Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable

1. My first Charge is, That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men, without respect to any foreseen Sin, or cause in them, but merely because •••• pleaseth him to do it: This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation.

That words may not deceive us, let us in the beginning on •• for all know what you mean by the word [Decree.]

I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de event • , tha • this shall be.

And, I suppose, we are agreed; 1. That God's Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object. 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity but God himself. 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man, nor of the same formal Conception. And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man, and not as in God; and so this to us is the prius significatum. 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sense formaliter, but only eminenter. 6. And lastly, That Mortals know not just how God's eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man. All this you must grant me, or be singular and ignorant.

All this is past denial; but proceed to the Case.

Do you differ from us de eventu, whether there be a Hell, or yet of the number of those that are damned?

No: or if we do about the Case of Heathens, that belongeth not to this Point.

Do you differ from us about the Cause of men's Damnation? We say that God damneth no man, but for Sin; yea, for Sin impenitently continued in to the last, against all the mercy which tended to their Cure.

So far we are agreed: But it's not the cause of damnation which I speak of, but the cause of the Decree.

Do you not hold that what ever God doth, he willeth to do?

Yes, God doth nothing without a will to do it, at least consequently.

Do you think that God willeth anything today, which he willed not yesterday, and so from eternity?

No, we do not with Vostius make God mutable.

Good still: you grant then that God damneth men; that he damneth them for sin; that he doth it willingly; that he willed it from eternity. And do you think that from eternity here was anything but God?

No.

Then can that which is not be a cause; was there anything but God himself to be the Cause of God's Will from eternity?

Not in esse reali, but there was in esse cognito.

So: now the game begins: Thus the World is chea • ed and troubled by Logical Notions, and mere words. Is that esse cognitum anything or nothing? If nothing, it is no Cause; If anything, is it God or a Creature? It can be no Creature, because it is eternal: If God, you do but say, That God caused his own Will.

It is God's fore-knowledge of Sin, which causeth his Decree or Will.

1. Even fore-knowledge itself, say the Schools, is but the same with knowledge, and spoken (say they) but to the respect and sense of man. There being neither pri • s vel postori • s, before or after in eternity. But this I now insist not on. 2. It is commonly taken for blasph • my, to talk of a Cause of God, or anything in God. If God's Will be his Essence, it hath no Cause. He causeth not himself, being no Effect. 3. If this were so as you say, yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge. For Si • f • re-seen is no Sin, and nothing is no Cause; so that you yourself resolve all into God. And indeed, what can be a cause of the first Cause, or anything in him?

Use not tergiversation, and vain words now, and tell me what you have to say.

A thing not existent, but foreseen, may be • moral Cause, though not a physical; and so foreseen Sin may be to God.

1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cause of his Will, is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence; And shall so base a thing a • Sin cause God? 2. We are still at the cheating Game, of playing with • rbitrary Notions. What mean you by a moral Cause? If a true cause of moral Being▪ that's one thing: If anything that is not physically or properly, but by moral imputation only a cause of any event, that's another thing. The first you dare not own, as if anything which is nothing (Sin not existent) were a Cause of God's Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica: It is really no Cause; but that, for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that •••• equivocally a Cause▪ 3. Therefore if you use not the word [Cause] equivocally, your rule is false. Nothing is no moral Cause. You will instance in good destr • d, in fine nondum existente, &c. But I answer you, Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an existent entity or subject. A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis, & à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii, valet argumentum. That which is not, is not good or amiable: Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other good, but the desire of good, or the apprehension of the •••• rity of good which causeth; so that all the Cause is in the Agent. 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge, that when any m • n saith, That sin which is no sin, and nothing as foreseen is the moral cause of God's Will, he must needs mean no real cause; Because to be a cause, is tertium Adjectum, and presupposeth to be▪ That which is not, is not a cause; much less of God, or of his Will.

I can show you, that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logic: For if this hold true, then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings, &c. was no moral true cause of God's Will to pardon Sin, and save Souls, to • hose under the Promise before the Incarnation.

Your diversion turneth us from the matter, but advantageth you not at all. Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this, that nothing can do nothing, nor cause nothing. It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering, not yet existent, that caused God's Will t • pardon Sinners. Nor had God's Will any proper cause: But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another, he willed that Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fullness of time demonstrate his Justice, and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency, and to pardon Sin: And therefore (not Christ's Death itself, but) God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate, was the cause of the Promise, and of the New Covenant made with Adam, and of the Salvation of Believers then. Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word.

But at least Sin foreseen is causa sine qua non.

Call it by what name you please, as long as you confess it to be no Cause, (for causa sine qua non, is called Causa fatua, and is none) But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non; for it is no sin from eternity.

It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non.

Yet more notions! what is futurity? anything or nothing? nothing certainly: For quoad ens, it is terminus diminuens; and nothing is no cause. But it is God's knowledge that Sin will be, which is to be called the Cause of God's Decree, as sine qua non, if any be. But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists, when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula.

I pray you then open me the matter as it is yourself.

I will make your Cause better than you have made it; But not by making other men's worse, but by opening the reconciling truth. 1. I shall tell you in what sense God's Will and Decrees may and must be said to have an extrinsic cause, without change in God. 1. Know therefore that God's Essence is his Will, but not as Essence. To say that God is God, and that God willeth this or that, are not terms of the same signification. 2. God's Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object; and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will. 3. As God willeth himself, the Act being perfectly immanent, his Will is called himself much more properly, than his Will of things extrinsic (which is ever either effectively, or at least objectively transient;) Because it is God that willeth, and that is willed or loved, (which made many Ancients say, That this was the third Person in the Trinity.) 4. But as God willeth things ad extra, though it is his Essence that so willeth them; yet it is unfit to say simply, that this Will is God; e. g. that to will Peter 's Salvation is God, because the name Will here includeth the thing willed. 5. And therefore when we speak of God's Will in the universal notion, as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts, it is less inconvenient to say simply, that this Will is God, than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra. By this time you may see, that though God's Will, as his Essence, hath no cause; yet his Will as denominated extrinsically from the Object, may have some kind of Cause that is Objective, which is quasi materia actus, and the terminus sine quo non; that is, God's Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent, or in Peter regenerate, or his understanding, a seeing that the World was good, before any of these things did exist. So that by extrinsic denomination, without any change in God, he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent, to be past, to will things as existent with complacency, or will them with displicency: But not to will the futurity of men's damnation de novo; but yet his Will of the futurity of men's damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause, from whence it is denominated: As in esse cognito, the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man, a subject, and then a Sinner, and a Despiser of Mercy, and then a damnable Sinner. And so these are indeed conditions in the Object, or Causae sine quibus non, or Objective material-constituent causes; not in themselves, but the fore-sight of them; not of God's Will as his Essence, nor of his Will as a Will, but of his Will as extrinsically denominated, a Decree to damn Judas; e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsic denomination to God's Will.

II. Both you and I hold, and must hold, that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned. But it is false, that we hold that he doth it without any respect to foreseen sin. For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation; what he doth in time, that is it which he decreed to do from eternity: But in time he damneth no man but for Sin; therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin: For sin, I say, as the cause of damnation, which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess. 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of God's Volition or Decree, yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object, as foreseen in the Mind of God, and so, as aforesaid, is an Objective Cause as foreseen.

III. The execution of Justice, and glorification of it, and God's Holiness thereby is good, and fit to be the Object of God's Volition or Decree. But in the word Reprobation is in most men's sense included much, which we hold not, which is to be opened further anon.

IV. And as to the absoluteness of God's Decree to damn those that are dammed; I think you will not deny it yourself, supposing them to be foreseen finally impenitent Sinners. God doth not only will, that all the finally impenitent shall be damned; nor only that, e. g. Judas shall be damned, if he be finally impenitent; But also that Judas as foreseen finally impenitent, shall certainly be damned. So that when the condition is foreseen in the Recipient or Object; it is no longer a mere conditional Decree, but absolute, supposing that condition. In all this we are agreed.

II. But that's not all; But you hold, That God eternally decreed men's sin; yea, all the sin of Men and Devils; some say, That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act; and the moderatest, that he decreed the event, that Sin should come to pass ipso permittente quamvis non efficiente; or at least, that he decreed his permission of it.

I. The first sort are those few, whom I in the beginning renounced; of whom the Dominicans, and good Dr. Twisse, and Rutherford his Follower (de providentia) are the chief. I easily confess to you, that God made the Law, and God made man, and God maketh the Objects, and God causeth the Act as a natural Act in genere, by a natural general concourse: And if it could be also proved, that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will, and that by necessitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that, (e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery,) I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin. For the formal reason of Sin is Relative, viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God. And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent, Posito fundamento & omni absoluto: And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation. And Dr. Twisse and Rutherford so far saw this, that the up-shot of all their Vindication is; 1. That God causeth not sin as sin, but as a means to his Glory. 2. That God is under no Law, (as we are) and therefore can be no Author of Sin. But, to the first I answer; It's one thing to will Sin as Sin, and another thing to cause Sin as Sin. We charge them not, with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin; but if he will it and cause it for another end, he causeth the formal nature of Sin, (that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus) and that's as much as man doth. For Sinners do not all, if any, will sin as sin under this formal notion, as it is a breach of the Law of God, and displeaseth him; but as it bringeth them some seeming good: And by doing evil for that good, they are Sinners.

To the second, we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner: But with making him the chief cause of the sin of man, even in its form.

II. But this is nothing to the Calvinists in general. Therefore, I say, that yourselves hold the same that they do in this point. Q. 1. Do not all the Jesuits and Arminius hold, That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of. And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural, in the general. See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphysics, and Bellarmine whom he followeth.

That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act.

And Dr. Twisse hath oft enough told you, where Arminius saith, That God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his Sin.

That is not that he willed the sin, but that Ahab having made himself wicked, God decreed not to stop him, but let him go on.

Either you mean, that the Object of God's Decree was but his own permission (as the Arminians use to say) or else, that it was the Sin itself (matter and form) permitted, (not because it is sin or evil, for so man oft willeth it not at least, but) as an occasion of God's Glory. Arminius his words import the latter: And then you go as high as Dr. Twisse or Rutherford. But if you say, that it was but a rash word of Arminius, which you stand not to; to make plain and short work with you, I am so far from being liable to your charge, that I charge you as presumptuous, if not erroneous, in saying, that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin. And I assert.

1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin. 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end (For, Ut peccatum eveniat, is but peccatum futurum;) and what is it to decree Sin, but to decree that it shall be? Nor 3. Hath he decreed, that this Act which is the Sin, shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state, from whence it is, that Sin in its form resulteth. And so Augustine's saying so much decantate by Dr. Twisse and others, is not found, that nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth, either effecting it, or permitting it. It cometh to pass without God's willing it or decreeing it; so that he permitteth it, but decreeth not that it shall come to pass. Not that it is against his contrary absolute Decree; but as Lombard from other places in Austin telleth you plainly, God neither willeth that it shall be, (because it is sin) nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be, for his Will is not overcome. 4. Yea, he cannot be proved to decree his own permission; Because to permit, is but not to hinder, which is nothing but a negation: And we have no ground to feign, that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing, or of negations.

So that I say, that Sin cometh to pass without God's Decree of the event, or of his permission. (Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it; of which more, when I speak to the other extreme.) And of this also more anon.

III. You make God necessitate men's sin and damnation by your negative decrees, as well as others by their positive: For you hold, That no man can believe and repent, but such as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to: And no man can do anymore good than God decreeth that he shall do. And some say that God decreeth, Not to give men anymore Grace than he giveth them (which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando); And you and others say, That he doth not Decree to give them more. And so as a stone is not culpable for not flying, no more are Sinners, not elected, for not believing and obeying God.

You wholly mistake and misreport us. If we differ from you, it is by going further from the matter of the Objection than you do yourselves.

1. We hold, that God giveth many men power to do more than they do: And consequently that he decreeth to give it them. Men do not do all that they can do. Indeed we hold, That no man can do anything, which God doth not give him power to do, and decree to give it him. And dare any of you deny this. There is no power but of God.

2. I hold not, that God hath any Will or Decree in proper sense, Not to give Grace, not to give Faith, not to give Repentance, Help, Means, &c. But only that he doth not decree to give it, where he giveth it not indeed; But as Lombard afore-cited, saith, He neither Willeth, nor Nilleth it. My Reasons are, 1. Only Good is the Object of God's Will, and Evil of his Nolition. But nothing is not Good, nor Faith, Repentance, &c. nor Grace, evil: Therefore God doth not will nothing, or nill the said good.

2. Frustra fit per plura, &c. It is presumptuous to feign needless Decrees and Volitions in God: But the Decree of nothing (of not giving Grace) is vain: For nothing will be nothing, without any Decree or Volition of God, as well as without any efficiency. If God neither make, nor will more Worlds, more Sons, more Men, there will be no more, though he have no Will or positive Decree that there shall be no more.

3. No man knoweth where to bound the Doctrine of Decrees de nihilo; And to make them infinite or boundless, soundeth so presumptously and profanely, that common reason doth disclaim it. It is possible that there be as many more sands, pebbles, straws, &c. made as are: It is possible to make every stone, or sand, an Animal, or the choice of a thousand other things: It's possible to give each man and Creature the choice of a thousand other names, places, circumstances: And must we feign in God a positive Will or Decree of everyone of these possibles that they shall never be? That this Sand shall not be a Man, nor that Bird a Stone, &c. It is enough to conceive that God's infinite Wisdom knoweth what is fittest to be, and that all that he willeth shall be; and that he willeth no more; and therefore no more Creatures will be. But he willeth to give power to free Agents, to do or not do certain acts in specie; and therefore they can do more than he decreeth they shall do.

2. And as to the necessity of men's sin or misery, you lay as much of it upon God as we; that is, no causal necessity at all, (as Rob. Baronius distinguisheth it well in his Metaphysics.) To omit all the Distinctions of necessity which Hereboord, and many others give us, that we need not, it is here sufficient to distinguish between mere Logical necessitas consequentiae in order of argumentation; and Physical or causal necessity in order of Being. God's fore-knowledge (which you deny not) inferreth the former: For it is a good argument (what ever God fore-knoweth will come to pass: But God fore-knoweth the sins of all that sin; Ergo they will come to pass). The major is a necessary proposition, and so is the minor; therefore so is the conclusion. But yet God's knowledge causeth not sin; nor is it necessitated in any. Dr. Twisse, who goeth as high as predetermination, doth yet grant Arminius, that it is only necessitas consequentiae, and not consequentis, which God's Decree or Will doth infer as to men's sin and misery; and professeth, that all the School-men say the same; and blameth Arminius for pretending that we infer a necessitatem consequentis: And the other Arminius owneth. And are they not then agreed whether they will or not? I doubt not but predetermination inferreth necessitatem consequentis causally, though this be denied by them that hold it. But so doth nothing which we assert.

You will make either the pure mass, or man as man, or the corrupted mass, to be the Object of Predestination, (Election and Reprobation). And so make God desert most men in Adam 's sin, as he did the Devils in their sin, without remedy, or hope.

These are words of confusion, which, when opened, will appear nothing, and that we are all of a mind.

Either you will distinguish God's Decrees by the Objects, or not. If not, you must not distinguish between Election and Rejection, willing and nilling, loving Peter, and hating Judas, &c. If yea, then you must not take up with the unexplained words, Reprobation and Election. 1. By Reprobation is meant either God's Will to punish men. 2. Or his Will to give them no special saving Grace. 3. Or his not-willing to give it them. For the first, I told you before that the Object of God • Will to punish men in Hell, is a Sinner foreseen finally rejecting Mercy. 2. The Object of his Will to punish men with positive temporal punishments, is the Sinner foreseen in his immediate capacity for them. 3. Whether punishment by not giving that Spirit for Faith, Repentance, and Holiness, be decreed (being nothing but a not-giving) is before discust. But if it could be proved, yet the Object of God's denying further mercy and help, is evermore one that hath abused former mercy, or refuseth that as offered to him. 4. But God's non-Volition to give Grace i • no act, and hath no Object. But we judge that all mankind are now from under the mere Covenant of Innocency, and that none perish but for the abuse of mercy, which had a tendency to their recovery (The case of Infants must be spoke to in its place once for all.) But all this belongeth to the Case of Grace and Free-will.

And 2. As for Election, we say that 1. The Object of God's Will to glorify men, is man sanctifying and persevering in an immediate capacity for Glory in esse cognito. 2. The Object of God's Will to give the Grace of perseverance, is a foreseen sanctified person in the next capacity. 3. The Object of God's Will to justify, sanctify, and adopt, is a foreseen Believer. 4. The Object of God's Will, to give special Grace, which shall effectually cause men to repent and believe, is ordinarily a foreseen disposed Sinner prepared by his common Grace; but sometimes an unprepared Sinner, whom, of his free will, he will suddenly convert, as it pleaseth him freely to distribute his benefits (all being unworthy.) 5. The Object of God's Will, to give the highest degrees of common Grace, external (in the purest preaching of the Gospel, and other mercies,) and internal (in greater helps of the Spirit) is sometimes a Sinner in esse cognito, who hath not grossly rejected lower helps, and sometimes freely the worser sort of Sinners, who have abused former mercies. 6. The Object of God's Will, to give the first common mercy which hath a tendency in its use to men's recovery and Salvation, is all mankind fallen in Adam: For all are under the New Covenant of Grace made with Adam, Gen. 3. 15. in some degree, (and with Noah) and all have much mercy tending to Repentance; and none are left as the Devils in dispair, without any offered remedy or help. 7. The Object of God's Will to give man the Covenant of Innocency, was Adam foreseen as mere man. 8. The Object of God's Will to create man, was nothing in the sense that we now take an Object in; that is, for the materia circa quam. But if you will call the intended effect the Object, then the Object of God's Will here (and in the rest) is the thing willed. But if you will needs presume to seek one higher in the Mind of God, you must say that it was man as conceived fit to be, as well as possible. For we can think no otherwise of the Divine Conceptions and Volitions, but as we are led by the analogy of human acts. And so we must say, that 1. God's Power maketh it possible for all things to be. 2. Next God knoweth them possible. 3. He knoweth what is convenient or fit to be made, to his unsearchable ends. 4. He willeth that they shall be, and man among the rest, and so on. If you will needs have the order of Decrees, this is all that we can say of them.

All this pleaseth us well: but it will not please your own Party, or the Calvinists; that you make so many acts of Election, which they tell you is but one entire thing, as mentioned in Scripture: Nor yet that you lay every Decree or Will upon fore-sight.

You are mistaken: No moderate considerate man of them will deny anything that I have said. For 1. As to the Scripture use of the word Election, it is not the mere name that we are now opening, but the matter in question: Nor is it the expounding of particular Texts that I am upon: And if I were, no man will deny but that the word Election is variously used in the Scripture: Sometime for God's eternal Will to make us Christians of Infidels, and to save us by Christ; and sometime for actual choosing us by converting Grace in time; and sometime for actual choosing men in time by Vocation to some office or special work, &c.

2. And as to the distinguishing of all these Volitions of God, no man will deny the effects to be distinct; undoubtedly these are various effects of God; 1. To make man. 2. To give him the Covenant of Innocency. 3. To give him the Covenant of Grace, with all the common mercies of it. 4. To give some Persons and Nations the Gospel, and other mercies above the greatest part of the World, with answerable helps of the Spirit. 5. To give men special Grace, effectual for Faith and Repentance. 6. To give men Pardon, Adoption, and Sanctification. 7. To give men Perseverance. 8. To give them Glory. And if these are various works, either you will distinguish of God's Will by his various works, or not. If you do not, our whole Controversy about the Order of the Decrees is quickly at an end (and I am content with the abreviation): For where there is no Distinction, there is no Order. And when I distinguish them never so much, I say, as well as any, that they are all one in regard of the one Will or Essence of God that willeth them. In God there is no real diversity; but his Will is thus variously denominated extrinsically from its respect to the various objects to which it doth transire, and of the various effects which it produceth. And thus do all men talk of God. Else they could not distinguish his saving Will from his damning Will; nor Election from Rejection, in his Decree. So that no man can tell how to differ here.

3. And as to fore-sight, you as much mistake. For 1. I say not that God fore-seeth any good in any man, but what he giveth him, and willeth to give him; But we speak of the Order of those Volitions, in the way of execution. 2. And all men that ascribe Intentions, Volitions, or Purposes to God, do and must make the Object of them as such to be Quid cognitum, or something which some call an Idea in the Mind of God; It is not a prius Volitum qua tale that is the Object of a Volition, but bonum intellectum. And therefore nothing but fore-sight or apprehension of the thing, needs to be put in the description of the Object.

Nor do I deny, but that we must in our ordinary Discourse speak comprehensively, and denominate Election eminently from the noblest parts: For as our full Salvation includeth all, or almost all, so our Conversion and Glorification presupposeth all that antecedeth. And therefore as we may and must talk of Salvation in general, and not always stand to mention all the parts of it; so must we eminently talk of Election to Salvation, as comprehending the rest, and not always stand to distinguish of the parts. But when you will make a Controversy of the Order and the Object of these acts or parts, we must distinguish.

But you make God's Decrees to proceed according to the Order of Intention, De fine & mediis; and so you feign God to Decree men's damnation; yea, and the denying them Grace; yea, and their Sin, • ub ration medii, as a means to his Glory: And so he first decreeth to damn them, and then to leave them in sin to that end.

All this is your mistake: what any particular men say, I now mind not: But that which we hold is this; 1. I have told you, That not to give men Grace, Faith, yea, and Heaven, is nothing: And nothing needeth no Volition or Decree: Though both the Threatning and the Sentence of these Privations is something, and those are willed or decreed.

2. I have told you, That God decreeth no man's sin at all: It is no capable Object of God's Volition; unless as circa quod, as he willeth what use to make of sin presupposed.

3. Sin is no means of the Glory of God; and therefore is not willed as a means: otherwise it should have the rationem boni qua medium, and be elegible. But it is an evil presupposed; the curing or punishing of it, and not it itself, being the means of God's Glory: And therefore God doth not will it as a means.

4. Do not you yourself say, 1. That God doth glorify his Justice in the damnation of the Wicked? 2. And that he willed from eternity so to do? 3. And that he fore-knew who would be wicked? 4. And that he could have cured and saved them if he would? 5. And that he had no absolute Will or De • ree eventually or effectually to cure and save them, but only in tantum, to do so much towards it, which he knew would be ineffectual through their fault? 6. And that therefore the Decree of damnation, upon this fore-sight, did pass upon the individuals, and not only on the Wicked and Impenitent in general? All this you hold, and must hold; and what hold we more?

5. For as to the Order of God's Decrees, we further hold as followeth:

1. That though when there is need, we must distinguish them by their Effects and Objects; yet we dread the presumption of feigning those Orders in the Mind of God, which we know not of, and cannot prove. He had need to be better acquainted with the Divine Acts, that shall venture to tell us in what Order they lie in the Mind of God, than Mortals are, except where God hath plainly told us.

2. We hold, that God doth not intendere finem, or eligere medi • thereto, in the sense as man doth; because he wanteth nothing, and therefore doth not velle desideratum, nor seek anything which he wanteth. But that improperly God is said to intend an end, when he doth but will to produce an effect, or else still perfectly enjoyeth that which is improperly called His end. And in the first sense, every Creature is his end; that is, the terminus or effect of his operation. And in the other sense, He himself only is his own end; that is, the complacency of his own Will.

3. Therefore to undertake to delineate the Order of God's Volitions or Decrees, according to the way of mental intention de fine & mediis, is a work unfit for us to meddle with, as being beyond our reach.

4. But those that will needs meddle that way, can go no further than to say, That God is his own end, (or the fulfilling or complacency of his Will) and therefore that God first willeth the complacency of his own Will, and then willeth all Creatures as the means thereto. And what is this to any of our Controversies? For the glorifying of his Justice, is but the means of the complacency of his Will. Or if you will say, that his Glory is his end, it is no created thing that you must mean by his Glory. For nothing created can be God's Ultimate End. Or if you could prove that a created Glory were God's Ultimate End; that is, the appearance or refulgence of his Image or Likeness on the Creature: yet you must confess, that it is the Glory of God in his Conjunct Perfections, Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and that the Glory of his Punitive Justice must be either taken as a means to that; or else that God hath his End continually in the Glory which is upon every Creature, and every man and act of man.

5. Though Dr. Twisse so frequently inculcate, Quod prius est intention, posterius est executione; he saith, that it is but de fine & med • is, and not de medii • inter se; and that no medium is properly God's End (and then nothing but himself is his End); and he glorieth as the discoverer of this Truth, that all the means are one to God, and therefore have but one Decree; so that he reduceth all God's Decrees to two, 1. Of his Glory as his End▪ 2. Of all the means thereto as one.

6. And other learned men's Writings I have seen, who come after him, and seek to prove that the Decree de fine & mediis are but one, and consequently that there is no such order to be feigned among them.

7. The plain truth is, God's Will is the beginning and end of all: And all the World are the means of accomplishing and pleasing it: And it is always fulfilled and pleased, though not always by the same means: And God loveth no Creature finally for itself, but for Himself, as his Perfection shineth in it, and as it fulfilleth his Will. And to feign any other Order of Intention and Election de fine & medii • in God, is presumptuous; much more to lay our frames of them, and tie God hereto, and trouble the Church with contending for such Models. But the Order of Execution is intelligible (in part) to man: And we are sure that God eternally intended to execute his Will in that Order in which in time he doth it. And therefore this is the only necessary and the sufficient method of God's Decrees, which man can investigate.

8. We deny therefore that God decreeth or willeth to damn any before he fore-seeth their Sin; or that he decreeth to damn any, but as impenitent Sinners; or that the damnation of any man is his End; or that he decreeth any man's sin; or that he decreeth not to give them Grace; or that Sin, or not giving Grace, or not believing, &c. need a Decree, being nothing; much more that these are decreed as means to God's Glory. But if you speak de fine, 1. As that which man is bound to intend, 2. Or as a mere effect; so no doubt all things have their relation, use, and order to each other.

You deny all conditional Decrees in God, and so make them all absolute, and consequently arbitrary, merely because God will do it.

Do you think we differ in this? You dare not profess your dissent from any of this following explication of our sense.

1. God's Will is the Cause and End of the whole Creation: And what ever pleaseth him to do he doth; whatsoever it pleaseth him shall come to pass, it shall come to pass; and what ever he is pleased to make our Duty by a Law, is made our Duty. All that God doth and commandeth is Arbitrary: His Wisdom indeed and his Will concur; but his Ends are within himself; and his Will is the end of his Will, so far as it may be said to have an end. Arbitrariness and self-willedness is God's Perfection, which is man's Sin and Usurpation. If you will stretch to that impropriety, as to say that He willeth it, because his Understanding seeth it fittest to be willed; and so make Causes and Effects in God; yet must you add, that the fitness or goodness so understood, is the Aptitudinal congruency to his Will.

2. We affirm that God hath many Decrees which are conditional in respect of the thing decreed. So Dr. Twisse frequently tells you. He maketh one thing a means and a condition of the event of another. And we say that God hath conditional Promises and Threatenings; [If thou confess with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart, &c. thou shalt be saved]. And we believe that God's Will made these Promises and Threats, and that they are the true signs of his Will: And that he will fulfil them. And so far he hath a conditional Will, and conditional expressions of his Will.

3. But as to the Act of Volition, we believe that his Wills are eternal, and have no proper condition of their existence, or not existing; because being existent, they are Necessary necessitate existentiae; e. g. God never had such a Will as this, [If thou repent, I will purpose or will to pardon thee if thou repent, or to make the pardoning conditional promise;] But [If thou repent I will pardon thee, and whether thou repent or not, I will conditionally pardon thee, or make that Covenant which saith, I will pardon thee if thou repent,] our Acts are the Conditions of God's Gifts and Acts, but not of his Will, as suspended on those Acts.

4. Sure this is your own sentiment: For you deny not that God knoweth from eternity whether the condition of each Event will itself be or not; And if so, it must be only the condition of the Event, and not of his Decree: For he that e. g. willeth absolutely that all shall perish that repent not, and knoweth certainly that Judas will not repent, doth thenceforth absolutely Will that Judas shall perish, though only that he perish conditionally. For that Will is no longer suspended on a Condition, but it is the Event only that is suspended. At least you must say, that it is passed into a certainty, equal to an absolute Will.

5. But we will come as near as truth will lead us. If by a Condition you mean only that Condition of the event which is not a suspender of God's Decree, but only a constituent qualification of the Object; so I grant to you, that though God's Will as it signifieth his Essence, or his essential Principle of operation, in itself, have no cause or condition; yet as it is extrinsically denominated, the Volition or Nolition of this or that, the Object hath its Conditions; that is, qualifications, without which God's Will is not so denominable. And so God's Will hath its Conditions of complacency or displicency in the Creature, without which he cannot truly be said to be pleased or displeased in them; yea, I told you, that these may oriri de novo, without change in God. And whether his judicial Will to condemn men as Judge, have the same conditions, we shall inquire further hereafter. I have already manifested, that the Objects of it have their proper qualifications.

At least you make Election absolute, if not Rejection; and say, that God electeth men to Salvation, without respect to any goodness in them.

I have said enough to this already; 1. Do you think that men are good before they are elected? when they are not men? You do not certainly. 2. Do you think that God fore-seeth any good in men, when he willeth to them their first good? no doubt you do not. 3. Do you think that God fore-seeth in men any second, third, or following degrees of goodness, before he intend to give it them? what need he purpose to give it them, if he fore-see that they will have it without his Gift? 4. Do you think that God fore-seeth any power to do good in men, but what he intendeth to give them? or any good act, but what proceedeth from that power which he giveth them, and from his concourse, or co-operating influx? I dare say that you do not. 5. And do you think that we imagine that God giveth, or purposeth to give, any following mercy to him that hath not the necessary antecedent mercy? As to glorify any that is not justified, or to justify any that is not called. 6. You see then that it's necessary, if you will quarrel, that you distinguish of Election as before said. Though God's Will in itself, as was now said, have no proper suspending condition; yet, 1. The effects of God's Will have. 2. And the Objects of God's Will have their necessary qualifications. 3. And some of God's Volitions are thence extrinsically denominated conditional.

Now, 1. God giveth Salvation to no Unbeliever, but on condition of Faith. And God actually glorifieth none but penitent persevering Believers: And both these he accordingly decreed or willeth. And can you say then that Election hath no respect to the persons goodness. It hath not only respect to the good intended him, but to that good which is a necessary qualification found in him; that is, necessary to the benefit to which he is elected. God decreeth to give glory to none but persevering Saints, nor perseverance to none but the Holy, nor justification to none but Believers.

But I will confess to you, that we hold, 1. That God absolutely willed to give Christ and the New Covenant to the World; 2. That he absolutely willeth or decreeth to give the Gospel and common Grace in a greater degree, to many a one that is no more worthy of it than others that are past by, and to give it to none but the unworthy. 3. That he absolutely decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to many that have long resisted him, and are as great Sinners as those that have them not, and to none but the unworthy in proper sense. And dare you deny any of this yourself?

Thus you bring presumption into the World, and encourage men to sin: If once they be elect, let them do what they can, they are sure to be saved; for they are certain that Election will not change.

1. You are leading us towards the question of Perseverance, before the time.

2. Do you think yourself that Election changeth? Is not this as much imputable to you as us? or do we differ here? Do not you say that God fore-knoweth who will be saved? And can God be deceived? or shall not all certainly be glorified that are so fore-known? Nay, do you not say that, at least, upon that fore-knowledge, God decreeth each persons certain Salvation that shall be saved? And can that Decree which is upon fore-knowledge be frustrate? Do not you then as much encourage presumption by a certain unchangeable Election as we.

3. It is factious perverseness (reflecting on yourselves as much as us) which puts in that word, [Let them do what they will, or live how they will, or sin they never so much;] For it falsely intimateth that God electeth men to Glory, that live impenitently in wickedness; according to our Doctrine. Whereas we say, 1. That if the word Election be taken partially, for the act of God's Decree to glorify them, none but foreseen persevering Saints are the Objects; And a wicked Saint is a contradiction. Or if it be taken for God's Decree to convert a man, we say that this is true, that let the World live never so wickedly, God doth decree to convert some of them from that wickedness, but not all: Do you question this? 2. But if the word Election be taken comprehensively, then men's Holiness, Repentance, and Faith is part of the Salvation which they are elected to: And to say that God absolutely electeth Peter to live and die a Saint, let him (after Conversion) live and die never so wickedly; this is a putid contradiction, such paltry dealing faction causeth; what do you differ from us in all this?

4. But as to presumption hereupon, I answer you, 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuse, even Christ, and the hopes of Heaven itself. 2. As long as wickedness is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from; he that is wicked may be sure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election, and cannot have the least assurance that he is elect. 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to persevere in godliness; this is no rational inducement to him to forsake godliness, anymore than to renounce Heaven, but rather to conclude, I am decreed to persevere in holiness, therefore I must so do. 4. And to pass by the Controversy of perseverance till we come to it, it is as all confess, so few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election, that this Objection can extend but to a few. 5. Lastly, None are certain of their Election, but such as have strong clear active Grace and evidence; that believe firmly, and love God much, and obey him carefully: And such as these are fit to improve assurance, and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude. Did you ever know what love, and thankfulness, and delight in God, and holiness are, and yet can you think that they are the way to sin? You know nothing in Religion, if you know not, that they are the life and soul of true Religion, and the most powerful principles of Obedience and Perseverance. Nor do you understand the Gospel-design, if you know not, that the greatest manifestation of the love of God, is the greatest means of love, and thankfulness, and desire, and delight in God and goodness, unto man.

At least thus Fate is set up in the World, and all things are under necessity, and unavoidable.

You had this Objection about necessity before, and to the answer of it I refer you further, 1. Immutable Election doth set up but a consolatory quietting certainty in the World, without which man's mind must still be in troublesome, unquiet, if not tormenting terrors. Is it a wrong to you, if you can be sure to be saved? Had you rather live and die under these apprehensions, [I know not whether I shall be in Heaven or Hell forever?] If you have not certainty, or a hope that is somewhat near it; I think this conclusion, if you be awake, and in your wits, must needs make your life a constant bondage, and the fear of death your constant misery, and must blast all the pleasures of your fulest Prosperity. Thank God that his Foundation standeth sure, and the Lord knoweth who are his; and see that you keep his mark upon you, professing Christ, and departing from iniquity. And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven against your wills.

2. As for the word [Fate] it is ambiguous: Some by fate, mean but the certainty that God's Predictions shall be fulfilled; Quod fatur eveniet. Some mean only the certain connection of Causes and Effects under God's sapiential Government of the World. (As Campanella maketh Necessity, Fate, and Harmony, to be the result of Power, Wisdom, and Love; but not accurately enough.) And some say, (but how truly I know not) That the Stoics took Fate for some primary necessitating Cause, which did necessitate all Acts of the God's and Men. It is a word that we have no need of; they that will play them with it may.

3. But as to Necessity again, I say, 1. Election maketh no man's sin or misery necessary, nor tendeth to it. 2. It maketh no man's Salvation necessary against his will in sensu composito. 3. The more it maketh our Salvation necessary, that is, certain and insuperable, the greater is God's mercy, the greater our happiness, and cause of gratitude and Joy. The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their persevering blessedness.

If you shall Object, That it necessitateth the perishing of all others, because none can be saved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination, and is answered before. I say again, 1. Necessity and Impossibility are either Logical in ordine probandi; or Physical in ordine causandi. The first sort followeth upon your own Doctrine: He that God fore-knoweth shall sin and perish, it necessarily followeth Necessitate consequentiae; and it is impossible but it should follow, that he will sin and perish, but not by God's fore-knowledge.

Causal necessitating either taketh away the true power of escaping, or depriveth of such power by prevention: But so doth not the Election or Decree of God.

2. Though we hold such absolute Election as hath been opened to you, and that God decreeth to cause men to believe, before he fore-seeth that they will believe, (in order of Nature, according to human Conception;) yet we hold as you do, that Reprobation doth not so proceed, but that God decreeth men to Hell only on fore-sight of final wickedness, which he never caused or willed. And if in this we agree with you, you must accuse yourselves as much as us.

3. God doth both Decree to give, and actually give men power to do more than they do; And his decreeing that another man shall well use that power which he hath, doth sure take away no power from you.

4. Yea, God's not decreeing to cause you to use your own power well, doth take none of it from you; But includeth that such power you have: much less his Decree to do more for others.

5. All the World acknowledgeth, that a Benefactor as such is free to give his own benefits as he pleases, unequally. And giving more to one taketh nothing from another. Suppose that God had for 4000 years, till Christ's Incarnation, but willed and given his mercy equally to all the World, even so much as might leave the matter merely to their wills; and after that had given greater mercy to the Christian Churches, taking nothing from the rest: Had this been any injury or diminution to the rest? Suppose now God should fetch half the damned out of Hell, is this anymore hurt or wrong to the rest than if he had delivered none.

But all these things are here anticipated, and cannot be fully answered till we come to the Article of Grace; where we must show how God doth differ his Operations on men's Souls: For none can deny, but as he differenceth them, so he decreed to difference them, and no otherwise.

At least you make God's Decrees and Ways unequal, and make him a Respecter of persons, as decreeing to save one, and not another; or to give •• re Grace to one than to another, of equal demerit.

You may show your ignorance about this yourself; but this is no difference between the parties. For, 1. No man can deny but that God standing towards us in a three-fold Relation, as our Owner and the Lord of all, as our Ruler, and as our Benefactor, so he is free in the first and third Relation. A Proprietary may do with his own as he list: And a Benefactor may unequally give his benefits as he seeth meet: For he is supposed to give only that which is no man's Right, till he give it them (by promise or collation). But as God is a Rector, and governeth Mankind by a Law, which hath Rewards promised, and Punishments threatened to promote Obedience, and as he is Judge according to that Law, and as he is a Benefactor already obliged by promise; thus God doth keep an equality in his Judgments and Executions, and ever proceedeth according to his Word or Law. He will in just equity and equality forgive, justify and adopt all penitent Believers, and no others, how great soever. He will glorify all persevering Saints, and no others, just according to his Word; Because his Law is Norma judicii, or that which he will observe in judging. If God forgive and save one penitent Believer and not another, you may say that he ruleth not in equity and equality. But in cases of other disposals and benefits, which no man hath right to by any Law or Covenant, the case is otherwise.

2. And full experience tells us this. God made not every Man an Angel, nor every Stone a Star, nor every Star a Sun, nor every Beast a Man, nor every Toad a Bird, nor the Dirt and Water Fire. Wonderful is the Variety of his Works through all the World: No two Birds, Beasts, Men, Stones, Trees, are perfectly equal and like. No two men's Faces, Constitutions, Parts, Dispositions, Virtues, are perfectly equal. With what various temperaments come we into the World? And is God a Respecter of persons for this? or are his ways unequal? As a free Owner and Benefactor he will diversify his Gifts, and do with his own as he list, though Sinners quarrel at it. You dare not say that God giveth his Benefits equally to all, that are of equal demerit.

3. The sin of respecting persons belongeth to a Judge, obliged by rules to equal distribution: By a Judge, I mean any judging and executing Governor, or obliged distributer of Rights. And it consisteth in partiality and injustice, because of something in the person, (as Greatness, Riches, Learning, Relation, Flattery, &c.) which is no just cause of that inequality. But this is nothing to God, who regardeth no man's person for any such thing, nor denieth to any man his proper due.

You make God play the Hypocrite, to send abroad Ministers to entreat men to repent and be saved, when he hath decreed that they shall be damned, and not repent. And you make all the preaching, and means that are used for such men's Conversion, a mere mockery.

No more than you do; For there is no difference as to this. 1. Do not you say that God fore-knoweth from eternity that Judas, e. g. will not repent, or be saved? yea, that upon such fore-knowledge he hath decreed before he was born to damn him? And doth this make God play the Hypocrite, or his Word to be a mockery? We say but the very same of all that perish.

2. To help you to rescue both yourselves, and us from this accusation, consider, that God's Decree hath several parts. As, 1. That the lapsed World shall have a Covenant of Grace, and be entreated to be saved. 2. That Judas, one of this world, shall have his part among the rest. 3. Whereas Judas will not receive this offered Grace, for rejecting it he shall be condemned: These are the material parts of God's Decree; And is there any hypocrisy or mockery in this? God decreed not to condemn Judas, but for rejecting offered Grace: And this presupposeth the offer: He cannot reject that which never was offered him. What would you have had God rather say, [I fore-see if I offer Judas Grace, that he will not accept it, and therefore I will offer him none, but condemn him, because he would have refused it, had it been offered.] By this rule, the sin of all the World against mercy and means of life, should have been prevented by offering them no means or mercy; and yet men perish and be damned for that which they never did, because God fore-saw that they would have done it. Are not these ways unequal, in comparison of God's, which vain men quarrel with.

2. But again, I tell you that your feigning to hold, that God decreed that Judas should not repent, is not true of those that you now talk with: It is enough that God did not decree that Judas should eventually repent.

Though you say that God decreeth to give men more power than they use, yet you add, that none of that power will ever be well used, unless he fore-decree it; For you say that God absolutely willeth or decreeth every good Act, as well as the Power. And so no such Act followeth any Power, where God decreeth it not: And what good doth that Power do them.

Still you anticipate those Controversies which belong to the point of Grace. But I answer, 1. You must answer this for yourselves first, for it as much concerneth you as us. For you teach that what ever Power God giveth men, it will never be exercised, unless he fore-know that it will be so: Yea, unless upon fore-knowledge of man's due cooperation with God, it be decreed. For you say that God fore-knoweth all the Acts of Grace and Power that will be exercised; yea, and decreeth them on the said fore-sight, as your Doctrine de scientia media inferreth.

2. By this Objection there is no way to reconcile you to God's Providence, unless he will be ignorant of all men's future sinful Omissions, or unless he will not be beforehand willing of all the good that is in the World, or at least not decree it, and be the Author of it; Or else unless he will cause all men equally to use their powers, and do good alike. Now you dare not say, that ever any of these shall come to pass. You see and confess that all men do not use their power equally, nor do good alike. And you know God will not be before ignorant of it. And you shall never abate God's goodness so, as to keep him from willing and working too all the good that is the world. And will you therefore be unreconciled to him?

3. And where you say, what good then doth such power; 1. I pray you mark that you confess that we hold, that they had power. And if they had power to do good, they could have done it. For what else is power, but that by which I can do the Act. 2. The power given was a proportionable demonstration of God's Power, Wisdom and Mercy, and therefore it did good. 3. That it was not used to their own Salvation, was their own fault for which they suffer. And in all this we are agreed.

And now I appeal to your considering Reason, whether there be any difference hitherto left in the point of Predestination between you and me? And I again mind you, that were it not for the importunity and prejudice of contenders, all that I have said of this had been needless. for it is obvious, that while we are all agreed of these generals, 1. That God decreeth to give all men just so much Grace or Mercy as in time he giveth them. 2. And that he absolutely decreeth not to give them anymore but what he giveth them. All this Controversy of Decrees or Predestination, depends on the Controversy of Grace, how much it is that God giveth unto men.

I confess that you have indeed proved yourself reconciled to me; But that is because you are an Arminian, and do not know it: For you grant me all that I can justly desire. But the Calvinists will not be therefore reconciled to you, or give you thanks.

Except the few Predeterminants afore-excepted, and some odd words that drop from passionate or injudicious men; I am past doubt that the generality of sober moderate Calvinists will stand to what I say, or may do it I am sure, in consistence with their main cause. And I am confident that these are the healing-terms that must unite us. And remember, that you confess, that thus far we differ not.

Had you but this following Doctrine from one of the greatest Jesuits, V • squez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp. 91. c. 11. p. 659. it might put you to your study to be able to disagree. Catholica sententia est nullam causam, nul •• ve initium, aut occasionem ex parte praedestinati excogitari posse, ob quam De • s aut in tempore gratiam ipsi donaverit, aut in praescientia dare decreve •• . Doctrina haec non solum intelligenda est de initio fidei, orationis, aut • oluntatis consequendi salutem; vel de aliis operibus quae circa Deum versan • ur; qualia sunt religions; verum etiam de quovis opere moralis virtutis, •• od in ipsum solum bonum honestum referatur. Et non solum excludimus initium, quod sit meritum condignunt, sed etiam meritum congruum seu impetratorium, aut dispositionem, & quamlibet causam & occasionem, ob quam Deus huic potius quam alteri gratiam donaverit, aut donare praefinierit; Ita •• totaratio praeparandi huic potius gratiam quam illi, fuerit beneplacitum divinae voluntatis, nihil autem vel minimum ex parte praedestinati. Ita Thom. Marsil. Gregor. Armi. &c. And yet must we disagree.

I. They destroy the comfort of the Faithful, by denying that God did certainly and immutably elect individual persons to Salvation.

You mistake them: They hold that he did certainly and immutably elect particular persons to Salvation. They hold that he foreknoweth what motions means and circumstances will eventually take with men's Wills, without such necessitation as is inconsistent with their liberty; and that to certain persons he immutably decreeth to vouchsafe them all those means and motions; and that he then fore-seeth that these will prevail, and that they will believe, yea decreeth that they shall thus prevail, and so decreeth that all those persons shall be justified: And in like manner that he fore-seeth what means and motions will prevail to their perseverance; and that he decreeth to give them those means and motions; and that by them they shall eventually presevere, and shall infallibly be saved. The moderate Jesuits, and Arminians, and Lutherans do maintain, and will grant all this. And all this is from eternity. And is not here then an eternal ascertaining immutable Election of individuals.

II. They feign an election of Things, instead of an election of Persons; and say that Election is God's Decree to make Faith the condition of Salvation: And so they bring in an indefinite Election of Universals or Species of persons; that God decreeth to save Believers, & damn Unbelievers.

Doth any Christian deny any of this? 1. That God hath de facto, made Faith the condition of life, is visible in the Gospel: And what God did in time, from eternity he decreed to do. Therefore he decreed to make Faith the condition of life.

2. That God hath in his Covenant made a Deed of Gift of Christ and Life to all true Believers, and of Heaven to all that so persevere, and that he hath promised to perform this Covenant, is visible in the Scripture. Therefore God decreed to do this from eternity, even to justify Believers, and glorify persevering Believers. Make not the world believe that any of us question this.

But if you mean that they deny all other Decrees of Election, and extend it not to individual persons, you mistake them. Read but Molina, Suarez, Vasquez, Penottus, and other Jesuits, and you will see it: And so you may in Arminius himself. They hold an Election of Individuals, as I last described it, in the way of their scientia media, besides the Election of Believers in general. See also our Playfaire on the Point.

III. They deny any Decree or Will of God to give men the first special Grace, effectually to make them believe and repent, but only that he decreeth to give them sufficient Grace, which their own Wills must make effectual.

Did not I tell you that all the Controversy of Predestination is resolved into that of effectual Grace? Such Grace as he giveth men, such he decreed to give them. This all confess. But what it is that denominateth Grace effectual, we are to consider in its proper place. Only let me here tell you, that all will grant you (of whom I now speak) that God decreeth to give men that special Grace which shall cause them to repent and believe. But on what terms, and in what manner it so causeth it, is afterward to be handled.

Their Doctrine de scientia media on which they ground their Opinions of God's Decrees, is many ways injurious to God; and is a fiction not to be made good.

1. I doubt all sides are over temerarious in their distribution of God's Decrees and Volitions. But, 1. All are agreed that ex parte Dei Volentis, there is no real difference in his Volitions; nor ex parte Dei scientis, in his knowledge: For so his Knowledge and Will are his Essence. 2. All agree, that ex parte objecti cogniti & decreti there is a real difference. 3. All must agree, that in God's Intellection and Volitions as denominated ab extra, viz. ab objectis, there is a relative or denominative difference. 4. Ex parte objecti, there is no man can question, but that this Proposition [If John have such and such means and helps, he will believe,] doth differ from this Proposition, [It is convenient and good that John shall believe] and from this, [John will believe]. 5. If you are against mincing God's Knowledge into such scraps as these various objective Propositions do infer, you must be against the old distinction, into scientiam simplicis Intelligentiae, & scientiam purae visions. For no doubt but God knoweth all things, how various soever, un • intuitu, with one simple knowledge, ex parte sui, though it be by our weakness denominated many, even innumerable, ex relatione objectiva, vol terminatione rei in quam transit. Doth not God with one Act know Convenients, Desirables and Futures? And cannot I here copiously thetoricate against you for your first and second sort of Divine Knowledge, as well as you do against them de scientia media. 6. It is agreed that God knoweth all things to be what indeed they are▪ and not otherwise. 7. It is agreed that God knoweth not as man doth, by Names, Propositions, or Syllogisms; And yet that God knoweth all Names, Notions, Propositions and Syllogisms, with their modes; as they are the measures, organs or actings of Human Understandings. 8. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians, that the thing which they call scientia media, is as certainly in God, as is the scientia simplicis Intelligen • iae & Purae visions; that is, [that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions, and knoweth what would be done, by such and such causes, or upon such and such alterations, if they were put]. Doth any Christian doubt of this? 9. Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine, and that of no great importance, and not at all de re? 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversy, is a question only about the order of argumentation, as long as the thing itself is confessed to be true. 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter, do go as far from you as the Jesuits and Arminians who use it; As you may see at large in Ludov. à Dola, and Durand himself. 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God, and dread the taking of his Name in vain; And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters. But as the truth of the thing is confessed, so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation (as it is commonly called) and not (at least always) to the Doctrine of Election, I see no untruth that it inferreth, nor no real difference that it will prove between us.

They deny absolute Reprobation at least, and say that God reprobateth no men, but upon fore-sight of sin; And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin, nor that he will permit them to sin, nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin: As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart, the sin of Sihon, of Rehoboam, of the Jews in killing Christ, &c.

1. I told you before, Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts: You dare not but grant them, that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin, and as a Sinner: And this is the same thing that they mean.

2. If by Reprobation you mean God's Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance. 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will, for a mere negation, where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace, will do as much. 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah; And that no man is now under the mere Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency, which saith [Be perfect and live, sin and die forever]: And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World, which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation. He subverteth Scripture, and all experience, that denieth this. Therefore all must grant, that God denieth no special Grace to any, but the abusers of this common Grace. And he decreeth to do but what he doth. Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to, are none but the abusers of common Grace, or the rejecters of that special Grace, when offered.

3. If by Reprobation, you mean God's Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully; 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will: Because permission being a negation or nothing, needs it not, but will be as certainly without it, upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from sin. 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it: For he saith with you, That God decreeth his own permission. 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief, and between negative and privative not-hindering Sin, or not-giving Faith. Negative Unbelief is mere not-believing: And so none of us did believe from eternity, or before we were born: He that is not, believeth not; nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us. Our unbelief is not sin, or privative, but on supposition that we are men, and have reason, and have a Law and