Discovery of Jacksons Vanity

CHAP. XIIII.

YOur theme runs in an indefinite current as touching the object of God's love; but it appears by your discourse ensuing, that you have a farther reach, and do extend this love of God towards all and everyone. For by the last clause of the first section it appears, that you conceive the notion of love infinite to bespeak as much, namely, that therefore it must extend to all and everyone. And this reason of yours is soon dispatched, in less then two lines; all the rest of your first section is wide enough from the mark you shoot at, and yet unsound enough in many particulars. First you maintain that blessing and cursing both cannot proceed out of the mouth of God. Secondly, that God is the author of being to all, and therefore loves all. Thirdly, that in as much as he gives being to all, he loves all. For he hateth nothing that he hath made. All these I will examine in their order.

Touching the first, you begin with the authority of St. James, Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren, these things ought not so to be. And he doth illustrate it with similitudes drawn from natural things, as from a fountain that sends not forth at the same place sweet water and bitter: and from trees, which bring forth proper fruit only, according to their kind: Can the fig tree bear Olive berries, or the Vine figs? And you seem to conceive that these reasons of the Apostle, as you call them, (which indeed are but illustrations) have more force to prevail, then the Apostles authority; for thus you write, If the Apostles authority could not persuade us to believe, his reasons would enforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and though same mouth are contrary to the course of nature, and argue the nature of man to be much out of tune. Herein I am not of your mind. I am rather of Abraham's mind. If they will not believe Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe, though a man rise from the dead. And yet a man rising from the dead, were as fit to make faith of the state of the dead (in my judgment) as these illustrations (secluding S. James his authority,) are of force to prove, that it becomes not a man out of the same mouth to send forth blessing and cursing. For fountains send forth water, and trees bring forth fruit by necessity of nature: But man speaks by freedom of will; and as a man may be induced to curse, so in case he curseth, and be challenged for it by a brother, he may answer as David did unto his brethren, And what have I now done? is there not a cause? For if all curses were causeless, Solomon would never have told us, that The curse which is causeless shall not come. I never yet read of any that censured Elisha for cursing the children that mocked him, saying, Come up thou bald head, come up thou bald head; and indeed it is said, He cursed them in the name of the Lord. And yet this curse of his had a very bloody issue, two Bears coming out of the wood, and tearing forty two of them. And in the book of Judges the Angel of the Lord bids the people curse Meroz. Curse ye Meroz, saith the Angel of the Lord; curse ye bitterly the inhabitants of Meroz, because they came not to help the Lord, to help the Lord against the mighty. And as curses may have their due course, so blessings may be causeless. For as for him that blesseth himself in his heart, when he heareth the word of God's curse, saying, I shall have peace though I walk after the stubbornness of my heart, herein he doth but add drunkenness unto thirst, and the Lord will not be merciful to that man. And if some do sin in blessing themselves, how much more do others sin in blessing idols? We well know that out of our Savior's mouth came forth cursings sometimes, as well as blessings at other times. For he cursed the fig tree, and anon it withered. And therefore it were fit to distinguish between cursings and cursings, yea and between blessings and blessings, lest otherwise we confound truth and error, good and evil.

And to this purpose I think fit to distinguish between cursing as it signifies only the pronouncing of a curse; and cursing, as it signifieth cursed speaking. And S. James, as I take it, speaks of cursing as it signifies cursed speaking, and not as it signifies the bare pronunciation of a curse, which may be done without cursed speaking, and in an holy manner, as when our Savior cursed the fig tree, and Elisha the children that mocked him, moved undoubtedly thereunto extraordinarily by the Spirit of God. Like as when profane persons bless themselves, and superstitious persons bless their idols, their actions are unholy enough, and do bring the curse of God upon their persons. For they shall multiply sorrow upon their heads that run after other gods. Now S. James useth fit similitudes to illustrate this duty of blessed speaking, and to move them to refrain from cursed speaking: considering that God's Spirit is as a fountain of holy life in their hearts; and therefore they should send forth nothing but sweet water, not indifferently either sweet water only, or bitter water only, but sweet water, and that only. And seeing they are trees of righteousness, of the Lord's planting, that he may be glorified: therefore to bring forth nothing but good fruit, but that of divers kinds, like unto that tree of life, that bare twelve manner of fruits, and gave fruit every month.

And yet if sometimes they break forth into cursed speaking, it is the less strong, considering they are in part carnal, and but in part, spiritual; and therefore in part out of tune, though nothing like so much as they were in state of nature; when they sent forth nothing but bitter water, neither blessing their brethren, nor God; no nor themselves neither. Not one of these instances, say you, but holds as truly in God as in man. He being the tree of life, cannot bring forth death. To cause the vine to bring forth figs, were not so hard a point of husbandry, as to derive cursedness or misery from the fountain of bliss. For a spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, is more competible, then for hateful and harmful intentions, to have any issue from pure love. But God is love, yea love is his essence as Creator. Why do you not speak plainly, and tell us, that out of God's mouth cannot proceed blessing and cursing? Yet the Lord protesteth to Abraham, saying, Blessed shall he be that blesseth thee, and cursed shall he be that curseth thee: And tells the Jews to their face, that he would curse their blessings. Yea, that he had cursed them already. And equally and indifferently, as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient, so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient: and therefore calls heaven and earth to witness, that he hath set before them, life and death, blessing and cursing. So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God, as the Author of them, like as life and blessing; and both are in due proportion to the behavior of man, as it is found, either in the way of obedience, or in the way of disobedience. And in this respect perhaps you may say, that man is the cause of cursing, & not God. To this I answer; 1. By the same reason, man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing, and not God. 2. If in this respect, cursing be to be derived from sin, it is only in the way of a meritorious cause; so doth not fruit proceed from trees, but only in the way of an efficient cause. God, and none but God can be the Author, as of happiness, so of misery, as of eternal life, so also of everlasting death. And as none is truly blessed, but whom God blesseth; so none is truly accursed, but whom God curseth. Yet no man, I think, that hath his wits in his head, will say, that this cursing proceedeth from God's love, but rather from his hatred. God's love towards the creature is essential, his love to the creature is not so, no more then to be a creator, is of God's essence. And love is no more of God's essence as a Creator, then hatred is of God's essence as a revenger. And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alleged, belong to God only as a Judge, to execute the one by way of reward, and the other by way of punishment. Albeit there is another course of God's blessing and of his cursing, though you love not to distinguish, but to consound rather; as all that maintain bad causes, love darkness rather then light.

I come to the second point, wherein you insist, In that he is the Author of being, he is the Author of goodness to all things that are. And this is very true; for, God saw all that he had made, and lo it was very good. And as it is very true, so it is nothing at all to the purpose. For when we inquire, whether God's love be extended towards all and everyone, we presuppose their beings in their several times and generations. And secondly, we speak of a love proper to mankind, which consisteth not in giving them their being; for, God hath given being unto Angels, even unto Devils as well as unto men; and as to men, so to all inferior creatures, be they never so noisome and offensive unto man. And it is a strange course of yours, to magnify the love of God to man, in giving him being, which is found in the basest creature that breathes, or breathes not. I have heard a story of a great Prince, when one of the prime subjects of the land, being taken in a foul act of insurrection, and yielding upon condition to be brought to speak with that Prince, presuming of ancient favor, whereof he had tasted in great measure, and which upon his presence might haply revive, he found nothing answerable, but imperious ta • ts rather, and dismission in this manner, Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad. Yet you magnify the love of God to mankind in as comfortable manner, when you say that hoe hath given us being, which we well know God hath given to lions, rigers, and beasts of prey; yea, to snakes and adders, to frogs and toads, and fiery serpents.

Herehence you proceed to the third point, and do infer, That because he hath made us, therefore he loveth us; for, He hateth nothing that he hath made, as saith the wise man: and to give the greater credit to the authority alleged by you, you use an introduction of strange state; for you say, The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive, nor be deceived, that, He hateth nothing that he hath made, But to what purpose tends all this pomp? Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all, and can neither deceive nor be deceived? May not fools speak of him, that can neither deceive nor be deceived, as well as wise men, and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this? If the author of that sentence had been such a one, as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived, then indeed the sentence had been of greatest authority, and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Jew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull, & take the author of it for such a one, as could neither deceive nor be deceived? If you did, this were very foul play, and no better then a trick of conicatching. Yet we except not against the sentence, but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours, taken from the same ground, above two hundred years ago.

You shall find it in Aquinas his sums, where his first objection is this; Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim reprobate, quem diligit: sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt, & nihil odisti eorum quae secisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobate. It seems that God reprobates no man. For, no man reprobates him whom he loveth. But God loves every man according to that, Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing that thou hast made. Therefore God reprobateth no man. And the answer he makes unto this objection followeth in this manner, Adprimum dicendum, quod Deus omnes homines diliget, & etiam omnes creaturas, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare. To the first is to be answered, that God loves all men, yea, and all creatures, for as much as he willeth some good to them all: but yet he willeth not every good to all. There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good, which is life everlasting, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them. And you might have been pleased to take notice, not only of that wise man (though as wise as Philo) who speaks herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived, but of that wise God, who is wiser then men and Angels, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, and affirmeth openly, that He hath loved Jacob and hated Esau; as also of the Apostle Saint Paul, who by the infallible direction of God's Spirit, applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne. And if to inflict the torments of hell upon these, or these for their sins be to hate them; surely to intend to inflict the torments of hell upon them for their sins, is to hate them. And seeing God from everlasting intended to do whatsoever he doth in time, it followeth, that from everlasting he did hate them.

Yet this truth you dare secretly to outface, without taking any notice of it. But here you argue; well, let us consider it; For men to bless God and to curse men, doth argue a dissolution of that internal harmony which should be in the human nature: therefore for God to hate some men, and to love others, would necessarily infer a greater distraction in the indivisible essence, besides the contradiction which it implies to infinite goodness. This latter clause is thrust in to make weight, and to turn the scale, but being nothing save mere breath and air, makes it rather lighter. Like as when the Spaniard to make his state weigh as much as the state of France, and finding that Spain and other places would not serve the turn, clapt in Millane and Naples into the balance, whereupon it was found well the lighter. Yet I am content to consider that also in its turn. But first of the argument. My answer hereunto is twofold: First, as touching the antecedent; I say, and have already shown, that the passage of James, whereat you aim, proceeds of cursing, only as it signifies cursed speaking, not as it signifies the pronouncing of a curse, which may be in an holy manner, it being clear, that both God and man; both God the Father, and God the Son, may, and have pronounced curses in an holy manner, without giving evidence of any dissolution of that internal harmony which should be in them; and yet such a dissolution is to be acknowledged to have its place more or less in the best of men in this world, for they have flesh in them as well as spirit, but neither is nor can be in God. Secondly, I deny the consequence; for, it doth not follow, that, because it is not lawful for man to curse, therefore it is not lawful for God to curse. Are not Devils accursed? At the day of judgment shall not our Savior pronounce that sentence on thousands, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire? And why should this argue any distraction in God, more then in a Judge that absolveth some, and condemneth others? So our Savior at the day of judgment will say unto some, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire: unto others, Come ye blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. If you do not speak of blessing and cursing in the way of execution of judgment and reward, what mean you to walk thus in the cloud of generalities? If you speak not of execution, but of intention: as God doth execute judgments for sin, and rewards of obedience; so doth he from everlasting intend both the one and the other, as it is impossible it should be otherwise. Your self acknowledging in words God's decrees to be eternal. And doth it not become God from everlasting to intend to proceed in the day of judgment, as before spoken of? As great a divine as you are taken for, I much doubt you little understand the state of the question, wherein you seem to oppose somebody, for, I cannot be persuaded you do willfully dissemble it. But there is another course of God's providence in another matter, and far different from the execution of punishment and reward, maintained by your opposites, and impugned by you: but you are loath to be seen in your opposition therein, and to have your opinion known particularly for fear lest the common voice should cry shame upon you, as upon a professed Arminian, a manifest impugner of the sovereignty of God, in showing mercy on whom he will, and denying mercy to whom he will, and so hardening whom he will. Now here you have no comparison to help yourself withal, drawn from the condition of man. For in man's power it is not, either to give grace, or to deny it. But to the contrary we find, that Superiors have the dispensation of favors and gratifications in their power, which they enlarge or restrain at their pleasure, and extend to whom they will. How much more shall the Lord of all take liberty unto himself, to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to show compassion on whom he will show compassion; yea, and as to have mercy on whom he will, so to harden whom he will also; and that I hope without contradiction to his goodness, which you besides the word of God cast in, to outface the proclamation of God himself. For as God's goodness did not bind him to make the world; so neither doth it bind him to save the world. And as when he made the world, he made as many creatures as he thought good; so in saving the world, he saves as many creatures as he thinks good, both amongst men and Angels, by giving grace to whom he will, and denying grace to whom he will. When you say, that, To love the work of his own hands is more essential to him that made all things out of his mere love, then it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible. This speech of yours is a gross unsavory speech, transforming God into a natural and necessary agent: for, it is well known that the fire burns naturally and necessarily. And if God doth more essentially love his creatures, then he must naturally and necessarily preserve them in being, and cannot destroy them And because it is out of the same love that you derive the creation of the world, it followeth, that God was necessitated by the necessity of nature to make the world; and consequently that the world was everlasting without beginning, and so shall continue without end. Behold the flowers that grow in the paradise of your contemplation, fitter for Aristotle's Physicks, or Metaphysics, then for the meditations of a Christian Divine, as being fit only to make a nosegay for the Devil. The love of God towards himself is essential, towards his creatures is merely accidental. He needed not to have made them, neither is it any whit necessary that he should preserve them. And as creation and preservation are attributed of extrinsical denomination unto God, so is his love towards his creatures also. Neither was it out of love to the creature that he made the world, but out of love to himself, as who is the end of all. For, both Solomon professeth, that God made all things for himself: and Saint Paul likewise gives us to understand, that as things are from him, so all things are for him also. But God's love is infinite, therefore, say you, it extends to all, seeing all are less then infinite. A proper argument, and as well suitable unto your text, which undertaketh only to show, that God's love is infinite to mankind. And this argument proves as well, that it is extended to frogs and toads; to Angels and Devils, as well as to mankind. This is only to profess, that it extends to all. Now this is a very improper interpretarion of infinite love: for less love, and less liberality, may extend to more then greater love, and greater liberality: for he that gives ten shillings to one person, is more liberal, then that divides five shillings amongst threescore persons, in giving them a penny apiece. Lastly, the fruit of this love can be but being: and is it not a proper commendation of God's infinite love towards mankind, to say that he gives being unto all? And doth God's love to man appear more herein, then to the vilest creature that is?

2 In the next Section you discourse at large after your manner of the amplitude of God's love in comparison, which is nothing at all to your purpose, whose chief aim is to insinuae, that God's love is alike to all.

Yet having proceeded thus far, my resolution is to go on, and to consider what you bring. What think you of Adams love in the state of innocence, was it perfect, or no? Though without sin awhile, yet he fell into sin: so did the Angels before him, so should we, though as perfect as they, if God should not uphold us. Yet our love in greatest perfection could not be so much as a shadow of God's love, there being no resemblance between them: our love being a love of duty, God's love to us of mere grace and mercy. Besides, between the fruits of God's love to us, and the fruits of our love towards God, no color of resemblance. Man is bound heartily to desire the good of all; but God is free, and hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Many widows were in Israel in the days of Elias, when heaven was shut three years and six months, and great famine was throughout all the land: But unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta a city of Sidone, unto a certain widow. Also many lepers were in Israel in the days of Elesaeus the prophet, yet none of them was made clean but Naaman the Syrian. And if God's will had been to do the best that might be, he could have cured no doubt all other lepers as well as Naaman, and succoured other widows as well as the widow of Sarepta. Yet I confess, God's good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively also: for not a sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly Father: he saveth both man and beast, and heareth the young Ravens that call upon him: the eyes of all do wait upon the Lord, and he gives them their meat in due season.

And as touching the conferring both of grace and glory, therein he saveth more then we know, or are acquainted with. The number of the children of Israel, is as the sand of the sea that cannot be counted for multitude. As touching temporal blessings, all partake of his goodness therein, in their natural preservation and consolation; therein we must imitate him in doing good to all, as it lieth in our power, though chiefly to the household of faith, yet not to them only, but to others also. But though he causeth his sun to shine, and his rain to fall upon the just and unjust; yet pronounceth not the sentence of salvation on all promiscuously, whether they be just, or unjust.

And whereas all are equally corrupt in state of nature, yet he doth not equally show mercy on all, or bestow the means of grace on all; or where he doth bestow these means of salvation, he doth not make them effectual unto us. He blinds the eyes, and hardens the hearts of some, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, and be converted, that he might heal them. Whereby it comes to pass, that the word of God, though it be the savor of life unto life unto some, yet it is the savor of death unto death unto others; and the Ministers of God are a good savor unto God in both; even both in them that are saved, and in them that perish. For God made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. Mercy, you say, is not restrained from ill deservers in distress, so long as the exercise of it breeds no harm to such as are more capable of bountiful love and favor.

This is a consideration, which I confess hath place among men sometimes, and in some cases. Yet hardly can I devise how to suit with a fit instance. For no states (for ought I find) do take notice of any such distinction of times, wherein the exercise of mercy will not breed harm, and wherein it will, but they execute condign punishment upon malefactors according to the laws, that all may see, and fear to do the like; not be encouraged malorum facta imitari, but rather eorum exitus perhorrescere. God doth not so. His patience and long suffering is exceeding great; yet if he should give every man repentance in his death bed, and save their souls, what one in the world should be the worse for this? And though the wicked many times spend their days in mirth, and suddenly go down to the grave; yet by the grace of God we shall be nothing the worse for this, nor provoked hereupon to condemn the generation of God's children. Yet what is it that makes one man more capable of bountiful love and favor then another I know not: what makes him more capable of love in the execution of reward, I know; but what makes him more capable of love in the communication of grace, and in showing mercy towards him, I know not. Sure I am, that woman who had many sins forgiven her, loved so much the more, the ninety nine just persons that think they need no repentance, like enough love so much the less.

It is true, the laws of States take order for the just execution of punishment upon offenders for the common good; yet by your leave, Kings on earth, by their absoluteness do give pardons to whom they will, respecting more their own pleasure then the common good. And withal I think Princes do less offend (if at all offend) in refusing to pardon malefactors, then in granting pardons unto them. As for God, to whom you say the execution of justice is unnatural, he being the Father of mercy; I pray consider, if God should give repentance to all on their death-beds, and consequently save all, what common good of mankind would be hindered by this? And as God is the father of mercy, so is he also the Judge of all the world, and I conceive the execution of justice punitive to be as natural to him, as he is Judge of all the world; as the execution of mercy is natural unto him, as he is the Father of mercy. Yet you seem to have a place of Scripture to prove a notorious untruth; as namely, that the execution of justice punitive is unnatural unto God; and that is out of Lament. 3. 33. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Thus you take Scripture hand over head to serve your turn. But I pray consider, is it possible that God should do anything against his will? men may have reluctations, and conflicts in them, and do things volentes nolentes; is such a condition possible to be found in the nature of God? Yet in this case Aristotle hath defined the action to be simply voluntary, and done willingly. If God be represented sometimes unto us as it were fluctuating like men between different resolutions of executing either mercy or justice, as in the Prophet, How shall I give thee up Ephraim, how shall I deliver thee Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah, how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, and my repentances are rolled together; like as he is represented unto us, as well in the shape of the members of our body, as of the passions of our mind; we have cause rather to take notice hereby of the goodness of God in condescending thus far to our infirmities, to make us the better acquainted with him, and the more sensible of his favor, then hereby to take occasion to fashion God like unto ourselves, either in body or mind. Yet the meaning of the Prophet is plain enough, namely, that God comes not to afflict his children, unless he be provoked by sin, and herein he differeth from earthly parents, who sometimes chasten their children for their own pleasures; but God as he doth not, but in case he is provoked; so he doth it for our profit, as the Apostle telleth us in the same place. To do a thing willingly hath the same signification with the Latin phrase, animi causa, that is, when nothing is the cause thereof but a man's own will, as Causabon observes out of Seneca de beneficiis 4. whose opinion was, Neminem adeo à naturali lege descivisse, & hominem exuisse ut animi causa malus sit.

You further say, that Nothing can provoke good men to execute punitive justice upon offenders, but the good of others, deserving either better, or not so ill, which might grow worse and worse through evil doers impunity. I pray consider, do parents chastise their children for the good of others, and not for the good of the children themselves? God himself chastiseth his own children all manner of ways, and is this for the good of others that deserve better, or not so ill? and not rather for the good of those his own children themselves? No chastising for the present is joyous, saith the Apostle, but grievous, but afterwards it bringeth forth the quiet fruit of righteousness to them that are exercised thereby. Mark I pray, To them that are exercised thereby, he doth not say that this fruit is brought forth to others.

As for the torments in the world to come, who is the better for them, unless they tend to the improvement of joy in those blessed ones, while they behold in others that misery which only by the grace of God, themselves have escaped. For as for any other welfare of the Saints of God, or any welfare at all of the damned crew, or avoidance of grievances that is procured by the damnation of the wicked, if you know, it is well, but I assure you it is more then I can divine of. Yet do we not say, that God hath pleasure in the torture either of men or devils, but only in the demonstration of his own glorious justice towards them, and in the magnifying of his mercy so much the more toward his Saints.

You say, It goeth against the nature of God to punish the works of his own hands. A vile speech, and withal senseless; and no marvel if when men prostitute all honesty and the fear of God in opposing manifest truth, they lose their wits also, and fall upon most unsober meditations. For what a vile speech is it to say, that any work of God goeth against his nature, who as the Apostle professeth, worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. Then again, what a senseless speech is it to insinuate, that it were not so contrary to GOD'S nature, to deal thus with those creatures which were not the works of his own hands; but being the works of his own hands, you say, it is against his nature to punish them. A wonderful assertion, and whereat the most barbarous people might be astonished in the consideration of the impiety, shall I say? or the insulsity thereof, or both rather, namely, that it should be against God's nature to punish sinners. For it is well known that God punisheth none other, nor ever did; Christ Jesus the Son of God only excepted. And what a field have you here to expatiate in if you list to aggravate the unnaturalness of any action in God? And with as little sobriety do you amplify that unnaturalness in God by the consideration of man especially, as who (you say) is more dear to him then any child is to his Father. So then to punish others, you are willing to grant not to be so unnatural an action in God, as the punishing of man. And I pray what are those other creatures? Are they inferior, as Oxen and Sheep, and all these never sinned; yet is it not unnatural to punish them, if punishment may have place (as being taken for the afflicting of them) where there is no sin. For God gives us leave to wear them out, with plowing, carrying, riding, for our necessity, for our d • light; yea to set one creature upon another, the greyhound upon an hare, upon a deer, the hauke upon a partridge, or phesant, or wild fowl. No unnaturalness do we exercise in all this, such is the liberty which God hath given unto us. But yet to punish man, though a sinner, (for he punisheth no other) this how greatly (say you) doth it go against the nature of God? It seems you cannot tell how greatly; neither can I help you herein. For I do not see how it is against his nature at all. But you seem to give a reason, in saying that God is loving kindness it self. But I pray consider, is he not justice it self also as well as loving kindness? and is it against the nature of Justice to punish sinners? no nor against his loving kindness neither. For I hope that no attribute of God is contrary to another, though according to their different notions, some actions are more suitable to the one, then to the other. And why man should have more special consideration here then Angels, I know no reason. For if you say that God is the father of man, in as much as he hath created him, by the same reason he may be the father of the ignoblest creature that is. To say that God is the father of man, in as much as he made him after his own image, this is no more true of man, then of Angels, even of the very Angels of darkness. And men also are borne the children of darkness, and so continue until the time that God calleth them, and enlighteneth them. Or will you say that in special sort he is the father of man, by way of redemption; yet I find hitherto in your discourse no intimation of this fatherhood. But will you say that all and everyone have redemption in Christ through his blood? you may as well say, that all and everyone have the remission of their sins in Christ thorough his blood. For this is it which in Scripture phrase is meant by redemption. Arminius who maintains that Christ died for all and everyone, professeth plainly, that the immediate effect of Christ's passion is but this, that God now may, his Justice nothing hindering him, give pardon of sins and salvation, upon what condition he will. Which upon the matter is all one, as if he should say, that seeing faith and repentance are the conditions whereupon God gives forgiveness of sins, none but such as believe and repent do obtain the forgiveness of sins, that is, do obtain redemption in Christ, through his blood. Now consider, are not faith and repentance the gifts of God? It cannot be denied but they are; the Scriptures evidently give testimony hereunto, namely that faith is the gift of God, that repentance is the gift of God. And doth God give faith and repentance unto all? All experience of the world doth manifest that he doth not; no nor so much as the outward means unto all, whereby faith and repentance are wrought. I wonder you blush not in setting down such incongruities; as first, in saying that God as he is willing to be called the father of the sons of men, so he is ready to do the kind office of a father unto them: and for proof hereof allege that of the Psalmist, As a father pitieth his own children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. In which passage, the fatherly love of God is not extended unto all, but restrained to those that fear him. And yet I pray consider, what father would torment his children with everlasting fire, though never so unnatural towards him? or would not keep him from it, if it lay in his power, without sinning against God? Yet God torments even those whom you call his children, justly for their sins, in the torments of hell fire, that never shall have end. We willingly grant the love of God the Father, and the love of God the Son is such a love as passeth knowledge; but it is enlarged only towards those that are his children by faith in Christ Jesus. This is the filliation alone which the Apostle takes notice of; you take no notice of this at all. And again, Because ye are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Now is this common unto all, as you make God's fatherhood common unto all? So saith the Apostle in another place, As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Here is a description of that sonship we have in respect of our heavenly Father. And again, The Spirit of God witnesseth with our spirits that we are the sons of God. Of these passages I find no accompt made throughout this whole discourse of yours. And towards these sons of God, we shall willingly give you leave to extend and intend the love of God as much as you think fit. But you still continue to extend the fatherhood of God unto all, as it were in despite of all these passages formerly alleged. Where do you find throughout the Scriptures, that the title of the sons of God is attributed to the uncircumcised, or to the Heathen? To the contrary we read both before the flood, that The sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair: where we have a manifest distinction opposite to your confusion: And after; for this is the message which God sent unto Pharaoh, Israel is my son, even my first borne,—and if thou refuse to let him go, I will slay thy son, even thy first borne. How much more under the Law? Is Ephraim my dear son, or pleasant child? yet since I spake unto him, I still remembered him; therefore my bowels are troubled for him, I will surely have compassion on him, saith the Lord. Most of all under the Gospel: Behold what love the Fathe, hath shown us, that we should be called the sons of God. What have you here said of God's love to man, that may not as well be said of his love to the very Angels of darkness? For is it not true in respect of them as well as in respect of us, that having given them being, he doth much more love them, after they are enstamped with his image. For he sows not wheat to reap tares; nor did he give life to Angels that he might bring forth death. God gave both man and Angels life for the manifestation of his own glory; and for the manifestation of his own glory doth he punish transgressors amongst men and Angels with everlasting death.

3. You would willingly draw Heathens to the acknowledgement of this fatherhood in God towards all; though thinking it too narrow to comprehend all references of loving kindnesses between him and demy gods, which demy gods you take to be men. I think rather they were conceived to be inferior spirits; like as Aristotle makes all inferior intelligences to depend upon the first mover. And what reference of loving kindness is comprehended in this, that Jupiter is said to be both male and female, you may at leisure dilate of when you please. God's affection to his children exceeds the affection of any mother towards the fruit of her womb. For God was content to purchase his Church with his own blood. Your next sentence contains mere non sense: I rectify it thus; And as if his love could not be sufficiently expressed by these dearest references amongst men, &c. he hath chosen the most affectionate female, &c. Thus I make sense of it; but the poorest sense that ever was vented in so grave a matter of discourse. As if the greatness of place, or curiosity of education did make mothers so little compassionate towards their children, that God is fain to seek out for more proper resemblances. Thus you fetch about for matter, as Balaam did for divinations; as if there were no women in the world, but delicate Ladies, or such nice & curious dames, whose niceness hath made them so unnatural, that our Savior was driven to compare his tender affection unto the affectionof a hen towards her chicken; which creature is magnified by you (to hold up the jest) for the most affectionate female amongst reasonless creatures: implying that reasonable creatures may in tenderness of affection right well exceed the hen, and so you quite mar your own play. But where do you find (if a man might be so bold to ask) that an hen is so superlative a creature in her affection towards her chicken? I can hardly believe that either Aristotle or Pliny hath afforded you any such observation, but rather your comment upon them, or upon the book of Nature. What? is an henue more affectionate to her young ones, then a Pelican is to hers, who is said to let her self blood to feed them? or then a Stork, that hath her name from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and in the Hebrew is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is a word near of kin to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , bowels of compassion, as which indeed are most tender in her. A story whereof we have in the description of the Netherlands: namely, of a Stork, that when the house was on fire where her nest was, kept the fire off from her young ones with her own body and wings so long till she was burnt her self.

Still you proceed in amplyfying the love of God, nothing to the purpose. For the question is not, how great God's love is towards those on whom it is placed; but whether it extend to all or no? You say, All the sweet fruits and comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their children, or of husbands towvrd their wives, or of brethren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or of one friend to another (their sinfulness excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. We well know, the love of God exceeds all this; bu • I verily think your pen hath run riot ere you are aware, and you have written you know not, or you consider not what. For, herehence it followeth, that there is no act so abominable of the will of the creature, but God may infuse it, the sinfulness only thereof excepted; which yet is a very sory exception. for sinfulness is not a thing that can be infused by God, Angel, or man. Of old is was determined by Augustine, that sin hath not causam efficientem, but deficientem only.

And herein you manifestly contradict yourself, as who maintain, that whosoever is the author of the act, must therewithal be the author of the sinnefullnesse thereof, for as much as sinfulness doth result (relative like) upon position of the foundation. And of this kind of argument I have found you wondrous confident, in a certain treatise of yours, though a very weak argument, and long ago proposed and answered by Capreolus, and whose answer thereunto is again rehearsed by Soncinas.

But here I show only how you make no bones of contradicting yourself very handsomely, in saying, God doth infuse an act which is sinful, though not the sinfulness of it. The love of God (you say) though infinitely increased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize God's love towards every particular soul created by him. Thus you steal up, without all proof, the extension of God's love to every particular; and that in infinite manner. Whereas the Scripture professeth as plainly, that God hath hated Esau, as that he hath loved Jacob. And seeing God's love can be but infinite towards his elect, and towards his dearest Son, and towards himself, you make it infinite towards the very reprobates, whether men or devils: for every particular of them hath been created by him. Is not this good divinity, and very comfortable divinity? Yet no Arminian will say, that God so loved the Angels that were fallen, that he sent his Son to die for them. When you say, The creatures for fear do not so much good for their little ones as they might; not so much for the model of their wit or strength, as God for his part (though infinite in wisdom and power) doth for the sons of men. As he said of his Bore that was sent him, Noster te non capit ignis conturbator Aper, so may I say of this your eloquence, that it passeth mine intelligence. I can neither construe your sentence, nor correct it.

To say that the creature cannot do so much for his young as God doth for the sons of men, is so vulgar a truth, that when you introduce it with such pomp and state, I may well say', Tu pulicem Gaure giganta facis: yet the adversative interposed (Though infinite in wisdom and power) hath no congruity to this sense neither; for God's infinite wisdom and power is no adversative to this I trow, but rather a coroborative thereunto. Be it that God had done as much as could be done for his unfruitful vineyard, what is this to prove, that God's love extends to all? whereas the place it self doth manifestly restrain this love of God unto his vineyard. Yet what is there mentioned besides the well husbanding of this vineyard; wherein he appeals to their consciences, whether a better course could be devised then he had taken for the well husbanding thereof. But I pray consider, doth the work of grace extend no further then to planting and watering? Is it not God that gives the increase also? Is it not in God's power to give faith, to give repentance? you that will have God to infuse that love in carnal men, which is found to be sinful, and not to infuse the sinfulness thereof, cannot endure that God should infuse faith and repentance into the heart of man. But if God can do this, surely he can do more then ought that is expressed in that song of God concerning his vineyard. Yet it is true, that in the way of outward husbandry, God's course was without all exception, neither could the wisdom of man devise a better course for God to take, then was that which he took with them. And therefore you have small cause to charge your adversaries with such sorry shifts, so atheistical, as if we thought God's serious protestations deserved no credit with us. These are fictions of course, proceeding from an addle brain, to supply the room of so and arguments.

And surely, did we not believe God's serious protestations, why should we regard his oath? For, amongst men, he that is found to be no man of his word, is usually little regarded for his oath. God's word, without protestation, is, and ever shall be through his grace, sufficient ground of our faith in him. Look you unto it that you hunt not after some other foundation, the tenor of whose discourse in many places, and in this very place, treating of his infinite love to all and everyone, runs in a current of manifest opposition against the word of God: though now and then you have a snatch at it, and away, like the dog at the river Nile, for fear of the Crocadile; and content yourself only with a superficial consideration of it, as in this place, like as in the former. For what? is this spoken indifferently of all? of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews? It is manifestly spoken of the house of Israel, concerning whom the Lord asketh this question, Why will ye die ye house of Israel? And the whole proceedeth by way of answer to their murmuring against the providence of God, in saying, The fathers have eaten sower grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; and hereupon God proceedeth to justify the course of his providence unto their face. Now when God doth not take men upon the hip, as soon as they have sinned against him, but spares them, and not only gives them space of repentance, but useth means to bring them unto repentance, by sending Prophets unto them to admonish them, to admonish them of their sins, and to denounce the judgments of God against them; is not this a manifest evidence that God is not delighted in their death, but rather in their repentance, although he still reserves liberty to himself to bestow the gift of repentance on whom he will? And therefore all this is only in respect of his church, not in respect of those who are strangers from the common wealth of Israel, and aliens from the covenants of promise. then concerning those within the church, All are not Israel, that are of Israel, Rom. 9. And though the means of grace have their course withal, yet God intends to make them effectual only with his elect, according to that, As many as were ordained to eternal life believed; and whom he hath predestinated, them hath he called, and justified, and glorified. For as Augustine saith, Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit. quis aget poenitentiam: And speaking of the Non pradestinatis. Istorum neminem, saith he, adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritatemque poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat. Therefore we say, that as concerning the elect, though they sin, yet God willeth not their death, but willeth their repentance, and their salvation. But as touching others who are mixed amongst them, as tares amongst the wheat, and are partakers of the same means of grace and invitations unto repentance; in as much as he spares them, and giveth them not only time to repent, but admonisheth them of their sins, and affords them the outward means of repentance, it is sufficient to justify, that God doth not willingly bring judgment upon them, neither for their sins, because he comes not hastily thereunto, but upon willful despising of the means of grace, used to reclaim them; like as before I shown in what sense God is said, not to afflict the sons of men willingly. And as for this present place, yourself elsewhere hath interpreted it thus, I will not the death of an impenitent sinner, but that God wills undoubtedly the death of an impenitent sinner. To quash this construction in this place, you say, this oath of God proceeds as concerning those, who all their life long have hated him. Here I am persuaded we shall find no little inconsiderateness.

To hate God all a man's life time, what is it but to hate him from the first hour of coming to the use of reason, unto the last, even unto the moment of death? now I pray consider, Will not God the death of such a one as dieth in impenitence? The text I confess runs thus, I will not the death of him that dieth. But do you think indeed the meaning is, that as for such a man as now dieth, and hath lived all his life time in the hatred of God, God will not the death of such a one? Like enough you are content your Reader should entertain such a conceit. But I cannot be persuaded you take this to be the meaning. The text is manifestly against it; for it followeth, But rather that he return and live; so that it is spoken of a man living, and such as is capable of repentance. And we know, the whole Chapter is to justify God's providence in afflicting men with his judgments: so that to die in this place, is to be under the afflicting hand of God, and so in the way to death and to destruction.

Our living is reputed a continual dying; for as much as nature consumeth and wasteth, as the Poet wittily expresseth it;

Whereupon he concludes his resolution to correct his former phrase of speech, saying,

And would you know what is the difference between me and them;

So that I guess your meaning according to the articles of your own creed, is but this; That God's love is such to them that all their life past (not simply all their life, but all their life past) have hated him, that, He will not their death, but rather that they return and live. And I grant, that this is true of many in most proper speech, namely, of all the elect of God, though it be long ere God calleth and converteth some of them. Of others also that live in the Church, I have shown, how it may have course in the same sense, that God is said, not so much willingly to afflict them for their sins, as for refusing to repent and turn unto God after they have sinned.

When you tell us of infinite places more of sacred texts, and those most perspicuous in themselves, and also that, The whole ancient Church, with some small exception, which yet may be counterpoised, is ready to give joint verdict for you, it savoreth hotly of Smithfield eloquence;

Yet it was an old observation,

If you had some about you to justfie you in cleanly manner by some pretty qualification, it had been absolute. As the Gentleman who professed that he had certain ponds wherein Carpes were taken as big as that Somer-pole which he then rode by; and withal asked his man that rode with him, whether it were not so. Sir, quoth his man, though they were so big, yet I am sure they were nothing like so long: and indeed, the dimension of length is more suitable to the proportion of an Eele, then of a Carpe. As Cicero answered him that told a strange tale concerning the length of certain Eels which he had seen: for Tully handsomely to convince him of his vanity, made show of going beyond him in his own element of tossing; and forthwith replied, saying, That is nothing strange, for I know a place where Eels are taken, of such a length that they use to make their Angling-rods of them. And this assertion of yours may come as here to the truth, as an Eele is to an Angling rod.

CHAP. XV.

WHat you mean by a course of Compromising contentions between some other reformed Churches, in certain points of religion, I know not, neither am I acquainted with any such course. I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative, as of God's grace effectual to every good action; so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will, according to his good pleasure, and passing by others, as any Church in Christendom; which I do not speak upon, snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church, whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I think good (as your fashion is) but this I speak upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set down in the articles of religion, manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England. Yet you would persuade your Readers, the Church of England concurreth with you, in extending the love of God towards all. But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause, by walking in the clouds of generalities; as if you feared to come to the light, and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him. You talk of God's unspeakable love towards mankind, but you define not in what kind, but keep yourself a loose off for all advantages.

We acknowledge God's love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal, and that in an unspeakable manner. But the question only is, whether God doth bestow, or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all, or salvation upon all. If God's love in these respects, in your opinion doth extend to all, say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus, and predestinated all. For predestination in Augustine's divinity is but praeparatio gratiae & gloriae. Now the Church of England, in her public and authorized doctrine; plainly professeth, that God hath predestinated none, but those whom he hath chosen in Christ, as vessels of honor. If you say, that the reason why God did not predestinate all, nor elect all in Christ, proceeds not from the mere pleasure and free disposition of God, but that only upon the foresight of the obedience of the one, and disobedience of the other he elected those, and reprobated these (for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you, though you are loath in plain terms to profess as much) let any man judge whether this be suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church, whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority, and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft, observes in his fifth proposition, that, In Christ Jesus of the mere will and purpose of God, some are elected and not others unto salvation. And he just fieth it by holy Scripture, Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remain according to election, not of works, but of him that calleth, Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us, according to the good pleasure of his will, 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy, Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil, Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor.

But consider the Article it self, They which are endued with so excellent a benefit (to wit, as election and predestination is) are called according to God's purpose by his spirit, working in due season; they through grace obey their calling, they be justified freely, they be made sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ, they walk religiously in good works, and at length by God's mercy they attain to everlasting felicity. Whereby it appears, that election and predestination is made the fountain and cause of obedience, and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life; whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance; our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination, rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance.

Again consider, these alone whom God hath elected in Christ, and predestinated, are noted to be made in due time the sons of God by adoption. But you make all to be the sons of God, and God's infinite love in unspeakable manner to be enlarged towards all and everyone; even towards them that have hated God all their life.

Lastly, only the elect are here noted to be those vessels whom God hath made unto honor; not that any others are made unto honor: which is nothing answerable to your tenet. But proceed we along with you. You undertake to prove that God's love is extended to mankind, which no Christian ever called in question; but your meaning is, that it extends to all and everyone of mankind, and that so far forth as to will the salvation of all and everyone, as appears by the sequel, and all this out of the public and authorized doctrine of our Church. And yet you insist only upon certain passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church. The Liturgy I hope is not the doctrine of our Church, though it be not contradictory to our doctrine. But therein we have been content to conform unto the practice of the Church, so far forth as it might seem tolerable, and such as might be performed with a good conscience, which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion, it is rather to receive correction from the Articles, then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy.

But consider we what is that which you plead for yourself. You enter upon it after your course with great state, discovering unto us a wonderful providence of God, in drawing those Articles; for you tell us, that No National Council, though assembled for that purpose, could fit their doctrine more expressly to meet with all the late restrictions of God's love, then the Church our Mother, even from the beginning of reformation, hath done, as if she had then foreseen a necessity of declaring her judgment in this point, for preventing schisms or distractions of opinions amongst her sons. Here we have a pretty Comedy towards, and you have a poetical wit for fiction. Had our Church foreseen a necessity of declaring her judgment in this point, where I pray was it fit that she should do this, but in the Articles of Religion? But you find no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of God's love, but in the Liturgy and Catechism. Was that think you a fit place to fit her doctrine for the preventing of schisms and distractions in opinion?

Again, had she intended to prevent (as you say) distractions in opinion about the extension of God's love, would she not have done it rather expressly, then only in such a manner as to leave it to others to draw conseque • s therefrom, for the manifesting of her opinion about the large extent of God's love to mankind? Who would think that a sober man should be carried away with such vain and frivolous presumptions, without all tolerable ground? But let us come to the particular scanning of the places. All of them, I mark, are only the expression of prayer for others. Whence it no way followeth, that God will therefore save them, because we pray for their salvation. The child prayeth for his father, the father for the child, the brother for the brother; but hence it followeth not that God will save them; though we are bound to pray for the salvation of one another.

Moses prayed God to wipe him out of the book of life, rather then to destroy his people in the wilderness. God had no such resolution, and what sober Divine could doubt, but that Moses knew well that this could not be, yet he shows hereby what his desire was, secluding the consideration of God's will to the contrary, and what he would prefer, • f he were left to himself, even his own eternal confusion, rather then the glory of God should be obscured. And whoever censured this prayer of Moses for sin? I am sure God doth not: so S. Paul could wish himself separate from Christ for his brethren's sake, which were his kinsmen according to the flesh, Rom. 9. 2. yet he well knew that nothing could separate him from the love of God in Christ. Our Savior in like sort well knew that the cup must not pass from him, yet nevertheless he prayed earnestly that that cup might pass, if it were possible, and with final submission of his will to the will of his Father.

The first place you allege, is that passage of the Liturgy, where we pray unto God, that it may please him to have mercy upon all men. And for good reason do we pray so: for is not everyone bound to seek the salvation of all men, as much as lieth in his power? did not the Apostles labor for this in their place? And is not prayer a special means for this? We are bound to pray for them that persecute us, we are bound to pray for them that hate us. For what, if God will not save all, and we know so much, shall that hinder us from doing our duty in seeking by all means the salvation of all: specially considering we are not able to put a difference and to discern who are elect, and who are not. S. Paul, though he saved but some, yet would he become all things unto all men that he might save them. Yet he well knew that the word in his mouth was the savor of death unto death unto many; yea to Israel in special manner, and yet notwithstanding his hearty desire and prayer unto God for Israel wa • , that they might be saved. And albeit God should save all, and everyone that live in someone time or age, yet were this • o prejudice to the doctrine of election. For the number of God's chosen, for all this might be but few in comparison to the reprobate: And therefore we see no cause why you should upbraid your opposites, as if they thought this practice of the ancient and moderne Church had need of reformation.

As for the restraint of the universal all men, in the place of Timothy, by S. Austin unto genera singulorum, it is according to the usual Scripture phrase. For Matth. 3. 5. it is said that There went out unto John the Baptist Jerusalem and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan; what sober Divine doth extend the signification hereof any father then to give to understand, that some from all parts of Judea, and of the region round about Jordan had resort unto him? Matth. 4. 23. it is likewise said, that Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their Synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom, and healing every sickness, and every disease among the people; and that his fame spread throughout all Syria, and they brought unto him all sick people. Do you think there was not one sick person left in all Galilee and Syria that was not brought unto him? Act. 10. it is said, that while Peter was in a trance he saw in a vision a vessel let down from heaven, wherein was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , every four-footed beast; who doubts but that the meaning hereof is no more then this, that of all sorts some, or rather of most sorts some? 1 Cor. 15. 22. it is said, that in Christ all shall be made alive; is this true think you of all and everyone? All flesh shall see the salvation of God; what sober man will apply this to all and every man? Rom. 5. 18. As by the offense of one man the fault came upon all unto condemnation: so by the obedience of one, righteousness came upon all men, to the justification of life: will you hereupon extend the benefit of Christ's death to the justification of all men unto everlasting life, like as all and everyone are fallen into condemnation by the sin of Adam? Rom. 7. 8. the Apostle professeth that sin wrought in him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , can this possibly be applied to every particular concupiscence?

But by the way, what do you mean to apply S. Austin's restraint to this universal in this place? whereas Austin applieth it only to this universal in the place following, where it is said, that God will have all to be saved. And if no other place did afford us any such restraint of course, yet we must 〈◊〉 driven so to interpret it in this place, lest otherwise we be cast upon denying the first Article of our Creed. For seeing all are not saved, and the cause thereof is not because God will not save them; it necessarily followeth, that the cause thereof must be because God cannot save them. And it would have becomed you well to have answered this argument, and not presumed to carry your Reader to the embracing of your construction hand over head, in spite of so manifest a reason to the contrary. Now if you had but accommodated yourself to make answer hereunto, I doubt not but we should have had good matter to work upon; which I speak upon experience of another discourse of yours that passeth by tradition; but you were loath to intersert it there; and made choice rather to pitch upon the universal in the former place; that so you might be out of danger of that gun-shot that must needs have rung a peal in your ears from this place. Yet in this place alone S. Augustine interprets the universal according to the restraint mentioned, and not in the former. And therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin, but only to say that it is somewhere; and indeed so it is; and that somewhere is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before, he professrth; Deo procul dubio quàm facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostrae fidei confessionis initium, quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotence, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus. That look how easy it is unto God to do what he will, so easy is it not to suffer that to be which he willeth not. Unless we believe this, the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken, whereby we profess to believe in God the Father Almighty. For he is not truly called Omnipotent, in any other respect then because he can bring to pass whatsoever he will have to be, neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindered by the wit of any creature. So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father, and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse. To avoid the brunt whereof, you juggle and consider his restraint there, where he doth not use it.

And here you tell us magnificently, that if any man will lay this restraint upon this place, the scanning of the words following, the fitting of the matter contained in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other real circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease then it can be laid upon it. Here we have a great deal of cry, if the wool be answerable, we shall speed a great deal better then he in Aelian that shore his hogs. But the mischief is, S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place; but conceives the Apostles commandment to be this, ut oraretur pro singulis. So that your pains is like to be well bestowed, in shaking of Augustine's restriction from this place, whereupon he laid no restriction at all. It seems you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at putfinger in the dark.

We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other then whose salvation we are unfeignedly to desire, and we are to desire the salvation of every man, of what condition soever, or fort, or nation, provided that we know him. For do you think it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom? If so, I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what. Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine, I am bound to pray for, and I shall be sure to take notice of such a one, for I shall be sure to feel him. And as well for mean persons as for Kings, that I have anything to do withal: albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings then others, and that without accepting of persons: because by the good affection of Kings to God's Church, the Church of God is like to prosper far better then by the conversion of mean persons. And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings, that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty. And therefore I hope you will bear with me, if I pray with greater devotion for God's grace upon the Kings heart, and God's blessing upon his head, then for meaner persons: because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of God's glory, in the liberty and prosperity of his Church, then the gracious disposition of meaner persons. And herein I hope I shall not be censured for an accepter of persons, a conceit of yours quite besides the Apostles text you treat of. But yet the Apostle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings (whereunto you drive it, devising circumstances to fill the scale.) For what have I to do to pray for the king of Bungo, if any such king or kingdom there be? or for the kings in Terra Australis incognita, discovered by Ferdinand de Quit? yet his relations are of so little efficacy, that hitherto he hath made no men's mouths water after them. It is enough for us to pray for the fullness of the Gentiles, that it may come i • , so to make way for the calling of the Jews. But by virtue of the Apostles exhortation, every Christian congregation is bound to pray for their own king. Like as Darius, though an heathen Prince, desired the prayers of God's people that lived under him: Ezr. 6. 10. Let them have to offer sweet odors to the God of heaven, and pray for the Kings life, and for his sons. When I pray for the coming in of the fullness of the Gentiles, and the calling of the Jews, I except none; as likewise when I pray for the ruin of Antichrist, I except none.

I find, you do not much satisfy yourself in the weight of this your discourse, you are still casting about for somewhat more to make up the total of your account, We must desire (you say) the spiritual good of all men, not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our universal consideration. So that belike you are still jealous, lest we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an universal consideration. I desire to deal as plainly as you would wish; name any man throughout the world unto me, try me whether I will not pray God bless him, and convert his heart, and save his soul. And yet to my thinking, you should not urge me to pray for one with whom I have nothing to do, only I hear a relation of him, perhaps dwelling in the I will of Iapan. For though I am bound to love my neighbor as myself; and by neighbor I must comprehend a Jew, although myself be a Samaritan, yet this is in case we meet together, and I see him to have need to make use of my charity. Otherwise to my judgment, general prayers should serve the turn, as I shown, for the fullness of the Gentiles to come in, for the calling of the Jews, for the ruin of Babylon. Neither do we find any practice of the Saints to the contrary; and herein I assure you I except none. But because I see you travail to be delivered of somewhat, and I take pity of you, tell me I pray, is not your meaning this, that we must pray for all and everyone that liveth in the world? If this be your meaning, and it did not satisfy you to say we must pray for all, or desire the salvation of all; you do as much as confess hereby, that to pray for all doth not include the praying for everyone; & consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all, doth not exhort to pray for everyone. I would I knew once what form would satisfy you; for I am apt to entertain a resolution to gratify you therein. But to say that we must pray for all, not in an indefinite, but in an universal consideration, if you could make me understand it, I would soon come to capitulation with you. In the mean time, I appeal to your conscience, did you ever pray in this style, for all, and signify that your meaning was to pray for them, not in an indefinite, but in an universal consideration? I profess unto you, if God should leave me unto myself and to follow mine own desires, I should desire not only that all that now live, but that all that ever lived might have been converted and saved, yea the Angels that fell might have been kept from sin; or having sinned might have been brought to reap̄tance, & saved. I see no cause why I should desire the contrary. But considering the will of God, whereby the angels that fell are bound in chains, and kept to the judgment of the great day, I dare not pray for their salvation. And to pray that everyone that now lives might be saved, with submission to the will of God, I see no incongruity; but we have better grounds of faith, and those sufficient to take up our thoughts especially in these days wherein we live, whereupon to proceed in the ordering of our prayers. And I would be loath you should put upon us any course or form of prayer for all, which you practice not yourself. And if I knew your practice in this kind, I would soon give in mine answer whether I thought good to subscribe to your form or no.

In the next place you tell us, that the reason why we are bound to desire the spiritual good of all men universally considered, is, because we must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Here again you bewray your jealousy of the weakness of your own cause, as when you content not yourself in saying, we must pray for all men, but add hereunto, that we must pray for all men universally considered; the opposite member whereto before you signified to be this, To pray for all men indefinitely considered. Now the Apostle is far from these scrupulosities. He simply exhorts us to pray for all men; he doth not add as you do, We must pray for all men universally considered, and not indefinitely. Yet in no other sense you think it will serve your turn.

That reason of yours drawn from the conformity to the courses of our heavenly Father, whereon you so much insist, I have already shown how little it serves your turn. Now I will show you how in another respect it is rather repugnant, then consonant to your Tenet. For that example of conformity is only in an indefinite consideration, thus; We must pray not only for our friends, and them that love us, but also for them that are our enemies, and hate us, and persecute us; like as God doth good unto the just and wicked, and not only to the just and good. To our desires you say we must add our endeavors, that saving truth may be imparted to all. It seems you have not failed herein. Now I would gladly know▪ what those endeavors of yours have been hitherto, whereby you have endeavored, that saving truth may be imparted to the inhabitants of terra Australis incognita, or to the Negroes, or to the Tartarians, yea or the Turks, Saracens, or Arabians. Hitherto you have seemed to dispute thus: God will have it our duty to pray for the salvation of all: therefore God willeth the salvation of all; but now you dispute in a quite contrary manner, thus: God wills that all should come to the knowledge of his truth, therefore we must desire and endeavor that his saving truth may be imparted unto all. The consequence of your former argument is utterly untrue, as I have already shown; and as Austin long ago discoursed, man's will in an holy manner may be contrary to the will of God; and again in a most unholy manner may the will of man be concurrent with the will of God. As it is the duty of the child to pray for the life of the father, though God will have the father to die, and not live: On the other side, a wicked child wisheth the death of his father in an ungracious manner, yet it may be that herein he concurreth with the will of God, supposing (as it may well be) that God willeth the death of the father at the same time that the son wisheth it.

As for the second argument, we deny therein the antecedent, if you understand it of all and everyone. For the case is clear, that God doth not bring all and everyone to the knowledge of his truth; not because he cannot; for doubtless he could bestow his Gospel upon them that want it, as well as upon us that enjoy it; therefore the reason must needs be because he will not. As he plainly professeth, he will bring a famine of his word upon a Land, Amos 8. 11. Behold the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord. verse. 12. And they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the North even to the East shall they run to and fro, to seek the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. So the Lord threatens the Church of Ephesus, to remove her candlestick out of his place, Revel. 2. and long before threatened the Jews to take his vineyard from them, and let it out to others that should bring him the fruit thereof in due season. And it is very strange that these and such like judgments should come to pass, and God should not will them. This is the reason whereupon Austin is moved to inquire into a commodious construction of that place, left otherwise we should fall upon a direct contradiction to the prime Article of our Creed; and therefore after he hath given two constructions of the place, the last whereof is this, which you impugn, but not answer his reasons, which are two; the one drawn from the analogy of Scripture phrase, as where our Savior saith unto the Pharisees, you tithe Mint, and Rue, and every herb: which phrase cannot be understood otherwise, then of every kind of herb: the other reason is that formerly spoken of; as if we say, That God willeth such a thing to come to pass, which yet doth not come to pass; we shall thereby deny God's omnipotency. Yet see the ingenuity of this worthy father: he gives any man leave to give any fair construction of the place, provided that God be not made unable to bring to pass whatsoever he will have to come to pass. Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credero non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem statutum voluisse fieri factum{que} non esse: qui sine ullis ambagibus si in coelo & in terra (sicut veritas dicit) qucunque voluit, fecit, profecto facere noluit quaecunque non fecit. Let it, saith he, be understood after what other manner soever it may be construed, so that we be not constrained to maintain, that the Almighty God would have something come to pass, which notwithstanding comes not to pass. For, without fetching any further compass; if he hath done whatsoever he will both in heaven and in earth, as the truth witnesseth, certainly, he would not do whatsoever he hath not done.

2 But you proceed to show, that both this duty of ours to pray for all sorts, and for every man of what sort soever; and also that God's will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved, are expressly included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England. And the Collects whence you gather this, are in number three: they are, I take it, all appointed for Good Friday. In the first, we pray, that God would graciously behold this his family, for • he which our Lord Jesus Christ was contented to be betrayed. Now this family, being the present congregation wherein the prayer is made, it is very strange, that hereby should be signified all sorts of men, and every man, of what sort soever throughout the world. And what express signification do we find here, that God's will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved?

To help your argument drawn herehence; as if you should reason thus, We must pray for this family, therefore we must pray for everyone throughout the world. You tell us that, The tenor of this petition, if we respect only the form, is indefinite, not universal: but being in a necessary matter it is equivalent to an universal, as every logician knows. To which I answer, first, that the tenor of the petition is not indefinite, but definite, (to follow you in your own language) for therein we pray definitely for that family which is before us. Now that family is a particular family; and never any Logician was so simple as to think it law full to infer an universal out of a particular. Again, here is no necessary matter in it. For to use such a form of prayer is merely the arbitrary constitution of our Church.

Suppose God had bid us to pray in this form, to wit, for this family present; yet this makes not the matter necessary absolutely, but merely upon supposition of the will of God, and yet in this particular only. As for example, Our Savior prayed for them that his father gave him, and for all those that should afterward believe through their word, will you infer herehence, that therefore he was to pray for the world also? Again, God hath expressly bidden us to pray for them that sin unto death; and therefore, unless I may be assured, that there is none in the world that sinneth a sin unto death, I have no reason to pray for all and everyone; though I were bound to do so, it would nothing pleasure and advantage you. Hitherto I have followed you in your own most unlogicall discourse, the absurdity whereof, every simple Logician may easily discover.

Where have you been taught, that petitions indefinite in a necessary matter are universal: we were taught indeed, that propositions indefinite in a necessary matter are as good as universal: but for petitions indefinite to be counted universal in a matter necessary, is one of the absurdest notions that ever I heard to proceed from the mouth of a Logician. You proceed to prove, that the form of the petition is in the intention of the Church of England to be extended to all and everyone of the congregation present. But erst you told us, the matter indeed was universal, but not the form, which you acknowledged to be indefinite. Now the very form, you say, is to be universally extended: this is not to extend, but to destroy. But this that you labor for in so uncouth a manner, I never doubted of, namely, that by this family is understood all and everyone of the Congregation there present: only I deny, that herehence it followeth, that our Church binds us to pray for all and everyone throughout the world; and if it doth, we must comprehend even those that sin sins unto death, amongst the rest, unless we believe that there are no such sinners in the world: and he had need be of a strong faith, and have some extraordinary revelation that believeth that.

So that your second place tending to no other end but to prove that which we never doubted to be comprehended in the first, we need not trouble ourselves about any answer thereunto; save only this, though we are bound to pray, not only for the congregation present, but for the whole Church and every member of it; yet there is a great gulf of separation between the City of God, and the city of the Devil; which makes me remember what Abraham answered Dives, and therefore we can no way approve this consequence; We are bound to pray for all Christians, therefore we are bound to pray for all Atheists and heathens. We are bound to pray for Christ's members, & therefore we are bound to pray for Antichrist and his members. Therefore you tell us, the third and last prayer will clearly quit this exception, and free both the foremr petitions from these and the like restrictions.

But in this last clause you overlash miserably; I see no reason but I may as well say, that the restrictions in the former prayer will quit this latter prayer, for its extension. Certainly two of the three prayers you proposed to evince your Tenent are nothing to the purpose. Herein indeed we pray unto God, to have mercy upon all Jews, Turks, and Heretics; which in effect is no more then to pray, that the fullness of the Gentiles may come in, and thereupon the calling of the Jews. And whereas you desire to infer herehence, that it is God's will, that all these should come to his truth and knowledge, and be saved. As the consequence you shall never be able to make good, so the consequent is directly contrary to the word of God; for it is not, nor ever was it the will of God that all this should be done together, but one after another, namely, that the fullness of the Gentiles shall come in first, and after that the calling of the Jews, Rom. 11. Luc. 21. 24. Hence you conclude, That if God will not the death of any Turk, Jew, or Infidel, because of nothing he made them men; we may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. In reading your antecedent I wondered at your boldness, in supposing that which you are never able to gain by force of argument; but when I view your consequence, I wonder what giddiness possessed you, to take so wild a course in proving that which no Christian will deny. For your conclusion is, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. Did ever any Christian deny this? Is this it you are to prove, that God wills the salvation of all Christians? Have you not rather undertaken to prove that God willeth not the salvation of all sorts of men only (which was Austin's gloss, and which you set up here as a mark to shoot at, thinking by the power of your discourse to bear down the authority and learned discourse of that worthy Father hereupon) but that he willeth the salvation of every man, of every sort throughout the world? And this you would prove out of the doctrine established in the Church of England, that is, out of their Liturgy: and three prayers therein you insist upon, whereas the two first are apparently nothing for the purpose; whereof yourself seem to be sensible enough, and therefore the third place (Triary like) was to do the feat, and to clear all: and the conclusion herehence definite in piscem: being no more but this, that God willeth the salvation of all men whom he hath vouchsafed to make Christians: which no man denies or calls into question. May I not justly ask, and that with admiration,

But what should move you to carry yourself so preposterously, and to balk or blast rather so fair a consequence, and so beneficial unto your cause, as your antecedent doth bespeak? For if your antecedent be true, namely, that God willeth not the death of any Turk, Jew, or Infidel, will it not manifestly follow, that God willeth not the death of any Turk, or Jew, or Infidel? To my thinking it should follow as manifestly, as to say, that if the Sun shineth it shineth; though in my poor judgment this is identity rather then consequence or concomitance; I say, I wonder what moved you to blast this consequence with such a dash of your pen, in the very face of it, and the addition of such a proviso as this, whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. First, especially considering that no such qualification is in the antecedent; and it is most unreasonable that any qualification should be foisted into a conclusion that hath no ground in the premisses; especially it being such a qualification as utterly mars your market, and that at the end of the day, and you have a long time waited for a good penyworth, and now yourself are the man that cuts your own throat. Did the conscience of so foul a conclusion as was towards, make you blush to put it in writing? that cannot be, for you have it full and whole in the antecedent; though straining to proceed most indecently, it fares with you as it doth with the horse in the Poet:

Or by the way did your consequence suggest unto you that the argument drawn from this prayer, proves no more but this, that God will save every Jew, Turk, and Infidel, in case he be first made a Christian? If so, then the supposed consequence in your antecedent, was made against your conscience; and therefore by the consequence herehence made, you desired to strangle it, that so the birth of it might be abortive. Yet because you carry some show of argumentation in the antecedent, I will not trust to the corruptnesse of your consequent deduced therhence, but I will take the pains to strangle it myself, since the press hath brought it to light: your antecedent is this, If God therefore will not the death of any Jewe, Turk, or Infidel, because of nothing he made them men. Now this includes such an Enthymeme: Of all Turks, Jews, and Infidels it is true, that God of nothing hath made them men; therefore he will not the death of any Jew, Turk, or Infidel. Now I say this consequence is notoriously false, and instead of your proving it in any manner, I disprove it in this manner. Of all Devils it is as true, that God of nothing made them angels; shall I herehence infer, therefore he will not the death of any devil? So likewise of all cats and dogs, horses and hogs it is as true, that God of nothing made them such as they are; will it therefore follow, that God willeth not the death of any of them?

But perhaps some may say, that the Collect implieth some such argument, for it runneth thus; Merciful God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, have mercy upon all Jews. I answer first, here is no such argument implied, as to infer that God will not the death of any Jew, Turk, or Infidel, but only it implieth a reason why we pray God to have mercy upon all Jews, Turks, and Infidels. But albeit we do thus pray for all, yet it followeth not that God will save every Jew, Turk, and Infidel that liveth, as before I have shown. For who doubts but the child is bound to pray for the recovery of his fathers health, being cast down upon the bed of sickness, at what time it may be, it is God's will that his father shall not recover, but die the death. Secondly, the complete reason why we pray for all, signified in this prayer, is not this, because God hath made all men, and hateth nothing that he hath made; for by the same reason we might be urged to pray for devils as well as for men: This is only a part of the reason, not the whole reason. The whole reason is this, Who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live. And we find by manifest experience, that most wicked men are converted, and God hath revealed unto us, that the fullness of the Gentiles shall come in, Rom. 11. and that then shall be the calling of the Jews; therefore we pray for the fullness of the one, and of the other; but with submission unto the will of God, as touching the time of this, and the manner how.

Thirdly and lastly; like as it followeth not, that because we must pray for all men, therefore we must pray for every man throughout the world; in like sort it followeth not, that because our Church prescribes us to pray for all Jews, Turks and Infidels; therefore it prescribes us to pray for every Jew, Turk, and Infidel throughout the world; and look what restraint may be laid upon all men, the very same restraint of interpretation may be laid upon all Jews, all Turks, and all Infidels. Yet you keep your course, and tell us that as God made all things without invitation, (a pretty phrase for them that affect eloquence beyond intelligence) out of mere love, made nothing hateful. Apply this I pray to devils, and see whether we have not as good a ground to pray for them as for others. Again, if sin hath made them hateful, is there not sin enough in the world, in Jews, Turks, and Infidels to make them hateful? Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them, then they should not be hateful to God, and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers; yet seeing they are in the state of sin, and consequently hateful to God; for the same cause, in just proportion of reason, they are no fit matter for our prayers. Though a full measure only of enmity against God exempt men from God's love, yet will you deny that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world? and will not this be sufficient to forbid our prayers for all and everyone? Sure I am, if there be any in the world that sin a sin unto death, we may not pray for such an one.

3. From the authorized devotions in our Church, you proceed to the Catechism; and ask what can be more clear then that, as God the Father doth love all mankind without exception, so the Son of God did redeem all mankind, not only some of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken. And I think indeed that the one is as clear as the other. Throughout the Scriptures show me one passage wherein the love of God is expressed to Reprobates. If the Son of God did redeem all and everyone, then all and everyone have redemption in Christ, through his blood, and consequently the forgiveness of their sins. For in Scripture phrase, remission of sins is that redemption which we have in Christ: so is reconciliation also all one with forgiveness of sins. Sure I am, Christ professeth, John 17. 9. that he would not pray for the world, but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him, and for those that should believe through their word. And for their sakes did he sanctify himself for whom he prayed; and to what did he sanctify himself, but unto his death and passion, by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonado had seen, as the Jesuit himself professeth on that 17. of John: and he had seen very many, as there he signifieth, namely, Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine, Theodorus Mopsuestenus, and Heracleotes, Leontius, Beda, Theophilact, Enthymius, Rupertus.

But to proceed; out of our Catechism you allege, that God the Father made us and all the world; now the Church our mother hath taught us, that God hateth nothing that he hath made. The book of Wisdom saith so indeed; but because of the little authority that book hath in matter of faith from God our Father, therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother. Now you are not ignorant, I suppose, whence the Church our mother taketh this, which hath its course amongst Papists, as well as amongst us. And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists; and what interpretation he makes of this place, though received to be canonical Scripture amongst them, I have already shown out of his Summes: God (saith he) loves all things, in as much as he willeth unto them some good or other: but in as much as he willeth not a certain good to some, to wit, eternal life, he is said to hate them, and reprobate them. And indeed God saveth both man and beast, as the Psalmist speaketh; and so he may be said to love them all; and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to be the Savior of all men, but especially of them that believe. And to profess ingenuously what I think, I see no cause of controversy hereabouts, if so be the question be rightly stated. For when we say, Christ died for mankind, our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankind. Now let this benefit be distinguished and considered apart, and forth with contentious hereabouts will cease. For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sins, and the salvation of our souls; these being benefits obtainable only upon the condition of faith and repentance: As on the one side no man will affirm that Christ died to this end, namely, to procure forgiveness of sin and salvation to all and everyone, whether they believe or no; so on the other side, none will deny, but that he died to this end, that salvation and remission of sin should redound to all and everyone, in case they should believe and repent. For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price, which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world. But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also, even the very grace of faith and of repentance. For all God's promises are Yea and Amen in Christ; and amongst these promises one is, the circumcision of the heart, the healing of our ways, of our rebellions. These promises do include the grace of faith and of repentance. Now consider ingenuously, did Christ die to this end, that the grace of faith and repentance should be bestowed absolutely or conditionally? Not conditionally, for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes, there is nothing to be found in man but works of nature. Now it is mere Pelagianism to affirm that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a work of nature. And the Apostle clearly professeth that God doth not call us according to our works. Therefore it remains, that albeit remission of sins and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance; yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred: and consequently they must be conferred absolutely. If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and everyone absolutely, it would follow herehence, that all and everyone should believe and repent. But this being found to be a notorious untruth, it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces only unto some; and who can those be, other then the elect of God? Accordingly as our Savior professeth, that for those who were God's, and whom he had given unto Christ, or should in time to come give unto him (the rest excluded) for those he sanctified himself, that is, offered himself upon the Cross; which interpretation of Christ's sanctifying of himself, Maldonado professeth, was received by all the Fathers whom he had seen.

Now to go along with you. Secondly, we are taught, you say, by the same Catechism, to believe in God, who hath redeemed us and all mankind. What I pray is this more then to say, He hath redeemed us and all men? Is all mankind more then all men? and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength; and the issue of all was to prove but this, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians.

By the way I observe an incongruity. Of Infidels we are made Christians, as whereby we cease any longer to be Infidels: but I hope of men we are not made Christians so, as to cease any longer to be men. Yet you couple them together under one yoke, though very unequal heyfers: you should have said rather, of mere men we are made Christians. All that are redeemed are unfeignedly loved; but if all mankind signify no more then all men; and all men, no more then all sorts of men, what are you the nearer to that you reach after? And you know, I suppose, that this was Austin's interpretation of that universality; and he gives reasons for it; though you magisterially will have your own way, in spite of the pie, without answering his reasons.

Again consider, whether to pay a price which is sufficient for the redemption of all and everyone, be not in a fair sense to redeem all & everyone. And what one of our Church will maintain, that any one obtains actual redemption by Christ without faith? especially considering that redemption by the blood of Christ, and forgiveness of sins are all one. I would you would speak plainly, and tell us what is meant by redemption, which, you say, everyone hath in Christ, denying that everyone hath sanctification. So that whereas the Apostle joins these two together, where he saith, Christ is of God made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption, you divide them, telling us, that Christ is made redemption to all and everyone, but not sanctification. And truly I had thought that Christ had deserved the one as well as the other, for all those for whom he died. And it is very strange that God should be said to love them whom he never means to sanctify.

But I pray answer me, Doth he unfeignedly love the Devils? I think you will say he doth not; what reason have you then to say, that he loveth all men, though you will easily persuade yourself that the most part of them are reprobates, and whom he never will bring unto wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ, as Augustine writes, lib. 5. cont. Julian, Pelag. cap, 4. and whether you mean to contradict Augustine in this also I know not as yet: yet one word more with you before we part; How long doth God continue to love them? till the measure of their sin is at full? tis your own oracle in the former Section. And then belike he begins and continues to hate them. But I pray consider, how can this change, this alteration stand with the nature of God, that his love, his will to save them should be changed into hatred, into a purpose to damme them, considering that God's will is his essence? And the Lord professeth of himself, saying, I the Lord am not changed, and ye sons of Jacob are not consumed, Mal. 3. 6. All that are baptized, in your opinion, are not sanctified: yet some others much agreeing with you in other opinions maintain, that all that are baptized are regenerate, and they allege a better testimony out of the book of Common prayer, then any you have brought to serve your turn, namely, the profession that is made by the Minister thus, Now this child is regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's congregation. Yet that hath been answered by a Bishop of our Church, and that out of the doctrine of Augustine. Yet I grant, baptism is the seal of redemption, and of forgiveness of sins also, but to whom? to none but such as believe: for God hath not ordained, that the benefit of Christ's blood shall redound to the redemption and forgiveness of the sins of any man, unless he believeth. For God hath set him forth to be a propitiation for our sins through faith in his blood. But your inferences you conceive to be as clear as crystal, so that the consideration of them makes you doubt, whether such amongst us as teach the contrary to these, have at any time subscribed to the book of Common prayer.

And no question is to be made of your subscription, which deny all them to be sanctified that are baptized; though in plain terms the book of Common prayer professeth of every baptized child, that he is regenerate. And now you have plaide your part so well in working our authorized devotions, as you call them, and Catechism to serve your turn; you promise to perform as much touching the book of Homilies; but we must expect your performance therein, until you come to the article concerning Christ: in the mean time you will give us space to breathe, and take notice of your concludent proof, as you call it, thus. God wills the salvation of all that are saved, and all that are not saved, therefore he wills the salvation of all and everyone. Now the second part of the Antecedent, which alone is called in question, is proved out of that of Ezech, As I live I will not the death of him that dieth.

I had thought you had done with this; but if it be your course to tautologize in repeating former arguments, I may take liberty to repeat (without tautology) my former answer.

First therefore, I say, the words as they lie in proper speech are contradictions to your tenent in two respects; First, because in another discourse of yours, you maintain, that he whose death God wills not, is the penitent; but here you profess, that God willeth not the death of them that are not saved, when they die; which as as much as to say, that God willeth not the death of impenitent sinners.

Secondly, there is a time you confess, in the former Section, when God hates sinners, to wit, when the measure of their sin is full; and if then he hates them, he may then as well be said to will their death and damnation, as he was said to will their salvation, while he loved them. In the second place, the words as they lie in proper speech, are contradictions to manifest reason; for, seeing God is he that inflicts death and damnation upon them, he must needs will their death and damnation, because whatsoever God doth, he doth it according to the counsel of his own will, Eph. 1. 11. Secondly, if God doth not will the death which he inflicts, then neither doth he will the punishment that he inflicteth, nor the chastisement that he inflicteth; and so indeed it is said, Lam. 3. That he doth not punish willingly, nor afflict the children of men; which cannot be understood in proper speech; for then it would follow, that God doth afflict and chastise the children of men against his will. Therefore I say, this must be understood by a figure of speech, to wit, by a metaphor; and God said not to will or this or that, which he doth, because in the doing of it he is similis nolenti; as first when he doth it not, according to the Latin phrase, animi causa, for his pleasures sake, but being provoked; and yet not hastily neither, though provoked, but after long forbearance, and giving time of repentance, upon the despising of this goodness of God, as Ezek. 14. 23. They shall comfort you when you see their way, and their enterprises: and ye shall know that I have not done without cause all that I have done in it, saith the Lord God.

Secondly, when God doth chastise, not as parents, for their own pleasures, but with an eye to the good of those whom he chastiseth, Rom. 12. 10. According thereto is that of Augustine, Qui trucidat non considerat quemadmodum laniet, sed qui curat considerat quemadmodum seret.

This is my answer, following the course of your own reading of the place, whereas Piscator blames the vulgar translation in this place which you follow: for, saith he, in the Hebrew it is not, I will not the death of a sinner; but this, I am not delighted in the death of a sinner. But saith he, A man may will that wherein he takes no delight: as a sick man may will to drink a bitter potion, wherein he takes no delight. For he may will to take it, not for it self, but for something else, to wit, to recover his health. And so God willeth the eternal death of reprobates for his own glory, to wit, for the manifestation of his just wrath in punishing of their sins. And Junius reads it and translates it in like manner: and with these accordeth our last English translation, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live, Ezek. 33. 11. And the 18. of Ezekiel doth clear the meaning of the Holy Ghost, where the same phrase is used, and in the same manner translated by our worthiest Divines, and followed in our last translation, verse. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God, and not that he should return from his ways, and live? and verse 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, wherefore turn yourselves and live ye.

Now in this chapter the Lord justifieth himself against an imputation of harsh, if not unjust, dealing, as if he punished the children for the sins of their fathers, which in a proverbial manner was delivered thus; The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; which might occasion a desperate disposition in them, and provoke them to cast off all care of amending their ways, and turning to God by repentance; because all was one, whether they repented, or repented not, because the sour grapes which their fathers had eaten, were enough to set all their teeth on edge: Against this the Lord made a solemn protestation, that all souls were his, even the souls of the children, as well as the souls of the fathers, and that the soul that sinned, that should die; and hereupon expostulates with them thus, Have I any pleasure in the death of a sinner, to wit, so as to bring death upon him, notwithstanding his repentance, because forsooth his father had eaten sour grapes? No, no; the Lord hath no delight in their death, but if they return and live, he delights in that, and therefore concludes with exhorting them to return unto the Lord, that they may live.

Now when you forsake the translation of our Church, and slicke unto the Vulgar corrupt translation, to hold up your odd conceits; doth it become you to make question whether they that oppose you in your extravagant tenets and proofs, have subscribed to the book of Common Prayer? Piscator proceedeth further, and saith, that the meaning is not simply, that God delights not in the death of the wicked, but in case he ceaseth not from his iniquity; as appears, saith he, by comparing of it with that which goeth before, and with that which cometh after: for otherwise God takes delight in all his works: like as Lyra upon Ezech. 18. Punitio improbitatis been est à Deo volita quia justa. In Proverbs 1. 26. thus we read, I will laugh at your destruction, and mock when your fear cometh. How are these places to be reconciled? Piscator answereth, God is not delighted in the death of man, as it is the destruction of the creature, but is delighted therein, as it is the just punishment of the creature: which is as much as to say, he delights in the execution of his own Justice: like as we read, Ier. 9. 24. Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me. For I am the Lord which show mercy and judgment, and righteousness in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.

4. Now as if you had made all sure on your side, partly out of our authorized devotions, wherein you make choice of three prayers; whereof two are nothing to the purpose, and the third, at your uttermost straining of it, doth but encourage you to conclude finally that God wills not the death, but the life rather of them that of Infidels are made Christians; and partly out of the Catechism, where you find that Christ hath redeemed all mankind, which hath no coloutable extent further then all men; and without manifest opposition to Austin, you find this phrase will not serve your turn; whom yet you oppose so, as without answering any one of his arguments; one whereof was drawn from analogy of Scripture phrase, another from manifest reason, professing therewithal that your construction of this place contradicts the prime Article of the Creed.

And last of all, driving the nail of your discourse home, with a concludent proof depending upon a translation of the text quite different from the most authentic translation of our Church, which yet must be without prejudice to your conformity, having a sound heart of your own, and therefore some peccadilies may be well borne withal, and you take liberty to question others your opposites, whether they have subscribed or no to the book of Common Prayer; such is the height of your imperious carriage, bearing down all before you.

Now you come to inquire, By what will God doth will they should be saved that are not saved; and you demand whether God doth will their salvation by his revealed, and not by his secret will. As if this were our opinion; whereas neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concur upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years ago, and which you impugn; and how judiciously, we have already considered. Peter Martyr proposeth it amongst divers others, but embraceth it not; neither do I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations.

As you doubt whether your opposites have subscribed to the book of Common prayer; so if you take a liberty to put upon us the opinions and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not subscribed to the Council of Trent. We plainly deny that God doth will the salvation of any, but of his elect. For to will to save, and decree to save is all one, and election we say is the decree of salvation. And as God hath not elected all unto salvation, nor ordained all unto eternal life, so neither hath he willed to save all. For hence two absurdities do manifestly follow; first, that the reason why many are not saved, must be, because God cannot save them; which is the argument of S. Austin. Another is, that God's will shall be changed: for undoubtedly when God damns any man, then he will not save him; and therefore if before he did will to save them, his will is afterwards changed, both by changing his old will, which was everlasting, and by entertaining a new will, which was not everlasting. Hemnigius, a great patron of universal grace, interpreteth the place of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 2. 4. Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri modo fide oblatam salutem recipere non recusaverint. Neither do I like Cajetans interpretation after this manner, when he saith, Est sermo devoluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus praecepta salutis, doctrinamque Euangelij; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospel to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospel to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certain sign that God will have them to believe, like as it is no certain sign that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; for it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance to all that hear the Gospel, nor to a major part of them; but it is a sign, I confess, that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe. God's commandment is usually called his will, and the commandment of God Schoolmen make to be one of the signs of God's will. So he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. This they call voluntas signi, but yet he was determined that Isaac should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event; this they call voluntas beneplaciti. So he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, this was his voluntas signi; but yet he told Moses, he would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let Israel go; this they call his voluntas beneplaciti; the end whereof was, that God might have occasion to show his power, and magnify himself, in his plagues brought upon the Egyptians, to break those hearts that would not bend unto him.

So that you are out in the interpretation of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, as well as in the accommodation of it, as out of our opinion. God proposeth no signification of his good will to any man, as touching the saving of him, otherwise then by faith and repentance: and plainly protests, that without faith and repentance they shall not be saved.

You would fain have your adversaries grant, that God doth will the salvation of all men by his revealed will, or voluntate signi. Indeed if you may have the fashioning of our opinion, you may soon be victorious, in conquering men of straw instead of real opposites. This distinction of yours is absurdly applied to our opinion, in this case; who deny that God doth at all or any manner of way will the salvation of reprobates. For revealed will, and voluntas signi, is the will of God's commandment, and the objects of commandments are only moral duties, and not the rewards of them, such as is salvation. Yet it is truth, that what God is said to will by his will of commandment (so usually called, though improperly the will of God) the same at once he doth not will, but rather the contrary sometimes, by his voluntas propositi, will of purpose and decree, which alone is properly to be accounted the will of God, and which none can resist, Rom. 9. 19. And this we can prove, and have alreaby proved by two instances; the one as touching the sacrificing of Isaac, commanded to Abraham, but not determined by God that it should be brought to pass; as also in the letting of Israel go, commanded unto Pharaoh, yet God resolving for a long time to harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let them go.

Neither will it herehence follow, that there are two wills in God, as you most unlearnedly urge; but that God may command one thing, which yet he is resolved shall not come to pass; so that the thing commanded may be contrary to the thing determined by God, as when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, but withal determined that Isaac should not be sacrificed.

But God's commandment, though it be usually called his will, yet it is improperly so called; only the will of purpose and decree is properly God's will; according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9. 19. Who hath resisted his will? For the commandment signifieth only what is our duty to do, it doth not signify what God hath determined shall be done. For as for the crucifying of the Son of God; God's hand and his counsel had determined before that it should be done, but he commanded none to crucify him; but rather commanded all the contrary, namely in forbidding the shedding of innocent blood. Neither shall there be a contradiction between the objects of God's will which is one, but only betwixt the objects of his commandment, and the object of his will and determination, as in the instances proposed I have manifested. As for your applications of the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, to the salvation of mankind, I know none of our Divines that embrace it. We plainly deny, that God willeth the salvation of any but of his elect. For God's will we conceive to be all one with his decree, and election we define to be the decree of salvation, or the ordaining of men to everlasting life. So that we may well give you leave to run riot in your fruitless argumentation. You on the contrary do apparently maintain a manifest contradiction between the object of God's will. For seeing God doth damn many, it followeth that he did will to damn many, and that from everlasting, though only for their sin: yet these whom from everlasting he did will to damn, you maintain that out of infinite love he did will to save, till the measure of their sin was full. So that at once he did will to save, and will to damn the same persons by your opinion; thus the contradiction fairly and fully lights upon yourself, which upon a mere fiction of yours, and that contrary to our professed opinion, you charged upon us. We grant the will of God is but one, but we say his will properly so called, and his commandment usually called also his will, though improperly, are two distinct things. For by the one he showeth what is our duty to do, or to leave undone; by the other he determineth what shall be done or not done, what shall come to pass, or not come to pass in the world. Of what force and credit your words are, when you talk of manifest contradiction upon our part, let the indifferent consider and judge.

5. But you will seem to gratify your opposites, by not carrying yourself so rigorously critical, as to banish this distinction of voluntas signi and voluntas beneplaciti out of the consines of Divinity. But therewithal you continue your former fiction, in the stating of our opinion, as if we maintained that God did will the salvation of all, by that will which is called voluntas signi, but not by that will which is called voluntas beneplaciti: whereas I know none of our Divines that do profess their opinion in that manner, but rather they utterly deny in plain terms, that God doth will the salvation of all. And in my judgment, the application of this distinction in this case, by some that are orthodox in the point of Predestination, as namely by Aquinas and Cajetan, is most unseasonable, And therefore we have small cause to fear the imputation you cast upon us, forsooth of canonization of Jesuitical perjuries, and deification of mental evasions or reservations; seeing it is only grounded upon a mere fiction of yours, fashioning our Tenent at your own pleasure most unseasonably, and most incongruously, in respect of our opinion, who grammatically and plainly profess, God willeth not the salvation of all men. And yet I am persuaded that in the end this canonization of Jesuitical perjuries, and deification of mental evasions or reservations, will justly light upon yourself, according to the laws of your own making; and the tenor of your consequences, when you come to manifest wherein this distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti may have place. Yet I purpose to consider well, how you carry yourself in this imputation you cast upon us.

You acquaint us with two Jesuitical equivocations, each consisting in part of a protestation, and in part of a mental reservation. The first as touching the protestation, is this, I do not intend the ruin of King or State; as touching the reservation this, so they will become Roman Catholics. The second protestation this, J know of no conspiracy against them; the reservation this, with purpose to reveal it unto them. Now let us see how you make us to defy these or such like equivocations, upon your fiction of our opinion. You need not trouble yourself about putting any interrogatory unto God, it is enough to prove that God by our opinion doth make protestations of such intentions, or express such speeches with such reservations. God protests, you say, that he would not the death of him that dies; and we (you say) profess this to be spoken with such a reservation, So he will repent, which J know he cannot do. A second is this, God doth not will the non-repentance of him that dieth; the reservation that we make, as you say, is this, with purpose to make it known to him; however, according to my secret and reserved will, I have resolved never to grant him the means, without which he cannot possibly repent, whereas without repentance he cannot live, but must die. To each of these I answer distinctly, and to every part of each.

First therefore I deny, that God professeth any such thing in the place you beat upon, as that he will not the death of him that dieth, but only that he delighteth not, nor hath any pleasure in the death of him that dieth. And not only Piscator and Junius do so interpret the place, but our last, and best, and most authorized English translation doth so render it. And we cannot but wonder at your inconsideration, if you take no notice of it, or at your boldness thus to proceed in despite of it, if you did take notice of it, and yet question your opposites Archdeacon like at least, whether they have subscribed to the book of Common Prayer.

Secondly, touching the reservation; I say it is your own interpretation, as I have read in a manuscript of yours, namely, that he whose death God willeth not, is the penitent sinner. And in the end of the seventh section of this Chapter you profess that God necessarily hates them that have made up the full measure of their iniquity: whence it seemeth that when God saith (according to your translation) I will not the death of him that dieth, it is to be understood with this provision, provided that he fill not up the measure of his iniquity.

Again, I say this supposition of repentance is no reservation, but plainly signified by the tenor of the Prophets discourse, as appears manifestly both by the consideration of the 33. chapter in Ezekiel, and especially by comparing of it with the 18. wherein are found the same words, as I have already shown in the end of the third section. So that we add not this by way of reservation, as you impute unto us, but make it appear to be the meaning of the Holy Ghost, by the tenor of the Text: and if Jesuits did in like sort make their meanings clear unto us, we should never challenge them for equivocation or reservation. We see by this what is the issue of your imputation, which in great pomp you called out deisication of mental evasions and reservations; as if you spent your strength in phrasifying. You seemed to be sensible of your own weakness in justifying this your calumniation, and therefore to give weight unto it, you have your additions, without all congruity to the precedent, of Jesuitical equivocations, whereunto notwithstanding you desired to conform our tenent; and rest yourself wholly upon the odious nature of that conformity, especially as being charged upon God by our opinion, as you manage the matter. But your addition hath no color of conformity thereunto, but proceeds of it self without all respect of proportion. For the Jesuit protesting he intends not the ruin of the King and State, with this reservation, So they become Roman Catholics; doth not add hereunto these words, Which I know they cannot do; I do • not doubt but they have a more comfortable opinion of us then so.

Yet when you come to show how our opinion doth deisie, as you speak, this very Jesuitical trick, the greatest strength of your odious expression of our Tenet, consists in such like addition, whereunto not anything on the Jesuitical equivocations part is conformable. Do you see how well you perform the part of a disputant, and that in making good so foul a calumniation as is the deisying of equivocations? As if you followed the politicians counsel, who bids his disciples be bold to calumniate; for as much as though a man might clear his good name, yet in such a case cicatrix manet calumniae. Fie upon such shameless courses. And as for this addition of yours, what tail of consequence soever it draws after it, it is like to fall foul on your part, and not on ours. For you maintain, that there is a state of man in this life, in respect of a certain measure of iniquity, wherein it is not possible for him to repent. I know no such state, nor any rule that God hath given to himself to confine his grace. Nay to the contrary we read, that neither continuance in sin, nor greatness of sin, doth preclude the grace of God; but that God's grace as it can, so it doth many times prevail over both. But you love not to speak distinctly, but to carry yourself in the clouds of generalities. They that maintain a weak cause had need play least in sight; we say plainly, that God well knows, no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance; the Scriptures in divers places expressly testifying that repentance is the gift of God, though you love not to hear of that ear, nor are well pleased, as it seems, with the music that riseth upon the touching of that string. On the other side, God knows that every man at any time can repent, if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance, yea and that he shall repent also; the habitual grace serves for the one, and the actual and effectual motion of God's Spirit is requisite to the other.

I come to the second parallel of Jesuitical equivocation, or rather the deification of it, as you are pleased out of glorious spleen to calumniate your opposites. The protestation is on God's part, I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth, the reservation, with purpose to make this part of my will known unto him. But where, I pray, do you find any such protestation on God's part? Ezekiel hath none such. In him it is said, I will not the death of him that dieth. But nowhere doth he say, I will not the non repentance of him that dieth. This is a trick of your own device, as if you followed the counsel of Lysander; and where the Lions skin will not reach, you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skin. We profess in plain terms, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth whom he will; and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some, so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others. Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministry of his word, (I mean all those that hear it) To repent and believe the Gospel. So he did bid the Jews, and that with great earnestness, to keep the covenant, Deut. 30. 19. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live. By loving the Lord thy God, by obeying his voice, and cleaving unto him, for he is thy life, and the length of thy days, that thou mayest dwell in the land which the Lord did swear unto thy fathers. 'Yet I hope you will not say, this could be done without grace, though of the nature of grace, what you think, and of the universal extension thereof, I should be very glad to understand, and that therein you would speak your mind plainly.

As for the reservation here, it is most ridiculous, neither is any equivocation of Jesuits, I trow, answerable hereunto: for by reservations, a sense is raised, contradictious to the sense of the protestation; but by this reservation, no contradiction ariseth to the former as it lieth, but only it denieth a certain purpose to be joined with it: but, be it that Jesuits allow such artifice, what Divine of ours doth? Did we say, that God wills not the non repentance of any; we would say, he willeth it not, in as much as he forbiddeth it. And God's prohibitions and commandments are usually (though improperly) called the will of God. And here voluntas signi hath proper place enough.

Like as God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet his determination was, that Isaac should not be sacrificed. Some may have said, that God willeth not the death of him that dieth, in case he repent. But was ever any heard to affirm, that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth, to wit, with purpose to make it known unto him? What madness possessed you to ascribe so incredible a thing to your opposites, so contrary to the rule of fiction, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Callimachus hath set it down.

Your addition here likewise, which draws a long tail after it, hath no conformity to the pattern. And as for the substance of it, as touching God's resolution, never to grant some repentance, or the means of it (if thereby you mean the Gospel) we acknowledge it to be truth: for the arm of the Lord is not revealed unto all, neither doth he give repentance, or faith to all: but hath mercy on some only, even on whom he will; and hardenneth othersome, even whom he will; that is, denieth them repentance, and consequently, they cannot repent, which interpretation of obduration, yourself make in the seventh section following: and consequently they cannot live; this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us.

And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end, you proceed to talk of God's oath in giving assurance, that he will not the death of them that are damned; built merely upon a translation which you follow, different from the most authorized translation of our Church; and that contrary to evident reason: for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent, so he must needs will it; for he doth all things according to the counsel of his own will, Ephesians 1. 11. And yet according to your reading of it, a good construction may be given without all reservations, as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God it self. And what God hath manifested unto us in his word, I hope is not to be accounted a reservation, but a revelation rather. I am not of your mind to think, that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection; or to keep a man's word either, which yet is a better point of morality, then to keep an oath.

Such justice is to be found amongst heathen men; yet works of mercy go beyond works of justice, yet no great perfection neither; but to be merciful to our enemies, When they are hungry to feed them, when they are thirsty to give them drink: this is the perfection that our Savior calleth us unto, and sets before our eyes the goodness of our heavenly Father, in suffering his rain to fall, and his sun to shine on the bad as well as on the good. And here withal, how well your calumniation hath sped, imputing to us the deification of Jesuitical equivocations, let the indifferent Reader judge.

6 Here you proceed learnedly to distinguish between some things determined by oath, and some things else, and in the accommodation of your distinction, you tell us, that Voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in things determined by divine oath, but well it may in other things. What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by divine oath, you express not, but leave to your reader to conjecture. Now because usually when oaths are spoken of by way of distinction, the opposition is made between oaths and bare words, therefore we conceive your distinction completely delivered to run thus. Some things are determined by God's oath; other things are determined by God's bare words. Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the form, nor sound in the matter thereof.

As touching the form. It is not right to say things are determined either by God's oath, or by his word, but rather by his will. For determination is the act of God's will. Words and oaths are but the signification and outward protestation of the determination of his will. Then as for the matter, I see no cause but that by what reason soever the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, hath course in the one, by the same reason it may have course in the other also. For God's word undoubtedly is as certain as his oath; albeit in condescending to our infirmity he is pleased to protest in solemn manner, and by oath, for the strengthening of our faith. We commonly say that an honest man's word is as good as his oath to bind him. Certainly as God cannot break his oath, so is he 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a God that cannot lie, and his will can neither change from within, nor be resisted from without.

When you come to explicate your meaning by instance as touching the accommodation of this distinction, we will perhaps speak more of this. The distinction you say of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in their doctrine who make the bare entity and personal being of men the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting. It seems you desire to speak enough, as if you could hardly satisfy yourself, no marvel if you do not satisfy your reader. Yet in my judgment it is usual with you to over-do. For the distinctions implied by you, of the object of God's decree mediate or immediate; and especially of God's decree mutable or immutable, may soon cast us upon wild-goose meditations. By the entity or personal being of man, I take your meaning is, (for you speak in your own peculiar phrase) to express the pure mass of mankind. This (it seems) you like not to be made the object of election and reprobation, but rather the corrupt mass of mankind after Adams fall. Now because there was an election and reprobation of Angels as well as of men, if you can devise how a corrupt mass should be the object of God's predestination, in the election and reprobation of Angels, you shall perform such a piece of work as never any man adventured on before you.

And as for the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, I am persuaded I shall devise a more commodious place for it, supposing the pure mass to be the object of predestination, then you can upon supposition of the corrupt mass to be the object of predestination. This I presume taking the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti in that sense which they take it that have been the devi • ers of it. But if you shall take liberty unto yourself, to put what sense upon it you think good, and make your own grounds; as Aesop advised his master how to make his undertakings good in drinking up all the water in the sea, to wit, always provided that all the rivers that run into the sea were first stopped. For it were unreasonable that as fast as he drank up, the rivers should pour in, and that somewhat faster too. And I perform my undertakings thus. To promise salvation upon obedience, and to command obedience unto all, is in the phrase of Schoolmen to will the salvation of all voluntate signi. But withal to determine, that by his special grace heo will keep some from sin, and save them, but not others; is not to will the salvation of those others voluntate beneplaciti, whose salvation he is said to will voluntate signi. So that albeit to will and not to will the salvation of one and the same man voluntate proprie dicta, which alone is voluntas beneplaciti, be contradictions; yet to will the salvation of one man voluntate improprie dicta, which is voluntas signi, and not to will it voluntate proprie dicta, which is voluntas beneplaciti, is no more contradictious then to will the sacrificing of Isaac by commanding it, and to nill it by determining the contrary, is contradictious.

Again, if massa corrupta be the object of predestination, which is the more common opinion of our Divines, this distinction in this sense (which I take to be the only true sense of it) cannot be so well accommodated. For as much as in that case, the only way left for salvation is faith and repentance; for performing whereof there is no power in nature, as there was power in nature for the performing of obedience before Adams fall. And you hold it ridiculous to say that God wills the salvation of man so he repent, in case he cannot repent, as but erst you signified.

But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place, if the pure mass be the object of predestination. For (say you) the entity or personal being of man is so indivisible, that an universal negation, and a particular affirmation of the same thing (to wit salvation) falling upon man as man, or upon the personal being of man, draws to the strictest kind of contradiction. All this is but one proposition, but it contains more then one fault. For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men, to follow upon voluntas signi touching their salvation, and voluntas beneplaciti touching their non salvation. Whereas no such thing will follow. For although from voluntas beneplaciti, whereby God doth will the salvation of one man, it followeth, such a one shall be saved; yet upon the voluntas signi, whereby God doth will their salvation, it shall not follow that such shall be saved: like as from voluntas signi, whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his son, it did not follow that Isaac should be sacrified: yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing; but an Estrich will sooner digest a ten-penny nail, then any sober and intelligent Scholar will digest this consequence. If you would deal directly, you should profess, that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction; but that is untrue as well as the former. For unto contradiction is required that it must be, ad idem, secundum idem, eodem modo, & eodem tempore. Now these conditions are not found in this that we speak of. For we do not say, that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man, voluntate eodem modo accepta; for that he wills the salvation of this man, is only voluntate signi; that he doth not will it, is voluntate beneplaciti; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure, is only the will of God in proper speech, and that S. Paul speaks of when he saith, Who hath resisted his will? the other, to wit, voluntas signi, is improperly (though usually) called the will of God. It being indeed nothing else but God's commandment; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his son; yet who doubts but that it was God's will in proper speech, that Isaac should not be sacrificed. And because you perceived how easily the show of contradiction might be washed off, if it were proposed in this manner, therefore you made bold upon dame Logic, and without her leave, and in despite of her, fain a contradiction under another form by way of consequence, which indeed proves most inconsequent.

Thirdly, you speak in a strange language when you say that the affirmation and negation of salvation falling upon the personal being of men, contains contradiction; implying that it might fall otherwise then upon the personal being of men, and in that case it would not prove contradictious; both which are not only untrue, but absurd also. For the affirmation of the salvation of man cannot fall otherwise then upon the person of man, and consequently upon the personal being of man, whatsoever be the cause of it; which cause you most preposterously conceive, to give unto man a being different from his personal being, whereupon, and not upon his personal being his salvation should fall.

Again, no distinction of personal being and other being will serve your turn, to save the affirmation and negation of salvation of one and the same man from contradiction. I say of one and the same man, which is of principal consideration in the course of contradiction, and yet wholly permitted by you in this proposition, though therein you talk of the strictest point of contradiction. Straine your invention while you will, you shall never be able to free these propositions from contradiction; Peter shall be saved, Peter shall not be saved. But to change the nature of these propositions, and of absolute to make them conditional thus; Peter shall be saved if he believe and repent: Peter shall not be saved if he believe and repent not; is neither to affirm nor deny the salvation of Peter. For to affirm or deny the salvation of Peter, is categoricall, not hypothetical. What you want of force of argument, you supply with devotion, as if you came to enchant your reader, and not to inform him; as when you say, Far be it from us to think that God should swear to this universal negative, I will not the death of him that dieth; and yet believe withal that he wills the death of some men, that die as they are men, or as they are the sons of Adam. This is proposed by way of an holy and confident asseveration; but consider how sottish it is, and most averse from sobriety.

For first, what if God had not sworn it, but only said it, had there been the less truth in it for this? Is not God's word sure enough without an oath? yet before we heard, that in things determined by divine oath, the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti could have no place.

Secondly, where were your logical wits, when you said this was an universal negative, I will not the death of a sinner? I pray examine your rules well, and see whether it be not a singular? will you measure the quantity of a proportion by the predicate, and not rather by the subject? Yet if you should do so, it would not serve your turn. For both Aristotle of old hath taught us, that it is absurd to put an universal sign to the predicate; and here is no universality added either to the whole predicate, which is, Nolens mortem peccatoris, nor to any part of it (which you seem to confound.) For he that dieth, is a term indefinite. Neither is it in a necessary matter. For the most holy Angel God could turn into nothing, if it pleased him. And in the 18. chapter of Ezekiel it is apparent, that this is restrained to him that repenteth, without any mental reservation, but by plain evidence of the Text it self.

Thirdly, you harp upon a false string, and an erroneous translation, as it were in spite of the most authorized translation of our own Church, and follow the vulgar Latin herein. And withal in opposition to manifest reason to the contrary; for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon everyone that dieth, and is damned; and he doth all things according to the counsel of his own will, Eph. 1. 11. it is impossible he should do anything and not will it, that he should inflict death on him that dieth, and not will it.

Fourthly, be it as you will have it, that God doth not will the death of him that dieth; will you herehence infer that God willeth not the death of him that dieth as man, or as the son of Adam, implying that notwithstanding he may will the death of him that dieth in some other respect, without any prejudice to his oath? what a senseless collection and interpretation is this? You may as well say, God willeth the life of him that liveth, ergo, far be it from us to say that he willeth not the life of him that liveth, as he is a man, or as he is the son of Adam; implying that for all this God may be said not to will the life of him that liveth in some other respect. But I say that if God willeth not the death of any man that dieth, (as you will have it, and to be confirmed also with the Lord's oath,) then in no respect can it be said that he willeth the death of any man that dieth. For it is both ad idem, death is the same in both; and it is secundum idem, for we speak of the same man in both; and it is eodem modo, for we speak of the will of God in the same sense in both; and it is at the same time, and must be; for God's will is everlasting, and therefore willing whatsoever he doth everlastingly, he cannot be said at any time not to will it. As for the cause of death and damnation willed by God, we maintain, that God willeth not the death of any man, or the condemnation of any man, but for sin. But I pray what think you of infants perishing in original sin? If Goth doth not will their death as the sons of Adam, how doth he will it? Or had you rather shake hands with Arminius in this also, and profess, that no man is damned for original sin only; but that all the children of Turks, and Sarazens, and Jews, and Caniballs that die in their infancy, are saved, and enjoy the joys of heaven, as well as the children of the faithful?

You proceed in your devout asseveration, and will have it to be far from us to think, that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath. We are so far from thinking, that God recalls any part of his will declared by oath, that we do not believe that he doth or can recall any patt of his will that he hath declared by his bare word. And we think it equally impossible for God to lie, and to perjure himself; for he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Neither when he kept Abraham from sacrificing his son Isaac, do we say that he recalled any part of his will, which he had formerly declared by his word, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: for God's will of commandment, signifieth only what God will have to be our duty to do, not what he hath determined to be done: though you confound these usually, and that as willfully and unlearnedly as Arminius himself, because it serves your turn, and advantageth your cause to confound them. But look you to it how you free yourself from maintaining, that God doth recall something which he hath properly willed and determined to be done. For that God willeth the death of no man that dieth, you make to be the word of God confirmed by oath, and you understand it of God's will properly so called, and yet you maintain, that God willeth the death of him that dieth, though not as man, and as the son of Adam, yet in some other manner; which either is flat contradiction, or else God doth recall and change his will.

The last part of your devout asseveration is, Far be it from us to think that God should proclaim an universal pardon to all the sons of Adam, under the seal of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibility of receiving any benefit by it. Here you seem to show your teeth, but I had rather understand your meaning: for to proclaim pardon to all is ambiguous; for it may be done absolutely, as kings on earth grant pardons; and usually our kings grant pardons at the end and conclusion of parliaments. I do not think this is your meaning; for then all should be pardoned; for to proclaim pardon is to signify his Majesty's pleasure that he doth pardon them. But if conditionally; it is true, God proclaims, that whosoever believeth shall be saved, this is a known truth, no man takes exception against it. And how do we exempt any from all possibility of receiving it? You will say, that this we do, in exempting many from all possibility of performing the condition, to wit, of believing. I answer, that your own opinion is to be charged with this, ours is not; for you maintain that Pharaoh after the seventh wonder, was exempt from all possibility of repentance; and the like you avouch of all reprobates, and such as have filled up the measure of their sin, which according to your opinion, may be many years before their death: and in the seventh Section following, you express it thus, Having their souls betrothed unto wickedness: such undoubtedly was Ahab, that sold himself to work wickedness, and many such like.

And in this case you profess in your own phrase, that the door of repentance is shut upon them. But we like not this opinion of yours, we know no measure of sin, nor continuance of sin that doth prescribe unto the grace of God, and forbids the banes of matrimony betwixt him and his Church, but that in a due time the power of God's grace shall break through all obstacles, even through the furious idolatry of Manasseh, in giving his children unto Devils, and that sealed with blood, wherewith he filled Jerusalem from corner to corner; yea, and through his sorcery and witchcraft also, and through the rage of Saul, persecuting God's saints, and making havoc of the Church of God. And for as much as we maintain it to be possible for everyone to believe and repent through God's grace, it is manifest, that we exempt no man from all possibility of believing and repenting, to wit, in consideration of the power of God. But in consideration of the power of man, we exempt not many only, but all and everyone, from possibility of believing and repenting by power of nature. And dare you avouch the contrary? It is apparent that whatsoever you think, you dare not openly profess thus much. And therefore are content to hide your head, and lurk under generalities. So that the case is clear, that you do us wrong in saying we exempt many from all possibility of repenting: I say it is a notorious slander; for we exempt men from possibility of repenting only by power of nature; and so we exempt not only many, but all and everyone from possibility of repenting. But perhaps you may say, that withal we maintain that God doth not purpose to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all, but to deny it unto many, yea unto most; and upon this supposition we exempt them from all possibility of repenting.

But I pray consider, to exempt some from possibility of repenting upon supposition; is this to exempt from all possibility without supposition? For you have delivered this without all supposition. And then the issue is to inquire, whether God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all, or rather to deny it to many, yea to most. And dare you affirm that God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all? It is apparent you dare not openly profess this, and therefore carry yourself in the clouds, without any clear and distinct proposing of your meaning. In S. Paul's days there was a remnant amongst Israel which are called God's election, Rom. 11. and these had obtained this grace of faith and repentance, as there the Apostle signifieth, but the roast were hardened. And if God hath purposed to give grace unto all, you may as well say God hath elected all. But the Holy Ghost witnesseth, that many are called, and but few are chosen. Many I say are called, not all neither, nor the most part; as all experience, and the histories of the world do manifest: and therefore though God proclaims in his word pardon of sin to all that believe; yet he doth not proclaimethis unto all.

By the way I observe, that whereas you say, that God doth proclaim an universal pardon to all the sons of Adam under the seal of his oath; this of God's oath, which you add, doth draw us to conceive that the meaning of those words, As I live I will not the death of him that dies, contains this sense in your construction, that God will pardon the sins of all, and since these words (as you understand them) do not run conditionally, but absolutely; herehence it followeth, that according to your opinion God hath sworn absolutely to pardon the sins of all men, the absurdity whereof I leave to every man's sober consideration.

7. Hitherto you have told us in what matters the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti cannot have place. Now you tell us in what matters it may have place, to wit, in matters of threatenings, or of plagues not denounced by oath. And why not I pray in matters of promising, or of rewards not denounced by oath. Now you have already signified, that look in what matters this distinction may have place, there God may recall by his secret and reserved will, what he hath declared to be his will by bare words. For therefore you professed that this distinction may not be admitted in matters determined by oath, because, Far be it from us thus to think that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath. Let the Reader mark it well, and the force of consequence therehence; which I doubt not but you approve of, as we shall farther understand in that which followeth. Now we are so far from maintaining that God can recall anything, of that which he hath sworn shall come to pass, that we stand in defiance of any such opinion, as maintains, that God may choose whether he will be so good as his word, and that he hath liberty to recall ought of that which upon his bare word he hath testified shall come to pass. And it seems you are ashamed to propose it in these terms, but keep yourself in the general of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, the meaning whereof everyone understands not; and the best Divines take it in a far different sense from this of yours. And they that do understand your meaning and explication, yet do not always consider it, and therefore are the more apt so to be deluded by your generalities.

But proceed we along with you. God by his Prophet Jonas (you say) did signisie his will to have Ninevie destroyed at forty days end; this was voluntas signi: and he truly intended what he signisied, yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti, his good will and pleasure at the very same time that the Ninevites should repent and live. Now I do observe in all this, you do not say God recalls by his secret will, what he signisied to be his will upon his bare word. Yet the reason why the foresaid distinction might not be admitted in matters determined by God's oath, you made to be this, because then God should by his secret will recall that which he had declared to be his will by solemn oath; permitting that God may have liberty to recall what he hath determined (as you speak) by his bare word. But here you forbear these expressions; you decline this precipice. And justly. For if it be a part of God's perfection to keep his oath, as you have said, I see no reason but it should be a part of greater perfection to be as good as his word. Secondly, I say that if God's intentions and God's will be all one; for you to say that God at the same time did intend and not intend that the Ninevites should be destroyed, is flat contradiction. And you do as good as say so. For at the same time God did will that they should be destroyed, you say; and also intended that they should live, which is as much as to say he did intend they should not be destroyed. And I prove it thus: To affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject, at one and the same time, is flat contradiction; but you herein do affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject for the same time; therefore herein you speak flat contradiction. But you pronounce there is no contradiction in this; yet in clearing yourself, your carriage in words is very preposterous. For whereas to purge yourself you should say, there is no contradiction in this speech of yours; you quite besides the cushion tell us there is no contrariety between God's will declared, which you call voluntas signi, and his good will and pleasure, which you call voluntas beneplaciti; and forthwith you tell us there is no contradiction in the object of his will, however considered. All which is delivered very fumblingly, and so perplexedly, as nothing answering to those logical brains and accurate Philosophy, the want whereof elsewhere you pity in others, but not in yourself. I say you speak contradiction, in saying that God at the same time both willed that Ninivie should be destroyed, and willed that it should not be destroyed.

As for contradictions in the objects of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, we maintain that such contradiction may have place without any contradiction in the maintainer: As for example; The object of God's commandment to Abraham (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me call voluntatem signi,) was the sacrificing of Isaac; but the object of God's purpose and determination (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me, voluntatem beneplaciti) was the not sacrificing of Isaac. Which are terms contradictory. Yet is it no contradiction for me to maintain that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son; and yet resolved with himself that Isaac should not be sacrificed.

Yet we must give you leave to take your course, and consider what a fluttering you keep to unentangle yourself of this contradiction, wherein you are not taken as in a snare, but willfully and with your eyes open cast yourself thereinto, presuming either by the fineness of your wit to escape, or rather by the perplexity of your discourse so to confound your reader, as not to discover your fumbling to deliver your solfe.

You say the object of God's will was not one and the same, but much different, in respect of God's will signified by Jonas, and of his good will and pleasure, which not signified by him was fulfilled. And because you repeat this distinction again containing the difference between voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, I must needs tell you the exorbitancyie of it. Suppose God had made known to Jonah, that he purposed upon this his preaching to give them repentance, to save the Ninevites, had this been no longer voluntas beneplaciti? If you think so, I think you cannot name one Divine in the world that ever was of your opinion in this. If it ceased not to be voluntas beneplaciti for all this, then you see how absurdly you make the difference between voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti to consist in this, that voluntas signi is God's will declared, voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed.

The resolution at length to free your former assertion from contradiction, is this, One and the same immutable decree of God did from eternity award two dooms much different unito Ninevie, taking it as it stood affected when Jonah threatened destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected, and taking it as it stood upon the judgment threatened. All the alteration was in Ninevy, none in God's will and decree; and Ninevie being altered unto the better, the self same rule of justice doth not deal with it after the self same manner. The sum of all (were you pleased to speak plainly) would come to this: When he signified by Jonah to the Ninevites, that Ninevie should be destroyed at forty days end, the meaning was but this, that in case they continued in their sins without repentance they should be destroyed; but in case they repented they should not be destroyed. I find no fault in this as touching the substance of truth; but I wonder not a little to see you fail in the accommodation of it, both to the distinction of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti; as also in the reconciling of yourself unto yourself, in respect of what formerly you have delivered concerning the meaning of Jonah's message to the Ninevites. For you do not tell us which of these dooms is Voluntas signi, and which of the dooms is voluntas beneplaciti: or if both be voluntas signi, (as indeed they are) what is left for voluntas beneplaciti to be distinguished from voluntas signi in this place? It seems you distribute those dooms, and make one the object of voluntas signi, and the other the object of vol • itas beneplaciti, in which course there 〈◊〉 no sobriety in comparison to your own dictates. For you make voluntas signi to differ from voluntas beneplaciti in this, that voluntas signi is God's will declared, voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed. According to the tenor of which distinction, both these decrees are to be accounted voluntas signi for God hath declared this to be his usual course; as namely Jer. 18. 7. I will speak suddenly against a nation or a kingdom to pluck it up, and to root it out, and to destroy it. 8. But if this nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their wickedness, I will repent of the plague that I thought to bring upon them: 9. And I will speak suddenly concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build it up and to plant it: But if it do evil in my sight, and hear not my voice, I will repent of the good that I thought to do for them. Neither indeed can you in reason maintain the one of the dooms to be the object of voluntas signi, and the other the object of voluntas beneplaciti. For if Jonah had delivered his message thus, God seeth in what sinful courses you are, and hath determined that you continuing in the same your City shall be destroyed at forty days end; they would never have doubted but that the Lord's determination was, that upon their humiliation and repentance, and turning from their evil ways, Ninevie should not have been destroyed; and so each doom had been the object of voluntas signi, and nothing (for ought I can gather out of your discourse) should remain to be the object of voluntas beneplaciti.

Again, this elucidation of the doubt doth contradict your former assertion, when in contradictious manner you affirmed, that God at the same time did both will that Ninevie should be destroyed, and also intend that Ninevie should not be destroyed; whereas by the interpretation which here you make of Jonah's message to the Ninevites, according to the two dooms by you mentioned, God was so far from intending both the destruction and the not destruction of Ninevie, as that he intended neither the one nor the other. For to determine to destroy them, in case they continued in their sins without repentance, and not otherwise, is to resolve neither one way nor other, but to remain in suspense, which is a kind of reservation of liberty; which heretofore you have so much magnified as a point of very great perfection, and therefore fit to be attributed unto God.

But then I pray consider, did not God from everlasting know whether they would repent or no? I think you doubt not, but that God knew they would repent. And I pray what need was there then of any two such dooms as you have devised, when one would serve the turn, and that absolute, to wit, that God from everlasting determined they should not be destroyed, and thereupon took a course whereby they might be brought to repentance.

By the way I am glad to hear you make the repentance of the Ninevites the object of God's will, which is called, voluntas beneplaciti, which we take to be all one with God's decree; but I have no cause to rejoice to see you thus contradict yourself: for you have in divers places maintained, that no contingent thing, especially no act of man is the object of God's decree: but to the contrary have professed, that God, though he decreed the contingency of things, yet he doth not decree the contingent things themselves. You must be driven to take the same course in respect of God's promises of blessing, as well as of his threatenings of judgment. But to distinguish herein as you do between God's word and his oath, is most out of season. For suppose God had sent Jonah with the same message in this manner, say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord, yet forty days and Ninevie shall be destroyed, might it not admit the same justification according to the dooms proposed by you thus, As I live, Ninevie continuing in this sinful course, wherein I find it shall be destroyed at forty days end, not otherwise.

Or if God should have been charged with perjury in saying this, As I live, yet forty days and Ninevie shall be destroyed; should he not as well be charged with untruth in saying barely thus, Yet forty days & Ninevic shall be destroyed? Now whereas in the judgment pronounced by Jonah against Ninevic, you never speak of any revoking the judgment threatened, though your tenent carried you (as there I signified) so to speak, yet here (the case as you profess being all one) you are bold to profess, that God may revoke the blessing promised (and why (I pray you) may he not revoke his blessing promised upon oath, as well as a blessing promised upon his bare word? for if he may the one without breaking his word, why may he not do the other without breaking his oath. Or if it be not lawful for God to break his oath, dare you say it is lawful for him to break his word? Alas, do your wits carry you? and whither would you carry us, if we should suffer ourselves to be led by you? You conclude with a qualification thus, Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truly the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is unto whom he threateneth destruction. This you say, but I had rather hear what you prove.

By the will of God, called voluntas beneplaciti, we understand no other thing then God's decree, or the determination of his will. And hath not God as truly willed the destruction of them that die in sin, without faith and repentance, as he wills the salvation of them that die in faith and repentance. It is true, God takes no delight in the destruction of any, considered in it self, much less in their sins, whereby they bring destruction upon themselves; but God delights both in the faith and repentance of his elect, and in their salvation.

But this signification of good pleasure, is nothing to the purpose in this distinction; for no Schoolman understands it in this sense. And I well know Arminius, considering the usual acception of Voluntas beneplaciti, amongst Divines professeth, he had rather call it, Voluntas placiti, then Voluntas beneplaciti. If such lettice like your lips, you may make yourself merry with them.

A second extent and accommodation of this distinction of Uoluntas signi, and Voluntas beneplaciti, you allow of, applied to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are cut off from all possibility of repentance. I had thought no man had filled up the full measure of his sin until his, death; like as on the other side, no man hath fulfilled the measure of his obedience, until he hath finished his course, as Revel. 11. 7. When the witnesses had finished their testimony, the beast that came out of the bottomless pit, made war against them, and slew them. You seem to speak it of a certain measure, whereupon the door of repentance is shut upon them, and thereupon excluded from all possibility of repentance; as here you say it was with Pharaoh, especially after the 7. plague upon Egypt; whereupon you have taken great pains to discourse at large in another Treatise, which I have well considered, and examined your reasons throughout, and that following you 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; yet there you confess that it must have been so with Pharaoh at Moses first coming unto him, yea and was possible to have been so, when he was but 3. years old. And indeed I do not see how it can be avoided, but that as many as depart this life in their infancy are excluded from all possibility of repentance.

But it may be you will apply this only to men of ripe years, but by your leave such Pharaoh was not at three years old. And though God willed Pharaoh to let his people go, and sent Moses and Aaron to him to that purpose; yet you say, It was no branch of God's good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent: Rather it was his good will and pleasure to have the heart of Pharaoh hardened: though you restrain this to Pharaohs condition after the seventh plague, for which I see no reason. So that in such a case you will have it lawful for God by his reserved will, to recall that part of his will which he hath declared by his word or oath: and therefore as touching your holy asseveration mentioned in the sixth Section, it must be restrained to them that have not yet filled up the measure of their sin, as Pharaoh had after the seventh plague. For in such a case God may will their death, notwithstanding his oath in show to the contrary. For his meaning is this, As I live I will not the death of him that dieth, that is, I will not his death as a man, or as the son of Adam; neither do I herein defy Jesuitical equivocations or mental reservations; for I take liberty to charge that upon mine adversaries, and therefore you may well think I would not be so simple as to transgress in the same kind myself. And I think so too, if God had not confounded your wits, but it is God's course, and most just, to strike with confusion those that build Babel; and he makes the Egyptians to err in their counsels as a drunken man erreth in his vomit, the issue whereof is to defile himself and his own favorites, even those that sit next unto him.

In the same spirit you profess that God did punish Pharaoh for not letting his people go; as though it had been free and possible for him to repent, though indeed in your opinion it was not. But Pharaohs case was extraordinary, you say, and not to be drawn into example. But by your leave if God did so but once, it is no unjust thing for God to do so oftener; and therefore pray look unto it, that whensoever it is your lot to oppose your adversaries in such a point, you do not lay to their charge that they make God to be unjust, if not for conscience sake of the truth, yet at least for fear of contradicting yourself.

As for the Apostles intimation (you touch upon by the way) that it was an argument of God's great mercy and long suffering to permit Pharaoh to live any longer upon earth, after he was become a vessel of wrath, destinated to everlasting punishment in hell; I profess I am not so quick or accurate as to observe any such intimation of the Apostle. What if you devised this to make good some fictions of yours to that purpose, in another Treatise of yours, which I have already weighed in the balance, and found them a great deal too light of worth, to move any sober man to concur with you in opinion thereabouts.

But whatsoever it be that the Apostle intimates, you seem to express strange conceits, when you talk of God's providence in suffering Pharaoh to live longer on earth, after he was become a vessel of wrath destinated to everlasting punishment in hell. I had thought every reprobate had been destinated to everlasting punishment in hell before he was borne. For God's destination of them is the ordination of his will; and that I had thought you had not denied to be everlasting. But you refer it to a certain time, as in special to Pharaoh after the seventh plague; and in special to all after they have filled up a certain measure of iniquity; and shall not men in like sort be destinated to everlasting joys in heaven after they have filled up a certain measure of obedience? And so a little after you tell us, that men do not become reprobates, till a certain measure of iniquity be filled up; and so in proportion men are not elect till a certain proportion of obedience be filled up. Yet the Apostle plainly telleth us, that the elect are elect of God before the foundation of the world, Eph. 1. 4. and consequently so are reprobates reprobated before the foundation of the world: for the word election of some doth connotate the reprobation of others. Yea Jacob was loved of God before he was borne, and was not Esau hated also before he was borne? Rom. 9. Did God wait till the measure of Esau's sins was full, and the measure of Jacob's obedience, before he did elect the one, and reprobate the other? And if destination unto the punishment of hell, and on the other side destination unto the joys of heaven, begin in time after the obedience of some, and disobedience of others, what is the meaning of predestination? for what is that, but the destination of some to the joys of heaven, and others to the sorrows of hell? No doubt but if you proceed as you begin, we shall have a world of new Divinity communicated unto us, to endoctrinate us in these latter days.

To what end soever God plagued Pharaoh, for not doing that which he could not do, all possibility of amending being taken from him, this action was just in God, and so is the like, wheresoever it be found to proceed from God. And although Pharaoh could not repent without the grace of God, yet I make no doubt but that he could have let Israel go, notwithstanding his obduration. And it appears he did let them go after the ninth plague, which followed sometime after the seventh plague. And so I doubt not but he could have refrained himself from pursuing them when he had once dismissed them. And yet as for not letting Israel go God brought ten plagues upon Egypt, so for pursuing after them he drowned Pharaoh and his host in the red Sea.

Now in confidence of your performances in clearing yourself frō contradictions in one point, you are as adventrous to fall upon another. The Jesuits pretend they can equivocate without lying, and you take upon you to speak contradiction without all contradiction: yet by your leave, if nobody else will, I will take care it may not pass without contradiction. There is no contradiction (you say) between these two propositions; God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh. In like sort we may say there is no contradiction between these two propositions, God from all eternity did will the salvation of Judas; God from all eternity did not will the salvation, but the condemnation of Judas: and to proceed in the strain of your subtle discourse, I go along by you step by step. For albeit Judas continued one and the same man from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all that time continue one and the same object of God's immutable will and eternal decree. This object did alter as Judas his dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbor altered. There is no contrariety, much less contradiction between these, God unfeignedly hateth sinners; God doth not hate, but love the elect, though they be sinners. For here the object of his hatred and love is not the same; he hates sinners unfeignedly as sinners, not having made up the full measure of faith and repentance; but having made up the full measure of faith and repentance, and good works, and having their souls betrothed unto holiness, he loves them. His love of them as elect is no less necessary or usual, then his hatred of them as sinners. But though he necessarily loves them being once become elect, or having made up the full measure of good works; yet was there no necessity laid upon them by his eternal decree to make up such a measure of good works. No; to this sufficed the liberty of their wills, both to perform such a measure of good works, and to carry themselves like stout champions and patrons of this power of their free wills, and to gratify the grace of God so far as to admit her activity, both to admonish them aforehand, and upon their propension to that which is good to concur to the performing of it.

He that walks in the Sun must needs be coloured, and I have so long been versed in the contemplation of your argumentive faculty, that I am grown almost as sufficient to plead for the elects electing of themselves, as you to plead for the reprobates reprobation of themselves; and which of us dischargeth his part best, I leave it to the indifferent reader to consider; and I doubt not but his sentence will be this; Et vitulo tu dignus & hic.

But let us run over the contexture of your discourse once more, and consider it in it self. I say there is more sobriety in saying, God from all eternity did not will the salvation of an elect, then that he did from all eternity not will the damnation of a reprobate. For the only qualification of your saying is this, He did not will the damnation of Pharaoh as a man; but the qualification of my congruous assertion on the other side is this, God did not will the salvation or life of an elect as a sinner. Now I appeal to any man's judgment whether there be not greater congruity between the terms in my proposition, then between the terms in yours. The terms in mine are these, Not will the salvation of an elect as a sinner; in yours they are these, Not will the death of a reprobate as a man. Seeing it is well known, and Arminius confesseth it, that God can turn the holiest creature into nothing, without any show of repugnance unto his justice, But to will the salvation of a sinner, hath some show of repugnancy to God's justice.

But to deal with you closely, and upon a point. I deny that God did ever will the salvation of Pharaoh; and I prove it by two reasons; If he did ever will it, then God's will is now changed; for certainly now he doth not will his salvation: But God's will cannot change, He is without variableness or shadow of change. If God would save Pharaoh, and did not, as it appears he did not, then the reason why Pharaoh was not saved, was because God could not save him. This was Augustine's discourse long ago. For a father desiring the saving of his child, and not performing of it; who doubts but that the reason is because he cannot. It is enough for us that Pharaoh continued the same man; for like as of the same man it cannot be verified that both he shall be saved, and shall not be saved; so neither can it be verified of the same man, that both God will save him, and will not save him. Neither was Pharaoh ever in any other estate, then in the state of damnation.

In like sort the contradiction is evident enough in those propositions which you add to illustrate the contradictious nature (as you pretend) of the former; as if you should say, Ask my fellow whether I am a thief, which is nimis familiaris probatio. As if you should say, I unfeignedly love such a man, and yet I hate him; here is no contradiction: or as if a King should say, I unfeignedly love such a one, yet I will hang him; yet this with more probability may be saved from contradiction.

It is true, we may parcere personis, & dicere de vitiis, love the man, and hate his qualities, and manifest my love in seeking to redeem him from his lewd conversations, by prayer unto God, by persuasion towards the man himself. But to say I unfeignedly love him, and yet I hate him, and think to save it from contradiction, by saying I love him as a man, and hate him as a lewd person; is worse then for Adam to seek with fig leaves to cover his nakedness.

To say God loves men as they have not made up the full measure of their iniquity, is manifestly to imply that God loves a reprobate until he hath made up the full measure of his iniquity, and that this measure being full, God ceasing to love him, God is changed; for God's love is an act in God, and is made to cease after a certain time by your doctrine, and be turned into hatred. More probable it is to say that God hates all men, (seeing they are borne and bred in sin) until they are regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ. Yet this is untrue: For God's love is an everlasting love, as without end, so without beginning.

If you had distinguished of love as Aquinas doth, 1. q. 23. art. 4. and said, that God may be said to love all things that he hath made, in as much as he wisheth some good unto them; but for as much as he wisheth not unto them a certain good, to wit, eternal life, therefore he is said not to love but to hate some, your discourse had been more specious.

Touching a necessity laid upon them by God's decree to fill up the measure of sin, Arminius acknowledgeth, Deum voluisse Achabam mensuram scelerum suorum implere, God would that Ahab should make up the full measure of his iniquity; which is as much as to say that God decreed it; and the Scripture professeth that both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together to do what God's hand and his will had determined before to be done; so then in betraying, condemning, and crucyfying of Christ, they did but that which God determined should come to pass.

And upon supposition that God will expose any man unto temptation, and leave him therein destitute of his grace, all which it is but to harden him; we say it is necessary that men shall go on in sin without repentance, as yourself acknowledge was verified of Pharaoh after the seventh plague: only we say this is necessity only secandum quid, and not simpliciter, and hinders not our liberty: for it is necessary that such a thing should come to pass, but not necessarily but contingently and freely, like as upon supposition of God's decree to make the world; it is necessary that God should make it, but how? not necessarily like a natural agent, but freely, like a voluntary agent.

Yet once again to take a view of your uncouth tenets obscurely delivered, whē you say, Pharaoh did not continue one & the same object of God's decree. It is a very strange speech; for was not the man Pharaoh the object of God's decree? If he was so, & continued the same man, doth it not follow, that he continued the same object of God's decree; notwithstanding his person altered much in the space of his life? You may as well say of one of God's elect, as of David and Paul, that neither of them continued the same object of God's decree, if the alteration of their natures made them become different objects of God's decree. Nay, much more may you say so, because far greater alterations are found in the elect of God then in the reprobate: for in the elect there is found an alteration from the state of nature, to the state of grace; no such alteration is found in the reprobate: the reprobate only grows from bad to worse; the elect have grown so too before their calling, but by their effectual calling they are changed, and of the children of this world, they are made the children of God. And after their calling, though after the committing of one sin, they fall into another, as do the reprobate; yet withal again, they return unto God by repentance; no such alteration is found in the reprobates, but still prosiciunt in pejus, they grow worse and worse.

Again, if because the person of a man altereth, therefore the object of God's decree altereth, seeing that a man's person altereth not only in the course of manners, but in the course of nature, from childhood to youth, from youth to middle age, from middle age to old age, as also from health to sickness, from sickness to health, therefore the object of God's decree in this respect altereth also.

If you say the case is not alike; I say you might then have prevented this objection by plain dealing, and told us not only in what case, but why, in the case you mean, the object of God's decree altereth: whereas we are now driven to fish it out as well as we can, and bring your opinion to light, and set it forth in the proper and distinct lineaments thereof. Now the reason of the difference I conceive to be this, to wit, because God doth not will the death of a man, according to his naturals, but according to his moralls, and considered in his moralls. As if you should say, God did not will the death of Pharaoh, but of wicked Pharaoh.

But say I, Pharaoh did always continue wicked Pharaoh, from his birth to his death, never altering from wickedness to goodness; and therefore even in this respect he still continued the same object of God's decree to damn him. Perhaps you will further say, that Pharaoh, as wicked, was not the object of God's decree of condemnation, but as having filled up the measure of his iniquity.

But I say again, from the first time that he thus became the object of God's decree of condemnation, he still continued the same: for yourself confess, after once they have filled up a certain measure of iniquity, all possibility of repentance is taken from them. The last refuge for you, is to say, that this speech of yours in denying Pharaoh to continue the same object of God's decree, is to be understood not in respect of one and the same decree, but in respect of different decrees, thus; Though Pharaoh were wicked all his life, yet he was not all along the object of God's decree of condemnation, but until he had filled the measure of his iniquity, he was the object of God's decree to save him. For in the consequence you acknowledge, that God doth unfeignedly love all men, until such time as they have filled up the measure of their sin. And accordingly in another Treatise of yours you acknowledge, that men may change from the state of the elect, to the state of reprobates. And immediately before, you profess that God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh.

This you might have expressed in plain terms without faultering, but you were loath, as it seems, to alienate men's minds with so foul a Tenent, touching the change, not of the object of God's will and decree only, but of God's very will and decree also; which manifestly appears by this opening your Tenent, though in terms you profess God's will is immutable, and would have your reader conceive, that all the alteration is in the object of God's will and decree, not in the will and decree of God himself.

And over and above herehence it followeth, that if Pharaoh had died before the seventh wonder (for till then he had not filled up the measure of his sins by your opinion) Pharaoh had been saved, though he neither had faith nor repentance. For till their souls be betrothed unto wickedness, God doth not hate them; this is your dialect: whence it followeth, that either all infants of Turks and Saracens dying in their infancy are saved, or else all men as soon as they are borne are betrothed unto wickedness, and consequently all reprobates from their birth unto their death continue the same objects of God's decree without alteration.

And then again, I pray consider, if God hates them not, and wills not their damnation, until by filling up the measure of their sin they are betrothed unto wickedness (as you speak) then surely he did not hate them, nor will the condemnation of them in their infancy, much less did he will it before they were borne, much less did he will it before the world was made; yet you have already plainly professed, that God willed the death of Pharaoh from all eternity; and if from all eternity, then sure he willed it before the world was made, much more before Pharaoh was borne, much more before Pharaoh had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet I confess that though God from all eternity willed the death of Pharaoh, and consequently before Pharaoh was borne, and much more before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity, much less that he should be damned in his infancy, much less before he was borne, much less before the world was. So that these two propositions may well stand together without contradiction, God from all eternity willed that Pharaoh should be damned; but God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned from all eternity, or before he was borne, or in his infancy, or before he had filled up the measure of his sins. But the propositions which you take upon you to free from contradiction, are of a far different nature, and indeed directly contradictious. God did from all eternity will the death of Pharaoh; God did not from all eternity will the death, but rather willed the life of Pharaoh. And for clearing it, you only tell us that Pharaoh was not the same object of God's decree, though he continued the same man. A proposition both very obscure in it self, and void of all efficacy to free yourself from contradiction, neither do you take any pains to accommodate it, but leaving that as a blank for your propitious reader to fill up after his own judgment or affection rather. And the issue of all is, to profess that God did indeed from all etetnity will the life of Pharaoh, and so continued to will it, until such time as he had filled up the measure of his sin; and that from thenceforth he hated him, as he doth all reprobates, having once betrothed themselves unto wickedness: which assertion manifestly betraying your opinion as touching the making of God's will mutable, your desire to satisfy your reader with calling God's will immutable, and saying that the object of God's decree is not still the same: Sed quid ego verb a audiam facta cum vidiam? You manifestly maintain, that God's love and will to save, doth cease upon the filling up the measure of sin, and betrothing a man's self to wickedness, and thereupon and from thenceforth he hates them, and wills their death and damnation, whereas till that time he willed their life and salvation. These propositions (God loves all men, God doth not love all men) I say, are contradictories. All rules of contradiction justify these to be contradictions.

And yourself confess as much in effect; when going about to clear them from contradiction, you quite alter the form of them, by shaping them thus in effect, God loves all men till they have filled up the measure of their sins, but when once they have filled up the measure of their sins, he loves them not. Now these propositions are quite different from the former, neither do we charge these with contradiction as we charged the former. But that wherewith we charge these is this, they make the will of God mutable, contrary to the express testimony of the holy Ghost, saying, I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6. And Saint James professeth, that with the Lord there is no variableness nor shadow of change, which you perceiving, are loath to speak your mind plainly, but to avoid so gross an untruth, had rather cast yourself upon a manifest contradiction, in saying, God loves all men, and God loves not all men; and to free yourself from contradiction, betray your corrupt opinion another way, in making God's love to change into hatred after a certain time, to wit, after the measure of sin is filled up: and the only shift you have to charm it, is to confound the difference of time (which alone avoids the contradiction) and expressing it thus, God loves all men as men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity; but having made up that, or having their souls betrothed to wickedness, he hates them.

But this will not serve your turn: for seeing this contradiction of making up the full measure of sin, did not belong unto man from the beginning, but only after a certain space of time; the difference specified must necessarily resolve it self into a mere difference of time, thus God did love them till they had made up the full measure of sin, but after that he hated them. And this is further proved: For if the difference only consisted in respect of different considerations at the same time; then the distinction should have place as well after this full measure of sin is made up, as before. And so Pharaoh after the filling up of the full measure of sin, might be said to be loved of God as a man, and hated as having filled up the measure of sin: but nowhere do • you make use of any such distinction. Nay, much more should it have use in this case, and indeed only in this case: for until a man hath filled up the measure of his sin, this distinct consideration hath no place: for a body may be considered as Ens, or Naturale, or as Quantum, because he is both Ens and Naturale, and Quantum.

But a man cannot be considered at any time as having filled up the measure of his sin, but only after that time comes, he may be so considered; for to consider him to be that which he is not, is not to consider him what he is, but to fain him to be what he is not. Again, when you say, God loves all men as men; What is the meaning of this? What do • you denote by this love of God? For we commonly say, love is not in God, Quoad affectum, but Quoad effectum; at least, Quoad affectum, it is nothing at all different from God's will. Now I desire to know what that thing is which God wills to man as a man, or what is the effect of this love: and I doubt not but when you say, God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sin: your meaning is, that God wills their damnation, and that for this measure of their sin. In proportion your answer should be this, That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men; yet here is very great disproportion; for when you say, God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin: I find herein a manifest difference between the reprobate & the elect as touching the cause of damnation, and that on man's part; namely, the making up the full measure of their sin, which is found only in reprobates, not in the elect.

But when you say on the contrary side; God wills the salvation of all men as they are men, I find no difference at all between the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation, either on man's part, or on God's part; for as touching God's will, that passeth (you say) upon the salvation of all without difference: then on man's part likewise there is no difference at all, if they are considered only as men; for the reprobates are men as well as the elect. To help this, you rest not in this consideration of them as men, but add a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the form, thus, Or at having made up the full measure of their sin. Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent, which is untrue; for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second.

But I conceive the weakness of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helps, and thereupon you confound things that differ; for in some cases, the first consideration usually hath place; as when tis said, God hateth nothing that he hath made: therefore he hateth not man, true, say some, he hateth not man as man: and this distinction seems plausible to some, and therefore you seemed willing to help yourself with this by the way, for it might stir some propitious effection in a pliable reader. But then finding this bed a great deal too short to stretch yourself thereon, you added by way of disjunctive another consideration, which is this; As not having made up the full measure of sin. And because you rest upon it, I think good to consider it.

Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates, and in the particular of Pharaoh; and argued, that then Pharaoh had been saved, had he died before the seventh wonder? for, till then in your opinion he had not made up the full measure of his sin: yet we do not find, that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance.

Now I will propose another exception on the part of God's elect. Paul never filled up the measure of his sin, for if he had, then had he been a reprobate; but he was an elect, therefore if he had died immediately after the s • oning of Steven, he had been saved, though accessory to his death; For he kept the garments of them that slew him, as himself confesseth. In a word, all the elect, though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance, should notwithstanding be saved also.

My third exception is against the disproportion that nevertheless is found in these propositions; for when tis said, God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sin, the filling up the measure of sin, is noted here as the cause of their damnation; but in saying God willeth the salvation of all, not having filled up the measure of their sin, the not having filled up the measure of their sin, cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation. And therefore to mend this foul disproportion, the Genius of your tenet, drives you in conscience to proceed, and profess plainly, that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent: and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that do not believe and repent, and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sin. Now herein we agree with you, namely, in justifying the truth of both these propositions.

But like as from the latter it followeth not, that God willeth the damnation of all, but of some only, namely of those that do fill up the measure of their sin, and break not off their sins by faith and repentance: so from the former it followeth, not that God willeth the salvation of all, but only that he willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent. And if you please further to infer that, because perseverance in sin of infidelity and impenitence, as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also: I think I may with as good reason take liberty to infer from the former, that seeing faith and repentance, yea and good works also are the disposing causes of salvation, therefore they are to be accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation, that is of our election also: And so your opinion shall appear at full and to life in his proper coulors, not an hairs breadth different, either from the Arminian heresy of late, or from the Pelagian heresy of old.

8 The deductions you speak of in my judgment deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions. As for moderne Catechisms, you are not the first that nibble at them: it is a point of imperious learning now a days from on high to despise such performances. But to speak as a free man, the less they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them, the less shall they differ from the truth. As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandments, which you glory of now a second time: In this place it is hard, if not impossible to discern by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers, which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him, as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdom. In the close of the second Section of this chapter, you told us, That it was not every degree of man's hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from God's love; and withal, that this was observed by Bishop Hooper. But instead of alleging any passage in him to this purpose, you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter, which is this present section.

Yet concerning that sentence, I see a good construction may be made of it, taking love, quoad effectum (as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God, and not quoad affectum) and the chiefest effect of God's love is salvation. Now it is most true, that nothing but final perseverance in sin doth bereave men of salvation, of glory; nothing but final perseverance in sin, stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject. Now albeit in that which followeth it cannot be judged by your text, what you borrow out of Bishop Hooper, and what you do not. Yet upon consulting Bishop Hoopers Preface unto his exposition of the ten Commandments, I find, that both this sentence following, Every man is called in the Scripture wicked and the enemy of God, for the privation and lack of faith and love that he oweth to God; and all that followeth hereupon to the end of this eighth Section of yours, is taken out of that Preface of his: and I wonder not a little what you meant, not to discover so much, neither by express profession, nor by changing the letter, that thereby at least it might be taken to be another man's discourse, and not your own.

Well, I am willing to consider what you allege out of him, and whether his writings be so consonant as you speak to your deductions. First, you call him, A learned Bishop, and blessed Martyr; Et quis Herculem vituperat? You add, that this exposition of the ten Commandments made by him, Is a fit Catechism for a Bishop to make. I am persuaded, the whole Church of England hath a reverend opinion of his learning, of his holiness, of his martyrdom; and that this Catechism of his is worthy of a Bishop: but it followeth not herehence, that every Bishop in England doth: neither do I think you yourself expect they should concur with him in every opinion of his expressed in this book.

In his declaration of the ninth Commandment. Fol. 80. he justifieth mendatium ossiciosum, and professeth, that it is required in some cases; Do you look that all the Bishops of England should concur rather with Bishop Hooper, then with Bishop Augustine in this opinion.

Upon the eighth Commandment, Fol. 74. he complains, saying, A great pity it is to see how far that office of a Bishop is degenerated from the original in the Scripture, it was not so at the beginning when Bishops were at the best, as the Epistle of Paul to Titus testifieth, that willed him to ordain, in every City of Crete a Bishop: and Fol. 79. ▪as sharply as closely censureth the Bishops of his days, for arrogating to themselves so much wit as to rule & serve in both states, in the Church and in the Civil policy; and to the contrary professeth, that one of them is more then any man is able to satisfy; and that it is not possible that one should do both well, and that it is a great oversight of the Princes and higher powers of the earth, so to charge them with two burdens, when none of them, as he saith, is able to bear the least of them both. Do you expect that all the Bishops in England should be of his judgment in this?

On the same commandment, Fol. 73. as touching those who have great Forrests or Parkes of Deere or Conies, which pasture and feed upon their neighbors ground, or Columbaries whereas Doves assemble and haun • , and those feed on the poor's corn, he refers it to the charity of every man, whether the keeping of such beasts be not against God's laws, and man's laws, and whether it be not suffered rather for a few men's pleasures, then for many men's prosit: Do you think that either Church or State are precisely of his opinion, as it is manifested by this?