2. Is it not good reason that God, for Adams sin, should bereave us of all supernatural power in Adam, as of his mere grace he did adorn us all with supernatural power in Adam? 3. Notwithstanding this depravation of supernatural power in Adam, yet we acknowledge that nevertheless, whatsoever sin a man commits, he committeth freely: and the School hath taught it before us, Aquin. p. 1. q. 23. art. 3. ad. 3. licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit, unde & merito sibi imputatur in culpam.

THis Author seems to swell, in the conceit of his rational performances, as if never any fly sitting upon a cart-wheel in a Sommers day had made such a dust as he had made. And fashioning to himself a victorious conquest, as if all his adversaries were but Pigmies to this Anakim, glad to run into corners, or into Acorn-cups to hide themselves there. For his reasons like some hobgoblins, do so fright them, more then all the spirits that stand by the naked man in the book of Moons: And therefore all the help they have, if we believe this Pyrgopolinices is to charm them, by saying, that many things are delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of human capacity, among which this is one, &c. And I take this to be sound. For otherwise, why should the Doctrine of Godliness, be called a mystery of Godliness. And the Schools teach, that Fides est assensus inevidens: and Cajetan who was no gras-hopper, as great an Anakim as this Author, or his familiar spirit takes himself to be, spares not to profess, that about the reconciling of God's predestination with the liberty of man's will (a point that comes so near to this in hand as a point can do) there are many distinctions devised by the learned, but yet he saith of them, that they did not qutetare intellectum, and therefore that he did captivare suum in obsequium fidei: and Alvarez, no dwarf neither in Scholastical, that is, rational Divinity, addeth that herein Cajetan piissime & doctissime loquitur. But who they are, that have taken notice, of those arguments here specified, and at the sight of them were so ston'd, as at the sight of some Medusas head, and thereupon came to this course of incantation or pacification, he doth very wisely conceal, and like a man of authority, puts it upon us to take it upon his word. Yet I do not remember that I have rested myself upon any such course, though the holy Apostle thinks it sufficient to clear any course of God from injustice, by proving that Scripture doth attribute such a course unto God, as I have shown out of Rom. 9. 14. It is true, the spirit which this Author breaths, is the right Pelagian spirit, according to the Pelagians in Bradwardines days: for their vaunt was, that they could not be refuted by any reason Philosophical, but only by certain naked authorities Theological, (as I have heard of a Scholar, sometimes challenged by a friend and kinsman of his, for being given (as he heard) to the Arminian Tenet, made a ready answer with protestation, that that opinion was very plausible, but that S ^t Paul was against it.) And therefore Bradwardine undertakes to confute them by reason Philosophical; so far off was he from being cowed with their vain boasts and brags. His words are these; Sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoso nomine secularium scientiarum inflati consistorium Theologicum contemnentes Philosophicum flagitabant; ita & moderni. Audivi nam{que} quosdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in sacris apicibus; affirmantes Pelagium nusquam potuisse convinci per naturalem & Philosophicam rationem; sed vix arguebatur utcun{que}, per quasdam authoritates Theologicas, maxim autem per authoritatem Ecclesiae, quae Satrapis non placebat: Quapr opter per rations & authoritates Philosophicas ipsos disposui reformare. And for my part, though I affect not in those points, to go beyond Scripture and Christian reason, yet I am content to be led whithersoever my adversary thinks good to lead me: And as a Scholar of my acquaintance being left handed, and accordingly casting his cloak over the right shoulder, was answered by a Cittizen observing it, when he inquired his way, saying, when you shall come to such a place, you must turn on your right hand, meaning indeed, on the left; so likewise I am nothing afraid of this man's Philosophy, nor his Abettors neither, nothing doubting, but as many as I find opposing this divine truth, which we maintain, their best dexterity, in Philosophical and rational discourse, will prove but a left handed Philosophy: and in this very field of argumentation, I purpose to lay upon him ere we part. But let us first consider the things that he replies.

1. He saith, There is nothing in Scripture abhorring from sound and right reason, he adds, Odious too: as if his Philosophy had taught him, that it is the part of reason to hate, and not rather of affections. This rule when we were initiates in the University, we were soon acquainted with: Yet this Author to vent his fullness, casts himself upon an unnecessary proof thereof, and the mischief is, that his proof maketh his cause worse then it was before. For having formerly made the comparison between the word of God, and sound and right reason; in his reason he states the comparison between faith and reason, nature and Scripture, not distinguishing between nature corrupt, and uncorrupt, reason corrupt and uncorrupt. Our service of God is reasonable, in as much as it is performed by reasonable creatures, and the rule thereof is not natural reason, but merely the word of God. In whom was natural reason more eminent, then in Philosophers? Yet were they wont to be called Haereticorum Patriarchy: and the Apostle hath profess of all such, that the things of God seem foolishness unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. Now I pray consider soberly, how reasonable such courses are judged to be, which are accounted foolishness, and what a sweet harmony there is between things revealed, and men's understandings; and whether reasonable, and foolish, be not a plain contradiction; as well as wise, and foolish. If we enjoy a more pure and refined reason then they, let us give illumination Divine the glory of it: and say with him in Job, verily there is a spirit in man, but the illumination of the Almighty giveth understanding. And seeing the word of God, is the only means of Divine illumination, let us thank God's word for all. I come to the second Material of his reply.

2. And that is this, that all those Doctrine which are ad • erse and repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles, are not to be taken for Doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men, corrupting Scripture by false glosses and interpretations. No marvel that when men oppose the mysteries of Godliness, they fall upon the mysteries of iniquity. Here we have a rule given to try whether a Doctrine proposed, be to be taken for a Doctrine of Scripture yea or no? And mark it well, I beseech you, and I desire that every sober man will mark it well, and judge whether it deserve not to be numbered amongst the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the depths of Satan: And withal judge whether the pretended Author of this discourse, can in any probability be the Author of this, and whether it becomes not rather some old beaten Soldier in Arminianism, that takes upon him to be the Master and Dictator of Sentences. About Regula fidei, the rule of Faith, there is much question between us and Papists; the meaning whereof is, what that is whereinto must be made the last resolution of our Faith? We say it is the word of God contained in the Books of the Old Testament and the New; Papists say, it is the voice of the Church. This Author deviseth a new way, which I think was never heard off before, except among the Socinians, namely, that it is the judgment of understandings purged from prejudice and false Principles. For albeit the Doctrine of Faith, we judge to be contained nowhere, but in God's word, yet notwithstanding as touching the meaning of it, nothing must be taken to be the true meaning of Scripture, how fairly soever grounded thereupon in show, unless withal it seem nothing repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles. Into this therefore must be made the last resolution of our faith.

Again, where shall we meet with these judges as they are here described, to wit, as having their understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: undoubtedly, like as the Church of Rome, when they have once brought the matter hitherto, that the last resolution of faith, must be made into the voice of the Church, are confident enough, that when the question is made of the voice of the Church, where that is to be found, they shall undoubtedly be able to carry it for the Church of Rome: So these Arminians, or Socinians rather, when they have once brought the matter to this pass, that the last resolution of our faith must be made into the judgment of men's understandings purged from prejudice and false principles; and that the question beginneth to be made of understandings thus purified, where they are to be found, they will be so favorable to themselves, as to conceive, that such understandings are to be found nowhere, but amongst the nation of the Arminians; or at least among such, whose judgments are naturally inclined towards their Tenets. But is this a decent course to rest in the judgment of any man's understanding, whereas the soundness of his understanding is not, nor cannot be discerned, but by the strength of his argument: and again, considering the judgment of man is miserably corrupted in such sort, as that the things of God seem foolishness unto them, Is it not much fitter that we should judge of every man's understanding by God's word, which cannot err, rather then judge of the meaning of the word by the understanding of man? Let any man use his understanding in opening and interpreting the word of God unto us, and clearing the meaning thereof unto us as much as he can, by reason, by argument, by demonstration, but still let it be indifferent for any to judge, in what congruity his interpretation stands with the Text it self, and no man's judgment to be a rule of Faith unto others.

Before he goes off from this, he gives another description of those, whose judgments must be the rule of the right interpretation of Scripture; to wit, such as stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Now this seems to me to be as poor as the former, or rather much poorer. For this indifferency as I take it, is in respect of affections; now albeit a man may be thus disposed, in respect of his affections, yet he may be of a very weak judgment; as for example, I have heard of a good man, that was sometimes wavering about the point of Ceremonies, yet very willing to receive information; and therefore confers with both sides, as well such as held them lawful in the use, as with those that held them unlawful, and still was carried every way with the force of their reasons, who conferred with him for the present. Then again, suppose the indifferent were most fit to judge, where shall we find those indifferent persons, or who shall give rules, and what rules, according whereto to proceed in this our inquisition? Again, who are to be presupposed in likelihood, to be the more indifferent, then such as have not hitherto been versed in these controversies, and is it fit, that they who have been many years versed in them, should stand to the judgment of those who are little or nothing exercised therein? Lastly is the creature fit to judge of the Sovereignty of his creator, or being conceived of the freedom of his own will, to judge how far it is reasonable, God should have power over his will and no farther? When the Apostle calls upon the Corinthians, to judge whether that which he wrote unto them, were the commandments of God or no, whom doth he call unto this office? Doth he call any other but such as are spiritual? If there be any amongst you that is a Prophet, or spiritual, let him know that these things are the commandments of God. 1 Cor. 14. He doth not say, if there be any amongst you, that hath his understanding purged from prejudice, and false principles, let him know that these things which I write unto you, are the commandments of God. And the same Apostle tells us, that the things of God are spiritually to be discerned. 1 Cor. 2. 14.

Yet it is remarkable, that he appeals to the judgment not of the best only, but the worst also in this: but something qualified I confess, to wit, provided that they stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Mark it well, of any truths: and who are these? Not possessed with the entertainment of any Truths, but indifferent to the entertainment of them, I say who are these? The regenerate or unregenerate? Here I am at a stand, not knowing which way to take. But it may be this is spoken only in reference to our Doctrine of absolute Reprobation. But of whatsoever it be spoken, let him give instance in either or in both; it seems he is indifferent to have it take place either way, for he proposed it of best and worst. But why should he presuppose an unregenerate man to be indifferent, to the entertainment of any truth? Whereas the Apostle professeth of a natural man, that he cannot know the things of God, and he gives the reason of it, because they are spiritually discerned; and formerly said that they were foolishness unto him. Yet I willingly confess, the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, is very harsh to the judgment and affections of carnal men; and such as we had never embraced, had it not been for the word of God, which plainly professeth, that election is not of (good) works; and that by such an argument, as whereby it is manifest, 1. That election is as well proved not to be of faith, as not of works. 2. That reprobation is not of evil works; yet the harshness hereof, is nothing like so much appearing in its proper colors, as upon their deciphering and blazing of it, who are as zealous for making election to be upon foresight of faith and works (though this latter member, they are loath to have the World take notice of) as they are opposite to the absoluteness of reprobation. Now whereas before I have shown, that there is a great deal of difference between absolute election unto salvation, and election unto salvation absolute: And that not one of our Divines doth maintain, that God doth elect men unto salvation absolute, but to obtain salvation upon their faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein: In like sort there is as great difference between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation absolute. And if none of our Divines do maintain, that God ordains any man of ripe years to obtain salvation, otherwise then upon their faith and repentance, and final perseverance: how much less do they maintain, that God ordains any man unto damnation, otherwise then for his sin and final perseverance therein without repentance? Whereas these enemies of the grace of God, as Saint Austin sometimes called the Pelagians, to make their cause more plausible to the affections or carnal men carry the matter so, as if we maintained that God ordained them to be damned absolutely, and for the mere pleasure of God, concealing the only cause for which God ordained, that they should be damned, namely, for the willful transgression of God's holy Commandments. Only the giving and denying of the grace of regeneration, the giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of that natural infidelity and impenitency that is found in all; and the leaving it uncured by denying faith and repentance: this indeed we maintain to be absolute, according to that of Saint Paul, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 9. 18. Now, dare any of them deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God? They do not, they dare not; only of late they have come thus far, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any. Secondly, inquire whether God gives faith and repentance to some, and denies it to others of his mere will and pleasure, or because he finds some good works in the one, which he finds not in the other. Here is the critical point, we defend no other absoluteness of election and reprobation, but such as depends wholly on this, namely, that God finding men equal in corruption, hath compassion on some, giving them faith and repentance, which he denies unto others: All other absoluteness of Election and Reprobation, besides that which we undertake by clear demonstration to deduce herehence, we utterly renounce. Neither can our adversaries be so grossly ignorant, as not to perceive that this is the critical point of these controversies, the resolution of the truths wherein, will set an end to all contention about Election and Reprobation. Why then do they not deal plainly, and try their strength in this, whereby they should carry themselves fairly and ingenuously, and deal above board. For here alone is that absoluteness of God in execution, which we maintain; but here they are not so prone to show their horns: this argument is not so fit for the raising of clamours and Tragedies. And hating the truth of God as touching his sovereignty over his creatures, to have compassion on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as also the prerogatives of his grace, to work us effectually to that which is pleasing in his fight, and that in whom he will also: yet not daring plainly to deliver their mind in this, as wherein they are found most absurd, and encumbered with shameful contradictions; therefore by the back door as it were, they hope to discredit it, and by opposing the absoluteness of Reprobation, to supplant and undermine the Doctrine of God's free grace. And not content with this, they miserably corrupt our doctrine also, in the point of absolute Reprobation, drawing it to this; as if not reprobation only, but damnation also were made absolute by us: and that God damned men not so much in the way of justice for their sin, as of his own mere pleasure. At length to come to the third particular of his reply.

3. And that is this, that howbeit some things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Gospel, are above our understandings, and must without hesitation be believed: yet many things there, have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature; and amongst these, the justice of God's ways is one, as hath been shown. Isai 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. To this I answer, That the ways of God mentioned Isai. 5. 3. is only in his expecting fruits after so great pains that he had taken, in husbanding his vineyard. And Ezek. 18. consists only in rendering unto men according to their ways. Neither doth it follow, that because the justice of God doth plainly appear in these particulars, therefore it doth appear as clearly, or comprehensively in all others. Is there no difference between the ways of God there mentioned, and the ways of God's justice mentioned in other place; as namely, in causing the Sons of Achan to be stoned to death with Achan himself, for his Sacrilege: in drowning the old World, not sparing the very Infants and sucklings: and for their conspiracy against Moses and Aaron, causing the earth to swallow up not Dathan and Abiram only, but their Wives and Children, and all that they had? So in consuming Sodom and Gomorrah with fire. And as for the punishing of of sin, this is no peculiar truth of the Gospel. I had thought the Gospel, in the proper nature thereof, had been above reason altogether, and no way capable of demonstration. And as for the justice of God, must not this suppose him to be a free agent? Or was this known to Aristotle by all the light of nature whereunto he attained? We that believe him to be a free agent, and withal the creator of all, are ready to demonstrate, that it is in his power to do what he will with his creature, and that not only to annihilate him, though never so holy, but to inflict what pain soever upon him, yea even the torment of hell fire; which Medina acknowledgeth to have been Communem omnium Theologorum sententiam, viz. that this he can do, ut Dominus vitae & mortis; as I have shown in my Vindiciae graciae Dei, and by variety of arguments proved it, more then once in two several digressions, which this Author pretends to have seen, yet answereth not one of them. And as for justice divine toward the creature (whereupon this Author doth with such confidence discourse,) both Vasquez and Suarez Jesuits, in other points concerning God's justice, are miserably at odds, yet jointly concur in this, that all justice Divine, doth presuppose the free determination of God's will: Now, because I find this Gentleman, so conceited of the purity of his rational faculty, and the power thereof, as to require that all interpretation of Scripture, should veil bonnet to the sovereignty thereof; I purpose to try his ability this way, for the expediting of certain arguments about the absoluteness of God's decrees in general, and particularly of the decree of Reprobation. Therefore to combat with him on his own ground, and in his own element, I dispute thus.

1. No temporal thing can be the cause of that which is eternal, but the sins of men are all temporal, whereas Reprobation is eternal, therefore the sins of men cannot be the cause of Reprobation.

If it be said, that sin is not made the cause of reprobation, but as it exsists in God's foresight, and so not so much sin as the prescience of sin is the cause of reprobation. I reply, that this device cannot stand, viz. that the prescience of sin should be the cause of reprobation, and that for this reason; The cause of reprobation whereof we inquire, is of the nature of a meritorious cause, But the prescience of God can no way be said to be a meritorious cause thereof. Science and prescience are causes of God's works in the kind of an efficient Physical, not in the kind of an efficient moral, such as are all causes meritorious.

If it be farther said, that not so much the foresight of sin, as (to speak more properly) sin foreseen is the cause of reprobation: I reply against it in this manner; sin foreseen doth suppose God's decree to permit sin, and consequently if sin foreseen be before reprobation, then also the decree of permitting sin is before the decree of reprobation, that is, the decree of damning for sin. But this cannot be, as I endeavor to prove by two reasons. The first is this; There is no order in intentions, but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, and the order is this, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. Therefore if the decree of permitting sin be before the decree of damning for sin, the decree of permitting sin must be the intention of the end, and the decree of damning for sin must be the intention of the means. But this is notoriously untrue: For it is apparent that damnation tends not to the permission of sin, as the end thereof; for if it did then men were damned to this end, that they might be permitted to sin. But far more likely it is, that sin should be permitted to this end, that a man might be damned, which yet by no means do I a vouch; other reasons I have, to show the vanity of this argumentation. I rather profess, that permssion of sin and damnation are not subordinate as end & means, but coordinate, both being means tending jointly to a farther end, which, under correction from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles, I take to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative.

2. My second reason is, if permission of sin be first in intention and then damnation, it follows that permission of sin should be last in execution; but this is most absurd, namely, that a man should be first damned, and then suffered to sin.

2. My second principal argument is this; Reprobation, as it signifies God's decree, is the act of God's will; now the act of God's will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God's essence, and like as there can be no cause of God's essence, so there can be no cause of God's will, or of the act thereof. Upon some such arguments as these, Aquinas disputes, that the predestination of Christ, cannot be the cause of our Predestination; adding that they are one act in God. And when he comes to the resolution of the question, he grants all as touching actum volentis, that the one cannot be the cause of the other; But only quoad praedestinationis terminum, which is grace and glory, or the things predestinated. Christ is the cause of them, but not of our predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. And I think I may be bold to presume, that Christ's merits are of as great force to be the cause, why God should elect man unto salvation; as man's sins are of force, to be the cause why God should reprobate him unto damnation. The same Aquinas (a tall fellow as touching Scolasticall argumentation) hath professed that no man hath been so mad as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis; and why, but because there can be no cause on man's part of the will of God quoad actum volentis. Now reprobation is well known to be the will of God as well as election; and therefore no cause can there be on man's part thereof quoad actum reprobantis. And it is well known, there is a predestination unto death, as well as unto life, and consequently tis as mad a thing in his judgment to maintain, that merits are the cause there of quoad actum praedestinantis

God by efficacious grace could break off any man's infidelity if it pleased him, that is, by affording him such a motion unto faith, as he foresaw would be yielded unto: this is easily proved by the evident confession of Arminius formerly specified. Now, Why doth God so order it, as to move some in such a manner, as he foresees they will believe; others in such a manner as he foresees they will not believe? but because his purpose is to manifest the glory of his grace in the salvation of the one, and the glory of his justice in the damnation of the other. Herein I appeal to the judgment and conscience of every reasonable creature that understands it, in spite of all prejudice and false principles to corrupt him.

4. In saying sin foreseen is the cause of God's decree of damnation, they presuppose a prescience of sin, as of a thing future, without all ground. For nothing can be foreknown as future, unless it be future: now these disputers presuppose a futurition of sin, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sin is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is merely possible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and therefore it cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause do these men devise of the futurition of sin? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof: For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future; otherwise, God could not have known them from everlasting, And consequently the cause of this passage, must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men do utterly disclaim, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future, rather then to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be considered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, then all such things should become future by necessity of nature, which to say is Atheistical) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cause why everything merely possible in its own nature doth pass from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it: And consequently the reason why everything becomes future is, because God hath determined it shall come to pass; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined shall come to pass by his effection, All evil things God hath determined shall come to pass by his permission. And the Scripture naturally affords plentiful testimony to confirm this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles.

5. My fifth argument is this. If sin be the cause of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature, as all, that hitherto I have known confess. But I say neither can it be by the free constitution of God; for mark what a notorious absurdity followeth hence, and that unavoidably, namely, that God did ordain, that upon foresight of sin, he would ordain them to damnation; mark it well, God did ordain that he would ordain, or God did decree that he would decree. In which words God's eternal decree is made the object of God's decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of God's decrees are merely things temporal, and cannot be things eternal: we truly say God did decree to create the World, to preserve the World, to redeem us, call us, justify us, sanctify and save us, but it cannot be truly said, that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain: for to decree is the act of God's will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of God's will. Yet these arguments I am not so enamored with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to such a sense, as is suitable hereunto, presuming of the purity of my understanding, as purged from prejudice and false principles. I could willingly content myself with observation of the Apostles discourse, in arguing to this effect; Before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God according to election stands not of works. In like manner may I discourse: Before the Children were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred, that therefore election stands not of good works; so therehence may I infer, that therefore reprobation stands not of evil works.

6. If sin foreseen be the cause meritorious of reprobation, then faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto election. For therefore evil works foreseen are made the meritorious cause of reprobation, because evil works exsistent, are the meritorious cause of damnation. And if this be true, then also because Faith and Repentance and good works, are the disposing causes unto salvation, then by the same force of reason, faith, repentance, and good works foreseen, must be the disposing cause unto election; But faith, repentance, and good works foreseen, are not the disposing causes unto election; as I prove thus.

1. If they were then the purpose of God according to election, should be of faith, repentance, and good works, which is expressly denied by the Apostle, as touching the last part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts also, by the same force of argumentation which he useth: as for example, from this anticedent of the Apostles, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, it no more evidently followeth that therefore the purpose of God according to election is not of works, than it followeth that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance: For before they were borne they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance, than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works, as any other.

2. If God doth absolutely work faith in some, and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said, that faith foreseen, is the cause of any man's election. For in this case faith is rather the means of salvation, then salvation a means of faith; and consequently, the intention of salvation rather precedes the intention of faith, than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 1348. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life, making ordination to everlasting life the cause why men believed; answerable hereunto is that Acts 2. last. God added daily to the Church such as should be saved: and that of Paul to Titus, according to the faith of God's elect: So that according to Paul's phrase fides est electorum, but according to the Arminians Doctrine the inverse hereof is a more proper and natural predication, as to say, electio est fidelium.

But God doth absolutely work faith in some men, according to the mere pleasure of his will, denying the same grace to others: which I prove;

1. By Scripture. Rom. 9. 18. God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, compared with Rom. 11. 30. Ye in times past have not believed, but now have obtained mercy; where it appears by the Antithesis, that to find mercy is to believe, that is, to obtain the grace of faith at the hands of God, in Saint Paul's phrase.

2. By clear reason: for if it be not the mere pleasure of God's will, that is the cause hereof, then the cause hereof must be some good works, which he finds in some, and not in others; whence it manifestly followeth, that God giveth grace according unto works, which in the phrase of the ancients is according to merits: and for 1200 years together, this hath been reputed in the Church of God mere Pelagianism.

2. I further demand, what that good work is, whereupon God works it in one, when he refuseth to work it in another? Here the answer I find given is this, that God doth work in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 velle credere modo velit. Now of the absurdity hereof, I appeal to the very light of nature, and let all the books that ever were written on this argument be searched, and let it be inquired, whether ever any did express themselves in the manner of so palpable and gross absurdity: as wherein the act of willing is made the condition of it self: whence it followeth evidently, that it must be both before it self, and after it self; for the condition must always exsist before the thing conditionated. Yet they are driven upon these rocks of absurdities in spite of their teeth: so shameful is the issue of their discourses, who, in hatred of God's truth revealed in God's word, and in a proud conceit of their own performances in the way of argumentation, dare prescribe rules to all others, how to carry themselves in the interpretation of Scriptures; as namely, to be so wary, as that they do not deliver anything, repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: as if the word of God supposed them that are admitted to the studying thereof, to have their understandings already purged from prejudice and false principles: not that it is given by God for this very end, namely, to purge our understandings: for what is the illumination or opening of the eyes of the mind, other than the purging of the understanding from prejudice and false principles: and how miserable these aerial disputers do betray themselves, and manifest how they are transported with prejudice, and corrupted not with false only, but gross principles, by this it may appear in part.

I come to the consideration of his reply to the second answer, which here he represents.

THis Second answer is in like manner, delivered at pleasure, without quoting the Author of it: And no marvel if this Author desires to have the making of his own bed, that he may lie the more softly. Yet touching the similitude here mentioned let it be stated aright: a Master trusts his servant with a stock, not to receive it from him again, though the stock be of a moveable nature, but to receive from him in lieu thereof, some yearly emolument. In this case let him say what he can against it: now here his discourse is for the most part at large, showing how God, though a most free agent, may oblige himself to his creature.

1. Decremendo; whether hereby God doth bind himself to his creature (which hath no being at all when God's decrees are made) or to himself rather, it is little or nothing material to the present: whatsoever it be that God decrees, we are sure that must come to pass, provided that we do not make his decrees of a revocable nature with some; but as touching any use of God's obliging himself this way unto his creature, this Author is content to say nothing at all, in the accommodation.

2. Promittendo. And we willingly grant, that what God promiseth he never fails to perform, after that manner as he hath promised: as namely in case he hath promised that as many as believe in Christ shall be saved, we nothing doubt, but if all the world should believe in Christ, all the world should be saved. But whether any devise a promise concerning the giving of faith & repentance unto all, & everyone; and that whether conditionately or absolutely this Author is content to say just nothing. As likewise, neither doth he take upon him to plead any promise of God, to give to all and everyone power to believe or power to repent.

3. Legem ferendo. This alone of all the three serves his turn, and therefore here he doth expatiate, much more than in the former. And herehence he infers, that God binds himself to give supernatural power, to keep the Law he commands, provided the Law be such, as without supernatural power, he can no more keep it, than eat a rock. Now this accommodated to Adam, had need of explication, seeing we read of no other Law given unto him, than of abstaining from a certain fruit: which I do not deliver as if I doubted, but that to the performance of obedience herein, a supernatural power was requisite; but only to signify, that it were worth the labor to give a congruous explication of it. Though of Adam I nothing doubt but he was endued with supernatural power, to perform other manner of duties than this. And yet again, this denomination of power supernatural, had need also of explication; for though that power which Adam had given him in creation, be supernatural to us, yet our Divines usually conceive it as natural unto Adam, received together with his nature, and such as should have been natural unto us all, had Adam continued in his original integrity. But I am content to let that pass; only whereas he saith, that by such a law the Almighty law-giver binds himself to his creatuees, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law; I think rather if any obligation had place in this case, it were rather to maintain the power already given them, than to give it. For every law-giver rather presupposeth ability of obedience in them, to whom he gives a law; then first gives a law and then gives ability to perform obedience thereunto. And certainly God first created man after his own image, before he gave him any law to be a rule of his obedience unto his creator. So I take the multiplying virtue, was given to his creatures in their creation, before he said increase and multiply: In the curing of the lame man, his word indeed was a word of power, like as when he said let there be light, and there was light. For though it go under the form of a command, yet it was not so properly a command (which is to command obedience) as the going forth of virtuous efficacy to create: like as that also Ezek. 37. O ye dry bones hear the voice of the Lord. And undoubtedly the strength of obedience given unto Adam preceded God's command, for his abstaining from the fruit of the tree, in the midst of the Garden. He had in his creation given him, posse non cadere, not non posse cadere, the event manifested as much: and it is as true according to the same Austin, that God gave him posse stare si vellet, not velle quod potuit. But that God is bound to restore, any such power unto mankind, which they have willfully lost, is boldly avouched, but let us consider how Scholastically it is proved.

1. The first reason hereof is, because God hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. To this I answer, that God hath entered into a new Covenant with men, is an indefinite proposition, as touching the persons included in this Covenant, and being not in a necessary matter but contingent, this Covenant proceeding merely from the good pleasure of God, it hath no more force than to signify, that God hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with some men, which we wilingly grant but not with all, neither doth this proposition, enforce any such meaning. And that God hath not entered into a new Covenant with all, I prove by these reasons.

1. As many as are under the Covenant of grace, sin shall have no dominion over them. Rom. 6. 14. Sin shall not have the dominion over you, for you are not under the law but under grace. But sin hath the dominion over too many, even over the most part of the world, as we find by lamentable experience, therefore too many, even the most part of the World, are not comprised under the Covenant of grace.

2. The covenant of Grace, doth covenant on God's part, not only to give salvation upon condition of faith and repentance, but for Christ's sake to renew men's natures also, and to give them faith and repentance. As appears by diverse passages of Scripture: Jer. 31. 31. Behold the days come saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah. v. 32. Not according to the Covenant, that I made with their Fathers, when I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt, the which my Covenant they brake, though I was a Father unto them. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the house of Israel, after those days saith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people.

Ezek. 36. 26. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your bodies, and will give you an heart of flesh, and I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my Statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them. Ezek. 20. 23. I will surely rule you with a mighty hand, &c. 37. And will cause you to pass under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant. Isai. 57. 18. I have seen his ways, and will heal him. Hos. 14. 5. I will heal their rebellions, I will love them freely. And that faith it self and repentance, is the gift of God, who hath taken upon him by his covenant of grace, to be our Lord and our God to sanctify us, is manifest by diverse pregnant passages of holy Scriptures.

2. I come to his second reason. And in that Covenant he requires obedience at men's hands, even at theirs that perish. God in his covenant of Grace requires obedience unto salvation, but of his free grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience; but how? Agreeable unto their rational natures, that is by admonition, instruction, exhortation, that is to work faith and repentance, by exhorting and persuading them unto repentance: And because this he performs by his Ministers, to whom he hath not revealed who they are, whom he hath chosen, therefore he commands them to Preach indifferently unto all, persuade all, exhort all, unto faith and repentance, whereof also he makes this use even towards reprobates, that whereas they are naturally confident of their ability, to do as much as any other, and as Austin saith dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem. The Lord by his Ministry takes from them this excuse, so that unto all that hear is this truth delivered, whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved: and thereupon everyone is exhorted in the name of the Lord to believe and repent. But God resolveth to work faith and repentance in none, but those whom he hath chosen, according to that Acts 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life. And withal the Doctrine delivered in the Gospel is such, and so confirmed, as may justly make them inexcusable that do not believe: when it shall appear, that many a vile legend they are apt to believe, and in the mean time despise God's holy Oracles, by divine Authority, many ways confirmed unto them.

3. It is most true, eternal life is promised to every on that obeyeth and keeps Covenant with God; but God over and above worketh some unto obedience, unto faith and repentance, bestowing these gracious gifts on them, even on whom he will, when he hardeneth others even whom he will. Rom. 9. 18.

4. He punisheth the disobedient with eternal death; true: but according unto what Covenant? Not according unto the Covenant of grace, that is only a Covenant for Salvation, but according unto the Covenant of the law, the Covenant of works.

Whereas herehence this Author infers, that the most free God is engaged to give ability of believing unto men: he may as well infer, that he is engaged to give ability unto men to the keeping of his law, and what need was there of Christ's coming into the world? Seeing by his coming into the world, we have gained no better condition by the Arminian Tenet, than to be saved if we will; and if men have ability to to keep the law even by the law, they may be saved if they will: and it will follow as well, that God, without giving this ability to keep the law, cannot justly punish the transgressors of it; as that God without giving men ability to believe cannot punish men for not believing: no more than a Magistrate having put out a man's eyes for an offense, can command this man with justice to read a book, and because he reads not, put him to death. But this is a very vile simile, and stands in no tolerable proportion to that whereunto it is resembled. For the man thus bereaved of his eyes hath a will to read, and consequently it is no fault for not reading: for all sin is in the will. But it is not so, in not obeying either Law or Gospel. If a man had a will to obey and believe but he could not, in such a case it were unreasonable he should be punished. But in the case of disobedience unto God, we speak of, all the fault is in the will voluntarily and willfully, they neither will obey the one, nor the other: like as they that have accustomed themselves to do evil, cannot do good, as a blackemoore cannot change his skin. Yet with this difference, that man is never a whit the more excusable, or less punishable for not doing that which is good; not so the blackemore, for not changing his skin. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency Moral with impotency natural, as if there were no difference. As wild is the comparison following, of the Masters exacting from his Servant a just employment of that stock, which he hath taken from him. An evil servant may have a will to play the good husband in employing his Masters stock, where he pleased to intrust him with it: But though he hath a will to be faithful and thrifty, yet without matter to work upon, he cannot exercise this fidelity of his to his Masters behoove. Shew the like will in a carnal man to believe if he could, and if God bereave him of power, in such a case, then conclude the unreasonableness of God's courses herein. But if the Master gave him a stock to employ, upon a reasonable rent to be paid him yearly for certain years: if so be the servant wast the stock, Shall it not be lawful for the Master nevertheless to require his debt? And bid him pay that he owes him? This is the case we speak of. In Adam we all have sinned, saith the Apostle, and thereby have wasted that stock of grace which God had given us, and so disabled ourselves to perform that duty we owe to God: What therefore? Shall not God call upon us to pay our debts, because we are become bankrupts? Especially considering the natural man is proud enough of his abilities to perform anything that is good. And as for ability to believe, is there not a kind of faith performed by profane persons, by Hypocrites, who concur with the best in the profession of the Gospel? Nay, Is there not a secret kind of hypocrisy, as when a man thinks his heart is upright towards God, when indeed it is not? Otherwise what should move Saint Paul to call upon the Corinthians to examine themselves whether they were in the faith, saying, Know you not yourselves how that Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates? 2 Car. 13. 5. It is true there is a faith infused by the spirit of God in regeneration; but whoever said that any man was damned, because he doth not believe with such a faith? As much as to say, that non-regeneration is the meritorious cause of damnation. Now how well he hath proved that our Doctrine in the point of absolute reprobation is repugnant to God's justice, let the indifferent judge.

THat God is true, we make no more doubt than that there is a God at all: and that God is as far from hypocrisy as hypocrites are far from him. They that beat their fellow servants, and eat and drink with the drunken, we are taught shall have there portion with hypocrites: and we judge it impossible that God should cherish any such disposition in himself, which he so hates in others. But how God is made untrue and hypocritical in his dealings with men in all (or in any) matters, that concern their eternal estate by our doctrine of Reprobation, more than by our doctrine of election, it is a mystery unto me; whether we consider his commands, his offers of grace and glory, his threats, his passionate wishes and desires of men's chiefest good, and in his expostulations and commiserations also. But come we to examine how learnedly and judiciously this is carried throughout in the particulars.

1. That God commands by his Ministers many to believe and repent, whom he secretly purposeth shall never believe we willingly grant; like as he comanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and yet secretly purposed that he should not sacrifice him. This is evident by the word of God, for both his command given to Abraham to this purpose is there expressed, as also his effectual hindering of Abraham, when he came to the point of sacrifysing him; and look what God did, that he secretly purposed to to do: For he doth all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. Only here is the difference, God commanding Abraham to sacrifice his Son, did positively hinder him from sacrificing Isaac, but God commanding all to hear the Gospel to believe, doth not hinder them from believing, when they are willing to believe. But only refuseth to give them that grace whereby alone their natural infidelity might be cured; according to those words of our Savior, Ye therefore hear them (my words) not, because ye are not of God. John. 8. 47.

Now let every sober man judge, whether God's course be not to be censured for hypocrisy, as well in the one as in the other: yet is this a most trivial argument, and thus usually answered by our Divines, and particularly by Master Perkins. But this author takes no notice of this our common answer, to reply against it, but is content to pretermit it in silence; a manifest evidence that he hath nothing of worth to say against it: for I cannot conceive him to be so ignorant, as not to know this usual answer of our Divines. But let we him proceed in his course. Whom God commands to believe and repent, those he outwardly wills should believe and repent; for by his commands he signifies his will and pleasure, and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or else he dissembles. All this is as congruously appliable to God's commandment given unto Abraham for the sacrificing of Isaac, as to the commandment of believing and repenting given unto any; although there is a vast difference between God's commandment of Sacrificing Isaac, and his commandment of believing. For God himself gave the one immediately, and that to a particular person, Abraham: But God commands his Ministers to preach his Gospel unto all, that are present to hear them, and why? But as he tells Paul. Acts 18. 9. because he hath much people, in the place whereto he sends them, and yet tells them not who those people are, who his elect are and who are not. But they, though thereupon they proceed to Preach unto all without difference, yet so, as aiming at the salvation of the elect. I do all things for all men, saith Saint Paul, 1 Cor. 6. 22. That I may save some; and who are they? Let himself answer, where he saith, I suffer all things for the elects sake; and by the way where he distinguisheth of God's willing outwardly and inwardly, I willingly profess I never read nor heard of it before. God's words and commandments are outward, and uttered by him, but his will is always inward, though it may be, and is signified by his words, and so is his will signified always by his commandments; But what will? Not that such a thing as God commands shall be done, as this Author ignorantly conceives, but that it shall be their duty, (to whom the commandment is given) to do that which is commanded: for if God's will were that such a thing should be done de facto, undoubtedly it should be done and come to pass de facto, for who hath resisted his will? So that here we have a true interpretation of the mind of God by his commandment, to wit, quid ab homine fieri debeat, but no interpretation of any such mind in God, as if fieri vellet, whatsoever he commands. For the case is clear and undeniable that God's will was, that Isaac should not be sacrificed, as well as by his command, to make it Abraham's duty to sacrifice him. The like was the case of Pharaoh to whom the Lord sent a message by Moses to let Israel go: hereupon it was Pharaohs duty to let Israel go, and that upon God's command, God thereby signifying his will to make this act Pharaohs duty; But was it God's will also that Pharaoh should de facto obey, and let Israel go upon this command? If so, why doth God tell Moses that he will harden Pharaohs heart, and that he shall not let Israel go.

Where we have a manifest example of the great difference of the objects of God's will; the one what God's will was, that Pharaoh ought to do; and the other what his will was should be done by him: the letting of Israel go, was that which Pharaoh ought to do by the will of God, but the not letting of Israel go by Pharaoh, was that which God willed should come to pass; And why doth not this Author take boldness to censure these proceedings of the Lord with Pharaoh as hypocritical proceedings? The same spirit will serve the turn for both, though not without betraying as much judgment as honesty. In the like sort, it might be urged of the very elect, as of the reprobate, for the very elect are not always converted at the first hearing of the Gospel, nor till the time God hath appointed for their effectual vocation: yet from their first hearing of the Gospel, this command is made unto them, and thereby is signified God's will that they ought to believe it, yet is it not God's will that they shall believe, and be converted until the time that God hath appointed. That which in my judgment is more to the purpose is this, that by commanding to believe, he supposeth them at least in pretence to be endued with a power to believe; but then say I in like manner, he supposeth them to be indifferent to believe or not to believe, as they will, that is either to yield or else to resist; now this is indifferent to be objected as well against election, as against reprobation: For like as we say it cannot be that the reprobate should believe de facto, so we say it cannot be, that the elect should not belief at that time, de facto, which God hath appointed for their effectual conversion. And what advantage this Author can hence work to himself, I will be ready to take into consideration, as soon as it is offered. So that hitherto I hope, I have freed the divine course maintained by us, from all just imputation of imposture and dissimulation: let him look to it how he can clear his conscience from the impiety of his crimination. I come to the Second.

2. Here those offers of grace and glory, which we ascribe to God, he chargeth with imposture and simulation. But he contents himself with the generality of grace, that is for his best advantage. I will answer to each part. As for glory or salvation, we offer it unto none, (neither do we teach that God makes offer of it unto any) but to such as finally persevere in faith and repentance, according to that, Revelations 3. To him that overcometh, I will give to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his Throne. And be thou faithful unto the death, and I will give thee a Crown of life. And Gal. 6. Be not weary of well doing, for in good time ye shall reap if ye faint not. And accordingly we teach, that it is the will of God, that as many as believe & repent and persevere therein, shall be saved: & no other will of God is signified herein. And if this be true, that God doth will this, and no other thing then this is signified in his offers of glory and salvation.

What color of imposture and dissimulation, doth appear in all this? For glory and salvation, God doth not will that it shall be the portion of any one of ripe years, absolutely but conditionally, to wit, if he repent and believe. And in case all and everyone of the World should believe and repent, all and everyone (how notorious sinners soever they be found) shall be saved; such is the sufficiency of Christ's merits. I say this is true, not of them only, who are invited to the Wedding. Math. 22. Nor of them only, to whom Saint Peter speaketh, Acts 3. 26. Or to them only, of whom our Savior speaketh, Math. 23. 37. But of all and everyone throughout the World: and it is as true, that none of them shall be saved, if they die in infidelity and impenitency, this God himself signifieth to be his will by his promise, Acts 2. 28, 29. on the one part, and on both parts, Mark 16. 16. And as God signifieth this to be his will, so indeed is his will according to our doctrine, and there is no color of imposture or simulation in all this. In like sort as touching the grace of pardon of sin, this also God offers unto all that hear the Gospel, but how? Not absolutely but conditionally, in case they believe and repent; and it is God's will that everyone who believeth, shall have his sin pardoned; none that I know either thinketh or teacheth otherwise, whether he falleth out either to be elect or reprobate; though how to distinguish men according unto this difference I know not, I leave that unto God.

And accordingly as touching the desire and hopes, that hereupon arise in the thoughts of Reprobates, I am nothing acquainted with them, anymore than I am with their persons: as likewise neither am I private to their stirring up of themselves to forsake some pleasing sins, which otherwise they would not part with; and to do some unpleasing duties, which otherwise they would not do: But in general I have read in Austin, that God calleth some (though Reprobates) ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur. But I can hardly believe, that Herod was any one of them, though he did many things at his admonition, because I see a shameful issue, giving way to the cutting off John Baptists head, for the gratifying of a wanton damsel.

Now like as we say, God doth signify his meaning to be, that as many as believe and repent shall have their sins pardoned, and their souls saved: So if it can be proved that there is no such meaning in God, then in my poor judgment it cannot be avoided, but that God must be found halting in his offers. But for my part, I acknowledge such a meaning in God, neither have I to this hour, found any one of our Divines either by word or writing to have denied this to be the meaning of God: and I wonder what this Author means after this manner to carry himself in the clouds of generalities; and whether it be through silliness, or maliciousness I am to seek: but if I may be so bold as to guess, I think the root of all this his superficiary discourse is the confounding of absolute Reprobation with absolute Damnation, and in like sort absolute election with salvation absolute: for as for pardon of sin, and salvation, we acknowledge them to be bestowed on men of ripe years conditionally; and as God bestows them, so also he decreed to bestow them (we say) conditionally, to wit, in case they believe and repent: but in case they believe and repent not, damnation is their portion, and that by the decree of God. But as touching the gift of faith and repentance, these we maintain to be given of God absolutely, according to the mere pleasure of his will: and accordingly denied unto others, as the Apostle signifieth, saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. But this Author meddles not hither to with these gifts, but keeps himself to the graces of pardon of sin, and of salvation, which God bestows conditionally; and signifies his meaning to be, to bestow them conditionally, namely, in case they believe and repent, and not otherwise, and such indeed we maintain to have been his meaning, and that from everlasting. So that in all this there is no color of imposture or simulation. But in that which followeth, he stealeth upon the grace of faith it self; let us see how clearly, and with what felicity he carrieth himself, and whether it be not answerable to his former carriage which he continueth throughout.

Zanchi (he saith) tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think he is elected; but why doth he not speak out and say, that everyone is bound (in the opinion of Zanchi) to believe that he is elected, as formerly he related it. I grant that to believe is to think, for credere, is defined to be cum assensione cogitare, but thoughts he knows are very wild, they have their course in dreams; as a hungry man may dream that he eateth and drinketh, but when he awaketh, his soul is empty. And as for that doctrine of Zanchi, I have already given a fair interpretation of it, upon consideration that he speaks it of election not unto faith, but unto salvation: and seeing God hath manifested in his word his determination to give salvation to everyone that believeth, it followeth herehence, that everyone is bound to believe, that as many as do believe shall be saved: and consequently everyone that heareth the Gospel is bound to believe, That God hath determined to bestow Salvation on him, in case he be found to believe. The like construction may be given of Bucer's Doctrine; namely, that God hath predestinated him to obtain Salvation in case he believe, not otherwise. For God hath not predestinated any man of ripe years to obtain Salvation, whether he believe or not. And seeing God hath plainly professed that whosoever believeth shall be saved. Mar. 16. 16. If I do not accordingly believe, that God hath predestinated me to obtain salvation in case I do believe, I do hereby make God to delude me in saying Whosoever believeth shall be saved. And whereas this Author upon the back of this addeth, that a man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation is but deluded; and that this is the necessary result of our speeches. All the color of this his inference, depends merely upon confusion of things that differ. For he distinguisheth not between absolute predestination unto salvation, and predestination unto salvation absolute: likewise he distinguisheth not between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation absolute: neither doth he distinguish between predestination unto faith, and predestination unto salvation; nor between reprobation from faith, and reprobation unto damnation. And the absoluteness of predestination appears only in predestination unto faith, not in predestination unto salvation. For salvation being bestowed on none of ripe years, but by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good works; hence it follows, that God predestinates none unto salvation of ripe years, but by way of reward of their obedience. But as for predestination unto faith, it is clear, that God purposeth absolutely to bestow faith on whom he will. So on the other side damnation being inflicted on none, but for sin God hath destinated no man unto damnation but for sin. But as touching obduration, like as God hardeneth whom he will, so he decreed to proceed herein, to wit, in hardening of men according to the mere pleasure of his will, that is, absolutely. Now let us not suffer a cauteriate conscience, to smother a plain truth, with the confusion of those things which are to be distinguished. Absolute is opposed to conditionate; and this distinction applied to God's will is to be understood not quoad actum volentis, sed quoad res volitas; as for example, God decrees that a man shall be saved upon condition of faith, this is called voluntas conditionata, so oVssius expounds it. Hist. Pelag. lib. 7. p. 638. his words are these, Aliqua vult cum conditione, quae idcirco in effectum non prodeunt nisi conditione impletâ. Some things (God) willeth with a condition, which come not unto effect, but upon the fulfilling of the condition; this is plainly understood, not of the act of willing, but of the things willed, which he calls aliqua, and the instance he gives us is this, quo modo omnes homines salvari vult, sed per & propter Christum fide apprehensum, after which manner he will have all to be saved, but by and for Christ apprehended by faith; where faith is plainly made the condition of salvation, not of God's will; yet this will of God, he calls forthwith a conditionate will, and that according to the ancients, in these words, de hac conditionatâ illâ Dei voluntate extant longe plurima apud veteres Scriptores. By which it is manifest, that voluntas conditionata, is by Vossius so called, and in his opinion by the ancients, not on the part of God willing, as if there were any condition thereof, which Bradwardine hath disproved as a thing impossible well near 200 years ago; but on the part of the things willed by God; now the things willed by God are either absolutely so willed, or conditionally; as for example, pardon of sin and salvation, are only conditionally willed by God: to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance, but as for the gift of faith and repentance, they are willed by God to be bestowed absolutely, to wit, according to the mere pleasure of God's will, hence it followeth that the will of God to confer salvation, is only voluntas coditionata, and denominates not a man absolutely predestinated, but only conditionally, still understanding it not quod actum volentis, but quoad res volitas, as Vossius himself interprets it, and that according to the ancients. In like sort the will of God to inflict damnation, is a conditionate will according to the same construction that Vossius makes of a will conditionate, according to the Fathers; and denominates not a man absolutely reprobated, but only conditionally. Now this being the will that Zanchi and Bucer speak of, most preposterously doth this Author shape a man hereupon, to be termed an absolute predestinate, or an absolute reprobate: For in this respect, like as the will of God in this case, is accounted not absoluta but conditionata, so the person denominated hereby, in all equity is to be accounted, not predestinated absolutely, but conditionally, nor reprobated absolutely but conditionally. But in respect of another will of God, I willingly confess, one may be accounted predestinate absolutely, and another reprobated absolutely, to wit, in respect of the will of giving the grace of faith and repentance unto one, and denying it to another: And that because faith and repentance are not given and denied upon any condition, but absolutely, according to the mere pleasure of God; as we are ready to maintain. But herehence no species of contradiction ariseth, for like as it is no contradiction to say that God willeth absolutely unto Paul the grace of faith and repentance, and conditionally willeth unto him and everyone salvation, to wit, upon condition of faith and repentance: In like sort, there is no contradiction to say, that the same man is predestinated absolutely unto faith, and conditionally unto salvation: In like sort it may be said without all contradiction, that the same man is both reprobated absolutely from faith, and yet reprobated conditionally from glory unto condemnation. And lastly, in like manner, there is no contradiction to say, that the same man is predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation; and yet absolutely reprobated from faith: especially seeing it is all one, to be predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation, and conditionally to obtain damnation: For he that is ordained to be saved in case he believe, is therewithal ordained to be damned in case he believe not: The ground whereof is, that of our Savior Whosoever believeth shall be saved, whosoever believeth not shall be damned. Now if God may both will unto a man salvation conditionally, to wit, upon condition he believeth, and yet withal will the denial of faith absolutely unto him, without all contradiction, (as I have already proved) it followeth, that without all contradiction, a man may be said both to be predestinated to obtain salvation conditionally, viz. In case he do believe, and so to be predestinated absolutely, to be hardened, or to have the grace of faith denied him. So that this Authors conclusion depends merely upon confusion of different denominations of a man said to be absolutely, or conditionally predestinated: which may be in respect of different things whereto he is predestinated, to the one absolutely, to the other conditionally, and consequently without all contradiction. For he that is absolutely reprobated from the grace of faith, may yet be conditionally predestinated unto salvation. For to be conditionally predestinated unto salvation, is to be conditionally predestinated unto damnation, and what sober man will say, that there is any contradiction in this, to say, that the same man is both conditionally reprobated unto damnation, and absolutely reprobated from faith. Faith being such a gift of God, that like as God absolutely bestows it on some, so as absolutely he denies it to others. But as for condemnation, that is inflicted on none but for sin, like as salvation is bestowed on none of ripe years, but as a reward of obedience. In like manner God decreed not either to bestow the one, or inflict the other but conditionally, to wit, upon condition of faith on the one side, and upon condition of infidelity on the other. Now if such confusion be committed in these denominations of the predestinate and reprobate, absolutely and conditionally, on the part of things willed by God, as namely in respect of grace and glory on the one side, and in respect of the denial of grace and glory, together with inflicting of damnation on the other; How much more must this confusion be augmented, if not only different things willed by God (as before mentioned) are confounded, but over and above the act of God's will is confounded with things willed by him. For as for the act of God's will, that it admitts no condition, I have formerly demonstrated by diverse arguments; one whereof, and that invincible, is this; If sin be the cause or condition of God's will, or decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature (as all confess,) nor (say I) can it be by any constitution of God, as I prove thus; If by the constitution of God, then God hath ordained that upon the foresight of sin, he will ordain men unto salvation; where the eternal ordination of God, is made the object of God's eternal ordination; a thing utterly impossible, it being apparent that nothing can be the object of God's eternal ordination or decree, but things temporal. The similitude whereby he illustrates, not his conclusion, but the pretended absurdity of our doctrine, is most aliene. For God is not like unto a creditor, Who resolves upon no terms to forgive his debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet makes offer to remit the whole debt upon some conditions. For as God hath professed that whosoever believeth shall be saved, so; Hath not God resolved that whosoever believeth shall be saved? Was ever any of our Divines known to deny this? But herein they join issue with their adversaries, as the Contra-Remonstrants did with the Remonstrants, namely, in maintaining that this is not the whole decree of predestination; But that there is another decree of predestination besides this; namely, that God over and above hath determined to bestow faith on some. So on the other side, none of our Divines were ever known to deny, that God hath decreed, that whosoever believes not shall be damned; but further they profess, that this is not the whole decree of reprobation, but that there is another decree concerning reprobation besides this, namely, that God hath over and above decreed to deny some the grace of faith, and that absolutely. Now whereas he saith, we maintain that God hath irrevocably decreed not to save some, whom he promiseth that he will save if they believe; Is he well in his wits, for charging us with that, by way of crimination, which no understanding Divine among the Arminians themselves dare deny? I mean as touching the point of God's irrevocable decree. For what Arminian hath dared in plain terms to profess, that God's decrees are of a revocable nature? Whereas the mere prescience of God, is sufficient to make them irrevocable; How much more if God's prescience be grounded upon his decree? as indeed there is no other ground imaginable, without falling upon manifest Atheism. But whereas he fashioneth our Doctrine, so as if we said, that God hath decreed at no hand to save them, to whom he promiseth salvation upon condition of faith; this is a notorious untruth, and such as implieth manifest contradiction: For to say he hath resolved at no hand to save them, is as much as to say, that he hath resolved to save them on no condition. But if he hath promised to save them in case they believe, undoubtedly he hath resolved, to save them upon condition of faith. Only God's resolution to save them, is not held in suspense, considering that from everlasting, he well knew who would believe, and who would not; and therefore he knew this, because he purposed to grant faith unto the one, and deny it unto the other. So that in all this cry, we have little wool, no substance of any sound proof, but mere clamours and miserable confusion; as God sees how well it becomes him to smite them with the spirit of confusion, that build Babel of their own invention, and oppose the truth, the precious truth of his sovereignty over his creatures, and of the prerogative of his free grace, to have mercy on whom he will, like as he shows his power in hardening whom he will, and in smiting with giddiness whom he will.

3. In the next place, we are to hear how God, by our Doctrine in his threats and comminations is hollow, and unsincere. I willingly grant these are always denounced against actual sins, as also that the sins for which men go to hell, are actual sins, if they live to be conscious of actual transgressions. But if God have decreed men to hell for original sin, then God (saith he) is not true, and so not sincere. This is utterly unconsequent; For God can manifest his pleasure otherwise than by his threatenings. Of the Sodomites it is said, they suffer the vengeance of eternal fire; and Infants perished therein, as well as men of ripe years: And the Apostle plainly saith, that we have all sinned in Adam, and that the wages of sin is death, without distinction; and that all are borne children of wrath, and therefore as many as die in that condition, die children of wrath. And whence hath this Author learned, that the sin of Adam hath brought upon us the guilt of eternal death, as formerly he hath professed: but if I be not deceived, this extends farther than to Infants, and in as much as some of our Divines conceive the corrupt mass, to be the object of reprobation, hereupon he conceits, they make God to damn all Reprobates for original sin; whereas their doctrine is no other than this, that God determines to damn every man for no other sins, but such wherein they die unrepented of, whether they be original or actual. Threatenings are denounced unto all to this end, that men may know, that by continuing in sin without repentance there is no hope of mercy, and therefore as they desire to be saved, it is there duty to break them off by repentance: And in particular unto some that by this consideration, God may bring them unto repentance. But these are only God's elect, but as for others God never brings unto them true repentance, according to that of S. Austin, Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiriitalem{que} poenitentiam qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem praebeat. Yet God ordains no man of ripe years unto destruction but for sin finally continued in, without repentance; and the threatening of damnation signifies no other thing but this, that if they repent not, they shall be damned, which is most true to whomsoever it is pronounced; and this dealing of God is plain enough. But these Divines would not have faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, but the works of men's free-wills, that so they might be their own crafts-men of their salvation.

GOD (he saith) by our Doctrine, is made full of guile in his passionate wishes, that even these men might repent, that repent not. The guile I guess consists in this, that God hereby makes show, that he would have them to repent, when yet indeed, he hath no such will. To this I answer, that by the same reason he might conclude, that God carrieth himself with guile, in taking unto himself eyes, and ears, and hands, and heart, for hereby he makes show that he hath the members of a man. But to this we answer, that this show is only unto them that understand that properly, which is to be taken figuratively: so that it is not the word of God, so much as the weakness of men in understanding it, that casts this color. For these things indeed, are spoken only per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is a metaphorical kind of speech. And if God takes liberty to conform himself to the members of our body, may not he take as great liberty to conform himself to the passions of our minds, and to assume unto him, the passions of fear, wrath, and jealousy, joy, sorrow, and such like? Isai. 63. 8. For he said surely they are my people, Children that will not lie, so he was their Savior: yet what followeth in the next verse save one: But they rebelled and vexed his holy spirit. According to the course of this Divines superficial consideration, a man might conceive, that God is subject to error, and improvidence, as well as man; for God said surely they will not lie, but it appeared by the event, that they did lie. So that hereupon we are driven to conclude, that the former passage is delivered per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in conformity to a man's judgment, who promiseth unto himself better obedience from his child for the time to come, then afterwards he finds. In like sort, God in his passionate wishes, conforms himself to the condition of man, who useth this sometimes, as a means to work impression upon his child, to be more careful to order his conversation towards his parents. And this being apt to work upon a child, though but naturally ingenuous, why may not God use this course? nay if he should not use this course, he could not be said to do all for his vineyard, that could be done, in the way of outward husbandry. So that passionate wishes, are but a passionate kind of exhortation; God through us doth beseech you (saith Paul) we pray you in Christ's stead, to be reconciled unto God. 2 Cor. 5. 20. Yet nevertheless the same Apostle professeth that the Gospel was a savor of death unto death to some, 2 Cor. 2. 15. Now the Gospel includes all these and such like pathetical admonitions; And hereby God doth effectually signify, how much he delights in the obedience of the creature, and in the glorifying of his mercy in their salvation. But yet this mercy of God, in giving the grace of obedience, is not shown indifferently towards all, but only to some, even whom the Lord will. Rom. 9. 18. And this consideration drives us to interpret such passionate wishes not properly, but figuratively. For whereas the Lord saith, Deut. 5. 29. Oh that there were such an heart in them to fear me. Who can deny but that God could give them such an heart, if it pleased him? And the same Moses professeth of these very people of Israel, that God had not given them such an heart for the space of 40 years. Deut. 29. 4. you have seen the great temptations and signs; But the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day, and Jerem. 32. 40. He makes promise of giving it to some; I will put my fear in their heart, that they shall never depart away from me. In like sort whereas the Lord saith, Isai. 48. 18. Oh that thou hadst hearkened unto my commandments. Psal. 81. 13. Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! who doubts but that it was in the power of God, to work them hereunto, by boring their ears, and circumcising them, by regenerating them, and so making them to be borne of God; that so being of God, they might hear his words. John 8. 47. As also to put his own spirit within them, and cause them to walk in his statutes, and keep his judgments and do them: Ezek. 36. 27.

2. In his expostulations, in that, Isai. 5. 3. What could I have done more for my vineyard? What doth this signify more, than that more could not be done? But how? In the way of outward Husbandry, conforming himself to an husbandman, that hath planted a vineyard. For can it be denied, but that God could have made them fruitful, had it pleased him: and though Paul plants and Apollo watereth, yet, Is it not God's peculiar office to give the increase? Is it not he that worketh in us every good thing that is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Heb. 13. 21. Is not he both the Author and finisher of our faith? Was it not he that gave repentance unto Israel; Acts 5. 31. And to the Gentiles. Acts 11. 18. And must we not wait with our hearers, if so be God may give them repentance? 2 Tim. 2. 25. And as for that of Jerem. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornament, or a Bride her attire, yet my people have forgotten me. And have I been a Wilderness unto Israel, or a land of darkness. Is not this exprobration of their unthankfulness just, and without guile, unless God do actually change all their hearts. Yet this might be a means and also was, and is, and ever shall continue to be a means to bring God's people to repentance. And undoubtedly the worst of them, had power to have abstained from many of those foul sins, yea from all of them, wherewith God doth upbraid them; albeit to abstain from any sin in a gracious manner, be a work of God's special grace, which he affords not, according to men's works (which way tends all this eager but superficiary discourse) but according to his own purpose and grace. 3. Hosea 11. 8. God represents as it were a conflict within him, between his mercy and justice; and his mercy hath the glory of the day; But wherein? To spare them, though their sins deserved at his hands, that he should make them as Adma and Zeboim, as Sodom and Gomorrah. He would rather show himself to be as he is, God, and and not Man; And wherein? But in this, man may pardon his enemy, but cannot change his heart, it is otherwise with God, he can both pardon our sins, and change our hearts, and to this purpose he becomes our Lord and our God, and walks in the midst of us, as the holy one of Israel, to sanctify us, as it followeth in the same place of Hosea, v. 10. They shall walk after the Lord, he shall roar like a Lyon, viz. In such expostulations, comminations, &c. but the issue shall be gracious; for when he shall rear, then the children of the West shall fear, that is fear unto him, as Hos. 3. 5. That is, come flying unto him, and to his goodness with fear: like Birds scared from one place, fly with greater speed to another: so conscience affrighted with sense of sin, and apprehension of God's wrath, shall fly from his wrath, unto his mercy, to his goodness: whereof God shall make unto them a full representation in David their King, that is in Christ, as in whom we behold the glory of God's grace with open face, and trepidare in Latin, is found to be of the same signification with festinare. And v. 11. Is manifested as much, as where it is said, They shall fear as a sparrow out of Egypt, and as a Dove out of the land of Egypt; and I will place them in their houses, saith the Lord. That is, come flying unto the Lord with fear. As for that Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem, how oft would I: &c. This is of another nature, as being delivered by Christ the son of God, made under the Law, who, as in his manhood, he might entertain such desires in proper speech, so by the Law of God, was bound to desire the conversion of his brethren, as well as any other Prophet, or man of God, or minister of his word. But such confusion becomes this discourse right well.

In all this (he saith) there is little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution, that the most of these, towards whom those wishes, chidings, and commiserations are used, shall be unavoidably damned. But what if but one of them, towards whom these are used, by a secret resolution shall be unavoidably damned, is there sincerity enough in these courses divine? Sureif this resolution, concerning the unavoidable damnation of the one, doth not prejudice God's sincerity, neither shall such a resolution concerning the damnation of two, or of two hundred, or thousands, or the most, any way prejudice sincerity divine. But this kind of discourse, is spread all over this Treatise, like a scab only to work upon vulgar affection, where judgment is wanting to observe the frothy condition of it. And whereas he saith that in all this God aliud animo vult aliud verbis significat, its most untrue, as to everyone should be made manifest, according to the right understanding of it, had he been pleased to accommodate it severally, and show what that is, which God signifies by his word, and what that is, which he willeth in his heart. And indeed, as in the point of God's commandment, I have shown there is no color of contradiction between it, and God's purpose, but only according to this Authors superficiary interpretation. For to command a thing, is only to will, that it shall be our duty to do it: notwithstanding which, it is apparent, God may purpose not to give grace to work the doing of it. So in everyone of the rest, had he instanced as it became him, and shown wherein the guile consisted, the absurdity of this crimination might have been made as manifest as in this. That which he conceals, and which he would have his readers rather take to themselves, than show himself clearly to stand to the maintenance thereof, seems to be this; that everyone hath power given him to believe, to repent, to change his heart, yea to regenerate himself, but it sticks in his teeth, and he dares not speak it out plainly. Only he keeps himself to God's resolution, concerning man's unavoidable damnation; yet we maintain not that any contingent things come to pass unavoidably, that were utterly against the nature of a contingent thing, which is to come to pass, so as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass. And as for damnation in particular, we acknowledge it throughout, to be avoydable by repentance, and not otherwise, unto men of ripe years: And as for repentance, we say, that there is no man but may repent as long as he lives, through grace: so that in the issue the main point to be debated herein is, whether every man living hath such a grace given him as whereby he may repent. But upon this point though his whole discourse be grounded thereupon, yet is he content to say just nothing; least their shameful and most unconscionable courses in dishonoring the grace of God, should be discovered and brought to light. But consider in a word or two as touching this universal grace, which they make to consist in the enabling of the will, to will any goodthing whereunto they shall be excited. If such a grace be universal, then everyone hath power to believe, and power to repent. But this is untrue, for the Apostle telleth us of some, that they cannot repent. Rom. 2. 4. of the natural man, that he cannot discern the things of God; and that they are foolishness unto him; and while they seem foolishness unto him, is it possible that therein he should discern the wisdom of God? 1 Cor. 2. 14. our Savior tells us of some, that they cannot believe: John. 12. 46. and tells others to their face, saying, How can you believe, when ye receive honor one of another, and seek not the honor that comes from God only, John. 5. 44. Likewise of them that are in the flesh Saint Paul saith, They cannot please God. Rom. 8. 8. 2. It is the habit of faith that enables us to believe, so that if all men have power to believe, it must be confessed, that all men have faith, but the Apostle saith, Fides non est omnium; 2 Thes. 3. 2. Tit. 1. 1. he saith it is electorum; like as Austin professeth Habere fidem, sicut & habere charitatem gratiae est fidelium: de praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. 3. Whosoever hath power to prduce a vital act, hath life in him; and consequently, whosoever hath power to produce any act of the life of grace, hath the life of grace in him: But the acts of faith and repentance, are the acts of the life of grace, therefore whosoever hath power to produce these, hath in him the life of grace. But this is not true of all, for the Scripture testifies of some, that they are dead in sin. Ephes. 2. 1. Are strangers from the life of God. Ephes. 4. 18. Again, then all should be regenerated, but that is untrue, for regeneration is signified, Psal. 19. in Scripture to be wrought by the word of God. 1 Peter. 1. 23. I am. 1. 17. But all have not the word of God. 4. If a man hath power to believe and repent, then the reason why a man doth not believe and repent, is not because he cannot, but because he will not; so that in the issue it comes to this, that a man may believe if he will, repent if he will; But such a power is not grace, but nature rather, as appears by Austin. l. 1. de Gtnesi contra Manich. cap. 3. where he professeth, that omnes possunt credere si velint: now compare this, with that he hath in the same place, where though he saith that omnes credere possint si velint, yet posse credere, simply taken, ariseth merely out of the gift of charity; which he professeth to be gratiae fidelium, de praedest. Sanct. c. 5. But there he professeth that posse habere fidem, is naturae hominum, the very natural condition of all men. I farther prove it by reason thus; Look by what power I can believe if I will, by the same power I can refuse to believe if I will; Now such a power is no other, then whereby a man is indifferent to do good or evil: but such a condition is not grace; for grace is goodness, now goodness doth not dispose any, either to good or evil indifferently, but precisely to that which is good; like as naughtiness disposeth a man only to that which is evil.

He sleeps so sweetly upon his Arminian pillow, that his very dreams make him confident of the evidence of his deductions. And he gives reasons for it, and that of most force for conviction, namely the confession of his adversaries; the maintainers of absolute reprobation, for even they, he saith, do not deny this, but ascribe unto God sanctam simulationem, duplicem personam, duplicem voluntatem. But he names none, content to sing to himself & his Muses throughout, when he relats what our sides answer to his profound discourses. And I commend his wisdom more then his honesty in this, for if he had quoted his Authors herein, it may be something might have been discovered that would be little pleasing unto him: yet herein he confounds things much different; for as for a double will ascribed unto God, all the Learned do acknowledge so much, and the Scriptures testify it; as namely, that his decree is called the will of God: as, what the Lord willeth, that hath he done, both in heaven and in earth, and who hath resisted his will? as also that God's commandment is called usually the will of God, as, This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that everyone should know how to possess his vessel in holiness, and honor, and not in the lust of concupiscence, as the Gentiles do which know not God. 1 Thes. 4. 4, 5. as for duplicem personam, that is a phrase which I never read before, yet the phrase of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is usually in the Holy Scripture, as when God takes unto him both the members of a man's body, and the passions of his mind; and so speaks in the way of condescension to our infirmities, as to put upon himself the person of a man: and this is undeniable by all that are not Anthropomorphites. And as touching our blessed Savior, we acknowledge in him duplicem naturam, a double nature, though not duplicem personam, a double person, and accordingly sometimes, he both speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as touching the nature of his God-head, and sometimes as touching the nature of his Man-hood. As for the first, that alone is material to his present purpose, namely, as touching Sancta Simulatio, ascribed unto God by our Divines. Now it were worth the while to know who is his Author in this, and that of the passages alleged by this Author, doth profess that they do represent in God an holy kind of simulation: How could he expect that this should give any satisfaction, seeing he conceals the Author of it? And what reader would not be moved, with a very greedy desire to know the Author of such an interpretation of the passages alleged by this. Divine, that he might consider whether it be rightly alleged or no; and if rightly, with what sobriety they deliver it? Now I remember well to have read in