Discovery of Jacksons Vanity

CHAP. IX.

IN the first place you tell us that some Schoolmen mould immutability in the same conceit with eternity, and that others make that the offspring of this; but you conceal your Authors. I see no reason for either, but manifest reason I have against the first. For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability, then no man could conceive a thing to be eternal, but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable. But this is most untrue. For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternal both ways, without beginning, and without end; yet did not conceive them to be immutable, for as much as he acknowledged them to be all under motion; and the elements also, as touching their parts subject to corruption. Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning, yet he acknowledged it to be eternal one way, that is, without end, yet did not conceive it to be immutable. The first matter was generally held to be eternal both ways, yet none maintained it to be immutable. And no marvel. For mutation comprehends all kind of motion, and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion, but eternity signifieth only continuance forever.

Now like as continuance for seven years, or an hundred years, &c. doth not require that the same thing should be without all change for seven years or an hundred years, &c. much less doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of years in the conceit thereof: so neither doth continuance forever include the notion of being without all change forever in the conceit thereof.

Adam was made immortal, and so had continued if he had not sinned, yet should he not have been free from all change. The Angels are eternal; that is, such as shall continue for ever, and so were made, yet neither are they now, nor were they made immutable. Indeed there are divers kinds of motions, some are in quality, called alterations; some in quantity, called augmentation and diminution; some in place, called local motion; some in substance, as generation and corruption. Immutability in this last kind cometh nearest to the conceit of eternity, yet there is a difference. For eternity signifieth only an everlasting continuance which may be joined with a possibility of not-continuance, as in Angels, and the souls of men, and our bodies also in the world to come; but immutability cannot be joined with such a possibility; therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutability are much different. And for the same reason immutability cannot be the offspring of eternity, rather eternity is the offspring of immutability. I think both immediately flow from the manner of his being, which is necessary. The like judgment may be made of that you avouch in the next place, to wit, That the true explication of the former contains the truth of this. If by the former you mean eternity, as I think you do, (though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of God's infinite wisdom, which you chiefly place in foreknowing all things, which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will.) In my judgment immutability rather confirms eternity, then eternity confirms immutability: and the knowledge of God's eternity is the offspring of the knowledge of his immutability, rather then on the contrary; and that for the reasons before given, to wit, because immutability infers eternity, eternity doth not infer immutability.

2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt, but in my judgment you do not well to prove it from the infiniteness of his essence; First because this consequent carrieth no evidence with it. That nothing can be added to that which is infinite carrieth some evidence, but that nothing can be diminished from it, doth not. Some have maintained that God can make an infinite magnitude, and a number infinite as Hurtado di Mendosa disputes. Secondly your argumentation is rather à Posteriori then à Priori. For if by essence infinite you understand infinite in duration, which is as much as eternity, I have already shown that immutability better infers eternity then eternity doth infer immutability. But as for the necessity of God's being that doth manifestly and à Priori infer his eternal being, and that it is impossible he should cease to be. And Bradwardine maintaynes that this attribute of God ens necessarium is the first attribute, as whence all other perfections are manifestly derived. For that a less perfect nature should have a necessity of being, and a more perfect nature should have a contingent being is most absurd and impossible. For so that which is more perfect should have his dependence of being from that which is less perfect. Wherefore seeing God is of necessary being, it followeth manifestly that he must be most perfect. Yet I have cause to doubt of your sincerity in affirming, that To infinite perfection nothing can accrewe. It is well known what conceit Vorstius entertained hereabouts, as namely that God's decrees are not everlasting; in which case some new act of will doth accrue to God, which before was not found in him. And I fear you will be found to be of the same opinion. And I pray what meant you in the former chapter and 5. Section to maintain that it is a point of high perfection for God, to reserve his liberty, and what liberty is this but of decreeing? Yet in the same Section you style God's decrees everlasting. But that denomination comes in against the hair, as if it were only to choke your reader and h • nder him from laying that to your charge which this reservation of liberty, (which you attribute to God, as a point of high perfection) doth manifestly import.

When you say, that From infinite perfection nothing can fall but must fall into God, or into infinite perfection seeing that he is in being infinite, in such a conceit strained so high, that it breaks into non-sense and flat contradiction. For if it fall from him, it falls not into him; • f into him, it falls not from him. In like sort in saying that God is indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined, you contradict that which formerly you have delivered in the chapter of God's immensity. For hence it followeth that God is in vacuo which you in plain terms denied there.

3. In the next place you propose a difficulty, and that is this: How God's will or counsel should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free. And instead of answer you tell us, You see not what appearance of difficulty can present it self, at least to such as bear the two former principles before mentioned level in their minds and thoughts. So then two principles will serve the turn to clear all this, provided that we keep them level in our minds and thoughts: otherwise woe be to the funambulus if he swerve never so little awry. Now these principles you say are first, That God is absolutely infinite in being, the other, That he is absolutely perfect according to all the branches of being or perfection by us conceivable or more then all these, perfection it self. If you will believe me, I assure you, I do believe all this, and yet I am as far to seek for clearing of the former difficulty as ever. If the reason be because I do not keep them so levill in my mind and thought as I should, I assure you, I would willingly help this also if I knew how. I would do anything for a quiet life, and to clear such a difficulty as this which in my opinion is a wondrous one, if rightly understood. But I much doubt whether everyone that proposeth it, rightly understandeth it.

For I have found by experience that many talk of the liberty of God's will in proportion to our liberty; Now our liberty consisteth in an indifferency of intertayning different acts of will. But we shall foully err if we entertain any such conceit of the liberty of God's will. For the act of God's will being all one with God's will, and God's will being his essence, and his essence being one most simple act, it was ever impossible that there should be anything found in God which now is not, or that anything should not be found in God which now is. You will say then was it not possible that other things might have been decreed by God then are? Yes undoubtedly even Judas might have been an elect, and Paul a reprobate. Yet other things thus decreed should not have been decreed by any other act in God then now is in God, for the reason above specified, and that for ought I know so received by School Divines, as denied by none. And this is a mystery I confess, wherein we must content ourselves with the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , & leave to inquire how this may be; for we are uncapable of that. Only we can prove that the course of things that now is, in whole and part hath no necessary derivation from God, but merely contingent, and accordingly proceeded from the free will of God, yet everlastingly determining this course of things that now we see; and having everlastingly determined it, this will of God concerning this course of things, hath everlastingly continued immutable unto this day, and so shall forever.

As for your principles how they confer to the clearing of this, I persuade myself you are not able to manifest. And what need, I pray, of making a difference between these principles which seem to be all one; and yourself have coupled them tog • there, as all one in the former section, and in that argument of yours whereby you proved the immutability of God. Yet these principles must be helped with another supposition, that so they may do the deed; that is, That absolute contingency, or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of God's eternal decree, as necessity in other works of nature.

Which supposition to raise your readers thoughts to an admiration of the momentous nature thereof, you say, You have often promised, and once for all by God's assistance shall undoubtedly prove: whereas you might well spare your pains in this, no man being so simple as to question it, were it not that you do intoxicate your readers thoughts in the delivering of it with wild phrases, in calling the contingency of things possibilities aequipendent. enough to slagger a man at the very noise of such cracking of thorns. We maintain that God decreeth not only contingency, but things contingent; as namely Cyrus his restoring of the Jews, and giving them liberty to return to their own country: the burning of the Prophets bones by Josiah upon the Altar; yea and the crucifying of Christ Jesus, the Apostles with one voice directly expressing so much, Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free, continue immutable, and that from everlasting, as indeed being from everlasting. And we say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed, considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting.

In that which followeth we agree with you, that immutability is a perfection, & mutability an imperfection; likewise that to work freely is a perfection, to work necessarily is an imperfection; and where both immutability and freedom of operation meet, the perfection of that nature is so much the greater. But this I find not so scholastically expressed, when you say, That if man were as immortal as the heavens are, he would be more perfect then they can be. This I say wants much of accurateness. For the heavens are not immortal. Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible, but not immortal. For like as in case they were corruptible, yet could they not be counted mortal, because they have no life to lose; so though they be granted to be incorruptible, yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortal, and that for the same reason, because they have not life, which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortal, and for want of life, the meanest of creatures having life do in excellency surpass the heavens.

And if Aristotle had lived in our days to be acquainted with such Astronomical observations as we are, of so many Comets and blazing Stars in the celestial Region, not only above the Moon, but even in the firmament it self, and that of long continuance, and at length wasted and consumed; it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have been changed, considering his apologies and excuses in his books De Caelo, that the body of the heavens being so far remote, and little certain experience (whereupon all natuall reason is grounded) to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof: therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to be taken in the better part, and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a natural Philosopher. And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens, he professeth that all experience did justify his opinion in that point, for as much as there was never known any alteration there. So then, had he known of any alterations there, this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle, and that no alteration was then known, was to be attributed to the weak nature of Astronomical observations in those days, whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions, being no Astronomer himself. In the next place you tell us, that Though freedom in it self be a great perfection, yet to be free to do evil is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedom. This deserves well the scanning. Adam in his innocence was free to do evil was he not? Yet was he made very good, and after the image of God, and no sin had yet estranged him from the life of God, and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection. Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam.

As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any, of all creatures. The perfection of Angels is above the perfection of man. The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocence. Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection, rather then of perfection. And for ought I see, freedom unto evil is no more favoring of imperfection then freedom unto good, considering that they both make but one moral freedom. For to be morally free to do good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will do good or no, and quoad specificationem, is to be free to choose whether he will do good or evil. So to be morally free to evil quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will do evil or no; quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will do evil or good. This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your own phrase, that speaks of freedom unto evil, but to speak in mine own phrase, I should not hastily speak of any freedom of the will of man to evil. You may say as well that the will of man in th • use of the eye is free to behold either colors or sounds which he will, or in the use of the ear is free to judge of sounds or colors as he will. There is a Common sense within, I confess, whereby the will is able to judge of these, but by the eye or ear she cannot.

The reason is, no faculty extends beyond his object. Within the compass of his own object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is only color, and the object of the ear is only sound. And a man may look upon what colors he will of many, that are presented unto him, so by the ear take notice of any sounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the ear appr • hēd ought that is not of the nature of sound. In like so • the will within the compass of her own object, may settle upon what she will, but beyond her object she cannot extend.

Now the object of the will is good not evil, and therefore she is of free choice to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evil. But here some may say how then can any evil be committed? I answer two ways: First by error of judgment. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgment of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a less good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasureable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a far greater damage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superior authority hath forbidden it; both because an evil inclination makes us prefer things presently pleasing and profitable, and withal proud that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawful authority, such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God.

Hence it comes to pass, that we are said also to be free to good or evil, which we may call a moral liberty in distinction from the former, which is liberty natural, and consisteth in being indifferent to do ought that lies in our power to be done, provided that it may seem convenient to be done. As for that moral liberty, it scarce ever was to be found in the world. For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination neither vicious nor virtuous. Now where was ever such a disposition to be found? Not in man before his fall. For he was created good and holy, and inclined only to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God. Some will say, then how could he sin? I answer, his sin was the actuating of his natural indifferency to the doing of any natural thing. As to eat an Apple, or not eat it, or to eat this or that, a thing meerelie indifferent, had not God forbidded it, and in this case restrained his liberty: which prohibition of God's, he hearkening too much to the temptations of Satan, by the ministry of Eve, who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit, without any damage discernible, and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed. Since the fall of Adam a vicious inclination hath possessed all, which even in the regenerate continueth in part, though a supernatural virtuous or religious inclination hath possessed them, whereby it comes to pass that both carnal things are pleasing to them as they are flesh, and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit.

Still the natural liberty continueth in all, to do any natural thing, whether commanded or forbidden of God. For even in the regenerate there is a power to do any natural thing, though God hath forbidden it, and too great a propension to the doing of it, (and that because God hath forbidden it) in respect of the flesh. And in the unregenerate a power also to do any natural thing which God hath commanded, and an affectation to do it also because God hath commanded it; but in the way of hypocrisy to further their own carnal ends and courses, yet have they no religious inclination to honor God. How freedom to evil is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedom, I do not yet understand.

First, what mean you by the creatures freedom▪ Do you mean it of his freedom to good, or freedom to evil, or such freedom as is neither to good nor evil? I think your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good.

Secondly, what mean you by the change of this freedom of the creature? If you speak of the creatures freedom unto good, how is it changed? or into what is it changed? here is nothing to answer, but by saying, that his freedom unto good is changed into a freedom unto evil. Which if it be your meaning, it was very absurd to say, that his freedom to evil did spring from his change into freedom unto evil. For thus the self same thing shall be both before and after it self. Yet you say not, I confess, that this freedom to evil springs from the mutation of the creatures freedom, but from the mutability; that is, from the possibility of change. But that is as absurd. For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change, but rather from the agent that changeth. Why did you not say plainly, it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator? I see a reason of this. First because freedom to evil doth rather go before disobedience then follow after it. Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency, whence came it? The truth is, not freedom to do evil, but bondage unto sin proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker. And this is a state of great imperfection indeed, or rather of great misery, as whereby all mankind are borne children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse. And are you pleased to mince it thus, calling it only a freedom to do evil, whereas if yet we are only free to do evil, it must needs follow that we are free also not to do it; yea and free also to do good, which freedom is nowadays found in none but those whom the Son hath freed, according to that of our Savior, If the Son hath made you free, then are you free indeed.

But let us proceed with you. It was, I doubt not, the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy. But hence it followeth not, that this mutability was necessarily prerequired. For how can that be said to be necessarily, which depended merely upon the free will and pleasure of God, without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God, upon supposition whereof, this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily prerequired before their happiness? Now what kin this is to the immutability of God, or to the reconciling thereof to his freedom, let the Reader judge. As also of the sobriety of that which followeth; God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable, essentially free and immutably happy, because infinitely good. Then follows the order of immutability and freedom; that the ground of this, this the perfection of that. Yet many creatures are free without any such grown as immutability, and where the one is wanting, the other cannot be the perfection thereof. And if we speak of immutability in respect of second causes, is it not in the power of God to make the heavens, the Sun, Moon and Stars immutabl • which notwithstanding should not be any free agents. And undoubtedly, the immutability of God's will rather supposeth the freedom thereof, then is presupposed by it. But these are matters of no great moment, that which followeth is of more, though you do but touche, and away, like the dog at the River Nile, who fears the Crocodile, and it may be herein you fear some bug-bear also. Freedom it self (you say) were no absolute perfection unless it were immutably wedded unto goodness. God's freedom then, you will have wedded unto goodness. In what sense is this delivered? I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth, it is impossible it should be otherwise then good. For it is impossible that God should transgress; As who hath no superior to give laws to him, but rather his will gives laws to all, yet in giving laws to others he gives none to himself.

And if his will were a law unto himself, it were impossible he should transgress it in doing ought. For as much as whatsoever he doth, he doth according to the counsel of his own will. But you I doubt have some other sense which I will labor to start out if I can. You signify his freedom must be wedded to goodness. When a man is wedded to his wife, he is restrained from all others, and must keep himself only unto her.

So belike amongst diverse things whereunto God's power doth extend, his freedom must not extend to all, but be confined to that which is good. As if there were some rules of good and evil prescribed unto God, and he were confined to the one, and restrained from the other. This is Arminius his language, upon which occasion, I have been bold to encounter their 〈◊〉 in two digressions, who maintain that there is a justice tha • doth oblige the will of God. If you would deal plainly in setting down your opinion, and Scholastically, in taking pains to dispute for it, and not in some sory manner to beg the question, I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also.

And at this time, had you named anything that God cannot do in the way of justice, which otherwise he hath power to do, I would have taken the pains, not to consider it only, but to confute it. For I hold that tenent not far from blasphemy. And I do well observe that in expressing this your opinion, you do not signify that God's freedom must be wedded to his goodness, but that freedom must be wedded to goodness. And indeed the freedom of men and Angels is to be limited by the laws of God, who is their Creator, and may and doth give laws unto them. But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto, I know none, no not to his own goodness as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it: but by necessity of nature he loves it, that is, himself, and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth, he must do for himself, and for the setting forth of his own glory, as he shall think good, and not to any other end.

He that is the supreme efficient, must necessarily be the supreme end of all things. So from him and by him, and for him are all things. Much less is he bound to the rules of any goodness or justice without him. But it may be of this we shall hear more from you hereafter.

In the next place you return to show, how immutability and freedom may stand together; and instead of proving it you tell us, that we may easily conceive it, provided that they be rightly joined or sorted. And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them, and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so; (yet that serves for matter of your discourse,) but as touching the right sorting of them, I doubt we shall never hear of in such a manner as you promise, to wit, that our conceits shall easily comprehend it, no more then we have heard of that reservation of liberty which you promised to intimate as a point of very high perfection in God.

Well, the ill sorting of them seems to be the conceiving of God to be freely immutable, and that you say implieth contradiction, if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceit of infinite being. I know no congruity of this discourse of yours. For freedom is only in resp • ct of operation, not in respect of being. For freedom supposeth being according to the kind and nature of the thing which is said to be free. It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man, or that he were not freely reasonable. And no less absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable. You might as well tell us that God is not freely God. And yet if we list to walk along with you in the like vanity of discourse, we might maintain that God is freely immutable, freely of absolute perfection, freely of infinite perfection, if you take freedom in opposition to coaction. For God is not immutable by coaction, nor of absolute perfection by coaction, nor of infinite being by coaction. And to be that which a man is freely, is better then to be that which he is by coaction.

To be freely immutable in your sense, is not a branch of imperfection, but rather of impossibility. For it is neither possible to the Creator, nor possible to the creature. But imperfections imply a possibility, rather then include any impossibility. But suppose there were any such freedom in God, yet it followeth not, that it should put all those perfections which are contained in his nature upon the hazard. For how improbable were it, that God by his will should choose to be imperfect rather then perfect? Possible indeed it were upon this supposition, but yet in respect of his wisdom and goodness, • t were as good as impossible he should will any such thing, though he were free to will it. But God by necessity of nature is immutable, and impossible it is he should be otherwise; & in this nature of his the will of God delghteth. And accord • ngly we may judge of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions: yet by your leave, mutability is not always charged with possibility of doing amiss, but only in creatures reasonable, yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable, yea and without sense and life also, as in creatures reasonable. But to proceed: as it is impossible God should be freely immutable, so is it impossible he should be mutably free.

But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason, more then to be immutably wise, immutably powerful, immutably good. Neither do I like your inference herehence, namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedom, as in power, wisdom, or goodness; like as because God is immutably wise, and powerful, and good, it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisdom, power, and goodness, as he is in freedom. The consequents, that is, the propositions themselves I approve, but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other. Now because God is immutably free, therefore he was, and is, and shall be eternally free, to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodness. All this we grant, and by all which you seem to go a birding, and if your tackling hold, you are like to catch something ere long; and if I mistake not, the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long: Free it is (you say) for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipoten • lie to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate. In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them, I find more then at first blush I dreamed of. For that which you hunt after as now I perceive, is a soryconceit, and such as being granted you, will yield your cause as much support as a bulrush; what need you thus travel to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinks worth the asking. Only you carry it in such a phrase of obscurity, as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery, whereas if • t were plainly delivered, and that in a sober sense, it is no more then this, God hath decreed that some things shall work contingently and freely, as namely, men and Angels; like as he hath decreed that other things, to wit, natural agents, shall work necessarily.

And can you tell who is ignorant of this? or can you show that ever any was found to call this into question amongst Christians? All Naturalists acknowledge this difference between natural agents and voluntary agents; and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from God's inward decree, and outward operation accord • ng to this decree. But what if you have a further aim then this, and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves only to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth, that so in the mean time his intention may oversl • p the observation of foul things broached by you in a few words? For consider I pray, would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this, that God is at this time free to decree this? Why do you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man? For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another? and how contradictious is this to your own often profession of God's everlasting decrees, and also to your present doctrine of God's immutability? For if he be now free to decree this or that, then may some decree of God begin to be, which before was not, and consequently there shall be a change in God. For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not. And if God's decrees be everlasting, and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees, then is God free to change. Perhaps you will say, God's liberty is eternal, (for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of God's eternal liberty.) I answer, God is still and ever shall be free, but in respect of what? In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that God's eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to be made by him or no, is a thing utterly impossible. God alone cannot do this, as Philosophers were wont to say, to make that which is done to be undone, it being a thing implying manifest contradiction.

Again, the liberty of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such liberty is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should be any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not be otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. God's liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you pass over this without any distinction.

Again, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodness; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exerc • se of his power, nor communication of his goodness. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have been free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodness. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.

Your next sentence is as wild as the former, or rather more, not to speak of the coherence of them. For it seems you have no more care of that, then as if you were dictating proverbs. That the course of man's life, or the final doom awarded to every man (though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses) should be immutable, because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more color of truth, then to say the omnipotent creator must needs be black, because he made the crows and Ebony black, &c. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances, as the course of your style is to exuberate in matters of no moment. You might as well have said that there is no color of truth, why God that made a crowe should be a crowe, or that made the swanne should be a swanne. And indeed there is no color of truth in this. For indeed a painter makes a fair picture, but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fair picture, or so much as fair.

And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot, yet no color of truth, that he should be therefore a chamber pott, or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimny, therefore himself should be a clean chimny. Never was any known to be so absurd, as to devise any such inferences. Like as I think never any before yourself was known to affirm, that there was as little color of truth in collecting, that things decreed by God should be immutable, because his decree is immutable. For I pray, what proportion do you find in these? the efficient cause that is aequivocall, is not of the same nature with the effect produced, therefore the thing decreed is not immutable, by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed.

Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likeness between these, as between a fox and a Fearne-bush. Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion it self to bear it out. Now the former inference which you deny, is drawn from the cause to the effect, the later inference which you deny is drawn from the effect to the cause. Yet these inferences you make proportionable. If you would make them suitable, after some such manner as this, it should proceed. God makes crows black; herhence it followeth not that God himself is black, so God decreed to damn Judah • herehence it followeth no • , and what I pray? I am ashamed t • follow the proportion of your inference least so I should utter that which in modesty is not fit, or thus. God makes Judas his damnation immutable; herhence it followeth not that God is immutable, or to help you with a proportioned case fitter for your turn. God makes Judas his damnation mutable, herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable.

This I say better serves your turn, but this is not the inference whereupon you pass your denial, but rather quite cam as we say; God's decree is immutable; herhence it followeth not that Judas his damnation, though foreset by God is immutable. Yet as for that inference proposed, which I said was more fitter for your turn, whoever said that God decreed Judas his damnation to be mutable, or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable? Who ever said that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul, or of any one of God's elect to be mutable?

And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of God's elect, after they have obtained it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touch • ng his elect, that they shall ever be with the Lord, and as touching the reprobate that their Worm shall never die, and their fire never be extinguished? Yet I confess either is simply mutable, in respect that God hath power to alter it. But this kind of mutability is not the object of God's decree. For God doth not decreec to take unto himself power to do this or that. Yet it is true, that by virtue of God's decree some things come to pass contingently, and some things necessarily. But this is only in respect of the agency of second causes, some of them being made by God, agents natural working necessarily, some agents rational and free, working contingently and freely: Not in respect of God's own agency, for whatsoever God doth work outwardly, that must needs come to pass contingently or freely: for it is not in the power of God to work necessarily; it is the perfection of God unalterable, to be necessarily, to work freely. Now the doom of any man is the work of God, and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels, and not the work of second causes: and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of God's decree. God doth not decree, that to fall out contingently, much less doth he decree that after it is, it shall be mutable: speak your mind plainly, and tell us whether the damnation of Judas, or of the Angels that fell, or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable. I presume you dare not affirm this: and what is the reason? not because God wants power to alter, but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise, and his will can neither be changed from within, nor resisted from without, because it is omnipotent. In this case therefore this consequence is good: God hath decreed the damnation of Judas, and his decree is immutable, and omnipotent, therefore the damnation of Judas is immutable, to wit, supposing the foresaid decree of God.

Now consider we the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life; hath God decreed it, or no? if no, then his decrees are not everlasting, the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words, though I fear your meaning is otherwise.

Again, if God hath not yet decreed it, then hereafter he shall decree it, (for he must first will their damnation before he damns them) and consequently there shall be a change in God, and something found in him which before was not, contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter, sect. 2. in these words, Unto infinite perfection what can accrue? If then God hath decreed it, and this decree or will of God cannot be changed, for you confess it is immutable, nor can be resisted, for you confess it is omnipotent; will it not necessarily follow herehence, that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable? This I speak in your phrase, but in mine own phrase I say only that herehence it necessarily followeth, that all such shall be damned, which necessity is merely upon supposition of God's decree: and therefore not necessity simply so called, but only secundum quid, and upon supposition,

So likewise concerning the salvation of God's Elect, who are yet surviving, if God hath decreed it, seeing his will is both unchangeable, and unresistible, their salvation must needs be immutable, to speak in your phrase, but to speak in mine own phrase, it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved.

There is to way to help this, but by maintaining that God's decrees are not absolute but conditional; but it seems you dare not venture upon this assertion in plain terms, though the face of your tenet bespeaks such a course: And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certain disjunctive decree of God. It were a commendable thing in you to deliver yourself plainly of your meaning; for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgment. And indeed if you would deal plainly, and maintain that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely, but to all conditionally, and withal by sound arguments confirm it, there should be no further question; we would willingly subscribe that no man's salvation should come to pass immutably, as you speak, or necessarily, as we speak; no not so much as in respect of God's decree; if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely, but conditionally; and that in such sort as that he may be either saved or damned as he will. But then withal you must maintain that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another; but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will believe and repent or no.

For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon there final perseverance in faith and repentance; yet if God hath withal decreed to give some men faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein, and deny all this unto others; herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation, and not other; and it will necessarily follow herehence, that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance, and perseveran • e, they shall be saved; and as necessarily, that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the denial of the like grace, unless you will say that though God doth not give any such grace, yet they may believe and repent if they will, and therein persevere unto the end: I see no reason to the contrary, but this must be upon your opinion, as before hath been specified, albeit you are not very forward in plain terms to express as much. And in this place you scatter something that seems to me directly contrary hereunto.

For consider, though God's decree concerning the doom of every man be immutable, yet you deny that hethence it follows, their doom shall be immutable. Now this of a conditional decree is evidently untrue, as I presume will appear of it self. For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doom then this; If thou believest, thou shalt be saved, if not, thou shalt be damned; the case is clear that this doom is immutable, not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely, but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God. Therefore seeing you speak of such a doom which you deny to be immutable, it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doom, as salvation, or damnation; but you must needs understand it of a single doom by itself • , as the salvation of Peter by it self, or the damnation of Judas by it self.

And withal you do acknowledge this doom to be forset by the decree of God, which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God. Now I say if it be decreed by God, seeing his decrees cannot be changed, no • his omnipotent will resisted, it must necessarily follow that everyone so destinated to salvation shall be saved, everyone so destinated to damnation shall be damned. The best help you have against this, and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most run, is, that the object of God's decree is contingency, or mutability, (for so you are pleased to confound things that differ.) But you are nothing wary to keep yourself from contradicting yourself. For when you say that God decreeth contingency, you do withal deny that God doth decree • the thing contingent; as you have expressly professed in your treatise upon Ier. 26. Did not Hezekiah fear before the Lord, &c. And withal to make your meaning the more plain, you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity, but withal decrecing the things that come to pass necessarily; yet in decreeing contingency, you deny that he decreeth withal the things contingent.

But in this place you have plainly signified that the doom it self of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God, and not only the contingency of it; And no mervayle, For albeit as touching the actions of men, there may be some color for the exempting of them from being the objects of God's decrees, yet the dooms of men being the actions of God himself, there is no color at all for the exempting of them from being the object of God's decrees. And therefore this distinction of God's decreeing contingency, or mutability, but not the things contingent themselves, will nothing avayle you in this place. For you plainly profess that the doom of everyone is forset by the decree of God: and it is impossible it should be otherwise. For God could not execute it, unless he did will it. He cannot execute the salvation of Peter, unless he did first will it, nor the damnation of Judas except he did first will it, and his will was everlasting, otherwise there should be a change in God.

And seeing his will can neither change, nor be resisted, therefore it necessarily followeth, that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be saved, and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be damned. And thus much as touching the doom of every man foreset by God's decree. You add unto this, The course of every man's life, and affirm, that it also is foreset by God's decree; And this course of every man's life you understand in respect of good and evil moral, as appears by this, that you proportion men's dooms unto the courses of their lives: which can bear no other interpretation then in respect of men's good and evil actions.

• w at the first I wondered what you meant to bring so unequal heyfers to plow under the same yoke, considering that the courses of men's life's in this sense are the actions or works of men; but the dooms of men according to their courses of life, are the actions or works of God, much more have I cause to wonder to read you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God. For as for the good, yea the most gracious actions of men, according to your opinion, they are not foreset by the decree of God. For your profession is (and that as of some singular subtlety and invention) that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent; whence it followeth, that as touching the most gracious actions of men, even faith and repentance (they being only contingent things) that God decreeth them not, but only the contingency of them. How much less fit is it for you (according to the tenor of your opinion) to join all the courses of men's lives, even the evil courses as well as good with the dooms proportional, and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God, as here you do▪ Yet I see how someone in your behalf might plead for you, namely, that this is delivered by you only by way of • upposition, not positively affirmed; but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for yourself, but rather give yourself to the emasculating of God's decree by some frivolous distinctions. For you acknowledge God's concourse to every action.

And in the preface you make show not so much of excepting against the doctrine of God's decreeing all things, as against the manner of decreeing them. And when you speak of the worst courses of men's lives, as of Jewish blasphemy against the Son of God, and amplify the heinousness of their opinion, that maintain it to have been decreed by God, you rather except against the manner of decreeing it, to wit, ineritably, and that as touching the obliquity of it only, then simply against the decreeing of it. Yo • r words a • e these, ch. 1. sect. 15. Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of Jewish blasphemy? Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not, unless to make some declination from ma • fest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost, Act. 4. 28. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation unto God, saying, Verily against thy holy Son Jesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, are gathered together to do what thy hand and thy counsel had determined before to be done. And indeed it is nothing but ignorance, or willfulness in some, and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others, that makes those things seem harsh, which yet notwithstanding their harshnes, are manifestly commended to us in the word of God. For what harshnes I pray is in this: God determined that all the evil that was done to Christ should be done by his permission? And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware, then they that with might and main oppose it, as Arminius, who professeth that the Jews proceeded so far in their ignominious handling of Christ, as God would have them, and this he delivers without all temperament.

And Bellarmine prof • sseth, that it is good that evil should be by God's permission. And yet herein we say no more then Austin professed 1200. years ago, saying, Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotence fieri velit, velsinendo ut siat, vel ipse faciendo. And yourself in this place join the doom of every man with the course of every man's life in good or evil, and suppose them to beforeset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God. Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we do believe God to be eternally and immutably free; yet we do believe he is so, not to decree a new, (for God's decrees are eternal, not temporary) but to do anything that is possible to be done, and to bring forth some creatures, agents natural to work necessarily, others, agents rational to work contingently and freely. As for the resemblance of God's freedom and immutability, your talk of it is like your other discourses; For what resemblance do you find of God's freedom in the mutability of the elements, in the generation and corruption of mixed bodies? The best resemblance of God's • reedome is in the freedom of creatures rational, which are to be found as well in the superior, as in this inferior World. And why should any mutability be a resemblance of God's freedom, who is immutabile throughout? And as for the resemblance of his immutability in the Heavens, to make that good you had need devise a quintessence first, and deny all those appearances of comets, breeding and wasting in the Heavens, even in the firmament, the acknowledgement whereof is now commonly received by frequent observations.

Sure I am the Prophet plainly professeth of the heavens, that they all wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture God shall change them, and they shall be changed, but God is the same, and his years fail not. You may do well to deny the Heavens motion also, & so you may the better free them from all change, for as I take it, all motion is mutation, though all mutation be not motion. That God is both immutable, and irresistible our opinions manifest, so do not yours, but dangerously prejudice them both. But I know no reason why his irresistiblenes should flow from his immutability. For if his immutability be conceived as free from all possibility of change from within, there is no coherence at all between this and his irresistiblenes, which is in respect of agents from without. The essence of spirits is immutable from within, and so were the Heavens, if a simple essence, or quintessence as some call it; but hence it followeth not that any of these are irresistible from without. But if immutability be spoken of in respect of freedom from all change as from without, in as much as no outward thing is able to work any change in the nature of God, then it is only immutability passive, but irresistibility in God is in respect of his power active, able to bow and break all things without resistance, so that in this sense also there is no coherence between these two attributes, as if one could be said to flow from another.

To the preventing of wise contrivances is required not only wisdom to discover them, and means to prevent them, but also power for the execution of this prevention. And that God's contrivances are not prevented, it is a work of his power, as well as of his wisdom.

As for the rule of God's decree, I know no goodness of God to be the rule thereof, but that goodness whereby he is inclined to the setting forth of his own glory, for He hath made all things for himself. Prov. 1. 16. 4. And seeing All things are from him and by him. Rom. 11. ver. last. There is great reason why all things should be for him also, even referred to his glory as to the end. What other goodness you dream of, as the rule of God's decrees, I know not, neither do the Scriptures teach any other, but it is generally your course to dictate much, and to prove wondrous little; Whether your ability that way be the more in store and reserved for some special subject to show it self therein, I know not.

CHAP. X.

VPon this you enter with a fair promise of betteringe or rectifying our apprehensions of God's absolute and omnipotent decree. I hope we shall never be unwillinge to learn of any, much less of yourself. For why should we not affect to have our apprehensions if they swerve from the the truth to be rectifyed, and though in good propension thereunto, yet to have them bettered. For though good be good, yet better is better, especially in so preciou • a point of divinity as about the decree of God. Most of all if it be true (as you say) that in all ages it hath been most difficult, and is so common in this, that no divine can adventure upon any other service profitable, but he must either enforce his passage thorough it, or come so high, as to do homage to it. As for the difficulty you speak of, as you give me no edge to embrace it, so I profess I have no edge to oppose it. But as touching the commons thereof in such sort as in all profitable services to the Church, we must be driven to take notice of it, and that with appropriation to this age above all ages that went before possesseth me with admiration. For what reason can be devised why divines and fathers in former ages could handle diverse worthy points of divinity without touching upon God's decree, and our divines in this age cannot? I doubt your care in this sentence was to vent more phrases then truths. Three attributes you give us of God's decree, namely, that it is immutable. 2. Irresistible. 3. Eternal. But the first of these you choke with strange cautions, a manifest sign that you have some stitch or spleen against this attribute. The first proviso is, if we take it in the abstract; and you give no instance to explain your meaning. I had thought this word, the decree of God had been an abstract, and of abstract signification alone, and not indifferent to signification abstract & concrete also. Decretum, I confess in the Latin is indifferent to signify either in the abstract God's decree, or in the concrete a thing decreed. But God's decree in the English admitteth of no such equivocation, but is of abstract signification only and not concrete.

Your other caution by way of exegeris and interpretation of the former is no less strange, as when you say, Or as it is in God, implying that God's decree may be taken two ways, either as it is in God, and so it is immutable, or as it is out of God, and so it is not immutable. Now I do not find it possible that God's decree can be anywhere but in God, it being an action immanent, or intramanent, not passing forth of God, but abiding within him, such as are all actions called elicit both in men and Angels, as the actions of their understanding, and the acts of their wills. Yet (you say) it is not agreed upon by all, either what a decree is or what to be eternal; at least the most part do not perfectly bear in mind the true importances of an eternal decree. With these differences which you intimate, I never was acquainted, but am ready to be, as soon as you shall inform me of them. I had thought no man had doubted what God's decree is, as namely his purpose or resolution of will that something shall be brought forth in time, either immediately by himself, or by second causes and the agency of his creatures.

And as for eternity, I had thought that all had agreed in this, that to be eternal is to be either without beginning or without end, or both; and as applied to God's decree, it signifieth the being of it without beginning. But it may be you travel in childbirth to be delivered of some subtleties, which you call here the importances of an eternal decree. We are ready to entertain them as soon as they come to light, with such consideration as becomes our poor abilities, in Philosophical or Theological speculations.

First you tell us that to this purpose your former speculations concerning eternity of God's infinite wisdom, have been premised; that is to prepare for the delivery of the child: you fore saw belike you were like to have an hard labor of it, an hard bargain. Yet if a manchild prove to be borne, this hardness may well be endured, and will soon be forgotten. By the way it seems the importances you speak of do concern as well the wisdom of God's decree; as the eternity thereof; and therefore it is that you have premised the speculations of God's infinite wisdom, as well as of his eternity. And all to prevent a mischief, to wit, lest by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture phrases (God fore-knows, or hath decreed all things from eternity) that slumber might creep upon the unvigilant and unattentive reader, with whose dreams many deceived have spoken of God's decree or predetermination of things to come, as of acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; and by a consequent error, resolve that it is as impossible for anything to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. The child is born, but a monster, rather then a perfect child. For the doctrine you propose savoreth strongt lie of making God's decrees to be of a revocable nature. Well, let us consider it piece meal. First, the proposition, then the consequent deduced therfrom. You are jealous over your reader, & that for his good as you pretend; & that is, lest Scripture phrases should carry him too far through incogitancy, and unvigilancy, and unattentivenes, whereupon a slumber may overtake him, & he may dream of God's decree, as of an act already irrevocably finished & accomplished. Well then to conceive of God's decree as of an act already finished or accomplished, is but a dream as you censure it. And dreams have great liberty to err from truth. Let us scan this a little. First, doth it like you to affirm that God's decrees are finished and accomplished, provided that they be of a revocable nature, and may be altered? If this please you, what need you except against the conceiving of God's decree as an act past or finished? For though it be past and finished, yet if it be of a revocable nature it will serve your turn well enough. But if you deny it, positively and simply to be finished, what meant you to put in irrevocably, which manifestly implies an acknowledgement of the finishing of God's decree, though not irrevocably, but so as it may be revoked.

Again, as touching the word accomplished, that is very ambiguous. For like as God's promises which are not eternal but in time, and the significations of God's decrees may justly be said not to be accomplished until they be fulfilled; in like sort God's decrees may be said in a good sense not to be accomplished until they be executed by performing that which God hath decreed. But you speak of the finishing of God's decree actu interno, not actu externo. For you oppose them that maintain that God's decrees of things to come are already (that is, before the things decreed do come to pass) finished. Now never any man was known to dream waking any such dream, as to think or affirm that God's decrees were finished actu externo, that is in plain terms executed before the things decreed were brought to pass.

Now lets examine your opinion cleared from ambiguities. I say the decrees of God were finished actu interno before the World was made; And I prove it thus. Every decree is finished actu interno when it is made and hath existence. But the decrees of God were made and had their existence before the World was (otherwise they should not be eternal) therefore the decrees of God are not only already finished but were finished before the World was made. And the Major I farther prove thus. If before the World things were decreed by God, then also before the World, God's decrees were made and had existence, but before the World many things were decreed by God, therefore before the World, God's decrees were made and had existence.

Agayne I prove that God's decrees are already finished actu interno. Every thing that hath entire and full existence is to be accounted finished, but God's decrees already have their entire and full existence, even as God himself, and so had before the World was; therefore God's decrees are already finished and so were before the World was.

Thirdly if God's decrees be yet unfinished I demand when they shall be finished or whether they shall forever continue unfinished. If forever they shall continue unfinished; then God's executions of his decrees shall be finished before his decrees are; for they eternally shall be finished, these upon supposition never shall. If one day God's decrees shall be finished then either before the execution of them, or with the execution of them, or after the execution. If before the execution of them, then either for a certain space of time before the execution of them, or from eternity before them. If for a certain space before, name that space, and give a reason why such a space of time, rather then a greater or a lesser.

Secondly show what hath accrued to God's decrees whereby after a certain space of time they are said to be finished, for want whereof they could not be said to be finished before.

Thirdly it is manifest, this cannot hold, as touching the decree of creation. For as much as there was no space of time before the execution of that decree. And therefore if that decree were finished at all before the execution of it, it was finished from everlasting before it. And if that decree were finished before the World was made, then also all the decrees of God were finished before the World was made. For all God's decrees are alike everlasting as yourself (I think) will not deny. And here you propose not, this doctrine of any decree of God in special, but of his decrees in general, implying thereby that it is as true of one as of another, and consequently if it holds not in any one, it fayles in all. If God's decrees are finished from everlasting before the execution of them, this is flatly contradictory to your assertion: But if you think to say that God's decrees are not finished actu interne until they are executed actu externo; then they had not their full and entire existence till the execution of them; and consequently they are temporal, not eternal; and though man finisheth his decrees before he executes them, yet God doth not.

Secondly, if nothing doth accrue to the constitution of God's eternal decrees by the execution of them more then before; then God's decrees cannot be said to have their full and entire constitution more at the time of execution then before. But nothing doth accrue hereby to the constitution of God's decree. For the execution is temporal, the decree eternal, but that which is temporal cannot belong to the constitution of that which is eternal.

If they be not finished till after the execution, then God shall be said to execute things before he hath fully decreed them. Add unto this what Mr. Rogers writes in his Analysis of the Articles of the Church of England, printed by authority, and dedicated to D. Bamcroft Archiep. of Canterbury, upon the 17. Article, propos. 2. Those wrangling Sophisters then are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come, as present continually before his eyes; do say that God he did not in the time or age past only, but still in the present time likewise, doth predestinate. Thus I have considered your uncouth assertion, now I come to the consequence you draw herehence; and that is this, It is as impossible for anything to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. But I say this consequence is unsound, and I prove it thus: To recall that again which is past, is absolutely impossible, as implying manifest contradiction; but the impossibility of a thing to be otherwise then God hath decreed it, is merely secundum quid, & exsuppositione. And dare you deny that God's decrees had existence at the very beginning of the world; and is not that time long since past, though God's decrees continue like as God himself, for his will is unchangeable as well as his nature? And supposing things to be decreed by God to come to pass, dare you deny but it necessarily followeth herehence, that they shall come to pass? Yet I confess that of this consequence of yours there is some color, but that which followeth is as wild as ever entered into a sick man's brain to conceive: as when you say, to make God's decrees already finished, is to involve, That God by his eternal and powerful decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistible and irretractable swinge, and since only looks upon it with an awful eye, as masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they go the way they are commanded. Thus it pleaseth you confidently to dictate, and positively without all reason, that which hath neither truth nor color of truth, as it may be made manifest in each member.

For as touching the first member; God doth not only set the course of nature going, but continueth it going, and that not only in working necessarily, but also contingently and freely, which manner of working is always joined with a possiblity of the contrary, and that not only by way of resistance, but even of natural propension also, as appears manifestly in all free agents, whether Angels or men.

In a word, both course of nature, and course of free will is not irresistible, as appears by the issue. For the most determinate course of nature hath been resisted, for the Sun and Moon hath sometimes stood still; nay sometimes the Sun hath gone backward, and that ten degrees in the Diall of Ahaz; the river Jordan hath stood still, and the red Sea hath been divided; and the fire it self hath been restrained from burning the three noble children cast into the fiery furnace. Only upon supposition of the will of God, it necessarily followeth that the course of nature shall have its course, or be restrained from having his course without resistance. For who hath resisted the will of God?

As touching the second member, how absurd is it to infer that God only looks upon the course of nature, if the will of God concerning it be already finished. Whereas God's will is for the continuance of the course of nature, either with disturbance or without disturbance, not of it self, but by the assistance, influence, and operation of God. For in him all things live, and move, and have their being. Pater meus us{que} hodie operatur, & ego operor, saith our Savior. So far are we from denying that there is as much use of power and wisdom infinite in the managing of it, as in the making of it. What odd conceits possessed you to shape so absurd a consequence from this assertion, that the decrees of God are already finished, that is, that already they have their existence? In the next line you discover the original of this absurd fancy of yours, when you say, And as he ceaseth not to work, so doth he never cease to decree. By this I perceive, you would fain have your reader confound God's working with his deeteeing, as you do.

Indeed if we had said that God's works are already finished; it would follow that he should be a spectator only and not a worker for the time to come. But we say no such thing, we say that his decrees are finished and that from everlasting, we do not say his works are finished. Though you are pleased to confound these to make unto you matter of extravagant discourse, yet I pray give us leave to distinguish them: Yet here you seem to give a reason why God doth never cease to decree, and that drawn out of the Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all things according to the counsel of his will: when I consider that which went immediately before, I thought you had hereby gone about to prove, that God ceaseth not still to decree, which is as much as to make decrees; But when I look upon the collection you make herhence, I find you have no such meaning: For your inference is only this: So that albeit the counsel of his will by which he worketh, be eternal; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Now of this no man maketh any question.

But the question in present is not whether God's works be already finished, but whether his decrees be already finished. We say they are and were from everlasting, because from everlasting they did exist. You say they are not, but as God doth not cease to work, so he doth not cease to decree. Which in my judgment is a strange assertion, and the comparison is without all proportion; For God's works are temporal, and God brings forth new works one after another daily. But God's decrees are eternal and therefore cannot he be said to bring forth new decrees daily one after another.

And though all his works he brings forth according to the counsel of his will, yet both this counsel and this will of his is eternal. Here you propose a question, shall we say then, he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us? And you answer it affirmatively in a certain sense which is this, He doth not now first begin to decree them. Now I appeal to every judicious Reader to determine, whether this interpretation of yours be not plainly contradictious to the manifest meaning of that assertion which you interpret. For if God doth not new begin to decree those things that befall us, doth it not manifestly follow here hence that he hath already decreed them, rather then that he hath not decreed them already? We willingly grant that God's decrees have no end but continue the same still, but you would have us think that they are still in making.

As God himself was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlasting, in like sort God's decree or will was from everlasting, and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadow of change. But albeit God's will continueth the same without change and end, yet I find no example to justify this phrase of yours, in saying God now decreeth the things that befall us; and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that do befall us; and that by the same reason; for his decree hath no end. And is it a sober speech think you to affirm, that God doth now decree the creation of the World, or the fall of Angels, or the turning of Adam out of Paradise, or Noah's flood, or the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone? You say it is much safer to think on God's decree as present to the whole course of our life, then as it was before the World: for so we shall think of them as of acts past and finished, more irrevocable then the laws of the Medes and Persians. Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World, if this be as much as to be now past and finished, then also it is true, that they are acts past and finished; which you deny; If to be before the world be not to be past and finished, then to think of them as they were before the World, is not to think of them as acts past & finished, which yet you say it is, but without all reason in this case. And I pray what think you? are God's decrees, which you dare not to deny to have had their existēce before the world, of a revocable nature? Certainly they are no more alterable then that which is past irrevocable. But like as God cannot be said to be past, though he was before the World: Because he still continueth and shall continue forever: So the decrees of God cannot be said to be past, though they were before the World; because the same will whereby he decreed all things, doth continue without all change and shall continue forever, though the things decreed and willed by him do change from things to come to things present, from things present to things past. But the laws of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making, which they utterly take from them being enacted. Very well observed, and therefore let us think it fit to maintain that God's decrees are still in making, and none of them made, no not the decree of creation, nor of redemption, nor of sanctification, of all the holy Patriarchs & Prophets that ever were; lest otherwise we should spoil God of his liberty. By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing still, but never doth anything, lest after he hath done it he have no longer any liberty to do it or leave it undone. These conceits have as much wisdom as sobriety in them, being equally removed from both. For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as great liberty of will the last year of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. years old, notwithstanding many things had been done by him in the space of 900. years, which to do or not to do in the last year of his age was not a thing indifferent unto him. And were it not a mad thing to affirm that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty? or that the more idly a man liveth, the more liberty he keeps in store, and the more painful he is, the more his liberty perisheth?

2. God's decrees are infinitely more unalterable then the laws of the Medes and Persians. For God cannot change, man can change. God's will cannot be resisted, the will of man may be resisted, even the will of the greatest Princes, by God himself, by his Angels, by men, by foreign enemies, by their own subjects. The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable, are either evils of sin, or evils of punishment; you will not say evils of sin. For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of God's decrees. If evils of punishment, it is false to say that God's decrees do not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men. For no decrees of men do make evils of men inevitable, but upon supposition of transgression.

Now it is of an undoubted truth, that punishment designed by the decrees of God, is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men. For many malefactors escape the hands of men, but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God. Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of God's judgments to overtake them, it is said, that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travail upon a woman with child, and they shall not escape. You are besides the truth when you say that wisdom hath just warrant to make decrees for men; this belongs to power and authority, not to wisdom.

The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make laws to bind him, but rather the Prince though inferior in wisdom, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to govern, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisdom of the governor to be bound to aim at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himself. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent habuit potestatem. When you say that too strict obligement unto laws positive or decrees unalterable, deprives both law-givers and others of their native liberty and opportunity of doing good, I find nothing sound in all this. For you confound the liberty of nature, which is equally common to all, with liberty of condition, which is greater by far in one then in another. Secondly, you range God the supreme Law-giver, with other law-givers which have only power deputed unto them; no obligement unto laws doth deprive any man of liberty natural. For whatsoever is forbidden any man, yet is he never a whit the less naturally free to the doing of it then before, though in case he transgress, he is subject to censure and punishment. And of this natural liberty you speak of hitherunto, as being most proper for the nature of decrees, that is, liberty from coaction and natural necessitation, though now you divert from this unto civil liberty, which is only liberty from subjection.

As touching the laws of men, it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation, because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out, and by too strict observation of laws, summum jus may prove summa injuria. But this cannot without great absurdity be applied unto the decrees of God, who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing, but foresaw all things that were to come. And by the way, what do you manifest hereby, but a strange fancy, that in some respects it were fit God's decrees should be alterable, lest otherwise he might be deprived of liberty, in taking opportunity of doing good: implying withal, that God in course of time takes notice of something, whereof from everlasting he was not conscious. And though the Pope in reserving to himself power and liberty to send them forth or call them in again, doth take upon him more authority then is fit, because he hath neither wisdom nor integrity answerable to so great authority: yet seeing God wants neither wisdom nor integrity, it seems fit in your judgment (as may appear by the tenor of this sentence) that he should make decrees, and recall them at his pleasure. And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse, and since also you professed that God's decrees were unalterable; yet here you plainly signify that God's wisdom and integrity may well bear him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurps, to wit in making grants at pleasure, and at pleasure to revoke them. Which I confess the Pope doth with a great deal more ease, then he doth draw in the same breath, which once he hath breathed out; which if he doth, yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to do at his pleasure, unless he hath some extraordinary device that I know not of. I doubt your mysteries are not yet full; you seem to commend the condition of mutability, as a condition befitting the wisdom and integrity of God; it remains that you do as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition, that so with the better grace you may reject it, as unbeseeming the nature of God. In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text, and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should show how alteration of decrees is no sign of a fickle disposition, you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no sign of a fickle disposition. For by the same decree may different awards be executed, without any revocation or alteration of the decree. It was long ago the saying of Gregory, that Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. But by the way you signify that the former practice of Popes in making grants and recalling of them, is no sign of mutability. A manifest untruth. Nay yourself labored to justify such a change, as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparent change: but you justified it by the opportunity to do the greater good thereby, provided that wisdom and integrity be answerable. So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it, yet: apparently there is a change. But: the administration sometimes of rewards, sometimes of punishments doth argue I confess no mutability in decrees. One and the self same laws of men do cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons, yea and to the self same persons at different times, without all color of change in the laws themselves.

Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before, I will not inquire, for what do I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgment you do not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by laws then by the wills of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good laws, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to choose, the reason in my opinion why they will choose to be governed by laws, is because by laws they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evil. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give laws and to execute just • ce thereby, then to be trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of laws, which may be particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in special cencerne them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himself, or a brother, or near of k • nne, which is a shrewd temptation to provoke him (though otherwise uncorrupt and fit enough to mak: general laws) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partiality to corrupt the course of justice.

Secondly, in case government is by succession; laws are most necessary, because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himself, or if he should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripeness of age and experience he shall be fit for government: and by experience we find that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyranny in the son. And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their country and people, have sometimes remitted off their absoluteness, the better to enjoy the hearts of their subjects (which is the best maintenance of perpetuity) then by force to compel them. Yet by your leave every Act, whereunto princes pass their consent doth not restrain them of their former liberty, or abate something of their present greatness. For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents; yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a year, or restoring and confirming unto him the customs called runnage and poundage, I do not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty, or abates anything of his present greatness.

It is true the laws of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them; and therefore they are said non cavere de particularibus; for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences, yet in this case there is an help in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences; without so much as taking any notice of the Pope, as the Chancelor of Christendom. For if S. Peter himself were alive and Bishop of Rome, yet what should he have to do with governing of States? Our Savior would not meddle with dividing of inheritances, and professed his Kingdom was not of this world, & Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feed his sheep, not with any civil coerc • tive power and authority to govern them. Yet Popes have laid title I confess to both swords: but the unfittest that ever were to manage either, such abominable abuses and corruptions have been found amongst them in the managing of both, as I think are without example.

But that rule of the Canonists, Papa • nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much inamour you, and great zeal • oth inflame you to apply it unto God, to free him from impotent immutability, as hereafter you call it, and that his decrees may not oblige him, and indeed they do not; for how can he be said to be tied or restrained that is confined to nothing against his will, but to everything according to his will? But to free God from an impotent immutability, you would have his decrees, not alterable, (for you dare not profess so much) but something else, I know not what, which you call reservation of liberty, and to be still as it were in making decrees, but not having decreed any thing till the time of execution or afterward: mysterious inventions of your own brain, which if perhaps you seem to understand yourself, I assure you I do not: but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this.

3. In this Section, you begin with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternal power of jurisdiction. This is a truth and will nothing serve the turn of your reaches. By the way you deliver unto us the object of God's foreknowledge, and that you say is whatsoever will be; and the object of God's decree, and that you say is whatsoever may be, which later is a most absurd position. Look we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done they make choice to decree the doing of such courses, as seem most convenient. Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God which God can do, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to pass. As for example, before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made, was this by virtue of God's decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been p • ssible or no.

Again, was not the creation of the World, is not the end of the World decreed by God, the rewarding of the godly & the punishing of the wicked, are they not decreed by God? What moves you then to make only things possible the object of God's decree, and the things that will or shall be only the object of his foreknowledge? This wit of yours is able to make us a new World of Divinity and Ph • losophy both, if it be let alone to run a wild goose race at pleasure. Well, God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternal power of jurisdiction. What of this? In the next place, you tell us that, what grant or promise soever he makes cannot bind the exercise of his everlasting liberty for a moment of time: they last no longer then Durante been placito: seeing gracious equity, and only it, is his everlasting pleasure. Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure; and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises do proceed from his gracious equity, and this you say is his everlasting pleasure, and his grants and promises must last you confess during his good pleasure, is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make, they do so far bind God to performance, that we may assure ourselves they shall stand good forever and never be reversed? Only you discourse that they shall last no longer. And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity? Or what wisdom is found in such discourse as laboreth to prove that God's grant, shall last no longer then during pleasure, and withal confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting. But no promise you say, binds the exercise of his everlasting liberty for a moment of time: It is fit to consider this. To my judgment God's promises bind him as much, as our promises bind us; the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty, but to keep our honesty: For what promise soever he makes, he is still free naturally whether he will perform what he hath promised or no; but if he breaks his promise he shall be unt • ue. In like sort God if he should do otherwise then he hath promised, he should be untrue, though never a whit the less free. And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the less free.

For even men do freely keep their promises though not always willingly, because when they promised they might be of one judgment and disposition, and when they come to performance they may be of another. But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God. Every honest Magistrate is free to recompense every man according to his evil ways; for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs, he will not punish him. And look what a good Magistrate resolves upon, when facts are committed either good or evil; the like may God decree from everlasting. For no Mag • strate knows so well what man hath committed, as God from everlasting knows what he will commit. And more then that, God knows how to keep man from evil courses, or to expose him to evil courses, by having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will; which power and wisdom is not incident to a creature. Besides all this, a Magistrate is bound by duty, to recompense every man according to his works. But God is not bound by any such duty, to any such course. He can pardon one and p • nish another; have mercy on one and deal severely with another. Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some, deny repentance unto others. And if he hath made any such promise as this. If his children forsake my law and walk not in my judgments, if they break my statutes and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes, yet my loving kindness will I not take frō him, neither will I falsify my truth; they to whom such promises are made, may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much, bound I say by moral obligation in such sort, as it is impossible he should do otherwise, yet shall he perform it never a whit the less freely; First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation, and because he is as well pleased still to do it as to promise it. For as much as look of what judgment and disposition he was when he promised, of the same he is when he makes it good; and consequently performs it as willingly as he made it.

It is not always so with man in the execution of his promises. If God's one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fits all the changes, several dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angels, as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for everyone of them; what moved you heretofore to profess that the reservation of liberty, and that to make grants and to revoke them, is a point of so high perfection, as that you would fain bestow it upon the nature of God? What mean you here to profess that God ceaseth not to decree, which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were, that God is still in making of new decrees. God's decrees continue I confess as God himself continueth, and more unalterable then laws of Medes and Persians. But neither could they be said in this respect not to cease to make laws, so neither can God be said not to cease to make decrees. For like as while laws are in making, they are not yet made; so to intimate that God's decrees are in making (as you do while you say God ceaseth not to decree) is to imply that God's decrees are not yet made; which you do more plainly signify in the words following, when you say, They are conceived and brought forth as well befitting them as the skin doth the body, which nature hath enwraped in it. Whereby you manifestly profess that God's decrees are brought forth in time, not only the executions of them, and thus howsoever you flatter your readers ear with bestowing on God's decrees the title of everlasting, yet you plainly declare your mind that they are brought forth in time, together with the execution of them.

And hereto properly tends that reservation of liberty which you magnified as an high perfection, and the power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them, as a power only fit for God. And to this purpose you seem to discourse of eternal liberty, making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporal condition, lest if they were eternal, they should deprive God of liberty. Let every indifferent reader judge whether this be not the language of your heart, disclosed by the tenor of your discourses, howsoever you style God's decrees eternal; herein like unto boat-men, that look one way and row another.

Besides, by this discourse of yours you seem to acknowledge no other • d crees of God then in rewarding them according to their works; for hitherto tends the congruity of God's decrees, which after your manner you amplify as no less congr • ous to the actions of men, then the skin to the body. A very good resemblance by the way, that as the skin doth befit the body, so God's recompenses do befit men's works. Yet this you apply most incongruously to God's decrees (for thereof runs your discourse) and not to the executions of them, and withal as touching the actions of men, though never so gracious, though actions of faith, love, repentance, these I say are not objects of God's decrees in your Divinity; but only the rewards of them. No not Cyrus his restoring of the Jews, nor Josiah's burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, nor the children of Israel's coming out of Egypt, nor Pharaohs dimission of them; and infinite the like, God decreed none of these by your doctrine. He decreed only the contingency of these actions, not the actions themselves.

Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of, when in the next words according to your course of argumentation, you tell us, No man living (as you take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Eli's line from the priesthood, or his two sons destructions by the Philistines. For here you seem to imply a grant that God decreed it, but not inevitably, and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition, but not absolute. Now it is well known that Solomon deposed Eli's house in Abiathar freely, and the Philistines by free actions of theirs were the death of Eli's sons. And therefore if God decreed them, the very free actions of men are the objects of God's decrees; and consequently no action by the freedom thereof is any way hindered from being the object of God's decrees. All which is directly contrary to your opinion, who maintain contingency to be the object of God's decree, and not the thing contingent, as you have plainly expressed and professed in another Treatise; and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men, as if the actions of men were no objects at all of God's decrees.

Again, is it a sober distinction which here you imply, as if the decrees of God were some evitable, some inevitable; well it may be accommodated to the executions of God's decrees, but most absurdly to God's decrees, which being everlasting as you confess, were before anything could have existence to avoid them. Yet we plainly profess that God decreeth some things to come to pass necessarily as works of natu • e, some things contingently as the actions of men. Again, some things to come to pass inevitably, as the end of the world, some things to come to pass evitably, as the judgments of God, which may be avoided by repentance. But you desiring to speak home, tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Eli's house. Indeed decrees are free, or else they are no decrees. Neither the making of the world, nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God, but freely. Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration, and add very cautiously (I take it) implying this • o be your opinion, not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others. And as if you were fearful lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception, you propose it of absolute necessity; and so you think That no man living (whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise, that matters not) will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Eli's line. So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition, yet if he doth not say that it was absolutely necessary; or if he doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it; yet if he doth not say that this was so from all eternity, or though he should say this also, yet he shall not contradict you, provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it.

And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this, and if you had used the like wariness in every sentence, he had need rise betime that would go beyond you in this k • nde of wariness and circumspection; yet to make all sure, you give a reason of it, saying, For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternal liberty. And herein you say very true, for if it were absolutely necessary for him to decree this, surly it were not absolutely free for him whether to decree it o • no.

Yet I find some in opinion have transgressed in this later, but never any in the former. For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent, and conceived him to be a necessary agent, yet never believed that it was necessary for him to decree the deposition of Eli's house, or ought else. And therefore you do not well to prove a more plain thing by that which is less manifest. We have as good stuff in the next. To say that before Eli's days God past any act that could contstrain his eternal liberty of honoring Eli's family, as well as any others, were impiety, because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability. Herehence are certain Aphorisms to be selected, worthy our consideration. 1. God is not to be charged with anything that is impotent; but there is a kind of immutability that is impotent; therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability. Now to att • bute unto God • hat which doth not become him, is a kind of blasphemy. The contrad • ctorie hereunto doth become God, and must be attributed unto him, to wit, immutability. For mutab • lity and immutability are terms contradictory; and it is one of the most general principles that are, that one of two contradictory terms may be attributed to anything, therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable, it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable. And in haec Amph • arae sub terram abd • tae? Old Prophet Ma • achy dost thou hear this, that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God, I the Lord am not changed? And thou James the Apostle, how hast thou deceived us in ll • , that with God there is no variableness nor shadow of change? Yet now we are taught that it is no l • le then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable, yea it is to ascribe impotency unto him. He must be mutable that he may be potent.

Well, let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist, to wit, in not being able to reverse his own act: so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his own act. Here by the way it is acknowledged that God's decrees are acts past, otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no color of mutability. Yet hitherunto it hath been denied, that God's decrees were acts past. And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty. For so you thought better to discourse, then at the first to profess any revocable nature of God's decrees. But now that conceit not fadging, and yourself as it seems not thoroughly satisfied, you plainly break forth, and adventure to maintain that notwithstanding God's decrees are acts past, yet he can change them, and thus far he is mutable, and to say that God is immutable herein, is to charge him with impotency.

From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprunge. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrained. I answer, this is a vain fiction, proceeding from the vain consideration of man's infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fain break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therefore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther then to do what we can or will.

Now though God can do otherwise absolutely, yet he will not do otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to do this it is impossible that he should do otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfulness, or sicklenes or the like, and yet do not we say that the deposition of Eli's race, or the death of his Sons were absolutely necessary.

But God had ordained them to come to pass contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary, and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage, but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage. If you rest yourself upon such a decree of God, They that dishonor me them will J • dishonor what need you trouble the World with such distasteful speculations, as to affirm that to say God is immutable, is to charge him with impotency? But this is an indefinite proposition, and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God, you must deny that the will of God to depose Eli's line in particular from the Priesthood, was eternal, and affirm thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty, but not to do it until Eli had dishonored God. And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations; and these do far better suite with your first course, namely as touching reservation of liberty, and suspension of resolution, then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past.

But the common and general opinion of making God's decrees eternal made you to shuffle in that a long time; and at length plainly to fall fowl upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise, God's liberty should be restrained. Of Cicero Austin saith, that dum homines fecit liberos, fecit sacrilegos. And you to make God free make him immutable; and think to help it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent, like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceive.

4. In conclusion you tell us, that to think of God's eternal decree without admiration void of danger; we must conceive it as the immediate axis or center, upon which every successive or contingent act revolves. And I profess I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration. And the object of my admiration is, upon what axis or center your wit did revolve when you pleased yourself with this resemblance. Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an heretic. For it had need be understood first. And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this. For like as he was a worthy Scholar that bid his Master give him positions and let him alone to prove them; so no l • sse worthy a Scholar is he also, that gives his Master leave to speak what gibrish he will, yet nothing doubts of understanding him; In this Section hereafter you say that God's eternal decree is coexistent to each human thought or action: But in what sense it is, your axis or center whereupon every contingent act doth revolve, you nowhere explain that I know. As how every act (many of them being instantaneall) hath a revolution, or how the whole body of contingent actions being drawn into one by aggregation may be said to turn round. As if time from the beginning of the World unto this day did turn, and the change of things to come into things present, & of things present into things to come, were a sphericall change; or lastly how God's decree is the center hereof, and yet coexist with every part of the circumference; These are mysteries I confess which we cannot think upon without admiration, yet no other danger herein do I find in hast, besides the wasting of precious time in the consideration of so wild and extravagant speculations. Yet one word more of this before we part. Every contingent act revolves you say upon the axis of God's decree.

Now I demand whether these contingent acts are the objects of God's decrees or no. If not, what hath God's decree to do with them? or they with the decree of God? let them rather be thought fit (if you please) to revolve upon the axis of God's knowledge, and that will be with far less danger unto your tenet. For this revolution of contingent acts upon the axis of God's decree, doth savor strongly of making them the object of God's decrees. But this you may remember is directly opposite to your tenent, who maintain that God decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves.

The next member of the first sentence in this Section had been very mystical, had we not been already reasonably well acquainted with this dialect of yours in the chapter of eternity. And upon my remembrance of that your discourse, I take that, wherein the whole frame of succession and contingency is fully comprehended, to be no other then that precious creature called time, wherein all contingent things come to pass, and so are comprehended therein as in the measure of their existence and duration. For of such a comprehension (as I take it) you do discourse, not of substantial or integral comprohension; For I see no reason why the decree of God should not be the axis of the whole body of contingent things as well as of any particular of them, whereon to revolve. But you make a far greater quiescent to be the axis of this, by which greater quiescent, I think you mean God's eternity. For that alone is it, as heretofore you have expounded it, which draws all the successive parts of motion into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. I am now almost grown as perfect in this canting language as yourself.

But herein I had need of your help for satisfaction, as touching certain points. As namely, why time should be accounted by you, an inconstant and moveable sphare. Time I confess cannot be conceived without motion, but it is neither motion it self nor a thing moveable. Yet in the course of it to my understanding it is most constant; for things never so different in constancy or inconstancy are still measured with the same time; as whether motion be uniform or difforme, swift or slow, the same or different, yet the time wherein motion is, is still the same.

But least of all do I see any reason, why you should account time a Sphere. For a sphericall form is proper unto bodies, & such bodies moving round are said to move spherically, but of sphericall time I see no congruity. Again, why should you account eternity a far greater quiescent, then the decree of God, you may as well say that eternity is a greater quiescent then God himself. Eternity as it is duratio manens, without beginning and without end, so it is of God's decrees also.

Thirdly it is impossible that all the successive parts of motion should be drawn into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. For motion can neither be made indivisible nor permanent. Well it may cease, but it cannot be drawn into permanency, or indivisibility. Again, duration permanent of indivisible unity (if I understand the language aright,) is eternity. But motion cannot be drawn into eternity, no more then eternity can be drawn into motion. To swallow up motion into a vigorous rest • understand right well what it is, I am pr • ty well acquainted with this language.

It is for a Sphere of Heaven to turn round in a moment, that is to turn so swiftly, as to stand stock still. For to be where it was immediately before this instant is to stand still. Yet if such a revolution should be in an instant, then every part of the larger Sphere should have coexistence local with all and every part of the lower Sphere under it, provided you understand it aright, & so shall every part of the lower sphere have coexistence with all and every part of the Sphere above it, without any pains more then ordinary. And that whether it move swiftly or slowly; to wit, in an instant. This is sober discourse, is it not? For if one body may move twice so fast as another in an instant; then in half an instant it may move as fast as the other in an whole instant.

In the next place you tell us, that God's foreknowledge is included in the conceit of his eternal decree. And you speak of the foreknowledge of things contingent. For of no other things but contingent have you spoken in reference to God's decree; hence it followeth that contingent things are the object of God's decree; and that therefore he foreknows them, because he hath decreed them; otherwise how could the foreknowledge of such things be included in the conceit of God's decree? But that the foreknowledge of such things depends upon God's decree, is a thing which you impugned in the 8. chap. and 5. Sect. pag. 96. 97. God's ubiquitary presence you have heretofore compared sometimes to a center, sometimes to a Sphere. And there must be an analogy as here you signify, between his decree and his ubiquitary presence, and therefore we must believe the decree of God to be as the axis or center upon which every contingent act revolves, but you do not infer that therefore it must be as a Sphere also; yet analogy requires this as well as that.

Neither did you tell us that God's ubiquitary presence was as a center whereupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of God's decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceit is (you say) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing, otherwise. Now to prevent this suspicion, we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving God's decree (or fore-knowledge rather) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves. We say that by virtue and efficacy of God's decree, not only some things come to pass necessarily, as the works of natural agents: but other things also come to pass contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, only upon supposition of God's decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to pass: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.

In like sort supposing God's foreknowledge of things to come, (which foreknowledge of God not only is today, but was before the world was made, though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are, and afterward also with the notion of knowledge) it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily but contingently: Here follows a list of what you will prove; when time serves: 1. That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most human acts. I pray tell me, had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world, and before that also? If it had, what mean you to say he doth decree it, as if this decree of God which yet you call eternal, had not existence till now? why do you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world, the turning of man out of Paradise, the drowning of the world in the days of Noah; the destruction of Sodom, and the like, for you have no color of reason to justify your phrasiologie herein, but only this, that though (God's) decrees be eternal, yet they still continue. Now this is as true of the decree of creation, and the rest above mentioned, as of any other decree. Secondly, what mean you to qualify your assertion, by saying In most human acts: as if you durst not avouch it of all? Are not all human acts of a contingent nature, and consequently have a contingency in them? and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others? It may be that herein you have reference to the Jesuits distinction, of future contingents absolutely that shall be, and future contingents conditional that should be, if and in case some condition were put in esse. But how then will you prove, that the acts of men that shall be, are of a greater number, then those that might or should be, in some case? For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed, is in most human acts. I have a manifest reason to the contrary. For the number of things that might be upon supposition, is far greater then the number of things that are, have been, and shall be; for in case the world had been made twice bigger then it is, and twice as many men as there are, and should last twice as long, the number of human acts would be far greater then these are, wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency.

Again, the Jesuits maintain that God hath not only decreed contingency in human acts, but the human acts themselves, which you do not: we maintain that God decreeth the actions of men themselves, that they shall come to pass contingently and consequently; decreeth the contingency of them, but not that only, but the actions themselves. As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel, God decreed not only the contingency of it, but the act it self, that it should come to pass in a contingent manner. Josiah's burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, God decreed not only the contingency of this act, but the act it self, to wit, to come to pass in a contingent manner. So Cyrus his restoring of the Jews out of captivity, to their country, was an human contingent act, and God decreed not only the contingency hereof, but the act it self, to come to pass in a contingent manner.

2. The second Aphorism is, that God's eternal decree doth coexist to each human action throughout the whole succession of time. This we do not deny, no more then we deny God's coexistence with every action: but heretofore you have professed, that God doth at this present coexist with all things, not only with all things present, but with all things that are to come: and this we deny, because God cannot coexist with that which doth not coexist with him: and therefore seeing things past, and things to come, do not at all exist at this present, and consequently do not coexist with God, therefore we profess that God at this present doth not coexist with them.

In the next place you say, that God's decree doth inspire them with contingency in their choice. It was wont to be said, that praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato; rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth, then his decree; for his decree was from all eternity, yet nothing was inspired into man, till the creation, nor into us men, until we are brought forth, and grow capable of inspirations. When you talk of contingency in our choice, you might have spoken plainly and called it liberty in our choice. But doth God continually inspire this? It is too absurd: to inspire, is to bring forth something anew: as when God doth inspire good motions into us. You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us, as liberty of choice; more congruous it had been to say, that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures. For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a liberty of choice in all that we do: and he moves us so, as that we may move ourselves more ways then one. But when doth he move us thus? in the very time of doing ought, or before? and so doth he move us by persuasion only, or by mediate operation on the will? For all this whereabouts alone there is question nowadays amongst Divines, we have nothing but blanks here: you are yet only upon the promise of performance, and not upon any performance it self.

Yet whilst it moves them, it withal inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents, which were foreordained, to the choices which we make, whether they be good or evil. That is, God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved, they that die in impenitence shall be damned. Wherein you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God, to wit, of an indefinitive nature, thus, Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not, shall be damned. But that these men in particular shall believe, and repent, and so be saved; others shall neither believe, nor repent, nor be saved, you will be wise and wary enough to keep yourself from the acknowledgement of any such decree, unless it be provided that God be not charged with any such impotent immutability, as not to be able to revoke his decrees. For though the Pope wants wisdom and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himself, as namely, of making grants, and again revoking them; yet God doth not.

CHAP. XI.

I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this, or in the Chapter following; yet having begun this work of examination it is fit to consider these also, if it be but to take notice of what you deliver, and rightly to understand the meaning thereof.

They which fetch light beyond the Sun, must be content with Star-light; and they which cannot satisfy themselves with day light, but seek for star-light, they are well enough served if they go to bed darkling. We commonly say, Life is sweet, and it is a truth, not because it is a principal stem of being, in my judgment, (for reason is a more principal stem of being then it) and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable, as to creatures reasonable. And you confess that the appetite of preservation, of it self is natural unto all; yet it cannot be denied but that life is subject to sour things as well as sweet: whereupon some have said, Non est vivere sed valere vita. And 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Better eye out then always akeing; and better once dead then always dying. Nay the hope of a better state, without all others consideration, may make this life of ours distasteful unto us, I desire to be dissolved, saith S. Paul, and to be with Christ, I am not of your opinion, in your construction of the Maxim, Omne ens qua ens est bonum, as if the meaning were, that it is good it self, for that which is good, and that whereunto a thing is good, should be rather different then the same, for the terms of relation, must be distinct. Your instances, are very incongruous, you should say, that poison is good to it self, not to the asp, for the asp is a different thing from his own poison, and so is the Adders stinge, from the Adder. And as sure I am that even of poison, good use may be made for the service of man; And the Scorpion cures the wound, that is made by his own sting: And even of the Adders sting, God the Creator of it, hath a good use evē in stinging, and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he saith:

If natural qualities of contrary nature, do fight for the maintenance of their own being, it seems being to them, is as sweet, as life is to us, though life be a principal stem of being. How transcendentall goodness, should be equally communicated by God to all, and not equally participated, by all, I understand not: the contrary seems true to my opinion, for as much as like as there can be no communication, where there is no participation, so there can be no equal communication, where there is no equal participation; And though a less vessel, may be as full as a greater, yet there is no equal communication of water unto them both, and the comparison is no way congruous, for as much as it is an easy thing, to distinguish between the water and the vessel, filled with it, but not so easy to distinguish between the thing, and the being of it. Rather thus. God doth sit everything with qualities, or parts according to the being thereof, or as it shall require, like as every vessel small and great are filled with water. The being of a fly, of a man, of everything is good in it self, and as it may be, and is referred to the glory of God, for God made all things for himself.

But in the things that God hath created, there are degrees of perfection, some creatures have only being, some being and life also, some add sense unto them both, some have reason over and above them all. The degree of entitative goodness, cannot arise from the specifical nature of it, for so it should arise from it self, for the degree of entitative goodness in anything and the specifical nature thereof is all one; Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodness is as bad or worse, as when you derive it from the degree of their specifical nature: As if the specifical nature of a thing had degrees, which is untrue, as I remember; Aristotle compares specifical natures or forms of substances to numbers, that admit no intention or remission; three flies are as truly three, as three Elephants.

The difference of individuals under the same species, is merely accidental not essential; Thus, that one is not so happy as another, is an accidental difference, not entitative or essential; It is true, sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once, yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman, that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds, upon his five senses. It is not the fruition of goodness incident to one sense that defeates another for the time, of that it most desires, but rather want fruition thereof by your instances. For if the belly be satisfied, it is free to delight in music also, if pinshed with hunger not so, yet too much feeding I confess may bring a man asleep, and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise, either of body or mind. On the other side deep contemplation, as you say pines the body, and is occasion of far worse accidents also sometimes; as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematical operations, made him neglect the Soldier that came upon him, and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies, to the great grief of Marcellus the General, who had given chardge to the contrary. The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hands, though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him, had been more worth, to an ingenuous Conqueror, then the taking of Syracusa. I have great cause to be sensible, of that of Solomon's, of making many books there is no end, for I think if I should live Methusalehs years, yet I should not make an end. Much study is a weariness unto the flesh, but by the goodness of God I find this weariness, with a little refreshing quickly to vanish, and I return unto it with as great vivacity of mind and Spirit, as ever I did before. I desire to do the task, which God hath appointed for me. And if death prevent me, yet it is good to dy doing something. I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get, the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied, yet it is true I confess the more we increase in knowledge, the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge. For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgment, enabled to proceed in knowledge. And this capacity of ours will never be thoroughly satisfied, till the enjoying of God himself, yet I see not how the nature hereof hitherunto can be said to hinder the entire possession of ourselves, whether contemplation be vain or not vain, whether it be used as a pledge of a better life to come or no, I see no reason why it hindereth or furthereth the possession of ourselves, though it hinder or further our possessing of God.

Certainly that life to come is no part of ourselves, like as eternal death is no part of the damned selves. But eternal life is a condition that God bestows upon us, and everlasting death is a juste recompense, which God inflicts upon others. Yet in what sense contemplation may be used (as you say) as a pledge of a better life to come, I am to seek. The Spirit of God and the fruits of sanctification, are the pledges and earnest penyes hereof, but contemplations are not; How Angels are said entirely to possess their angelical natures, and men not to possess their natures entirely hath need of explication. Angels have no bodies, and consequently are not capable of augmentation as we are. In this sense I conceive how we by degrees attain to a fullness of age, Angels doc not. There is a growth of our souls in knowledge also, Eph. 4. 13. in grace, 2 Pet. 3. last. This fullness of age is not all at once in us; you suppose it is so in Angels, but without distinction; for there are Angels of darkness, as well as Angels of light. What think you of Angels of darkness, do they entirely possess their Angelical nature, or no? I should think they differ not in nature Angelical, though their accidental condition be much different. As for the elect Angels, do you think they do already possess all that may belong unto them, either in respect of knowledge or glory? It appears Eph. 3. 10. that the very Angels themselves do increase in knowledge, and that by the Church. It seems also, that though they are void of sin, and so void of sorrow, in respect of themselves, yet that all tears are not wiped from their eyes in respect of us; for if there be joy in heaven for one sinner that repenteth, what is there in respect of the falls of God's children? No question but the nature of man at best is inferior to the nature of an Angel. And on the other side, as little question is to be made (I should think) whether man shall not be as happy in his kind as the elect Angels in their kind: in the 20. of Luke, our Savior professeth, that the time shall come when we shall be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , like unto the Angels.

God's infinity is nothing pertinent to the comparison of men and Angels, from whom Angels as well as men are infinitely distant, as the creature from the Creator; yet this infinity of God's joy is vainly amplified, by saying, he wanteth no moment of time to enlarge or perfect it by continuance, whereas time is no measure suitable with the being of God, no nor with the being of Angels. Yet God hath continuance, it cannot be denied, both without beginning, and in respect of being, without end, which is an essential perfection of God, as much as any, as being but the interpretation of his necessary being, whereas all the being of a creature is merely by the free will of God, and yet continuance to the creature adds no perfection. For will you say that the Angels and Saints of God in heaven do grow more and more perfect by continuance. In this world for a while we grow more and more perfect by continuance. But then again it is as true, that by continuance we decay more and more both in body and mind.

Aristotle hath said, that Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius. But of the transcendentall goodness of God (you say) you now entreat not, but of the transcendentall goodness of the creature, which you make to consist in doing good to others: and withal you deliver another maxim, namely, that amongst visible creatures, the better everyone is in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. And I confess this latter stands in much congruity with the former. But I have already shown my dislike of the former, and given reason for it, and I see no reason to embrace the latter. A Lyon is the king of beasts, but of more good he doth to others, then the inferior beasts whereon he preyeth, I am nothing conscious. An Eagle is the king of birds, yet we commonly say, that a Lark is better then a Kite. What creature more profitable then the Sun, yet I pray consider, doth not a Mouse, or an Emmet, or a Fly, in entitative perfection go beyond it? for these are animate, the Sun is not, though God sends him forth as his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroom bedeckt with light & comeliness, as you are pleased to expatiate or take the air, & breath yourself in a rhetorical flourish. God himself to the contemplation of whom the Sun you say doth invite us, though from the boundless Ocean of his internal joy and happiness (as you say) sweet streams of perpetual joy and comfort more incessantly issue, then light from the Sun, to refresh this vale of misery. Yet I hope you will not say, his entitative goodness consists in doing good to others.

For before he made the world, he was no less good, then since the creation; and though he had never made it, yet had he continued every way as good as now he is. And in that dispensation of this his goodness, which proceeds not from his joy and happiness, though you say so, but from the counsel and freedom of his will; though as touching the comforts of this life, God maketh his rain to fall, and Sun to shine as well upon the wicked as upon the righteous; yet as touching the dispensation of his grace, though he be most good, that way also, yet it is but towards whom he will; for that Oracle of God, I will have mercy on whom I will; and again, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, must sway more with us, then any vain conceit or imagination of man to the contrary. And why do you call this world a vale of misery? is it not in respect of God's judgments, as well as in respect of sin? which judgments of God have their course as well as mercies, how then doth perpetual joy and comfort more incessantly issue from him, then light from the Sun, to refresh this vale of misery? Surely as the Prophet said, his song should be of mercy and of judgment: so doth God also sometimes mourn unto us, that we may weep, as well as at other times draw us to dance after his pipe.

You conclude with telling us the causes why men are not so happy as they might be. The one is, you say, That they do not believe the eternal happiness of their Creator to be absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are. The other, That they do not consider that the absolute infinity of this his eternal happiness, is an essential cause of goodness unto all others, so far as they are capable of it. As for the first of these, what Heathen Philosopher, that acknowledged the making of the world, that acknowledged a God, did ever doubt of his eternal happiness, and that as infinite as any other of his attributes. As touching the other, doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much, when he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ? Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God; and did this make them as happy as they might be? It is true indeed, their goodness they conceived to be from themselves.

And do not you I pray concur with them in this, even in this place? For although you carry it in general terms, when you say, he is the cause of all goodness, yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodness; as when you say, God is a cause of goodness to all that are capable of it, and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are, none but themselves can make them uncapable of happiness. And where is any mention of Christ Jesus in all this? where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this, which you make sufficient to bring them unto happiness? It is true, God cannot be the author of evil of sin, but God forbid that we should so maintain God to be no Author of evil, as withal to deny him to be the author of good.

Speak plainly, do you believe that God is the author of faith, that God it is who gives repentance, that works in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure? if you believe this, then you must believe that God did decree to give men faith and repentance. But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed, who profess that God doth decree contingency, but not things contingent. And who doubts but the faith of Peter, and his repentance, the faith of Paul and his repentance, were contingents? and if God did never decree them, surely he was not the author of them; for God doth nothing in time, but what he decreed to do before all time.

And in case you did truly acknowledge God to be the cause of all goodness, we would not quarrel with you about the term essential, which with what learning you deliver, I profess I know not; but I observe you are very liberal of your words and phrases; we were never acquainted with anymore then four causes, can you tell us which of them is called by any essential, unless matter and form be called essential, because they constitute the essence of that, whose matter and form they are. But I hope you will not say that God, in this sense, is the essential cause of all our goodness.

CHAP. XII.

I do not like this Title, the disjunctive argueth, that God's goodness communicative as communicative, is the pattern of moral goodness in the creature, I know no pattern of moral goodness, which we must imitate, but that which is commended unto us in God's Law, God's communicative goodness was exercised in making of the World, and us; Is this a fit pattern for us to imitate? As touching his providence, whereby he governs the World, we are called by our Savior, to imitate him in some particulars, as when he suffereth his rain to fall, and Sun to shine on the bad, as well as on the good.

But in most particulars we cannot, in many we may not imitate him; He caused two she bears to come out of the wood, and tear 42. children that mocked Elisha, we must not imitate God in the like, we must still bless them that curse us, and pray for them, that persecute us.

The sense of imbecility and indigence in ourselves, even in this corrupt state of man, doth only provoke us the more, to show pity unto others, in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. D • do, Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco: But it doth not breed it, for it is manifest that men little exercised with the Cross, or not at all, may show more mercy, then such as have been in great misery themselves. Yet these merciful natures having tasted of misery themselves, will be the more provoked to show compassion unto men in misery.

2. And this is true, not only in the corrupt state of man, but even in the state of integrity, for is it not said of our Savior, that being tempted himself, he knew how to succor them, that are tempted? It is now a days without question, among divines, that mercy and pity as they signify passions are not in God, but attributed unto him, per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as are the members of our body also. But the will of succouring creatures in their necessity, may with propriety enough be attributed unto God, for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him, and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground, without the providence of our heavenly Father, how much more, is his love enlarged towards man, who when they were sinners, sent his Son to dy for them, and when they lay weltering in their blood, said unto them, live, And washed them with water, yea washed away their blood from them, and anointed them with oil: Thus God hath a will to succor man in misery, and this will, and grace, and favor of God is in Scripture phrase, called mercy. But he showeth this mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, I wonder you should applaud that saying; Nemo sponte malus, which hath no color of truth; Save in respect of original sin, traduced to Adams posterity of which original sin, the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant; And you in another sense treading the authors steps, seem to maintain it, not in respect of any natural corruption that hath soured our natures, but in respect, rather of the perfection of our souls, and their native inclination unto good, for external things, you say, do so captivate the human soul, that she cannot do, as she would, but these strings, being cut, she followeth her native sway: And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this, Nemo sponte malus, manifesting thereby, that you acknowledge the native sway of the soul to be unto good.

But by the way you cast yourself upon an erroneous assertion, convictable of untruth, by the very light of nature; as when you say, that external things do captivate the soul; as if the object had power to the will, which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity. And nothing indeed, but a man's own corruption is it that captivates him unto evil. For let Joseph be tempted with a wanton Mistress, yet if lust be mortified within him, her wanton invitation, shall never captivate Joseph. No nor the ladyes admitted to his presence, could inflame Scipio Adricanus, though a man of war, with a lustful appetit. Show a Lyon grass he is nothing affected with it saith Decumenius, because it is not the diet of a Lyon, but of an Ox; Shew an Ox flesh, he hath no appetite unto it, for flesh is no diet for an Ox, but for a Lyon rather; every man is tempted, (saith S. James) when he is drawn away by his own concupiscence and enticed. And by working upon this concupiscence, it is that the Devil leads men captive, to do his will, no such matter could he find in our Savior.

And so much some conceived to be signified, when he saith: The Prince of the World cometh and sindes naught in me: Yet cannot the Devil certainly prevail to every particular, nor to any particular, so as to justify, that man doth not that evil which he doth sponte; for even beasts do sponte whatsoever they do, and man even the worst of men doth not only of his own accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also, yea and freely too; And yet the Devil is none of those external things you speak of, with far more color of reason did they proceed, who maintained, that look what mē did of passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraynt of doing voluntarily, not from things external, but internal rather even from the passion themselves, but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long ago.

3. We must with patience expect and wait, till you come to your text, and entreat of the theme proposed, to wit of the infinity and immutability, of divine goodness communicative. The first sentence is not well stated; for Sarah was old stricken in age, and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women, when hearing from the Lord, something concerning the conceiving of a child by her, she said; After I am waxed old, and my Lord also, shall I have lust? Lust, certeynly may be in old age and not a sin, lust is one thing, inordinate lust is another thing, and where lust is, why should it seem a Monster, in corrupt nature, for that lust to be inordinate? And if a proud man be brought to a beggars condition, why should it seem monstrous, if his moral condition be not altered, but he continue as proud as ever? As Plato discerned a proud heart, thorough Antisthenes patched coat; And Diogenes might be as proud of his tub, as Alexander of his Crown; And a man may be as proud of carrying a cloak bag beh • nde him, as Cardinal Camprins, was of his sumpter horse, that followed after him; for pride though it be more hateful in one then in another, as the wiseman speaks, yet it disdeyns no condition, but accepteth entertainment in every breast; how much more in the breasts of Kings, and such may be found even amongst the wandering planets on earth, otherwise called Roagues, and beggars. Certeynly men of a shifting disposition, if they have gotten wealth thereby, it is nothing strange if they continue their trade still, considering that Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit: especially if they have prospered well by it. And yet I confess, men sometimes give over their former trades, as horse leaches leave sucking, when their bodies are full; but I do not think, they can so easily, leave off their manners, neither do temptations, beget any sins, but rather provoke our corruptions, to actuate themselves; as a man's corrupted will and affection, to actuate it self, and bring forth actual sin.

And as the Apostle saith, Sin not only provoked by temptation, but even taking occasion by the Commandment, doth bring forth in us all manner of concupiscences. It seems you are a very moral man yourself, that are so well persuaded of others▪ but in the mean time, you are little thankful unto God's grace; For this your morality, when you ascribe it to a general inclination of nature, belike you are loath to be beholding to God's grace; for the morality of your nature, I wonder the less at the prodigious blindness of your mind, maintaining that he, who hates his brother, desires, to deserve well of him, whereas S. John saith, that he, who hateth his brother, is a manslayer, that the avaricious person, desires to be liberal, and the Hypocrite, desires to be upright, and the unmerciful to be compassionate, the Extortioner or robber to be just, and the Niggard to be bountiful, which is as much as to say, that the hot fire, desires to be cold as earth, and the cold earth desires to be as hot as fire.

Why do you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a natural man, even of the worst of men, and say that they have a desire to repent, to please God, to be holy, to be religious? Continuance in sin was wont to be called altera natura, and secunda natura; and the Prophet justifieth it, where he saith, Can a black Moore change his skin, or a Leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed unto evil. The sight of God's judgments causing fear, may restrain from evil, like as an hedge of thorns, crossing a man's way, may hinder him from finding his paths: But as for impulsions unto goodness, in a man abandoned unto his lusts, and who, as the Apostle speaks, commits sin with greediness, and is grown to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I know none. And Seneca seems to be your only Oracle for this; a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon. And yet upon the scanning, Seneca alleged by you in this place, I find pleads against you, rather then for you, as who plainly professeth, that They who err in matters of life and manners, are delighted with their errors; every criminal person is delighted with his crime, one sola • th himself in adultery, another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft. He saith, that naughtiness is afraid of darkness it self, which may restrain from evil, I confess, but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodness, no more then his last conclusion, that naughtiness may be safe, but never secure. Which conclusion seves you for a passage to the next Section.

4. It is very true, an evil conscience will not suffer a man to be secure; for if a good conscience be a continual feast, surely an evil conscience holds a man continually upon the rack. Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum. The wicked sly when no man pursueth him, saith Solomon; and, There is no peace, saith the Lord, to the wicked. It was one of the Judgments God threatened to his own people, when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him; namely, that the sound of a leaf should chase them, and they should fly, no man pursuing them: but this is no evidence of any impulsion unto goodness. And when Seneca saith, Even in minds drenched in the dregs of filthiness, there remains still a sense of goodness: this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of, when he saith, they have a conscience accusing them, by virtue of that law that is written in their hearts: yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drenched in the dregs of filthiness. He acknowledgeth elsewhere, that some through the course of sin become past all feeling, and have their conscience seared with an hot iron. And it is a proverbial speech in the world, Nemo senex metuit Iovem. Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodness by the conviction of their conscience, & a far different thing to have an impulsion unto goodness.

Be it that the mind of man in that it is endued with reason, hath the rules of equity imprinted in it, is it not as true, that the rules of iniquity are imprinted in it also? doth he not know evil as well as good? Nay, hath he not more knowledge of evil then of good, at least as touching the compassing of it? doth not the Lord complain of this, where he saith, They are wise to do evil, but as touching good they have no understanding. If this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God, what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common wealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise? especially considering what d • fference the Apostle puts between these, when he saith, We Jews by nature, not sinners of the Gentiles.

And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferior faculties, she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity, as rules of equity. And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to be stamped upon faculties, that are not intellectual? appetites are guided by rules, in their motions, not instamped with them. Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing, not inherent in them. And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will, as well as on sensual appetites? or if it be so, why should you reckon the will an inferior faculty in comparison to the mind? whereas indeed the will rules in man as king, the mind is but his privy Counselor.

To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature, as thus, If the mind have such good rules, and withal seeks to instamp them upon inferior faculties, how comes it to pass that there is so little love of virtue in many? your answer is, that this proceeds from their disposition, being over-grown with sensual desires. But by your leave this is a weak reason, for it only transfers the difficulty, but answers not the doubt; for still I may demand, how it came to pass that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensual desires, and without grace what place is left for any goodness in the nature of man? Philosophers had a love of virtue, but can you show they had any love of God? their most virtuous actions in the state of nature, was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata, glorious sins? For the discerning of true virtue aright he gives us this rule, Noveris non officiis, sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes. I am sure they were not ordered by God's word, nor referred to his glory, nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God, yet they looked for justification by them: and as for repentance and confession of sins, they make that no part of their integrity. So that whether their knowledge were in a mist, or out of a mist, it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God: as the Sun, whether in a mist or out of a mist, was never known to set moist stuff on fire, but • st dries it, then fires it. And our Savior was bold to profess, that Publican's and Harlots • ntred into the kingdom of heaven before Scribes and Pharisees.

If the notions of the mind be ideall characters, you may, if it please you, bestow the phrase as well on notions of evil, as notions of good; and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unse • led affection of youth, it seems the bad are more permanent; yet these natural notions of good are far distant from true notions of God, or of true goodness; A heart hardened with vast desires, you say, 〈◊〉 hardly cured; but I pray tell me, when one man transgresser • for an handful of barley, or a morsel of bread, another saith, Si violandum est jus impij causa violandum est, which of these is the greater hardness? yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape, so you signify the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame. I confess, to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle, is not impossible unto God: and what natural man hath not a body of sins to be cut off by spiritual circumcision? but that this you make to be a work of grace, you give not the least intimation: nay you rather imply the contrary, when you say, that if hopes of supplies from internals be intercepted, a work that may be done by course of nature, then you say, the soul thus freed, becomes more fashionable to reason; a saying that would become Seneca well, that knew no reason but natural; but full ill becoming a Christian Divine: let desire be never so vast, as you speak, let seven devils possess a man, yet the strong man Christ, by the power of his grace is able to cast them out, and make even Ekron become as the Jebusite.

Without grace, will any man's morality commend him in the sight of God? As Lebanon is turned into Carmell, so Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest. And most moral men have been as great enemies to Christianity, as any other; like as the Scribes and Pharisees were greatest enemies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficial draught of reason, that endeavoreth to stamp the heart with real and solid kindness. I know no reason; this in my judgment deserves to be accounted a substantial operation. And when you tell me that Affability consists in this, you go about to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle. I had thought affability might have place in all men, as a moral virtue, whether they were enabled to stamp the heart with real and solid kindness yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures, but not temperance; yet Epicurus, if my reading deceive me not, was known to be as temperate a man in moderating his appetite, as most that then lived. And that because he made man's happiness to consist in pleasure, the sense whereof was quickened by temperance, and dulled by intemperance. And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitableness to his neighbors or brethren, either in time of plenty, or time of scarcity. You do him the greater wrong, to charge him, with sucking in cruelty as wine, and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates: neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you do him in deeds; as for cutting morsels out of other men's throats; this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate man's diet: is fitter for a superstitious Papist, that in case the Priest should vomit the host, thinks the people bound to lick • it up.

The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first; between which, what suitable matter hath occurred, let the Reader judge. Though indigence be the mother of cruelty, yet herehence it followeth not, that it is not the mother of pity, for, Rara est concordia fratrum: Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother, yet there is a great difference in indigence, as the cause of these. Indigence heretofore suffered, is made the cause of pity; but indigence in present alone, is the cause of cruelty, and that only in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty.

5 Philosopher-like, or rather mere naturalist-like, you make error of judgment the root of all evil: as the cause of covetousness you make to be the opinion of want, either that is for the present, or may be for the time to come. How far are you different from Aquinas, who maintains, that our wills are more corrupt, quoad appetitum boni, then our minds, quoad intellectum veri: yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his, Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor. Saint Paul, I think, was a man regenerate when he made that profession, I see a law in my members rebelling against the law of my mind, and leading me captive to the law of sin. It is true, there are bosom sins (as we call them) like familiar spirits to particular men, and so they may be dispensed withal in these, they will show themselves very moral in other points, and think it reason God should be merciful unto them in breaking one commandment, so they keep the other nine. Herod heard John the Baptist gladly, until he touched upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife. Judas was content to follow Christ, so he might b • are the bag, and so long as he could make best wages by his service; but thirty pieces of silver moved him to give his master the bag, and to betray him. A man for judgment able to arbitrate and void of exorbitant affections, which might expose him to partiality or prejudice, no doubt is the fittest arbitratour. But if you ask me whereto this running discourse tends, I cannot answer you yet, it may be you may answer yourself hereafter. Internal moderation mixed with outward competency, is the only supporter of true constancy. I had thought, integrity had made a man fit for arbitrament, not constancy, for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just; I presume, it proceeds from constant integrity, That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiency of estate, not only competent, but more then competent. And to my thinking, even in the course of natural morality, a virtuous condition should not depend upon outward things; the exercise of virtue doth, I confess, but not virtue it self. Bias his saying was, Omnia meo mecum porto: but we are taught of a better Master, that, Godliness is great gain with contentment, and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his mind, which is delivered without distinction of poor or rich, like as that which followeth, The belly of the wicked shall want: And that, a dinner of green herbs, and love with it, is better then a stalled ox with hatred and strife. The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him, who answereth to the joy of his heart; and the most glorious King that ever was, professeth that, A good conscience is a continual feast; and David the father. a great conqueror, found no blessedness in any temporal state, but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects, saying, Blessed is the man whose iniquity is forgiven, and whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile. The truth is, if our pretences depend upon outward things, they shall be as frail as those are mutable; and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God? As there is no being but from God, so no permanence of being but from God: & till the time of temptation a man is not known; let the rain fall, and the floods rise, and the wind beat upon the house, then it will appear whether it were built upon the rock, or upon the sand. We know the Angels fell, we know Adam fell; and how vain a thing is it to discourse of any natural permanency in virtuous courses amongst natural men that knew not God. By the way, your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous; of satisfying desires we usually hear, but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse. You proceed to discourse unto us of another root of inconstancy, which you call contingency, which is a term of art with you and your peculiar dialect: this root you will have to be, the infinite capacity of reasonable creatures, conceits or desires, within whose compass their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular, as it were a star fixed in too wide a sphere. And this applied to the fall of Angels, in whom we find a double change or alteration; the one moral, to wit, a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created, into the state of sin; the second natural, to wit, a change from a blessed state, into a wretched and damned condition; the first change was their own work, as wherein they sinned; the second, the work of God whereby they were punished. Their inconstancy in not standing upright, but falling into sin, is only pertinent to the present purpose, and to inquire after the root of this, is to inquire after the cause of their fall. Now the cause hereof, as it is plain, so if we please, we may as plainly express it; for, as for their possibility to fall, that rose from the condition of their natures, being made by God free agents, and so accordingly, a law being given them by God, they might freely obey it, freely disobey it: what need we strain our wits for obscure expression of so plain a truth, as by referring it to the infinite capacity of their conceits or desires, within whose compass, their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular? What need we affect such perturbation of speech, in confounding conceits with desires, and placing finite motions within the compass of desires, infinitely capacious; which motions undoubtedly were their desires (for they sinned questionless in desiring somewhat) and comparing desires to spheres, and again, desires to stars fixed in spheres, that so the sin of Angels may be sinely phrasified, and called an excentrical motion; thus in catching after a phrase, you obscure the sense of a sentence, which when all is well scanned, is but this, the root of the Angels fall was this, that he might commit an irregular motion, which might have been done, although the capacity of his desire had not been infinite, that is, though he had not affected the greatness of the divine Majesty; for this I take to be the meaning, and yet this meaning is little congruous. For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide, and the finite motion you compare to a star fixed in this sphere, and to it you ascribe the irregular motion, not to the sphere, and that very incongruously too; for the finite motion of Angels you speak of, was their very sin; but the star fixed in his sphere, is not his irregular motion. If ever Divinity and Philosophy have been frayed out of their wits, by any man's discourse, it is your discourse that hath done this deed. You suppose the sin of Angels consisted in affecting Majesty infinite, whereof, you say, he was more uncapable, then a whirrie of an Arposies sails. But how I pray you could such a thing be affected, without error of judgment? And was it possible that error, and so Foule an error of judgment could be in an Angel before his fall? Should not so poena be prior culpa? Hereupon it is that Scotus maintains, there could be no affecting of any such thing, but only complacentia simplex therein, not that he did affect it, well knowing it to be a thing impossible. For my part, I do as little like that simplex complacentia he speaks of.

No wise man (in this state of our corruption) will please himself, in conceiting himself to be a King, much less to be a God, but reckons of such fancies as most vain and frivolous: let us leave unto Clownes such conceits, O if I were a King I would live like a Lord, I would eat fat beese, and glorry porridge, and have a whip should cry slash. Dic mihi si sieres tu Leo qualis eris. And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concur with him in so unreasonable an affectation? Do you think the chief called in Scripture the Devil, did sin in one thing, to wit, in affecting majesty infinite, and the rest, called his Angels, in another thing, to wit, in standing with him, and standing for him? I should rather think their sin was one and the same: And I make no doubt but their sin was pride. Sure I am, they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eye, but to pride, spirits may be subject as well as men. But wherein this pride manifested it self, that is a great mystery; but if they did affect divine Majesty, I should think it was in a way whereby they were capable of it: and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing. And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angel, and as many as he would, as well as man. But I do not say that they did affect it; I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entered into their thoughts. But as God took a course to put Adam and Eve to the trial of their obedience, so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience, which became a scandal to many of them, through pride and disdain to be in subjection, not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God, but more likely to some inferior nature, which was to be advanced to the throne of God. For as God made this visible world for the service of man, so God might withal reveal unto them what his purpose was, namely, to advance the nature of man unto his own throne, so that all the Angels of God must worship him: Th • s I say might be the rock of offense to them, of anymore fit then this, I cannot conceive.

As touching the roof of man's inconstancy, you are nothing so curious, as about the Angels. But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth, but merely to the involving of a plain truth, by most wild expressions. The bitter fruit of Adams prevarication we all feel in a general impotency unto that which is truly good, or to resist temptation unto sin in a gracious manner. But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation, without grace, but not in a gracious manner. For what think you? is it necessary that as often as the Devil tempts a man to incontinency, to murder, to theft, he should as often yield to the committing of any of these? It is apparent that many natural considerations may restrain us: but in a gracious manner, that is, in such a manner as is acceptable unto God, no man can resist any temptation unto sin, without grace.

That maxim, Mora facilius moventur, hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it, for it proceeds of the same individuals, such as Adam and his children are not; yet by Adams yielding unto sin, through Satan's temptation, all his posterity are made more prone to sin, then any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinful act. For a sinful or vicious act, in ordinary course, hath no more power to habituate a man's inclination unto evil, then a virtuous action hath unto good: but far greater is man's proneness unto sin, since and through the fall of Adam, then by any virtuous action is our proneness unto good.

Touching your close, I say, to seek our own welfare with another's harm, is not to seek that which is good and right; yet in some cases another man's harm may be sought, without any transgression. For undoubtedly the Judge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor: no nor the Israelites neither, in robbing the Egyptians; nor Abraham, in going about to cut the throat of his own innocent child Isaac.

6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations, which you say is wrought by inequality, partly of our natural propensions, partly of the means which minister their several contentments or annoyances. Herein you propose a distinction, but I do not find you very careful to follow it, and make it appear how you accommodate yourself thereto. Great means of annoyances are apt to breed great fears, and fear is a strong passion hindering the course of reason, and of moral duty, according unto reason.

Peters confession of Christ at the very time when, and in the place where Christ was in his enemies hands that sought his death, might have hazarded his life; and the consideration hereof, being suddenly put unto it, either to confess him or deny him, surprised him with fear; this fear exposed him to deny his master. Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poisoning of Sir Thomas Overbury, saw manifestly, that his refusal would have been an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower, which he had bought with a great sum of money. This temptation prevailed with him: we commonly say, The greater is the temptation, the less is the sin. So where small means of contentments are, the greater is the temptation to discontent, and to taste of the bitter fruits thereof. But I do not find that the particular instances following, do any way savor of this member of your distinction. You seem to keep yourself wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of natural propensions; yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected. For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit: Wit is a natural faculty, I confess, I never heard it called a natural propension till now. But as for wealth, it is neither propension, nor faculty natural, nor at all natural. It is true, I confess, that some men's wealth gets the start of wit, as he observed, that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors, When I behold your wealth, I wonder at your wit; again, when I behold your wit, I wonder at your wealth. I confess willingly, that to abound in wealth, is to abound in temptations unto sin; that fullness of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodom, that when Jeshurun waxed fat, he spurned with the heel. But the temptations herehence arising, prevail only on them that want wit, is an observation I have not been acquainted with before, neither am prone to believe it. I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians, or of Xerxes, who (as I remember) it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure; nor to Heliogabalus; among the Roman Emperors Nero was luxurious enough, I never heard it proceeded from want of wit, for the first quinquennium of his reign he manifested himself to be no fool: Hercules servivit Omphale, was it for want of wit? That the Merchants son of whom it is reported, that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses, had his honesty been answerable to his wit, he had kept his reputation with the best. And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys, that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turk, I never heard defamed for want of wit. Yet we commonly say, many men have good wits, but they are in fools keeping. And indeed a fool in Solomon's computation doth usually stand for a knave. And it is most true, that such are most unwise, as appears by the issue; for by such courses they shorten their days, and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves, there to grow green before their heads be gray; and after they are gone, their remembrance rots, and they leave a very ill savor behind them.

But I should think, that dull fellows are neither so inventious of mad courses, nor of so active spirits to prosecute them, as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding. I grant men of great wits have not always revenues answerable: But I should think it is their pride, rather then their wit, that instigates them to injurious courses. For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labor to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their minds, this must needs expose them to lewd courses. Yet a good wit, I confess, to maintain a bad cause, may animate some more to molest and vex, and it is not the greatness of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses. Though men's bodies overgrow their souls, yet if they have not a spirit answerable, they will prove but lubbers, though great lubbers, as great as Gog-Magog, whom Corineus met withal at Dover, when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie, over and over. And it is a common saying, that a short man needs not a stool to give a great lubber a box in the ear: though he that is weak had need to be witty, yet it is not always true, or for the most part, that weak persons are wily: and where wiliness is found, it is a temptation strong enough without weakness, to move men to practice unlawful policy, where grace is wanting. But to say that wiliness shelters it self with craft, is as much as to say, it shelters it self with it self; and if the distinction be put between the disposition of wiliness that is within, and wily crafty courses without, well, something else, to wit, men's private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltered hereby, yet wiliness cannot. For like as wisdom is not sheltered, but rather discovered & laid open by wise courses, & folly by foolish courses, so also wiliness & craftiness, by wily and crafty courses. I see no reason to justify that saying, men love their wits more strongly, when they perceive them set upon that which in it self is good. And I give a reason for my negation, though you give none for your affirmation; for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite, the more strongly doth the appetite affect it; and the more convenient things are unto us, the more we love ourselves for affecting them. Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite, then objects temperate; and avaricious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person, then courses of liberality; and generally to all men in the state of corruption, the pleasures of sin are more grateful then the pleasure of righteous courses. Nay, a man regenerate may for good reason seem not to be so strongly carried in his affections unto good, as the wicked are in their affections unto evil; my reason is, because in the regenerate there dwells a flesh lusting against the spirit, which remits and qualifies the fervor of his affection unto good: whereas on the contrary, in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh, to remit or qualify the fervor or fury, rather of their affection unto evil; especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them.

Again, to do good to the poor, is not good in it self (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the University, that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that vain-glory clotheth the poor as well as charity. And how can that be a good will to the poor, that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poor? • o may he be said to bear a good will to Paul, that robbeth Peter to pay Paul; yet that which he will leth is good to Paul, I confess, but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfy Paul; it may well proceed from other intentions. No man is bound in conscience to hinder any man's welfare, or his own either, no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses; no nor doth the obligation rest in general, but it concludes in special, all good courses that lie in his power: so to tender it, a man is bound and not otherwise. You have discoursed of divers enormities, in the close you open the cause of them unto us, and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence: this you say is the cause, not why such enormities are, but of the possibility of them. Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression. Therefore the infinite capacity of finite existence is the cause why sin is possible. I thought it had been satisfaction enough in this point, to conceive, that because we are in subjection to a Lord, who can give us a law, and are free agents, therefore we may either obey a law given unto us, or transgress it. And because, look what is the cause why disobedience is possible, the same is the cause why obedience also is possible. It followeth, that the cause why obedience is possible, must be the infinite capacity of finite existence. And because by finite existence you mean a reasonable creature, your meaning a little more plain is this, The reason why a man may sin, or abstain from sin, is his infinite capacity. We say, it is the liberty of his will, being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny, nor any sober man: herehence it followeth, that this infinite capacity you cant of, is but the liberty of man's will in subjection to the law of a superior Lord. For man being free, may overcope, as you speak, that is, to express in a small and still voice, without thundering, or fire, or mighty wind, to do that which he should not. And thus having attained to your plain meaning, we bid farewell to your mystical expressions of so plain a truth, by comparing this infinite capacity you speak of, to too wide a sphere, and finite motions, to a slarro fixed in that sphere, and thereby exposed to excentricall and irregular motions, which I think neither Copernicus, nor Ticho Brahe, were they alive, could well tell how to expound unto us, or to their selves either. We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible, as for the life and improvement of this possibility (for so you are pleased to bestow the being, and life, and improvement upon it) by the inequality of internal propensions, never fitly matching outward occurrences, that we reasonably well understand, and have discoursed thereof what we thought fit, enough, if not more then enough.

7 At length you are come to the house it self of your present discourse, according to the title of this Chapter; hitherto we have been complementally entertained in the porch. But, in God, you say, there is no place for exorbitancy, he being an incomprehensible sphere, which hath omnipotency for his axis, ubiquity for its center: if you had added, & nusquam for his circumference, the illustration, according to your former subtleties, had been more complete. We say, that God in doing what he will cannot sin, because he hath no superior Lord to give him laws, to bind him; his own wisdom alone can and doth direct him, and it becomes his wisdom to manifest his own glorious nature; and therefore whatsoever he can do, in case he doth it, it shall be wisely done, for as much as his power therein is manifested. You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this, that his capacities cannot overcope, though the Angels did. One branch of being in him you say, cannot missway or overtop another: what your meaning is I know not, but look unto it that you do not contradict yourself, in maintaining, that God can do some things by his omnipotency, which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him, which is as much as to say, that he can do that which is unjust. And if this be not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope, I do not know what is. To say that God possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have, is to say, that he possesseth nothing; for it is impossible that God should desire to have anything, for this implies a want of something belonging to the deity. It is directly false and foul to say, that God is whatsoever possible can be; for if it be true, then it ever was true, seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time, and consequently, before the world was, it was true; wherehence it will follow, that God is an Angel, a man, and every vile thing, as we account them amongst the creatures: for all these were possible to be before the world was; neither will it salve this foul sore, to say, that God is a man, or an ox, infinitely, for he is no bodily substance at all, neither can any bodily substance be infinitely. We say, that God is all things eminently, whereby we mean no more then this, God is the cause of all things; and better thus in plain terms to express our meaning, then by affecting curious strains, and forms of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn & derision amongst atheists. God is of necessary being, and therefore of himself eternal, without beginning, and without end. To perfect himself, or to be greater or better then he is, is to suppose that he is imperfect, and not Optimus maximus, which is a thing impossible, and therefore not subject to, nor the object of Almighty power; nay, it destroys it, as one part of contradiction destroys the other: for Almighty power were formally destroyed, if it were imperfect, or less then Almighty. Therefore all outward employments are for the good of his creature, but how? not as tending to the good of the creature as God's end, but both his employments for the creatures good, and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory. Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much, that both from him and for him are all things: and the Prophet also, God hath made all things for himself, even the wicked for the day of evil: and that for good reason, as many hundred years ago hath been acknowledged in these terms, Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent, habui potestatem. If God's will to have creatures when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essential goodness, I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are? The scripture tells us, that God worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will; so he did when he made the world, so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it, so he should if he should set an end to all, and return them to the gulf of nothing from whence they came. It is false to say, that the continuance of being is desired by all, as the stamp of God's goodness: for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation, as by those Christians that do believe it. And as for the making of the world, it is in holy Scripture (the language of God) attributed to the word of God, to the breath of God, to the wisdom of God, to the power of God, to the counsel of God; but never, that I know, ascribed to the goodness of God. And it had need of explication, to show how God's goodness is communicated unto all, much more how it is communicated unto a stone; yet the earth is filled with his goodness, in as much as God provides for everything that which is good for it; so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort, we call it God's goodness, for as much as things which are good to us, are derived to us from God, and therein we have a taste of his goodness towards us, in that he doth good unto us. Your last position I have heretofore spoken of, and shown the incongruity of it. That which is good, and that whereunto it is good, must be different; but the entity of anything is not different from it self, and therefore it cannot be good unto it self, as you affirm.

8. God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 serus irarum, slow to wrath, even against sinners that dishonor him to his face. But to say he is never swayed to sudden revenge, is a more bold assertion then sound. Did not Zimri and Cozbi perish in their incestuous act, and give up both lust and ghost together, without leisure to enjoy their sin, much less respite for repentance? Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborne, notwithstanding former sins, though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden. So perished Herod in his pride, and Balthasar in his revellings, and the Israelites in the wilderness; while the meat was in their mouths, and the delicate flesh of Quails lay between their teeth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and before they could swallow their sweet morsels, sent them to the graves of lust to be swallowed by them.

Again, Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven; were not some children in their mothers wombs, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some newly come to the use of reason, all consumed to ashes, and made an example of God's wrath, and suffered the vengeance of eternal fire, as Inde speaketh? Here is no forbearance of divers particular persons: so it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be at the coming of the Son of man; for while they shall say, peace and safety, sudden destruction shall come upon them, as sorrow upon a woman in travail, and they shall not escape.

The difference you make between man and God, I like well; man by forbearance may bereave himself of power to execute vengeance, God cannot: and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the very reprobates; but towards his elect, a power exercised in another kind, yet a power too, namely, to sanctify the consideration of his forbearance, to bring them unto repentance; as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sins, by the blood of his Son. A sentence related out of the book of Wisdom. ch. 12. 15, 16, you say is canonical, although the Author be not; a distinction that I never read nor heard of before. And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical, the canonical Scriptures shall be multiplied unreasonably, not out of the book of Wisdom only, but out of the rest of the works of Philo the Jew, and Josephus too, yea and out of Seneca's works, and Plutarch’s morals; not to speak of Plato, and Aristotle, or your Plotinus. But let us consider this canonical sentence you speak of and weigh the truth of it in the balance of the Sanctuary. I pray, wherein had our Savior Christ and the Son of God deserved to be punished? And did not God (think you) think it agreeable to his power to condemn him, notwithstanding his innocence, and his fervent prayers to be delivered from that cup, but with submission to the will of his Father? I pray consider the martyrdom of God's Saints, were their punishments according to their deserts? Nay, what think you? is it not agreeable to God's power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was? yet we do not say that God condemns any man, that hath not deserved to be punished, the Son of God and our Savior only excepted. But the desert of eternal death is not only in sin actual, but in sin original also, which Pelagius did not say, Arminius doth not, whether you do or no, I know not; the latter clause, which is this, Because thou art the Prince of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all, makes a show to plead for universal grace, I cannot tell whether you lick your lips at this; yet the author of the book could not be ignorant what a difference, as touching the participation of his grace, God had put between the Jews and the Gentiles, for, He had shown his word unto Jacob, his statutes and ordinances unto Israel: But he had not dealt so with every nation, neither had the Heathen knowledge of his laws. And the Apostle, who undoubtedly was canonical, to speak in your own phrase, hath plainly professed, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.

And as for the reason here used, drawn from this, that he is Lord of all, the Apostle himself taketh notice of it, but in a different manner, Rom. 10. 12. There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian, for he that is Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him: and who are they that call upon him, but they that believe in him? for it followeth, How can they call upon him in whom they have not believed? Yet like as it is the part of parents, not only to bring children forth, but after to provide for their bringing up: so God doth not only make things, but also preserveth them: and for their preservation causeth the Sun to shine, and his rain to fall, as well on the wicked as on the just; always provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right, but merely according to the good pleasure of his own will. For what grace was shown to infants, either unborne, or hanging at their mothers breasts, which perished in the flood, and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven? and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Ninivie that could not discern between the right hand and the left, and also much cattle, yet God was not bound to spare them. And can you doubt, but as many as these, if not in Sodom and Gomorrah, yet at least, or rather many more, perished in Noah's flood. Yet by the way, this sparing of the Ninevites was but as touching salvation temporal, not spiritual.

You have but trifled a long time, now you begin to be serious, yet in little or no congruity to the theme; you were more then half way over this chapter, before you came to entreat of God's goodness, and now you come to inculcate it, not in the infinity or immutability of it, but in the generality of it unto all, as whereby he wills and desires indifferently the salvation of all. This is the voluntas antecedens that so many are enamored with nowadays, and you as much as any, wherewith we are like to be acquainted much more in your following chapters. And a chapter you have hereof expressly in your book of Providence. But first you beat another bush where the bird is not; only it seems to have a reach a far off to something that is of kin to it; you demand, What lord would spoil his proper inheritance? what Architect would disgrace his own work? implying, that surely, God will not. Now if you had withal told us whom you do oppose in this, and in what particular point, we might be the bolder to reply in knowing what to answer; which now we do not because of your concealements. All creatures are the works of God, which as by generation they are wrought, so by corruption they are defaced: What a beautiful piece of work was Absalom? What a wise piece of work was Solomon? What a strong piece of work was Samson? yet these works of God are all defaced. And the defacing of them is the work of God undoubtedly, as well as the making of them. And no marvel, for when that work, for which God hath appointed them, is at an end, to what end should he continue them, considering that he made them but for himself? Nay, Kingdoms and Nations God hath raised, and made them glorious; then again, those glorious Kingdoms he hath defaced. Perhaps you will say, but the defacing of these is for sin. Be it so, yet God could set an end, both to kingdoms and to the whole world, though there were no sin: for God's well-being depends not upon his work, the world, as man's well-being depends upon his inheritance, yea, and upon the work of his own hands: for the master of it could have no comfortable habitation without an house, and every trades-man lives by his trade, and therefore it stands him upon not to deface his work when he hath made it. Again, only reasonable creatures are capable of sin, yet all other creatures are the workmanship of God, which he maketh and defaceth at his pleasure, without any prejudice to his wisdom or to his goodness. Yet there is another manner of defacing, and that is by damnation; and herein I know no color of inveighing against any man, unless it be in the behalf of infants, as many as perish in original sin; wherein if it please you, or any man else, to show your teeth, or horns, we will be nothing dismayed, by God's assistance, but ready to encounter you. Yet there is another defacing, and that is by sin; so we say the Devil and his Angels defaced themselves by their free and voluntary rebellion against God: so Adam defaced himself, by a voluntary and free action, hearkening to the voice of his wife; and Eve to the voice of the Serpent; each voluntarily and freely neglecting to hearken to the voice of God, and to maintain the consideration thereof always before their eyes. Thus every man, even the unregenerate, yea, and Devils themselves, do still continue voluntarily and freely to sin against God: so that this defacing is not the work of God, but of the creature, it being a thing impossible that God should be the author of sin, because it is impossible that he should do anything that he ought not, of anything in other manner then he ought. Again, it is impossible that he should omit anything, or in anyother manner then he ought. And no other means can be devised to make any one become the author of sin. But it is enough for you to propose your interrogatories at pleasure. And in the third place you bring in another interrogatory, different from all the rest, which is more suitable with your tenet; for the delivery whereof in good time, you seem already to travail in childebirth, and that is this, Who would leave a good foundation bare or naked, unless he be not able to rear it up without injustice. I profess I wondered a long time, to what purpose the last clause of this exception was pulled in by the ears; for if a man want means to finish an house which he hath begun, though he would be unjust, yet hath he no certainty to enable himself for the finishing of that work he hath begun. But by comparing it well with the sentence following, I seem to spring your meaning. The foundation which God hath laid, is the creation of our reasonable natures, the finishing of this work, is the adding of salvation, or an happy being to this natural being. Thus to finish the work in everyone, it is the will and pleasure of God, by your profession. This in another Tract of yours, that yet hath not seen the light of the press, you amplify, and call it, A most earnest desire in God of the salvation of all, and everyone, though he much desire it, is, as here you say, because he cannot do it without injustice. And why so? Is it because they are sinners? why, what then shall become of us all, seeing we are all sinners? There be but two things that might be replied, the one is, that though all have sinned, yet Christ hath satisfied for the sins of his elect, Rom. 8. 33. Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect, it is God that justifieth, who shall condemn us? It is Christ which is dead, or rather risen again, who is also at the right hand of God, and maketh request also for us. But I presume, this kind of answer is no lettice for your lips, for that were to maintain, that God willeth the salvation of none but of his elect. 2. The other answer is, that though all are sinners, yet all do not die in impenitence. To this I reply. 1. That if Christ hath made satisfaction for all their sins, I see no reason why they should not be saved, notwithstanding their impenitence: for, what justice can require, that damnation should be suffered for those sins for which full satisfaction is already made. 2. God could give them repentance, if it pleased him, as he gave to Israel, Act. 5. 31. Him hath God lift up with his right hand, to be a Prince and a Savior, to give repentance unto Israel, and forgiveness of sins. So then, Christ gives not only forgiveness of sins to them that repent, but he it is that gives repentance it self also: These be no Cabalismes, but the plain testimony of God's word. And as to the Jews, so to the Gentiles also, Act. 11. 19. When they heard this they held their peace, and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life. And accordingly Saint Paul warns Timothy, to carry himself gently towards them that are without, waiting the time, when God will give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth, and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devil, by whom they were led captive to do his will. By this let everyone judge what strength there is in your illation, when you say, Wheresoever God hath laid the one (to wit natural being, it is to all that rightly consider his wisdom, truth, and goodness, and assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to finish it with the other. Why the truth of God is directly against it, professing, that he hath mercy on whom he will, and heardeneth whom he will: and that the same word of God is, a savor of life unto life, to them that are saved; he doth not say, to them that are careful to prepare themselves, and a savor of death unto death, unto them that perish, and a good savor unto God in both; he doth not say, to them that do not prepare themselves. And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are, even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation; for they believed, as there the Apostle professeth, as much as to say, the word preached was a savor of life unto life unto them, and wot you the reason hereof? Why surely because they were ordained to salvation, like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that, God added to the Church day by day, such as should be saved. You might with as much modesty profess, that in as much as God hath made every man, It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to give every man repentance, before he drops out of the world. God's gifts are without repentance; it is true of the gifts of sanctification, but it is as true, that God repented that he made man. That the current of God's joyful beneficence can admit no intermission, is most untrue, for he dispenseth it freely, so he continueth it as freely; For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will, that is, nullo necessitatis obsequio, as Ambrose expoundeth it. Nay it doth admit intermission in this world. In the world to come, indeed, it shall admit no intermission, in this it doth, both in respect of blessings temporal, and in respect of motions spiritual. For as touching blessings temporal, God showeth the back sometimes, and not the face, Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spiritual motions and consolations, what moved the Lord to cry out upon the cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me, but the intermission of these? It is true, sorrow to us hath no other original then our own sin, yet no sin in Christ could be found to be the original of his sorrow. And though the woman, by reason of sin, hath ever since conceived in sorrow, yet brute beasts conceive in sorrow, notwithstanding that they are incapable of sin. And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures, is merely according to the good pleasure of his will. And though all sorrow proceeds from sin in the way of a meritorious cause; yet all sorrow proceeds from God, in the way of an efficient cause. He is the great Judge that inflicteth sorrow on some, as well as he causeth joy to others.

9. The comparison is most absurd. For illumination proceeds from the Sun, as from a natural cause, working by necessity of nature; but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought, or send forth any influence; is more Atheistical then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happiness, wherewith they were sown in their first creation; for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall, as well as the Angels of light. And all the influence that God sends forth, you say, is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happiness; whence it followeth, that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in the very Devils. And seeing God's concurrence to the actions of men and Angels, is a part of that influence that proceeds from God, and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits, without hope of recovery; in concurring to this assurance, God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in them. Besides this, with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinful actions, this yourself have often acknowledged, and this concourse of his is a part of his influence, and no influence (you say) can proceed from him, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happiness, wherewith their natures were sown in their creation. Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinful actions, doth cherish the seeds of joy and happiness in reprobate men and Angels also.

Now proceed we along with you: God, you say, doth inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them. This is a bone very well worth the picking. I am persuaded many a sweet morsel will be found about it. You do not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will, but as many as are conformable to his will, he inspires with other good desires; whence I pray then comes conformity to his will, if not from the inspiration of God? do you make conformity to God's will to be the inspiration of the flesh? For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world, or of the devil. Yet S. Paul saith, that it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, not by any necessary emanation, as light issueth from the Sun, but according to his own good pleasure. Again, this very desire of doing others good, is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God? Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to God's will, why not also with another? And so why may we not run over all parts of conformity to the will of God, and find as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God, as the cause of them? The mystery of your meaning in this, the next sentence serves as a key to open, when you say, that such as willfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodness, or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestial influence, become creators of their own woe, and raise unto themselves those storms wherein they perish. So then God's influence is to all, like as the light of the Sun; only the difference ariseth herehence, that some resist it, others yield unto it. As good Arminianism and Pelagianism as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himself. So then it is not God, that ex nolentibus volentes facit, but man's free will. And in spite of St. Paul it shall be volentis & currentis, and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speak of, can be no other then exhortations, whereunto some yield, and some resist. And I pray, who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith, the author of my repentance? he that exhorteth me hereunto, or rather I myself, that do believe, and do repent, though upon another's exhortations? For exhortation may thus far be performed by a reprobate: for such plead at the day of judgment, Have we not prophesied in thy name? and S. Paul observed, that some preached Christ not chastely, but upon pretence, and that with foul intentions, even to add affliction to Paul's bonds; yet howsoever he rejoiced in this, that Christ was preached, which he would never have done, if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance.

Again, to inspire them with good desires, and with conformity to God's will, this is no other in your language, then to exhort them hereunto. And thus it is that God works in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peters speech bewrayed him; but with this difference, Peters speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ, but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius, and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth; for thus did Pelagius discourse, Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futurae gloriae magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit, dum revelatione sapientiae, in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem, dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est. Now see to what acknowledgement of grace Austin putteth him, if so be he will be a true Christian. Nos eam gratiam volumus, isti aliquando fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditor & speratnr, nec solum reveletur sapientia, verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, verumetiam persuadetur. Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non mod • videri, sed esse Christianus. Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election, namely, that it must be upon the foresight of men's obedience to God's exhortations and persuasions, which here you call placid inspirations. Now because God exhorts us to faith, repentance, and all manner of good works, the foresight of our obedience hereunto must be it whereupon our election must depend, and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle, not of fellowship, but to bid him adieu, as who plainly professeth, that Election is not of works, but of God that calleth us; and he proves it by this, that before they had done either good or evil, Jacob was elected, and Esau reprobated, which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works, but the pre-consideration of them; otherwise he could not therehence conclude that election is not of works; and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith, as good works. For a man unborne is as unable to believe, as to perform any other work. And notwithstanding this foul injury, you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace, and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinks good, in making whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessels of wrath, yet you think to pacify him with an hungry, base, and mere verbal amplification of the streams of his goodness, the issue whereof is to injury him afresh in like manner, by robbing him, and adorning man with the spoils of his glory. For increase of joy and happiness shall be, you say, unto a man from the streams of life, proceeding from God as a fountain of life, provided that man gives free passage to their current. And what is this current, but God's spirations formerly mentioned, whereby he exhorts us to profit by the examples of his judgments on others, and also to patience when we are injuried by others. Now if we do ye • ld to this, and do profit by the consideration of God's judgments upon others, and do patiently bear the wrongs that are done us by others, then increase of joy and happiness shall be unto us from the fountain of goodness, who as he hath some streams of life, whereby he exhorts us unto that which is good; so he hath other streams of life and happiness, wherewith he rewards us for our obedience: so that whatsoever show you make of honoring God, the issue is to bestow all the honor upon the obedience of man. So that the amends you make herein for former injuries, is as if a man having given his neighbor a box in the ear, should make show of making him amends by kind stroking of him, and instead of stroking him, give him another box in the ear, Thus Joab took Amaza by the beard as though he would have kissed him, but, indeed, stabd him to the heart. You are willing to make God the author of glory, but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author, but only the orator of grace: like to the Panims, who were wont to say,

What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer, are unknown to us; we read that they believe and tremble, I am. 2. that they are kept in chains to the judgment of the great day. They ask our Savior whether he be come to torment them before their time; they pray him not to send them into the deep. And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of any good which their miseries work upon us, seeing that their miseries are so unknown unto us.

Yet as conceiving yourself to have been somewhat free in • venting somewhat, which alas is but a vain ostentation of some momentous matter, which hath no moment at all in it; you demand whether God may yet inspire these castaways with mischievous thoughts, seeing their mischievous thoughts work for our good. A very vain objection; as if the devil and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villainy, or as if prompting unto villainy were fit to be called inspiration, which is never used, but either in the way of prophecy, or in the way of some gracious suggestion. Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan, yourself dare not deny God's concourse to the substance of the action; and as for the manner of concourse, we are willing to undergo with you, or any man else that breathes, any scholastical discourse or inquisition hereupon: as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator, or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather.

As touching the evil it self, whether from our opinion can be inferred anymore then this, that God's will is it shall come to pass by his permission; and whether we cannot show better reason for this our tenet, then you or any man else for the contrary. As for the intending of the creatures woe and misery, as occasions or means of God's glory, what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and misery, as it signifies the misery of punishment, and in inflicting punishment on transgressors, undoubtedly he doth advance the glory of his justice, yea and the glory of his Saints also, who may see in others sufferings, what might have been their portion, if God had shown no more grace unto them then unto others, and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of God's goodness toward them. As for the misery of sin, be the sin as great as the crucifying of Christ, God determined it should be done, Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdom to the beast, little less then the giving of their kingdoms to the devil, yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to do his will even in this also: and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God, and the good of his elect. For both heresies must be, that they which are approved may be manifested, and God raiseth tyrants up, to exercise the patience of his children, yea their own sins redound to the profit of God's elect. Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestamque cadere peccatum. But hereupon to make use of that maxim, God's will is the rule of goodness, is most absurd; for the rule of goodness is God's will of commandment; but the will of God, that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to pass, is far different: neither I hope will you make question, in case God willeth anything to come to pass, whether God doth well in willing it; though that which he willeth or determineth be the crucifying of Christ Jesus.

As for the will of commandment, that is only the will of God touching what is our duty to do, or to leave undone, and accordingly called voluntas approbans, for certainly he approves obedience unto his will, in whatsoever he enjoineth us: yet this wide leap hath cast your meditations upon this point, to inquire forsooth whether God's will be the rule of goodness. But as you have entered upon it without distinction of will and will, so you carry yourself therein with miserable confusion.

CHAP. XIII.

THe question was never before (that I know) proposed in this manner, viz. of God's infinite will, but only of God's will. The Heathens painted Justice as an assistant of Jupiter. Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander, cast down with conscience of his foul fact, inmurthering his dear friend Clitus, deviseth an interpretation of this pageant, suitable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander; and that was this, Jupiter's actions must always be esteemed just. So saith the great Monarchs who are God's on earth, their actions must be accounted just. Anaxarchus is censured by Arian, and justly, for his gross flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth, who, it is well known, may degenerate into tyrants. But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God: you will not make question, I trow, whether God be righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, much less deny it, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, allowed Samson to sacrifice himself, the Israelites to rob the Egyptians; though he send an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem; though he put a lying spirit in the mouths of all Ahab's Prophets, to seduce the King, and to persuade him to go up against Ramoth Gilead, that he may fall there; though he sends to Pharaoh a commandment to let Israel go, yet tells Moses he will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel go; though that work of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two, comprehending the defection of people from their lawful King, he by open protestation takes unto himself as his own work; like as touching the defiling of David's concubines, he telleth David to his face, that he would do this openly, saying, I will take thy wives from thee, and give them to thy neighbor, and he shall lie with them in the sight of the Sun.

2. Your comparison of God's power with his goodness, I do not much mislike; only your comparing of him with Monarchs in goodness, is not so fit; for alas what prerogative have they of goodness above other men? They are to be borne withal, though they are not so good as others, because they are exposed to greater temptations then others, and the greater is the temptation, the less is the sin. No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus, or Heliogabalus in goodness; yet we know there is a great deal of difference between the goodness of God, and the goodness of man in the course thereof: for man's goodness in the exercise thereof, is subordinate to a law, and they are bound to exercise it towards all: God's goodness is of no such condition, nothing could bind him to the making of the world, or to the making of any creature at all. They being made, he exerciseth his goodness towards whom he will: for though in the course of his natural providence he causeth his Sun to shine, and his rain to fall both upon the just and unjust; yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings, his spiritual blessings in heavenly things, he hath mercy on whom he will, yea and whom he will he hardeneth also. And though ordinarily all are partakers of his temporal blessings, yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the communication of them also. Am. 9. 7. I have withheld the rain from you, when there were yet three weeks to the harvest, and caused it to rain upon one City, and caused it not to rain upon another City; one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereon it rained not, withered. Some die in their mothers womb, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some after a long time are consumed with a lingering death: neither is God's love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect. Thus Jacob was loved, but Esau hated.

Again, what justice do you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concur in this, that the justice of God towards man doth always presuppose his will, and God may bind himself as he pleaseth by promise. But God's will (you say) is not the rule of goodness, because the designs thereof are backed with infinite power. Your theme was to prove, that God's will is not the rule of goodness, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing less, but only that the cause why God's will is not the rule of goodness, is not, for that his designs are backed with infinite power. This is not to disprove God's will to be the rule of goodness, but rather to confirm it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why God's will is the rule of goodness, you do imply, that you maintain, that his will is the rule of goodness, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintain God's will to be the rule of God's goodness, do maintain it upon no other ground then this, to wit, Because his designs are backed with infinite power.

But had it been so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would bear the world in hand, that yourself in some sort hold God's will to be the rule of goodness, whereas you mean nothing less; and therefore in carrying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the main. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintain God's will to be the rule of goodness, for this cause, because his designs are backed with infinite power, as much as to say, because God can do what he will. This reason carrieth no color of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can do what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore be honester men then other. But because God hath infinite lawful power, that extends to everything that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can do, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, otherwise he should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. Holiness (you say) doth so rule his power and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoin, or the other exact anything, not most consonant to the eternal or abstract patterns of equity. You take great liberty of discourse throughout. What I pray, according to our understandings is the subject of God's holiness? is it not his will? And how can his holiness work upon his will? Doth the heat of fire work upon the fire? or the cold of water work upon the water? Again, here we have power and will distinguished, and the act of enjoining attributed to the one, and exacting to the other. Both are acts of command: now I pray consider, doth God's power command? I had thought imperium had been the proper prerogative of the will, yet both these, by your discourse, are in subjection to the eternal patterns of equity; and equity before you confounded with justice. Now I know no such justice in God, different from his wisdom. And herein I am of the same mind with Aquinas, Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei, Art. 6. where he disputeth this question, Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat. And there he professeth, that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione, & ad se invicem, & ad suam causam. Now let any man name anything that God can do, and then let him answer me whether God be not as well able by the infinity of his wisdom to do it wisely, as by the infinity of his power to do it at all. And mark what in the same place (where he seems most to favor your present Tenet) Aquinas professeth, Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus, & voluntas secundum rem & pro hoc nec idem, est voluntas & rectitudo voluntatis: Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus, & voluntas, & propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis, & ipsa voluntas. Although in us the understanding is one thing, and the will really another thing, whence it is that our will, and the rectitude of our will is not the same, yet seeing that in God, the understanding and the will are really the same, hence it is, that in God his will, and the rectitude of his will are all one. But be it that his will is consonant to the eternal or abstract patterns of equity, I pray, what more eternal and abstract pattern of equity then this, that it is lawful for God to make the world, if he will, and not to make it if he will; yea, and to do what he will, and leave undone what he will. I hope the will of God revealed, doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions, if things are therefore good because God wills them, as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them. Now the former of these is true, without all question, in most things; for whether the world had been made sooner or later, bigger or lesser, more Angels or less, more spheres or less, whether they had moved this way they do, or the contrary way; whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall, all had been received as the good course of God's providence equally as now it is. But here you pass to a point of a far different nature; for it is one thing to inquire whether God's will be the rule of goodness in this sense, whether whatsoever God brings to pass in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it, and a far different thing to demand, whether God's will be the rule of goodness in this sense, that whatsoever God commands us in his word (for so I understand you when you speak of God's revealed will) it is therefore good because God commandeth it. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of God's word, and without that, all men naturally are able to discern between good and evil, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousnesse, contempt of government, murder, uncleanness, gluttony, drunkenness, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evil, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evil written in the hearts of all, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing, Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say, that we know this or that to be good, because God's will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, we know this to be good, and that to be evil, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good, therefore justice and goodness are the objects of his will; first, because we have heard out of Aquinas, that God's wisdom is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodness, or wisdom are the objects of his will. Again, if the goodness of God's will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, then the rectitude of God's will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not be essential unto him, like as the rectitude of man's will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alleged. Whereas you say, unless this or that had been good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turn; for the wisdom of God may represent this or that to be good, that is, such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to be good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity. Nay, mark what Bradwardine professeth, suppose the wisdom of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that, yet is not God hereby bound to prefer the doing of that before this. Ratio praeponderans est, qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud, vel quod melius est, hoc facere quam dimittere, & talis ratio non movet, nec concludit voluntati divinae, nec eam determinat ad agendum. Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit & multa bona quae non facit. And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti. Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem, nisi faceret omnia possibilia, & horum quod libet infinitum, quod contradictionem includit. Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ration, voluntas, vel saltem ratio congruens & concomitans praelaxata. Yet the will of God is always reasonable: but mark what is the ground of this denomination, according to Aquinas, in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid, sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud. Yet you would make the world believe that you fetch your divinity from the fountain, they that think otherwise never taste it but in trenches, yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountain from whence you take it?

3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poor one, Seeing nothing can be without God's will, what can be good before God wills it? And your answer is by concession, That goodness actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of God's will, as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet only from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodness actually existent in God himself, doth that depend merely upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends merely upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed only by outward works, and God might have chosen whether he would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for God's goodness, we that taste of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himself, and depends not at all upon the liberty of God's will: There is, you say, a goodness objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of God's will. What I pray? Is it any such as binds God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheism by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodness which you make the object of God's will, savoreth of ditch water rather then of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which showeth God's will, what is to be done. But every novice knows, it belongs not to goodness to give direction, but to wisdom rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I shown before, makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisdom of God's understanding. And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisdom in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alleged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, qaam rationabiliter velle. Yet neither the wisdom of God shall determine his will, unless it doth so direct, as to show that this or that ought to be done▪ For if it doth only direct by showing what is fit to be done, and of many courses which God's wisdom can devise sit to be taken, if it be left indifferent to God's will to choose or refuse what he list, it is apparent, that though before God choose, it was fit to be done, like as many other courses were also, yet no necessity why God should prefer this before another: sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto, neither out of the fountain, nor out of the trenches. Intellectus divinus (saith one) singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat, & omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat, Henry. quodlib. 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth, that whatsoever God is able to do, that also he can wisely do, in 1. Quest. 25. Art. 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit. And again professeth, that the order of things in the government of this world, doth not adequate the wisdom of God; as much as to say, he could have brought forth a world, and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as he hath shown in this: his words are these, Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio justitiae consistit: non adaequat divinam sapientiam. sic, ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. And he proves it thus, Tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus à se factis imponit à fine sumitur. Quando igitur sinis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est sinis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas: unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum, ita ut non possit alius cursus rerum ess • uere. Scotus in like sort, Nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus à voluntate divina acceptante statuta. And he gives this instance of his assertion, Omnis peccator finalis, damnabitur: quis autem dubitat Deum de potentia absoluta potuisse peccatorem non damnare, sed annihilare? See also what John Gerson saith to the same purpose, Deus non ideo vult res ad extra fieri, quia bonae sunt, quemadmodum movetur humana voluntas, ex objectione boni veri, vel apparentis: Est e contra potius, quod ideo res ad extra bonae sunt, quia Deus vult ease tales esse; adeo quod si vellet ease vel non esse vel aliter esse, id quoque jam bonum esset, propterea been enuntiavit magnus Ambrosius post Basilium quod voluntas divina naturae primaria lex est. Yet of these you may say that they are but trenches. Although yourself hath hitherto brought nothing for your assertion, either out of fountain or trench, save only out of your own brain, which may be the fountain of your invention, and yet inferior to these trenches. But come we to the fountain, God is said to work all things according to the counsel of his own will. Mr. Hooker passeth his censure upon those Divines that refer all the reason of justice to the will of God. Calvin belike is one of those divines whom he in his reprehension reacheth at; who in his Institutions hath these words, Adeo summa est justitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quicquid vult, eo ipso quod vult, justum habendum. Yet Calvin saith not, that in this respect it is just; but only that in this respect it ought to be received as just. But Mr. Hooker, though he acknowledgeth that there is a law of divine actions, yet he professeth that this law is to be resolved into the will of God, which is somewhat more then Calvin professeth, and as much as Perkins professeth, when he saith, Nothing is just to God before it be willed by him, he speaks in respect of things to be done by him, and not of that justice which is called by the Schoolmen, Justitia condecentiae, which dictateth what may conveniently be done. For certainly, if a thing might not conveniently be done, God would never have done it: but he speaks of justitia obligationis, justice that binds to the doing of it; and maintains, that nothing binds God to the doing of it, but only his own will and determination. And in this sense have I elsewhere justified Mr. Perkins against Arminius. But as for Calvin's saying, when he professeth, that whatsoever God willeth must be received of us as just, is a most temperate speech. And to what purpose should we trouble ourselves to look any further, and to inquire after the reason of it. Whereas we are given to understand, that of the wisdom and knowledge of God there is such a depth as is unsoundable, O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God; how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out? But upon the matter, we may easily perceive how little difference there is between Mr. Hooker and others, when he professeth, that though this counsel of God's will, according whereunto he worketh all things, doth signify a law of divine actions, yet withal, such a law as is resolved into the will of God. Again consider, how is it called the counsel of God's will? not of God's will giving counsel, for that belongs to the understanding; but of God's will accepting the counsel proposed; and if many wise courses are proposed (as why should we conceive that God's infinite wisdom is limited to the devising of one course) then the will doth freely accept one rather then another. And thus Suarez interpreteth it when ho saith, Non ita operatur Dei voluntas secundum consilium ejus, ut omnino à consilio determinetur, sed potius (si ita loqui liceat) ut ipsa determinat consilium. In like sort Didacus Alvarez, though of a sect much opposite to the Jesuits, yet concurreth with Suarez in this exposition, Hic ut notavit Glossa, prius ponitur consilium, quod pertinet ad intellectum, deinde additur voluntatis suae, Ubi significat quod intellectus divinus, seuscientia ejus, ut determinatur à voluntata est causa rerum. You that pretend to fetch your divinity from the fountain, have not brought so much for proof of your assertion as this place cometh unto; it is enough for you to dictate and say, There is a goodness objective, precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will. And yet I willingly confess, it is so far good, as that God's wisdom doth represent it as a thing that decently and conveniently may be done; but that of necessity it must be done, and that thus divine wisdom represents it, yourself is so fat • e from proving this, that you do not so much as take notice of this distinction. You proceed, and tell us positively, that Unto some things considered as possible, this goodness objective is so essentially annexed, that if it be his will to give them actual being, they must of necessity be actually good, nor can he that can do all things, will their contraries. Never, I think, was so vulgar an assertion so much honored, as to be brought in with such state and pomp. As if any Scholar did make question, whether Ens & bonum convertuntur; or any sober man doubted, whether the works of God must needs be good. Whereas this is utterly beside the question: which is only this, Whether because God willeth anything, therefore the doing of it be just; or rather because it is just therefore God doth it. So that the question is not, Whether any entity produced by God be good; but rather, Whether the producing of it be therefore good, because God willeth it.

Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion, as when you add, God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodness of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodness, to imply no contradiction. Then let evil be goodness, and injustice goodness, and darkness light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, we understand it of things containing divers notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essential goodness of God, as you expound it. For that which is continual, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetickes, that I know, did ever maintain, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essential goodness of God; more then in contradiction to the nature and essence of an Angel, or to the nature and essence of a man.

I do not find any reason why the making of the world should be esteemed more consonant to the nature of God, then the not making of it. And whatsoever God willeth, if he willeth it freely, he might forbear the willing of it, and that without sin. I know nothing that God willeth necessarily but himself; and it is improper enough to say, that God's nature is consonant to it self. But in what sense a sphere of heaven, or a tree, or any vile creature shall be said to be consonant to the nature of God, I am content to be ignorant. I know no purity or holiness without the will of God, as that must be which is the object of it. In a word, is it created purity and holiness which is the object of the will of God you speak of, or increated? Increated it cannot be; for the object of that will of God, whereof we speak, is such as God willeth to have existence: but God doth not will increated holiness to have existence; for that were to will himself to have existence, seeing increated holiness must needs be God himself. But to say that God doth will himself to have existence, were to imply, that God as yet hath no existence. If created purity and holiness be the object of God's will, you speak of, then God cannot but will some created thing to be, therefore he must necessarily create the world.

A little before you told us, that God could not will ought contradictory to his own nature and essential goodness, as in this particular; he cannot will a man to be a man, and yet unreasonable. So then if he will have a man to be, he must have him to be a reasonable creature: in like sort, if he will have a beast to be, he must have him to be an unreasonable creature.

But what purity and holiness, or what consonancy to God's purity and holiness is to be found in all this, as namely in willing a man to be a reasonable creature, a beast to be a creature unreasonable, seeing now you affirm, that God's will cannot pitch but upon that which is pure and holy? If I be not deceived, you are now passing to another point, and do begin to apply the terms of your assertion to God's will of commanding; which makes me remember what the Welsh Tailor said to his boy, in making a garment while the owner stood by: for he cried out, Potherion, potherion, which afterwards by inquiry was found to signify, Wide stitches, wide stitches. At length you come to the fountain whence you fetch your Divinity, whilst others taste it but in trenches. And you tell us out of the book of Wisdom, that For as much as God is righteous, he ordereth all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to his power to condemn him that hath not deserved to be punished. God is righteous in keeping his word; I hope you will not deny it: neither Philo the Jew, nor the author of the book of Wisdom, doth inform us of any other righteousness in God. Sure I am, that both Suarez and Vasquez, other manner of Scholars then Philo ever was, acknowledge no justice in God, in respect of his creatures, but upon supposition of his will. Now God hath promised, that every soul that sinneth, it shall die, and not that the sons teeth shall be set on edge for the sins of the father. And yet I appeal to your own judgment, whether thus to carry himself be to do that which is agreeable to his power, or rather that which is agreeable to his righteousness. God, you say, loveth truth & sincere dealing, because he himself is true & just. Yet when the devil testified of the Apostles saying, These are the servants of the most high God, which show unto us the ways of everlasting life, though it were a truth which they uttered, yet the coming of it out of such a ones mouth, I think was as little liked by God himself, as by his Apostle. Amongst the actions of heathen men, truth was found, as well as other virtuous conversation; yet of their best actions Austin was bold to profess, that they were no better then splendida peccata. And he gives this rule for the discerning of true goodness, Noveris non ossiciis, sed sinibus discernendas esse virtutes. And as one blemish of their best actions was this, that they were not performed in reference to his glory; so another very suitable hereunto I take to be this, that they were not performed in obedience to his will. For the horrible sin of the Jews in offering their sons and daughters unto Moloch, is amplified thus in holy Scripture, Things that never entered into my heart to command them. And why should God regard that which is not performed in obedience to his will? Many things may be done, and are done by strangers living in far Countries, agreeable to the laws of this Kingdom; but we ken them no thanks for this, because they do it not in obedience to the laws in this kingdom. There is no likeness between the goodness of God, and the moral goodness of the creature. For look what goodness is in God, the same is in him necessarily; it is not so in man.

As for justice, I have often shown the consent of Suarez and Vasquez, and that opposed by none that I know, that justice in God in respect of the creature, doth always presuppose the will of God. Then as touching the truth of God, it is well known that God is a spirit, and hath no tongue to be the interpeter of his mind, as he hath given unto man; only he hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles, to deliver his oracles unto his people. And though God is not bound to reveal himself unto any; yet if it be his pleasure to reveal himself, he is not capable of any such inducement, to deliver an untruth, as man is: man may advantage himself by untruth, when by other means he cannot: it is not so with God, who needs not untruth. thereby to advantage himself. But whereas you say that God's veracity is coeternal to his essence, in my judgment it is a very wild phrase. For veracity hath no place where speech is not; and seeing that God speaks not but by his Ministers, it followeth that before the world was, he never spake at all; and seeing he could have forborne the making of the world, he might have never spoken at all; so far off from truth is it, that veracity, which supposeth speech, is coeternal to his essence. For if speech be not coeternal to his essence, how can truth of speech, or truth in speech be coeternal to his essence? Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech, or to speak by his Ministers, so it is all one with the nature of God, and no marvel if in this sense it be coeternal to his essence. Intemperancy, and consequently the opposite virtue of temperance and chastity is found only in bodies, not in spirits; and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angel to be chaste, so neither is it to the nature of God.

You say, God could not give a law for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust. Yet it is manifest, that promiscuous lust in brute beasts, in all sorts, hath its course, without any transgression, and it being a course of nature in them, it cannot be denied to be a work of God. And Suarez, though he takes upon him to maintain a tenet like unto