Discovery of Jacksons Vanity

CHAP. VI.

I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition wherewith you begin your discourse on this Argument, as touching the exact proportion between immensity and eternity. For God's immēsity is that whereby he is ubi{que} or everywhere, like as by his eternity he is semper or always: But to be everywhere supposeth the creations, but to be semper always, doth not: For God was always ever before the world: Again God in proper speech hath true being, and consequently true Duration of Being, which having neither beginning nor ending is properly eternal. But God in proper speech hath no quantity, and consequently neither extension, and so in proper speech cannot be coumpted immense, which signifieth extension without beginning and end; and having no extension at all, being merely spiritual and not material. And ere you turn over a new leaf, yourself make doubt, whether Time hath the same proportion to eternity, as magnitude created hath to Divine Immensity. In a word, I do not believe you are like to find so many nothings to resemble God by in this argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of Immensitie. That saying of Tertulliā you mention, is no more appliable to God's eternity as tis said he was to himself Time, then to his immensity, as 'tis therein said he was unto himself a World; And for ought I see, God is so still, and not only was so before all things; in as much as he hath no more need of them, then before all things he had. You say we cannot properly say God was in time before the world was made; I say such a speech in my judgment seems to be neither proper nor improper; but directly false, even as false, as to say God was in place before he made the world: For before the world was made there was neither time nor place: Now he is in neither as contained in them, but only as containing both time and place, which before the World, absolutely were not at all, & consequently could not be contained by him. I do not think that Austin himself was conscious of any acutenes in inferring that God could not have been before all times, if he had always been in time; for common sense doth justify, that that leg which was ever in the stocks, was never out of the stocks. But whereas you say, that we believe God to be as truly before all times future, as before all times past, & seem to affect it as a subtlety of opinion herein.

I willingly profess, that if it be a subtlety, it is of so subtle a sense, as quite passeth mine intelligence: I had thought it might be avouched of everything that is past, that it is before all times to come: And that all future things are behind the things that are past.

Neither had I thought any reason needful to be given of this: because common sense, I think doth justify it.

Yet you seem to make this a peculiar property of God, that like as he is before all times past, so also he is before all times to come.

Yet I guess at your meaning: For we now existent, allbeit we are before the things that are to come, yet it is not necessary, that we should be after them. But God as he is before all, so, if it please him, he may be after all; For God is that which was, & is, & is to come; that is, which shall be, and that forever of himself.

Now this phrase; to be after all, in a sublimate streyne of conceit attributed unto God, is more truly and perfectly to be accounted his being before all, then after all, in your opinion, as it seems; like as the Heavens invironning the Earth, though they seem to sense to be under the Earth, and under our Antipodes, yet indeed they are above them; So God in being after all things future, is more properly and truly to be accounted before them.

This mystery I seem to find by your subsequentd iscourse and I wonder what you mean to carry yourself so in the clouds, when you might have expressed yourself plainly.

And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your own phrase, above the apprehension of your Reader, when your terms are not sufficient to express your meaning. This is to equivocate like the Jesuits. Of that conceit of yours I will prepāre myself to consider against the time, I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof, in the pa • s subsequent of this Chapter.

In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this. His eternity then is the inexhaustible founteyne or Ocean, from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow.

But I can neither justify this inference, nor the truth of the proposition inferred: For I know not from what premises of yours, it can be inferred.

That, which went immediately before, was this: God is before all times future, as well as all times past; Now to infer that God was before all time, therefore all time flows from his eternity, is no good consequence. You might as well argue thus. God was before all place, therefore all places flows from God's eternity. We our selves are before all times that are to come; but herehence it follows not, that all times to come flow from our eternity, or from us.

Suppose Angels had been made before the World, yet would it not thence follow that the World did flow from them.

Now for the proposition it self inferred, it is subject to exceptions divers ways. The phrase, to flow, savoreth of a natural & necessary emanation, & so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a founteyne. But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God.

Natural emanations from God are not to be found but in God, and that in respect of the Persons; the Son being natural and necessarily begotten of the Father, & the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father & the Son.

Again, the water that floweth from the founteyne on from the Ocean, is of the same nature with the founteyne, on with the water of the Ocean, so is not time of the same nature, with eternity from whence, you say, it flows.

Agayne it is untrue that eternity produceth time or duration of things created: for the duration of them is nothing else, but the continuance of their existence.

Therefore look what produceth the things themselves, & maynteynes them, being produced, from thence they are to be accounted to have their beginning. Now it is the power and will of God, whereby things are created and preserved, & not the eternity of God. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, & all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. We nowhere read, that by the eternity of God all things were made, Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth.

And so likewise as by his word he made all things, so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things. Heb. 1. And therefore all things both touching their being and duration, depend upon the mighty word of God: this we have ground for: But that they depend upon his eternity, we have no ground to affirm; though it is true that both God, and his Word, and Spirit are eternal, otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World. Upon the back of this, you come in with a new Paradox, namely that From all eternity, there was a possibility for us to be; as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternity.

Yet I know some Schoolmen have maintained it (as what will not wild wits dare to undertake): but doth it therefore become a Divine, to suppose it without all proof? I hold it to be impossible, and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant, in my judgment, then any that are brought for it: to wit, that then, years and months, days and hours should be equal; for each of them, even years, should be infinite, and days, and hours, yea and minutes past, should be but infinite; whence he infers, that to every minute should be equal to an year; and albeit he invadeth only eternity of things in motion; yet I see no reason to the contrary, but the argument is appliable as well to all created things, though not subject to motion, though the evidence of deduction is not so manifest as in case of motion.

I know well that Aquinas enterteyned the opinion of this possibility, out of zenle to uphold the creditt of Aristotle in some measure. But then taking upon him to reconcile seeming contradictions in his opuscula, and one of them being this; If the World were eternal, then the souls of men pa • were infinite, supposing the immortality of them; according to the opinion of Aristotle: And both Aristor. as well as Aquinas himself hold it impossible that there should be infinitum actu either in number or in magnitude: Mark how he reconciles this, and what course he takes to prevent an infinite number of souls; Though the World, and Man (saith he) had been everlasting, yet the first man might have been preserved without generation for an infinite space of time, & not begin to generate till about six thousand years ago.

By this let every sober man judge to what shifts this great Schoolman was put to salve this opinion of a possibility, of the worlds being eternal from contradiction. To this you add that in like sort our actual being or existence whiles it l • steth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity; you might well say so or in like sort, for there seems as like truth in this as in the former. Man as he is unum perse is said to consist ex potentia et actis, which is as much as to say ex materia et forma rationali; which Maxim had a capacity of receiving this form, upon whose conjunctiō doth arise that compositum, which we call a man, and us it had a power, so an appetite thereunto, all which was contained under that principium generationis which is called Privatio, According to that saying Materia appetit formam sicut femina virum. But the particular appetite being satisfied with the form, it no longer remaineth, nor the capacity to receive it, that time being now past. But rather an appetite there is in the matter to a new form, by corruption of the present compound, which is the natural ground of man's mortality. And the general appetite of matter is never satisfied.

Much less is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knows that the capacity of the matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio. Now Privatio, though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma; yet is it not principium compositi. Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertiu companitur? But perhaps you speak not of the capacity of the matter to receive a form, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the possibility of Being, before they are, which is extended even to Angels. But then I say much less is the nature of man to be said, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica, but a only potentia logica, to wit, negatio repugnantia, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implies no contradiction: For God's almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angels should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neither man nor Angels can be said to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a real & positive thing is composed of that which is neither real nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not real or positive should be a part of that which is real & positive. But yet, you may say; All created things consist ex potentia & actu, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angels themselves, God alone is Actus purus void of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken in respect of the potentiallity going before the Act, which you say is actuated, but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we conceive it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.

Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himself: In which respect they are said to consist ex potentia et Actu, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called Metaphysica; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be said to be filled, when essence is actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seems rather to contain essence, then essence, existence. But most paradoxicall of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuatiō or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgment, is rather the actuation formal of essence, then is composed thereof.

In the next place you tell us, that life (especially sensitive) is but the motion or progress of this capacity towards that which fills it; or as it were, a continual sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actual being, from somewhat preexistent. I think there is a liberal error in this, and instead of life sensitive, as I take it, there should be life vegetative. Now this doctrine of yours is wondrous strange. There is a motion & progress in life vegetative by way of augmentation, but not by way of generation.

Neither hath the existence of any vegetable, much less man, any degrees: Neither is it of the nature of any substantial form, much less of a soul, least of all of the reasonable foul, to be brought in, much less to be sucked in, by degrees.

And if our existence be present, as you call it, how can it be sucked in? For we suck in that which we have not; not that which we already have. Neither could we have power to suck in ought, much less the actual sucking in of ought, unless already we had existence: For without existence presupposed there can be no motion. And of degrees of existence, especially of substantial forms, or of the things compounded of them, I never heard till now: Degrees, or rather a gradual extension of quantity is gotten by that act of vegetation which is called growth or augmentation. So then, not existence, simply, but of quantity rather; nor the existence of quantity neither, but a greater extension thereof is sucked-in by things that grow: Neither is this extension sucked in; but rather matter of nourishment is sucked in, which by the peculiar operation of the soul is first fitted for nourishment divers & sundry ways, and after that converted into nourishment, & appropriated to each part; and after that by another peculiar property of the soul, there flows from it augmentation of quantity; which is not sucked in from without, but only the materials of it: This wild phrase and manner of speech of yours, if it proceed, is sufficient to corrupt all Philosophy, & not Divinity only.

The next point, I confess, is no Paradox, when you say, Except the vegetables by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us. This, I say, is most true: for if they had not being before, they were just nothing; and it is impossible that that which is nothing, should nourish anything.

Nay, if they had not their being before, they should have no being at all: for Milk or Bread if it had no being before it nourish us; surely it hath no being of milk or bread when it doth nourish us, by being converted into flesh and bone; for then surely, it is neither milk nor bread. The next assertion is very obscure, if at all it hath any truth in it, as when you say, These vegetables themselves cannot exist, unless they did draw their existence or continance of their being, from that which did exist before them, and unto which they do by motion or continuance oft their being approach: For you propose this of life vegetative, which is found in plants as well as men; and the matter of their nourishment is only the moisture or fatues of the earth; which fatness of the earth, how it draws existence or continuance of its being so much as in your sense, I cannot conceive; sc. Matter of man's nourishment, Honey, and potted butter, and poudred beefe, and bacon, and bisket, how they draw it from that whereunto by motion or continuance of their being they approach: Wherein you seem to have a sublimate conceit, resolving the continuance of all things into the operation of God: But, by your leave, they do not draw their continuance from God; God gives it rather, and that by natural means, whereby things are preserved from putrefaction, which is the destruction of their being: Which preservation against putrefactiō, is either in the nature of the things themselves, which God by an ordinary natural course hath wrought in them, onby the Art of Men: Which you resolving without more ado into the operation of God carry yourself not like unto a Philosopher, but like unto that Grammarian who being demanded by a gardenar what should be the reason, why weeds thrived so fast notwithstanding all his care to weed them out, and pluck them up by the roots; when good herbs prospered so slowly notwithstanding all his care, not only to plant them, but being planted to water them, and to manu • e the ground that bare them; Derived the reason of all this from the providence of God; Whereat a Philosophes standing by laughed, not that he despised the Providence of God, but because he conceived there was a more immediate reason thereof, though it also were subordinate to the providence of God, and that was this. As for the weeds that grow of themselves, the earth is a natural mother unto them; but as for the herbs that were planted in her bosom, she was but a step-mother unto them; & ergo: no merveyle if she maintained her own children, her own fruits brought forth by her better, then strange children brought unto her to be fostered by her. But be it as you intimate, that all things draw their existence and continuation of their being from God; but how will you unfold that mystery of yours that follows, namely, that by motion or continuation of their being they approach unto God? For I have read, that the Crow liveth out nine men's lives (measuring every age to be an 100. years) and that the Hart liveth thrice as many years as the Crow; and that the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance; whence came that Theophrastus his complaint of natures inequality, that to Harts and Crowes had given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man: what shall we say therefore that these have approached nearer unto God then Man? Perhaps you will say, yes, in respect of God's eternity: Why but herein, yourself shall be brought to plead against yourself; For in the eight sect: of your former chap. discoursing how the center of God's immensity might be said to be everywhere; you gave this reason or exemplification of it; that be supposing a spere infinite, every point is equally removed from the circumference, as put the case, S. Michaells mount should be as near to the circumference Eastward as Dover, and consequently Dover as far of as S. Michaells mount, though the whole breadth of England lie between them.

And by the same reason the life of a Raven shall be as far of from eternity, as the life of a Hart, and the durance of an Hart as far from eternity as the Durance of a Crow, though three times as much; & the durance of a Crow as far of from eternity, as the durance of a Man, though nine tunes as much.

In the next place, as by way of inference, you add: So that future times and all things contained in time it self, presuppose a fountain of life. I will not trouble myself with your inference: What such move you to make choice of future times to instance in, rather of times in general, whether future, present, or past?

I doubt preexistence to future times is in your imagination a very mysterious point; & such as you are loath your Reader should be acquainted with: For as Aristotle saith of Fallacies, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to discover them, is to solve them; so you may fear, the bare discovery of your conceit may be enough to discredit it. And yet, to show how well you please yourself in it, you say that this fountain of life, presupposed to future times, and all things contained in them, is as truly preexistent to their future terminations, as it was to their beginnings.

How will you construe this sentence, and accommodate it to future times, whereupon notwithstanding it proceeds, as well as of things contained in time, both touching the terminations of them, which are future, and touching the beginnings of them which are past? Surely you cannot; ergo: the latter part of the sentence must be accommodated not to future times wherewith you began this sentence, but to all things contained in time it self. And these indeed have had beginnings which are past, and we do expect future terminations or, motions of them, according to the parts of future time, so long as time it self shall last.

But what is this strang assertion you are impregnated withal, when you deliver it as a rare and curious conceit, that things contained in time do suppose a fountain of life not only to the beginnings of them, but also to their future terminations and motions. Whereas to my poor conceit, if a founteyne of life be presupposed to things past, it must be presupposed also to things to come: And there is no curiosity in this; the inference rather is most vulgar; For seeing future things are behind things past, quod est prius priori must needs be prius posteriori; yet, that which is before a former thing, must needs be before a latter thing.

Hence you proceed (whether by following on, or falling of, lett the Reader judge) to censure that common saying, Tempus edax rerum, as relishing more of poetical wit, then of Metaphysical truth. For which kind of censure delivered by you, I find no just reason; For what? can no truth satisfy you, but that which is Metaphysical? And why you should make such an opposition I know not; as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysical truth, were no truth, but rather of Poetical wit: and whatsoever relished of poetical wit, did not relish of truth. You may as well censure Aristotle's Physicks, and Ethics, and Politics, and Rhetoricks, for surely they do not relish of Metaphysical truths; no nor Euclides Mathematics; no nor of Poetical wit neither; belike they are liable to a double censure.

Yet what think you? cannot Poetical wit have course in conjunction with truth, as well as in separation from it. Nec fingunt omnia Cretes. No nor Poets neither. And as for this saying, Tempus edax rerum: I never knew any sober man or other except against the truth of it before: But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure, to show your wit in refuting it; you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather then the Philosopher; for some of them have taken a course to shape stories, according to the use they had to make of them, and not to follow the direct truth: and this hath been said to be the difference between Sophocles and Euripides: And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is said Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur: And abstracting a line from the matter of it, they may add to it, or take from it what they list: So you construe this saying, Tempus edax rerum, as if it were delivered in proper speech, and not by a figure; whereas the meaning is Synecdochicall; that in course of time things do consume and wast, not that time it self doth wast them; For time being the duration of things; how can the duration of a thing consume it self?

Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose, as when you say, If time did devour things, what could possibly nourish them or continue them from their beginning to their end, And that in two respects; for neither the saying signifies that time should devour thē, before the time appointed for the consumption of them: And though time did consume them, yet something else might contnue them; For their own natures wherein God hath made them, are for a time apt to resist that which laboreth to corrupt them. And other means also there are for the preservation of thē: As man by using means for his preservation may hold out longer then he which useth none; neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying, Tempus edax rerum, ever conceit that anything should desire the destruction of it self, as you are pleased to rove in impugning it: And look in what sense time doth not destroy, but things are destroyed in time; in the same sense, things temporal have not the continuation of their being from time, but from somewhat else in time; For when things are preserved, by the wit and industry of man from putrefaction, they do not receive this preservation of theirs from time, but from the wit and industry of man: And ergo: as time doth not wast, so neither doth time preserve from wasting.

It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth, rather to say that the motions of things themsselfes, and their endeavors, to enjoy or enterteyne time approaching is that which doth wast and consume them; For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption, yet in all other creatures inferior unto man, as beasts of all sorts, how can you make it good that they out of a desire and endeavor to enterteyne time do wast themselves, who know not so much as what time is? How much less will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts, as plants and trees, and in all sorts of mixed bodies? Nay, how will you make it good in man? Some die by course of nature, and that either through age or sickness; when a man of 100. years old dieth, what motion or endeavor is there in him to enterteyne that wasted him? and how will you prove, that had not this motion or endeavor of his been (as all endeavors are voluntary and free) he might have lived longer.

When God sent apestilence among the Israelites, that in the space of 3. days swept away 70. thousand; was it a motion of theirs, or an endeavor to enterteyne time, that consumed them? Nay, when any disease proves mortal, how can it appear that when one man died of an Ague, another of the Dropsy, another of the squinancy, another of the pleurisy, another of the consumption, that all of them died of a certain disease, called their motions and endeavors to enjoy and enterteyne time approaching: A disease, that I think was never known to Hipocrates or Galin, or any Physician before or since. I should think the disease of Pastime should wast us more then the disease of enjoying Time. Others come to their ends by violent deaths, some in war, some by course of justice, others by private malice: In all these I find myself in the briars, and cannot possibly conceive, how men's own motions and endeavors to enjoy time should wast or consume them: or in case a man makes a way with himself by hanging drowning or poisoning. Not altogether so wild is that conceit of yours which followeth, in saying we naturally seek to catch time. Yet wild enough; for it is untrue that men catch. Time; they catch opportunity, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and not a little differing from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time. As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth, ergo; I will roundly set myself to the making of Hay, while this opportunity is offered, wherein I catch not time but opportunity; for the Time were the same in case it rained, but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same, because the wether in that case were not the same; And Hay-making requires fayr wether.

Who they are, who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion, I know not; I should think no man so blockish as to confound them, seeing motion it self may be of more or less continuance in respect of Time, as well as anything else, And in the same Time some things more or less slowly, something more swiftly, some in one kind of motion, some in another: But of divers kinds of time, that should belong to things moved, with divers kinds of motions, I never heard that any Philosopher hath discoursed.

Aristotle I confess, defines time to be numerus motus secund. prius & posterius; but this is not to confound time with motion, but rather to distinguish the one from the other: For he g • ves a far other definition of motion it self: And albeit the time of every temporal thing be the duration of it, whether it resteth or moveth, yet if the questions be made how long such a thing hath continued, or when such a thing began to be, or ceased to be; We have no better means to answer it, then by numbering the revolution of the Sun, if we will show how many years; or of the Moon, to show how many months; or of the Diurnall motion of the Heavens, to show how many days ago such a thing was done, or began, or ceased to be; or to show how many days, or months, or years anything hath continued: & ergo: Aristotle in his Physicks considering time as the measure, in such sort as hath been expressed, gives a definition suitable, in saying it was numerus motus per prius & posterius. Which definition when your true Philosophy shall mend, we shall be so ingenuous as to give congruous respect unto it.

As you began, so you proceed to acquaint us with your subtleties in Philosophy concerning time, Motion (you say) in true observation goes one way, and drives time another way, as the stream which runs Eastward, turns the wheel West-ward.

This curiosity is worth the examining, it may minister some merry matter of refreshment unto us, which in my judgment, your reader hath no little need of to take him of from too sad and serious attention in tracking your obscure phrase, and treading out therhence some morsel of good meaning.

I think you speak of motion circular, and that of the heavens, because nothing so fit to notify unto us Time, as that, and of such motion you speak as immediately before you have signified: Well then; The circular motion of the Heavens goeth one way, and drives Time another way: Before you told us that Motion notifies Time, here you say, It drives Time; but how? Not the same way, but another way as the streams which runs Eastward, drives the wheel West-ward: And which way. I pray doth Time pass: Eastward of Westward? As there is a motion of the heavens, that makes the day, which is from East to west; so there is a motion of the Sun which makes the year, and that motion is from West to East; doth each motion drive time a different way or the same way? Again each motion is not only from East to West, as the first, and from West to East as the second; but the first is again from West to East, and the second is again from East to West; You have not told us, which way Time is driven by motion; and ergo: being to seek, you drive our inquisitions divers ways, and perhaps all different from your own; And all because you will not acquaint is with the way you conceive to yourself, ergo; you drive us other ways, as the motion drives time: Let us see whether we can have any help from your comparison.

The stream, you say, running Eastward drives the wheel West-ward; Now this seems to us untrue, & so far forth as it may be tolerated for true, surely it drivs the wheel no more West-ward then East-ward: First I say it is not true: For the wheel by the stream is turned neither East-ward nor West-ward but round; Now to move Eastward or Westward is to move motu recto a straight motion, but to move round is not to move motu recto, but orbiculari, not by a straight motion, but circular: Yet because circular motions may be said to be towards the East or towards the West, & so the motion of the wheel may be (as you say it is) Westward; yet then I say it is no more Westward then Eastward, as it is manifest in all circular motions: And indeed the river moving according to his natural course drives the wheel before it, but the wheel being round, moves round, not only Eastward as the river goes, but Westward also; For to move circularly towards the East in respect of some parts, is to move circularly towards the West also in respect of other parts, not Westward only or principally so as to give the denomination of a motion Westward, rather them of a motion Eastward.

But all this while we have not found which way Time is driven in your opinion: For sure your meaning is not that time is driven circularly (though I have observed you to discourse of circular duration.) And my reason is this: if the motion from East to West should drive Time another way of motion circular; then seeing that motion which makes the day is contrary to that motion which constitutes the year, it would follow, that the time of the day should go a way quite contrary to the Time of the year: And as little reason to drive time another way, in respect of direct motion.

For there is no reason why the way of Time should be towards the East, rather then towards the West, or contrariwise; and why rather either of these ways, then towards the North or towards the South.

And no mervayle, seeing the way of place is one thing, & the way of time another: For though the stream run directly Eastward, and turn a wheel round; 'tis nothing strang, since both are bodies apt to move, and the stream apt to run downward, and a wheel apt to be turned round. But time is not a body that it can move ane way.

And this reflects my thoughes upon the consideration of another incongruity, as when you say, motion goes one way; you might as well have said, motion moves one way; whereas it is the body that moves, & motion is the act of it, but it self moves not.

Yet there is a proper way for a body moving, & so for motion. And it may be there is a proper way for time as when that which is to come becomes present time, and present time, becomes past time; as this year the last year was to come, now it is present, and after a while it will be past: So all the way of time is this, & shall be, it is, it was: one after another.

And (by your leaves) motion drives it no more then rest: If the Heavens should stand still, yet might things continue still the same time that God hath appointed them, as well as in the case of their motion.

Neither is it true, that our actual existence slides from us with time; our being still continueth the same, by you leave, and not our capacity of being only; For Socrates senex non differt a Socrate puero according to our University learning, which whether it be true Philosophy or no, let the Reader judge; I say, he differs not in substance, I do not say, he differs not in accidents: I doubt not but Socrates was auncienter in his old age, then in his child-hood, and different both in quantity of body, and quality of mind; But I see no reason but his existence was still the same: And as for capacity of being, I see no reason why that should have any place where being already is: As for substantial actuation of capacity of Being (which you make to be continual) after a man hath his being I know none; Neither am I conscious of any such desire; and it is strang to me, that you should be more privy to my desires then myself. I desire to increase in knowledge, and to grow in grace and goodness, and in favor with God and man.

But of any desire of actuation or replenishment (as you speak) of the capacity of being, I am nothing conscious to myself: Neither can I acknowledge any new coexistence (with time approaching in respect of any mutation of my existence, but in regard that times do change and succeed one another, I may be said to coexist anew with them, because they coexist anew with me.

Neither do I know any such office of time as you devise to be assigned to it by eternity, as to repair that ruins which tions present or past, have wrought in our corruptible substance.

No mervayle that you could not brook that time should be accounted edax rerum: For now I perceive you maintain time to be reparatrix rerum, yea the curer of diseases; For to repair the ruins which motion hath made in our corruptible substances, what is it but to cure diseases? So that time is a simple of more sovereign virtue, then I was ware of; but I know not whether it were ever known to Hippocrates or Galen; I doubt it was not; And that tempus is edax rerum, hath better authority to confirm it I think, then that it is reparatrix rerum: And consider in reason, time is the duration of things temporal, whence it cometh to pass, that the very ruins themselves which are wrought in our corruptible substances have their time, that is, their duration; so have all diseases: Now lett any sober man judge, whether the duration of such a ruin, such a disease, be fit to repair it, fit to cure it; What time then shall cure or repair it? Take the most sovereign remedies to repair such ruins, to cure such diseases, and the duration or time thereof hath no power to repair or cure it, but the nature of that remedy applied may; which nature and the application thereof, is not time, but the remedy hath a duration, which is the time thereof, whether it be applied or no.

As for the motions of the heavens numbered according to preority and posteriority, which in a Physical consideration is the time of everything, as the fittest measure to measure out the continuance of all things, as little power hath that to repair ruins or cure diseases, more then to make them.

In the next place you draw us to the consideration of Plotinus his excellent observations. I had rather you would acquaint us with some accurate conclusions and demonstrations of his. Yet these observations which you so magnify in a Platonic, such as they are we will consider them. The first is that the best of our life, the very being of things generable is but as a continual draught or receipt of being, from the inexhaustible founteyne of life. This is one of his (so much by you magnified) observations, and a very proper one. As if a man should say, the very water, be it the best of waters, is but a stream flowing from the fountain of waters. Is not this an excellent observation, think you? Yet you add something of your own, which partly swerves from truth, and partly mars Plotinus his music; For you make the very being of things generable, and the best of our life to be all one; whereas the wickedest men that are, are the miserablest things that are, are things generable, and have a being as well as the best; And in the state of our corrupt nature we had a being, & so had Paul when he persecuted the Church of God, and Peter when he denied his Mr. and David when he committed adultery with Bathsheba and caused Uriah to be slain with the sword of the children of Ammon; but did this being of theirs, or their very being, deserve to be accounted the best of their life? Now whereas you say, Our being is a continual draught of being from the inexhaustible founteyne of life: I find no mention at all of any fountain of life in Plotinus, His words as you cite them are, Videtur in rebus generabilibus id potissimum essentia esse, scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse, (this is all he hath concerning the inexhaustible founteyne of life as you paraphrase it) ex generationis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat.

And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens, like as we say, linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem. And thereupon his first sentence is this, that take away erit from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add erit to them, it shall befall them a seed ipfiue esse labe, to slide from the seat of being; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in their subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not natural unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the founteyne of life; as it is well known Plato first, and accordingly Platonickes maintained, that the world was made by God.

To this I answer, that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing, but out of matter actually preexistent; yet here Plotinus discourseth, not of the creation whereby the world was made, but of generation, whereby the parts of it were continually meynteyned; Neither doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable, but only of the formality thereof: But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being, who can doubt but his answer would be either ascribing this to the individual generating, and virtus seminalis as his instrument, working to the extracting of forms ex potentia materiae; or otherwise to the Dator formarum; in neither of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible founteyne of life, whither you would draw him, to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious: But what should Christians expect from the Scholar of Ammonius and M ^r . of Dorphity? Now, whereas he confines this to things generable, do you magnify that also! What think you of Augul • s? Is not their being also a continual draught or receipt of being from the inexhaustible fountain of life, as well as the being of things generable?

But proceed we to take notice of the rest of his so excellent observation: Nature (saith he) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seeing it draws or sucks in that being which it hath, by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle, with the desire of essence, or of being what it is. By this I perceive where you dipt your pen that dropt forth such wild conceits as before in this very section I have encountered with; to wit, in Plotinus his Philosophy, fit lettice for such lips as like them. And for the obscurity of conceit, your writings, to my thinking are very like unto his; and the rather may men be moved to suspect, there are some rare notions in them which they understand not; Yet by the way you sometimes insperse such glosses as make Plotinus meaning worse then it is; as when Plotinus saith of a thing generable, that movetur in orbem quodam essentiae desiderio, that it is moved round with a certain desire of essence; you render it this with desire of essence or being what is: Now Plotinus saith, not of anything that it hath a desire to be what it is, which is very absurd; for nothing desires what it hath already, but rather what it hath not: So when Plotinus saith, that esse sibi haurit, it draws unto it self being; you render it thus, It sucks in what it hath; whereas indeed it is a thing impossible for any man to suck in that which he hath, but rather he sucks in that which he hath not.

Nor can I approve this saying of Plotinus, that A thing generable hactens to that being which is to come; which Plotinus seems to understane only of Time; Now we rather on the contrary many times complain that time passeth away too fast; yet again some there are, I confess, that think time never passeth away fast enough: Both are conscious of times hasting more or less; but neither are conscious of their hastening to Times: And the truth is, the swiftest motion and the slowest motion is in respect of the same time, which indeed in neither swift nor slow, though motions in time may be swift or slow; yet the swiftest mover no more hastens to time to come, then the slowest mover, how excellent soever Plotinus observation be in your conceit, yet I grant we may be said to hasten to a being which is to come, but this being is alway accidental never essential: A man may make hast to be rich, and such a one saith Solomon cannot be innocent: A man may grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to make hast therein is commendable: and so for everyone to be diligent and quick in the works of his calling: But our essential being we hast not unto, it is the same still; for Socrates being old differs not essentially from himself being a child: Indeed we labor for the preservation of our being; but all our actions tend not hereunto, they tend to the service of God as well as to the service of ourselves.

And how in these motions whatsoever we move in orbem, or as it were in a circle I know not; That quaint conceit I leave to Plotinus till your commentary may unfold the meaning of it.

Now you tell us (belike in a suitable proportion unto the conceits of Plotinus, or rather in some degree beyond them) that Nor we men, nor any creatures (specially generable) are permitted to draw or suck so much of our proper being from the founteyne of eternity at once, or in any one point of time as we list, and that We have our portions of life or self-fruition distributed peecemeale and sparingly unto us, least too much put into our hands at once might make us prodigal of the whole stock.

It is great pity the pages of your book be not stored with the word Mystery; for they are nothing almost but mystery; This is delivered not only of men, but of all creatures generable: Why then, all creatures generable have a list to draw or suck more of their proper being from the fountain of eternity, then they do or can suck: Surely you charge them with that they are nothing guilty of; For, not to speak of stones and metals nor of vegetables; How doth it appear there is any such desire in brute creatures, whether beasts or birds or fishes • that neither know eternity, nor their own proper being, nor what it is to suck more of it at once then is fit.

And as for myself amongst reasonables, one though a poor one, having some knowledge both of eternity in the way of Christian Divinity, and of my proper being in the way of natural Philosophy; yet what it is to suck more of my portion of being at once then God think fit, I am utterly ignorant, and therefore cannot be conscious to myself of any such transgression: Suppose the durance of my being in the appoyntement of God be between 50. and 60. years, do I desire or can I desire to enjoy these 60. years in the space of 20. or is it possible by the almighty power of God that I should? I grant the knowledge and goodness I have arrived unto by God's grace in the space of 50. years, I might have arrived unto in the space of 40. Yet am I not conscious of any desire I had of this: But this is only my accidental being, and therefore deserveth not simply to be accounted my proper being.

The like may be as touching the Qualities or Quantitie of my body: But my substantial being, that only deserveth to be accounted simply my Being; And this I had all at once, as I had my organical body, and soul all at once; though the continuance of it I had not all at once; For that was impossible I should have, it being a continuance by way of succession of days after days &c. And • f I had had all at once, there had been no succession; and therefore, in my judgment, it is absurd to say our portions of life are piece-meal & sparingly distributed unto us, lest too much being put into our hands at once might make us prodigal of the whole stock. And which implies, that God could, if it had pleased him, have made us enjoy the whole space of our life at once; For that were to make time past, present and to come, to exist alltogeather, which, I think, every wise man will judge to be impossible: Yet this case being put; how were it possible to the contrary, but that we must needs spend it all at once? For like as the space of life of 60. years must necessarily be spent in 60. years: So if we had all this space together in one day, or one year, we wust needs spend it together in the space of a day, or a year: In a word, since this cannot be true of our essential being, which we have all at once undoubtedly; nor of our accidental being; for that cannot be properly accounted our being; it remains to be understood only of the continuance of our being: And to desire to have all this at once, is to desire to have at 7. years, as much age as others at 60: But no man desires this, though lately we hear, that after the surrendering of Rochelle, maidens, by reason of the famine there during the Seige, of 16. years old were found to look like women of an 100 years old. We rather desire in old-age to be young, like unto Moses who being an 100. and 20. his eye was not dimne, nor his natural strength abated. Yet your conceit is manifestly impossible; for it proceeds not of having the qualities of age in youth, but the very continuance, which is as much as to say, at seven years of age to be as old as a man of 60. which no man desires, neither is it possible for God to effect.

This piercing of time, or reduction of many years into a small space being as utterly impossible as the penetration of dimension in magnitude, if not much more.

Men's stocks may be spent in one year upon as much pleasure as another may be taking in seven years: but the continuance of space or time to come, can neither be taken before the time, nor spent.

2. In the next Section you are more popular; I do not say more true: For you give me no cause to say so.

For first, in my Judgment, it is a manifest untruth to say, that time is a participation of eternity: For as immensity is to place or magnitude, so is eternity unto time: But place or magnitude is no participation of immensity, therefore also time is no participation of eternity.

And like as God's immensity is without extension, & therefore quite of a different nature from magnitudine corporal; So his eternity is without succession; and therefore of a quite different nature from duration corporal.

And whereas you say, that He should design the several branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher that several actuations, draughts, or replenishments, which are derived from the infinite founteyne of life and being, to fill the capacities or satiate the internal desires of things temporal; Here again you slip back to the transcendentall notions, far above, not only common sense, but all sobriety of conceit.

You tell us of actuations, draughts, and replenishments derived from the founteyne of life to fill capacities, and internal desires; all which together with the several branches of time you speak of, and their references to the actuations after mentioned, are so many hobgoblins unto me: what are the parts of time, I seem to understand, time past, time present, and time to come, but what the Several branches are, I know not.

The founteyne of life is it, that which brings natures possible into act of being? But how hereby he can be said to satiate their internal desirs, I comprehend not: For while a thing is only possible, • t neither hath, nor can enterteyne any desire of being. Perhaps you may say, that when things are, they may desire continuance: And it is the founteyne of life, that as he made all things, so he doth perpetuate them so long as he thinks good. But what mystery, the deciphering of this actuation or perpetuation doth contain, so avaylable to the definition of the several of time, I therefore know not, because you have not vouchsafed the enucliation hereof unto your Reader.

I find no sense in that which followeth, as when you say the motion of the Heavens is more uniform then time (which you call the duration of things temporal): For every part of time is still uniform, and that in such sort as it impossible to be otherwise; be the motion never so deficient in uniformity. As an hour is still the same, whether motions herein be swift or slow, or both swift and flow (as such different motions may be in the same time without all question) and that according to all variety; yea though one and the same motion, I mean of one and the same subject be partly swifter, partly slower, and that in all variety of degrees.

So is the month, so is the year most uniform, taking it to consist of how many days and hours soever you will: I grant things in time may dure more or less; but time it self admitts no contraction or dilatation; as for example, a day cannot be contracted into the space of an hour; nor an hour cannot be dilated into the space of a day; but the motion of a day may be contracted and reduced within the space of an hour; that is, a thing may move as fast in an hour as it doth in a day, I have heard of a Pope, that when his countrymen presuming of his omnipotency, entreated they might have two sommers in a year, made answer as Elias did to Elisha, that he had asked a very hard thing; yet it might be obtained by them upon a condition: And when they being eager to obtain what they desired, shown their willingness to accept of any condition; Hereupon the Pope told them, that upon condition to accompt 24. months to their year, they should have two sommers every year: This was a cunning trick to fill his country men's mouths with empty spoones: He was no more able to gratify his country-men in this, then Mark Anthony was the Athenians, who having imposed a double tribute in one year; was told by an Orator, that if he could give them two Sommers, and two Springs within the compass of one year, he might exact two revenues, not otherwise.

I know no such double duration or course of time indented, as you speak of, what if a man be sometimes in health, and sometimes in sickness? the condition of his life, and the quality thereof it diversified, his duration is not; as appeates by this: In the same time wherein one it sick, another is not; one in pleasure, another in pain; it is manifest, the time may be the same, though the condition much different.

These conceits of yours are so popular, that they cross withal: In grife or pain to thrust time from us, is but to wish it were shorter then it is; as it is signified Deut. 28. 67. In the morning, thou shalt say, would God it were evening. and at evening thou shalt say, would God it were morning: And yet the meaning hereof in effect, is but this, to wish that our pain were shorter, then would we not care though the time were longer. And so our joy to be continued, we desire not the moments of our time to be fixed.

Still you confound a man's condition with the time, as if time it self were sweet or sour. Let every sober man judge, whether it be not an absurd conceit to affirm, that men desire to prolong their days by living the same time over and over again. As if we could not have the sam • oy, without living the same time over and over again: Whereas it is manifest, that in one and the same time, one man may be in case and joy, another in pain and sorrow.

And yet in serrow the fr • ction of our existence is never the less perfect, then in times of joy, for joy and sorrow are no parts of existence, for existence is found never a whitt the less where joy and sorrow have no place: This you confess in the next place, where you say; that the pleasure of borrowed • ife is to the identity of being but at water to the pipe through which it runs. yet both serve alike to fill up the matter of your discourse, both the confusson of things different, and the correction of such confusion.

And if the gluts and gushes of pleasure (as you phrasifie it) may be at one time much greater then at another, surely they may continue at one time as well as at another, and therefore for the continuance of pleasure, it is not necessary to desire the stay of time, which is a thing impossible: Yet you pleased yourself not a little in your former popular discourse of this nature.

The fruition of pleasure may be as entire as our selves; and it is no more true, that they are begotten and die in every moment, then it is true of us, that we are begotten & die in every moment: For this scrupulous hicetie ariseth from no other ground, then the being measured with time, their duration is partly past, partly future, and but a moment present: And judge whether this conceit of but a moment present, be not a vain conceit: For I pray, what is that which follows this present moment immediately? Is it a moment only, or no? if not a moment only, what is become of your conceit? If a moment only, will it not follow, that time consisteth of nothing but moments? And you may as well say, that magnitude consists of nothing but points, which were indeed, to consist of nothing.

We truly say, this day is present; this month is present; this year is present, like as time is said to be present, to wit, by way of succession of parts, which parts are not moments succeeding one another, but times Homogeneall, though according to reason divisible in infinitum, as all things continual are.

3. How the Angels do account the continuation of their duration, I know not; but surely we have no better means to account their duration past, then by the making of the World, and the number of yearly revolutions of the Heavens, that have been since. But because we believe, that God could have made Angels, & no visible World; yea and made the Heavens without moving of them; in which case yet I doubt not but their duration, & continuance thereof should be known to themselves, but by what means I know hor.

The Learned do distinguish of the duration of Angels, from the duration of things material; & so accordingly their measures; making time to be the measure of the duration of the one; and even of the other: Yet I have no cause to think that their duration is a participation of eternity more then time: And like as their magnitude spiritual is no participation of immensity; so neither is their duration any participation of eternity.

They are creatures as well as we, though no mortal creatures, and have their beginning as well as we; and the time shall come, when we shall be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 even as the Angels themselves, and continue as long as they, yet never attain to any eternity of being, though our being shall never have end: But seeing both theirs, and ours had a beginning; therefore it is impossible that it should ever grow to be eternal.

I see no reason why Angels should not be said to watch for opportunities of time as well as we.

The Devil I am sure is still compassing the earth. Job. 1. & goes about like a roaring Lyon seeking whom he may devour, and do they not wait all opportunities to do mischief? And why may not Angels as well wait all opportunities to do us good, according to the will of their and our Heavenly father? Especially considering they are all ministering Spirits sent forth for the good of them that shall be heirs of salvation.

But I confess, how this waiting or expectance of opportunity should be said to feed them, I am as much to seek, as to define how it is said to feed us; unless in respect of Hope; & so I see no reason, but that it may be as well said to feed them also; for surely their own glory is not at full, & they wait for the enjoying of that; neither our glory nor grace is yet at full; & as they rejoice at the conversion of a sinner; how much more will they rejoice at our salvation; and why may they not be said to wait & hope for that also, & rejoice in the hope, as we do?

If a desire to continue what they are doth argue, they have not all that in present possession which is allotted to their complete duration; then surely they never shall, nor we neither, no not in the state of glory, have all in present possession which is allotted to our duration: And what, I pray, is wanting? You will say the future duration; but what, I pray, do we get by that, when as fast as duration future becomes present, so fast duration present becomes past? Yet surely by continuing what we are, we loose nothing; & if by this, that our duration passeth in respect of time, we cannot be said to loose anything; then surely by this, that duration cometh on as fast, we cannot be said to gain anything. If indeed we should grow weaker and weaker, and our strength and prosperity should pass with time, then we should be losers by it, not otherwise; So if we should grow stronger and stronger, & our strength or prosperity should increase with time, then we should be gayners by it, and not otherwise.

Now I hope it is without question; that the glory of Heaven shall not increase, but be at full, at the very first, and so continue without end. And, in my judgment, it is a very poor conceit, to deny that a man hath his whole life together, because the duration of it, is not all at once.

If we had our life by degrees, one part at one time, and another part at another time, this were a manifest imperfection; but having all of it together, to conceive that the duration & continuance hereof longer & longer is an imperfection, is a very wild conceit in my judgment: This were to cast us upon the denial of God's continuance; For like as our time being upon supposition of 60. years, if we should have all of it, within an hour, it should end at an hours end; so likewise, if God should have his continuance all at once, it should end all at once.

But we say, that the Divine essence as it is without beginning, so it is without end: and nothing past with him, nor nothing to come to him, as it is with all creatures, which are subject to motion in some kind or other: if not of corruption, yet of perfection, at least capable of it: if no such thing were, yet as they come from nothing, so they might return to nothing: But that God, as he gave them their being, so he continueth it. As for God he receiveth not his being from anything, no not from himself: But is most necessary to exist, and most necessary to continue, without loosing of ought that is in himself, no not so much as a thought; nor receiving anything into himself, no not so much as a new thought, or a new affection: All which, and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angels, though not so much as unto us; who also have material motions, as local, and alteration, & that tending to corruption.

In a word, as man's existence is as it were an accident to his essence; because the nature of a man is only of it self passively possible to exist, and God can give existence to such a nature, or make the human nature to exist, as he hath done; so likewise to Angelical natures, existence is but an accident.

And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them; so is continuance an accident to such existences. In which respect every day and hour, both man and Angel may be said to receive a new accident, which before they had not.

But it is quite otherwise with God; For as his existence is all one with his essence; (because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist:) so his continuance is no accident to his existence: because it is necessary that God should be, & so be, as to be without beginning and without end: And therefore though our continuance be new to us, as being an accident unto us, and wrought by motions; yet God's continuance is no accident unto him; For it is impossible, he should not continue, who is of necessary being: But of this, and of the indivisible nature of God's continuance more hereafter.

I willingly confess, that because Angels were made of nothing, therefore their continuance is merely at the pleasure of God, and have parts divisible, in regard that God can set an end to them, whensoever it pleaseth him.

But I know no cause to deny, that they enjoy an entire self-fruition; For though they have not all their continuance at once, yet seeing their continuance is no part of their essence, which is a thing indivisible, I see no reason why they should be denied, entirely to enjoy themselves.

Man grows to perfection in parts integral, though not in parts essential, which perfection of parts integral, as it daily groweth, so it makes him daily more fit to perform the offices of nature, and duties of his calling; and so may be said, not to enjoy himself entirely (according to that perfection) which belongeth unto him but by degrees: But it is not so with Angels; yet may they acquire something unto themselves accidentally, which before they had not.

God can acquire nothing: His duration ('tis true) is indivisible; For there is no prius nor posterius therein; For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion.

I do not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God: as when you say, he cannot gain ought today, which yesterday he had not; or loose today, what yesterday he had: For this, in my judgment, is incident to glorified creatures: For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angels be at full without gaining any new or loosing any old? Yet no doubt, their duration notwithstanding shall be divisible; God is not.

Perhaps you will say, they loose the former days existence, and gain the following days existence: And so we do much more properly in this world, but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence: For to loose the former days existence, and gain the following days existence, is but to loose our coexistence with the former day, and gain a coexistence with the day following: Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration; which I prove thus: It is incident to God, yet is he still the same in duration: And that 'tis incident to God, I prove thus; God himself was yesterday coexistent to yesterday, and now he is not; for if he were, then yesterday should now exist, which is not only untrue, but impossible to be true, for then time past should be present: And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same • nes in duration is manifest; for to coexist with something yesterday, and not today, may arise from no variableness from within, but only from variableness in something from without: As, namely, therefore God doth not coexist today, with many things today, with which he did coexist yesterday, is not because of any change in God, but by reason of change in these outward things, which had a being yesterday, but today have not.

In that which follows you manifestly betray your cause: For that God hath such fullness of joy and sweetness of life, that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetness; doth no way infer, that therefore, the duration hereof cannot be added unto him, and the continuance thereof: Your comparison utterly overthrows you: For as in a body infinite, though there cannot be a middle nor extreme; yet there are parts without parts by way of extension; So in infinite life, though it hath, no extremes, as being without beginning and without end, yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before, and parts coming after by way of succession.

And whereas you say, that Natures capable of these differences have always the one accomplished by the other, is either without sense; as if you mean it of the parts of time, as if one were accomplished by the other; For how I pray you, is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come, or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past: Or if in respect of natures subject to time, which are perfected by time, or rather in the course of time; thus, as it is sometimes true, so sometimes it is notoriously false: For as there is a time of growth in perfection, so it is well known that there is a time of diminution, & corruption also; And, I pray you, how doth a man's dotage accomplish him either in soul or body? And in the Kingdom of Heaven, what accomplishment by time, when our glorious condition shall be as full and perfect at the first, as in the progress, for what space imaginable soever.

As for this state, 'tis well known, that as there is a time of repairing and increasing, so there is a time of impairing and decaying: And though perfection cannot be perfected, yet it may be continued; so it is in man, so it is in God; but by necessity of nature continued in God; by the pleasure of his gracious will continued in the creature: And therefore though his essence being infinite excludes such a continuance as is wrought by reiterated acts; yet it excludes not such a continuance as is by necessity of nature, but rather includes it, it being of the nature of life infinite to be as with beginning, so also without end: Even created Angels and Saints shall have no want of continuance in the Kingdom of Heaven; much less God the Author of their continuance, more then of his own; Yet shall he continue and that by necessity of nature, both to the worlds end, and after that without end. Yet nothing in him is to come to him; nor nothing from without can come to him; For who should give it him? But the duration both of men and Angels is maintained unto them by the will and pleasure of God: And herein consists the true difference between the duration of creatures and the Duration of God; For as for prius & posterius, past, and to come, this hath his foundation only in respect of motion, And therefore time is commonly not reputed a fit measure for the essences of things, but only for individual substances: and these only generables, not of substances merely spiritual, as you may remember Plotinus hath taught you. What do you mean by the degrees or acts of life, an infinity whereof you place in God? We commonly account three sorts of life, and no more, to wit, vegetative, sencitive, and rational; Of an infinity I never hard before in this kind: And as for the degrees of these, I doubt not but there may be degrees in any; as in each kind some may be more quick and vivacious then other. But none of these kinds, much less the degrees of thē ar found in God formally, but iminently: And as for the plurality in respect of such as are decreed by him, the case is clear, that they are infinitely far of from infinity; for undoubtedly the things decreed by God are but finite. I do not agree with you to conceive God to be everlasting in referēce to perpetuity of succession; for that kind of everlastingnes is a parte past: But eternity chiefly consists in being everlasting a parte ante, and before there was any succession at all.

But here, by the way, you give me an hint of what you make your foundation of many wild discourses; and for which I have looked all along; And not till now you have bolted it out, as where you say, God's interminate existence is present to the whole and every part of succession: which long ago hath been discovered to be a very vain conceit, though embraced by as great a Schoolman as Aquinas himself; who hereupon builds his opinion of the presence of all things in God's eternity: And his opinion herein is built upon a very plausible comparison, and devised correspondency between God's immensity and eternity, for like as God by virtue of his immensity doth fill all places, and should coexist with every part of magnitude, although, upon supposition, it were infinite: In like sort God by reason of his eternity should fill all times, and coexist with all times, and all things that hereafter shall exist in time.

But the fallacy of this comparison, and the error of this assertion hath now long ago been discovered by Johannes Scotus: It is true indeed, God must needs coexist with all places. and all things in place; but not until the place it self▪ and the things therein do exist: As if the world were twice at big as it is, God should coexist in every part of it; But yet God doth not coexist with any such, because, as yet there is not any such to coexist with him: In like sort God shall coexist with all times, and all things existing in all Times; but when? Not till these times and the things therein shall be found to exist: and as they shall be found to exist, so shall God coexist with them: Now all Times, and all things contained in all times do not exist but by way of succession, (magnitudes exist otherwise, even all together) and in like sort God shall coexist with them, to wit, by way of succession: Nor that God's existence is or shall be by way of succession; (for nothing in God is found that succeeds anything in God) But because both times, and creatures in times do exist by way of succession, in respect of whose succession and not of any succession in God, God is denominated, and that properly enough, to coexist with them by way of succession, in as much as they exist, and consequently coexist with him by way of succession: Like as a pole fixed in a river doth coexist with divers parts of the stream by way of succession; not that any motion or succession is found in the pole, but only in the parts of the stream, that succeed in their course one after another: velut unda supervenit und • : And albeit Alvarez hath taken great pains and shown great wit in justifying the opinion of Aquinas in this (yet no otherwise then upon the supposition of the predetermination of God's will) and in dissolving the arguments which Scotus brought against it; and that in such so • t, that in so spinous of matter I have sometimes thought it a matter very difficult to find out a clear solution of his reasons; yet (I thanck God) as it was the first work I undertook after I left the university, before ever I thought of dealing with Arminius, so I seem to have fully satisfied myself therein; and am reasonably persuaded of ability to give satisfaction, on that point, to others also.

But to proceed along with you; In the next place you tell us, that God considered in himself, He is every way indivisibly infinite and interminable; not only, because he had no beginning, nor shall have ending: Here your attentive reader would expect what is answerable to this not only, and when you come in with but also; but here he must hold his breath till you have dispatched your parenthesis; and if he hold his breath till you come to make up this your imperfect sentence, he is likely never to draw it again: Again when you say, God is indivisibly infinite and interminable, considered in himself; you leave your Reader to suspect that your opinion is, that God considered not in himself, is not indivisibly infinite and interminable, and the meaning thereof I am yet to seek.

But consider we what you insert in your parenthesis; For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the heavens have been created from everlasting: So they might, as much as to say, as well as that of whom but e • st you spake, and that was of none but God: But God, you said was indivisibly infinite, and interminable, not terminable: Wherein in making so incongruous a comparison, whether you had forgott yourself, or strained to be delivered of some involved conceit, the congruity whereof must be far fett, and dear bought, before a man can meet with it, I know not he obvious meaning which your text aims at, seems to be this; God is infinite and interminable, not only, because he is without beginning and without end; for so the heavens should be infinite and interminable, put case they were created from everlasting, but in another respect also; which respect or cause you forgett to express, to perfect the sentence of yours, which is otherwise very imperfect; Yet in this way of interpretation of your text, there are faults enough; for to make the heavens like unto God in this, you should putt the case, not only of being created from everlasting; but also of being to be continued without end, otherwise they cannot be like unto God both as he is without beginning, and also as he is without end: Secondly though the case were thus put, yet is it incongruous enough; for albeit herein they should be like unto God in being without beginning, and without end: Yet herein they should be nothing like unto God in being indivisibly infinite, and interminable; whereof notwithstanding proceeds your comparison: we acknowledge a difference in this, & that a mighty one, though the heavens had been created from everlasting, &c. not because all God's continuance to come is present, as you devise; but because God's duration and continuance is impossible to be divided, the continuance of a creature is not: For God can make the continuance of any creature to cease this day and hour; but it is impossible God's continuance should cease; for he is of necessary being: As for the conceit of prius & posterius in God's duration; that is a sory conceit, for that is to be found nowhere, but where there is some motion or other, spiritual or corporal, either in place, or alteration in quality, or augmentation or dimination in quantity, or generation and corruption: And you may remember that your excellent M ^r . Plotinus, whom you so much magnify, confines his discourse of time to things generable, as if he meant the Angels were free from such a division of duration as is made by prius and posterius; How much more God? But of such a division as I speak; the Angels cannot be free from it being creatures; but only God, who is ens necessarium, of necessary being; And therefore his continuance or duration is impossible to be divided from his continuance tomorrow, because it is absolutely impossible, that it should ever cease: and therefore whensoever time and place, and things contained in them shall exist, & as long soever as they shall exist, God must necessarily coexist with them, and it is impossible it should be otherwise: But before time and place had course, though God did exist, yet did he not coexist with them; So likewise before time to come doth exist, and the things that are to exist therein, it is impossible that God should coexist with them.

But whereas you say in your parenthesis, that had the Heavens been everlasting, their revolutions nevertheless should have been truly numerable, and therefore terminable; It is true, I confess, of some of them, as 10. 40. 60. 100. 1000. &c. but impossible that all should; For had the Heavens been everlasting, their motions undoubtedly had been innumerable, neither could we ever come to the first number while we could.

Secondly you say all things contained in their circuit should have gotten somewhat which before they had not, and this something, you say is either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or new acts of life, or sense, or reason.

All very odd, and little or nothing congruous to things gotten by motion, without which nothing at all is gotten: Now every poor Scholar knows what is gotten by motion; For if it be motion local, a new site is gotten; If alteration, a new quality, if augmentation or diminution, a new quantity; If generation & corruption, the matter getts a new substantial form; Now where none of these are gotten, there is no addition of any new thing: And it is well known, that the Divine Essence is capable of none of these, neither of new place; nor new quality, not new quantity, nor new form substantial; Allbeit he continueth forever, and consequently there can be nether prius nor posterius to be divided in God: But yet because you enterteyne a wild conceit of God's eternity indivisible; you would have his duration so, ind visible; as if both the time past, and the time to come were drawn together within an instant: And therefore, you say, that all other things have either addition of duration, or continuance of existence, or some new acts of life, or sense, or reason; the last whereof is only congruous & agreing with the nature of that motion which is called alteration; as the two last and the first, may have reference also to generation, or augmentation; from all which the case is clear that God is free, notwithstanding that his continuance which is to come be not said, to be present, at which wild conceit and the justification thereof you seem to aim: But as for the two first, which yet you make to be all one, they have no place of consideration among the terms that are acquired by motion: And dare you deny, that God hath continuance of existence or duration? But you will say no new duration is added unto God: Who saith it is! And what new duration is added unto man by his continuance? God may add something unto him if it please him; but if he continue him in statu quo, what addition, I pray? You will say duration: I demand; whether naturally or supernaturally? if supernaturally, then God doth a new create it; But God hath long ago ceased from creation: again then not only every day, and hour, but every minute also, and every part of a minute God should creare a new duration: If naturally, then by motion corporal, or spiritual; Now I pray devise, if you can, what motion that is whereby duration is procured; Yet I confess, thus far God may be said to add duration; in as much as he will not set an end to it, though he can.

But as for the duration of God, it is impossible, that should have any end.

But some may say, If God's future existence be not present, when it is present, something is added to God's former duration; As for example, when tomorrow comes God is a day older, then he was: I answer, nothing grows older by access of time, but that which took it being either with time, or in process of time; So did not God.

Secondly, I answer, God's future existence is nothing else, but his coexistence with time to come, or with things which shall be in time to come; which is an external denomination, arising from the futurition of things to come: In any other sense it is false to say that God hath any future existence, or past existence.

But his coexistence with time or things in time may be said to be past, or to come, as well as present; and in this sense is the Scripture phrase to be understood, when it is said that God is he which is, which was, and which is to come: That is, when this World, and Angels were fifst made, then he was, that is, he did coexist with them, and so all along unto this day present; And so shall exist all along with all creatures & times that are to come: Now this existence of God, more properly to be called his coexistence is partly past, partly present, partly to come; not in respect of God's existence, (who hath neither motion nor shadow of change, & consequently nothing in him is found to be past or to come) but in respect of the existence of creatures which is partly past, partly present, and partly to come.

Henceforth you acquaint us with certain definitions of Eternity; The first is out of Boetius, which you commend above that which follows out of Aquinas, belike it fits your turn better in your conceits, then that other of Aquinas; and therefore deserving well at your hands you bestow upon it that preferment which you think good; Well let us consider it: Aeternity (then in Boetius account) is the entire or total possession of interminable life, all at once, or together.

The scope you aim at, is to prove that in God's eternal being there is no succession; Et quis Herculem vituperat? whoever said there was? In man the very life vegetable, sensitive and rational grows more and more perfect by degrees: No such motion, no not to perfection, is to be found in God; In Angels there may be a succession of thoughts & of affections: no such succession is to be found in God.

Yet doth he and you also maintain God's life to be interminable, that is, of such a continuance as is without end, as well as without succession.

But you shall never be able to prove herehence, that God's existence is present to every part of succession of other things, as namely, both to that which is past, and also to that which is to come.

Aquinas definition though very artificial you grant, yet doth not, you say, imprint so lively a character and notion of the everliving God his infinite happiness, as the definition givon by Boetius doth: Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine principio & fine, mensurâ carens.

This lettice fits not your lips like to the former; because, belike you cannot find by this, that time past & future should be present unto God; as you conceive to find by the former; but you will never be able to make it good.

4. Yet Plotin is your Oracle in Philosophy beyond all, who gives, as you say, a more deep apprehension of it in fewer terms, saying Aeternitas est vita infinita, which you render thus, Eternity is infinity of life: Like as if when man is defined to be a reasonable creature, you should render it thus, A man is the reasonablenes of a creature.

We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I do not mislike that saying of Plotius, to wit that when we say God is always, we breed in our minds a wandering imagination of plurality or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand God's duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no error, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to things to come.

And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleged out of Boetius or Plotin, that can justify this; no more then in the definition of eternity made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a conceit of the existence of all things both past and to come in God's eternity, not only as they are known: For that is to exist rather in God's knowledge then in his eternity, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I do not dislike your notification of eternity, to be that which always is and cannot cease to be, save that I find no virtue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; although I conceive, that whatsoever always is the same, doth necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.

And therefore the Apostle takes eternal power and Godhead to be terms equivalent. You say that in true Philosophical contemplation it is not onething truly to be & always to be. There is a typographicall error in this, if I be not deceived; and the sentence should run thus, It is but one thing truly to be and always to be. This I take to be your meaning, but I acknowledge no truth in it. For if this were true, then all creatures should have no true being; for certainly they are not always.

And if they have no true being, then they have no being at all, as afterwards yourself acknowledge this manner of consequence to be good. And albeit to have a being and to have a true being be all one, yet hence it follows not, that truly to be and always to be is all one. I grant that to be always, without beginning and without ende, doth infer an independent being. But even true beings may be dependent; otherwise the beings of Angels and men made after the image of God were no true beings. For undoubtedly their beings are dependent beings.

Another use of the word always is to note (as you say,) the interminable, indistiuguishable, and indivisible power, which needs nothing besides that which it actually & for the present hath. But I see no congruity in the word always to signify all this. And first I wonder what you mean to leap from God's life and power; seeing you propose the infinity of each, as several branches of God's infinity to be discoursed on a part, Say then it denotes his interminable and indivisible being or duration: yet I cannot like this neither.

For though the term always, doth congruously denote his interminable being, to wit, without beginning and without ende: Yet I see not howe it can note his indivisible being. I grant this latter may be inferred out of the former, for as much as that which is always, cannot be produced, but must be of necessary being and consequently indivisible in such sort, as that the duration of it today, cannot be divided from the duration thereof tomorrow: for then it should cease to be, which is impossible, seeing it is presupposed to be of necessary being. We deny not, but God hath all that belongs to his divine nature; though not for the reason you give to wit, because he truly is. For that were to infer, that nothing besides God h • he any true being, which were to deny the being of all creatures.

The divine nature contains a totalitie of increated entity (if a totalitie may be imagined of that which hath no parts.) As for created entity, that is not to be found in God at all but only from God. All creatures may have need of something else then continuance, as namely their natures being capable of greater perfection; then yet they have atteyned unto. As for continuance, they have only thus far need thereof, because otherwise they shall cease to be; and so likewise God himself, if he should not continue, he should cease to be. Only here is the difference. The creature may be said properly to need continuance, because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another, for the obtaining of it, to wit, upon the will of God.

But God depends upon no other for the obteyninge of his continuance; no nor upon his own will neither.

And therefore he cannot be said to need continuance, but rather that he must needs be, because he is not ens contingens, but ens necessarium, of no contingent, but of necessary being. By your leave, Eternity contains more, then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had.

For undoubtedly, it signifies also the continuance of all that without beginning, and without ende.

But you after your manner, seem under these • rmes whatsoever is expedient to be had, to include and comprehend duration future, as if duration future were already present unto God; which is a groundless conceit, arising merely from a superficial interpretation of the nature of eternity, which is commonly called an instant of duration.

〈◊〉 It is true, the duration of God is not to come; For it is present, and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation.

But there is a duration of time, and of things measured by time to come; which future duration is no way present to God, in respect of his coexistence with it.

It is most true, and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase, that God is he which was, & is, & is to come: which phrase of specche implies neither change, nor succession in God, but only in things without God.

Agayne, wisdom, power, and goodness are expedient to concur in the supreme essence: But this eternity comprehends not, but only the continuance of all these without beginning, without ende.

That a thing looseth so much of perfection, as it wants of duration, is a wild assertion; unless under perfection, you comprehend duration; and then your proposition is identicall, and no more then to say, that a thing looseth so much of duration, as it wants of duration.

Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue, not only because Aristotle was bold to say that, Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius; good is not therefore better because the more lasting, or everlasting, but also, because by the same reason of yours it would follow that a Crowe, an Hart, and a Raven were much more perfect then a Man; if it be true as some write, that a Crowe lives three times as long as a Man, an Hart three times as long as a Crowe, and a Raven three times as long as an Hart.

Sure we are the least star hath continued from the beginning of the World.

〈◊〉 . I muse not a little to see Platonicall and Plotinicall Philosophy, so much advanced by an Oxonian: as if Aristotle's learning left Logicians perplexed in a point of sophistry, and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them. And lookinge back to what you have discoursed of, out of Plotinus, if so be I might light on that parcel of subtlety suitable to this ende you speak of, I profess, that as I find nothing in that which you have alleged out of Plotinus, that is not vulgar, nothing worthy of that commendation which you besto we upon him, (thereby reflectinge no small commendation upon your own peculiar studies in Plotinus:) so withal, I cannot imagine what piece of wit that is, the ignorance whereof doth perplex either any other better Logician, or myself either, in the resolution of that question, which you propose.

Neither do you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus hereunto, that might serve as a key to open that lock, which as you say, is so hard to be opened, but leave your Reader at randon, to pore after it. But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your own, let us consider it.

And first the question proposed is, Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man or corps, or both. To be both (you say) implies contradiction, and yet you say, there is as much reason, that in this instant he should be both as either. Thus have we the question and that argued in part. Now followeth your resolution, as it were our of Plotinus, though you allege no crumb of any sentence of his for it. Now I observe that your solution, though you would have it seem to be but one, yet indeed it is diverse; the one nothing to the purpose, the other something to the purpose, but utterly overthrowing your former assertion, as whē you said, There is as much reason he should be both as either. The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question it self, in effect professing that it proceeds from a false ground or supposition.

A manifest evidence that you are still to seek howe to satisfy yourself herein, or others in this unproffitable speculation.

And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus, make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy, I shall have no great cause to complain of my ignorance therein.

Your first resolution is, that he was a man and shall be a corps. This I say, is nothing to the question. For the question proposed is, not what he was, or what he shall be, but what he is in the instant of his dissolution.

In the next place you seem to speak more to the purpose, when you say that in the instant of his dissolution, he ceaseth to be a man, and begins to be a corpse. But even this also, is not fully to the purpose. For the question is not, what he begins to be, or what he ceaseth to be, in that instant, but what he is.

Yet because substantial forms have no degrees as accidental forms have, and therefore cease to be, or begin to be all at once; therefore I take your answer at the best to be this; that in the instant of his dissolution, he is a corps, and not a man, which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed saying, There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both, as either.

Your third resolution different from both the former is this: that the space of dissolution is not in an instant, as the question supposed, but a space of time consisting of parts, which is not to answer the question, but utterly to overthrow it; and withal it openeth a way to a new difficulty; for in this case it may well be demanded, what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man, and what to the being of a corps; and take heed least you ascribe one instant to the last of the first form, and another instant to the beginning of the succeeding of the second form.

For seeing two instants cannot be immediate, it will follow herhence that materia prima, shall some space of time actually exist without any form.

As for myself, I never • ept upon Plotinus his Parnassus, nor was ever acquainted with his muses. Nay, I have been so long time departed out of the universitie, and while I was there so long removed from these kind of studies, that I may well be said to have forgotten Aristole. Nun • mihi sunt oblita sophis • ata. Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripateticke store with your achievements out of Plotinus.

I say then, the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more general question.

And that is concerning the beginning and ceasing of form, now the rules thereof most received as I remember, are these. The forms we speak of are, either permanent, or successive. Forms permanent begin per primum sui esse, by the first instant of their being; desi • unt per primum sui non esse, they cease to be, by the first instant of their not being.

In such sort as to say, that immediately before such an instant they were not, but at such an instant, and in the time following they were. Agayne, touching their endinge, you may say, Immediately before such an instant they were; in and after such an instant, they were not.

As for forms successive, such as are time and motion, they are said to begin per ultimum sui non esse; by the last instant of their not being; and to ende per primum sui non esse, by the first instant of their not being.

That is, at such an instant motion (speaking of motion properly as it includes succession) was not: for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was.

Agayne touching the ending of motion we may say, at such an instant motion was not, but immediately before, it was. And accordingly, to the question proposed, I answer; Corruption or dissolution is taken either in a complicate signification, comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the form, and then all that while, undoubtedly Socrates was a man, and not a carcase.

But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the form human. I say, in that instant, wherein he is said to desinere or cease (it being the first instant of his not being, as before hath been shown, to be the manner of desinence or ceasinge of all forms permanent) he is a corps; but immediately before he was a man.

In the next place you tell us of Plotins conclusion, namely, That while we seek to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, looseth its indivisible nature.

First, I like not that assertion, whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin, in saying, that God alone truly is.

I well know our being is of a quite different nature from God's being: but to deny that we creatures have a true being, is as good as to deny that we have any being at all.

Secondly, I know no man; that goethe about to fit God's nature, with any proportion of quantity.

Yet we maintain, he was coexistent with all things past, is coexistent with all things present, shall be coexistent with all things that are to come in their order, & that without all, divisibility, or succession in himself: his coexistence after the manner forementioned, implying only divisibilitie and succession in the creatures.

Of time, you say, no part truly is but the present.

So then the present time, at least truly is. Yet but a little before and often heretofore you have professed, that nothing but God truly is.

Now give me leave to maintain some paradoxes, as well as you.

I say, all time truly is, and is present, as well as that which you account to be only present.

For how doth this present hour exist but by succession of parts.

If you account nothing present but an instant; it is well known, that an instant deserves no more to be accounted time, then a point deserves to be accounted magnitude.

But if you speak of time properly, it must have parts, which cannot exist together, but only by succession. As for example, this minute of an hour is present but how? only as having a part past, and a part to come.

For this only to exist is to exist by way of succession. In like sort this present hour doth truly exist; but how 〈◊〉 as havinge a part past, and a part to come.

So this present year doth truly exist, as having a part past, and a part to come.

In like sort the time of the Gospel, accoumpting from the day of Pent • cost, when the H. Ghost came down upon the Apostles, unto the ende of the World, may as well be said truly to exist, namely thus, as having a part past, and a part to come.

So dividing the World into two parts; The old world, from the beginning of time by creation unto Noah's flood; and the new World, computed from Noah's flood to the ende of the World: I say the time of this World doth only exist, as havinge a part past and a part to come.

So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the ende, may be said truly to exist, to wit, by way of succession of parts, havinge one part past and another to come. For not the least part of time doth exist otherwise, to wit, by coexistence of parts, but only by succession of parts.

They who made doubt, whether navigators were to be accounted amongst the living or amongst the dead, affected more wit then truth. For if Navigators, undoubtedly, they are livinge and not dead; Indeed after they have set forth, we are uncerteyne what is become of them: and equally as uncerteyne may we be, what is become of our friends that are travayled unto China by the way of the Continent. But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being, is a conceit little becoming a Philosopher in my judgment, though it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of things successive, and in motion, whether by Sea or land.

I should think that sory imagination, is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant, which if it were true, would infer that time were nothing but a succession of instants.

But were it so; yet surely the shortness of continuance of any thing, nothing hinders the true being thereof, when it is. A child of a day old, hath as true being, as Methusalch had, who lived till he was, almost a thousand.

It seems the sent of Plotinus his subtleties, hath perfumed all those that have dwelt under his shadow; and therefore no merveyle if Ficinus commenting upon him, savoreth hereof also. He compares, you say liternitie to a center, and time to the points or extremities of the line in the circumference allwaye moovinge about the Center, so that if it were an eye it might view them all at once.

I doubt not, but ere we depart from this chapter, we shall meet with the Circumference of eternity as well as with the center of it; but not from Plotinus his text, or Ficinus his Commentaries, but from one that will be bold to add a Gemora to their Talmud.

For it is fit the World should profit in subtleties as well as in solid points, and not always to stand at a stay. But a word of this by the way: Though future times, and future things are all known to God, yet not by reason of any existence of theirs in eternity, or God's coexistence with them for the present. For how doth God at this time coexist with them, which at this time have no existence at all?

Agayne, God looks not out of himself for the knowledge of any thing now, more then he did before the World was made.

For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of change. When you take upon you to tell us how Eternity is indivisible, to wit, by containing all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be contained in time it self. I pray remember, that in like manner you professed, that God did contain all entities even the entities of brute beasts; and you expo • nded it in this sense, because forsoothe he was able to produce them.

And thus we easily grant God contains all perfections of successions, in as much as he can produce them. If so be succession may be coumpted a perfection, whereof but erst you made doubt, whether it had any being at all. Yet we doubt not, but God can produce them; yea so far forth as to exceed all that is contained in time.

For as much, as he could have made the duration of the World, ten times more then it is like to be.

I do not affect to quarrel with Plato his wit; much good do you with it, and if you please yourself with such fancies, as namely that time is a moovable image of that which is unmovable; a divisible image of that which is indivisible; a successive representation of that which is without all succession; a model finite, with beginning and ende of that whic • is infinite, without beginning and ende, you shall not displease me.

You have another sophism or seeming contradiction to unloose or salve by these rarities of curiosity; and that is, how it may be verified, that Petrus in aeternitate aegrotat, & Petrus in aeternitate non aegrotat. If this were spoken of the same time, you say it were contradiction; but being spoken of eternity, you say it is not, and yet you confess Eternity is more indivisible, then any time.

Let who will think, that you have salved this knott of seeming contradiction, to my understanding you leave it as you find it. The propositions containing a seeming contradiction are both absurd.

For Peter cannot be said to be sick in eternity, as in that which is the measure of duration eythe▪ of himself, or of his sickness, but only in time, with which time, eternity, I confess, is coexistent, but when? not till the time that Peters sickness doth exist, nor after it hath ceased to exist. For coexistence supposethe existence on both sides. And as the existence of the creature is past, present, or to come; so is God's coexistence with it, either past, present, or to come; which hath both Scripture & reason to warrant it; whereas your wild conceytes are warrantable by neither.

6. Materia prima, is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is nobody, but because it is no compound body. But God is ingenerable and incorruptible, because he is no body at all: Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angels who are ingenerable and incorruptible, because they are Spirits.

All things generable come from matter only as touching their material parts, not as touching their forms; neither can they be said so properly to spring from it, as to be compounded of it. But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause, yea the matter it self also, and that out of nothing.

If matter be most unlike him, in wanting the true unity of entity, other things belike have this; And if they have unity of entity, it is to be hoped they have true entity also, verity being the property of entity, as well as unity, and consequently they may be said to have a true being, which you heretofore, & that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God.

I wonder why you make the Creator and essence it self to be terms of equal signification; whereas God is not the creator of all things by his essence, but by his freewill rather.

Those things which necessarily belong to God, are usually ascribed unto him, by way of essence, but not such things, as contingently denominate him, arisinge from the liberty and freedom of his will.

God, you say, is the incomprehensible perfection of all things; do you mean of things create only, or only of things increate, or of both? You cannot mean it of things create: For no create perfection is found in God: Nor of increate; For no imperfection at all is found in essence increate.

The Earthe is not unmovable: some have conceived it to move naturally: Vndoubtedly, it may be moved, otherwise it were not Corpus natural; And Earthquakes do manifest as much.

If it cannot be moved by the force of Man (yet by prayer of faith, Mounteynes may be removed, and cast into the Sea), yet it may be moved questionless by the force of Angels, at least by the power of God.

Neither is infinite vigor of vitalitie required to an immovable condition in the opinion of greater Clerks then ourselves, as who think all Angels to be no way capable of local motion.

Yet you talk of a mobilitie of the Deity (a prodigious phrase) though you think to charm it, by calling it more then infinite, and calling the motion thereof a supermotion; and this his mobilitie, as well as his immobility formerly spoken of, you make to proceed from the infinite vigor of his vitalitie.

Nor doth eternity (say you) receive addition from succession infinite; Belike it receaves succession (in your opinion) though no addition thereby. For if it receaves no succession at all, what sober man could expect, that it should receive addition by it.

At length you come towards that, which I have a long time looked for: Eternity, you say, is like to a fixed center, because indivisibly immutable, but it is also as you say, like unto a circle, but you tell us not wherein, nor why.

And as Trismegist did define God's immensity, by the similitude of a Sphere, whose Center was everywhere, but his Circumference nowhere.

So you will take upon you to define God's Eternity, neither out of Trismeg st, nor out of Plotinus, nor out of Ficinus, but out of your own invention to be a Circular duration, whose instants are always, whose terminations or extremities never were, never shall be.

We willingly grant, that God's eternity is a duration without beginning, and without ende; This is nothing strange, nothing remote from vulgar capacity.

But to say it is a Circular duration, is such an attempt, and so audacious, as I think, it never entered into any sober man's brain either sleeping or wakinge, before it was fancied by yourself.

Lets bid farewell to Aristotle's Philosophy, and let Plato's Divinity come in the place of it. Distill Plotinus his Philosophy, and Ficinus Commentaries upon Plotins Enneades throughout, and see whether any such Extract can be made, as this Circular duration you dream of, and commend to the World as some rare notion.

Of Circular motion I have heard and read; But of Circular duration never.

Nay things that have circular motion, were never affirmed to have Circular duration. For motion may be from space to space in a round figure, returning thither, where it begun, but duration is neither round, nor goethe round.

For though the Heavens run round, yet the time of the Heavens and of the World runs not round, nor returns to the period of time from whence it began.

Yet is duration successive more fit to be accounted duration Circular, then duration constant, which hath no parts succeedinge.

I hold it to be a notorious untruthe, to say that eternity coexists to every parcel of time. For to say it coexists with time to come, is to say, that eternity existethe, and time to come existethe also, which latter clause is most false. For if it were present, it were not to come.

No time defines eternity, we say, but rather eternity sets 〈◊〉 ende to time.

But we dare not enterteyne so absurd a conceit as to say, eternity circumscribs time; as if time were some lower sphere, and eternity an upper sphere, and so time should be a circular duration as well as eternity.

Your next sentence begins to open the mystery, as whe • you say, Thoughe the motions of the Heavens should continue without ende, yet every period of time shall fall within eternity, now totally existent.

I mark your phrase well, as when you say, It shall fall within eternity, implyinge that eternity is beyond it, in respect of time to come; like as it is said to be before all time, in respect of time past.

Now to discuss this phrase of yours of falling within eternity: This phrase (I say) here used, is utterly out of his place. For in proper speech it hath place only in respect of quantity continual, outreaching all other things we speak of.

Thus all things in the World besides the uttermost Sphere, fall within the uttermost sphere; so that the uttermost sphere doth not only extend so far as they do, but beyond them.

Now to say that every period of time falls within eternity, is to suppose, that eternity extends beyond it so as to exist beyond it; which is true of all time past. For God did both coexist with it, and doth continue after it.

And as touching time present, it may be justified in this sense, to fall within eternity, in respect that God's continuance is not at an ende with this present, but continueth without ende.

But to imagine that at this present God's continuance doth actually extend farther then this present, is a most absurd conceit; As if forsooth God had not only an existence present, but also an existence to come, and that this existence of God to come is present. Whereas neither of these is true, but each false, and that most absurdly false.

For first God hath no existence to come, for if he had, then he should have also an existence past, and consequently he should be measured with time, and subject unto motion. And whereas the Scriptures do confess that God is he which was, and is, and is to come; this is to be understood of his coexistence and not of his existence; as much as to say God doth not only coexist with all things present, but also did coexist, with all things past; that is to say with everyone of them in the time of their existence, and also shall coexist, with all things to come, that is to say, with everyone of them in the time of theyre actual existence.

Now this coexistence of God with things past, and things to come is not present, only his coexistence with things present, is present, his coexistence with things past, is past, and in that respect tis said he was; so likewise his coexistence with things to come is to come, and in that respect only it is said that God is to come.

By this we may judge of the proposition following which is this.

God hath been, is, and ever will be, unto every minute or Scruple of time that hath been, is, or shall be, alike everlastingly coexistent. If one word had been left out (to wit the word everlastingly) it might have admitted an handsome interpretation, and a sober meaning taken respectively thus, God hath been coexistent to things that have been, is coexistent to things that are, shall be coexistent to things that shall be.

But to apply all these differences of time past, present, and to come, to each of the things mentioned, (as namely to say, that God hath been, and is, and shall be coexistent to all things that have been, and is, and shall be, coexistent to all things that shall be) is most absurd.

For the coexistence of God doth as well imply the exisstence of the things themselves with which God is said to exist, as the existence of God.

And therefore though it be true to say, that God was coexistent with all things past, because there was a time when these things did exist and at the same time undoubtedly God did coexist with them; yet it is false to say that God doth or shall coexist with things past; for that saying doth imply, that things past do now exist; and also are to come. In like sort though it be true: that God doth now coexist with all things that now are, for as much as both these things do indeed at this time exist, and God must needs coexist with them as the author and preserver of their existence; yet it is untrue to say that God doth now coexist with time past or to come, and with the things which were or shall be therein, for if this were true; it would follow that not only God is now present, but also that time past and time to come, are also present withal things contained in them, which every man knows to be most untrue.

Last of all though it be true that God shall coexist with the time to come, and the things therein, because both they shall exist, and consequently God must needs coexist with them, as the author and preserver of them; yet it is most untrue to say that God shall coexist with time past and present and the things therein, for if this were true it would herence follow that both time past, and present with all things contained in them were both to come, which how absurd a speech it is, let every sober man judge.

And yet that this is the meaning appears by the adding of the word everlastingly, which addition makes the proposition untrue in every member of it, though taken respectively, which otherwise as I have shown might admit a tolerable interpretation. For though it be true that God was coexistent with Noah's flood, yet is is un • ue that he was everlastingly coexistent with it.

At the time of Noah's flood God was coexistent with it by virtue of his eternirye, which makes him necessarily to coexist wiih all things when they are, like as by virtue of his immensity he necessarily filleth all places, as soon as there are any places to fill. But God was not everlastingly coexistent with Noah's flood, for as much as neither before the time of Noah's flood, was God coexistent with it nor after: For to coexist with Noah's flood doth imply the existence of Noah's flood: But Noah's flood did neither exist before the time of it nor after.

In like sort to say that God doth now coexist with all things present is true; but to say he doth everlastingly coexist with this time present, and the things therein is most untrue: For if this were true, then it were as true that he did coexist yesterday, with this day and shall coexist tomorrow with this present, which is utterly untrue; for if it were true, then yesterday and tomorrow should be this present day, Nay it would follow that this present day were everlasting (and not time only in general) if so be God did everlastingly coexist, with it.

Last of all it is true that God shall coexist with the fall of Babylon; but it is untrue to say that God shall everlastingly coexist with it, for if that were true, then he should coexist with it both before it were, and after it were past, with is impossible. For it would imply that Babylon should fall, before it shall fall, and after it hath fallen. And all this confusion ariseth from a precipitate and superficiary apprehension of the nature of eternity being commonly accounted but an instant, which indeed is a truth, because in the nature of God there is no succession, and that not only in respect of such motions whereunto bodies are subject, but in respect of such motions which are incident unto Angels. In regard of which motions the differences of time past, present and to come are attributed unto God, in respect of his coexistence with them, without bringing in such monstrous conceits as are hat • hed in the fancyes of some, though I profess I know not many such, nor never read or heard of the like till now,

So then the reason why God was coexistent with time past and the things therein; is coexistent with time present and the things therein, shall be coexistent with time to come and the things therein, is not only by reason of his own indivisible, and in erminable unitye; or rather is not at all by reason of this, for this consideration is rather opposite to the determinations of was, is, and is to come, which you attribute unto God, then any way suitable with it, but rather in regard of his eternity, in which respect he must necessarily coexist with all times according to theyre several differences; provided that they have an existence; for otherwise: how shall God be said to coexist with them.

But then again I say not only in respect of eternity are these denominations given unto God, but also in respect of the acquisition of new successive parts, not in himself but in time and things contained therein. For because God cannot be said to coexist with such things that have no existence at all, And all things without God have not theyre existence at once but some at one time some at another, hence is coexistence with them attributed unto God, according to differences of time past, present, and to come, not by reason of any succession of parts in God, but only in respect of succession of parts in time, and motions, in all things without God.

But we shall have a mad World quickly, when men shall take upon them doctórally to dictate conclusions unto others from certain principles (as about the eternity of God, and the indivisible nature thereof) superficiarily apprehended, and never rightly, much less sufficiently understood.

What time you have bestowed in the study of these attributes of God I know not; but as for myself I profess I never bestowed any hereabouts as I can remember, but ever contented myself with common notions generally received. And whereas I met sometimes with strange suppositions grounded upon these common notions, I have rather contented myself with ignorance how to justify them, then to think it worth the while to enter upon the discussion, only in the question about the presence of all things in eternity maintained by Aquinas, I found in Scotus a discovery of that errourous conceit.

And though Alvarez hath labored to repair the credit • of Aquinas in that particular and to answer Scot, yet the vanity of that discourse of his, I have labored to discover, and therein have reasonably well satisfied myself.

Now being cast upon these Meditations, by reason of this your discourse, which in the very Epistle dedicatory manifest your affection towards Arminianism, which I profess I hate as much, as I love the grace of God, and desire to be zealous in the maintaining of it to my last gasp; I am driven herewithal to take into consideration your Philosophical discourse concerning the essence of God. and his attributes, and finding therein some prodigious assertions by way of deduction from the received notions of God's indivisible and yet eternal being; out of the Logical faculty which I brought with me long ago, out of the University, I make bold to observe well the soundness of such illations, and finding no ground for them, but rather utter disproportion between them, and the principles wherehence they are inferred, in the course hereof I become better acquainted with the nature of God's eternity then before; and hope to be better enabled to encounter any unsound assertions, derived therehence and grounded thereupon, then heretofore.

And we are like to be acquainted with your mysteries to the full in the next Section.

7. You suppose duration successively infinite.

In this case 'tis true that God cannot be said to be after all duration successive. For to be after it, is to be when duration hath an end, but you suppose that such duration shall never have end.

And in this case it can neither properly nor improperly be said, that God is after it. For it is manifest contradiction to say, that hath an end which is supposed to have no end.

You seem to groan in the delivery of some quaint subtlety when you write thus: Yet that eternity now is and ever was a • infinitely preexistent to all ages in succession coming towards us one way; it is, and was to the Worlds nativity the other way.

Here you make a full point, whereby it comes to pass, that wanting a principal verb, the sentence contaynes a manifest non-sense; & it is the observation of others as well as mine, if divers such non-sensed propositions have dropped from your pen in this discourse, yet your meaning we see plainly in the sentence following, as when you say, This is a point which we must believe, if we believe God to be eternal, and know what eternity is.

So the former speech of yours though imperfect, & indifferently capable of being, pronounced to be a fable as a truth, we perceive to be received by you as a truth, and not so only but affected also by you as a truth, whose consideration hath not been so well taken to heart, by those who have had God's eternal decrees and the awardes of it most frequently in theyre mouths and pens; as it hath been by yourself.

Thus you accommodate yourself to the venting, & your Readers to the expecting of some sublimate and so quintessentiall a conceit, that poor Calvin & Beza, and such like unproficients in Academical studies, never attained to the depth of any such speculation.

Once before I observed a certain gradation tending to this purpose, and that with some wonderment, as when you affirmed in the beginning of this section, that God was as truly before all times future, as before all times past.

As if to be before all times future, were a greater matter then to be before all times past; whereas I had thought that such poor snakes as myself might truly be accounted to be before all times future. So in this place it might well make a man wonder what you mean to affirm in solemn manner that God is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages coming towards us, as to the Worlds nativity.

As if to be preexistent to the times to come, were as great a matter as to be preexistent to times past, which might seem to carry no sobriety in the forehead. For ever the meanest worm that creeps upon the Earth, is preexistent to all ages to come, but none is preexistent to all ages past but God himself. But there is, no doubt a mystery in this.

Heretofore I had a sent of it: But now it begins to break forth in great measure.

For when we say God is preexistent to all ages past, & consequently must needs be preexistent to all ages that are to come, we understand all this but one way according to the course of time from future to the present, from being present to become past, and so that which is first actually existent, is before all that which arrives to actual existence afterwards. But you tell us of two ways & that God is preexistent before all ages past one way, & before all ages to come another way, by which other way your meaning seems to be this, that as God is afore all ages past, so also he is after or behind all ages to come; which phrase of speech in saying God is after or behind anything, because you think it too ignoble to be attributed unto God, and perhaps in part to astonish your Readers with some strange language being never acquainted with the like; This being after all ages you are pleased to instile & call his being before them, but another way or a different way from his being, before all ages past.

As if a man should say that the Horse goes before the Cart one way, and the Cart may be said to go before the Horse another way, which later is indeed and in substance of sense no other, then to go after the Horse.

In like sort we may say the calling of the Gentiles is before the calling of the Jews one way, and the calling of Jews goes before the calling of the Gontiles another way, to wit as it comes after it.

So the rising & flourishing of Antichrist goes before the fall of Antichrist one way, and the fall of Antichrist goeth before the rising and flourishing of Antichrist another way, to wit it followeth after it.

Now if this manner of language doth not go beyond all Canting, I know not what doth. But take we your phrase according to this sense, yet there is no truth in this assertion. God indeed was before all ages past, because he was when they had no beginning; but he shall not be after all ages to come, because he shall not be when all ages have an end.

For according to your own opinion all ages shall never have end. And for this reason in the very beginning of this section yourself affirmed, that God could not properly be said to be after all times and durations to come. For what (said you) can be after that which hath no end? To this I added, this could not be affirmed either properly or improperly, because there was no truth in it, as that which implied a manifest contradiction.

Much less properly or truly can it be said that God is preexistent to all ages to come after a different way from that whereby he is said to be preexistent to all ages past.

But let us see whether any greater measure of sobriety, can be found in that which followeth.

In the next place you tell us, that As he is no Christian Philosopher, much less a true Christian divine, that would deny that whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed before all worlds: So he is no Christian Philosopher, much less a true Christian divine, that shall refer or retract the tenor of this speech, (before all worlds) to that only which is past before the world began, whatsoever can be more properly said or conceived to be past, then to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable can have no propertye of eternitye. So then whosoever shall dare say that it is a more proper speech to affirm, that God did choose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, then to say that God shall choose us in Christ after the end of the World, you will be bold to deny him the title both of a Christian Philosopher and of a true Christian divine also.

By the way let me ask you, what that is which you call past before the World was; for before the World was, nothing at all was but God. Agayne, though we say the decrees of God, were before the world was, yet no divine that I know saith they were past before the World was; for the decrees of God are nothing but the Counsayle and will of God, which undoubtedly we say continue the same and ever shall. In the last sentence you teach us that it may stand well enough with eternity, to be said to be past, present, and to come; so we do not affirm it to be more properly past, then present or to come. Yet I promise you, I nothing like to say that God is past, I had rather say he was and is, and is to come. As much as to say, God is of necessary being, and still continueth, and it is impossible he should be otherwise, in which respect we may truly and properly say he was coexistent with everything that is past, (to wit in the time of its existence,) is coexistent to everything present, shall be coexistent to everything that is to come (to wit in the time of the existence of each thing) and all this not by any succession of parts in himself, (as who is subject to no motion) but by succession of parts in outward things, with which or whom, he is said to coexist, his own existence being perpetual and invariable.

These your propositions I can find reason to make them good in some tolerable construction. Yet you add a reason of it, which should be more evident then the Conclusion, but indeed is far more obscure, and when the meaning of it is perceived, is found to have most need of reason to prove it, as being in show contrary to all reason; yet you content yourself with dictating it, & thence proceed to a wild goose race of illustration by the heavens that environ both us and the Antipodes; so to make way for the circular duration which formerly you attributed unto God, by comparing it with the heavens turning round (upon supposition) in a moment.

The rational proposition without reason delivered is this: For that only is eternal which always is, and so always is, that it hath precedence or preexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever we look upon them or take theyre beginning, whether backwards or forwards: Now this saying of yours is full of incongruities if not rather of foul absurdi its.

For first you suppose the beginning of succession may be taken backwards or forwards; but how is this possible? is succession indifferent to begin backwards or forwards? Is time indifferent to begin backwards or forwards? The first time is the beginning of it, but as for the last of time will any sober man call that the beginning of it, unless you make time like to a pudding, where a man may begin at which end he will. And surely I see no reason but a pudding may be in better sense, acknowledged to have two ends, then time two beginnings, Especially two such beginnings as you ascribe unto it, the one backwards and the other forwards; for begin at which end of a pudding, you will, you may be well said to go forwards and not backwards. Agayne suppose your own phrases be allowed you, and that the end of time may be taken for the beginning, yet where there is no end to be found how will you devise a beginning? As for example, Time we all know had a beginning but you suppose that time to come shall have no end, for though this world shall have an end, yet men and Angels shall have no end, but live with God forever.

For the same reason, though God be infinitely prexistent before times past, yet he cannot be said no not in your phrase and your meaning, that he is infinitely preexistent to all times to come, the meaning whereof is to continue infinitely longer then all ages to come; for that were to suppose that God shall be when all ages have run theyre course and are come to an end, which you suppose shall never be. Thus from your Antipodes which you devise in the course of time, I come to the consideration of the Antipodes in respect of place and situation. And hereupon I remember what you delivered in the entrance upon this discourse of eternity, and it is this; whatsoever hath, been or rightly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suite unto eternity, and in like manner whatsoever is incident to space of place, the same in porportion may be verified of space of time. And therefore like as Antipodes are found in place, so in some proportion Antipodes may be found in time. For when you begin at the ends of time you seem to turn the heels of it upwards.

And like as the roundnes of the heavens environing all, salves this and makes it appear how the heads everywhere are uppermost howsoever it seems otherwise to vulgar capacities: so here you have a devise of a circular duration to salve the turning of times heels upwards, for by this it appears that in truth time hath no heels to turn upwards, but rather wheels to turn roundwards; like as eternity hath a Circular duration, by way of supermotion or a vigorous rest as you phrasifie it.

Well let Lactantius pass with his error in denying Antipodes, and the vulgar with their error pass, that think the heavens if they be • ound be under us. Now we come to the comparison and comparative demonstration, which is this: As the heavens are every way above the earth: so is eternity every way before all worlds. Suppose there be truth in the parts of this assertion, yet I find no convenience in though resemblance.

It is true that Tiburne is three square, and a Citizens capp is round, but there is no congruity in saying that as Tiburne is three square: so a Citizens capp is round. Yet I find as little accuratenes in the propositions considered by themselves as in saying the Heavens are every way above the earth, for I know no other ways of the Heavens being above the whole earth which is round, then by compassing it; In my judgment it is more proper to say the heavens are everywhere above the earth (then every way above it,) and on every side above the earth, or which way soever we go, whether East, West, North, or South, we shall still find the Heavens to be above the earth.

So likewise I know but one way how eternity can be said to be before all Worlds, and that is by being before they had beginning. As for that other way which you devise as it were an Antipodes in time as well as in place, namely to be when all Worlds are at end, that is to be after all Worlds rather then before them.

And yet you flatter yourself in this erroneous conceit, as if it were some exquisite invention, by another fiction, & that is by conceyting eternity to compass and inviron time, as the heavens inviron the earth.

Now because the earth is immovable, but time hath succession of parts; and the heavens wonderful nimble in motion, and contrariwise eternity a constant and permanent instant; therefore you may do well to salve the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Sphere of your discourse to consult with Copernicus about blowing some quicksilver into the dull and sullen earth & set it going round, and on the other side persuade the Heavens to favor themselves and take their rest, the model of eternity, and time represented by you would be something the more accurate.

Some helps for this you have, I confess, of your own divising, to wit, by supposing the Heavens to move in an instant, leaving it to the Readers judgment whether to accompt that motion a cessation from motion, or a vigorous rest, besides that of the topp & scourge, which we may have time to consider of in due place. But to proceed; of the beginning of this World past, and the end of it to come, there is no difference between us.

To this you add, that the eye of eternal providence, looks thorough the World, thorough all the several ages, successions, or durations in the World, as well from their last end, to their first beginning, as from their first beginning, to their last end.

This World as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end. But successive duration even in your opinion, shall have no end.

And therefore you cannot say without contradiction, that God looks thorough the several ages thereof from their last end to their beginning.

Yet this last end, you might have called a beginning according to your phrase and tenent, maynteyning God to be before all ages, not only before ages past one way, but also before ages to come another way. Agayne, that all things are known to him, as well things to come, as things past, or present, is without all question.

This is to be present unto God, in esse cognito. But you have another wild conceit of the coexistence, both of things past and of things to come with God, & that for this present, which turn of yours this will nothing serve that God knows all things.

Last of all as touching this manner of knowledge which you attribute unto God, it is nothing decent.

We confusse, we may indifferently consider the course of the World past, either from the beginning unto this present day, or from this present day rising upwards unto the beginning of the World; because our understanding is of such a nature, as to consider things in succession one after another. But God's understanding, as you well know, is of no such nature, as to consider things one after another; for so you should maintain succession in the nature of God, and consequently subject him unto time.

Agayne, God doth not look out of himself in knowing the course of the World throughout; for he knew it as well what it might be, and what it should be before the World was made, as now he knows what it is, yet certainly before the World was, he knew it not by looking without him, for then there was nothing without him to look into.

And surely since the World was made, the manner of God's knowledge is nothing altered, for with him is no variableness nor shadow of change.

Neither do I see any reason why the knowledge of God, whereby he knows all things, should be called the eye of his. Providence: seeing Providence began with the world, but his knowledge was the same before the world began, and by his providence it is more properly said, that he governs all things, then that he knows all thing • s.

Agayne you return to the devised Circular form of eternity (yet that will not warrant a Circular duration thereof, which was your former sigment) and tell us that there is no period of time, which is not so environed with eternity, as the earth or center is with the Heavens; save only that the Heavens are finite, and eternity infinite.

Give me leave to profess the absurdity of this conceit of yours amongst many others. For what do you talk of environning that which hath no sides, but only hath a kind of extension of succession in length of parts one after another.

Every period of time hath eternity before it, and eternity after it, but this is not sufficient to maintain that eternity environs time as the Heavens environ the earth.

My self was borne before many thousands, whom also I have outlived, but yet I cannot be said to environ them as the Heavens environ the earth.

If a Crowe lives many ages of a Man, and an Hart more then the Crowe, and the Raven more then the Hart; how many thousands have begun to breath & ceased to breath within the limits of their duration; yet what an absurd thing were it to say, that they environed them all, as the Heavens environ the earth, yet you proceed, sitting upon these addle eggs, to hatch congruous conclusions, you say that in this sense were it possible, the world might have been created from everlasting, the Eternal, notwithstanding should have been everlastingly before them. Which as it is most false, so it is most inconsequent. Most false, for like as God cannot be after that which hath no end (as yourself before in a manner professed) and the reason is manifest. Because to be after a thing, as for instance to be after the world, is to be after the world is come to his end, which were untrue if the world had no end.

In like sort to be before the world, is to be while the world had yet no being, which is contrary to the supposition of being everlasting.

Neither doth it follow, that because God is before every period of time which hath a beginning, therefore he should be before such a time which is supposed to have no beginning.

I grant he should be before it by priority of cause, and by priority of dignity, but he should not be before it by priority of duration, which is the only priority whereof this discourse proceedeth.

Yet you will bring a reason to prove the former assertion, and that is this, For that period of motion which must terminate the next Million of years shall have coexistens with eternity now existent, whose insinity doth not grow with succession, nor extend it self with motion; but stands immoovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as well in respect of any set draught or point. Whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens when time took beginning.

This reason hath number enough of words; but let us consider what is the weight of sense it carrieth; And this is an hard matter to do by reason of the obscurity that accompanieth it; one peuliar character of your discourse; For what do you mean by the next Million of years? I know not how to accompt them, whether in respect of the time present; and so they proceed of the next Million that are to come; or rather of the Million of years next past; For I presume, you mean it not of the first Million of years of the world, in case it were eternal: For if eternal, then it had no beginning, and consequently as it had no first year, so neither had it any first Million of years. Therefore I understand it of the next Million of years to this present, whether it be the Million next past, or next to come, all is one, and it must be true of both, as well as of either, that they are coexistent with eternity now existent; and what I pray of all this? when comes the form of Syllogism, whereby to conclude that God is not only before, but everlastingly before that which is without beginning. And that God's continuance extends not only beyond, but everlastingly beyond that, which never shall have an end?

Give me leave to help you at a dead lift, thus; If the next Million of years cominge, are coexistent with God, now existent, then also the Million of years cominge next to that, shall be coexistent with God now existent: And so all the Millions of years that are to come, are coexistent with God now existent; But God's continuance of being, doth extend infinitely beyond his now existence: therefore it doth extend infinitely beyond all times to come, though they be without ende; So on the other side: If the Million of years next past doth coexist with God now existent, then also the Million of years next past to them, doth coexistent with God now existinge, and so by the same reason all the years past do coexist with God now existent; But God's continuance, hath been infinitely before his now present existence; therefore also it hath been infinitely beyond all the Millions of years, though upon supposition they have been infinite; This I think is the But of argument you shoot at, though you have not expressed so much; whether because your Logic served you not, being used to a confused manner of dictatinge at pleasure what you think good, or because you envied so much your Readers facility in apprehendinge your meaning.

Thus I have helped you in raisinge a Spirit: Now without your help I will assay to lay him again.

To the Major; I grant it in part, namely that there is as much reason why the two next Millions of years, whether you take them of the time past, or of the time to come, should coexist with God now existent, as well as one Million; but when you proceed and say; therefore by the same reason all that are to come, and all that are past, are coexistent with God now existent, you make an incredible stride or leap, infinitely greater then the stride, not only of Polyphemus, but of the Colossus at Rhodes too: For a Million and a Million, yea & a third Million, yea and though you make the progression in such sort while you will, still the number is but finite, but to leap herehence to all that are to come, is an infinite leap: For all are infinite both ways, both as touching time past and time to come: in which respect, no progression, from Million to Million, shall ever reach to all, nay it shall never make the number of years remaininge, either for the time past, or for the time to come, less then infinite.

This is the fowl flawe we find in the major: let us come to the minor which was this; But God's existence extends infinitely further, and was infinitely before his now existence. I answer thus; By God's now existence, you understand his existence, either in the present instant of time, or in the present instant of eternity; if of the present instant of time, then the proposition was not true in any one part of it; For certainly neither the Million of years next past, nor the Million of years next to come, are coexistent with God, now existent in instant of time, both because neither many years can possibly exist in an instant of time; nor God himself; but rather his existens is in the instant of eternity, though both he and his eternity be coexistent with every instant of time: Now if it be understood of the instant of eternity, I deny that God was before this instant, or shall continue one ace of duration after it; And no merveyle, seeing both everlastingness for the time past, and everlastingness for the time to come, are supposed, to coexist in this instant of eternity; Yet have I not all this while discovered the vanity of the conceit, which is as a mist before your eyes: You say, the next Million of years doth coexist with eternity now existent; I say this is notoriously untrue, whether you take it of years past or of years to come, all is one; for that which is past, and that which is to come, hath no existence with God now existent: And I prove it thus; That which hath no existence at all at this present, that cannot be said to have any coexistence, but things past and things to come have no existence at all at this present, therefore they cannot be said to have any coexistence with God; Things future shall have coexistence with God, to wit, when the time of their actual existence cometh; Likewise things past have had their coexistence with God, to wit, when the time of their actual existence was.

But neither things past, nor things to come have any coexistence with God now coexistent, for as much as they have no actual existence at all, the actual existence of the one being past, and that of the other being yet to come.

Neither doth it follow that because God's infinity doth not grow by succession, therefore things future are now coexistent with God, but because things present and things future are in succession one unto another, therefore they cannot be said either future things to be present, or things present to be future.

That reason of yours, (namely that God's infinity doth not grow by Succession, carrieth rather some color of proof, why God's coexistence with his creatures or with time, cannot be said past or to come, then why things future shall be said, to be coexistent with God in this present; Yet yourself use these forms, as to say, God was coexistent with his creatures that are past, shall be coexistent with such things as are to come; and indeed your reason is too weak to infringe these forms of speeches.

For this coexistence attributed unto God is not in respect of any succession in himself, but only in the things without him, which come and go one after another by succession, & you are in the right, when thereupon you deny all succession in God, because his nature is not subject to any kind of motion; God was before the World, and is coexistent with and in the World, and shall be after the World, which being after time, you in your language, enstile his being before the end of it; but after another manner, then whereby he is said to be before the beginning of it; But we must give you leave to be as disertus as you will in Lingua tua; Nobis non licet esse tam disertis, qui musus colimus severiores; At partinge you give us another paradox; when you tell us It is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginning or endinge without conceavinge it Circular, or altogether void of succession, on the contrary it is as wonderful to me, how it should be possible for any man to conceive any duration to be Circular, whether finite or infinite; For the word Circular is a denomination only of form, and of such a form as belongs to magnitudes, that have coexistence of parts extended, and of motion in such a form: But time is neither any such magnitude, nor capable of motion; In a round figure, I confess, there is no beginning nor end of magnitude, But of duration, round figures have their beginning, as well as squares; The latter part is as untrue. Some have been of opinion that the World was everlasting, and the motions of the Heavens everlasting, as Aristotle and his followers.

And some great Schoolmen have thought it possible; how much more could they immagine it. For surely we may immagine things altogether impossible; And in the very next lines you confess, men may immagine so if they list, and over and above you do them the favor, as to further them in this their imagination, to wit by conceitinge the uninterrupted sluxe of an instant; and why not as well I pray, the uninterrupted motion of the heavens; and what is this to the everlastingness thereof, seeing this hath place in the space of a few years? Neither do we find the Peripatetics needed any such helps to conceive the everlastingness of the world; In the last place you tell us, the stability of eternity may be best conceived, by the retraction of such a perpetual flux into one instant; And yet before you told us such at everlasting flux could not be imagined; sure I am the retraction of it into an instant is utterly impossible; And be not these proper things to represente God's eternity by, and fit for Atheists to make merry with? That God is everlasting, I trust we can demonstrate it, and that he is without succession, why should that seem hard to conceive, when it is improbable he should be subject to any motion?

And now I come to the topp and the scourge whence you derive observations of great force, If not for composinge some great controversies amongst learned men, yet for facilitatinge contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy whether sacred or human affords to the concerte of the most curious. At my first cominge to the university, it was a great comfort and incouragemēt, to me in the studyinge of Predicables to hear a Preacher out of the pulpit deliver that peccata Iuvenum Predicantur in quale; peccata senum Predicantur in quid. Shortly after in the Divinity School, I heard a divine in the question, whether the pope were Antichrist make use of that axiom 〈◊〉 uni opponitur; and another in the pointe of predestination to allege, that Scibile was prius Scientia: To hear such notions which at that time were familiar unto me, so much dignified as to find use in the pulpit and in the divinity School, it brought me even in love with such learning, which before seemed to me but course stuff in comparison to one of Ciceroes Orations especially, that conspicuae divina philippica famae volvitur à prima quae proxima, or Aiax Mastigophoros in Sophocles wherewith we were acquainted at winchester.

How much more might a man like topp and scourge the better while he lives, to observe what transcendent use good wits may make of it. And yet by your leave, I find no such difficulty in conceiving how eternity though Permanent, shall have coexistence with succession or motion.

A Pole fixed in a River hath coexistence with infinite parts of the stream succeedinge one another, without any succession in it self.

While I stand still, an army of men may pass by my side, & thereby shall I have coexistence in the same time with everyone successively; But if I be not deceived you would devise, how we may conceive eternity to have coexistens with all parts of motion at once; for such a mad coexistence you have devised to yourself, out of a wild apprehension of the nature of eternity, and you will not be beaten from it. And you may as well beat your brains to devise how all parts of time both past and to come, may coexist in one instant, and but erst you did cast us upon such an imagination, namely of the retraction of a perpetual flux into one durable or permanent instant. I have already labored, veteres avias a pulmone revellere, to scatter these vain conceyts.

But proceed we alonge with you; the topp turns so swiftly sometimes, that he seems to sleep; Indeed we were wont to say that in such a case the topp sleeps; And in turninge round every bright mark seems to make a circle; what of all this? hence you say it will be no hard supposal to conceit that a moover of strength and vigoure infinite, should be able to move a body in a momente. I do not deny, but a man may conceit so, as they do conceit Chymeras; and great divines sometimes are found to enterteyne such conceyts, as are found to be contradictions, such is this: never any question was made of this, rather it hath been generally received, as a thing impossible that local motion should be in an instant; And the reason of it in this round motion whereof you speak, is evident for to be in this instant in the same place what it was immediately before, is rather to rest then move; and so the parts of successive motion should not be contracted into unity as you speak, but rather into nullity.

And you yourself are in doubt whether it were fit to call it a cessation from motion or a vigorous rest or supermotion: you may do well to put it to Plotinus to resolve this, or Ficinus his Commentaries upon his Enneads. I perceive you have very vigorous conceits, which whether I should so call them, or rather a cessation from all sober conceit or a superconceyte, let the reader judge. In the mean while that must needs be a proper motion which may be called a cessation frō motion, and a rest and that a vigorous one. Yet wonderful strange is it, that a rest or cessation from motion should conteyn in it parts of motion successively infinite, and I confess it were a very hard thing to determine what to call it; for it is a certain kind of Chimera, that never I think was hatched in the conceit of man or Angel before.

If this were granted you, then you presume the moover would not move it more slowly this day or year then he should the former; But consider I pray, the pointe is not of moovinge it in a day or year, but in an instant; And because two instants cannot come together, therefore for the time between while, it must stand still, and because there be infinite instants in every day and hour, it followeth it should be moved about infinite times every day and hour; and infinite times stand still. Take what co • se you will, it must stand still as oft as it moves, and because between every two instants of motion there must be a time of rest, and everyone infinitely greater then the instant of motion.

For between that which is divisible and that which is indivisible, there is no proportion of greatness; Now this supposition being granted you, (which you professed to be no hard suppos • ) we shall find parts successively • nfinite in one revolution, or revolutions successively infinite in one or the same instant. So like wise E • ope would instruct his Master how to drink up all the waters in the Sea, provided that first all the Rivers might be stopped, from runninge into the Sea, for it was most unreasonable that as fast as he drank the water out, the Rivers should be suffered to pour water in again, and that with a longer and a larger spoon then he had need to use that eats with the devil.

And I see no reason but a man might by ocular inspection discover the world which Galileus hath made report of, in the moon, provided that he might have a stair case sure enough & high enough & all necessary provisions by the way, & at his journyes end also, & safe return, to quitt Lazarus relations of the dead, with celestial relations of • he terra incognita in the moon. And yet I confess a truth, I do not find to what purpose you should say there be parts successively infinite in one revolution. For in the motion of a snayle this is to be found as well as in the motions of the heavens; for everything that is continual is divisible without end, to w tt into parts proportional; as for parts quotall, as namely fifts or thirds, or fowerths, or hundreds, these ever in the motion of the heavens are finite, the other are infinite. Whereupon it is that Aristotle denies there is principium motus, in the seventh of his phisicks, not speaking of principium externum and effectivum, for so the nature of every thing is the cause, both of his motion and of rest, but he speaks of principium internum, and of the integral parts of motion whereof no part can be assigned to be the fist, but that it may be divided in o two parts, whereof the one is before the other; And in the same sense as there is no first of motion, so there is no last; for what part soever you take; it is divisible into two parts, whereof the one is latter then the other.

The like may be said of every thing that is continual, even of magnitude which is permanent, as well as of time and motion that consist in succession of parts: but then we must know too, that these parts proportional, are not to be accounted actual, but only potential; And so Aristotle dissolves that Achilles of Zenoes arguments, whereby he would prove that motion being allowed to be continual, the swiftest moover should never overtake the slowest moover, if he were allowed never so little ground before him because in the time wherein he is to overtake the first space, wherein his fellow moover was before him, that fellow moover will have got some ground more, and while that is in passinge over by the other, he will get some ground more, and so in infinitum • the answer whereunto I never yet found explicated by any.

Hurtado di Mendosa amongst other difficulties, the solution whereof he undertakes, falls upon this also, but most unhappily; for he gives no satisfaction; Aristotle's answer unto it, is but this; partes sunt in toto non actu sed potentia; it is spoken in reference to parts proportional; which answer of his seems a mystery, the right explication and accommodation whereof I never could be so happy as to find in any; but if I be not dereived it contains an admirable and clear solution of the difficulty; but I do not affect the ostentation of such subtleties.

I know not well how to give account for this very diversion from graver studies. To return I say it is a poor course to lash out unto the supposal of such impossibilities to show how in one revolution the parts are successively infinite; whereas this is found in every the meanest motion, which is a true motion and consists in succession; but in your feigned motion an instant, it is indeed not to be found, because in an instant there can be no succession.

But further you say, that upon this supposal there shall be revolutions successively infinite in one and the same instant. But how this shall be you have not shown, although I easyly conceive how it may be proved upon this supposal, but in a certain kind which I presume you dream not of.

And it is this; if it be admitted that a revolution of the heavens may be in an instant, then it is as possible that two revolutions may be in an instant, and in the same instant as well as one, and three as well as two, and three hundred as well as three, yea and look how many thousand days are past, since the World began, so many revolutions of the heavens there might have been in one instant of time. And it is nothing strange if uno absurdo dato, mille scquantur; but I do not find that you once so much as dream of this; and what your meaning is, I find nowhere explained, much less the deduction thereof manifested. Yet as if you had proved many revolutions, (upon this supposal) to be possible in one and the same instant, you discourse what they are to be called; and you will not have them properly to be termed motion, but rather the producte of motions infinitely swifte united or made up into a vigorous permanency; and herence to serve your turn in the explication of eternity, you add how should not duration of one or of all these revolutions be accounted as an instant of time, but a kind of duration indivisibly permanent. Here is strange language, had not we need of an interpreter, or of some urinator delius to dive into the depth, and sound the bettome if it? I remember what a friend of mine pleasantly discourst in the university, by occasion of a certain disputants strange manner of disputation; I have longed saith he to hear a scholar dispute eagerly, & distinguish and go one boldly in school terms and phrases which himself understoode not. And now to my judgment I have lighted on such a one.

But whether you understand yourself or no I know not. I doubt I never shall; yet I will not give over, I will adventure to discuss it, and to shake this rotten stuff in pieces, that at least it may not abuse the readers with suspicion of some rare notions, whom they cannot endoctrinate. First you speak of revolutions plural yea infinite, how you have come by them I know not, unless as capons come by chicken; you made supposal of a thing impossible enough, namely of the revolutions of the heavens in one instant of time, but it was only one revolution, and hereupon you steal up many revolations, yea infinite, I know not how, neither do you once go about to explicate how.

Secondly you will not have it called motion, but a product of motions. Had you said you would not have these revolutions called one motion but many, there had been some sense in the speech, though little reason.

For you profess these revolutions to be successive, and nowhere have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall.

And if you take them as continual, why should they not be styled one motion? But this I think is not it, you insist upon; For you dislike the name of motion it self; you will rather have it called the product of many motions.

Now here I am at fault, in hu • inge after the meaning of your invention, But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in huntinge after an hare, thus; he went not that way, nor that way, therefore he came this way; so will not I give over, but inquire which way the hare runs.

Now then this your product of motions is to be understood either of a product Physical, or of a product Mathematical; and I explicate myself (as you love to involve yourself) thus.

The product of motion Physical, is the form that is acquired by motion; As for example, in alteration a quality is produced, in augmentation a certain measure of quantity; in local motion a new place or a new site; Either in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions, or only in respect of the parts, as in all motions Circular; which new site is said to be new in respect of that which immediately went before.

Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you, there is no such product Physical, for look what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant, the same it hath still; And therefore you call it very significantly (I confess) a vigorous permanency; which is as much as to say, no motion at all; Neither do I think that by the product here spoken of, you mean a product Physical; Let us come therefore to consider, whether it may be verified of a product Mathematical, that is in the Arithmetical operation of addition: for if two numbers be added together, it will produce a total, and that total shall be the product.

Now here you speak of revolutions infinite, which being added to greater, make a product which you call a vigorous permanency; which I profess, in my judgment seems to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye.

For if in teaching my Scholar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition, and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus, 0000000, and then bid him add one unto the other, and tell me what in the product, & he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still, which is as much as just nothing; In like sort suppose the Heavens standing still immediately before this instant, and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before, this deserves to be called a vigorous permanency: that is no motion rather then a motion: For to be where a body was immediately before, is the definition of rest, and not competible unto motion.

Nay take such another revolution, and add unto the former, this also being rather a vigorous permanency, and so no motion rather then motion, add no motion, unto no motion, and what will the product be, but a vigorous parmanency; and so in infinitum, it shall be a vigorous permanency: For no motion added to no motion while you will, the product shall still be no motion; but a vigorous permanency.

But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency, infinitely swifte.

And yet I confess by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster, then now they go or run: allbeit they run so incredibly swift, in the judgment of some; that they had rather set the earth going, and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency, though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of: And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams, which he made of himself ridinge on Sarisbury plain: For being overtaken by a gentelman well mounted, who desired to have his company; Bastard Spurs his cut, the Gentleman reins his geldinge, yet could Bastard keep no way with him. Whereupon he complains thus, What should I do that was bestrided so. His Horse stood still faster then mine could go.

So the Heavens by your supposal stand still faster then now they go.

I am not a little sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine, as namely a great deal too light and vain for a Divine; especially in a matter of so high a nature, as of the essence of God, and his eternity.

I profess I am often stricken with fear of transgression in this kind: and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholly, I take so little pleasure in these Schole quircks.

Yet another consideration affrights me more then this, and that is lest coming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason, in following the course of my weak understanding this way (whereof in this case I am much suspicious) I should be found to shape the attributes of God in such a manner, as to attribute that unto God, which doth not become his Majesty, or deny that unto him, which doth well become him; and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave.

I had rather submit unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine, by faith, so far forth as they are revealed unto us in God's word; then curiously inquire into the nature of them, by reason, & quaint Scholastical argumentation.

But again, I consider, that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophical as Theological, which he hath given me, to clear some difficult points, concerning the nature of God, & thereby to prevent blasphemies each way.

And as, by his grace, I fear to enterteyne any indecent conceit of the Majesty of God; so I trust, he will not expose me, to have my fears brought upon me, but rather by exercise perfect those seeds of knowledge of his Divine nature, which have been sown in me, both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace, and assist me also even in these discourses, and make them means to keep others from being led away into erroneous opinions & enormous conceytes, concerning his nature, and divine attributes.

And as for the censure of lightness, and want of gravity, passable upon this discourse; let the Reader consider; we are now upon the By, and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition, and most ridiculous prosecutions thereupon, and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned.

Agayne when we medle with an obscure, perplex, and intricate manner of discourse, if matter of refreshing both of mine own, and of my Readers Spirits be offered, especially in that way of an harshe & unpleasing discourse; shall I balk it, and in the affectation of a Stoicall gravity decline the quickninge of mine own, and of my Readers senses? It was wont to be said Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci; & again Ridentem dicere verum, quis vetap. In a word; I am at thy judgment Reader, to pass what censure upon me thou pleasest, neither am I unwilling thou shouldst know mine infirmities, as well as my poor sufficiencyes, that knowing me to be flesh and blood, as well as others, thou mayst receive nothing herein for the Authors sake, but only for the evidence it carryethe with it. And that evidence is the work of God, though the manner of caryinge it be the work of Man.

Now it is high time to confider the other member of this sentence following, which is this, So should not the duration of one, or of all these revolutions be accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kind of duration indivisibly permanent.

Now I find no proportion between this and the former member, though they be coupled together with a particle of similitude, So. For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you; to be in an instant of time, why should not the duration of it also be accounted in an instant of time? So likewise, if you conceive diverse revolutions, yea infinite revolutions, to be in the same instant of time; what reason is there why their duration should not be accounted also, in the same instant of time? Fof if these infinite revolutions you speak of, have each of them a several instant, why should not the duration of each be accounted in each soverall instant, and the aggregate duration of them all, be reckoned to be, in an aggregation of all the several instants, in each whereof, one of the former revolutions is found?

Secondly, you do not well to join an instant, and a portion of time together, as terms equipollent, because; no portion of time is an instant, nor is an instant any portion of time; more then a point is a part of magnitude. For every thing consistethe of its parts; but neither magnitude consists of points, nor points of instants.

Thirdly, much less reasen is there, why the duration of one or of all these revolutions, should be coumpted a kind of Eternity. First, because there is no kind of eternity indivisibly permanent (such as you here speak of) but one, and that is the eternity of God. Secondly, what an absurd thing is it to say, that the duration of a thing in an instant of time and no longer, is fitter to be called eternity then an instant of time. For the revolution you speak of is but for one instant of time. For the justifying whereof I appeal to your own supposal.

It were no hard supposal to conceit that a moover of strength and vigor infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment: This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time. For to move a body in an instant of eternity, requires not a moover of infinite strength; the meanest motion of the meanest moover, is comprehended (as you acknowledge) within the instant of eternity. Nay all the revolutions you speak of, though successively infinite, are upon your supposition in one and the same instant, which cannot be understood otherwise, then of an instant in time. Now is it fit, that the duration of such a motion or motions, the beginning and ende whereof are both in a instant of time, should be styled eternity?

And how can that be called permanent, which both begins and ends in one and the same instant of time? Or how can that motion be coumpted indivisible, which hath parts successively infinite as yourself profess in the sentence immediately before? If these be sober conceytes, I never knew, what sobriety in this kind meaneth. But let us proceed to the next; The motion of the eighthe sphere supposed to be such as hath been said, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sun moovinge successively as now it doth should have local coexistence to every star in the eighthe sphere, to every point of the eclipticke circle, wherein it moves, at one and the self same instant, or in every least parcel of time. The substance of this hath reasonable good consequence, from the former supposition of a thing utterly impossible, and consequently it is not more impossible then the former. Yet by your leave, you err in many a circumstance.

For first, as touching the main intention of this sentence, the Sun shall not have local coexistence with every star or with any star in the eighthe sphere; how can it? there being the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheres, of three planets betwixt the firmament, and the orbe of the Sun.

But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawn from the North to the Southe I grant in Astronomical computation, and so by the same computation may be said to have local coexistence with it, though not in computation physical.

Secondly, mark I pray you, what liberty of speech you take unto yourself. For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency, in this place you term it a motion infinitely swift: as if you should say, the motion is so incredidibly swift, that the body indeed stands still and moves not at all. As much as to say, such a one talks so fast that he seems, and that in a vigorous manner to hold his peace.

And indeed I confess, that sometimes it falleth out, that the faster we ride, the later we come to our journeys ende; as in case by fast ridinge, our horse playeth the jade, and tyreth under us, and we can hardly make him go. I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have been devised in the heavens, as namely, that a motion swift, should become a vigorous rest. In my judgment if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest, it would give far better satisfaction.

Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession, yet you do impute unto it succession. For but erst you affirmed that it had parts successively infinite. Now if it hath succession, how is it possible, but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another? For like as magnitude havinge extension of parts, must needs be divisible in respect of its extension; so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts, so it must needs be divisible in respect of this succession.

Yet you suppose the contrary, like unto the Friar in Chancer, who to show his contentedness with a little, professed that he desired, but of bread a shiver, and of a goose the liver, and of a pigge the head, but that for him, nothing must be dead. So you will have the motion you speak of, to consist of parts succeeding, yet not divisible into parts succeeding. Lastly, your disi • nctive is not good, as when you say, in the false same instant, or in the least parcel of time. For your supposit on is of the revolution of the heavens, not in the least parcel of time at all, but in an instant, which you well know is no parcel of time.

Yet I think to charm the absurdity of your former supposition, which perhaps makes you weary of it, and something confounded in the prosecution thereof, you would fain turn it into some small parcel of time: but then, all that you build herupon falls utterly to the ground.

One sentence remaineth to be considered, whereby in prosecuting your former supposition, you desire to lay a ground, for the commodious illustration of God's eternity, and that is this: Every star in the eyghthe sphere should be converted into a permanent circle, and so in one circle there should be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the eclipticke circle. All this I may be bold to say is nothing to the purpose, but proceedeth merely from affectation of holdinge your Reader in admiration, at the wonderful conclusions, which yet being not superficially but exactly considered, contain most superficial conceytes; the things you here deliver, so far forth as they have any truth, are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heavē; yea as well verified in a tennis ball, at every turning round thereof.

For look how many circles are made, upon the eighthe spheres turninge round in a moment; so many circles are made, by the turning of it round in 24. hours, For the body of the heavens is divisible alike, whether it turn round in a day, or in an hour, or in a moment; savinge that the turning of it round in a moment; deserves rather to be accounted a vigorous rest, and may be called a cessation from motion, as yourself have professed, and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all.

But howsoever; I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that in infinitum, because it is corpus continuum; and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too & upon his turning round, you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him, according as the points therein are infinite.

Now we come to the application of this fiction (prosecuted with much variety, partly of Chimericall, and partly of vulgar inventions) unto eternity it self, as followeth: Thus in him that is eternal, or being infinite and in eternity, are actually contained durations successively infinite. Thus in him, say you; and what I pray, may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherein he saith There is no God. For may he not rejoyne in this manner? And if it be but Thus; like as the fiction here supposed by you, is of a thing utterly impossible, so you give us liberty to conceive alike of the Eternity of your God: not to reiterate the variety of vain conceytes, which have bloomed from the several branches of this your discourse in prosecutinge so vile a fiction to represent God's eternity thereby. Agayne, how doth God contain durations successively infinite? Not formally, you well know, but only eminently, for as much as he can produce them.

But no such thing appears, nor any model thereof in this your fiction. For this revolution in an instant, contains only it self formally it contains the motion of no other body, neither formally, nor eminently.

Yet thus, you say, God's eternal being contains durations successively infinite, though there be no more resemblance between them, then between harp and harrowe; a fox and a ferne bushe, no nor anything like so much.

Yet you proceed in your accommodation thus: The former supposition admitted, we could not say, that the inferior orbs moving as now they do, did move after the eighthe sphere, but that the times of their motions were continually contained in it. For the eighthe sphere being moved in an instant, should loose the divisibilitie of time, and the nature of motion, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect (as if it no way comprised them) but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite, into an actual permanency. To this I answer, first; The Heavens moovinge as now they do, I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbes do move after the eighthe sphere: But rather as in respect of their proper motion they go against it (supposing the eighthe sphere to be the uppermost Heaven) so in respect of Diurnall motion, they move not after it, but motu raptus are drawn a long with it: this is on the By.

Now to the main: I deny that upon your supposition, it will follow, that the times of these inferior orbs motions, were eminently contained in the motion of the eighthe sphere.

Your contrary affirmation seems to me wondrous absurd, neither can I devise any reason for it, or in what sense you take this phrase, to contain eminently.

For the common acception of it is this: That contains another thing eminently, which not conteyninge it formally, is able to produce it.

So the Sun is commonly reputed to contain heat eminently, for as much as not being formally hot it self, yet is able to produce heat in bodies capable.

So yourself before have acknowledged all things to be in God, not formally (for he is neither man nor Angel, much less any inferior creature), but yet is able to produce all these.

But it is impossible that the motion of the eighthe sphere, supposed to be in an instant, should produce the times of the inferior Orbes motions.

It cannot produce their motions, they moving as now they do.

For how should an instantaneous or momentary motion in one body, produce a temporal motion in another body? Much less can it produce the times of their motions. For that is only in the power of God.

He alone that gives existence to any thing, can give duration and time unto it.

Neither doth it contain their motions formally. For their motions are supposed to be temporal, that is in time, the motion of the eighthe sphere is supposed to be momentary, that is in an instant.

But a momentary or instantaneous motion cannot formally contain a motion that is made in time.

A swifter motion can contain a motion less swift, because it is both so swift, and swifter also.

And here by accident, and ere I am aware, I have a glimpse of your meaning; and while I dispute against it, I may seem to you, to make for it.

For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you, to be infinitely swift, and therefore it may well contain the motions of Inferior orbs, which are less swift, as moving round no soever then in the space of 24. hours; whereas the eighthe sphere is supposed to move round in a moment. I think I have sprunge the partridge, now let me see, whether I have not a springe to take him: First then I say, this is not to contain eminently, but formally rather.

Secondly I say, this swiftness of motion which you have invented is too swift, too infinite to serve your turn, to contain the revolutions of inferior Orbes. For you have already professed that it deserves to be called a vigorous rest, and that it may be called a cessation from motion,

Now let any sober man judge, whether a cessation from motion, whether rest, and permanency, and that a vigorous one be fit, eminently to contain the true mōtions of inferior Orbes, which in the space of 24. hours are turned round. Yet if leave were given you to suppose this also, namely that a vigorous rest is so infinitely swift, that it might well be said eminently to contain the motions of inferior Orbes; yet how would it herhence appear, that it should contain the times of them also?

Since this vigorous rest which you make to be infinitely swift, is but in an instant, and the motions of inferior Orbes of like quantity are performed, in no less space then 24. hours.

Is an instant of time fit to contain 24 hours? Yes you may say eminently. For as fluxus puncti in Longitudinem makes a line, so fluxus instantis for a certain space of time, makes 24. hours. Any man hath reason to give me leave, to refresh myself a little while my wits are dulled about such stuff as this. But you labor to show how the times of the inferior Orbes motions should be eminently contained in the eighthe sphere, if it moved round in an instant. And that by this reason: For say you the eighthe sphere being moved in an instant, should loose the divisibilititie of time and the nature of motion, not by defect (as no way comprising them) but by swallowing up time into an actual permanency.

It is true, I confess, that motion, which is made in an instant; loosethe the divisibilitie of time, that is, is not made in time. For an instant is no part nor parcel of time; Agayne it is well that you do so ingenuously confess, that it looseth the nature of motion, also, and all the properties that accompany it. For you have already professed, that it may be called a cessation from motion, and is to be called a vigorous rest or permanency, rather then motion.

All this I do not dislike. But yet to make way for the conteyninge both of times and motions, you tell us, that all this is not by way of defect, as if it no way comprised them, but by swallowing up time or division successively infinite into an actual permanency; which assertion of yours if we should take for a truth, we should swallow many a goageon. For first you imply, that what a thing comprisethe not, that it hath not, by way of defect, which is untrue for my hand comprisethe not six fingers,; yet that it is without a fixed finger is not by way of defect. Secondly you give us to understand that a certain mutation may loose both the nature of time and motion, and all the properties of them, and yet some way comprise them which is contradictious.

For look what way it compriseth time or motion, surely that way it hath it, and doth not loose it. Thirdly it is an absurd thing to say, that an instant of time swalloweth up time. For to swallow it up is to contain it. But it is impossible that an instant should contain the space of any time, as the space of 24. hours. For if it be impossible that an hour should contain the space of 24. hours, much more impossible is it, that an instant should.

The motion indeed, which you suppose to be in an instant, contains an whole revolution of the eighthe sphere, (for upon the fiction of this impossibility, you are pleased to descant much:) but surely this supposition of yours, though it be of a thing impossible, yet doth it not infer, that this instant shall swallow up the space of 24. hours, though it swalloweth up the motion, (as you suppose) which usually is made in no less space then the space of 24. hours.

Last of all consider I pray the sobriety of this speech: It swalloweth up motion into an actual permanency (as much as to say, into an actual rest) and so it comprisethe it, that is, rest containeth motion, and that in an instant; how much more shall the space of 24. hours rest, be sufficient to contain a motion infinitely greater, then an instant doth. As for division successively infinite (as it were to make your deductions the more admirable to vulgar capacities) it is a very sory conceit. For the least time or motion that is, is divisible in infinitum, like as every continual thing is, though never so small. By this, let the wise Reader judge, of the profitable nature of the improvements you speak of in improving motion infinitely swift into permanency or rest, which is as much as to say, into no motion; and let him well weighe and consider whether this be not to bring a noble unto nine pence, or rather unto no pence: and by such improovements, when you cast up your reckoninge at the years ende, you may put all your gains in your eyes, and never hurt your sight.

After this you come in with a new way of conceavinge the first moovers eternity, and that is as Mathematicians conceive the nature of a sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the Axis. There is such a definition, I confess, of a sphere, which is defined to be transitus circumferentiae as which transitus I conceive to be emanation rather then motion, like as a line is imagined to be fluxus puncti in longitudinem; and a superficies is imagined to be fluxus lineae in latitudinem. But all these are very vain imaginations. For neither is it possible, that such things should have any flux, or if they had, that by their flux they should make either length, or breadthe, or thickness in such a figure; but rather a length so made should consist of points, & a breadth so made should consist of lines, and a sphere so made, should consist of semicircles, which is utterly impossible.

And shall we never linne to compare the nature of God to the vain imaginations of such vain things? Yet seeing you will take your course, we will take liberty to consider it. And thus you proceed, For let the eternal be but thus imagined, to be an intellectual sphere, capable of momentary motion or revolution throughout this World, and the indivisible coexistence of his infinity to every part of time and place, will be very conceavable. Very conceavable, you say; but first let us try, whether this conceit of yours contain any conceavable truth. For if it doth not, are we not well advanced to the conceiving of God's eternity, by comparing it to such impossibilities? And first you were as good bid us imagine God to be an intellectual body, as to be an intellectual Sphere.

For a Sphere is a body, either physical or mathematical, that is, a body at least of quantitative dimensions. The world indeed is Sphericall, and God is in every part of it; but will you therefore conceive the nature of God to be Sphericall also, and his form altered, upon the making of the World, from that it was before?

Remember I pray, God is in the World and in every part of it but how? as containing it, not as being contained by it.

Secondly, you will have us imagine God to be capable of momentary motion, or revolution throughout the World? Now consider I pray, what a congerie of wild conceytes are involved here. Is a revolution, a motion throughout the world? Every man knows a revolution to be a turninge round. The orbs of the heavens have their revolutions, but do they thereby move throughout the World? or rather keep their places, & each moveth only about the bodies that are within the compass thereof.

Agayne you know momentary motion is a thing impossible. And that which doth so move round as you would suppose it, doth rather rest then move. For to be in the same place where it was immediately before is the definition of local rest. And yourself have confessed it may be called a cessation from motion, and do affect rather to call it a rest, a permanency, a stability.

If it were a motion, is it fit to attribute motion unto God? Is it fit to maintain that God moves from place to place? Agayne the motion of an intellectual nature as intellectual, is rather the motion of the understanding in knowing things, then motion local from place to place. And it is true, that all things done in time and place are known unto God, but without all motion so much as in the understanding. For even in the understanding of God, there is no change, much less motion. Lastly by moving through the World in an instant, he shall be coexistent to every part of place & that in an instant, but how shall we conceive herby, any coexistence of his to every part of time, as well to all parts of time past, and time to come, as to the time present?

The light of the Sun is diffused thorough all, let us suppose, thorough all the world, therefore it shall be coexistent to every place, but not to every part of time, but only to the present. But is it not your meaning that God's eternity should be diffused not so much thorough the world; for that belongs to his immensity; but rather thorough the time of the world, from the beginning thereof, to the ende of all durations successive without ende (for you do maintain that successive duration shall have no ende?) Certeinly this seems to be your meaning, and then indeed, it is no hard thing to conceive God's eternity to coexist with all parts of time past, present & to come, if so be we conceive it diffused thorough them all, as God is coexistent to all parts of this World, if he be diffused thorough them all (which is your phrase, and not mine, and utterly disclaymed by Durand.)

But then what Meant you to add coxistence of place to coexistence of time, which are woonderous different, the one belonging to God's immensity, this alone to God's eternity.

Secondly, what meant you to call this a motion thorough the World, whereas it is rather thorough the duration of the World, or thorough the time of the world, and the parts thereof, from the beginning of it to the ende, and infinitely further. For by the World we usually understand a World of place, and not a world of time.

Thirdly, what meant you to call, this motion throughout all times a revolution, doth time run round, & by fetching a compass about return to the beginning of it from whence it first issued? For this is the nature of revolutions.

Fourthly, what meant you to call it a motion, seeing it can neither be alteration, nor augmentation, nor generation, nor local motion, though you seem to devise a motiō throughout all time, like unto the local motiō of the eighthe Sphere turning round in a moment. And so you devise as it were a local motion thorough time but it shall be in an instant, to make up a world of wonders, that in an instant a motion may be conceived thorough all time, from the beginning of the World to the ende, and infinitely beyond it in duration. Yet this motion thorough so many thousand years while the world lastethe, and millions of years after that, shall be in an instant.

Fifthly when, I pray, did this motion begin? was it before the world, or with the beginning of the world? Not before the world: For, as there was then no place for God to penetrate (as you speak) and to fill, so there was no time for him to move thorough by his eternity. If with the world, then seeing this motion is supposed to be in an instant, in the first instant God moved thorough all time to come.

But how was that possible, seeing like as before the World it could not be, because then there was no time; so in the beginning of the World it could not be, because the time to come as yet was not. If you say, though it were not present, yet it was to come, and therefore God could by virtue of his infinite eternity move thorough it in an instant, I answer, that by the same reason, he might as well move thorough all time before ever the World was. For even then, though there was no time present, yet there was time enough to come.

But like as it is absurd to say, that God by his immensity did fill all places before the world, when as yet there was no place to fill: so it is alike absurd to say, that God by his eternity did fill all times before the world was, when as yet there was no time to fill. And now I pray, be pleased soberly to consider, what little need there is of all this pains, in streyning our conceytes as it were upon tenter hooks, till they are quite out of joint: what need of so many absurd fictions, of so many impossibilities to prove that which is most untrue, and yet confidently supposed by you as a principle out of a superficial consideration of the nature of God's eternity, Namely, that God by virtue of his eternity doth coexist with all times past, present, and to come.

For consider I pray, will you say that God did by virtue of his immensity coexist with all places before the world was? No sober man I presume, will say this; why then should you affirm, that God by virtue of his eternity did coexist with all times before the world was? And if the actual existence of place, be required unto this, that God by virtue of his immensity should exist with it; why should not the actual existence of time as well be required unto this, that God by virtue of his eternity should coexist therewith? And if before the world was, God did not coexist with times that were to come (like as then he did not coexist with place that was to come:) then surely by the same reason, he shall not at this time present coexist with time that is to come; and consequently, neither shall he be said to coexist with times that are past, like as if the world were destroyed, he should not be said to exist with those places, and bodily spaces, which sometimes were, but in this case now were not.