Discovery of Jacksons Vanity

CHAP. I.

YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great fear or despair. Arguments weak or weakly prosecuted, weakeneth the cause maintained, strengthenethe the cause oppugned. And first it is not handsomely carried, thus If every particular generation hath causes, then all generations have some cause; implyinge that every generation hath many causes; all have but one. But carry it howe you will, it is not capable of any sound inference. It is true, Every generation hath his cause: therefore all generations have causes; But what causes? only the same causes, which everyone hath a part, aggregated together. For as you make an aggregation of particular generations; so the cause of this aggregation, inferred, can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations. So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises, much less the being of the Godhead herby evidenced. Then your second inference is as wild, when you add, Otherwise all should not be of one kind or nature. For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation, to be of the same kind or nature with every particular. For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu & potentia; But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens, consisting of many particulars (each whereof is unum per se) heaped together, not by any natural union united into one. As we do not say the bushel of corn is of the same kind with every particular grayne, as also it cannot be said to be of a diverse kind in any congruity, although there were diverse kinds of graynes therein; But rather an heap of graynes, whether of the same kind, or of diverse kinds. Agayne you propose your argument, not only of the generation of Man, who is of one kind, but of all generable bodies, who are well known to be of diverse kinds, & therefore why should you account it any absurdity, for all these to be not of one kind or nature? Furthermore, when you make show of such an Inference as this, All must have some cause, otherwise they be not of one kind or nature, you do herby imply, that All, that have some cause, are in a fair way to be of the same kind or nature, which upon consideration you will find to be utterly untrue. For all creatures have some cause, yet are they not anything the more of one kind or nature; Allthoughe they have not only some cause, but the same cause also, namely God. Like as though things have different causes, yet it followeth not that they are of different kinds: As all mise are of the same kind, though some are bred equivocally, some univocally; so of lise and diverse others. For although Averroes were of opinion, that mise bred equivocally, & mise bred univocally, by generation were of different kinds, & thereupon maintained that such as were bred equivocal, did never propagate their like by generation; yet I do not think you are of that opinion, it being contrary to manifest experience. And to us it is manifest (who believe the creation) that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation, yet did propagate their like, & were of the same kind with creatures propagated from them. But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians, & denied all creation. I am sory, you are so unhappy in defend • nge truth, especially such a truth as the being of God; but th • best is, that truth needethe no man's defense. I hope you will prove nothing more happy in defending errors. Yet I deny not, but that the greatest Divines do conclude that there is a first cause (that is God) because the progress from effects to causes, & from causes inf • rior to causes superior cannot be infinite. According whereunto your argument should • have proceeded thus. In generations, as of th • Son by the Father, the progress upwardes cannot be infinite. Therefore at length, we must ascend to th • first of Men, as Adam, who was not borne by generation of Man; (for then he had not been th • first) but otherwise; and in like sort of the generations of all other things, that they had their beginning from some superior cause, to their own natures; which supreme cause of all, we account to be God. But yet I think you are not ignorant, that some Schoolmen maintain the world might have been everlasting, and that by creation; in which case there should be an infinite progress • in generations; unless as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle, to praevent an infinite number of immortal souls hence ensuinge devisethe, that though the World had been from everlasting, yet should it not be necessary that there should have been an infinite number of Men deceased, because saith he, God could have praeserved the first Man from generation, & propagation of his like, until some five or six thousand years ago: so you should take some such course to praevent an infinite progress in natural generations. But I mean not to put you to any such shifts. For I hold creation from everlasting, to be a thing impossible, and that the impossibility thereof, may be made evident by demonstration; and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned, to be of a thing merely impossible also. So that in fine, this argument of yours, though with little accuratenes proposed by you, is drawn from the creation; which kind of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of, till another time, yet in the first place you have fallen upon it, ere you are aware. Bradwardine writing against the Pelagians, layethe down two suppositions as the ground of all, whereof this is the second, that there is no infinite progress in entities; but that in every kind there is one supreme. The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more. And least he should seem to suppose this without all proof, one argument & but one he produceth to prove this. And the proof is to this effect: It implieth no contradiction to say, such a one there is; therefore it is necessary, that such a one have being, & it is impossible there should be no God. If any Man deniethe the Antecedent, it behooveth him to show, wherein the contradiction doth consist. And it is very strange, & so strange as incredible, that for the best nature to have existence, it should imply contadiction. As for example, we find these manifest capital degrees of perfection amongst entities corporal. Some liave only being, some have being & life also; some have being, life, and sense; some unto all these add reason also. Now that nature which includes both being & life, is of greater perfection, then such, as have being without life, and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist. Agayne that nature which includes both being, life, and sense, is of greater perfection, then that, which includes only being and life, without sense, and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist. Agayne, that nature which besides all these, in the notion thereof includes reason also, is of far greater perfection then the former, and it implieth no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist • Lastly, there are besides all these, natures purely spiritual, which we call Angels or Intelligences, of far greater perfection, then natures material & corporal, & it implyethe no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist, as the Philosopher hath demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all material concretion: Why then should it imply any contradiction, for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist, unless they are supposed to be of greatest perfection, even able to make a World out of nothing; and consequently to be of a necessary being themselves. For if possible not to be, howe is it possible, they should attain to being? Not of themselves; For that which is not, hath no power to give being to it self. Nor of any other; whether of a nature superior or inferior. Not of any of inferior nature. For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angel, neither by generation, nor by creation. If by a superior; this is to acknowledge, that there is a nature existent superior in perfection, unto Angels. And if Angels had a necessary being; then seeing they are of a certain number, their number also must be necessary; Now if it implieth no contradiction, that God should be, it is most necessary, that he is and must necessarily be granted, that he is. For being supposed to include greatest perfection, if he had no being, it were impossible he should have being; seeing nothing can bring it self from, nothing to being, neither can ought else produce him. For if any thing could, then that, whatsoever it were, should be of greater perfection then he. This is the argument of Bradwardine. And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before, and but one of the five ways, which he takes in the proof of this. The first way & more manifest, as he saith, is that which is taken from the consideration of motion; where hence he concludethe that we must at length ascend to one who moovethe, and is not moved, & that is the first moover, which (saith he) all understand to be God. The second is drawn from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (saith he) we find even in insensible things an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherein he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progress; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. Hence it followeth (saith he) we must ascend & rest in one supreme efficient, which acknowledgethe no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hath been already prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of things possible, with things necessary. The fourth is from the degrees that we find in things, as some things are more or less true, more or less good, more or less noble; whence he concludes, that something must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truth, goodness, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heat. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and lastis drawn from the government of the World, & the consideration of the order of things amongst themselves; whence he concludethe, there is some thing that orderethe them, and that must be God.

This last argument is, that which Raymund Sebond doth so much dilate & insist upon. And whereof he is very confident, like as of the success of his undertakings in general; as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine, within the space of a monthe; and that without any knowledge to prepare him, so much as the knowledge of Grammar, & yet he shall not be proud of it neither.

Vasquius further telleth us, that Aegidius was of opinion, that this truth, that there is a God, is a truth known of it self. And albeit Thomas Aquinas denyethe it to be a truth per se notam quoad nos; Yet in it self he professethe that it is per se nota for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject. And to my judgment it seems also to be so quoad nos, if it be duly consid • red & pondered what we understand by God, to wit the most perfect nature of all others. Now howe is it possible, that that which is more p • rfect then all others, should not have being? And every man knows that, that which hath being, is more perfect, then that which neither hath, nor can have being, (such as is the nature of God, if it have no being.) For according to the Proverb, a live Dog is better then a dead Lyon.

In the next place you inquire, whereunto you shall liken him? This indeed was the second thing you proposed to be inquired into. But in what congruity to a Philosophical, or Theological discourse, I leave it to others to examine. I will be content to sum up the account of what you deliver, rather then to argue the unseasonablenes of such a discourse. Thoughe nothing can exactly resemble him, yet some • thing, (you say) can better notify howe far he is beyond all resemblance, then others. But truly, what you mean herby is a mystery unto me. I should rather think, the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance, drawn from inferior things. That he is the cause of all things doth better represent the nature of God, then the resemblance of him to any thing; especially considering, what cause he is, to wit an • fficient cause of all things, and that not univocall but equivocal; & consequently such as comprehendes all things eminently, but in perfection without comparison beyond them. For comparison hath place only between things agreeinge in kind, or in proportion. But God and his creatures agree in neither. This I confess may draw to admiration. As the Philosopher, who being demanded what God was, required three days liberty, to put in his answer; and at three days ende, required three more, & at the ende of these, three days more, giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter; because the more he gave himself to th • contemplation of the nature of God, the farther he found • himself of from comprehendinge it, but whereas you add, that such admiration will more & more enlarge our longinge after his presence: I do no way like either your collection, or the phrase, whereby you express it. For as for the presence of God; of the very apprehension thereof we are not capable in this World, but by faith. Neither can any natural admiration arising from natural inquisition after the nature of God, & consideration of the fruiteles issue thereof, draw men to a longing after that presence of God which they know not. Bothe the knowledge of the presence of God, and a longinge desire after it, I take to be a work of special grace, and not any work of nature; upon the power whereof I find you doa • e too much in all your writings.

Painters (you say) can more exactly express, the outward lineaments of things, then we their natures. Painters expressions are in colors; our expressions are not so, but rather in words. And what a wild comparison is it, to compare things so heterogeneall in exactness. But though the expression of the one fail in exactness, in comparison of the other, yet the delight taken therein (you say) needs not: And thus you plot to make the love of God a work of nature, whereunto the natural conceptions of him, though nothing exact, by means of the creature may lead us. These conceptions of yours, are in my judgment as far from truth, as from piety. The frequent ebbs & flowings of Euripus, may cast a Philosopher into admiration, not comprehending the reason of it, yet bring him nothing the more in love with it. Angels are of very glorious natures, & in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason, both touching their being in place, their motion, their understandinge, & the communicatinge of their thoughts, & exercising of their power; yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them. Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodness in the object, which alone makes things amiable; as a beautiful picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight. But now I find, that from the impression of love, you slip I know not howe, to the impression of truth: & this I confess, delightethe some minds of purer metal; as Aristotle speaks of the delight that a Man takes, in the demonstration, whereby it is proved, that the Diameter in a squate, hath no common dimension with the sides of it, or that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right. Especially if the conclusion be rare & long sought after but not found, as the squaring of a circle received as knowable in Aristotle's days, though not known till of late, as Pancirolla writes & Salmuly in his commentaries upon him, about 30. years before that time. Yet some speculations may be as vain as curious: as to prove, that two Men in the World there are, that have just so many hairs on their head one as another. But to make a rain bow in the air, & by ocular demonstration prove the truth of that which reason concludes, namely that as often as a raynbowe appears in the clouds, though it seem but one, yet indeed there are as many, as there are Men that behold it, because it discoverethe a secret of nature, very curious and nothing vain. For it is the glory of God to hide a thing, and it is the glory of a Kinge to find it out. And seeing God hath set the World in Mans heart, though a Man cannot find out the work that God hath wrought from the beginning to the ende; yet it is good to be doing, & to discover as much as we can, especially such as have a calling hereunto. But to proceed, you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances, namely to have a sight of some scattered rays, of a glorious light, which Saints have in blessedness; and to this purpose to elevate us, to a certain Horizon, whose edges and skirts shall discover this. Thus you phrasify the matter gloriously, & prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightness that appears in our Horizon after the Sun set. But surely that Sun did never yet rise upon us, and when it doth, surely it shall never set. And I much doubt, least the glory of your phrases prove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part.

Hence you proceed to a rule of Decorum in all resemblances, that so you may make way to betray your learning in Hieronymus Vida his Poetry, passinge his censure upon a comparison of Homer, wherein he compares Ajax retiringe from the Troians unto an hards kinned asse, driven with batts or staves out of a corn field, by a company of children. The comparison is justified by Vida, but thought not fit to be applied in like sort unto Turnus, unless a Lyon be put in the place of the asse, in the judgment of those courtly times wherein Virgil lived, thereby desiring belike to justify Virgil also. I still attend, when those scattered rays you promised us, of that glorious light, you spake of, will break forth; But it may be, we are not yet come to the Horizon, whose edges and skirts alone can discover them. But yet to stay our stomachs you tell us by the way; that the Holy Prophets in their courtly Decorum observed in framinge comparisons, are nothing inferior to any Poet, though as good as Virgil & Homer also. They are something beholden unto you, for your good word. Your instance is out of Isaiah 31. 4. Like as the Lyon & young Lyon roaring on his pray, when a multitude of shepherds is called forth against him, he will not be afraid of their voice, nor abase himself for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come down to fight for Mount Zion & for the hill thereof. I begin to conceive, this was it you went with child withal, in casting yourself upon this digression touching the resemblinge of the nature of God. And because the comparing of Virgil with Homer, is a pretty point of humanity learning; and you had observed this passage in Scripture suitable to that of Turnus his description in Virgil: to vent this piece of learning, you have drawn in by the cares a discourse or rather an inquiry, Howe God's essence is to be resembled, the issue whereof is but this, that the Prophet observes a very courtly decorum, in resembling him unto a Lyon.

Yet by the way take this; If it were not courtly enough to compare Turnus to an asse as Homer compares Aiax, but rather to a Lyon; do you think it courtly enough to compare the Lord of hosts to a Lyon? And what courtly decorum is observed think you when the second coming of Christ is compared to the coming of a thief in the night? Persuade yourself; the holy Ghost affects no courtly decorums; his language is always savoury to a gracious spirit, not otherwise. The wits of Virgil & Homer both at the best, savoured but of the flesh, So doth not the word of God. I honor them both in their kinds; but I would not have them remembered the same day, wherein we consider the spiritual decorum of the language of God's spirit.

Well, the child is delivered, & these pangs are over; Now we may expect to be advanced to the Horizon you spake of, for the discovery of those scattered rays of glorious light, wherewith you enamored us. But first we are to be acquainted with three sorts of errors out of Austin, in setting footthe the Divine nature; The first (you say) ariseth from comparing God to bodies, as by saying that he is bright or yellowe; the second, from comparing him unto souls; as by attributing forgetfulness unto him; The third by attributing such things unto him, as are neither true of him, nor of any other, as in saying that he is able to produce, or beget▪ himself. Yet you tell us fictions, or suppositions must be used of things scarce possible, whereby to represent God, in default of better. And thus you make way for a fiction of yours, whereby to represent God, & that is of a soul diffused: thorough the whole Universe. Now that Deus was Anima Mundi, was an old opinion of certain heathens two thousand years ago. And what necessity, I pray, of any such fiction? And withal it is a fiction full of absurdity; considering that a great part of this Universe is a World of souls of diverse kinds; and the rest are uncapable of souls whether they are inferior to animate things as baser bodies, or superior even to reasonable souls themselves, as Intelligences. And I wonder what you meant by that sory qualification, when you say. You must use fictions of things scarce possible; Implyinge that this fiction of yours which here you introduce, is of a thing scarce possible; Whereby you seem to conceive that this is a thing not absolutely impossible.

Neither do I find any congruity, why bodies abstract or Mathematical, should be of fitter capacity to receive this imaginary soul whereby to represent God. Only I confess, that an imginary body is most fit for an imaginary soul, but neither fit to represent God by. For what virtues, I pray, can you find in them, fit to resemble him? Yet you are not at ende of your extractions, though the ende of this Chaptor touching God's resemblance, moovethe us to send an ende to our expectations, and to look no more for those seattered rays of that glorious light you spake of. The child you travayled with, was Homers comparinge Aiax to an asse, & Virgil's comparinge Turnus to a Lyon, & Vida his judgment thereupon, and the Prophets concurrence with the wit of the latter, and three errors mentioned by Austin, in resembling the nature of God. And last of all a fiction to this purpose of a thing scarce possible, and that something refined, and the whole put of to further extractions, & all the glory, we were put in hope of, is the glory of a few phrases, wherewith you wish your Reader, seeing his cheare, to be merry, for he is welcome. And thus you have given us a flashe of powder without shot, but not without smoke. Our enterteynment may be better in the chapter following.

CHAP. II.

FROM light shows we come to solid discourse, at least we are promised such. The principles whereof are two, termed springs & founteynes, that they may be the fitter, for the baptizing of Atheists, (so you speak) as they are fit enough for the confirminge of Christians. The first is, Whatsoever hath limit or bounds of being hath some distinct cause, or author of being. This is taken for a proposition known of it self; yet are the terms very ambiguous, as namely the term limit or bounds. In one place you profess that beginning of being is one special limit of being. Newe I confess, that in this sense, the proposition is evident thus, Whatsoever hath a beginning, hath a cause thereof distinct from it self; because nothing can have a beginning of being without a cause; Neither can anything give being unto it self. And therefore, if all things in this World are acknowledged to have had a beginning; it must be acknowledged that they had a Maker which is God. But that this World hath had a beginning hath not been acknowledged by all: Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God, as Aristotle and his Followers, have utterly denied the World to have had a beginning as you well know; And therefore unless, the contrary be proved, & these Philosophers confuted, we have herby nothing profited in convicting Men's consciences of this truth by the light of reason, That there is a God; and so are far enough from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father. Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the H. Ghost. And therefore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense, but rather you extend the word limites or bounds to a greater generality of signification, in which sense, you would have it supposed, that All things, besides God himself, have limit and bounds of being, not in regard only that they had a beginning which is questionable, but in regard that they are Entia finita, which is out of question; In like sort the word being, is of ambiguous signification; For it may be taken, either for being of essence, or for being of existence. The limits of existence or duration are such as whereby things are said to have a beginning or an ende; and that at such a time or other.

But the limits & bounds of things according to their essence, are such, in respect whereof Entia are said to be fini • a, or infinita. Now in this latter sense, your proposition hath been very questionable, amongst the most learned Philosophers, that have been. For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted, but that this visible World was finite.

Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it, is nowhere evident. Nay he opposethe Plato, & the rest before him, who maintained, that the World was made, & so accordingly, that it had a beginning: whereby it seems, that he, denying the creation of the World, denied therwithall that the World had any efficient cause. And indeed, whosoever maynteynes, that the world had a beginning by creation, must therwithall maintain, that either it was made of something, or of nothing. You will not say that tis a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter, which matter had existence without creation. For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe. Therefore you must be driven to maintain, that it is a truth evident of it self, that the World was made originally out of nothing; or at least, that it may be immediately concluded evidently, by a principle, which is evident of it self; thus Whatsoever hath bounds of being hath been made, the World hath bounds of being: therefore it hath been made; and seeing it was not made of anything preexistent; therefore it was made of nothing. Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident? considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceived it to be a thing impossible, that anything could be made out of nothing; as also considering that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement hereof, not to any natural evidence, but only unto faith, as where the Apostle saith, by faith we believe that the World was made, so that things which we see were made 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , not of things that do.

2. You proceed to the enlargement of this position, & tell us, that this maxim is simply convertible thus, Whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being, because it hath beginning of being: For, omnis causa & principium, & omne causatum & principiatum. There is little soundness either of Logic or Philosophy in all this. For to say that a proposition is simply convertible, is in a Logical phrase, to say, that it is a good consequence which is drawn, from the proposition converted to the convertent, that is to the proposition whereinto the conversion is made. But this is untrue of the proposition convertible, which you speak of. For an affirmative universal cannot be thus converted by simple conversion, but only an Universal negative, & a particular affirmative. But I leave your words, and take your meaning; You say it is also true, that, Whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being. Now both this proposition is naught, and the reason worse. For the Son of God, the second person in Trinity, hath cause of being from his Father: for he is begotten of him. And the H. Ghost, hath cause of being both from the Father and from the Son: For he proceedethe from them both. Yet neither God the Son, nor God the holy Ghost, have any limits of their being. If you say, the Persons are limited, though the nature of the Godhead be not; I would gladly know howe the Person of the Son, and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father. For of the Son and H. Ghost, I know no other limitation then this, that the Son is not the Father, nor the H. Ghost: Likewise the H. Ghost, is neither the Father nor the Son. And in this sense, the Father is limited as much as either. For as the Son is not the Father, so the Father is not the Son; and as the H. Ghost is not the Father, so the Father is not the H. Ghost. You should have said, All things that have cause of being by creation, have also limits or bounds of being; Or thus, All things that have cause of being in time, and not from everlasting, have limits, and bounds of being. Or if you would apply it to generation, thus, All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and bounds of being. Yet none of these is to the purpose, save the first. And that first proposition supposethe the creation, which yet is not evident, but unto faith. So then you see howe weak this proposition is; Yet the reasons you bring for the proof of it, are much worse. Your first reason is this, because it hath beginning of being. Now if by limits of being, you mean limits of existence, such as is the beginning of duration, then your proof is merely identicall. But if you mean by limits of being, limits of essence, whereby a thing is said to be Ens sinitum, the consequence is true I confess, but nothing more evident is the conclusion, by this reason, then it was before of it self. For that it hath a cause efficient which producethe it, doth as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced, then that it hath a beginning. Yet neither doth the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue, that the effect produced is finite, unless the efficient cause be finite. For to say that a finite thing could produce an effect infinite, is to maintain that a cause in working should exceed the sphere of his activity. But there is no place for this exception, in case the efficient cause be infinite. And I have known some infer herehence that the World is infinite; Otherwise say they, there shoude be no effect of God suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent. And consider; finite things are able to produce finite things, equal unto themselves, why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite? It may be answered, that the experience of producinge equals to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation. And so God also in the way of eternal and incomprehensible generation producethe a Son equal to himself, yea, the same with himself as touching his nature. But this is grounded upon a mystery of faith, which hath no evidence unto reason natural. For although by reason & meditation on God's works we may attain to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature, yet can we not thereby attain to the knowledge of God as touching the Trinity of persons. Add unto this, that diverse have not only believed, but undertaken to prove also, that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension, either in quantity continual or discrete.

And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanish Jesuit, and a late Writer, is most eager in the maintenance of this. So far of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that whatsoever hath cause of being hath also a beginning, of being, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Son and Second person in the Trinity hath a cause of his being, to wit the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hath not only a cause, but causes of his being, to wit both the Father and the Sonn, for he proceedethe from them both; yet hath he not such beginning of being as you speak of. For both he and the Son are everlasting like unto the Father. Your second reason is worst of all, as when you say: For omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principiatum. For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium, are taken for voces synonymae, words of the same signification; not signifying two things, the one whereof is consequent unto the other. And what sober Scholar would affirm, that omnis causa est principium, as principium signifiethe the beginning of being, whereas indeed it is the cause of beginning of being to its effect, rather then formally to be styled the beginning of being it self. That which followethe of the limits of things, more easily or more hardly discerned, according as the cause is found to be preexistent in time or no, is an assertion as wild, as the similitude whereby you illustrate it; and all nothing to the purpose, to prove, that whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being, though still you proceed ambiguously without distinction, either of being, or of the limits thereof.

For first, where the cause is not preexistent in time, as in things risinge by concomitance, or resultance, yet the effects are as easily seen to be limited, as when the cause is preexistent in time; as for example; the light of the Sun, and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by natural emanation, was as easily seen to be limited, the first time it was, as after the light is a long time hid from us, and afterward appears again unto us. Secondly, what if the limits be not seen, what I say is that to the purpose? Angels are invisible, yet we know, their natures are limited. Thirdly, what think you of the World, hath it limits or no? You think (no doubt) it hath; yet was not God the cause thereof preex • stent in time, but only in eternity. For before the World, no time had any existence. Agayne suppose the Wolrd had been made from everlasting, which some Schoolmen have held to be possible; in this case, God should have no preexistence either as touching time actual, or as touching time possible; Yet I hope that limits of the World, even in that case had been as discernible to Aristotle, as now they are to you. As for the similitude whereby you illustrate it, that rather showeth howe in such cases when effects do rise by way of concomitance or resultance, they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernible. Yet what should move you thus to amplify, howe hard it is to discern such effects, from their causes, I know not. For what hardness, I pray, is there, in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sun that gives it, or from the body of a Candle, or of a Glowewoorme, or of some kind of rotten wood, or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the dark? Yet is all this nothing pertinent to the confirmation, or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you. Howe far dependence upon a cause doth infer limits of being upon the thing dependinge, I have already spoken; What meant you to distinguish of the consideration of effects and causes, according to the consideration of them either distinctly, or in gross, unless it be to puzzle the Reader as much as you confound yourself, when eftsoons you manifest that you speak of them both as they have causes, which is to consider them only as effects. For that notion alone hath reference to a cause. But whether this doth infer that they are limited, I have already thereupon delivered my mind.

3. Hence you proceed to the solution of new problemes, and that as a mere naturalist. Why men in these days are not Giants; why Giants in former times were but men. And the reason you give is, because the vigor of causes productive or conservative of vegetables, of man especially, from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation, is less now then it hath been, at least before the flood. The latter of your two questions is wild. For what do we understand by Giants, but men of a Gyantlike stature? & is it a sober question to ask, howe it commethe to pass, that men of an huge stature are but men? For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts, as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor set up in the plain of Dura, or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes; should not men notwithstanding be men still? and neither Angels nor beasts; much less either inferior to the one or superior to the other. If the heavens were infinite as some conceive that an infinite body may be made by God, yet should those heavens be heavens still, and a body still.

Neither doth it follow, that therefore those Giants were men still, because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite & limited. For though they had been turned into Wolves or other beasts, the matter of nutrition had been limited still; yet in such a case, they had ceased to be men. As touching the stature of men so much lessened in these days in comparison unto former times; I no way like the reason thereof assigned by you. First because it caryethe no evidence with it, & you give no light unto it, but barely suppose the truth of it. Secondly because you limit it, in comparison of the like causes before the flood; As if there were no Anakims known since the flood. Of late years in the place where I dwell, hath been taken up the bone of a man's leg, broken in the digging of a well, the bare bone was measured to be two and twenty inches about, in the calf, and the spurr about the heel was found also, & that of a very vast proportion. It seems the whole body lyethe there. If King James were alive, and heard of it; it is like enough that out of his curious and Scholastical Spirit, whereby he was carried to the investigation of strange things, he would give order that the body might be digged up, & the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times. As touching the stature of men in these days what doth Capteyne Smith write by his own experience of the Sasque Sahanocts, borderers upon Virginia on the Northe; He professethe they seemed like Giants to the English; One of their wero • nees that came aboord the English, the calf of his leg was 3. quartars of a yard about, and the rest of his limbs answerable to that proportion. Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood; and Homer writing of the stone that Aeneas took up to throw at his enemies calleth it

And he was little acquainted with Noah's flood, that said Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos. Thirdly in these days some are very low, some very tall of stature in comparison; yet the vigor of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each. So in all likelihood both before the flood and after, such difference was found.

The Spyes sent by Joshua to take a view of the land of Canaan, having seen the Sons of Anak, seemed in their own sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them.

Yet the vigor of food and nourishment was the same to both. Far better reasons might be alleged, if I mistake not, of this difference; and withal I see no reason to the contrary, but that men might be of a great stature in these days, as in former times, and that by course of nature; if it pleased God to have it so. But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse, it is unseasonable, and I desire rather to deal with you in matter of Divinity, and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets. The question following, why vegetables of greatest vigor, do not engross the properties of others less vigorous, is a senseless question.

For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kind, or of a diverse kind, it is ridiculous. As for example. Woulde any sober man inquire after the cause, why that vegetable which is of the greatest heat, hath not the property of such a vegetable, that is of less heat? Or why that which is vigorous in heat, hath not the property of that which is vigorous in cold, or in any other disparate quality? Nay why should any man expect a reason why different kinds of things have different qualities? Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider, that they are different kinds of things, and therefore no merveyle if they have different properties? The cause hereof derived from the vigor of that which propagates is very unsound; For that which propagates, and that which is propagated is of the same kind, and consequently of the same property. And the question proceeds equally as well of the one as of the other. If you should ask how it comes to pass, that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angel; it were very absurd to say the reason is, because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angel, and therefore he could not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angel; least so he should propagate a more intelligent creature then himself. I say this manner of answer would give little satisfaction. For the question was made of man, not of this man in particular, but of mankind, which comprehendes the Father as well as the Son. And again, the Son may be more intelligent then the Father, though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angels are. The following question is as little worth the proposinge as the former. For what hostility is to be feared between the air and the water? But you make choice to instance in the hostility between the earth and the water, as a matter of dangerous consequence. You demand the reason why the wrestles or raging water swallows not up the dull earth. I had thought the earth had been fitter to swallow up water, then water to swallow up earth. For suppose the Sea should overflowe the Land, should it thereby be said to swallow it up? Then belike the bottom of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea. And by the same reason, the Element of the Air swalloweth up both Sea and Land, because it covereth them; and the Element of fire in the same sense, swalloweth up the Element of the air. And the heavens swallow up all the Elements, for as much as they do encompass them. Every Naturalist conceaves, that it is not out of any hostility, that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth, but out of inclination natural, to be above the earth, being not so heavy a body, as the massy substance of the earth is; And we know it is withdrawn into certain valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles, as the Poet acknowledgethe, who was but a mere naturalist, & that in commoda • habitationem animatium, that the earth might become a convenient habitation for such creatures, in whose nostrils is the breathe of life; of whom the chief is man, made after the likeness and image of his maker, and made Lord over his visible creatures. The last question is worst of all, and all nothing to the purpose, but mere extravagants. What sober man would demand a cause, why the heavens do not dispossess the elements of their place? might you not as well demand, why the fire doth not dispossess the air, and then why it doth not dispossess the water? & lastly why it doth not dispossess the earth of her seat? which is as much as to say, why is not the heaven where the eartheis, and the earth where the havens are? whereas every man knows, that the more spacious place, is fitter for the more spacious bodies; and the higher places more agreeable to lighter bodies, like as the lowest place is most fit for the body of the earth. To say that the nature of the heavens, hath not so much as liberty of egress into neighbor elements, is as if you should say, that light things have not so much as liberty of moving downwards, nor have heavy things liberty of moovinge upwardes. Yet there are cases extraordinary, when a certain universal nature moves them contrarily to their special inclinations, for maintenance of the integrity of the whole, and for avoidance of all vacuity. I see no reason for that other assertion of yours, that nature cannot set bounds to bodies natural, but rather is limited in them. What think you of the souls of men, do not these as other souls prescribe limits unto the matter? Materia prima was accounted in our University, to have dimensiones in determinatas, and that it received the determination thereof from forms, but by the operation of Agents, in their several generations. I confess nature it self is but the effect and instrument of God, who is the God of nature as well as of grace. But yet whether every thing that hath bounds of nature, as the World hath, doth herby evidence and infer the creation thereof, is such a question, wherein Aristotle and his followers did peremptorily maintain the negative; and the Scripture it self do the impute unto faith, our acknowledgement of the Creation.

4. Now we come to the scanninge of your second Principle, Whatsoever hath no cause of being, can have no limits or bounds of being. This in part hath evidence of truth thus, Whatsoever hath no efficient cause of being, the same hath no beginning of being. But if it proceed of limits of essence, or of quality, or of quantity, it requires help of reason to make it good. For as many as denied the World to have a beginning, denied as it seems, that it had any cause of being; and thought the being thereof to be by necessity of nature. Yet did they maintain that the World had limits of quantity, and quality. For they maintained that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible, as Aristotle by name. By your distinction following, of diverse ways whereby being may be limited, you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginning thereof; which yet hath been the chief, if not only limit, which hitherto you have mentioned.

Agayne, why should you make but two ways, confoundinge the limits of quantity, with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kind. It were too much in my judgment to confound limits of quantity, with limits of quality, which yet are both accidental. But most unreasonable it seems to confound either of these with intensive perfection of every several kind. But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition? Allmightie God hath no cause of being; therefore he hath no limits of being. Now, I pray, apply this to the members of your distinction concerning the kind of limits of being. Is he without limits in number? why then belike he is numberless. Yet indeed he is but one and can be but one in nature, and in persons can be but three, & must needs be three. Is he without limits in quantitio, and so infinite therein? But in very truth he hath no quantity at all. Is he without limits in qualities, not material (for such are not incident to him) but spiritual, & so infinite therein▪ Are there no bounds of the degrees of his goodness: why but consider, in God there are no degrees, no qualities at all.

As touching perfections created thereof indeed, we have several kinds, but none such are to be found in God. Only because God is able to produce them, therefore they are said to be eminently in God, though not formally. But the like you may say as well of any material attribute, as of spiritual. For God can produce all alike. Therefore all are eminently alike in God. Of things visible the most perfect, you say, are but perfect in someone kind. It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible; but this kind is to be understood of a kind created. But you may not say, that God is perfect in all such kinds, but rather in none of them. For that were to be perfect in imperfections. God's perfection transcendes all created kinds, and he is the Author of them, producinge them out of nothing. They that maintain the World to have been eternal, maintain it to have been so, by necessity of nature. And all such would peremptorily deny, that it was possible for the World not to have been; and therefore in this discourse of yours it would have becomed you rather to prove the contrary, then to suppose it. Howe the Heaven of Heavens should be accounted immortal I know not, seeing they are not capable of life. And seeing death properly is a dissolution of body and soul, immortality must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soul, which is not incident to Angels (much less to Heavens) which have neither bodies nor souls whereof to consist. Neither doth Seneca, in the place by you alleged, speak of Angels, in my judgment, but rather of the Species of things generable; particulars, though subject to corruption, being enabled for generation, and thereby for perpetuation of their kinds, and consequently for the maintenance of the World, and that forever. It is well known that the Platonickes, though they maintained the World to have a beginning, yet denied the matter whereof the World was made, to have had any beginning. Of the same opinion were the Stoics. Their common voice was, De nihilo nihil, in nihilu • nil posse reverti, & accordingly they might well conceive, that God might be hindered in his operation, by reason of the stubbornness and churlishnes of the matter; & so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers, I conceive to be just. Yet by your leave, I do not think, that any creature, capable of immortality, in what sense soever appliable to Angels as well as unto men, can be made immortal by nature. Yet I doubt not, but God can make creatures in such sort immortal by nature, as that no second cause can make them cease to be. For it is apparent, that God hath many such, as namely the Angels and souls of men. Yet still their natures are annihilable, in respect of the power of God. Neither can I believe, that to be immortal in Seneca's language, was to be without beginning. For I do not find, but that the Stoics together with Plato, conceived that the World had a beginning. But in this respect he calleth them eternal, (I should think) because the World, together with the kinds of things therein contained, subject to corruption and generation in particulars, should have no ende, and that by the Providence of God. We believe that nothing is absolutely necessary, but God. But Aristotle believed the World also to be everlasting without beginning, & of absolute necessity. For that the World should be created originally out of nothing, all Philosophers held impossible, and that the matter should be everlasting, and of absolute necessity, whereof the World was to be made, that seemed impossible unto Aristotle, and that upon good reason. The creation therefore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument, and not avouched only by bare contestation. That which followethe, we Christians are apt enough to believe, but you take upon you to convict Philosophers of the truth of them by evident reason; this I say you undertake, but prove not. You say, that the most strong and perspicuous way of inferringe the existence of God, is by this, that all things are originally derived from him, and made by him. And indeed, let it be proved, that the World had a beginning of being, and it will be manifest thereby, that there is a God, to wit, the Maker of the World. But you have not yet proved against Philosophers that the creation of the World is to be acknowledged. Nay this kind of argument (which I acknowledge to be the most pregnant and illustrious) you put of till another time, and to another discourse of yours, and yet all that you have to say doth but harp upon this, though herein you do but fumble, and prove nothing, supposing belike, that feeding us with expectation of some performance of yours, this way hereafter, we should be the more willingly drawn to bear with the imperfection of your discourse here. Yet had it been far better for your credit in my judgment, to have wholly passed it over according to your project mentioned at the first, then thus slightly to dispatche it.

5. But you have not yet dispatched it as it seems. Now you begin to dispute the creation of the World; but your phrase in expressinge it, is very incongruous, as when you suppose Philosophers to maintain, that the root of incorruption in the heavens, can brook no limits of duration, but must be imagined without ende or beginning. Now Philosophers maintained (and they only were the Peripatetickes. For Aristotle ingenuously acknowledgethe in his books de Caelo, that all that went before him, supposed the heavens to have had a beginning) that the Heavens were without beginning and without ende, not that the root of incorruption in the Heavens (as you speak) was without beginning and without ende. For of any such root of their incorruption he disputethe not; and I verily think, that herein, affecting to phrasifie, you speak you know not what. Now this he maintained, in opposition unto those, who feigned the World to have had a beginning ex praejacente materia; which matter had no beginning. And Aristotle concurringe withal that went before him in this, that nothing could be produced out of nothing, and opposing them in the point of matter praejacent, drew up his Tenet to this pitche, that the World had no beginning. As if he had disputed thus; If the World had a beginning, it must have its beginning either ex aeterna materia praejacente, or no. But not ex aeterna materia praejacente, as he labored to prove, therefore if it had a beginning, it must be of nothing; Now all granted that ex nihilo nihil sit; whence it followed that it could have no beginning at all. And truly, I am of opinion, that his Tenet was more sound then his opposites; and that with better reason it may be maintained that the World had no beginning, then that the matter or Chaos rudis indigestaque moles, whereof the World was made, had no beginning. Now that Principle wherein they all agreed, nothing can be made of nothing, they thought to be evident of it self, and such as needed no proof.

Yet Averroes in his commentaryes upon the books of Aristotle's Metaphysickes, gives a reason of it, disputing thus. If the World were made, and that of nothing, then it was possible to be made before it was made; which we willingly grant. Now saith he I demand, in what subject this possibility was? And withal telleth us that Johannes Grammaticus made this answer, that it was in Agente, which Averroes takes up in scorn, but confutes it not. Now Grammaticus his answer rightly understood is fair and full; not meaning that any possibility or power passive was in God; but that there was an active power in God so almighty as enabled him to make a World out of nothing, & consequently was foundation sufficient to denominate the World possible to be, before it was; not by any physical possibility, which always requires a subject really existent, to support it; but only Logical, which is nothing else but negatio repugnantia, which is appliable to non ens. For that which is not, may be denominated possible to be, in case there be an active power existent sufficient to produce it. But to proceed; against the opinion of Philosophers you dispute thus, If the Heavens can brook no limits of your duration, such as are beginning and ende, why should it brook limits of extension? as it doth. For the heaven is supposed by them to be finite in extension. For answer whereunto I say the reason is manifest. For an infinite magnitude actual is impossible, and admits manifest contradiction as Aristotle hath disputed the point at large. But to be without a beginning of duration, they conceived to be nothing impossible. Nay rather to the contrary, to have a beginning out of nothing, all of them conceived that to be a thing utterly impossible. And albeit in other cases they held motion, magnitude, and time to hold exact proportion, yet those cases were nothing to this purpose.

And whereas you say duration is a kind of extension; implyinge thereby, that extension is the Genus to magnitude and duration, as unto two species comprehended by it, I take this to be untrue. I judge rather, there is no univocall notion common to duration, and magnitude; though this be little material. But if you can show that it implyethe as great contradiction that the World should be everlasting, as that it should be infinite in magnitude, then you should speak home indeed to the purpose. And I profess I make no doubt but the demonstration of the one may be as evident, as of the other: but that is a task, which you have not hitherto performed. And whosoever undertakes it, is like to find opposites enough. For there want not Schoolmen, that maintain the possibility of both, namely both of the everlastingnes thereof in duration without beginning; and of the infinity thereof in extension. And one though no Schoolman, hath adventured to prove that the World is actually infinite, saying that otherwise, there were no effect suitable enough, to so infinite a cause and agent as God is:

Yet I fear not any of these colors, but am persuaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibility of eache may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertook to prove, then proved it. Yet you proceed, saying things caused are always limited. But you should have proved, that things of limited essence are always caused, and have a beginning of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neither is this proposition always true, as hath been shown in the example of the persons in the Trinity. And yet on this point, which is neither universally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your following discourse.

You should prove, that whatsoever hath limits of extension, the same also hath beginning of duration: which yet I deny not to be a truth, and demonstrable, but of the demonstration hereof, your discourse hath failed hitherunto. When you argue thus, It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing; as for anything that is, to take limits, or set form of being from nothing. You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it. For they that maintain the World had no beginning, do also maintain, that it took no beginning of the limits thereof: And as they do not say, the World took his beginning from nothing; so neither do they say, that the World took the beginning of his limits, or took his limits or form from nothing. Now you, by this form of your dispute, do instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World, thus; If God made the World out of nothing, then he put a new fashion upon nothing: But it is impossible that any new fashion should be put upon nothing; therefore it is impossible that God should make the World out of nothing. Now in this Syllogism the minor is most true. For not any thing can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion, as the form thereof. But the consequence of the major, is most untrue. For when we say that God made the World out of nothing, our meaning is not that nothing was the matter whereof the World was made, but only that it was the terminus a quo, not materia ex qua. As much as to say God made the World, whereas nothing went before, neither had God any matter whereon to work when he made the World. And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginning, do therwithall deny that the World took either being or limits from any thing. You turn their negative into an affirmative, so to corrupt their opinion, in stead of confutinge it. They thought, it needed not any thing to give it being or bounds of being, least they should be driven to affirm that something could be made out of nothing: whereas they had rather maintain; that the world ever had existence by necessity of nature. Neither did they maintain, that the world took limits or being from it self anymore then from any other, which you devise and impute unto them, in stead of convictinge their Tenet of error, by force of argument, in the way of natural reason which you undertake. And therefore havinge so weakly disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited, you do thereby betray the weakness of your proof of God's illimited condition from the everlastingnes thereof.

6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived, in the point of creation, you proceed magnificently to suppose, that the conceit of being without limits is essentially included in the conceit of being without cause precedent, which if it were true, then were it a truth per se notae, and consequently the creation of the world evident of it self even to common reason, seeing it is supposed to have limits. And again your discourse is so fashioned, as if Philosophers maintained that the world took beginning of it self, which is untrue and indeed a thing evidently impossible, namely that any thing should take beginning of it self. And indeed if a thing could give being to it self, it might give what it lusted to it self, if so be it had a lust, which the Elements and Heavens have not: Yet those Aristotle maintained to have been from everlasting, not that they gave beginning to themselves, but that they took no beginning from any thing. The reason whereof was, because they could not conceive, howe any thing could be made out of nothing, a thing contrary to all natural experience: upon which kind of ground yourself but erst built your discourse, when you said, things caused, as induction manifestethe; are always limited and molded in their proper causes. Yet notwithstanding upon this fiction, of a thing able to give being to it self, you dilate at large.

I grant, that upon this fiction nothing could restrain it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it self, in case it had power to give being to it self. But never any Philosopher maintained, that it had power to give being to it self. For they that maintained a Chaos precedinge the production of the world, maintained that out of this Chaos, God produced all things, and not that the Chaos or ought else gave being to itself. And Aristotle that denied such an eternal Chaos, & maintained the world had no beginning, was far from maynteyninge that the world gave being to it self. Secondly I answer, that though it should thus receive all bodily perfection possible, yet this should not be infinite, and without limits as you would have your Reader to suspect without proof, and indeed unless this be imagined, tis nothing no the purpose. The reason why in this case, it should not be infinite, is this; because all bodily perfection possible is but finite, as they conceived, and therein conceived nothing amiss. So of quantity or quality, the impossibility of either to be without measure in bodies, whose perfection is only finite, is a sufficient hindrance from taking either quantity or quality without measure. In like sort, let Vacuitie (as you speak) be left free to give it self full and perfect act; let it take all possible perfection, yet since all possible perfection of bodies, is supposed to be only finite, it will not follow that the perfection taken shall be without limits: which yet you must prove, otherwise your discourse is of no force to prove, that whatsoever hath n • cause of bring distinct from itself, is without limits. Allthoughe the Philosophers that maintained the world or matter thereof preexistent to be without beginning, driven hereunto, because they conceived not how it was possible, that any thing should be made out of nothing; yet did they never maintain that the one or the other gave being to it self. Yet this fiction you pin upon their sleeve, to supply the weakness of your discourse. Much less could it enter into any sober man's conceit, that they gave power to a Vacuitie, to give it self full and perfect act, seeing Vacuitie is stark nothing; which the Chaos was not, but a material thing, though merely passive and nothing active. But as for vacuity that is neither active, nor passive, as being stark nothing. And yet to this you add a further solecism in this your fiction; as when you suppose this vacuity to have power to assume either bodily substances or spiritual; which the Chaos had not, no not so much as in capacity, being wholly material, whereas spiritual substances are immaterial. And yet, I confess as you give unto that which is nothing power to assume which it list, either bodily or spiritual substances; it may well be said that nothing hath power indifferently to assume either or both of them. This I propose by way of an universal negative, not by way of a particular affirmative as you do, making the term nothing, to be the subject in your propositions, and not an universal sign only. Yet all thus assumed (as you speak) should be but finite; because all possible perfection besides the nature of God it self, is but finite. Therefore I say it should be but finite, if any thing at all; which caution I do put in, because upon due account, it will be found, that the sum of all this, in a good sense, will prove to be no more, then just nothing. For suppose, nothing doth assume bodily substances; again suppose, nothing doth assume spiritual substances; put this together, and add nothing to nothing, and see whether the total will prove to be any jot more, then just nothing. You proceed further, and tell us that while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginning, no reason imaginable could confine it, to any set place of residence or extension, why rather in the center, then circumference, or either rather then both. In this you seem to have reference to that which immediately went before, and that was a vacuity. And in very truth upon this supposition, where now the center is, nothing was; where now the circumference is, nothing was; and in all the bodies between, nothing was. For you suppose a vacuity of all, and nothing to be, where now there is some thing. Yet this nothing by your leave, must be confined in reference to the places, where bodies were before or after. And the places where bodies were before, being the same, by your supposition, with the places which now are, must needs be finite. For undoubtedly, the space of this whole world, between the center and circumference, yea & including both, is but finite. But foortwith you relapse to the former iniquity of your supposition; and in steed of havinge a being without beginning, which was indeed the opinion of some great Philosophers, concerning the world, or concerning preexistent matter, whereof the world was made, driven hereunto upon supposition, (as of a thing impossible) that nothing could be made out of nothing; wherein all agreed, though otherwise of different opinions, nor different only but contrariant also: I say, from this true state of their opinion, you relapse, to the worlds taking of beginning to it self; which is rather to maintain that it had a beginning (though of it self) then that it had none at all; yet this alone was affirmed by them, and not the other. Of which other, namely of taking beginning to it self, imagination only (you say) is the true cause. And therein you say true, but this cause is to be understood of your imagination, not theirs: For they imagined no such taking of beginning to it self, either in the world it self, or in the preexistent matter thereof. Yet upon this you found a new imagination, of extendinge (forsoothe) its existence both ways, and drawing a circular duration to the instant, where it begins; to wit where it begins in your imagination not in theirs; for they imagined no such thing. And indeed, he that imaginethe white to be black, I see no reason why he may not proceed further and imagine black to be white, and add unto this a third, to wit, that white is neither white nor black, and black is neither black nor white. Of circular motions I have read; but of circular durations I have neither read nor heard till now; well, let us understande it of duration in circular motions. But if you please, imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbs, and in course of time to return at length to the beginning of it. For what else to make of the instant where it begins, I know not. It seems by this discourse, that you have seen the gigge, and if your brains have not run round, I assure you mine have all most in following you. At length you come to a more sober supposition and expression; as when you relate their opinion thus, that the world hath a true present being without any cause precedent. This I confess is suitable to their opinion whom you impugn; who were driven hereunto (as I said) because they could not comprehend, howe any thing could be made of nothing. But when you add, without a superior guide to appoint it a set course, you something swerve from the right. All maintained the world could not be made out of nothing. But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it. The Platonickes and Stoics acknowledged a divine understandinge to have made the world, but out of a prejacent matter, which they conceived to be eternal, and to acknowledge no maker. Now as they acknowledged a maker, so they acknowledged a Governor, though sometimes hindered in his course, by the stubbornness of the refractary matter, which acknowledged no maker. Aristotle maynteynes also a first moover, therefore he acknowledged a guide also. But whereas he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent (as I conceive) it was in effect as much, as if he had acknowledged, no Governor. But all agreed that the duration either of the world, or of the prejacent matter was everlasting for the time past, and that the world should be everlasting for the time to come. To this Plato yielded. And so contained all duration imaginable both ways; namely both for the time past, and for the time to come; but with this difference, that for the time past it was actually infinite; only the duration for the time to come not actual, but in such sort infinite, as it should never have an ende. Now this consideration openeth a fair way to a discovery of the impossibility of this conceit of theirs concerning the eternity of the world, or the eternity of time, and that by very evident reason; (though I deny not but men have and may set their wits on work in quashinge the evidence thereof; in their zeal I think to defend the honor of Aristotle.) For if the world were everlasting? Paulus Venetus, though zealous to defend the possibility hereof, yet acknowledgethe it would follow, that the part is equal to the whole, nay greater then the whole; and that in so evident a manner, that he hath no other way to answer it, then by professinge that this maxim, Totum est majus sua parte, is of force only in materia finita, not in materia infinita; which in effect is as much as to say; The world may be everlasting I will maintain it, but I forbid any man to dispute against it. For I purpose to deny all maxims that are made use of, in disputing against it; and will be bold to say that they all have force only in materia finita, and not in materia infinita.

And because seeing I have excepted against weak courses of argumentation, in defense of the creation; it may be expected I should substitute stronger arguments in the place of them. I will not spare to address myself hereunto so far as out of the old store of my Philosophy I have in readiness. And yet if things be considered aright, there is no necessity of any such course. For certainly we have no need of it for the fortification of our faith, that being built only upon the word of God; and according to that old saying: Fides non habet meritum quoties humana ratio praebet experimentum. And as for Atheists, may we not justly say of them, as Abraham saith of the rich Gluttous brethren. If they believe not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe though̄ a man should rise from the dead. Especially considering that the Scriptures suppose (in my judgment) the creation to be acknowledged by general instinct, actualed by consideration of the course of the world; as where it is said, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handy work, Day unto day uttereth the same, and night unto night teachethe knowledge. There is no speech or language, where their voice is not heard. And as is the voice of the Prophets in the Old Testament, such is the voice of the Apostles in the new. The invisible things of God, that is his eternal power and Godhead, is seen from the creation of the World, being considered in his works, so that they are without excuse. And Paul preaching before the Athenians, in an University much addicted to Aristotle's Philosophy, yet is bold to suppose this, as a thing without his preaching received amongst them, God that made the World, and all things that are therein, seeing that he is Lord of Heaven and Earthe, dwellethe not in Temples made with hands. Neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though be needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life and breathe & all things. And hath made of one blood all mankind, to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hath assigned the seasons, which were ordained before, by the bounds of their habitation. And the being of the World from everlasting, though by creation, doth apparently limit the power of God thus far, that he could not then have made it sooner. And if God could make the creature like unto himself in everlastingnes, why not in anything else, seeing the Apostle, speaking of the Godhead as evidenced by his works, noteth it to consist in his eternal power. But come we to that manner of demonstration which is expected, leaving such arguments as Mornay prosecutethe, as namely the novel invention of all Arts and Sciences, as appears by History, and the like, evidencinge that the World had a beginning: It is well known that the most general opinion is (even of Aristotle himself) that an infinite magnitude or a number actually infinite, is a thing utterly impossible as that which implyethe manifest contradiction. Now let those arguments be well observed, and considered, whether the most pregnant amongst them, may not with as great evidence be accommodated against the everlastingnes of the World, to prove it to be a thing impossible. As for example. One of the most forcible arguments that I have found to prove the impossibility of an infinite magnitude is this. If a magnitude were actually infinite, then it should consist of an infinite number of yards or ells; for if it consisted but of a finite number of them, the whole could be but finite. Now it is manifest that such an infinite magnitude can consist but of an infinite number of inches. And herehence it followethe, that the number of inches, and the number of yardes or ells in such a magnitude are equal; & herehence it followeth that an inch in this case should be equal to a yarde or • ll; which is impossible, and consequently as impossible it is that there should be any magnitude infinite. In like sort, if the World were everlasting, then the days past should be infinite, & not so only but the years past should be infinite; and so the number of days and number of years past, should be equal, and consequently a day should be equal to a year; For if twenty days were equal to twenty years, then certeynly one day should be equal to one year. For fi ab aequalibus aequalia demas quae remanent erunt aequalia. Now it is impossible that a day should be equal to a year, & consequently it is impossible that the World should be everlasting without beginning. Perhaps some may say that the same reason might prove as well that it is a thing impossible the World should be without ende. But this is untrue, though at first sight men are apt to be deceived with a show of parity, where indeade there is no parity. For though we shall continue as the Angels already do without ende, yet herehence it shall never come to pass, that it can be verified of such that they have continued an infinite space of time; but still the space is finite, though with addition of continuance longer & longer in infinitum. But if the World were without beginning, then an infinite space of time were actually past already, which implieth manifest contradiction as before hath been shown. Now consider the answer to the former argument, & whether it be of any force. The only: course to weaken it is to maintain, that datur infinitum, infinito insinitius. One infinite may be greater then another, to wit an infinite number of years past, greater then an infinite number of days past. This at first sight seems to be a mad kind of answer. For hence it followeth that one infinite cannot be admitted, but that therwithall you must admit an numberless number of infinites. As for example; If there were past an infinite number of years, then seeing every year contains 365. days, you must acknowledge that this infinite space of years consists of 365. parts, each whereof is infinite. And whereas if the World were eternal, & the space of time past, infinite, then the millions of years past were infinite also; whence we infer that the space of millions of years past being infinite consists of ten hundred thousand parts, each whereof is infinite, and each infinite part consists of 365. parts, each whereof is infinite also. And this is the very argument that Aristotle useth in his Metaphysickes to prove that there cannot be an infinite magnitude; for then it should consist ex infinitis, now indeed this they do grant that streyne their wits to maintain the possibility of infinity in magnitude as namely Hurtando de Mendosa in his disputations; as being necessarily driven hereunto. And the like course they must needs take that maintain the possibility of infinity in time past. But as for the possibility of it in time to come, that is altogether of another nature, as before I have shown. Now I will clearly overthrow this answer and prove evidently that an infinite number of years is not greater then an infinite number of days; and I prove it thus. If upon the position of an infinite number of days, there follweth hoc ipso, the position of an infinite number of years, then an infinite number of years is not greater then an infinite number of days. All experience justifieth this. For if upon the position of a quart of measure, followeth the position of two pints, then it is manifest that two pints is not greater then a quart, and so give instance in what you will, it never fayles. Now to the major proposed I add my minor thus; But upon the position of an infinite number of days, hoc ipso there followeth the position of an infinite number of years; And therefore an infinite number of years is not greater then an infinite number of days. The minor I prove thus; Upon the position of an infinite number of days there shall follow a position of a number of years not finite, therefore infinite. Not finite; For if the number of years arisinge from the presupposed number of days were but finite, then the days whereof this number of years consists should be but finite; For the days should be but 365. times more then the years. And a finite number multiplied by a finite number, can bring forth but a finite number. But we have supposed, & the Tenet touching the possibility of the Worlds everlastingnes doth suppose the days past, to be possibly infinite. Which yet by this one argument we have demonstrated to be impossible. Consider one argument more. Paulus Venetus maynteynes it is a thing possible that the time past of the World should be infinite; yet to exercise his wit, he disputes against it in this manner in effect. If the time past were infinite, as we all confess, the time to come may be infinite, then the part shall be greater then the whole, as for example, the time from yesterday upwards shall be greater then the time from this day upwards; which he proveth thus. The time from yesterday upwards, is equal to the time from yesterday downwards. (This is supposed for as much as all confess it to be possible that time should be without ende.) But the time from yesterday downwards is greater then the time from this day upwards; therefore the time from yesterday upwards, is greater then the time from this day upwards. The minor he proovethe thus. The time from yesterday downwards, is greater then the time from this day downwards. But the time from this day upwards is equal to the time from this day downwards; therefore the time from yesterday downwards is greater then the time from this day upwards; & consequently the time from yesterday upwards (being equal to the time from yesterday downward) is greater then the time from this day upwardes; which is as much as to say, that the part is greater then the whole. These inferences depend upon this maxim most evident, that which is equal to a greater, is also greater. Now mark how Paulus Venetus answereth this argument, which is of his own devisinge; & his answer is this; This maxim the whole is greater then his part, hath place only in matter finite, not in matter infinite. A most absurd answer; for it is in effect to forbid all disputation against him. For we cannot dispute without grounds to insist upon. And no more evident grounds can be devised, then such as contain the rules of contradiction. Yet I will make it manifest, that this maxim must have place in all matter, whether finite of infinite. To maintain that the whole is not greater then the part in some case is to maintain that both parts of contradiction are true in some case. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true in any case; neither in matter finite nor in matter infinite; Therefore in no case can it be truly maintained that the whole is not greater then the part. The minor I prove thus; there cannot be greater difference between matter sinite and matter infinite, then between ens & non ens. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true either about ens or non ens; (like as one part must be true de omni ente & non ente); therefore neither can they be true in any matter whether finite or infinite. Agayne if this which he saith were granted, then there could be no disputation as touching the nature of God, seeing he is infinite. And if we take away the rules of contradiction, we take away all disputation. Now I proceed in scanning that which followeth in your discourse.

7. I have hitherto followed you in the course of your own suppositions, and shown how far short you fall of provinge what you intended, although your fictions have been wondrous wild. We commonly say, Uno data absurdo, mille sequuntur, we do not say infinite. Yet I see no reason to the contrary, but that from these thousand absurdities, others may follow, and that in infinitum. Thoughe fewer follow it suffizethe us, if your collections be of the number of them. By the way, let me tell you, your marginal quotation stands in no congruity with the text. Then you compare impossibilities, and tell us, that for a mere logical possibility, to take beginning of actual being from it self is as impossible, as for that which is thus supposed to take beginning, to be restrained to any determinate kind or part of being; Implyinge that the opinion of Philosophers, which you oppose did maintain, that a mere Logical possibility did take beginning of being from it self; whereas indeed there is no such matter. Never any Philosopher was found to dote in such manner as you fashion the nobler sort of them. This is a mere fiction of your own brain. For first whether they maintained the World to take beginning of it self, as you seem to fancy they did, or the praejacent matter, whereof it was made to take beginning of it self; yet herby they did not maintain that a mere Logical possibility, did take beginning of actual being unto it self. For they were never found to maintain that the World was a mere Logical possibility, or that the matter praejacent whereof it was made, was a mere Logical possibility. Secondly they never avouched, that either the World, or matter praejacent whereof it was made, did take beginning of being to it self, as you impute unto them, without all modesty, only endeavoring to supply the weakness of your argument, and give some color of strength to your discourse, by the corruption of other men's opinion. But Aristotle's opinion was, that the World was without beginning; and the former Philosophers opinion was, that the matter whereof the World was made, was without beginning: and the reason of both was this, because they conceived not how it was possible, that any thing could be made out of nothing. So that your argument rightly accommodated should run thus, It is as impossible that the World was without beginning, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginning should have any limits of being, and be finite. Now this they would maintain to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of it self. And you have hitherto afforded no evidence at all to justifye it. And again there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of being, or no beginning of being, yet can it not be infinite, because that implyethe manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have been found to justify, that a body might have been everlasting, by the power of God, and consequently without beginning. And again, if the World hath a beginning (as we believe it hath) it must necessarily follow, that some thing should be made out of nothing, which not only Philosophers conceived to be impossible, but the H. Ghost also professethe it to be a truth so far overreachinge the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faith, saying, By faith we believe that the World was made. What I think of your modells I have already signified. In fine you tell us, whereto they tend, which you express im pomp, saying, They are destinated to the errection of an everlasting aedisice. And that is a certain proposition concerning the nature of God, namely, that God is such a one, as he should have been, if he had had beginning of himself. Which assertion of yours how well it becometh the honor of God, let every sober Reader judge. For you affirm that God is of such a nature, as should be existent, upon supposition of a thing impossible; namely, The taking of beginning of being from ones self. By the way I observe, that though you maintain God to have no beginning of being, yet you deny him to take beginning of himself; and thereby distinguish between such things upon the confusion whereof alone, the plausibilite of your former discourse did wholly depend. For whereas Aristotle maintained that the World was without beginning; and the ancient Philosophers before him were of opinion, that the matter praejacent, whereof the World was made, was without beginning, you shaped their opinions in such sort, as if they had affirmed, that the World took beginning of it self, or the praejacent matter whereof the World was made, took beginning of it self, which indeed is most absurd; yet not their opinion but your fiction; the less was your ingenuity in pinninge such a conceit upon them: though I confess, it served your turn well, this corruption of their opinion wrought by you, being your best argument to strengthen your discourse. By the way I observe, you make God to be the sole Maker of all things, yet I never found you to acknowledge God to be, the sole Author, or so much as Author of faith and repentance.

CHAP. III.

BEFORE you come to your Philosophical Divinity, you are pleased to acquaint us with some Logical formalities. You dispute that there is no medium between nihil & aliquid, praesupposinge that some Answerers in the Schools, though few, would make choice to affirm a medium between these. You say to find a medium betwixt them by abnegation, is as hard as to assign a space or vacancy between a line and a point that terminates it. And this is a very hard matter I confess, even as hard (to requite you in your own Rhetoric) as to find a space between a part of a line and the point that joins it to the other part. To this you resolately add, that what name soever we propose, unless it have some degree or portion of entity answearinge to it, we may justly say, It is just nothing. But this to my understanding is untrue. For to the name of God no degree or portion of entity is answearinge, but rather entity, without degree or portion. It may be you understande this part of your discourse as well as the former, of the names of entities create in distinct on from God the entity increate. For forthwith you confess, that these reasons notwithstanding though they firmly hold in secular disputes of predicamentall or numerable entities, yet the infinite essence comes not within this division. So then God, is neither aliquid, nor nihil. And therefore it is not so hard to find a mean by abnegation between these, as to assign a space between a line and a point that terminates it; unless you will say, that to acknowledge a God is as hard, as to acknowledge such a space or vacancy. As then God is not nothing, so he is too excellent, you say, to be comprehended under the name of some thing. And indeed the word Aliquid signifiethe a part of quidditie, or entity, which cannot be affirmed of God, neither in respect of created quidditie; For in that respect, he is verily nihil, and not at all aliquid creatum; Nor in respect of quidditie increate; for that hath no parts; and if it had, God should be rather all that quidditie, then a part of it. And thus we may say that aliquid and nihil are not contradictories: if they were, it could not be avoided, but God himself must admit the denomination of one of them. But if it be farther objected, that God is aliquid in respect of quidditie or entity, neither create nor increate in special, but considered in common to them both. So also it may be denied that God is aliquid, or a part of such entity or quidditie, seeing no entity, is common to create and increate entities. For entity is no univocall Genus, fit to comprehend God & his creatures; though some subtle inventions have been on foot brought in by some to justify that the word ens doth univocally comprehend God and his creatures. But you seem not to approve of such speculations. For as much as you deny him to be a numerable part of entity; and if he were a species of ens, he might well be numerable with the other species thereof. Therefore I think it needeles for me to undertake the disproovinge of Scotus his reasons, though curious ones, whereby he proves the univocation of the word ens in respect of God and his creatures. It should rather have been your task, who undertake a discourse of this nature, which for my part, I had never meddled withal, had it not been for some pieces of corrupt Divinity, which you patch on in some places to this your Philosophy. Yet by the way we are to consider, that although the word aliquid be an unfit denomination of God, yet ens is not, which though it be not univocally attributed unto the Creator and the creature, yet usually it is analogically. God may well be said to be an ens independent, and upon whom all other entia do depend. You farther proceed to give a reason why the Latin word ens, is not fit to denominate God, so to make the Divine nature a mean by abnegation, not only between something, and nothing, but all so between ens and non ens. For the word ens you say, out of Mirandula, hath the form of a concrete. And every concrete hath his name from that nature whereof it participates; as hot is that, which participates of heat; white is such a nature as participates of whiteness. But God cannot be said to participate of essence. In this I find some defect. First, because you do not show, howe ens, which you call a concrete is divided, (as concretes are) into a part material participating, and a part formal participated. In a word, you do not once offer to resolve ens into the parts of its signification. Secondly, there is little congruity between ens that which hath being, & hot or white, that which hath heat and whiteness. For that which hath whiteness in it, or heat, is a substance, or subject really existent, wherein the quality of heat or whiteness is found. But the word ens admittethe no division comparable, or congruous hereunto. For you cannot with sobriety say, that ens signifieth a nature really existent, wherein essence is found distinct from the nature signified, or coming over and above unto it, as heat doth over and above to the constitution of the subject. And therefore it followethe not, that because hot doth signify a subject participating of heat, therefore ens also signifieth a subject participating of essence. A great deal of difference there is between concretes of accidental denomination, and concretes of essential denomination. As Homo & Animall, which may be accounted concretes, in respect of such abstract notions, as are conceived under the terms of Humanitas and Animalitas. The specifical essence being constituted by the abstract notion, and not participating of it, as bodies participate of heat. The truth is, all compounds do properly admit a concrete denomination, as in whom the suppositum (as Homo and Animal, differethe from the nature denominatinge it, as Humanitas & Animalitas. But in things not compound it is not so, least of all in God. For though Homo be not Humanitas, yet Deus est ipsa Deitas. Aquin. 1 q. 3. art. 3. De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; & ideo de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita. Et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus ejus simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur Deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem, quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. That God is one, by whom all things are, is true; but this description is little congruous to the nature of God; in as much, as it could have no place before the creation, or in case the World had never been created. Yet God's nature is still the same. I cannot admit that things created participate of God's being. They have their being from God, I grant; but I cannot admit their being to be any part of God's being, or God's being to have parts. Yet if all things are from him, howe can you avoid, but that God himself shall be from himself. Vnles the Apostle help you in this discoursinge, In that he hath put all things under him, it is manifest that he is excepted who did put all things under him. But be it so that all other things are from him; & then also accidents as well as substances are from him, and can they participate of God's being? Of accidental being, I grant they do participate and that from God, but not of God's being. If so; howe much more must faith and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God; which I much fear, you will be found to deny, if not at first hand, yet at least in a second place, by maynteyning it in such a manner to be the work of God, as upon condition of man's will; which in my judgment is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them. The name of God I am, openeth a fair way to the expoundinge of a mystery, which you medle not with, contenting yourself with ventinge of phrases, in setting forth the nature of God. The existence of all creatures may be accounted as a mere accident to their essence; for as much as all of them have being after not being; and from being either do or may return again to not being. It is not so with God, who is everlasting and that formally by necessity of nature. So that whereas the essence of every creature abstract from existence, includes a possibility formally indifferent to being or not being, God's essence includes a necessity of being, an impossibility of not being. Your lines of amplification are either very wild and without sense, or my wits are too shallow to comprehend them, the rest I cannot construe, the close I can, when you say the essence of God is the bond of all things that can be combined or linked together. I can construe these words, but not comprehend their meaning. The combination of things together, you understand, it seems in affirmations & negations. Now that God's essence should be the copula, whereby the subject and predicate in all propositions, are linked together, and that whether true or false; Holy or profane, may well pass, I think, for the tenthe wonder of the world. God only is by nature, all other things by the will of God. I am that I am say the the Apostle, but by the grace of God. God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence, we are in such sort, as that our existence is not our essence. For sometimes we were not; and if it pleased God, we might cease to be. But yet we live and move, and have our being, & all in him. I cannot admit that Angels participate of God's essence, or that God communicates his essence to any, but to his Son. They, as all other things, have their essence from God, but not his; Yet are they according to the Image of God. Other creatures may have vestigia footestes of God. In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God; I say the Image of God, but not the essence of God.

2. Whether Angels are creatures, and consequently of a finite nature, no Christian makes question. But as touching their nature, understanding, place, and motion attributed unto them, they are such secrets and mysteries unto me, that I have no heart to medle with them. The Scriptures, tell us, that a Legion of devils were in one man; and of the good, that the Angels of little children do always behold the face of God their Father. But touching the nature of God, to say that his indivisible unity, comprehendeth all multiplicity is an ambiguous speech; both because multiplicity is found in evil as well as in good; and the phrase of includinge, to my thinking, inclines to signify, comprehension formal rather then virtual. As for Seneca's sentence, which you so much magnify, as if we could not say more of him in fewer words, I judge to be an unwoorthy speech to denote the nature of God, as indeed more false then true, or rather false throughout, and void of all truth. And why should we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man, and from a Stoic, as Seneca was. So Lucan, Deus est quodcunque vides, quocunque mover • , out of the mouthe of Cato Vticensis, a man of Stoicall profession, as Seneca was. And such sayings as these, Deus est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides, savor hotly of an Atheifticall opinion, of such, as being ignorant of the nature of the true God, deified the nature. And commonly their several God's denoted only several parts of the World, as Vesta the Earth, Jupiter the air, Baal or Bel, and as some say, Hercules, Tyrius the Sun. Yet several Nations, like enough had their several opinions, but all concurring in this, namely in adoring the creature, and specially all the host of heaven, in steed of the Creator. And then withal they had an universal Deity, whom they called Pan, representing the whole Universe. And according to Platonicall opinion, God was accounted Anima Mundi. And thus with them, God was Totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides. Yet I may well grant, that more could not be said in fewer words, but this is in the way of falsehood, and not in the way of truth. The best construction, that can be made of it, is to say that God is the Author of all that we see, and of all that we do not see. Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoics, of whose profession Seneca was. For though he did believe the World was made, as Aristotle professethe in his books de Caelo, it was the opinion of all that went before him: Yet did he not believe, that it was made out of nothing, but that the matter whereof the World was made, was eternal. Therefore they did not believe, that God was the Author of all, both of that we see, and of that we do not see. Your self confess, they conceived the matter to have been coeternal with him, and not so only, but able also to overmatch the benignity of his active power by its passive untowardlines. Agayne I do not find, that any of them maintained, that immaterial substances were made by God; for then they should all be made out of nothing. For Angels consist not of material extensions. And it was their general voice that nothing could be made out of nothing.

3. The analogy you speak of, is without all proportion. For the picture of a man, though it be no true man, yet it may be a true picture; and whether a true picture or no, yet undoubtedly it hath a true being, though imperfect, in comparison to the being of a man. And therefore herehence to conclude, that no creature truly is, is without all proportion: Man indeed is but the Image of God, as some things are the Images of men: Whence it followethe; as the Images of men are not men, so man the Image of God is not God. But to infer that therefore man is not in truth, or hath no true being, hath no ground, no foundation. If the being of a creature is but the shadow of true being, then humanity (which is the being of a man) is but a shadow of true humanity, & brutality, which is the being of a beast, is but the shadow of true brutalitie. And is it proper think you to say, that the truth of all these are found in God, to wit true humanity &c. David and Solomon were types of Christ; but I never read, nor heard, that the creatures are types of the Creator. Effects they are, and the works of God; and as the cause doth shine in the effect, so God's eternal power & Godhead are made manifest by his works. Yet the types of Christ, were not types according to their essence, but according to their course of life and actions. And yet the very actions, whereby they represented Christ, were true actions in themselves separate from typical signification; though the actions of Christ or office of Christ, were of far greater dignity and price then were the actions of men which represented him. Before the World was made, this proposition was true, God alone is, and he could again make it true if it pleased him, by turninge all things into nothing, from whence they came. But now other things also are. Otherwise there could be no place, either for the name of creatures, or for the representation of God in them. And howe can that be said not to be, or not truly to be which as you say, participates of God's being? It is true, God alone is in such sort, as whose essence and existence are all one. For as much as possibility in him is mere necessity, not so in any creature; as who all were not, before they were, and again may return to nothing, if so it please him that made them, to dispose of them. What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speak of, and howe well it accordes with this, I know not. As touching the nature of God, I know no such discourses superior, if equal to the discourse of Aristotle in a certain chapter of his Metaphysics. Your text, I am God and there is none besides, is fair short of congruity with your present discourse. For will it follow that because there is no God, besides him; therefore there is nothing that hath any true being besides him?

4. It is incredible that the Stoics or any other, held nothing worthy the name of essence, which was not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any faculty of wit. But what think you? is God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ? Have you forgotten the diversity of errors, which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin, the last whereof was, to conceive that God could beget himself? Yet if 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 shall be the property of God, as yourself confess by Plotins Philosophy (you might as well have said by the Philosophy of Heathens that denied creation out of nothing) there shall be many God's, even as many as there be immaterial substances, which they called minds or Intelligences from their narure; but from their office we call Angels. But this error, you say, was easy to be checked, If the favorers of it had been put in mind, that these their demy God's, by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have been acknowledged infinite in being. So that had you lived in their days, you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle also & all others from this point of heathenism. For necessary consequences all must yeilde unto, especially if the consequence be perspicuous also, as you seem to suppose, by the little or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument. For oportet, ut lancem ponderibus, ita animum veris & perspicuis cedere. And seeing Intelligences, if made, must needs be made out of nothing, which I am persuaded you will not deny, hence it followethe, that you could evidently convict all those Philosophers of error in denying the Creation. Yet shall not you by this your confidence any way hinder us, from givinge God thanks, for bringing us acquainted with his word, and givinge power unto it by his Spirit, to make us by faith to believe that the world was made, and that the things that be, were not made of things that do appear. But of this your confidentiary consequence we have discoursed enough in the former chapter. Touching the comparison between Plato, & Aristotle; or between Platonicall and Aristotelicall Christian, doth any Aristotelicall Christian deny, that immaterial substances have their dependence on God? If any man by Aristotle's discourse, hath been withdrawn from acknowledginge this truth, he ceasethe to be a Christian, and becomes an Atheist. The meanest Christian by light of grace knows more then Aristotle by light of nature concerning God. So might Plato, if by tradition he received something derived from the Word of God, and believed, which Aristotle either received or believed not. Compare their achievements (if you please) by light of nature, either concerning the nature of God, or the knowledge of the World & the parts thereof: that is consider what each affirmed, & what reason for his assertion each delivered, and thence consider whose ability deserves to be preferred. Plato with the rest maintained the World to have a beginning, but the matter, whereof it was made, to be eternal. Aristotle maintained the World to be everlasting. Zabarell thinks he had better reason for this opinion of his, then Plato, and the rest had for that opinion of theirs. I am of Zabarells judgment in this. The eternity of the matter is as absurd to us Christians, and as contradictious to the truth of God, as the eternity of the World. But supposing the eternity of the matter, and denying the eternity of the World, this brings forth some proper absurdities over and above the former. The continuance of the World for everlasting is maintained by Plato as well as by Aristotle, herein cried down by others, in that maynteyninge it to have a beginning, yet denies that it shall have an ende. Plato maintained you say, the creating of immaterial substances, Aristotle denied it: This was suitable with the opinion of Aristotle, who denied the possibility of creation: that not suitable with the opinion of Plato. For if the World could not be made out of nothing, which Plato affirmed as well as the rest, why should he think that Angels could be made out of nothing. For if the more excellent nature could be produced out of nothing, why could not the lesser nature, such as matter is by the same power, be brought out of nothing? Agayne you say, Plato denied things sensible truly to be: Aristotle, we doubt not, professed the contrary, which of these opinions, I pray, is most agreeable unto reason? Is not the latter, and that both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace? Is it not true of us all, that in God we live and move & have our being? And if our life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our being also a true being? especially, if as you say, all things that are, do participate of God's being. But let us come to Seneca's interpretation hereof; that is they put on a countenance of being for a time, being incapable of the stability, and solidity of true being. Mark, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. For either the being of sensible things is a true being or no. You say a true being, then herein you shall contradict both, Plato and yourself also: If not a true being, then seeing it is said that in this they continue not, it followethe that they want not so much continuance of true being, as continuance of such a being, as is no true being. Nay the Gloss corrupts the text, as I prove thus. They that want continuance or stability of true being, fail not in the want of true being, but only in want of continuance of true being: so that her by it must be confessed, they have true being, though they have little or no continuance therein. Agayne it doth not follow, that because they want continuance, therefore they are uncapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earthe forever if it please him? Yet these are sensible things. Agayne what meant either the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible things have no stability of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earthe were to continue forever, as well as immaterial substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Chartar of their Maker. And of this we read from you, of the other we read not. I willingly confess, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by the Father unto the Son; and therefore I have already misliked, that you should maintain, that the Creatures do participate of God's being.

5. That Principle Omnia unum sunt, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And though Simplicius doth not double with you (for why should you suspect that, especially seeing any man may err and misreport another's opinion without doublinge); but though he erred not, and Parmenides indeed acknowledged distinction (and no other likelihood but he did), yet this is far from justifyinge that mystical interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaning: although you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to wit that Multitude of things visible is but the multiplied shadow of invisible independent unity. He spake Poetically, you Figuratively; which kind of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, either you mistake, or I; who rather think that saying to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all things are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signify respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter whereof every thiing consists, is of the essence thereof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other things, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other things besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter it self, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternal, as God himself. Nay nor all other things, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spite of the Agent, being overruled with the untoward lines of the matter, as yourself but a little before professed to be the opinion of the Stoics. In God's essence is only his own being formally, ours virtually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily also, but that, I confess, is something mysterious unto me, save that I conceive, it respecteth his understandinge, like as to be in him virtually, respectethe his power. And I doubt not, but that the essence of God doth represent unto him, all natures possible. But to say that this being of the creature in God, cannot be with safety committed to the creatures own charge and custody, is a very wild phrase, and as much as if you should say, God's infinite wisdom, & power, and essence cannot be committed with safety, to the creatures charge and custody: for nothing that is in the creature is formally in God; nothing that is formally in God, can be communicated to the creature.

6. Howsoever Aristotle had implied his wit yet without grace it had never ended in his happiness. And yet I tell you, he hath done strangely herein, and in my judgment to the wonder of the World, in so much that I may wonder, that you take so little notice of it. But seeing he had only the book of God's creatures, whereabout to exercise his wit, & to read God therein, and whereby his eternal power & Godhead is manifested; and you know, this book is written in a woonderous hard language, and requires many years stoody to attain to the understanding of it; & necessarily we must begin with the knowledge of the creatures: Therefore no merveyle if he began with the knowledge of things visible; but thence he ascended to the discovery of things invisible. In his Physicks he discoverethe unto us, a first moover; and he hath Metaphysickes as well as Physickes; and in his 12. book especially he discoursethe of the nature of this first moover, and that unto admiration. He showeth also the references of immaterial creatures unto him, and of material creatures unto them all. But as touching that reference which you glance at the reference of creation, he speaks nothing indeed thereof. For he believed it not; but as touching the opinion then current with some, of the making of the World out of a praejacent matter, he gave himself to the utter disproovinge thereof, in his 8. book of Physicks. Vndoubtedly he gave himself to the contemplation of this (whatsoever you out of cunninge insinuate to the contrary, to make the better way, for the broachinge of your conceytes) yet never perceived, that the definition of infinity imagined by him in the divisibilitie of magnitude or succession of time, was but a mooveable image of that true and solid infinity, to wit of God. We are reasonably well acquainted with the nature of God in the School of Christ; yet have we not learned the Infinity of God to be such, as may fitly be resembled by the one, or by the other. To my understanding it is quite contrary, even by that definition of infinity which yourself applaud in saying. Insinitum est extra quod nihil est, infinity is that without which nothing is. Now infinity in division of magnitude and succession is quite of a contrary nature, being such as semper liceat accipere aliquid extra, we may always take something without it; as when more and more divisions in magnitude may be still made; and more and more revolutions in time may still succeed. And Aristotle might well deny that definition of infinity, which you propose. For by that definition, the uppermost sphere of the Heavens, might justly be accounted infinite. And other Philosophers, that proposed this definition, which you say was censoriously rejected by him, did as well as Aristotle understande Infinite only in quantity. And if you blame Aristotle, for this acception of the word, you must blame the rest as well as him. So that with all these that maxim, insinitum est, extra quod nihil est, signified, that an infinite body was such, as without which nobody was, or no quantity was, the meaning whereof I conceive might be this; No measure of quantity could be imagined, that was not comprehended under infinite quantity. Now we know, that no quantity, or bodily dimensions are to be found in God, but altogether without him. Yet you seem to attribute such a kind of infinity unto God: for you would have the definition of infinite not to be appropriated to quantity only, but to be simply and absolutely considered, as much as to say, it should comprehend that which is infinite in quantity also. Yet we confess, immensity is one of the attributes of God, because he fills all places, but yet by your leave, without all quantity. Your comparison is very incongruous. For infinity in length comprehends all length formally; but will you say in like • ort, that God's infinity in being, comprehends all being formally? Is the being of a body of a man, of a beast in God formally? Exemplarily and virtually, or eminently they are in God; but so is not all longitude, in that which is infinite in longitude, but rather formally, and admi • th all denominations of length. God doth not admit all denominations of being. Thus, say you, did these Ancients feel after, and seek the Lord; whereas alas, they thought not at all of God in this their definition of infinitum, when they said, infinitum est extra quod nihil est. Aratus, I confess, was far more Theological, then most of them, when he said, that in God we live and move & have our being; but this hath little correspondency with the former definition of infinitum. As sillily do you conclude against Aristotle, as for the other Philosophers, when you say he came far short of the truth in saying insinitum est, extra quod semper aliquid est. For this is applied by Aristotle only to division in magnitude, and succession in time, not unto God, as neither did the other Philosophers, which gave another definition of infinitum; apply that their other definition unto God, but all of them accorded in this, that finitum and infinitum were the differences of quantity and of corporeal dimensions. And as for infinity of being, Aristotle had nothing to do with that consideration in his Physicks, where he treatethe of infinitum. For infinite applied to being, is a difference of ens, and so belongs rather in consideration to the Metaphysics, whose subject is ens, then to the Physicks, the subject whereof is corpus natural. To infer infinity of being from no better ground, then those branches of infinity, which consist only in possibility and succession, were a very sory inference in my judgment, and little becomminge any grave divine. For by continuance of time, and succession of creatures in time, no specifical perfection is added; but only individuals of the same kind succeed one another. The Angels themselves being to continue forever, shall ever produce new thoughts new actions; but doth this argue any infinity in them? By this manner of discourse, Aristotle had better reason to conceive of God's infinity, then we Christians. For he maintained succession of time and of the parts of this World by individual propagations, both without beginning and without ende, which we do not: but as we know the World hath had a beginning, so we believe it shall have an ende; And consequently the producing of more individual substances shall have an ende. And whereas all Species, and individuals formerly produced, being put together, do make up a number only finite, howe can this infer, that God is infinite? especially if so be, more Species might be produced, then have been produced. For either it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things, or no. If it doth; then the producing of those that are produced, is no evidence of God's greatest power. If is doth not; then the number of things produced, were they double to that they are, or shall be, cannot evidence that God's power is infinite. Agayne, seeing God is yet in producing more and more, we can have no evidence herby of God's greatest power, till he come to the ende of his works: therefore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power, or that his power is infinite, though perhaps the world may have, to wit, when God is come to the ende of his working. Yet when that time is come, wherein God shall cease from producinge new, all his works put together being but finite, howe can that consideration, evince a power infinite? Wherefore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea &c. maintained, that the World already made, was infinite; because it was fit (as he thought) that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent, and therefore, saith he, the world must be infinite. To proceed a little further; when the time shall come, that God shall surcease to produce any new thing either in kind, or individual the particulars produced put together from the beginning of the world to that day shall be but finite, and howe can this infer a power infinite? Now all this discourse of yours proceeds, upon supposition, that all things are produced by God, and not only by course of nature; but by such a cause as was first created, and since maintained, and governed, and ordered by God, which truth was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were. And you well know that the creation of materia prima, was denied by them all. And therefore I should conceive that the infiniteness of God, is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things, then by the number of things produced; as namely, by his creating of the World, & that of nothing. For if God hath power to give being, unto that which hath no being, but only is capable of being (as put the case to a man or Angel) and that by his word & will, he is as well able to give being to any thing conceavable, (that is capable of being,) by his word and will; and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotence. He that can give being to any thing that is possible to be, he is Almighty.

Agayne, if God were finite in perfection of entity, then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God; & then that also should have an existence. For if the essence or existence of a nature less perfect should be all one, how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect. And consequently, there should be many God's, one different in perfection above another.

CHAP. IV.

AS for the argument, which you propose, We must either allow the God's to have bodies, or deny them sense, because sense is never found without a body. I see no great cause to mislike it; especially if it be rightly proposed, as it may be, thus, because sense (to wit in proper speech) cannot be found without a body. For is not sense an organical faculty, that is such a faculty as cannot exercise its function without material instruments? How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument, let the Reader judge. God the supreme Artificer can make Virtus formatrix, (you say) do more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason; and hence you conclude, that therefore God hath both sense and reason. Whereas you may as well prove that God hath bodily substance in him, both because he sets virtus formatrix, on work in producing bodies, and can do more then we can withal our bodies and souls. Therefore if you please, you may in confidence of such illations, proceed to say that God consists of a body, and soul too. The Psalmists Philosophy is a poor ground for you to build on. For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist, that God hath eyes, and ears, and hands also, as when he say the, The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, & his ears are open unto their prayers. The right hand of the Lord is exalted, the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly. And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God, why do you not attribute unto him feeling, and smelling, and tastinge also? Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses, why may not God understand the same without sense, as well as Angels. That God only is, and all things numerable are but mere shadows of his being, are your own principles and phrases; & to draw conclusions from such grounds, is to build Castles in the Air. You think to help it by saying, that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patterns or perfections, you might have taken in three senses more as well, and have said that smelling, • astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patterns and perfections; and justify Epicurus too, in maynteyninge that the God's have bodies. For though our Savior said, a Spirit hath not flesh and bone, yet you know howe to justify that bodies and souls, and flesh and bone, and brains and senses, yea and the basest thing that is, are in God, to wit, according to their ideall patterns and perfections. For we make no question, but that all these things are known to God, and he is able to produce them, (& no more do you require in the next Section unto this, that all things are in God;) yea materia pr • a and all. And this conceit of yours you prosecute▪ with a great deal more Rhetoric then Philosophy or Logic. Certeinly not to be, and not to have operation, are far more different between themselves, then nihil agere, and otium esse. For these are formally the same, the other are not. For like 〈◊〉 , to be, and to work, are in themselves manifestly distinct, so must be their negations also; so are not nihil agere, & otium esse.

2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge, more like a Rhetorician, then a Philosopher, makes you overlashe and cast yourself upon resemblances without all proportion. As when you say, all things are in God's power, as strength to move our limbs is in our sinews, or motive faculty. Now in this, I say, is no proportion. For seeing all things are in God because he can produce them, so strength (by just proportion) should be in our sinews, because our sinews could produce it, which is palpably untrue. You should rather say, as the motion of our limbs is in our sinews, or in our motive faculty rather, because our motive faculty can produce such motion. Yet this were a very strange resemblance taken at the best. For it is nothing strange that our motive faculty should move our limbs; but that God, should produce all things out of nothing, is so wonderful strange a thing, that the most learned Philosophers could never digest it, and the H. Ghost imputes it unto faith that we believe it. Here you confess that sense cannot be without a corporal organ, whence it follow the manifestly, that if sense be in God, then also corporal organs must be found in God. And again you confess, that what we feel by sense, he knows much better without sense: how little then did it, become you to profess, that he argued like himself (that is sottishly belike) who said, we must either allow the God's to have bodies, or deny them sense? I make no question, but that the Divine essence represents the natures of all things: For by knowing himself, Divines say, he knows all things. But is this representation only of natures extant as you speak? If so; how did he know all things before the World was? howe shall he know all things, after that the World shall cease to be, some natures only reserved. How variety sets forth unity, as you speak, I am to seek; yet the variety of God's creatures, by your leave, is not infinite.

3. Of the questions proposed by you, let the Reader judge, as they deserve; as also of your solution of them, & of your more accurate and exquisite distinction of universality, and totalitie, then the Platonics ever atteyned too, you distinguishinge it, not only from that totality, which arisethe from aggregation of parts, but from that also, whose extent is not more then equal to all the parts: which last member, I confess, is very curious, to wit, that there should be a totalitie more then equal to all his parts; and I little wonder that the Platonickes, were not acquainted with this subtle curiosity. God's nature we acknowledge to have no parts, but yet contains all entities, not formally, but virtually, or eminently and examplarily; which eminent comprehension is equivalent to a formal comprehension of all (if possible) though the number of them were infinite; but not greater, because a number cannot be imagined greater then infinite. Exhaustinge by particulars derived from them, belongs to natures that contain the particulars formally; as a bushel of wheat by subtraction of graynes may be exhausted, it belongs not to natures, that contain particulars eminently. To say that God is being it self, or perfection, doth not exclude plurality in my judgment, and that for this reason. Humanity is humanity it self, yet this hinderethe not, but that many thousands may be partakers of humanity. In like sort, though divine perfection be perfection it self, yet this hinderethe not, but that many may be partakers of Divine perfection. But you speak, I confess, of plurality in the nature of God, and that in respect of attributes real, not of denominations personal. For plurality her of undoubtedly you do not deny. Now to say that God is all perfections eminently, doth no way hinder his formal unity; as likewise his formal unity doth nothing prejudice his perfectious eminent plurality.

4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideall perfections, & internal perfections. For if you understand ideall perfections of perfections external and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the plurality of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created things are many, so they are all known by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and plurality of finite perfections represented unto God, and known by him, doth no way hinder the unity of God's infinite essence, no more then it hinders the unity of our souls essence, such as it is. But if you mean it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to prove this unity in God, is neither congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to prove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kind of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of plurality, or without, that is another question, to the clearing whereof, you confer nothing for ought I yet perceive. You demand, if God's being be absolutely illimited, what could limit or restrain it from being power, from being wisdom, from being goodness, from being infinitely whatsoever anything that hath being is? I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by yourself. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether God's being be both life and power, and wisdom, and goodness, and whatsoever any thing is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisdom, and all these his goodness, and every thing else, that any creature is, whose being also (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether all these things are in God, but whether all these are drawn to an unity in God, without all plurality? If you frame your argument in another fashion to help this, as thus; What hindereth God's life from being his power, and wisdom &c. I answer that the formal notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then hitherto you have done. A second incongruitie I find in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision whereof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maintained; that all things were in God, in a kind of Ideall, and transcendentall manner, now yourself have confessed that Ideaes were of substances, if not only of them. For your words are these, If Plato meant that there were as many several Ideaes eternally extant, whether in the first cause of things, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, &c. But here you give instance only in such things as are of accidental notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisdom, and goodness. Lastly, I have already shown that this argument of yours is not sound, whereby you prove God's being to be illimited, because forsoothe it is independent: As if this consequence were evident of it self, whereas on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maintained the World to be independent; all others maintained the matter whereof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceived, that herehence it would follow, that either of them was therefore illimited, or at all illimited. That God's attributes are not really distinguished, we all confess, you need not have brought in Austin's authority to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherein you fail very much. For it will not follow, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, then the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not follow, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes thereof must needs be distinct from the essence. For the soul of man is limited, yet some have maintained that the faculties of the soul are not really distinct from the essence of the soul, as Scotus, & that by shrewde arguments. And Zabarell professethe, that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas. And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisdom of God, yet if both be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kind, what prejudice is this to the infiniteness of God's essence? Neither will it follow, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite being in his kind, as another hath of proper being distinct from it; considering that these notions are of different kinds. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there should be both infinite length, and infinite breadthe, and infinite thickness, neythers infiniteness being any whit prejudicial to the infiniteness of the other, because they are of different kinds. And what color of reason have you, why infiniteness of power should prejudice the infiniteness of wisdom, though they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what think you, if some attributes be found answerable to personal distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly said that the second person in Trinity is the wisdom of the Father, and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from both per modum voluntatis? But I have no edge to look into the Ark, or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries. Yet I confess, though the Father be not the Son, nor the H Ghost, &c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is alius & alius, not aliud & aliud. But you maintain that God's power is his wisdom, &c. which yet notwithstanding I misl • ke not, but only do question the argument, whereby you endeavor to prove it, and to my judgment it seems very superficial. But my comfort is this, if you weakly maintain the nature of God, you will as weakly oppose the grace of God. Agayne I say, it will not follow, that if the several beings of wisdom and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, then the essence should not be infinite. For it may be said that the essence is infinite in a being substantial; the power and wisdom of God are infinite in a being accidental, though such as necessarily flows from the nature of God. Indeed if it were proved, that there is no accident in God, then the case were clear, that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God, as indeed they are not; but this is more then hitherto you have proved. And till you have proved it, they may be conceived as distinct from the essence (as before hath been said) without any prejudice to the infinity of God's essence, or danger of exposing it unto nakedness, for ought your discourse, hath as yet alleged to the contrary.

5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite; Infinitum est, extra quod nihil est, which you make so much reckonninge of; I take it to be a vain conceit; considering that the Philosophers who urged it, never made any such construction of it, as you do; but applyinge it only to material bodies of quantity and extension, maintained that in this sense the World was infinite. But Aristotle doth not approve of such a notion of infinite, as nothing agreeable with the denomination; the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion; and yet as they all thought, without the world nothing was. Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite, though I nothing commend either their learning, or their honesty herein. And in those former days finitum & infinitum, were taken only for material differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immaterial natures, abstract from bodily or material extension of parts. And Zabarell (as I remember) observes as much (as touching the opinion of Aristotle) upon the last chapters of the eighthe book of Physicks. And howe far forth infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature, Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed. Now in the sense before spoken of, it is very absurd, to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God, who is not only a Spirit but the Father of Spirits, and incapable of parts, much more of extension in any material manner. But let the words be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God; to wit, as if he were such an entity, as comprehendes all entity. I say it is manifestly untrue. For is not the World & all the parts thereof, from Angels unto the basest worm that creepethe, and drop of mire, or sparkle of fire, or the least cinder; are not all these something, and that extra Deum? For though eminently they may be said to be in God, yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally; and to my understanding it is absurd to say, they are identically contained in God's essence. It is true that God's essence doth represent them. For God knows them not, but by knowing of himself and his essence, and being of infinite power, can produce anything that implies not contradiction. I cannot represent a fit comparison: but such as the creature can afford if you give me leave to make use of, I say that everything which a glass represents, is not identically contained in the glass, neither is it true, that whatsoever is known by the understanding of man or Angel, is identically contained in the understanding or spirit of man or Angel. As I have said, so I say again; I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus; God is illimited, therefore all things are in God; and therefore also, all things that are in God, or are attributed unto him are all one. That which you add, when you say, whatsoever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numerical difference, is very ambiguous; and the ambiguity being cleared, will prove partly to be without all question, and nothing to the purpose, partly as questionable as ever, where it is to the purpose. For that, that which is infinite in essence, must be one and not many, I think is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes, that have any learning in them; although a man may fail in the demonstration of it, as here you do. For to be infinite in essence, is to comprehend all specifical entities not numerical. For such, as such, differ not in essence. And for it to be multiplied according to numerical differences only, seems nothing prejudicial to the infinity of the essence, save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceived to imply quantity. Infinity of power doth more evidently include opposition to numerical plurality, then infinity of essence in my judgment. But be it, not only without question, but also supposed to have been made evident by some demonstration of yours, yet is it nothing to the present question. For the question in present is not, whether there may be two God's: but only, whether in the one nature of God, there be not things different; to wit whether God's wisdom be not different from his power, and both these different from his goodness; that is in a word, whether there be not any accident in God. And yet, unto this question you are arrived, but in a very indecent, and incongruous manner. For whereas before you had undertaken to prove, that all things were in God according to ideall perfections, by all things understandinge substances chiefly, as of Angels, and men, and beasts of all sorts. And in this chapter do undertake to show, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of plurality, but drawn to unity: and accordingly should herby prove, that the essence of an Angel, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thing: You shift of from this, and in the place thereof, only mention, how God's life, and wisdom, and power, and goodness are all one in God. And this you prove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sory a consequence as that, whereby you proved his illimited condition, to wit from this, that he is independent, and received not his being from any thing. Which consequence of yours, is so far from natural evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of old, who maintained either the World, or the first matter (not to speak of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all making, yet did never conceive that herehence it must follow, that either of them should be infinite. No less inconsequent is that, which followeth also, as when you say, Whersoever it can be truly said, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits. I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case both length, and bredthe, and thickness were infinite; yet length were only length, and not bredthe, yet never a whit the less infinite. Neither is infinity in thickness any hindrance to infinity in breadthe, though breadthe be not thickness; nor infinity in breadthe, any hindrance to infinity in length, though length be not breadthe. In like sort the infinity of God's power should be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisdom, though his wisdom be not his power; Nor the infinity of his goodness, any prejudice to the infinity of his power, and wisdom, though his power, and wisdom, and goodness were different in themselves. But to come nearer; what think you of the Persons in the Trinity? The Father is the Father, and neither is he the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite? The Son is the Son, but he is neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost; will you therefore say, he is not infinite? The Holy Ghost, is the Holy Ghost, but neither the Father nor the Son, will you hence infer that he hath limits, and is not infinite? And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolmen, but even by our divines also, that the Son is produced of the Father per modum intellectus? Is he not the wisdom of the Father, and what difference between the wisdom of God, and the understanding of himself? And do they not also confess, that the H. Ghost proceeds from both per modum voluntatis? And as we say, God's understanding is not his will, though it be no different thing from his will; and God's will is not his understandinge, though it be no different thing from his understandinge, so we may adore the indivisible unity of the Godhead, notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons, though we are not able to comprehended the mystery hereof. It is true, our understanding is such, as that, oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari; & imaginatio non transcendit continuum. Yet notwithstanding we attain by discourse to the acknowledgment of things immaterial, as of our souls, yea and of Angels; yea and of the God both of men & Angels; yet not by material things as by the pictures of them, as you phrasify it, but rather as in the effects; wherein as it were in glasses do shine the causes of them. Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hath inferred the existence of immaterial and abstract substances as the moovers of them. And we commonly say, that the World is as a glass wherein the glory of God is represented. His eternal power and Godhead being made manifest by his works, as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of God's illimited being we make no question; but well we may question the soundness of your arguments, whereby you prove it, as also the soundness of those consequences, which you make from it. And far better it is to content ourselves with the simplicity of our Christian faith, in believinge of God, what God's word teachethe us, then to depend upon weak reason for the confirmation thereof. For weak reasons do rather betray a cause, then justify it. We believe that God is one, and that there is no plurality of natures in him, but only of Persons. And we must take heed that the Metaphysical extract of vis unita fortior (which you speak of) do not so far possess us with the contemplation of God's unity, as to deny the Trinity. And touching the attributes of God, as neither distinct from the essence of God, nor from themselves, we do not much affect curiosity of demonstration; but if any man voluntarily undertake such a task, we look for substance of sound proofs, and are not content to have our mouths filled with empty spoones. You seem to gratify God with your hyperboles; but surely he doth not put us to tell any untruths for him, as man doth for man, to gratify him. You enterteyne a conceit of God's power, above all conceit of infinite power; of God's wisdom above all conceit of infinite wisdom; of God's goodness above all conceit of infinite goodness. To be essential to the nature of God, is more noble, I grant, then to be accidental: but howe any power can be greater then power infinite, or any wisdom greater then wisdom infinite, or any goodness greater then goodness infinite, I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe, that wheresoever infinite power, & infinite wisdom, & infinite goodness is found, that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerful, and wise, & good, as namely the nature of God: though of the evident demonstration thereof, for ought you have brought to help us herein, we may be still to seek. As for succession, and extension, we hold that each is impossible to be infinite. And neither of them any attribute of God, as power, and wisdom, and goodness is. And therefore, the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kind, must needs be wondrous wild.

Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations, but rather wonder that succession, and extension should be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections contained in God, and that all these mentioned attributes laid out in several, should have infinities added unto them. Much more should we have wondered, if the issue of your discourse had been answerable to the original, which is to show, not how power, and wisdom, & goodness are all one in God, which are with us of accidental denomination; but to show how every substance is in God, of Angel, of man, of beasts, of birds, of fishes, of woormes and every creeping thing; and that all these are to be accounted excellencyes and perfections. And surely they had need to be in God, in a more excellent manner, then they are in themselves; otherwise their advancing so high, would be too great a degrading of the nature of God.

But to add my mite of discourse, touching the being of all things in God, and the precise unity of all things in God, which under a form of plurality according to our conceytes, are attributed unto him. As touching the first, that all perfections are in God, is to be acknowledged without all controversy, because we understand by God such a nature, as nothing can be imagined better; and I approve of Aquinas his reason. Like as heat if it did exist of it self, it should comprehend all degrees of heat: so the essence of God being all one with his existence, that is he being essentially 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him. But as for the perfections of being which are found without God, according to their several ranks and kinds therein; • s namely of being, without life, of being and life without sense, or reason; of being, life, & sense without reason, of both being, life, and sense, and reason: as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species, o • kind, but only analogical, which as Aquinas showeth, is this, that God is entity by essence; every other thing is an entity only by participation. So likewise their perfections cannot be said to be in God univocally, but only analogically, as the effect is said to be in the Agent, in as much as he hath power to produce it. It is true, some things are attributed unto creatures, which cannot be attributed unto God; and some things are attributed both to God, and to the creatures. As for example; God is not a body, man is a body; God is a spirit, an Angel is a spirit; God hath being, so have all things; God hath life, so have many things. God is wise, good, powerful; these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angels. Yet these denominations, in admitting whereof both God and creatures do agree, are as different in respect of God and the creatures, as those denominations in the communion whereof they do not agree. As for example the Spiritual nature of God is as far different from the spiritual nature of an Angel, as from the bodily nature of ma • or beast, as being infinitely different from eache. And therefore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God, but rather their remotion a non esse. One creature having more perfections of being then another, & consequently so much the more removed from not being. But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely removed from God who is infinite. So that like as the bodily nature of man doth not agree in any kind with the spiritual nature of God; so neither doth the spiritual nature of an Angel agree in any kind with the spiritual nature of God. But God is equally an equivocal Agent in respect of both. And no merveyle; for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree, are commonly such as are of accidental denomination unto the creatures; as when we say God is wise, and holy, and powerful; a man or Angel is wise, and holy, and powerful &c. But is there any color why, the nature of God should come nearer unto those things that are of accidental denomination in us, then unto those that are substantial; whereas every mean scholar knows, that substances are more noble then accidents, and as for substantial denominations wherein God, and the creature do agree, if they be examined, it will be found that in the resolution of the truth, the agreement will appear to be only in negation. As when we say, God is a spirit, the negation of extension corporal and material, is the only thing, wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angel. Like as our Savior intimates the description of a spirit in distinction from a man, to consist in this, that a spirit hath not flesh and bones. And as for the general not on of entity common to all, mark what a vast difference there is herein between God and the creature, and such as excludes all univocation. God is an entity independent, and whereof all other entities depend both for their production, and for their preservation, and that out of nothing, as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles. Let it suffice then, that all perfections are in God, and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence. But as for created perfections, the word created is a term diminishing perfection; but such as they are, they are in God only, as effects are in their causes, and they not univocall, but equivocal only, or at the best but analogical. Let us come to the consideration of the unity of God's attributes, especially with God's essence, whence it will follow, that an unity of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves. And the question will come to this, whether there be any accident in God? Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysical speculations; or that I think our language to be fit for them, for want of terms of Art in common use to express such notions, as here must necessarily occur: But only being provoked hereunto by your discourse, who here and there inculcate foul errors in Divinity, & that depending sometimes upon these, or such like Metaphysical contemplations.

Some therefore argue thus. If there were any accident in God, then there should be some essence common unto God with complete substances create, to wit an essence supporting accidents. And if there were any common essence to God with other substances, then there were to be acknowledged something in nature before God; as the Genus is commonly accounted in nature before the Species thereof. And further, it seems, that if any genericall nature were common to God and us, then some part of God's essence should be found in us, and some part of our essence should be found in God. Like as the essence of Animalitie being common unto man & beast, is found both in man and beast. And consequently. God creatinge substances, should create in part a certain common essence, which is found in himself, and so the self same essence should be both the Creator, and the creature. If to avoid these dangerous consequences, it be replied that to support accidents is not af any essential denomination, but accidental; as great absurdities seem to follow on that part also. For if to support accidents be an accident, this makes way to a progress in insinitum without ende. For even this supportation of accidents, if it be an accident, must be supported by a substance and so without ende. Agayne if to support accidents be an accident; it must either flowe from substance, in case it be an accident proper; or be brought from without by some agent, if it be an accident common. This latter cannot be admitted in respect of God. If the former be, then there must be acknowledged some common essence both to God and other substances, whence this accident flows, and then we are, where we were.

Another argument may be conceived thus. It is commonly received, that every substance is more noble, and of greater dignity then any accident. And therefore if accidents were to be found in God, some thing should be found in God, more ignoble then his creatures.

If accidents were to be found in God, then either they shall denote entities of perfection or imperfection. Impossible it is that any entity of perfection should be found in God. For Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest. If of perfection, then it is the very essence of God and no accident, for as much as God's essence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which comprehendes all perfection of entity. Like as heat comprehendes all degrees of heat.

Agayne an accident is compared to the subject, as an act to the power of receavinge it. But there can be no power passive in God: For as much as passive power is always perfected by the act. And so the nature of God should admit perfection from an accident.

Lastly, God is a Spirit, and therefore no bodily or material accident can be found in God; if any be found in him, it must be spiritual. Now as Aristotle saith, there are but three sorts of things in the mind of man, and they are either faculties, or passions, or habits. Of these, passions are too base to be attributed unto God, and they are not severed from change. And as for habits, they suppose an imperfect nature, which is perfected by them, which cannot be verified of the nature of God. Now the faculties of God are either of understandinge, or of willing, which are operations immanent or of working without by operations transient. If it may appear, that God's faculty of understandinge is all one with the act of his understandinge, then it will thereby appear that the faculty of the understanding is not distinct from the nature it self of God: considering, that albeit it is without question that the faculty of man's understanding is distinct from the act of his understandinge; yet some have questioned, whether the faculties of a man's soul be really distinct from the substance of the soul, and maintained that they are not, as namely the Sco • ists. But what need we proceed further. Aristotle him self, that great naturalist hath acknowledged the first moover to be his life, and his intelligence.

Yet consider in reason; If God's essence and existence be all one; how much more his understanding faculty; and his actual intelligence. For an understandinge faculty can easily produce the act of understanding; but essence cannot give it self existence. But essence and existence in God are all one. For if they were not, then either his existence should flowe from his essence, which is a thing utterly impossible. (For act cannot flowe from possibility; neither can anything be conceived to be productive, unless it suppose existence.) Or existence must proceed from some exter • or Agent that causethe it; Now this were to maintain some superior cause unto God himself, which hath power to create him. In which case he should have something better then himself, which is flat contradiction to the nature of God, whom we conceive to be such, as nothing better then he can be imagined. But I willingly profess, I nothing like these curiosities, neither did I ever give myself to this kind of study before. There is no reason but may be shaken by wrangling opposition. Faith cannot.

CHAP. V.

HENCE you draw us to the speculation of the several branches of absolute infinity; and first of God's immensity, which you premise unto God's eternity; whereof I muse not a little: considering that immensity is an attribute denominating God in respect of creatures; and is not any otherwise considered by Schole Divines nor by yourself neither, but in this respect that he fillethe all places. And therefore before the World was, and before there was any place to fill, he could not be said to fill all places. As for eternity in being without beginning, that is an absolute attribute, and was ever verified of God. Perhaps you consider immensity not as it signifieth his filling of all places, but as it signifieth his ability to fill all places. Yet this is in reference unto place, and we commonly confound God's immensity with his ubiquitie. Much less can I approve your Rhetoric, as when you make infinity of space to be the shadow of God's immensity. First because infinity of space is neither existent nor possible to be existent, and to my judgment, such a thing seems not fit to be a shadow of that which is existent, such as you suppose the immensity of God to be. Secondly immensity of space is in respect of that quantity which is called quantitas motis quantity of extension, and capable of division, but the immensity of God denominates him, in respect of that quantity, which is called quantitas virtutis, quantity of virtue, incapable of extension or division. And therefore the one seems no way sit to be the model of the other. Thirdly shadows do many times exactly represent the proportion of the thing shadowed; and if at sometimes they are far less, at other times again, they are far greater then the bodies which they represent, as when the day declineth and the shadows of the evening are stretched forth, as the Prophet speakethe. And indeed you may well say that immensity of space is even in this respect a shadow of God's immensity. For immensity of space is absolutely infinite; but God's immensity as it signisies his existence in all places, (neither do I find it otherwise considered, either by Schoolmen or yourself) is absolutely finite: For as much as all places put together are but finite, nor can possibly be anymore then finite. But let us consider the particulars of your discourse. You tell us, that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from time and place. This is a paradox to me. I had thought rather, it had been far 〈◊〉 for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then either of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined, as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend either time or place otherwise then infinite. If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite, it had been less distant from the truth; yet that also distant from the truth. For undoubtedly my imagination may conceive a time definite, as well as indefinite; As for example, it may as well conceive three years space of time, as well as more years space of time then three, without de • ing how much: the like may be said of place also. As for infinite time and place, as it is impossible that any such thing should be, so I promise you, I cannot conceive that it should be so easily (as you suppose) if possibly imagined. Yet you take upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion. But that proof is as inconsequent, as your former assertion was insolent. For though sensible things cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time, yet when herehence you infer, that place it self cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensity thereof, nor time it self from the eternity thereof, I find neither art in this consequence, nor any tolerable color or show of reason to make it probable. And to the contrary (as I said) It is a ruled case that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci. And therefore it is so easy a thing to separate infinity from time & place; as it is impossible, that in the understanding of man it should be con • oyned with them. Yet this is not all the error of this your discourse. For the Antecedent is utterly untrue: as when you say, that sensible things when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding, they still retain their circumstances of time and place. Whereas to the contrary it is undoubtedly true, that Intelloctus abstrahit ab hic & nunc; the understanding considereth things abstract from time and place; and so doth the imagination also: Only this is the condition of the imagination, in distinction from the understanding, that imaginatio non transcendit continuum: It cannot consider things abstract from continuitie, that is from extension of parts: but from time and place it can abstract, how much more from the infinity of each And surely each faculty were a sory winnower, if it could not separate the graynes of natural things, from such gross hu • kes that in wrap them. It is true we are apt to imagine a local distance, beyond the utmost surface of heaven, but it doth not herehence follow, that we imagine an infinite distance beyond it, but rather indefinite. And therefore we are apt to imagine a distance without the globe of Heaven, because we can imagine the globe of Heaven in as small a proportion as we list, even no bigger then one of the globes in our College Libraries. In like sort we may imagine time before the World; for who doubtethe, but that it was possible that time should have been sooner then it wa • & wh • s it is now about six thousand years since the World began; so if it had pleased God, it might have b • ne 1 • . thousand. But do not you infer herehence, that we do imagine infinite time preceding the World; for that is not held to be possible as finite time is. But it is an easy leap, I confess, in the • rrour of a man's imagination to pass from time indefinite, to time infinite, • nd to take one for the other. To imagine a successive dur • tion of time much longer before the creation of the world, th • n hath been the continuance of it since, is one thing▪ but to imagine an infinite duration of time before the World, is another thing, and much different, • ea infinitely different. Looking back upon this discourse of yours to prove▪ whether it might admit any other toler • ble construction; I conc • ved your meaning might perhap • be this; not that place and time could not be conceived without the immensity of the one, and the eternity of the other▪ but • ather that immensity could not be conceived without place, nor eternity without time. But upon serious consideration I do • not find this latter interpre • tion to be any way congruous unto your text. For you plainly profess, that albeit both reason and faith drives us to confess both time and place to be finite, yet our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from them, which can admit no other interpr • tation then that whi • h I have impug • ed. That whi • h you talk, of certain School brains pu • ed in passing this unsoundable gulf, and that so far as to suspect, that God, who now is in every place of the world created by him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time before the creation was att • mpted; is nothing but a bundell of mysteries unto me. For I never kn • we any that offered to p • sse that unsoundable gulf, you sp • ache of, otherwise, then by imagining • ; • nd how their brains were p • zled in giving way to this imagination I k • owe not; much le • do I understand▪ how being pu • ed in this imagination, they should herehence grow to suspect, that God was as truly in • hat imaginary distance of place as in things truly exist • t, and • ruly distant • ach from other. And most of all do I wonder, what you mean to clap the imaginary distance of time▪ with the imaginary distance of plac • . For though I hav • read of some that discourse of vacuum lo • i, an imaginary distance of place, and maintain that God was and is therein▪ yet I never heard nor read of any man discoursing in like sort of Vacuum temporis, and maynteyninge that God was and is therein. And as touching the question, whether God be i • Vacu • or in that imaginary distance you spe • ke of; I have read the question proposed by Vasquius, and th • opinion of some mentioned, who maintained that God was in Uac • ; but very few; yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one; but whe • ce doth he fetch this • pinion of Cajetan? no • out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hi • Summes, where is the proper place for a Schoolman to manifest his opinion herabouts; but out of his Commentaries upon Io • n. 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelity of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan. The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction. And sinc • we are fallen upon it▪ I am willingly to confer discourse with you herabouts. And first, I say, that Scripture and reason seem to favor it. For King Solomon professeth that the Heavens of Heavens do not contain the Lord: & likewise Job saith of him▪ that He is higher then the Heaven, and deeper then Hell; & certainly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens, and consequently in Vacuo; & herupon it seems to some, that in good reason God should first have a being there, before he produce the anybody there. And this is one reason of many, which Brad wardine usethe to prove, that God is in Vacuo: (for tha • is his opinion) though Vasquius was not acquainted with him. Now by your leave, I will consider your reasons to the contrary. First you demand whether this local distance be created or no • ▪ whether it be something or nothing? I answer, that • rteinly it is not created, as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body should be, where before was nobody. As for example where now the World is, before the World was, 〈◊〉 nobody, yet was it then possible there should be a body, So without the Heavens is nobody, yet is it possible that a body should be without the heavens. You proceed saying, If it be nothing, then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing; and we grant they had. For they held it only an imaginary space or distance. Further you infer; If really nothing, then it could not be truly termed an imaginary space, before the World was created. A manifest inconsequence. For as men may imagine things that are not, so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not real. And there is no such difference, as you avouche, between these two, To imagine an infinite space, and to say, that There is an imaginary infinite space. For wheresoever there is the imagination of an infinite space, there must needs be an infinite space imagined. And therefore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens, this is as much as to say, there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens. But I observe your subtlety following. Before the heavens, you say, there could be no imagination of any such space; therefore there was no such space imagined. I answer; though before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it, yet nevertheless was it imaginable, and now you confess it is so imagined. And not only do we imagine a Uacuum to have been before the World was, but even since the World is, to wit, without the Heavens. And taking it aright, is not only now so imagined by us, but a truth that a Uacuum is without the heavens, and was before the world was, where now the world is. For the error of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaning of Vacuum. For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent, whereas indeed it is rather the negation of a body existent, joined with the possibility of a body to exist. So without the heavens is no space or body, yet possible is it, that a bodly space should be. Neither is it required hereunto, that it should be created by God; for only real things are created by God, but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation, but rather the suspension of creation. You think the reality of this imagination to be God, whom the Hebrews call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 place; I rather think the reality of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies. Touching which possibility, if it be demanded in what subject it is; I remember what answer Johannes Grammaticus made to the like question, reported by Averroes on the 12. book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, namely that it was in God, to wit fundamentally not formally. For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this. In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing, whence it followeth, that before the world was, there was a possibility that the world should be, and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibility. A possibility physical or natural requires a subject to support it, but a possibility logical not so, as being only negatio repugnantie, a want of repugnancy. And if God was able to make a world out of nothing, then surely it was no contradiction, that the world should be, and consequently the world was possible before it was. And yet to draw a little nearer unto you in this; I profess, I find it more hard to maintain, that God i anywhere as in a place, then to maintain that God is in Uacuo. For mark howe Durand distinguishethe; Place, saith he, is considered two ways, either as a natural thing, or as containing the thing placed therein. As it is a natural thing, God is in every place, but as it conteynethe the thing that is said to be therein; so God is in no place secundum se, in respect of himself. For nothing without him is able to contain him; but in respect of his effects, he is in all places; because he is contained of nothing, but rather containeth all things, and preservethe them. But in respect of his effects he is everywhere. For he fillethe every place with his effects; & in this sense, it is proper to God to be everywhere. Herupon some may conceive that God may be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 place, because he conteynethe all things, rather then is contained. Yet we know that the continency of place is corporal, and ordinarily the place is more base then the things contained therein. But God's continency is merely virtual and spiritual, and in dignity infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures. And we have no great cause to dote upon the Rabbin's, whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinity. Yet one thing more: The question was whether God might be said to be in Uacuo, and your discourse is only to deny, that there is any such infinite space as is imagined, either now to be without the heavens, or heretofore to have been before the world was, but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary, much less do you take any care to answer any one of them. And yet to my thinking some are shrewde ones, and different courses are taken in answering them; which argues that one man's answer gave little satisfaction to another. I will therefore take this pains in part for you, & represent the arguments of Bradwardine, who takes upon him to prove, that God is essentially and presentially everywhere, not only in the World, and all the parts thereof; but also without the World, in that Uacuum or site imaginary; & withal I will make bold to show you my judgment of them. His first argument is large; in effect this: God can move the World by a direct motion further Eastward, or further Westward. Upon this supposition he proceedeth thus. Either God was here before, whether the World is now moved or no; Agayne, either God continuethe there from whence the World was moved, or no. If God was there before his motion thither, and continuethe still where he was before the motion from thence, then it is manifest he was and is in Vacuo. But if from the time that the World moved from hence, he ceaseth to be here, and upon the Worlds moving more Eastward, he beginneth to be there, then God changethe his place with the world, ceasinge to be where formerly he was, and beginning to be where formerly he was not; and consequently God shall be moved at the motion of the world, as the soul of man is said to be moved, upon the motion of the body. But this seems very uncouthe to be attributed unto God, though some are content to swallow it, not satisfyinge themselves in finding out a convenient answer. Others deny the supposition, to wit, of a direct motion competent to the world. But saith Bradwardine, to deny that God is able thus to move the world, is to curtll the Almighty power of God; and therefore that opinion saith he, is amongst the Articles which were condemned by Steven Bishop of Paris. Yet of those Articles it was wont to be said, non transcendunt Alps, they do not climb over the Alps; and we may as well say, they do not go a ship board to sail over our narrow Seas. In my judgment the supposition is unsound and the contrary rather true, namely that the world cannot be moved Eastward or Westward; not thorough any impotency in God, who can do all things that imply not contradiction; but by reason that this is such a thing as implyethe contradiction, if it be well considered, and therefore is impossible. For it supposeth that without the world there is a space, consisting of parts, thorough some parts whereof more or less: the world may be moved. But this is utterly untrue; for they themselves confess, that the space they speak of is only imaginary. Now herehence it followethe that the motion thorough an imaginary space, must be only an imaginary motion, and no real motion. Secondly we answer, supposing the motion true and real and such a thing possible; that God is said to be in the world not secundum se, but secundum effectus, as before we had out of Durand, because with his effects he fills all things, all places. Now though these bodies do thus move, & therwithall the effects wherewith he filleth them, yet he himself is not moved; because himself, as himself cannot be said to be anywhere, but as in himself he was before the world was, so in himself he continuethe to be still. His second argument is this: Suppose God create another world without the heaven; then either God is there, where he was not before, and so shall be changed in place; or if he were there before, then he was in Uacuo. I answer, that God may be in things, wherein he was not before, not because himself becommethe otherwise then he was before, but because things which before were not, now are; and God with his effects doth fill all things and all places, as they have their being, and ceasethe to fill all things, as they cease to have any being. In a word God is said to coexist, or not coexist with things anewe, not that he doth either begin or cease to coexist with them; but in respect that they do either begin or cease to coexist with him. His third argument is, that as many as deny God to exist in Uacuo, must be driven to deny that God could make the world bigger or less then it is. But we see no cause, why we should be cast upon any so absurd assertion. We grant that God could and can make a real and spacious distance beyond the Heavens: but till God doth create such a distance, we deny that there is any such, though we deny not, but man may imagine such. Agayne he say the we must be driven to maintain, that God necessarily made the world n the site. A. where now it is, and that before the world was made, there was no other site, but the site A. where now it is. But we say that before the World was, there was no site at all, not only no site different from the site A. but also not so much as the site A. neither. And that to imagine any different sites before the world was, is to imagine distance of parts, where neither any parts were, nor distance; though such distance of parts be imagied by us, like as Chimeraes are, and such like fictions. Agayne he disputes thus: Except Uacuum be granted to have been sometimes, the world was everlasting; I answer; Uacuum sometimes was; but the question between us is not about the existence of it (as such negations and possibilities may be said to exist) but only about the nature of it, to wit wherher it contained any distance of parts as it is imagined after the form of a positive thing. This we deny, and do maintain that Uacuum is only a voydnes of bodies with possibility of existence of bodies, not of existence of bodies therein, as in a space capable of bodies as it is imagined, but simply of their existence. His chiefest argument is this 〈◊〉 when God created the world either he was there before he created it or no. If he were there before he created it, then he was in Uacuo. For before the creation was, nothing was without God, but Uacuum. If you say, God was not there before he created the world; this he saith is contrary to reason. But to my judgment it is contrary to all reason, to say that the differences of site, as here 〈◊〉 there were extant, before anything was created. Well he proves it thus; for say ••• he, God must first be there, before he works there. I answer; God's works are of diverse sorts; there is a work of creation, a work of preservation, and a work of moovinge his creatures agreeably to their natures diverse and sundry ways, as he thinks good. Now all other operations of God about his creatures, suppose his being in them, they being already created, but his creation doth not, much less doth it suppose his being there as in Uacuo. For to be in Uacuo, is as much as to say to be in nothing. Which I confess is true of God taking it as a negative thus, God was not in anything. The truth is, all differences of place and site as here, & there, and else where, are not, but by creation. For to say that God is in some site or place, is to say, that some site or place or thing is coexistent with God, which cannot be without creation. That which he addethe hereunto is of the same nature, and admitts the same solution, now I proceed along with you.

2. To the Atheists demand, where God was before the world was; your answer is, God was in himself. I do not mislike it: and so I say, God is in himself still. For he is not changed. Only in the creation and preservation of all things, virtue did and still doth flowe out of him always, so that with his sweet influence he fillethe all things. To be contained in place, is too base a condition for the nature of God, he rather contains all things. So that even now, God is nowhere contained; before the world he was nowhere conteyninge, because there was nothing without to be contained and nourished by him. Neither is it anything harshe to say, that God was in no place, where there was no place for him, wherein to be. But between the question which you propose, and the answer thereunto, you do insperse some strange assertions, affecting curiosity of discourse, more then sobriety of sense, as when you say; In respect of eternity and immensity, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe, is so like unto him, as this negation of all things, which we describe by the name of nothing. A string may be strayned so high, as by breakinge to mar all the music; and some wits have affected so high a streyne of subtlety of sentence, as that they have degenerated into non-sense. Such is this assertion of yours, wherein you affirm, that no numerable part of this Universe (as much as to say, neither man nor Angel; yet was man made after God's image & likeness) is so like unto God as nothing. Ou • upon such abominable speeches; whereby God himself who is the breath of, our nosthrills is made, if not just nothing, yet to come nearest unto nothing. What sport are Atheists like to make with this? why like David's fool, say in their hearts, there is no God: when a Christian, and a Divine, and a great writer, whose works are current, when others are not, is found to profess, that no creature is so like unto God as nothing. Yet this is not all; for you say also, that no positive essence is so like unto God as nothing, as if God himself were not so like unto himself as nothing is. And indeed we commonly say nullum simile est idem. Yet by your leave the Son of God is the image of his Father, and dare you say that he is not so like his Father, as nothing is! No merveyle if the Spirit of confusion overspreades your discourse like a garment. For what sense, I pray, is there in this speech of yours as when you say, that this name, nothing, is the description of the negation of all things; whereas indeed the negation of all things, is much fitter to be the description of this name, nothing; then the name, nothing to be the description of the negation of all things. For the description is usually larger then the term described. The reason you bring to justify so uncouth a speech, is as absurd and odious, and false as your former assertion, as when you say, Nothing hath neither beginning nor ende of days. Fye, fie upon such shameful assertions, as much removed from wit as from honesty. Hathe nothing neither beginning nor end of days, which is as much as to say, that the days of it are everlasting? why I say, It hath no days at all, no being at all, no not so much being as propositions attribute unto negations and privations. I say it never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have any days, at all, neither is i • possible it should have days, for as much as it is utterly impossible, that God should not be, or cease to be, who is the sovereign being, and i • whom but erst, you professed that all things are, and that in a better manner then they are in themselves. And shall this name nothing be now so far advanced, as to be above all positive essences, or parts of this World, in likeness unto God, and that in respect of eternity, and immensity? But what eternity or immensity of being is to be found in that which hath no being at all, nor ever had, nor ever shall have, nor can have, no not so much as negations have? Yet the Heavens have had continuance so long, as not very well known to man; and so have the Angels had, and shall have forever. The smallest part of this Universe, hath some magnitude; some parts have quantitatem motis, quantity of extension, and that all most incredibly great, certainly incomprehensible by the wit of man, as the Heavens; other parts have quantitatem virtutis, quantity of spiritual perfection, as the Angels, and that also inscrutable by the wit of man. But as for the name nothing, that hath no magnitude at all, neither of corporal extension, nor of spiritual perfection, unless you will return to the imaginary distance of space without the Heavens, which but erst you disputed against. For no immensity otherwise can be found in this your nothing, which you advance so high as in eternity and immensity, to be so like to God, as no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe more, or so much. If in consideration of the most monstrous incongruitie of your assertion, and that as God hath his being necessarily, so it is a thing utterly impossible, that nothing should have any being; to shift yourself out of this absurdity, you shall say, that by nothing you understand not the negation or privation of any thing whatsoever (which yet was delivered by you without all limitation) but only the negation and privation of things created: yet herein you shall fall into a new non-sense. For then your proposition shall run thus in effect, No creature is so like unto God as no creature, which yet is as untrue as absurd. For surely every creature is more like unto God, then no creature, in as much as it hath a true being, which the negation or privation of a creature hath not. And yet you consider not that in this sense, nothing, hath an ende of days. For as soon as the World began to be, forthwith ceased the being of nothing which went before it. But you proceed to take the word nothing in a more large signification, as when you forthwith say, The negation of all things is more like unto God then any one thing; You were as good say, that it is more like unto God, then God himself, yea then the Son is like unto the Father. What blasphemous conceytes are these, & how fit for Atheists to make merry withal. And that you may not seem to run mad without all reason, you add a reason unto it, and the reason is this, Because no distinct or proper place of residence can be assigned to nothing, or to the negation of all things. A most absurd reason, and only plausible unto them, that have lost their wits, in the wilderness of their confused imaginations as you have done. For in such a sense no place can be assigned to the negation of all things, as makes it more base, then the vilest thing that is, so far of is it from advancing it to any likeness unto God above such things as have being at all. For therefore no proper place can be assigned to God, because he filleth all places, and if there were a thousand Worlds he should fill them all, nor by being contained in them, but by conteyninge them, yet not locally conteyninge them, but virtually. But therefore no place can be assigned unto the negation of all things, because it is uncapable both of place and being, whether, circumscriptive as bodies are capable of place; or desinitive, as Angels are said to be in place; or repletive, as God is said to be in all places. Nay it is not so much capable of place, as accidents are, which are in places not per se of themselves, but per accidens, as they affect bodies, which are in place of themselves. For in very truth, the negation of all things never had, nor hath, nor ever shall or can have, any such existence, as propositions attribute to negations or privations. For it was ever false, & is, and shall be to say, Nihil est; For as God all ways is, and that necessarily: so it is impossible, that this proposition should be true Nihil est. Yet that it may in some sort appear, that this your wild discourse proceeds from the zeal of the glory of God, that so you may advance him, above that which is most like him, to wit above nothing or above the negation of all things, you tell us, that this nothing is most unlike him. Yet this also is a new non-sense, namely that, that which is most like unto God, and that for eternity and immensity, prime branches of God's infinity, should be most unlike him; and herein you manifestly contradict yourself. For if it be most unlike him, then everything is more like unto God then it, which before you denied; and to the contrary affirmed, that no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe was so like unto God as it, to wit, as nothing. Yet now you say even this nothing, is most unlike him: and as it were to endoctrinate our plumbeous cerebrosities, and to supply our insufficiency of proovinge so quaint a point of Metaphysical untruthe, namely that this name nothing is most unlike unto God, you help us in a friendly manner with a reason hereof, and that is this, because for soothe nothing is truly, and absolutely nowhere. But why did you not add, that as it is nowhere, in respect of place, so it never was, nor is nor shall be in respect of time; nor is it possible that it should be, like as it is impossible that God should not be. For nihil esse, est Deum non-esse: to say that nothing is, is to say that God is not, or to deny that God is. But you proceed to exercise your wit in disparaging nothing; and whereas before you said, that it was nowhere; next you say, that It is not in it self; as if to be in it self, were some kind of being some where. And you add as it were a reason hereof, when you say, non entis non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio. But this reason is as good as the rest. For that nothing should be in it self, it is not requisite, that it should have either action, quality, or real condition. Or if it had either of these, it should not be in nothing. And why should you account it a condition of being, to be in nothing? You add that nothing cannot have any right or title to be accounted it self; a wondrous strange assertion. For if it be not it self, then it is not the same with it self; if it be not the same with it self, then it is different from it self, & that in something. For if in nothing it be diferent from it self, then every way it is all one and the same with it self. But if in something you conceive it to be different from it self, it behooves you to show what that something is, wherein nothing is said to be different from it self. But if nothing can be alleged, wherein it differethe from it self, then surely it is the same with it self, and consequently it hath good right and title to be it self. You proceed in your unprofitable subtleties, and tell us, that we may truly say some objective conceytes are nothing. Yet surely every conceit is something, but the objects of some conceytes, perhaps your meaning is, are nothing. Now the objects of conceytes are the things conceived. You might then as well have said, that somethinges conceived are nothing. And it is a truth; for Chimeraes may be conceived, and Tragolaphoi, and Centaures, and after a sort privations and negations also, which yet are no real thing. But we cannot rightly conceive (you say) that nothing should have any degree or kind of being. And I say, that neither is any such conceit requisite to maintain, that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it self. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no being, then this proposition Nihilest, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in maynteyninge this proposition you have proceeded so far, as to affirm that nothing hath neither beginning nor ende of days, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternity. Want of being, you say, is the worst kind of barrenness. But is it not more sober to affirm, that want of being is no kind of barrenness at all. For barrenness implies being. And why should you put yourself to such pains of phrasifyinge, in proovinge that nothing cannot bring forth any rank of being? since no such thing is needful to this, to wit, that nothing may have right or title to be termed it self; taking it as an affirmative proposition, wherein nothing is the subject, not as a negative, wherein the word nothing is only a sign of an Universal negative. For in this latter acception, it is utterly untrue, seeing everything may be termed it self, as in saying a man is a man, and so is a mouse a mouse; and so the negation of all things (which is your own description of the word nothing) is also, it self, to wit, the negation of all things. And so it is true to affirm that nihil est nihil.

Thus far you have discoursed of nothing; now you come to discourse of something, or rather of God.

And God, you say, cannot be said to have being nowhere, before the World was made, but with this limitation, save in himself. But I judge this to be a very improper speech, as that which supposethe God's being in himself to be a kind of being somewhere, which in my opinion is untrue.

The truth is, God is in himself, but not as in place. And to be in place, here, or there, or everywhere, is a denomination too base to be attributed unto God: who as Durand saith is nowhere that is in no place secundum se, in respect of his essence, but everywhere by his effects, as filling all places, all bodies, all Spirits, whether of men or Angels with his effects. You say, he is so in himself as that he is more then all things. But consider I pray, how is plurality a fit attribute for indivisible unity? Yet tis • ue, he can produce more then all things of this world of creatures put together, are. You say he is longer then time; I had rather say, He is more ancient then days; because he is eternal, & being eternal and all mighty could have made time more ancient then it is. You say, he is greater then place; It had been more fit to say, he is greater then space; because the greatest place, is but the hollowe superficies of the uppermost heaven, the spacious body whereof is far greater; and God greater then it.

Yet is this a very improper speech, because comparisons ought to be of things in the same kind. But God's greatness & the worlds greatness are far different in kind; the greatness of the world, being quantitas motis, quantity of extension; & the greatness of God's being quantitas virtutis, quantity of spiritual perfection. Yet in this sense it may pass. He is virtually greater then the space of this world, because he could & can produce a greater space then this. You say he is more infinite then capacity it self; Belike you suppose capacity to be infinite, in saying God is more infinite. But created capacity cannot be infinite; though greater, and greater it may be in infinitum, yet still finite; and this is all the infinity, that we do or can conceive by succession or addition; & so God's power to produce greater neither doth nor can receive any bounds or limits. And as God is able to enlarge time and place, so is he able to limit it, but by your leave with distinction. It is not possible that time past should be made less, then it is. But if I mistake not you overlashe, when you say, that God by his essential presence or coexistence is able to limit time and place. For as the limitation of things proceeds from God's will, not from his essential presence; so likewise, it is God's power that denominates him able to limit all things according to the pleasure of his will, and not his essence, or essential presence or coexistence. It is true, that nothing could have beginning or continuance of being but by him: and it is true also, that all other things have had beginning, and still have continuance, and that from him. Though this was no Article of the Peripatetics faith, yet it is an Article of our Christian faith. And herehence, to wit, from God's preserving all things, and working in all things, doth Aquinas infer, that God by his essence (not only by his power) is in all things, because, and that according unto Aristotle's doctrine, Movens & motum must be simul. But then again you know, or may know how this inference is impugned by Scotus and his followers. As if this were the property of a finite Agent, to work only on things indistant from it. But God being an infinite Agent, they conceive it to be his property, to be of power to work upon that which is distant from him; if by supposition, it were possible, that God were distant from any thing, or any thing from it. And therefore though if he be in all things, at the center of their supportance as you phrasifie; yet this is to be in them only by his power, and operation; and great Schoolmen have peremptorily denied, that herehence it can be soundly inferred, that he is in all things by his essence. It is untrue that things in succession, may be in number infinite. They may by succession be more and more without ende; but never shall they come to be infinite. Likewise it is impossible that God should be in more things then those that are, or may be; because it is impossible that there should be more things, then those that are or may be. And withal I wonder, how you can maintain that God is in those things that yet have no being, but only may be.

3. You have discoursed so long of infinity, that your discourse seems to be transfigured into it. For the sentence, wherewith you begin this Section, hath no ende, no way out of it. Had the evaporation of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the luster of his glorious presence, in that late prodigious questionists brain, which would bring us out of the sunshine of the Gospel, into old Egyptian darkness. Here your Reader becomes erect, to understande, what then: But you falling upon givinge a reason of the last clause, by way of parenthesis, utterly forget to make up the sense of your former sentence. This Questionist you speak of, seems by that which followeth, to be Vorstius. For his opinion is, that of enclosing God in the Heavens, and excluding his essential presence from this inferior World, which was (as you report) first brought forth in Egypt. So that it seems, the Egyptians were long ago troubled with this disease, arising from the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, as well as Vorstius; yea and some Nations too. You say indeed it was not propagated to many Nations, thereby implyinge, it was propagated unto some. Only few Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it (as you say) except Aristotle or the Author of the book De Mundo. You would say, I take it, that no Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it, except Aristotle &c. as it lyethe, your sentence is incongruous. But herein, you say, Vorstius did dissent from them, in that he held that God was and is everywhere by his power and immediate Providence. This error of his, you censure as exceeding gross and unsufferable in that he makes God's infinite power, wisdom, and goodness in whole sweet harmony, Divine Providence especially consistethe, but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majesty: as if his infinite Majesty only were full compeere to his essence; unsitting to be employed abroad, or to keep residence anywhere save in the Court of Heaven. Concerning Vorstius, I profess, I never found any such sufficiency in him, especially for Metaphysical discourse, as should make any man zealous of salving his reputation. And that the essence of God should be confined to one place, more then to another, yea to the Court of Heaven, rather then to the basest corner of the earth, is so absurd to my judgment, that I profess ingenuously, all the reason and wit that I have, is not sufficient to make it good of Angels, as being Spirits abstract from material extension. And I will remember how Aquinas makes Angels to be in place, only in respect of their operation. And places are for the natures of bodies, and not of Spirits: and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angels, and such things, as I am willingly content they should continue as they do without the reach of my comprehension. How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place, then to another. And indeed, to my judgment, to be in place, is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God. And Durand as already I have shown, professethe that God secundum se is in no place, but only secundum effectus, and so everywhere, for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects. And as God is said to have been in seipso in himself, before the World was made, is he not so to be accounted still? according to those verses of course in this argument.

And is there not reason for it: For God's essence hath no respect to outward things, as his power hath, and his operation hath. And see, whether by ascribing place to him, you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo, which opinion but erst you impugned. For suppose many Angels existent in the air, (as some are called Princes of the air,) and so within the hollowe of the moon, and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moon, the bodies and spheres of the Heavens only remayninge. It will not follow herehence that the Angels supposed to be within the hollowe of the moon, shall be annihilated, because they being abstract substances, and undependant on any matter, shall exist still, and consequently shall be in Uacuo. For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies, not of Spirits. And who doubts, but that God could have created spiritual substances only, and not bodily; in which case they must be said to be in Uacuo, or nowhere without them. Then again suppose these Spirits themselves within the hollowe of the moon should be annihilated; yet God shall not cease to be existent there, upon the annihilation of Angels, like as Angels did not cease to exist there, upon the annihilation of bodies: and consequently God himself shall exist in Vacuo; and all this cometh to pass by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence, and from his power. Do not all confess that God is nowhere without himself as contained, but only as conteyninge? now to contain is the work of his power, and of his will, & not of his essence, save as his essence, and power, and will are all one reality in God. And so God may be said to be everywhere, not only three manner of ways, to wit, by his essence, by his presence, & by his power: but more manner of ways, to wit, by his knowledge, by his wisdom, by his will, by his goodness. Yet all these shall be but one way, as all these are but one in God. But yet in proper speech as God's essence is nowhere, but it may content us to say, that God ever was and is in himself only: so his goodness is nowhere, but in himself, his knowledge, wisdom, and understanding no where but in himself; his will & mercy and justice nowhere but in himself; his power to make, to preserve, to work nowhere but in himself: but the operations of all these united in himself, are everywhere, and so saith Durand; God fillethe all things with his sweet influence and effects of his power, wisdom, and goodness, all which are as it were the Trinity of his one essence. Thus we may say, his power, and wisdom, and goodness reachethe unto the earth, and to every thing within this canopy,