Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable
4. If by Reprobation you mean merely God's Preterition; that is, his •• t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace. 1. Not to Will or Decree, is nothing; And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional? These are the modes of Acts, and not of not-acting, or of nothing. All grant that God's non-agency, non-volition, not-decreeing hath no cause, much less a cause in man, least of all in man when he is no man.
5. The word Condition, either respecteth, 1. The thing or event willed; 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event; 3. Or that Will radically considered in itself. I opened this before, but think of it again; for the reason of the distinction is very plain. And, 1. God damneth no man but for sin, (nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace, but for sin.) Therefore the event no doubt is beforehand conditional; that is, dependeth on a condition: God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently, and not else. 2. The Act of God's Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly, may be called, A conditional Act or Will. But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine. 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition. Dr. Twisse denieth none of this.
6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally, all the Christian world almost confess. And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing, that should tempt good people to father it on God, or attribute the being of it to his Will, or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise?
7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general, but with all its modes and circumstances, he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin, or the immediate necessary cause of it; which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear.
God willeth not the Form, that is, sin as sin, and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances.
I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form, and yet not will it as sin. To will it as sin, is to take the form of sin as such to be good, and so to be the ratio volendi; which few if any Sinners ever do. But to will both matter and form in one, not as the formal reason of Volition, but making total sin, the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end, this is possible for a very wicked man to do: But I think the ordinary case of Sinners, is not at all to will the form of sin, but cast that by, and to will the matter of it, for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to. Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness, that they will not malum sub ration mali, or sin because it is sin, but for another end. And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do?
God willeth it to a good end, and they to an evil end.
As evil must not be done, that good may come by it, so neither must it be willed to that end. Man may need such a means to his ends, but so cannot God. Yea, men have oft good ends for evil Acts: Many lie to glorify God, and sin for his Cause and Church, and for their own and other men's Salvation. Much of the Blood, and Cruelties, and Superstitions in the World, have had good ends; which yet excused not the things from sinfulness.
God is under no Law, and therefore cannot sin: But man is.
1. That proveth God no Sinner; but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man. 2. God's natural essential Perfection is his Law, and more than a Law to him: And from that Perfection all Laws in the world, that are just and good, have their Original; that is, God's own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature; and Mans Laws are authorized by, and subservient to, and derived from the Laws of God, in Nature and Scripture: So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God, he saith, That the Law is not made for the Righteous. 3. If God's Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law, forbidding sin on pain of Hell, the same Wisdom and Holiness, with his Justice and Mercy, will not will the sin so forbidden, nor cause it; nor consist with so doing.
It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth, but the existence, and futurity or event; not sin, but that sin be.
I many a year studied thinking to prove that true: But I doubt it is but a game at words, and groundless distinguishing, for a false conclusion. For, 1. Sin is a Relation formally; even a disconformity of an Act or disposition, and so of the person to God's Law. It can no otherwise be caused, but by making the Law, and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform. God maketh the Law, and God maketh man and his faculties, and God causeth the Object, and God permitteth the tempter: If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances, he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin: And so of his Volitions or Decrees. As for the essence of sin in notion, without the existence, more may be said that God indeed is some cause of that, without culpability, yea by his Holiness and Power. For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum, as compared to the Correlate, or terminus; so he that causeth any of them, hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation: And so God by forbidding Adultery, Lying, &c. by his Law, doth by Institution make those acts to be sin; that is, He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed. That Adultery is committed is long of man: that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man; God by his Law, and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence, but the existence or futurity, you are so far out, as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him, as to the existence, than the essence.
2. But what is the existence but the essence existing, or extra causas? And what is it to cause sin, but to cause it to exist? And what is it to cause it to exist, but to cause it, or give it a being? And what is it to will that sin shall exist, but that the essence of it shall exist? And what is it to will the event or futurity, but to will that sin shall be? And what more can man will or do about it, to show himself to be bad, (as Estius and others fully manifest.)
I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin, so he do not will it as sin, (and so may cause it) Quod peccatum, but not Qua peccatum.
Here are three things before us: 1. The common substratum or • atter of the sin, which is the Faculty, and the Object, and the Act only in genere act us, or as not clothed with the forbidden circumstances. 2. The Act thus circumstantiated. 3. The Relative form of sinfulness. 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first, the Faculty, Object, and the Act as an Act; e. g. In David 's Adultery and Murder, and Peter 's denying Christ, God gave them the Faculty by which they did it: He • pheld their natural power; and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act; But, 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed, but permitted only; that is, that David should hic & nunc lust after her that was another man's wife, that he should vitiate her, that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword, that Peter should speak those particular words, &c. In the first sense, God willeth the Act which is sin, and the Faculty which is sinful; but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated.
And as for your Qua peccatum, I tell you again, few Sinners, if any, will it qua peccatum.
What say you to this undeniable Argument: If God will not that Act which is sin, he willeth almost nothing that men do; For we sin in all someway or other. And so God hath little to do in the world.
The last answer fully serveth to this. If we sin in every Act, yet all that is in every Act, is not sin, or prohibited. All that is good in the Act is of God, and willed by him. But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act, which God doth not cause or Will, which morally specify it as sin. As when I pray, I sin in praying coldly, unbelievingly, with wandering thoughts: God causeth not these, though he cause the Prayer. Or to come from compound Acts to simple: Those wandering thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts, but as they are upon an undue Object. A lie is not a sin as it is a word, but as this word which is false; And so in all others.
But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves, and not only in their circumstances: Therefore if God there cause the Act, he causeth the Sin.
No Act as an Act is forbidden, but as circumstantiated, by Object, Time, Mode, Place, &c. Mr. Capell chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se. But I answered before, that all the Act in lying is Volition, Intellection and Speech; And these as such are not forbidden: But only these particular words which are false. The common instance is Odisse Deum; But here hatred in itself is not the sin, but • s unduly terminated on God as the Object. And this God willeth not.
By this you defy man: For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of. And so man is made a first cause, that is a God. For the particularizing of the Object, and the circumstantiating of the Act, is aliquid, something, and must have some first cause.
The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants: Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lye, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised. And Dr. Twisse hence saith, That moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them; And it's true that it is not a Physical specification.
2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this case to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the Cartesians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by mere Action as such, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will simply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, instead both of nilling it, and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time.
3. An Action itself is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove. The Glory of God's Works, is their likeness to Himself; And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness, we know not just how far God can go in such Communications. I see no contradiction in it, to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force, with necessary (though not determining) concourse, can determine itself without anymore causation. And if it be not a Contradiction, God can do it.
4. But this is all prevented by considering, that man's Soul is never out of Act. Its active force is never idle; though it act not always the same way, nor with the same extension or intension: so that to reduce it into act, is not to reduce it from a mere potentia in actum, but from a power acting one way, or slowly, to act another way, or more intensely.
5. Yea, this is all answered by considering, that as I said, while God continueth the Soul in its nature, it continueth a naturally active force or power; inclined essentially to activity: So that though, I say▪ that Action needeth more cause than non-action, that is, here done, in God still causeth the active disposition. But supposing that upheld, I say, that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action, than to cause it to act. Whatever the world talketh against Durand, they are never well able to answer à Dola (though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he.) And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed (as a thread), supposing God to continue the nature of it, and all things else, there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling, than to make it fall, when the thread is cut. It was a work of God's Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors, Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel, Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites, and the Sun from moving in Joshua 's fight.
6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action, which is but modus rei, that is in question, but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action; so that it is but modus modi rei.
7. And lastly, The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved, overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion. Now whether any man should deny all our Religion, and certain necessary Truths, for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this, that God is not able to make a Creature, that can cause a modus modi, in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that, without Divine predetermination, let sobriety be judge.
But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts, without God's determination, as well as of the evil.
Jansen is in the right in this: we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil. We cannot do evil without his natural support and concourse: But we cannot do good, especially spiritual saving good, unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace. To the specifying of good actions, there must ever concur God's natural help, God's gracious help, and man's free-will or self-determination. It is not two or three determinations of the Will, which are made by these several Causes; but one determination. So that under God, man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good; or else he were not a Believer, nor rewardable or punishable. And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil, proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will, (for with that such a determination was consistent) but from its Pravity or Corruption. But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled.
Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. (Vol. minoris) hath a full digression (4) to prove that [God willeth that sin shall come to pass, he permitting it, and saith, Nostri Theologi affirman • : Arminiani • ontificii negant.]
I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it, when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act, clothed with all its circumstances. That which God causeth, he must needs will. But when he saith, Nostri Theologi affirmant, he must mean but some few, such as Maccovius, Spanhemius, Rutherford, (and perhaps Piscator or Beza,) of his own mind. But the generality of Protestants either are against him, or meddle not with it. He that will read Davenant, and such others, shall find the difference. I remember but few English Divines at all that own it, besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton. But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse, and to his and Alvarez, and other men's Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion; I may pretermit that here.
But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World, and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works.
1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation, but of God's Works. 2. Take heed of such irreverent words of God: Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain. Dare you reproach God as Idle, if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him?
The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine, and not mine that do but denominate their consequents.
Let us try that. Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do? that he made the World as soon as he was able, and could have done it no sooner? or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast, or Plant or Atom more than he hath made? nor to do any one action more than he doth?
No: I hold no such thing: For God is Omnipotent and Free.
I pray you then study it, and tell me, if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle, for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles; why should you call him Idle, if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning? And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent, able (by God's common generical concourse as the cause of nature) to determine or suspend his own Volitions, without any predetermining efficiency of God. If God will delight himself in making such a Creature, will you dare to say that he is Idle, because he moveth him not in another manner? you will not so reproach a Watchmaker, for not moving the Watch all day with his finger.
I confess I cannot answer that: But how then is God the Governor of the World, if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation.
The Work of a Governor, as such is only, 1. By Legislation, to make the Subjects Duty. 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject, whether he do that Duty. 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment. But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions.
It is so with man, because he can do no more: but not with God.
Indeed God governeth all mere Naturals and Bruits, by physical motion, as Engines are moved (as a Clock or Watch) by natural necessitation: And so he doth the mere naturals of man; (As his Concoction, Pulse, circulation of Blood, generation in the Womb, &c.) But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent, ruleth him as such, agreeably to his nature; even by moral Agency, by Laws and Judgment: And this is that Regency of which we speak. If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind, or King of the World; you deny him to be God, and overthrow all Religion and Morality.
But what say you to all the Texts that tell us, that God willed and caused that which wicked men did; as in the case of Pharaoh, Sihon, Rehoboam, Absalom, the death of Christ, and many others.
One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object, is, that they distinguish not between the sin, and the effect of the sin; or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him, and the reception of this Act in passo, in the recipient. God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect, without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination. Especially when Custom compriseth both in one name; dull wits are easily here deceived▪ As the words, Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenness, &c. do signify both the Volition and Act of the Agent, and the Reception or Effect. Now God can many ways make the sinful Volition and Act of every such Sinner, to produce that effect which the word Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenness, &c. connoteth or includeth, without causing the Volition or Act forbidden determiningly.
I pray you show me how?
1. He can by Providence order or set the Object in their way. 2. He can fit the Receptive disposition of the Patient to the effect: Most of the wonderful Varieties in the World are à diversa recipientium dispositione. That Act will produce an Effect on a disposed matter, which will not on another. 3. He can rule the Sinners Instruments of Action. 4. He can remove other Objects out of the way. 5. He can remove Impediments. 6. He can put in some good thought or desire into the Sinners mind, which shall determine the Effect. 7. He can suspend some concourse of his own, which will tend to this effect rather than another.
Give me some Instances to make it plain.
You need no other than the instance of the Murder of Christ: 1. When his time was come, he that before oft retired into the Wilderness, and lived in Galilee, came up to Jerusalem in their way. 2. He was willing himself to die for man, and so did not avoid it. And he went into the place where Judas could find him. And he spake the words which he knew that they would call Blasphemy, &c. 3. God directed the Soldiers Spear to the Region of Christ's heart, which their intent or aim alone else had not done. And he provided a Cross, and a Simon to bear it, &c. 4. God did not open to them effectually those Reasons which should have moved them more to desire the death of Barrabbas. 5. Abundance of Impediments God could have set in their way (as the people's tumult, Pilate 's resistance, &c.) which yet he did not. 6. God put into their minds (by moral means at least) the true apprehension of the probability that the Romans hearing of a King of the Jews, would turn their jealousy and fury against them, and take away their place and Nation. 7, He suspended that preserving operation by which he could have kept Christ alive on the Cross, and healed his Wounds, and caused him to come down from the Cross, when they promised him then to believe in him; and he restrained the Soldiers from breaking his bones, &c. And in all this, there is no Decree, Volition or Causation of their sinful Wills or Deeds.
So in the case of Absalom 's Incest (or any sinful Generation,) 1. God ordered it so, that his Fathers Concubins were just in his way. 2. They had an inviting pulchritude; and an impotency of resisting. 3. The state of his affairs was such, as that the action had an appearance of tendency to his ends, by making him seem irreconcilable to his Father. 4. And for Achitophel and Absalom to know the truth of this, was no sin. 5. Other diverting Objects and occasions are kept out of the way, &c. Yet in all this God neither willeth nor causeth that Will and Act of Absalom in specie; but the effect.
But by all this you do describe God as plotting and doing the same thing that they do. And (but for different words) this cometh all to one.
1. If you think this enough, why doth it not satisfy you? while it is granted by them that you oppugn. 2. It is not the same thing. Is it the same thing for Christ to be killed, and for the Jews to will and perform his Murder? Is man's Will and Act, and Christ's Death the same thing? 3. God did fore-know their sinful Will and Action, and permit it only, but did not cause it, but was a concause of the Effect.
So God may to a Drunkard, 1. Cause strong Drink or Wine to be in his way. 2. And remove some smaller Drink, that would have satisfied him. 3. And remove Disswaders and many impediments. 4. And give him money, and facility of obtaining it. 5. And cause him truly to know that the Drink is pleasant to the taste, exhilerating, spiritful. 6. And cause it when he hath drunk it, to make him drunken. And none of this is quid prohibitum, or sin in man: But his sinful Will and Act, which are forbidden, are presupposed or foreseen.
I cannot see but that it cometh all to one, for God to permit that which he fore-seeth, and could easily hinder if he would.
1. Your conceits that it cometh all to one, must not over-rule our certain knowledge of God's Holiness, and his true and holy Word, and all the certainty of Religion in the World. 2. We are sure that God is Holy, a hater of all sin, and a righteous Judge, &c. And are you as sure that it cometh all to one? And must all men else say that they are sure of it too, or else be back-bitten, and called Arminians, Jesuits, &c. 3. Do you consider what God's permission is? It is far from a full permission. He doth all that belongeth to a Rector to hinder it. He strictly forbiddeth it by Laws: He openeth the malignity of it. He threateneth misery here, and everlasting damnation hereafter to them that will not forbear it or forsake it. He promiseth all blessings in this life, and endless Glory in Heaven hereafter, to them that will. He sendeth his Ministers, first with Miracles, after with sealed Doctrine and Gifts, to proclaim all this to the World, and to persuade them: He gave his own Son to condemn sin in the Flesh, on the Cross, and by his holy Life, and Doctrine, and Suffering, to declare the malignity, and hatefulness, and hurtfulness of it to the World: He sets up all his Ordinances, Magistracy, Ministry, Sacraments, Worship and Discipline to this end: He warneth the World by many Judgments; and especially by the Messengers of each man's death; and the constant Afflictions which are the fruits of Sin: He obligeth them to Obedience, by multitudes of Mercies: He sets Heaven and Hell before them daily; and is this permitting it? He doth indeed in this sense permit it, in that he doth not all that he can against it, or doth no more than as aforesaid. 4. If this permitting be all one as loving or causing it, then when God made man a free Agent, and resolved to rule him by moral means, and leave Adam to his own Will, it was a loving and a causing sin. And is every King or Parent a lover of Vice, who doth not all that he could do to restrain it?
We do not hold that God loveth sin, though he will the event, and cause the act circumstantiated.
I know you say that neither God nor man loveth sin as sin: But whether Dr. Twisse & Rutherford say not in equipollent terms, that God is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world, judge by their confuted words in the former Book. 1. They deny not (nor can do) that Love and Voliti •• in God are all one. God's Love is not a Passion, but his Will. 2. They say, that God willeth that sin exist. 3. And that as sum & unice conducible to his Glory. 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good. 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently. 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being, so is he in the greatness, and power, and efficacy of his Volitions. 7. And that man loveth not, nor willeth not evil as evil, or sin as sin; but for inferior good infinitely below God's Glory, for which he willeth its existence. And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is?
Yet it sticks with me, that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World, and all Sin which is the common work of the World, should be without or against his Will: Providence is wronged by this.
You mistake the matter: 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will, under moral Government, was not from impotency, as if he could have made man no better, or more necessary an Agent: But of his Wisdom and Freedom, by which he made the Bruits without Reason, and Stones without Sense.
2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God, which determineth only of Duty, and not directly of Event. But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu: For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees.
3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first • ook, that God's Providence doth about man's sin, and then you will • ot say that he is Idle, or neglecteth his Government, unless he cause Sin.
I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image, and the Lord of his own Acts, as a Creature morally governable by Laws: And so all his free power is of God, who still upholdeth it.
II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus, and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere, and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin: And I do not believe that Aureol •• , Dura • d, or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise, though they differ in expressing the mode of concourse.
III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin, and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse.
IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners, in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions (as in generation, &c.) even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect: And that by all the ways fore-named, and many more.
V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor, maketh men's sins the occasions of much good, and ordereth and overruleth all Wills and Events, so as not to miss of any of his ends: But will attain all his ends, while the Sinner seeketh his own.
VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do. And all that Sinners do he fore-knew. And neither his Wisdom, Goodness, or Power, is ever over-come by sin, or defective in anything about it. And is not all this enough for you, but yet God must be the chief willer of sin.
I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much.
Take in but one thought more, which I afterward suggest. Ockam laboriously endeavoreth to prove, that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in itself distinct from that of the Will. I have told you my Opinion of his tenet: But this is granted him, that no outward Act hath any sinfulness, but secondary and participative, as animated by the Will: and that sin is primarily in the Will alone. Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alleged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford, it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of, but seemingly of the Act, (indeed of the Effect.) Now God cannot be the cause of any man's sin, unless he cause the sinful Volition.
But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this, because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed. And therefore when we come thither, you must excuse me from repeating it, or pardon what you put me to do.
The sixth Crimination.
My next offense against them is, that they make God's Will and Decrees conditional, and so make God dependent upon man.
This is opened in the Second Book. Indeed they differ not from the Synodists (or Dr. Twisse himself, I think,) in this. That is, 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations, Promises and Threatenings in his Word. 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word, and all that is in it, with its conditional mode. 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse, and all say, Deus vult, hoc esse propter hoc; sed non hoc vult esse, propter hoc. God's Will doth not depend on the Condition; but God's Will is, that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition. When the Condition is performed, it is not a medium of God's Volition, but of the Effect. 4. But yet this all must confess, that as to the bare extrinsic denomination from the Object, as God's Will is variously denominated from things past, present and future, so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises: which you will not deny but God hath made. 5. And in case of sin and damnation, sin foreseen is an objective condition, disposition or qualification sine qua non, of such as God's velle damnare is immediately terminated on (as they confess at the Synod at Dort, and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large.)
But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man, maketh God to follow the Creature, and depend upon it.
It maketh him no way dependant at all: For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God, nor hindereth him from anything which he would do. It is his own Will that this shall be the Order. But as to God's Acts or Volitions following man's, 1. They no way follow man's but as Objects; which Objects in their natures and qualifications, relatively terminate, or by connotation denominate God's Volitions. 2. And do you or any man deny that? Doth not God's Knowledge Praeteritorum & Existentium suppose the preterition or existence of Objects. Doth not God's complacential Volition of the holiness and glory of his Creatures, presuppose that holiness and glory? Doth not God's hatred of past or existent sin presuppose it?
But what can God fore see in man, till he first decree to cause it, or at least decree that it shall exist?
Sin: He decreeth neither, and yet fore-seeth it, (of which, lib. 1.)
The seventh Crimination.
But some of them say, that the Gospel itself, yea and the first special Grace, is given to men upon merit of congruity, though not of condignity, and so is decreed on that foreseen.
1. We mind not what some odd persons say, but what the moderate and sober say, whom we are reconciling. 2. But I pray you wherein do you differ from these? Is it in words, or sense also.
In both: I hold no such merit, fore-sight, or decree.
Do you hold that there is such a thing as common Grace, distinct from special?
Yes: so do all Protestants.
Is it not every man's Duty to make a good use of the common Grace or Mercies which he hath, as in order to his Repentance and Salvation?
Yes: He that had but one Talent should have improved it.
Is not a man that doth this as far as common Grace will go, more disposed and prepared to receive special Grace, than one that hath long abused it, and derideth God and godliness?
Yes, no doubt some such are not far from the Kingdom of God.
Have not Mr. Jo. Rogers, Mr. Tho Hooker, Mr. Rob. Bolton, and abundance of other Protestants written much of Preparation to Conversion? And is it not our common Doctrine?
Yes: but what's that to Merit of Congruity?
What do you think they mean by it more than you by Preparation?
They mean such Merit as it is decent for God to reward.
The greater part, I think, by far of the School-men say, That the first special Grace is not given upon any Merit at all. And the learned and sober that thus talk of Merit of Congruity and Decency, mean no more but this, 1. That God who commandeth men such use of his common Grace, as a means to special, doth command no Duty, and appoint no means in vain. 2. That such prepared persons are fitter for special Grace than the unprepared, and malignant Enemies of it. 3. That it is God's usual way to prepare men by common Grace, before he give them special Grace. 4. And many say that we cannot prove that God useth to deny special Grace, where he giveth the highest degree of preparing common Grace. And which of these are you against?
But doth not God give special Grace also without such preparation?
1. Our foresaid practical Protestants seem to think not (to men at age.) For they oft say, that it cannot be conceived that a man can value Grace, and come to Christ truly, that hath no preparatory sense of sin and misery. 2. But I find not that the Papists usually deny it, but that God may give special Grace to the unprepared on a sudden. 3. But Papist's and Protestants are agreed that this is not his ordinary way. And where do we differ in all this?
But we say not that there is any Merit in all this.
Phy on that word Merit! I thought it was but the name that we differed about. 1. And many of themselves dislike the name, and say, It is unapt: And I think so do the Lutherans and Arminians more commonly. 2. And others say, that by Morit they mean nothing but a moral aptitude for Reward. And they say, that they can find no one fitter name for that than this, which all Christians without known opposition used for many hundred years after the Apostles. And that the Scripture word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , worthy, is the same in sense. 3. And they usually say, that special Grace is called a Reward to the prepared, (if not unaptly, as many or most say, yet) but in a lower Analogical sense, and not as Heaven is the reward of Holiness: Because, of the latter, there is a flat Promise, and premiant Law or Covenant made by God; but of the former they can say no more than as aforesaid, that God appointeth no Duty and means in vain.
The eighth Crimination.
They make many Elections or Decrees where God maketh but one. As an Election to Glory, and another to Justification, and another to Faith and Conversion, and another to have the Gospel, and another to be redeemed by a sufficient satisfaction of Christ, and another to be made men. And so vary the Objects.
Some of these are Decrees of common Grace, and not called Election by any that I know of, except, as some say, God chose Man and not Devils to have a Savior. But all that I speak of are agreed with you, that God's decreeing Will is his Essence, and that it is but one God or Will in the notion of Essence or Principle, or Act as it is merely Agentis: But they say, that if we distinguish not God's Decrees by connotation of the various Effects or Objects, our Controversies are at an end. And I ask of you, Do not you distinguish them when you dispute of their Order, Priority and Posteriority?
Yes: There is no Order without distinction.
Will you not distinguish Election from Reprobation?
Yes: Though both be God's Decree.
Will you not distinguish the Election of Peter, both from the Reprobation of Judas, and from the Election of Paul?
Yes, as connoting various Objects and Effects.
Is there not then the same reason for distinguishing God's Vo •• tio •• about one and the same person, as to various effects? As God's Will that Paul be born, that he be redeemed, that he be endured in his sin, that he be converted, that he suffer, persevere, be glorified?
Yes: But though these be various Decrees, yet not Elections.
These names and words are our unhappy Difference. 1. Remember then that you agree to call them divers Volitions or Decrees; and, I think, no sober man will fall out with you for the name Election▪ 2. But what reason is there in the nature of the thing, why you may not as lawfully and decently say, that to choose David to be a Saint, a King and a Prophet; to choose Paul to be a Christian, a Preacher, and a Marty • , •• e various Elections, as well as various Decrees? 3. But my own Opinion is, that the denomination should follow the Object: And therefore where the Objects elected, or the Termini of the Relation are various▪ we may call them various Elections: But when they are diversified but as parts, we should call them various acts and parts of one Election. And no doubt but our election to have the Gospel, to Conversion, to Justification, to Perseverance, to Glory, to the Ministry, to Martyrdom, &c. may in several respects be named many, and parts of one Election.
I confe •• I am convinced that it is a shame to make a quarrel of this: because it is about • word, and really there is no difference. But why make they various Objects in one man of these Decrees?
What is it but diversity of Objects that doth diversify them? In the execution the case is plain. Paul uncreated and creandus was nothing, or no man. 2. Paul before he heard the Gospel, was a Pharisee that had not heard it. 3. Paul before Conversion and convertendus, was a persecuting Infidel. 4. Paul jam justificandus was a Believer. 5. Paul jam vocandus ad facrum Ministerium was a Christian. 6. Paul persevering, and ready to overcome finally, was a faithful holy Christian and Apostle. 7. Paul jan • justificandus per judicem finaliter & glorificandus, was a persevering overcoming Christian, Saint and Apostle.
The ninth Crimination.
But that's my next offense: that they order God's Decrees according to the order of Execution, and not according to the order of Intention: when as Quod prius est intention, posterius est executione.
Dr. Twisse hath that word, I think, many score, if not hundred times: But it is no fit matter for contention. Do you believe that in God himself there is Priority and Posteriority of Decrees?
Not in time: but in order of Nature or Intention.
How can there be difference of Order, where there is no diversity?
Though in God there be no diversity, yet you confess there is the Relative connotation and denomination from the Objects?
True: Therefore the Order also must not be denominated from any feigned diversity in God, but from the Order of the divers Objects, as one is first or last, in time, or nature, or use. That which is first, God decreed should be first: That which is propter aliud, God decreed should be propter aliud: And that which is the end of another thing, God decreed should be its end.
But even in God himself, we must, as men, conceive, that his velle •• em, and velle media are not all one, but must distinguish them.
As men, we must not judge falsely of God, when we know that it is false. If velle finem & media be certainly one without any diversity in God, saying what is in the connoted Objects, and the relation or denomination; how can we without sin destinguish where there is no difference? But I pray you tell me, what mean you by God's intendere ••• em?
I mean that as every wise man doth first will an end, and then do all for it, so doth God.
We call nothing to man an end, but something which he wanteth, •• at least is without: But God wanteth nothing, nor is ever without his •• d, or the accomplishment of his Will. But of this I crave leave to refer you to the first Book, where I have fully shown that God willeth an •••• improperly, and not as man doth. But tell me, what take you to be strictly God's end?
His Glory.
What mean you by his Glory?
Our Knowledge, Admiration and Praise of his Perfection.
I know some say, It is the objective Luster, or Demonstration of God's Perfections: Take that if it please you better.
That Luster or Demonstration objective is a Creature: And can a Creature be God's Ultimate End?
No: God who is the Beginning is the End alone.
God is no efficient Beginning of himself or anything in himself: For in God there is no Cause or Effects; how then can he be his own End or final Cause?
He is neither Beginning nor End, efficient nor final Cause of himself; but of his Works or Creatures only.
Therefore not of his Volitions, or Decrees which are himself, not of any of his Actions merely as Agentis; because they are himself: but as they are in the effects. But how can God be the Creatures end? The Creature is no means, either that God be God, or that he be perfect, or that he be glorious in himself, or that he be just or merciful: It is the highest blasphemy to say it.
You know all our Divines say, That God's end in decreeing, is the Glory of his Mercy in the Salvation of the Elect, and of his Justice in the damnation of the Reprobate.
Here are a multitude of Errors or Ineptitudes together. 1. That the name of the means (Salvation and Damnation) is put into the end. 2. That one little parcel of the means only is put, as if it were the whole. If we must speak so low, as to ascribe an End to God, we must say, that Ultimately he hath but one: And that one must needs be more than the glory of his Mercy and Justice towards man. Is all the rest of the world Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth, and Christ himself, no means in which he will be glorified? 3. That quid creatum is made God's Ultimate End: For this Glory of his Mercy and Justice is no other, but a created demonstration or apprehension of it. 4. And why are Mercy and Justice only named, as though the glory of his Power, Wisdom and Goodness itself were here no part?
If you like none of this, tell me your own sense of it.
1. I suppose that Intendere finem is spoken of God only in a transcendent sense, and not at all as it is of man. And, 2. I suppose that God's Being hath no Beginning or End, nor anything in him. 3. I suppose that God's Free-will, by communication of Essence, and of Perfections, is the Original free Cause of all things. He necessarily is what he is: but he freely made what he made. 4. Therefore I suppose that the same Will which is the Beginning of all, is the End of all: So that God's Will as efficient is the Beginning, and God's Will as fulfilled and pleased is the end of all his Works. 5. This may be called finis Dei improperly after the manner of men, but tolerably and with the least impropriety, and such as we must use. 6. This is more properly the commanded and appointed end of the Intellectual Creature, and analogically the end that all things tend to. 7. God is never without his end: For his Will is ever fulfilled and pleased; For pro hic & nunc he willeth nothing but what is. 8. But there are degrees of Perfection in God's Works, and the narrow Creature hath lower ends besides the Ultimate, inseparable from it. And so man must intend his own felicity, and above that the perfection of the Universe, and above that the complacency of God's Will. 9. And because all the parts are to contribute to the perfection of the whole, and so all the parts of the means do make up one perfect Universe, in the state of Glory, and there and then the whole world shall bear the liveliest impress of the Divine Perfections, this Impress or objective Splendor and Image of God, together with the active Vision, Love and Praise of the glorified (which is part of the said Image or Impress) is called God's Glory: which shineth in part in every part, and perfectly in the whole perfected world. 10. So that in a word, the perfection of the Universe being the medium completed, is called God's End in the lower material notion: And the fulfilling and pleasing of his Will in the perfected world, is called his End in the formal and higher notion. And we can say no more of God's Velle finem.
I confess your explication of God's End and Intention seemeth to be most agreeable to the Principles of Theology.
And do you think that it is wise and Christian-like dealing to fill the Church with Contentions, and make others odious to the people, about the Order of God's Decrees secundum intentionem, while men know not whether God do Intendere finem or not? or what his End is? or what his Intention is? or while they mistake all?
Will you make as many fines operantis and Intentions in God, as there are fines operis, and as the means or Creatures are made for one another as an End? or will you assign to God one End alone?
You know that in that our Divines do differ. Some that write of the Order of the Decrees, make God's Glory the end of Salvation and Damnation, and these the end of Grace and permitted Sin, and these the end of Creation, &c. But Dr. Twisse writeth against them (even Perkins and Beza, &c.) maintaining that God hath but two Decrees; one de fine, and the other de mediis; and that his End is but one.
If you are no better agreed, bear with others that differ from you. But either you diversify God's Decrees by their connoted Objects, or as divers intrinsic real Acts in God. If you say the latter, your own Party, and all the School-Divines, will say you blaspheme, by making God divisible or compounded, and will call you Vorstians. If the former, how innumerable must you make God's Decrees? And why may not the Order as well as the species and number of them be so denominated from connotation? And then you will say that God first intended to make man as the end of inferior Creatures, and after decred to make them for man. And he first decreed that there should be fruit, and then that there should be a Tree to bear it, and then that this Tree should be rooted in the Earth, and then that it should be planted, and then that there should be Earth and Water to nourish it, &c. And if poor man be but a little part of God's Creation, unless we could anatomize the whole frame of the Universe, how should we know just what place and order our own interest hath in such a frame among so many millions of millions of Creatures, of which Angels and the superior World are nobler than we? Is he to be numbered with the Churches Friends, who will make us such work, and lay men's love and peace upon it?
But what have you against the simpler way of two Decrees?
In God those are not two but one: But I see not, but speaking after the manner of men it may pass, as the safest distribution by connotation and extrinsic denomination, if he had but rightlier described those two. Of which I said enough before.
How would you then denominatively order the Decrees according to the order of Intention?
According to Dr. Twisse 's own rule and method, all that you can by that Order infer, is but this, that the infinite Creator first intended the pleasing and fulfilling of his own Free-will as his Ultimate end, and next decreed to produce all things as he produceth them to that end, and so is pleased in all things in their proper time and place; but further to bring all this Universe finally to perfection, and in that perfection his Glory or Image shall be perfect, in which he will finally be pleased: And the glorification of man is a little part of that Perfection. And what will this do to the promoting of your Opinions?
But I further ask you, Is it not certain that God decreed to make all things in the Order in which he maketh them in time?
Yes: If you speak of the Order of Execution.
And is not this Order of Execution needful to be observed?
Yes, no doubt.
And is not this Order of Execution easier to be understood?
Yes; for we are little disagreed about it.
If then this Order be plain, and sure, and needful, and that which we are all agreed in; and your Order of Intention be either none, or uncertain, and past the reach of mortal man, judge you what Order we should treat of, and who are the wise and peaceable men?
Yet the School-men before us have treated of that Order.
Davenant tells you, That Scotus was the first Artificer of that Invention. Whether that be so or not, it's sure that you use to declaim against the School-men's profane curiosity and audacity: And where (except about the Trinity) hath it been greater than in this? And you know that few of them that give you the ordinem signorum, as they call it, do agree in the same Order; (As I have shown in some instances, lib. 2.) And if you will condemn yourselves in condemning them, why should we think that you have hit of the right Order anymore than they? We have seen Beza 's, Gilbie 's, Perkin 's, and we have seen Twisse 's (much better,) and we have seen the Lutherans and the Arminians, and we see little agreement. Do you think that the Synod of Dort, that leaveth out such things, was not as wise as any of you all? Or was not Davenant as judicious as any of you in these Controversies, who openly and largely professeth, that he is not one of those Privy-Counselors of God, who know in what Order things lie in his Mind, and can assign each Act its proper place; but he thinketh this Order of mental Intention in God to be utterly unsearchable, and the Order of Execution only fit for us to treat of. See his Dissert. de Praedest.
The tenth Crimination.
They seem to err much, in that they deny the eternal Cause of eternal futurition; (while they make sin that is eternally future, yet not to be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future.) How can things pass without a cause enumero possibilium, in numerum futurorum?
Alas! what men, and what Engines must the poor Church suffer and be tortured by? sure Paul fore-saw these things, when he fe • red lest as the Serpent beguiled Eve, (with a promise of being as God in Knowledge) so he should draw us from the simplicity that is in Christ. And when he warned us to beware lest any beguile us with vain Philosophy, according to the rudiments of the world: And when he telleth us of a Wisdom which is foolishness with God; and of some who professing themselves wise, became Fools.
Your Doctrine soundeth so unlike to Christ's and his Apostles, that I must crave your Interpretation of it, that we may understand before we wrangle. I pray you what is it that you call Futurition?
The name tells you what it is. You know what we mean by it.
I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Substantive, but doth it signify something or nothing?
It signifieth that something will be hereafter.
Now you turn it to a Verb: But is futurity anything or nothing?
Suppose, I say, It is something?
If it was eternally something, it is God: For nothing else was eternal.
Suppose, I say, It is nothing?
If it be nothing, it is no effect, and therefore hath no cause, and therefore no eternal cause.
Suppose, I say, that it is neither something nor nothing: You know there are five sorts that Burgersdicius placeth between Res and Nihil, and futurity may be one of them.
Five sorts of what? You cannot tell. If you take Ens or Res limitedly for less universal than Aliquid, or a Species of it, you may say that Datur medium inter Rem & Nihil. But sure esse and non esse are contradictories. And taking Aliquid, Ens or Res in the most universal notion, it is a contradiction, and a denial of the first principle of Knowledge, to feign a medium: Burgersdieius'es five Non-entia quae non sunt nihil, are Privatio, Denominatio externa, ens Rationis, Relatio, modus entis. And all this cometh from the pitiful narrowness of man's mind, that can know nothing at all by one simple Conception, but by parts; And then it frameth several names, according to all its inadequate Conceptions, as if they all signified several some things. 1. Privatio is itself a compound notion, including, 1. The absence of the form. 2. The debitum inesse. 3. The matters capacity of it. The first is Nothing: the second is a Relation (of which after): the third is the nature or mode of the matter, which is an inadequate Conception of Ens.
2. Denominatio externa, signifieth, 1. The Denominabilitas. 2. Or the actual denomination. The first is considerable, 1. Qua talis. 2. Or in causa velratione. Denominability in se is nothing else but an inadequate Conception of ens rationis: For I can call nothing by a Name. But the Ratio denominandi may be something; and as now intended is Relation. 2. And the actual denomination is Res, that is, Verbum vel mentis veloris.
3. Entia Rationis taken effective & subjective are confessed to be real Entities: but objective it is denied. All Objects are so called, 1. As aptitudinal. 2. Or actually apprehended. 1. As aptitudinal they are not entia rationis, but something antecedent. 2. As actual, they are quid reale: For they are conceptus humanus inadaequate expressus, sub ration materiae. A thought or conception is an Act which is quid reale: And every Act consisteth of the modus agentis and the Object, which as such is quasi materia, and is essential to the Act: so that even Genus and Species, as in man's thoughts are quid reale. And out of man's thoughts, they are Relation or nothing.
4. Relation is a something or nothing, which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences. But when anatomized, it is considerable, 1. As in extrinsic Objects. 2. As in the mind of man considering them: 1. In the Object there is, 1. Quid absolutum, that is, the subject, the terminus, the fundamentum, cum ration fundandi. 2, The formal Relation. The first is quid reale, as is confessed. The second is nothing besides the first. It is nothing but rerum comparabilitas: And that comparability is nothing, besides the quid absolutum, or thing itself. When an Egg is new laid at the Antipodes, an Egg here is newly related to it ut simile: But nothing is added to this Egg; But only now the mind of man can compare it with that at the Antipodes, and consider, that in quantity, figure, color, &c. they are like: which likeness as in ovo is nothing besides the same quantity, figure, color, &c. themselves. But by those Realities, it is capable of being compared, and the mind can raise an universal notion of both, as compared. 2. But this comparing Act of the Understanding is quid reale. So that Ockam in his Quodlibets hath well proved in many questions, that Relation is nothing besides the quid absolutum in re & in mente humana. And though his Gregor. Armin. at large dispute that non-entia may be related, yet it is on this supposition, that non-entia may be imagined, and be the matter of a thought or conceptus, and as such they are entia rationis realia; that is, that conceptus is quid reale. But besides that, the Relatio non-entis is nothing but nonens, and a mere nihil.
Yet I confess that Rerum ordo is the sum of Relations and of morality; and that this Ordo is existent whether we think of it or not: But this Ord • is nothing distinct ab absolutis & rebus ordinatis, cum omnibus suis modis & circumstantiis realibus. Things are wonderfully diverse by diversity of quantity, quality, distance, &c. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity, quality, distance, &c.
But I must not write a Logic for you: I am by this much remembered, that, as David saith, man walketh in a vain show or Image; when multitudes of nothings go for some things, and fill up so much of his thoughts and life, and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in.
But you have said nothing yet of the fifth, which is Modus Entis. And futurition may be reduced to that
A true modus entis is quid absolutum & reale, and the same that we call an Accident: And Gassendi chooseth to call Accidents, Modes or Qualities: And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt, if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents, (as quantity, quality, action, &c.) But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified: not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part, but yet conceptions of quid entis, so that an entire perfect conception of the thing, would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident. So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens, speak not always so good sense as they think they do.
But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing, (as Cloaths to the Body, Servants, Lands, Riches, Honors,) are not properly Modes and Accidents at all, but Adjuncts.
Apply this to the point in question, (of Futurity.)
If Futurity, as is said, be an eternal Being, it is God: If nothing it hath no cause. If it be called Quid medium, the very Quid is a contradiction to it. To begin backward, 1. If it be Modus Entis, from eternity, it must be Modus Dei: For there was no ens ab aeterno but God: If it be Modus Dei, it is Dens: For all in God is God.
2. If it be Relatio, it is absoluti alicujus relatio. If so, either of some real Being, or of nothing. If of a Being from eternity, it must be a Relation of God to the thing future, in that he either willed or fore-knew • . For nothing was eternal but God. And if so, that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing. If something, it is God himself, and so hath no cause. If nothing, it is no effect, and so hath no •••• . But if it be the Relation of nothing, viz. of the thing future, (to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future) than it is nothing itself: For the Relation of nothing cannot be something, a real accident without a real Subject.
3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis, it was Rationis Divinae; for there was no created Reason ab aeterno: And if so, either Aptitudinal or Actual. If Actual, it was God: For all his Idea's and entia rationis (for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God,) must needs be God himself, and so have no cause. If Aptitudinal, and not yet in mente divina, but objecta possibilia; either they were something or nothing. If something, then there was something eternal besides God, which is not said by any of us. If nothing, to call them future, signifieth no more, but that God's infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were, which is true: But futurity itself being nothing, hath no cause.
4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations, it is something or nothing that is denominated future. I know you will say, It's nothing. If so quatenus extrinsical to God, it was from eternity nothing, which you call a Denomination. But if you mean the Act of God denominating, it was quid reale, that is God himself, who hath no cause. But yet this is the true foundation of the notion. Because God's Knowledge of all things, and his Will of all good things, extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity; therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be, and a Will which willeth all that he will do; And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity. And so from an extrinsic Denomination of God's Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings, and then talk, and write, and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams, as if they were some things. And this is the work of the fantastical World. And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia, & Species, & Entia rationis, & Universalia. And with Aristotle, Themistius, &c. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth, &c. O what work have vain notions, and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World, but in the Church, and among those that call themselves Orthodox, and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures! (The notion of Privations, I need not here apply.)
But things future are future, whether any one think of them or not.
And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others, whatever is said to them. It is certain, that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes & negantes quoad existentiam. That which only will be is not. Therefore the name signifieth nothing, but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it; but it implieth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio, which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say, It will be. And there needs no more to that, but the eternal perfection of God's own Intellect. But I have said more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more.
But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be, unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be (by his permission)?
I abhor the question and supposition. That such worms as we, who know not what God's Intellect or Will is, should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin, unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it; yea, unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it. When it is a wiser way of arguing, to say, [This is the way that man knoweth by, and that man can comprehend: Ergo it is not like to be the way of God's fore-knowledge.] But remember one thing, that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter? For is not the form future?
Yes.
And is not God's Will his Love?
Yes.
And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin, which yet you say that no wicked man loveth?
No: It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth.
O excellent distinguishing! He willeth not the form of Sin, but only willeth that it be, or exist. The form is the Essence: He willeth that the Essence exist; but willeth not the Essence, which is nothing, but as existing! But do wicked men will anymore, or so much, as that the form exist?
Dr. Twisse saith, No.
And if it were but the Act that existed, doth not God's Law make it sin, by forbidding it, and so cause the Essence?
Yes.
And if you say that God willeth the existence of the form of Sin, why say you that he doth not cause it? Is not his Will effective? or is it anymore contrary to his Holiness to cause it, than to will or love it?
He causeth the existence, but not the form or existence.
What juggling is this in such tremendous matters? 1. What is it to cause the form, but to cause that it exist. To cause it to be, is all the causing that it can have. 2. And you confess that God's Law, by forbidding it, maketh it sin in specie when it existeth. Remember that you say that it is not only the matter, but the form of sin, which God willeth and causeth to exist. And is it not a contradiction to call it evil, and yet say that God willeth it? when his Will is the Rule of Goodness?
It is not evil to God, but to us.
So Dr. Twisse saith: And to be evil to us (even man's sin or damna ••• n) is not evil to God. And so God is the great Lover of Sin and Damnation. But why then is he said to hate it? And is it not an Enemy to God, and contrary to his Holiness? Why did Christ die for that which God so loved?
Sin is nothing, and therefore God causeth it not.
1. Relations and Privations have their Causes, and so hath Sin. 2. Else man cannot be condemned for causing it.
The Synod of Dort and Reformed Churches teach no such Doctrine: But it •• such as you that tempt the Arminians to revile them, and say, that you describe God in the shape of the Devil, and much worse, as loving and causing sin and misery more than he: that so the love of God may be extinguished.
I think we must leave these Mysteries to God.
But, good Brother, though I have stopped your mouth and censures of your Brethren, in this and such matters, do you expect that every • onest Christian must be able to discuss all your Logical Fallacies, or else go with you for unsound and heterodox? And have you dealt fairly by the Church of God, to borrow from the School-men such snares for men's Consciences? And must every man be persuaded that God is the greatest lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act, that is not able to answer your smoky Sophisms about futurition and its eternal cause, with such like. I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as Eve, and turned men from the simplicity that is in Christ.
I pray briefly give me the sum of what you drive at.
The sum is, That though every Party, and almost every person of each Party, have odd notions of his own, and peculiar weapons, to wound his Brothers Reputation with, and militate against Love and Concord, and manifest the Pride of his self-conceited Understanding; yet all sober Christians, I think, are agreed in all this Controversy of God's Decrees, in all that is truly necessary to our brotherly love and peace. That is, All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth, and to give all the Grace and Mercy which at any time he giveth, whether to all or some. And that he absolutely and properly decreed no more. (But improperly he may be said to will an event in tantum, when he willeth only to do so much, or so much which naturally conduceth towards it, though he know that it will never come to pass.) But what it is that God actually doth or giveth in time is all the controversy, which is to be spoken of in the third Chapter. And were it not for your tenaciousness of contentious notions, I needed to have said no more than these few words here of God's Decrees.
THE Third Days Conference (With an ARMINIAN of Universal and Special REDEMPTION
The second Article of our Difference is so fundamental and • omen tous, and our distance so great, that I cannot believe that you can say anything sufficient to reconcile us.
They that study Controversy as such, are apt everywhere to fin • matter of Quarrel, and weapons of Contention; but they that see • peace do find out the terms and means of peace, as sure and easy in them selves, which Contenders cannot see.
Tell me, in a word, Are not all Parties agreed, that Christ by his Merits and Sufferings, procured for men all mercies which he giveth them •••• and no more, (but as he may be said to procure them that which he offereth and bringeth to their choice; which is properly to proc • re them that offer, or the benefit as offered?)
Yes, I think both sides will grant this, that he purchased all that he giveth, and absolutely or fully no more.
Why then all the Controversy is, what he giveth men: and that belongeth to the third and fourth Articles: And so I might dismiss this at the beginning, but for your expectations.
But what is it that maketh you think the difference so great?
The first Crimination.
1. The Calvinists and Synodists deny Christ's very Office, as he is the Savior of the World, and the second Adam, the Redeemer of Mankind, and the Mediator between God and Man. And all this they confine to a small part of the World.
Have you never read what Musculus hath written in Loc. Commun. and Bullinger in his Decades for universal Redemption? Have you not read the plain words of Calvin, cited by Amyraut in Defens. Doct. Calvin. (though Petavius rail at him for it most furiously)? Have you not read the writings of Joh. Bergius, Conrad. Bergius, Lud. Crocius, Calixtus, of Cameron, and his Followers at Saumers, of Testardus, Dallaeus, Blondel's Preface, &c. for Universal Redemption? Have you not read in the writings of Bishop Rob. Abbots, Bishop Carelton, Arch-bishop Usher, Bishop Hall, Dr. Sam. Ward, &c. their judgments for it? Have you not read Bishop Davenant 's excellent Dissertation for it, de morte Christi? Know you not that it was the judgment of Dr. Preston, Mr. W. Whateley, Mr. W. Fenner, and many excellent Divines among us? Know you not that Dr. Twisse himself, I believe twenty, if not forty times over in his Works, saith, That Christ so far died for all, as to procure and give them Pardon and Salvation, on condition they will repent and believe; but he died moreover for the Elect, to procure and give them Faith and Repentance also? Know you not that Pareus in his Irenicon saith, That the Sins of all the World lay on Christ on the Cross, as the cause of his Death? Know you not that it is the commonest Doctrine of the Protestants, That Christ died for all men as to the sufficiency of his death, but for the Elect only as to the efficiency of Salvation? And what can you say more or less than those few words signify? Know you not that the Synod at Dort itself saith,
You may spare your labor of citing Bullinger and Musculus, or Melanchthon, or Bucer, or such moderate men: But what are they to the rigid Calvinists?—
Calvin saith, in Rom. 5. 18. [Communem omnium gratiam facit, quia omnibus exposita est: Non quod ad omnes extendatur reipsa: Nam & si passus est Christus pro peccatis totius mundi at{que} omnibus Indifferenter Dei benignitate offertur, non tamen omnes apprehendunt.]
And in 1 Cor. 8. 11. [Dictum memorabile quo docemur quam (Chara) esse debeat nobis fratrum salus; nec omnium modo, sed singulorum, quando prounoquo{que} fusus est sanguis Christi.]
And in 2 Pet. 2. 1. [Non immerito dicuntur Christum abnegare à quo redempti sunt,—].
And in 1 Joh. 2. 2. He saith, That qui dicunt [Christum sufficienter pro toto mundo passum esse, sed pro elect is tantum efficaciter,] say true, and that which commonly obtaineth in the Schools, though he otherwise expound that Text.
You need not cite Calvin: Grotius said truly that he had his Lucida intervalla; and though Amyraut seek to defend him from selfcontradiction, Petavius calls him all to naught for it: But what can you say for your high Antiarminians, such as Pareus, Molinaeus, &c.
Pareus, (let all mark it) saith, Irenic. cap. 24. pag. 142. [Quod Christus pro solis electis satisfecit, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est, vel falsa accusatio: Omnium peccata Christus portavit, dissolvit, expiavit, si magnitudinem pretii, seu 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sufficientiam spectemus: Non omnium sed tantum fidelium, si 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , efficaciam, fructum, applicationem.] To which he citeth Ambrose, Innocent, Lyra, adding [Juxta hunc intellectum nulla est dissensio.
Art. 6. itidem 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est vel falsa accusatio. Promissiones Gratiae sunt Universales, pertinent{que} ad omnes, quoad praedicationem, invitationem, & mandatum credendi.]
And on 2 Pet. 2. 1. [Erant Redempti respectu sufficientiae 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c.]
Molinaeus Anatom. Arminianis. saith, cap. 27. sect. 8, 9.
That most methodical acute Divine, Georg. Sohnius, saith, Tom. 1. Thes. de Justific. (mihi) pag. 104.
But such violent men as Zanchi (the grand Patron of the impossibility of falling away) talk not at this rate.
Zanchi saith, (Thes. Vol. 3. fine, Thes. 13. 16. de Volunt. Dei) Eadem de causa dici non potest Dei voluntatem proprie & simpliciter fuisse, ut Christus pro salute omnium moreretur, id est, ut omnis per ejus mortem servaretur, ac proinde Christum secundum propositum patris pro salute omnium mortuum esse; sed tantum, ut loquuntur, sufficienter.—Caeterum damnari etiam illi non possunt, qui spectata revelata voluntate Dei docent, & Deum velle omnes homines salvos fieri, & Christum pro salute omnium hominum mortuum esse, & neutrum velle peccatum; cum haec omnia sint verissima.
And de Relig. Christ. fid. cap. 12. Thes. 2. [Credimus (Mar. 16. 16.) licet omnibus hominibus per Evangelii praedicationem Gratia Redemptionis, salus ac vita aeterna à Deo dispensanda serio proponantur, (quod enim permulti hujus non siunt participes, ipsorum sit vitio & culpa reipsa tamen non communicari nisi—electis, vocatis—]
What ever these hold, I am sure your English Calvinists hold otherwise.
Have you not read Bishop Usher 's Tract, for Universal Redemption? Have you not read Davenant 's Dissert. de morte Christi, so oft mentioned? Have you not read the Life of Dr. Preston, and how in the Dispute with Dr. White he maintained Universal Redemption? Mr. William Fenner in his Hidden Manna brings in Cain saying, [Christ died not for me, &c.] and answereth, [Mentiris Cain, Christ died for thee.] It would be too long to cite all.
D. Rob. Abbot de Verit. Grat. Christi, pag. 35, 36, 37. [Huic disputati • ni dabit initium—Ambrosis Sententia in Luc. c. 7. l. 6. [Etsi Christus pro omnibus passus est, specialiter tamen pro nobis passus est—] Quibus verbis aperte significat ita Christum pro omnibus mortuum, ut tamen in morte Christi, hand omnes pares existimandi sunt. Communiter quidem pro omnibus mortuum— viz. pro omnibus satisfacere voluisse dignitate pretii—esto Christum in promiscuo sensu generis humani, se aliquo modo pro Judae dedisse, &c. —Ne{que} enim Christus qua homo partitionem hominum vel discretionem ullam instituit ut quemquam dici possit à mortis suae beneficio excepisse, qui hac quidem ration pro persequentibus & crucifigentibus promisono patrem rogat, nostro quod sit exemplo—Quod certe dolere non potnisset, nisi pro illis quo{que} quantum ex homine, crucem obire statuisset—]
I told you before what Dr. Twisse saith twenty times over, That [Christ died to purchase Pardon for all if they will believe (conditionally) but for the Elect to purchase them also Faith itself.]
The Annotations called the Assemblies, say, on Heb. 10. 29.
Abundance more I could easily cite.
But they do but juggle and cheat the World with the Vizor of a Doctrine that cannot endure the Light: For by sufficiens pretium some say they mean but sufficiens si pretium fuisset, and no price at all.
Those be but a few odd conceited persons, driven by you into extremes: They profess that Christ hath sufficiently satisfied for all, and purchased them effectually a conditional Pardon. They call not that a sufficient price and satisfaction which is none at all.
But we agree not as to God's intent of the benefits to all.
1. That concerneth the Decrees. 2. The sober Papists agree, and say just the very same as the Synod. See Estius in 3. Sent. d. 19. sect. 3. Tapperus, Art. 6. Malderus Antisynod. p. 23, 24. Fr. Sonnius demonstr. Relig. Christ. l. 3. c. 19. Rivet citeth these, Disp. 6. de Redempt. And he himself makes Christ's death even partly effectual for all. And will you be more contentious and violent than all the sober Papists and Calvinists?
Know you not how excellently our British Divines in the Synod of Dort have opened this, and as well the three Breme Divines, but above • ll, most clearly and briefly the learned Matthius Martinius there? But I will name no more, when it is the whole of the famous Dallaeus his Apolog. Cont. Spanhem. Part. 4. To. 1. to show the consent of Protestants herein: And when his whole Second Tome • is to cite the very words of an hundred and twenty Fathers and Councils, for Universal Redemption and Grace, (Theophylact being the last) and sixty three Protestant Churches and Writers that speak for it, to whom I could add many more.
If this be so, how cometh it to be a Controversy?
A few particular men on each side that run into extremes, when once engaged run on further, and make a great noise, while sober men in silence pity them; And so with some the greatest and the loudest are taken to speak the common sense. And thus Spanhemius, Maccovi • s, and a few much inferior to them in learning here in England, have kept up the Contention. And several of the Jesuits, Lutherans and Arminians, have run out into the contrary extreme; and so the difference hath been made and maintained. So that with most Christians, the controversy is not whether Christ be the Savior of the World, or died for all men; but how far, and in what sense he did so, that this Article may agree with the rest of our Theology.
The sense is all: If we agree not in sense, we agree in nothing.
The few extreme Contenders agree not in sense: But the generality of Christians, much more may I say Protestants, do, in all that is necessary to our common concord. If really you differ, tell me yourself, What do you hold that Christ purchased for all men, more than the Synodists do? Name me one benefit if you can.
You would persuade me that we differ not indeed. 1. We hold that Christ procured and made the first Covenant of Grace with all Mankind in Adam and Noah: and so do not the Synodists.
I think you can name few Protestants that deny it. Beza himself in that Edit. of his Annot. in Eph. 2. 12. which H. Stephanus printed 1588. saith, [This Covenant was made in the beginning, Gen. 3. 15. with Adam, and all that should be born of him; and afterwards, Gen. 9. 10. with Noah, the other Parent of Mankind; as we have else-where noted,] plainly, they say that it is made to all men as a Law, then promulgate to Adam and Noah; even a Law of Grace, which Mankind was put under; And as an offered Covenant, and conditional Promise: But as, 1. A mutual Covenant. 2. And as giving right to Life, it is made, only with Consenters. Tell me whether you differ from this sense?
No; this sense is according to the Scriptures. But moreover, 2. We hold that the second Edition of the Covenant also is made to all.
It's granted you, that it's made to all that hear it, as far as aforesaid; and that Ministers should do their best to preach it to all: And do you hold anymore?
No: But, 3. We hold that this Covenant pardoneth all men's sins, on condition of Faith and Repentance, and not only the Elect.
So do they, unanimously: I told you Twisse twenty times over saith the same. No man can deny that which is the very plain scope of the Covenant itself, to pardon all if they will repent and believe.
4. But, We hold also that Christ purchased for all men sufficient Grace to enable them to repent and believe.
I told you that is the Controversy of the third and fourth Articles; what Grace Christ giveth all, he procured for all, which is not here to be anticipated, but opened in due place: And if I then manifest that in that point also you differ not, I shall prove that you differ not at all in these Points of Christ's Death and Universal Grace.
But they say, That Christ died only for the Elect, effectually and with a purpose to save them, and purposed to save no other.
You carry back the Controversy to God's Decrees, which we dispacht before. Tell me, 1. Do you hold that all are saved by Christ?
No; that's none of the Controversy.
Why then quarrel you with them that say, He died but for the Elect effectually, when they mean but that he saveth no other?
But his death effected something for them; viz. the new Covenant and common Grace, though it effect not their Salvation.
Who denieth any of this? not the Synod of Dort. But, 2. Do you hold that God absolutely purposed to save any by Christ that never are saved?
No: but conditionally he purposed it.
Have we not before proved, that your quarrel about conditional Decrees, is but a strife about words in the dark.
But they say Christ died not equally for all.
Do you, or dare you, say otherwise yourselves? 1. You confess that his Death doth not equally save all: 2. You confess that from eternity God fore-knew who would believe and be saved, and who not. Now the question is of equality of benefit (before denied) and equality of Intention: And can you think that Christ, as God, at the time of his Death (or before) did equally intend or decree to save those that he fore-knew would neither believe nor be saved, and those that he knew would believe and be saved? You cannot, you do not imagine this.
We do not: But we say that as to God's antecedent Will, he both elected and redeemed all alike; and the inequality is only in his consequent Will. But the Synodists say otherwise.
1. If you understand the distinction aright, they say the same as you: that is, If you thus distinguish only of the Will of God as Rector, or his governing Will, and by the Antecedent Will mean only the Legislative which making our Duty, goeth before our doing or notdoing it, and by the consequent Will, mean only the judicial which followeth Duty and Sin. God dealeth equally by all men in the first, (as to the tenor of his Law, though the different promulgation make a difference of Obligations,) but unequally in the second.
2. And if you distinguish thus of his eternal Decrees, either they respect Damnation or Salvation. And by his Antecedent Will, you mean that which goeth before the fore-sight of man's Will, and by the consequent, that which followeth this fore-sight. Now, 1. Have I not said enough to convince you that as it is Actus Agentis in God, we cannot prove any diversity or priority? But only ex connotatione objecti. 2. And as to Damnation, I have proved that they commonly agree with you, that God decreeth not Sin, but fore-seeth it, and decreeth Damnation only as for foreseen Sin. Whatever Piscator and a few more say, this is the common Doctrine of Protestants and Fathers. 3. But as to Election dare you say yourself, that God decreeth to change no man's Will, but upon fore-sight that the person himself will first change it? If man change it first, God need not to come after to change it: If God change it first, then he decreed first to change it, and did not first fore-see it changed.
Neither: But he fore-seeth man's concurrence or not-concurrence with his changing Act of Grace.
But can you think that he equally operateth on all, and that all the inequality is in their concurrence? Doth he do as much on every Persecutor (equally prepared) as he did on Saul? Doth he call all to follow him as effectually ex parte sui, as he did Peter, Andrew, &c. who presently left all and followed him? Did Christ himself preach to all Nations? or only to the Circumcision? Were not the sins of the Jews as much aggravated as those of Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah? or the Indians? why else should it go worse with them in the day of Judgment? and why else would Tyre and Sidon have repented if they had but had their means, were they not then as much prepard for mercy? Doth God equally send the Gospel to all Nations and Persons equally unworthy? Can you confute St. Paul? Rom. 9. Or can you give any reason why God must show equal mercy unto all?
I fully confuted this before, 1. Respecting persons is the fault of a Rector as such, especially as Judge: And so God dealeth equally; his Law being Norma officii & judicii as to all. But no man ever yet took either, 1. A Proprietor (Dominus absolutus); 2. Or a Benefactor, to be obliged to equality to all. Must you needs use all your Grounds, Trees, Goods, Cattle, &c. equally? Must you needs make all men equally your bosom-Friends, your Heirs, your Beneficiaries, who are equally worthy in themselves? Must you needs give equally to all the poor, that are of equal need and merit? All this is contrary to the common sense and usage of Mankind.
2. And in a Judge, respecting persons, is the vice of them that deal unequally with men for some by-respect unworthy of such a difference; As for Birth, Beauty, Wealth, Power, Eloquence, Parts, Wit, Kindred, or any selfish interest, to pervert Justice, or deal partially. But God maketh no difference on such accounts. Yea a Judge himself, or a King, when he acteth not as a Judge, but as a King above Laws, or as a Benefactor, may reprieve or pardon one Thief rather than another, yea and choose that which is the most learned, strong, wise, and capable of future Service to the Common-wealth.
This seemeth a wrong to the rest that are not so used?
Would it do the Thief that is hanged any good, to have the other unpardoned? Would it ease their pains in Hell, to have the company of all those that be in Heaven? If it be no wrong to them to suffer themselves, nothing but envy can call it a wrong to them, to have others escape. Had they love to others as themselves, it would be some comfort to them to think that others are in Joy and Glory?
At least this is a real difference between the Parties.
1. The School-men and many learned Jesuits (as I have proved, Lib. 1.) make it not a difference. And will you called Arminians or Lutherans go further from your Protestant Brethren, than the learned Papists and Jesuits themselves go? Are you not ashamed of this?
2. The Papists can bear with one another in these Points, and live in communion in one Church, (though the Jansenists Case hath had more than ordinary heats and stirs;) And yet the Dominicans go higher and further in the Controversy of Predetermination from the Jesuits, than the Synodists do: And are you more fierce or unpeaceable than they?
3. But remember here once for all, that you were not able to name any one benefit which Christ's death procured for all, other than the Synodists hold as well as you: But only you charge them as asserting more to the Elect. They give more (you say) to some, but not less to all.
4. And all this lieth in the point of Intention and Divine Decrees, which was sufficiently reconciled before.
But you have by all this enticed me to mingle various Controversies, and to anticipate that of Grace and Free-will, which is to be handled by itself in due place.
But I have a word more to give you, by way of caution, if you will think on it.
What's that?
What will you say if Episcopius, Arminius, Corvinus, are the men that deny most Universal Redemption, while the Synod maintaineth it? How can Christ die for the sins of any Infants in proper sense, if they have no sin, and deserve no punishment? Or be a Savior to save them from sin and punishment that have none?
The second Crimination.
By denying common Redemption, they deny the express words of Scripture, which saith, That Christ tasted death for every man, Heb. 2. 9. That he is the Savior of the World, Joh. 4. 12. That he is the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the World, Joh. 1. 29. That he died for all, that they which live, should live to him that died for them, 2 Cor. 5. 14, 15. That God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, 2 Cor. 5. 19, 20. That he is the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe, 1 Tim. 4. 10. That the Grace of God which bringeth Salvation to all men, hath appeared, Tit. 2. 11, 12. That he is the Propitiation for our Sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole World, 1 Joh. 2. 2. with much more to the same purpose. And do these men deal sincerely with God and the Scripture, that can distort all this to their own sense? And do they not use such violence with God's Word and their Consciences, as that on these terms they may make their own Religion, and believe what they list? Do they not plainly show that they take not their Faith from God, but from their Teachers, and believe as the Church believeth which they join with? Had it been but one or two Texts, or had they been obscurely uttered, a good man might have thought that he must reduce their sense to the many and more plain. But to oppugn the plain Gospel itself hath no ex • use.
You are sharp against other men's Errors, and other men against yours. But I have proved to you that the Synod, and the generality of the Protestant Churches in their Confessions, deny not anything which these Texts say. They hold a common Redemption as well as you: our very Children are taught in their Catechism distinctly to believe, [1. In God the Father, who made them and all the World, 2. In God the Son, who redeemed them and all Mankind. 3. And in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth them and all the Elect People of God.] This is the good old Doctrine, plain and true, and that which Austin taught.
I am sure many of their Writers expressly oppugn common Redemption; and even Jasenius the Papist who joineth with them denieth it, and saith, that Augustine denied it: Therefore we stand not to his authority.
1. As for Augustine and some Protestants, they oft deny that Christ redeemeth any but the Faithful, because the word Redemption is ambiguous, and sometimes taken for the price or ransom paid, and often for the very liberation of the captive Sinner. And when ever Austin denieth common Redemption, he taketh Redemption in this last sense, for actual deliverance. But he asserteth it in the first sense, that Christ died for all. Yea, he thought his death is actually applied to the true Justification and Sanctification of some Reprobates that fall away and perish, though the Elect only are so redeemed as to be saved. Read yourself Augustine, Prosper and Fulgentius, and you will see this with your own eyes.
2. I have oft told you, it is our Protestant Confessions, and not some singular or private Writers, that you must know their Doctrine by.
3. Even those few Writers differ more from you in terms than in sense. For, 1. Many of them will confess all the same benefits by Christ to men in common which you assert. Few of them will deny that Salvation is tendered to all men's acceptance, and brought to the choosing or refusing of their own Wills. And you seem to them to say no greater matters as for the Elect. But they say that Christ purchased Faith itself for the Elect only, of which in due place. 2. And so with them the Controversy is, 1. About God's Decree or Intent of saving men by Christ. 2. And of giving them Faith.
Tell me one word that you except against in the Synod in this Article.
I except against sect. 8. where they say that [Fuit hoc Dei patris liberrimum consilium, & gratiosissima voluntas at{que} intentio, ut mortis pretiosissimae filii sui vivifica & salvifica efficacia sese exereret in omnibus electis, ad eos solos fide justificante donandos & per eam ad salutem infallibiliter perducendos: hoc est, voluit Deus, ut Christus per sanguinem crucis, quo novum foedus confirmavit, ex omni populo, gente, tribu & lingua, eos omnes & solos qui ab aeterno ad salutem electi & a patre ipsi dati sunt, efficaciter redimeret, fide donaret, ab omnibus peccatis sanguine suo mundaret, ad finem us{que} fideliter custodiret, tandem abs{que} omni labe & macula gloriosos coram se sisteret.]
Very good: This is all in the Canons that you can except against. And, 1. You see that this is only about God's Intention or Decree: And so you differ not at all by your own confession, in the Article of Redemption, as distinct from that of the Decrees.
2. Is it the inclusion of the Elect in this Intention that you except against? So will no sober Jesuit. Do you think that Christ was resolved certainly to justify and glorify no man at all? The Semi-Pelagians will not say so. You say not so yourselves. Only some of you say, it is but upon fore-sight of Faith, and by the consequent will, of which I have said enough before. But do you think that Christ when he was on the Cross had no full purpose to save those infallibly who he fore-knew would believe, yea and to cause some men to believe? Those that come to him are drawn by the Father, and Faith is the Gift of God, Ephes. 2. 8. Who giveth us all things pertaining to life and godliness, 2 Pet. 1. 3. Even to will and to do of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13. To some it is given to believe, Phil. 1. 29. But of this enough before.
3. But, I suppose, it is only the word [Solos] in all the Canons that you except against. And dare or will you say, that God did absolutely intend and decree to sanctify and glorify all men by Christ? or any one that is not glorified?
But their meaning is, that all the rest which are most of the World, are left out of God's Election, even unto sin and damnation, merely because God would so have it, and not from any ill desert of theirs anymore than was in the Elect: which appeareth in that (as Episcopius noteth). They that say the Fall or Sin is quid praevisum, foreseen in Reprobation, yet deny that it is any cause of Reprobation: And then all cometh to one, whether God reprobate a Sinner or an innocent person, as to the cause.
You have nothing about Redemption, I perceive, still to controvert, but about God's Decrees: If we must go back to them, review your words, and see how you cheat yourselves into distaste of you know not what, by mere confusion, for want of accurate Scholastic Heads, (I except not Episcopius himself, notwithstanding men of his own measure think otherwise.)
1. Whereas you talk of [leaving out] either you mean non-Election, or positive exclusion. If the last, it's false: not only the Scotists, but some Protestants (as Ferrius in Scholast. Orthodox. and others,) assert but a negation here; And Davenant and the Synod assert but a negative Decree quoad objectum; which is but as much as Arminius propugneth, who while he maintaineth that God decreeth not sin, but only his own permission of sin, (which is the Synods sense) yet hereby confesseth that he willeth or decreeth that permission. You say then that he decreeth to permit men's unbelief, and this is all that the Synod saith of non-Election, or leaving men out of the number of the Elect.
2. If you yourselves believe all this, with what face can you oppose the same in others? If you do not, either you believe that none are Infidels and damned, or you believe that God doth not permit it to be so, but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency, or else you know not what you believe: choose which you will.
3. Do you really differ (as Episcopius pretendeth) about the cause of Reprobation? As to the cause of Damnation, all are agreed that sin is the true meritorious cause. The question is only of God's Will or Decree of it. And it is not of his sententia prolata, or Decree pronounced by Christ in Judgment: for of that also it is agreed that sin is the meritorious cause. Your oft recurring to your Objections, when they have been fully answered, puts me on the rediousness of repeating the same Answers. God's Will is considered either ex parte volentis essentially, or as extrinsically denominated from the connotation of the Object. In the first sense, you have not yet declared yourselves to deny the common Doctrine of the Christian World, that God's Will is his undivided most simple Essence; and that God hath no cause, and so his Will in itself hath no cause; that in God there is nothing but God. Dare you say that a Creature made God? yea, that so base a thing as Sin made him? How then doth it cause his Will which is himself? Is God's Will such a mutuable thing as man's? And is it not the first cause of all things? And shall men pretending to Learning reproach others, for not assigning a cause of the first cause, and that Sin, which is baser than a Creature, causeth the Creator?
But if you speak of God's Will as denominated by connotation of the Object; mark what we grant you, viz. that as thus only God's Will or Volitions are denominated diverse, so are they denominated to be of this or that sort, and numerically also distinguished; And so they may be said to have a cause, but not an efficient cause, but only an objective cause; And what Cause is an Object? To let pass the Error of many Logicians, it is only (as an Object) a material constitutive cause (at least here:) And so sin is the objective material cause of that extrinsical denomination and relation of God's Will, called Reprobation to damnation. It is that dispositio objecti which is essential to the Object. And so as God's Will may any way be said to have a cause, we will say freely, after the manner of men, that sin is the objective cause of the Decree of damnation. And speak now with shame, can you say more or less? Do you or any of us that are sober and understand ourselves, differ at all in this?
4. And you cheat yourselves and others more, in saying, [Not from any ill desert of theirs more than others]. When if you would speak congruously, you should only say, that when all deserved to be utterly forsaken, [God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect, not for any good desert of theirs above others.] You would infinuate, that God must punish no man, unless he deserve worse than every man whom he forgiveth; which is false. Do you not yourselves believe that all have sinned, and come short of the Glory of God? and that God might justly have let them perish? Do you not hold yourselves, that all men are guilty of resisting or sinning against Grace itself as well as against Nature? and that God may justly with-hold his Grace from the Rejecters of it? and if he did so by all he did not wrong them? If God then leave not all, as he might do, but resolve to prevail with some infallibly, do you represent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others?
What if it be apparent that you yourselves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World, as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone? (or as many of us do?) For they do but say that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills: And you say that he doth so by all the World. You say that God giveth all men that hear the Gospel so much Grace, as that they may have Christ and Salvation, if they will; And they say so too as confidently as you do. Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they? you cannot tell me: And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not. Only they say and think that they give more to God's Grace as to the Elect than you do, which is to be examined anon.
And then you will quarrel about the Cause of the first Cause, the Will of God, and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man, which is an effect and that of many Causes. Is it not enough for you that sin is the cause of all punishment, but it must also be the efficient cause of God's Will which is God? Yet again I tell you that all sobe • men will agree with you, that God's Volitions of extrinfick Objects, viz. Reprobations, denominate not God's Essence as such; (for we use not to say, [God is Reprobation or Election:] but only his Essence as terminated ad extra.) And (to gratify you to the utmost) we distinguish an operating efficient Cause, from a recipient Cause; And we maintain that a Sinner is the recipient Cause of God's damning Volition or Reprobation: As shutting the Windows is the cause that my Room is dark, and opening them is the cause that they are light, not by causing the Sun to shine, but by receiving (or not receiving) it; so man is a receiving Cause of the Effects of God's Will and Operation, and of the Will and Operation itself, as extrinsically denominated and diversified by the Effects. But this recipient Cause, is nothing but cause materialis objectiva, which hath two parts, the ipsa materia and the materiae dispositio. Take not on you still to differ, where you do not.
The third Crimination.
By denying Universal Redemption, they deny that Universal Grace, which is the very express Covenant of Grace itself, that all men are already through Christ's satisfaction reconciled to God, and pardoned if they will believe; or that a conditional pardon is already given to the World. And to deny this, is to deny the Gospel, and Christianity itself, and to be no Christians.
You would make yourselves and others believe that they deny that which they never dreamed of denying. Like him that dreamed that he was wounded, and called out for something to stop the blood. Do not all Protestaents profess to believe that Covenant and conditional Pardon as well as you? Do they not preach it constantly, and administer Baptism in the same terms as you do? who denieth that all are reconciled, if they will believe?
But by that they mean only exclusively that all are not reconciled or pardoned, because all believe not; And not inclusively that all men are conditionally pardoned already.
You mistake and slander them: Do they not read the very express pardon made already in God's Word? That [Whoever believeth shall not perish,] &c. Joh. 3. 16. Mark 16. 16? Do they not all acknowledge that this is a Law of God, an Act of Oblivion, Enacted long ago by God? And is not this visible written Promise or Law of Grace an existent conditional pardon of all? No man of sense, and understanding, and faith denieth it.
But they say that in making it God's secret intent, was, that none but the Elect should have any saving benefit of it.
1. Still you are returning to the dispatched Controversy of the Decrees; which is a confession that you disser not otherwise about Redemption. 2. Do not you yourselves hold the same which you quarrel with? 1. Inclusively they hold that the Elect shall be saved by Christ. And do you deny it? 2. As to the exclusion of others, they hold that God decreed not any man's Infidelity and Sin, but fore-seeing their Infidelity and Sin, decreed that they should not be saved by Christ, but perish. And do not you say the same? Away with these contentious dreams.
I am sure I can name you divers that say otherwise.
It is the Synod still, and the common Confessions and Doctrine of the Churches which you have to do with: Tell not me of singular men.
The Doctrine of the Church of England, I told you out of the Catechism. The Synods words I recited. And remember (as Dallaeus tells Spanhemius) that Davenant with the rest of the British Divines, Martinius and the other Breme Divines, who all gave their suffrages, and writ for Universal Redemption, did yet all subscribe in the Synod; And therefore undoubtedly understood that no words of the Canons were contrary to their sense of Universal Redemption. The later famous Helvetian confession saith, [We teach and believe that this Jesus Christ our Lord is the only and eternal Savior of Mankind, yea and of the whole world,] (upon which words the English Collector of the Confessions giveth us a ridiculous Observation, that he thinks they meant the restoring of the world at last; contrary to the context: As if he had not known that Musculus, Bullinger, &c. were for Universal Redemption.)
But that I be not over-tedious, I pray you peruse in Dallaei Apolog. To. 2. the citations out of the Confessions and Catechisms, and Liturgies of the Reformed Churches, viz. Of Berne, August. Bohem. Helvert. Saxon. Anglic. Palatin. Synod. Dord. Colloq. Torun. with a multitude of Protestant Divines.
The fourth Crimination.
They make it impossible for any man to believe in Christ at first, by a rational and true Faith: For his dying for men, being the Object of Faith, must be before the Act. And no man by their way can know that Christ died for him till he is a Believer; and yet they say that our first saving Faith must be a believing and trusting in Christ, as one that died for us. So that men must stay till they believe that Christ died for them, that they may have reason to believe that he died for them. For before the first Faith, or belief of it, they can have none.
You still make the world believe that men hold that which they do not. This concerneth not the Churches, but some singular men. The common Protestant Doctrine is, That Christ by his Death hath procured the universal conditional Gift of Pardon and Life, contained in the Covenant of Grace, Mark 16. 16. Joh. 3. 16, &c. And that his death was thus far efficient, by which it is sufficient for the actual Justification and Salvation of penitent Believers. And that this is it that men must first believe, and so accept of an offered Savior for Justification and Life, and give up themselves to him in the baptismal Covenant: which when they do they are justified and adopted, having right to and union with Christ, and in him right to the Covenant-benefits. And then Christ's death which was sufficient by its efficiency of Satisfaction, Merit, and the Covenant-grant, becometh efficient of Justification, &c. And are not you and they agreed in this? I confess that many singular Divines have given you this occasion: But what's that to the Churches?
The fifth Crimination.
They tell men that they must believe a Lye, or an unrevealed thing, that by believing it, it may become true, and they may be saved, and ese they shall be damned. For they say that Christ died for none but the Elect: And yet that others also are bound to believe that he died for them: And because they believe not this Lye God will damn them: But if they did believe it, it would be true: As if the Objective Truth were not before the belief of it.
This also is but your quarrel with singular men, and not with the Churches, unless you wrong them. Their common Doctrine is, that no man in his first act of Faith is bound to believe that he is Elect, or that Christ died for him anymore than for lost Mankind. But that he must first believe that Christ by his Death hath so far satisfied and merited for Mankind in general, as to procure the universal conditional Gift of Christ, Pardon and Life; And that they must believe that this is procured for, and offered to, themselves as well as other Sinners. And hereupon they are to accept this free Gift, and so it is theirs. What lie or unrevealed matter is in this? or what difference about it, among the Churches.
The sixth Crimination.
They disable Ministers rationally to preach the Gospel. For if Christ died for none but the Elect, and no Minister know the Elect, they know not whom to offer and preach Christ to; For the objective Gift must go before the offer: And that which is to be offered to every Sinner is, A Christ that hath already died and satisfied for him; and not one that is to die and satisfy for him yet, if he will believe. Therefore the very offer is as much as to say, [Accept Christ as one that hath satisfied for thee]. And so they make the very preaching of the Gospel, a lie, to most.
I will not answer you as some that say, they tell not men that they are Elect, and that Christ died for them; but that if they will believe, then it is a sign that they are Elect, and Christ died for them: And they may offer him to all, that some may accept him. For I say as you do, that it is a Christ that hath already made satisfaction, and thereby is become a sufficient Savior, who is to be offered to men. And the being of the Gift is before the offer of it in nature. But I say again that you fight against stragglers, in a Cause which the Churches are not concerned in: They say that it is a Christ who died for all as to sufficiency, who is to be offered to men, that he may efficiently save them.
The seventh Crimination.
They leave most men in the World as remediless as the Devils, who had no Redeemer: whereas God judgeth the wicked at last as Rejecters of his remedying Grace. If Christ died not for them, what differ they from the Devils in point of hope?
I will not answer you as some, that though Christ died not for them yet they know it not, and the offer differenceth their Case: For still, I confess, that none is to be offered to men, but a Christ that was already offered to God for them, and hath made satisfaction. But again I tell you, that you fight with a shadow, and feign the Churches to differ from you, because some singular persons do so.
The eighth Crimination.
They harden men in impenitency for the most damning sin; even denying the Lord that bought them: For they tell all the Reprobates that they never sinned against a Christ that died for them.
All this is the old fiction; and concerneth only some singular men.
The ninth Crimination.
They would exempt the Infidel World from much of the torments of Hell: For he that in Hell knoweth that Christ never died for him (especially adding that God unresistibly predetermined him to sin and unbelief,) cannot rationally have an accusing Conscience for his not accepting a Gift that never had a Being.
I will not repeat the same answer as oft as you call for it by the same false supposition. Let them answer it that are concerned.
The tenth Crimination.
They teach the World abominable Ingratitude, and reproachfully deny a great deal of the Grace and Mercy of Christ, and the fruits of his Death and Sacrifice. For they teach men, that all the Mercies given to any besides the Elect, were no fruits of the death of Christ for them, nor were at all by him purchased for them; yea, that they are no Mercies to them at all, because God eternally decreed that they should turn them into sin, and suffer the more for the abuse of them forever. And so all the rest of the World may say that they are not at all beholden to the death of Christ, for their Lives, Liberties, offers of Grace, and all other Mercies.
Let them answer you that are concerned in the Charge. The Reformed Churches hold, That Mercy is to be judged of by its nature and tendency in itself, and not by man's abuse; and that God decreed no man's abuse of it; and that all the Mercies given to Mankind, since the forfeiture of all by Adam 's sin, are procured and given by Christ as the Intercessor and Redeemer of the World; and that wicked men justly are deprived of life for rejecting it, and suffer Hell for abusing Mercy and refusing Heaven.
The eleventh Crimination.
They are Anti-Christian half-Infidels. For they deny Christ's Kingdom as to its far greatest part: For when the Scripture telleth us, That to this end he both died, rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living, Rom. 14. 9. And that the Father hath committed all Judgment (that is Government) to the Son, Joh. 5. 22. And given him all power in Heaven and Earth, Matth. 28. 18. And that his dying for all, obligeth all men not to live to themselves, but to him that died for them, 2 Cor. 5. And so that he hath by his death acquired a jus Dominii & Imperii over all Mankind; they deny him his Crown and Dignity, even this Right of Dominion and Empire as Redeemer, and deny the World to be obliged to subjection to him as their Redeemer: And so make that Rebellion for which they shall perish (Luke 19. 27.) to be no sin.
The Protestant Churches hold all that you charge them with denying. It's a pitiful work to caluminate that you may divide: Tell those singular men of all this, that are guilty of it.
The twelfth Crimination.
They make Christ to come on so narrow a design into the World, as if they would tempt Unbelievers to despise him: Even to die for none in all the World, for 4000 years, save a very few of the little Country of Judea, (which was mostly wicked); and even since the Church was Catholic, but for a few called the Elect.
1. If you and they differ about the conditions of Salvation, say so, and tell the World the difference: If you do not, but are agreed that it is Faith, Repentance and Holiness, what are all these Objections, but fighting by fictions against Concord and Peace? They never held that none out of Judea were saved. And how many in the World are holy Believers, they pretend not to judge. They believe that all that are holy are saved by Christ, in all Ages and Nations of the World: And that all the Order, and Government, and common Mercies of the World, with the offers of Grace and Salvation to them that willfully refuse it, are all to be ascribed to the death and procurement of Christ: And that his common Redemption is presupposed to our Faith and special Grace.
And now if this be all you have to say, review it and tell me, what disagreement you have found out, about the commonness of Redemption.
THE Fourth Days Conference (WITH a CALVINIST) Of Common and Special REDEMPTION.
We are now to try what difference you can find between the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches, or the Synodists and the moderate Arminians, in the Article of Redemption by the death of Christ. Name all that you have against them in this Point alone.
The first Crimination.
They make Christ to have shed his Blood in vain; even for them that he knew were to perish forever.
How prove you it to be in vain? and that God can have no end in it, but actual Salvation de eventu to each person for whom Christ died? 1. When the Scripture most clearly telleth us de facto, That Christ died for all, even for them that perish, and that he bought them that denied him; be afraid of blaspheming God, by telling him, [If Christ died for any that perish, he died in vain.] I accuse you not, but ex natura rei warn you. I durst not tell God so.
2. God made man in Adam capable of Salvation, as the very perfection and end of his faculties and nature, and put him under a conditional Covenant accordingly. And will you say that God made Adam in vain in this capacity, and made the first Promise of Life, and the Tree of Life also, in vain; because Adam, and all of us in him, did sin, and come short of the Glory of God? Nay, God made not the Devils in vain in a state of blessedness, or the way thereto, though he knew that they would forsake that state and perish. It is dangerous reproaching the Counsels and unsearchable Works of God.
3. By your own reckoning it is not in vain: For you say that God's Justice is glorified on Unbelievers, and that this is his end. And what is that Justice, but the punishing of men for rejecting a Christ that died for them, and Grace that was procured and tendered to them?
4. But if you add all the other benefits and ends, you will see that it was not in vain. God demonstrated and so glorified his Love and Mercy to lost Mankind, in the very greatness of the Gift (of Christ, Pardon and Glory,) which the Impenitent do refuse. And Mercy is glorified notwithstanding the refusal. God giveth the Covenant aforesaid, or the conditional Grant of Pardon and Life to the World. He reprieved them, and gave them time of Repentance, and exercised Patience toward them to that end, Rom. 2. 3, 4, 5, 6. Act. 17. Rom. 1. 19, 20, 21, &c. Joh. 3. 16, 18, 19. He governeth the World on terms of Grace. He giveth all men abundance of Mercies and Means of recovery and life. He keepeth the World in order hereby; and maketh the wicked serviceable to the Salvation of Believers. In a word, he will lose nothing by any man's sin against Nature or Grace. Where then is the vanity of the Death of Christ, if in a common degree it be for all?
The second Crimination.
They make Christ an imperfect Savior; by pretending that he died for some, to some lower ends, whom yet he saveth not.
This needeth no other answer than the last. Is God an imperfect God to Adam, because he saved him not by the way of Innocency, at first made by God the way of Life? Or was he an imperfect God and Salvation to the Angels, because they kept not their first Estate? Or is the Holy Ghost an imperfect Sanctifier, because he giveth some but such common and temporary Grace and Faith, as is mentioned in Heb. 6. 5, 6. Matth. 13, &c. Or dare you say that no man that perisheth had any Grace or Gifts of the Holy Ghost, when some prophesied, and cast out Devils in Christ's Name? Must Christ do all that our muddy brains will dictate to him, or else be reproached as an imperfect Savior? O take heed!
The third Crimination.
They cast that absurdity on Christ, as to die for those that were in Hell when he was dying for them, and to make a Medicine for the dead and desperate.
1. As you would state the Supposition, it would be as liable to your charge of absurdity, to say, That he died for them that were long ago pardoned and saved, and to purchase Heaven for them that had possession of it long before. 2. But when we speak of Christ's Death as a Sacrifice for the Sins of all the World, we mean no more, but that in esse cognito & volito, the undertaking was so far for all, as that all should have the conditional Promise or Gift of Life by the Merits of it. And so as all that were saved before Christ's Death, had actual Salvation by it beforehand, as undertaken; so all that perished had a Gift of conditional Pardon and Salvation, and perished for refusing it. But at the time when Christ was dying, we say that he was not then intending to offer the second Edition of his Covenant, either to those in Hell or in Heaven: But only that he purposed to do what he from the beginning undertook, for the undertaken ends.
The fourth Crimination.
They make Christ to die for those that he would not pray for, Joh. 17. I pray not for the world, but for those that thou hast given me out of the world—
He maketh himself to die for them. It is ofter and plainer said that he died for all, than it is, that he prayed not for all. And many plain Texts, yea the scope of the Gospel, must not be reduced to your feigned sense of one obscurer Text.
2. But doth the Text tell us, that he died not for the world, as it tells us, that he prayed not for them? Or doth it tell us, that he died for no more than he then prayed for? Or rather are not these your own Inventions?
3. But where doth the Text say, that Christ never prayed for any but the Elect? yea, or that he prayed not at all for the world, though he put not up that particular prayer for the world? Look on the Text, and you will see that he speaketh there only of the Disciples that followed him on Earth; And that he prayed not in that Petition for all his Elect only; And therefore he after addeth, verse. 20. Neither pray 1 for these alone, but for them also which shall believe in me through their word. And what was the prayer? [That they may be one, and kept from the evil of the world,] which is a blessing peculiar to his Disciples. But it is manifest, that Christ had other prayers for the world, even for many ungodly men; yea, for Reprobates. For, 1. On the Cross he prayeth for his Persecutors, Father, forgive them: And it is men's own invention to say that he meaneth none but the Elect: We must not unnecessarily limit where the Word limiteth not. And Stephen made Christ his Pattern. And it is gross fiction to say that Stephen prayed for none but the Elect.
Doth not Christ say, That his Father heard him always? and can you imagine that he prayed for that which God denied him?
2. My next Answer should have prevented that Objection, which is, that what God giveth to the World for Christ's sake, that Christ may well be said to pray for; For it is the fruit of his Mediation. But God giveth much Pardon, and many Mercies to the World, for Christ's sake. 1. He giveth them an Act of Oblivion of conditional pardon of the eternal punishment; which Christ purchased, and therefore prayed for. 2. He giveth them much Actual pardon of temporal punishments for Christ's sake. All the Life, Health, Time, Gospel, Means and Mercies, which ever he giveth them, are such as deserved full punishment would have deprived them of: And therefore they are all acts of executive pardon of that punishment.
3. And this very Chapter containeth a prayer for the World, viz. verse. 21, 23. That the World may believe, and know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them.— If you say that by the World here is meant only the Elect; I answer, 1. Your word is no Proof. 2. That they are prayed for, to believe and know, &c. is no proof: For many did believe that God sent Christ that yet were not saved. This soundeth but as a common Act of Faith. 3. And note, that here the world is contradistinguished, not only from Apostles, but those (after-mentioned) that should believe by their word; and it is prayed, That the world may know that God loveth those that believe in him: which may extend both to the Conversion of such as then are unconverted, and to the conviction of others, such as are the common members of the visible Church (at least): As the Spirit is sent to convince the world of Sin, and Righteousness, and Judgment.
4. And it is not to be granted you without proof, that by the World is meant all Reprobates as such: For Judas is before distinguished from the World (as one given to Christ) when yet he was a Reprobate: But either it may be the World of present Unbelievers, whom Christ prayeth for else-where, though not there: Or the World of final professed Infidels and Enemies of the Church, as distinct from both Elect and Reprobate in the Church. And several expressions of Christ's before of the Worlds hating and persecuting his Apostles, seem not applicable to every Hypocrite, who prophesieth and casteth out Devils in his Name, and perhaps suffereth for his Truth, and excellently defendeth it, and hath some love to Believers.
The fifth Crimination.
They make Christ to merit only Pardon and Salvation to Believers, but not to have purchased Faith itself for any man. And by that way, no one that he died for would be saved; For Faith is the necessary Gift of God: And if Christ purchased not that, all the rest would be in vain.
1. Let us not here confound the Controversy de nomine & de re: That Christ died to purchase the Act of Faith for us, is no Scripture-phrase, so far as I know. If therefore it be only the phrase which they refuse, you may well bear with them. But as to the matter, they do not deny any of these things, 1. That Christ is the Author and Perfecter of our Faith, as Faith signifieth the Christian Religion, or the Objects and Doctrine of Faith. 2. That our own actual and habitual Faith is the Gift of God; (Though the controversies about the manner of giving it are to be afterward decided). 3. That all that Christ giveth, his Sacrifice procured; and therefore it procured Faith. All this is commonly granted by most School-men, Papists, Lutherans, and moderate Arminians.
But, 2. It must be considered that Christ did not die to purchase Faith as immediately, and on the same account, as to satisfy for Sin, and purchase us impunity or Redemption. The proper direct reason of his Sufferings, was to demonstrate the Justice of God against Sin, instead of man's own suffering for it; and thereby to procure Pardon. We may well conceive Christ promising to the Father as it were, [I will suffer for Sinners, that they may not suffer!] But you will hardly describe his Undertaking thus, [I will die, if thou will give men Faith,] or [I will give thee so much of my Blood for so much Faith.] But because he knew that without Grace no man would believe and accept his Gift, therefore he whose Sufferings were primarily satisfaction for Sin, were secondarily meritorious of the means to bring men to the intended • nd; that is, of the Word and Spirit, by which Christ causeth Sinners to believe: so that Faith is a fruit of the Death of Christ in a remoter secondary sense. And in all this Name me any Christian Churches that are disagreed.
To bring it only to a man's free will whether he will believe or not, is not to give him Faith; and to purchase no more is not to purchase it.
Do you not perceive that here you divert to the Controversies of the Decrees, and of effectual Grace? Of the first we have said enough already: of the other after in due place.
The sixth Crimination.
They feign Christ to purchase only a conditional Pardon, Justification and Salvation, and so to leave it uncertain to the corrupt Will of man, whether any shall be saved or not.
This also concerneth the Decrees, and is fully answered before. 1. That Christ hath purchased, and God given a conditional Act of Oblivion, or Pardon and Life to all, is the very Gospel itself, and to be questioned by no Believers. 2. None of them all do suppose Christ to die at uncertainties as to the success: for they suppose that he fore-knew the success from eternity. 3. They suppose not that the success was undecreed: For they that presuppose fore-sight of man's concurrence, yet assert an eternal Decree of his Conversion upon such fore-sight. And it is not on the fore-sight of Faith, that they say God decreeth to give men Faith; but on fore-sight that the will of the Sinner will concur or not obstinately resist the Spirit that is drawing him to believe. And the Jesuits and Arminians by their Scientia media do hold God to be the chief cause of men's believing: For they say, That God foreseeing that man will believe if he have such a measure of help, and such means and circumstances, doth freely decree to give him that help of the Spirit, and those means by which he knoweth it will be done. So that here is no uncertainty, but different thoughts of the ascertaining decrees and ways. 4. And lib. 1. I have shown you, that not only the Schoolmen, but Bellarmine, Ruiz, Suarez, and many of the most famous Jesuits, do assert effectual Grace, to be such both ex voluntate operantis, and ex vi operationis, absolutely. And where then is this feigned difference?
The seventh Crimination.
They make Christ to do no more for Peter than for Judas; for those in Heaven than for those in Hell, while they say that he died equally for all.
Equality here is meant either of his Intention, or of the benefits given: Those benefits are of several sorts. 1. No doubt but they err, who feign God equally to decree, and Christ to intend, the eventual absolute Salvation of all. 2. And they err that say, that he bestoweth equal benefits on all, even in this life: yea, antecedently to man's Will. But the New Covenant or conditional Promise, doth equally, as to the tenor of it, give Pardon and Right to Life, to all.
But who is it that holdeth this equality of Intention or Benefit? Not the greater part of the School-men, or other Papists, no not the learnedst Jesuits. Not the Lutheran Churches; But some few Arminians that run into one extreme, as you do into the other. Nay, how can they hold an equality of Intention, when they confess, that upon foreknowledge of their Unbelief, the condemnation of many was eternally decreed?
Yes: they hold that antecedently to fore-sight, God's Intention is equal.
1. That fore-sight itself is from eternity. 2. Who can frame out Orders of antecedency in the mind of God, between his fore-sight and his Will, without confessing great darkness and impropriety of Speech. 3. And he that first giveth man to believe and will, doth not first foresee that he will believe and will, before he decree to give it him.
The eighth Crimination.
They make Christ's sheep to know him, before he know his sheep: that is, to believe before he decree to give them Faith.
This is but the same in sense, with what is before answered; And it belongeth to the controversy of God's Decrees. They all say that God decreeth to give them sufficient Grace to enable them to believe, before he fore-seeth their belief: And most say more, as is aforesaid.
The ninth Crimination.
Some of them say that Christ's Death did actually deliver all men in the World from the guilt of Original Sin, and so that none perish for Original Sin; because what Adam did, Christ undid.
You can name no Church that doth hold such Doctrine: And we have nothing to do with singular odd Persons. 1. Millions were unborn when Christ died, and were not guilty of Original sin till afterwards, and therefore were not capable of Pardon. 2. The Papists who damn unbaptized Infants cannot be of that Opinion. 3. What Adam brought upon us, Christ did deliver us from, upon his terms, and in his way, and by his degrees, but not immediately. He hath given all men a conditional Pardon of Original Sin, as he hath done of Actual, and no other. The Unregenerate are under the guilt of all Sin whatsoever. 4. But it is certain, that no man, except Infants, doth perish for Original Sin alone; For all men at age have other sins. And it being certain, that God offereth all men a recovery or remedy (mediately or immediately;) it is certain, that Infants perish not merely for Adam's sin i • puted, as a remediless evil: but that their non-liberation, or not being pardoned and saved, is long of their Parents Unbelief, and not entering them into the Covenant of God, who is the God of the Faithful and their Seed.
The tenth Crimination.
They make Christ to have died for the Serpents Seed, against whom the enmity is proclaimed, when the new Covenant was first made, Gen. 3. 15.
1. If by the Serpents Seed, you mean such as are God's Enemies, no doubt but Christ died for them, Rom. 5. 1. to 12, &c. What need reconciliation else? 2. If by the Serpents Seed, you mean Reprobates as such, you can never prove it to be the meaning of the Text. 3. If you mean foreseen final Enemies and Unbelievers, Christ died not for them as such, but as in their antecedent recoverable pardonable sin and misery.
THE Fifth Days Conference WITH AN ARMINIAN Of man's natural sinfulness and impotency to good, and of FREE-WILL.
You have hitherto persuaded us, that all the Controversies of the Decrees and Redemption, between the Synodists and Remonstrants, being resolved into those of the Execution, we should there expect the solution of all: To this therefore we are next to come. And first about man's Sinfulness, Impotency and Free-will; And there all these things following offend me.
The first Crimination.
That some of them deny all true Free-will, and others deny all Free-will to good, and others to all spiritual good, by which man is made uncapable of being a moral Agent, and so uncapable of moral Good or Evil, anymore than a Tree or Beast; seeing Free-will is the seat of moral Virtues and Vices, which necessitated Natures are uncapable of.
I hope you are willing to understand yourself, and to be understood. Tell me then, what mean you by Free-will?
I know that the true nature of Liberty is much controverted; but I mean that Qua positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, possumus agere vel non agere.
1. Do you mean by agendum, imperate Acts only, or also Volitions?
Both: All moral Acts of Body and Soul.
That which is requisite to extrinsic moral Acts, is, that they be commanded by a determined will: You mean then that it is Liberty for the Tongue or Hand to be able to Act when the Will forbiddeth it, and not to Act, when the Will commandeth it.
I mean it only of imperate Acts as voluntary; for it is the Will and not the executive power that is the seat of Liberty.
2. By Agere what Action of the Will do you mean? you know that man's Soul is an active nature, and can no more cease all action than cease to be. You may as well say that fire with fuel can forbear to burn, as a Soul to be active.
I mean only moral Acts, of Virtue and Vice.
All that a man doth by Reason is Actus humanus, a moral Act, either good or bad; And a man at the use of Reason liveth among thousands of intelligible Objects▪ necessarily presented to his Intellect by sense; and among thousands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, desirable or hateful; And is it possible for such a sensitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with intelligible, amiable or odible Objects, and to suspend all rational apprehensions, Volitions and Nolitions of them?
I mean it not of all moral Action in general, but of this or that singular Act • ic & nun • .
I will not entangle you with an enquiry; whether he that c • n do every particular good act, cannot do all universally; and whether he that can forbear every singular evil (or good) act cannot forbear all, when all is nothing but all singulars. But, 3. What mean you by [requisitis?] All things of mere necessity to the Act sine quibus non? Or also all things that can possibly be put to ascertain the Act?
Of the first I am most fully resolved: Of the second there is much doubtfulness. If I include it, I know you will ask me, whether it be impossible for God so to determine the Will, as to make the contrary act impossible, without taking away its Liberty? And whether Christ could commit every sin? or else was not free? And whether Heaven take away all Liberty, if it make sin impossible? But briefly I answer you, that the Libertas Viatoris differeth from that in Heaven; and that Ours still supposeth a possibility of the Contrary, but Theirs doth not.
But if it be their Liberty to be past a posse peccare, why should it not be ours to come as near it as may be? especially when we have the fore-tastes and first-fuits of Heaven on Earth, and Grace is the seed of Glory.
It is our Liberty to be as far from sin as may be: But this is another kind of Liberty, and not to be confounded with that which is a mere power of doing or not doing.
4. But that a man can act positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis is no wonder; so can a Stone, or Bruit: but how say you potest non agere, when non-agere is not an effect or exercise of Power? There needs no Power ad non agendum.
Yes; when Nature, or Vice, and Temptation draw us to a forbidden Act, it is a work of Power to resist them and forbear it.
But sure Nature, Vice or Temptation do not so draw us to love God perfectly, to hate all Sin perfectly, to be heavenly-minded, to consent to suffer Death for Christ, &c. as that we should need any power to resist such drawings, or forbear such acts. How then do you make this a part of your power?
But when the Spirit of God draweth us to love him, it is an act of natural abused power to resist him. And also in this and the former case I say, that by [possumus] here, we do not mean a moral or physical power always, but in this instance only a logical power: And our meaning only is, that we are not necessitated to Act or not Act; to love God, or to hate him, or not to love him. As Privations are reduced to Entities, in Descriptions, so are Impotencies to Powers.
The word [Posse] then in your definition is equivocal, and signifieth both Power and No -Power. What a definition is that? But, 5. What maketh you call it by the name of Liberty, to be impotent? or, if you will, to be able not to love God? not to live to God? not to know God? not to trust God? not to repent of Sin? not to be heavenly-minded? what Liberty is this? yea, or to be able to hate God, and Sin, and damn yourselves?
It is not Liberty specifically as it is for sin or against God; and so not Libertas moralis; but it is only Libertas naturalis, or the indetermination of the Will with a self-determining power, which is the natural seat of morality, and may be used to good or evil.
Now you say somewhat, and come into the Light; Therefore having thus prepared the way, I add, that there is Libertas à malo, and Libertas ad bonum; both properly: But it is improper to say, Libertas à bono (naturali vel morali) vel Libertas ad malum qua tale. 2. As there may be a three-fold Restraint or Compulsion, Physical, Ethical, or Civil; So there is a three-fold Liberty, 1. Natural, which is a Liberty from natural necessitation from God, or our own faculties, or things extrinsic, unto any evil. 2. Ethical; which is a Liberty from vicious inclination, or necessitation by it at least. 3. Civil; which is a Liberty from the restraining or constraining Laws, of any that would or might draw us to evil, or keep us from good; and so of penalties by those Laws. To which is reducible Liberty from the ill commands and punishments of Parents and Masters, and from the violence of enemies or wicked men. And Liberty is either from sin, or from misery. But the distinctions about Liberty are so many, that I have given them you in a Table in the Second Book, and refer you thither, that we may agree on the state of the question, What Liberty it is that you mean? But first I shall ask you a few more questions.
Quest. 1. Do you think that Liberty consisteth in the greatest indifferency of the Will, when it is merely in aequilibrio?
No: For then every virtuous or vicious habit should take away Liberty.
I pray you think on it then, Whether if strong habits which do tantum non necessitare, do not at all abate or take away any part of Liberty, it be like, that if such a habit were so strong as per eundem inclinandi modum to necessitate, it would not yet consist with Liberty of Will?
Quest. 2. Do you think that a man is not necessitated to will his own felicity by a simple Volition? Is he free to desire misery as such?
No: This is not an act of Election, and therefore not of Liberty.
Do you think that this certain constant necessary act of the Will, is not a more perfect or excellent act, than that which you call free, which sometime is done and sometime not done, and is before uncertain? Or, is it not a more excellent state of the Will to be constantly and certainly well determined, than to be undetermined, and defectible? I would know as we go on, whether the Liberty which we plead for, be good and desirable, or evil?
I cannot deny but it is incomparably more desirable to be certainly and necessarily determined to good, than not: But it is better to be free and left to our own choice uncertainly, than to be determined to evil, or to be so determined to inferior good, as shall keep down the Soul from the superior. I do not take this indetermination and free power, for our best state, but for a middle condition, fit for a Viator that is tried here in order to his end. Beasts are necessarily determined to things inferior: The glorified Angels and Saints (its thought and hoped) are necessarily determined to things superior; and so was Christ: But our undetermined state of Liberty is better than one, and worse than the other, and fit for our trying life on Earth.
You say well. Therefore remember, that our Liberty is no further good, than as it is a Liberty to good and from evil, not from all determination: but that the nearer we draw to necessary love to God and goodness, the better we are.
Q. 3. I further ask you, Do we not necessarily will also bonum sensibile, sensible good as such, with a simple Volition? and so are not at Liberty in that point?
What mean you by a simple Volition?
That by which we will a thing by simple complacence, considered as