Discovery of Jacksons Vanity

CHAP. XXI.

II is true some Schoolmen think that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative; not because this includes rationem dati & accepti, but rather because it includes, aequalitatem dati & accepti. Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety, then justice commutative: as may be seen in Vasque 1. in 1. part. dispute. 86. Likewise I know none, that think, mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger. For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God, as voluntas miserandi: that being as easily abstracted from grief, as this from compassion.

As for revenge there is no color why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or moral qualities may be contained in the divine essence eminently, is a very poor justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as yourself heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of anybody or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitely different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truly verified of God's signifying the nature of God in a certain reference unto his creatures without all passion.

So there is a will and understanding in God, but nothing like to the will and understanding of man: For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God. Our anger at the best, as being displeased only with such things that displease God, though in some little thing it be like God's anger; yet in many things it is very unlike: For it is a passion in us, not in God, it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God. God's anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so, but only in case we are his ministers. For vengeance is mine I will repay saith the Lord. I cannot justify you in so speaking, when you say that mercy is more real, and truly affectionate in God then his anger; For taking them sequestered from their imperfections, each is formally attributed unto God, though not as passions, and not eminently only as you have delivered it.

As for the execution of each more or less, that receiveth moderation merely from the pleasure of God's will. For he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and far more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men, then vessels of mercy, though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angels. Mercy consists in pardoning sins, and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God, but passion enough, even unto death upon the cross in the nature of man, & person of the Son of God. The better use men have of reason, the less are they subject to perturbation, but no whit less do they participate of affection, for virtues are not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as Aristotle hath taught us; but the right ordering of them. Christ's soul was heavy unto the death, at the approaching of his passion, and wept often before this; yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason; For all this. But no passion at all can be in God; for passions rise and fall upon new occasion, but no such alteration is incident unto God. I know not what you mean by devouring affections. They may be concealed or restrained not in a virtuous manner, but vicious; only to keep the rankor of their hearts from discovery, as Absalom a long time said nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had deflowered his sister Tamar, he was not any whit the more charitable in that, but played the fox in waiting opportunity to do mischief. Likewise, when Haman saw Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor moved for him then was he full of indignation at Mordecai. Nevertheless Haman refrayned himself, though he had plotted the destruction both of him and all his natiō. To say that passions are moderate in matters, which men least affect is as much as to say, that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect. And indeed affections must needs be moderate, when they are least in motion.

But perpetual minding of a thing should argue strength of passion, in my judgment rather then moderation. To my thinkinge, now you are in a vain of writing essays: Yet I find no great substance of truth in them. How secret carriages can be violently opposed I conceive not; For if opposed then no longer secret. And the more cunning men are, the more notice (I should think) they take of violent opposition, unless they do apparently, see such opposites are like to overshoot or come short; which is a very race case and comes ofter into a scholars fancy then into real practice. I find no great passion in Achitophel; but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country. So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himself. To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a great point of policy, undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity; not always to restrain them, but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinks of them.

As Moses in the cause of God was moved so far as to break the tables of the law, and calling others unto him to fall upon the massacring of the people, yet this testimony is given of him that, he was the meekest man on the earth. I do not dislike your allowance of men to be passionate, in the promoting of God's glory; I hope you will give like allowance to men to be passionate in the defense of God's truth. I have no great edge to make Christians contend in passion, with worldly men how wise soever.

Yet well I wote, that David (one of the worthyes of the World amongst Martialists) his eyes did gushe out with rivers of water, because men kept not the law of the Lord: & holy Lot did vex his heart with the unclean conversations of the Sodomites. These moral essays of yours have a foul issue; as when you infer, but most inconsequently (as arguing from the nature of man to the nature of God) that passions are in God, nor so only, but even such affections as essentially include perturbation; you were as good plainly profess, that God is not exempt from perturbation.

Neither is, to be zealous or compassionate, to be like God in wisdom, but rather in affection. Yet zeal and compassion are accidents in man, not in God; arise in man never without alteration, but no alteration, as yourself have made show to maintain, is incident unto God. Yet I do easily grant you, that the vehemency of man's passions doth as significantly represent the want of passion in God; as the swift motions of the Heavens doth represent God's immutability; Like unto him that presenting an insufficient person to his degree, and being demanded what he meant to prostitute himself to such profaneness; made answer he might do it with a safe conscience; For he undertook for him, but tam, quam, tam moribus quam doctrina, and he thought him as good one way as the other, though indeed good at neither.

And now if yourself be arrived after all this unto a rest (I do not say vigorous least that might prove the emblem of greater motion) from your passion; I pray consider how these do agree: First to say that God's wisdom doth not exempt him from passion; and then to acknowledge a want of passion in God.

2: I see no reason why you should complain of the barrenness of your imagination, in illustrating the attributes of God; to my judgment it hath been more fruitful then all that ever went before you; who I dare say were never able to discern that lively resemblance you speak of between the swift motion of the Heavens and the immutability or vigorous rest of God, as also between the vehemency; of men's passions and the vacuity of all passion in God. Your Mathematickes (though I profess myself a very sory scholar in that science) I do reasonablely well understand; as namely that a circular figure is, as it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and of all figures of equal circumference the most capacious, and that all other figures the nearer they draw to a circle, and the more Angles they contayn of equal circumference are the more capacious. I expect your mysterious and profound explication.

3. The Analogy spoken of between sides and Angles, as found in circles and other figures doth fitly express (you say) that analogy which Schole divines assign between wisdom, science, love, hatred, goodness, desire, as they are found in God and man. Your theme was, how Anger, Love, Compassion, mercy or other affections are in the divine nature: of all these there is but one found in this latter enumeration of yours, and that is love; and whereas you proposed to speak only of the affection, and to show how they are in God. Yet here you mention wisdom, science, goodness; which never were accounted affections. No name or title of affection can (you say) be univocally attributed unto God.

And this is true, and as true of habits and powers of our souls, that they cannot univocally be attributed unto God. For whatsoever is in God is mere essence; and therefore such titles as signify accidents in us, cannot denominate God secundum nomen & nominis rationem. But as we love by an act of passion: so God may love by an act, which is his essence. Our wills and understandings are accidents; yet doth God as truly will and understand as we, by his very essence; not by any act which is really distinguished from his essence, God's love, God's wrath, are merely his will, to do good or to revenge evil, as they signify anything within God. But if they be used as external denominations, so, when God punisheth us, he is said to be angry with us; when he doth us good, he is said to love us.

And in the like sense may every name of any affection, be attributed unto God, provided it doth not essentially imply any imperfection, as fear doth, and desire doth, which cannot be attributed unto God but metaphorically. The fruits of love & compassion proceed from none so freely, so plenteously as from God, and therefore he may justly be said to be most loving most compassionate, but to whom he will. In like sort the fruits of wrath and a revenging will, proceed from none more powerfully and more heavenly then from God. Psal. 90. 11. Heb. 10. 13. Who knoweth the power of thy wrath? Psalm 90. It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of God. Therefore may he justly be accounted a most severe regenger of iniquity, but on whom he will; For he can pardon it and cure it in whom he will, these being but the fruits of his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will. But to say he is wholly love and wholly displeasure, is a wild expression in my conceit. For to say, that he is wholly love, is as much as to say, that whatsoever he is, is love; whence it followeth that seeing he is displeasure also, as you say his very displeasure is love; and consequently by the same reason, his very love is his displeasure.

The truth is, affections in us belong only to the will; and so translated unto God they should only denominate his will. Now his power, his understanding, his will are very distinct notions; though in God they are not really distinct: yet so far distinct as that it seems absurd to say, that his power is his will, or his wisdom, or that his wisdom is his will or his power, or that his will is either his power or wisdom. So you speak truth, we are content, you take what liberty you think good in the illustration of it, and to satisfy yourself with your illustrations, though your readers you do not. I find you are much pleased in the commodious illustration which a circle doth afford you, or which you divise in a circle, which you call the true emblem of eternity.

Some I confess have professed that eternity doth ambire tempus, but I never observed that they compared it to a circle; but only I conceive their meaning was, that at this present it was not only before all time, but after all time. You add unto this, and will have this comprehension to be circular; and elsewhere have called it a circular duration. Yet as for this conceit of theirs, Durand hath longe discovered the absurdity thereof, & confuted it. And as great a Mathematician as you are, I do not like your interpretatiō of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which you render, as if it signified all sides and all angles; I rather take it to signify, all angle, all side, as if it were an angle throughout and one side throughout not all sides and angles.

Ant it is apparent the circumference is but one that encloseth this figure, and angles arising from inclination of lines in the circumferenc, there is a perpetual inclination, not the least part that may be designed and imagined, but hath an inclination of partes. When you say, the sides are angles, and the angles sides if not essentially yet penctratively the fame. You speak gibrish, you may as well say, in any right angled figure, that the angles and sides are penetratively the same; the sides are lines, and in the predicament of quality the angles, are the beginning of figures, as points are of lines, and so in the predicament of quality: of which figures, lines are the determinations and outward limites.

This I speak but upon remembrance of my old philosophy; and the angles arise from the inclinations of lines one towards another. What liberty you take in saying that a circle is of equal sides and of equal angles, whereas indeed it is but a side, throughout, and an angle throughout, let the reader judge. Yet it contaynes the space of any other figure of equal circumference and somewhat more: and so virtually it may be said to contain them even their sides and angles, in as much as it doth contain the space of them. So whatsoever the power, habits and affections of men do signify (always provided that you take their significatiō as touching the perfections in them severed from their imperfections) they are in God, and much more.

And thus touching your theme proposed how Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy and other affections are in God, your resolution may be this, if you think good, that all perfections are contained in him, not tanquam trigonum in tetragonon, but tanquam triganon and tetragonon and pentagonon, and all angled figures in circulo; but then they must be of equal circumference, which limitation hath no place in the comparison between God the Creator and his creatures. If your meaning be no other, then that these, which we call passions, are in God eminently the resolution of the question proposed had been as easy as it is vulgar, for to be in God eminently is by your own exposition, no more then God to be the Author of them. And no Christian doubts but that as God is the Author of our bodies and of our souls; so he is the Author of our natural affections also.

4. The Diameter I confess is the measure of a circle; that being known all is easy to be known, I mean in the point of measure: but as for the proportion, you speak of, between that and a man in reference to the World. I leave to everyone to judge of that. Who they be that are the Authors of such proportions, I willingly confess I know not. In these kinds of proportions you are very excellent, although you complain of the barrenness of your imagination that way; as when you tell us, that man's nature uncorrupt did include such an eminent uniformity to all things created as the eye doth unto colors. I profess you stone me with these resemblances of yours, and make me wonder at my dwarfy capacity, that is so overcoped (to speak in your own phrase) with these your tall inventions. For it were strange you should not understand yourself; that were like the Nun at Delphi, to give out oracles to set others on work to understand, that which she understood not her self.

And first I cannot devise, what that uniformity should be, which you say the eye hath to all colors; you seem not to understand it of the moral constitution of the eye; for that is different as colors are different, but rather of the formal constitution in respect of the discerning faculty it hath. Now the uniformity between this is no other then between any faculty and his object.

So then the uniformity runs this way; like as the eye of man judgeth of all colors; so man was in his innocence to all things created; here I was about to add, for the completing of this sentence, I know not what; but on a sudden I remembered what erst you proposed, namely, that man was like the diameter in a circle, the measure of all things. The meaning whereof I conceived to be this; as by the knowledge of the diameter the circle is easily known: so by the knowledge of man, which contains the nature of all things created, the nature of all created things may be known. In like sort touching this last uniformity you speak of. Like as the eye judgeth of all colors; so by the knowledge of man we may judge of all other things created. I need not trouble myself in taking exception against these illustrations; I doubt not but I shall perform a meritorious work in gratifying your reader so far a • to blanch your meaning, and of the congruity or incongruity to leave it unto him to judge. Thus was man the true image of God for his essence; and in this properly bears a true shadow of the divine prerogative. For like as all perfections are contained in God: so all created things are contained in the nature of man; save that they are eminently contained in God, in such sort as he is able to produce them; but so created things are not contained in the nature of man: Yet as the eye judgeth of all colors; so man participates of all other natures, and by the knowledge of him men may judge of them.

If the divine nature contained less perfections then the perfections of all things, then indeed it were something strange, it should be the measure of all. But seeing perfections in him are infinite, there was no reason, that you should bring man's acknowledgement, that his essence is the measure of all perfections; with an (although) in reference to his measurelesse perfection. Yet I profess I am to seek how to conceive God's essence to be the measure of created perfections; seeing mensura & mensuratum ought to be in the same kind, as it was wont to be said. But all this may be helped with saying he is the measure of them eminently; and indeed he is the Author of them; For he made all things in number, weight, and measure.

And indeed ere I was awarre, I find you fall upon this in the very next sentence, where you say. All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by Philosophers are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but far more eminently. Upon this I look for an enumeration of the conditions and properties of a measure, and the application of them unto God; and particularly that, that a measure must be that which is better known then the thing measured.

And it is of use to bring us acquainted with the things measurable. Now God is not better known to us then any other thing. To himself I confess he is as well known as ought else. But he hath no need of any measure, whereby he should arise to the knowledge of anything; though in knowing himself he knoweth all other things, nor looks out of himself to be acquainted with ought. But you I perceive are willing to ease yourself of this burden; you tell us what a measure he is not, as when you say, the Divine essence is a measure not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversities of parts; as who hath no parts: but instead of telling us what measure it is, you say that the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things are applied to it, in that they have actual being.

So that for God to measure all things, belike is as much as to say, God hath created all things. Now if to be created is to be applied to God; then to create is to apply. And so God's creating and application active, in order of nature was before their creation and application passive. You say it is impossible the Creator should be fitted to anything created. And is it not I pray alike impossible that the thing created should be fitted to the Creator? Yet before you said that God is a measure not applied to things created, but whereunto things created are applied, in as much as they have their actual beings. God is immutable and eminently containeth all things in his indivisible essence; but to say that he eternally and immutably, site all the possible varieties whereof contingency it self is capable. I doubt, will prove non sense in every particular. For first contingency is not capable of such variety you speak of: The things contingent themselves are various indeed, but not the contingency of them. Things are very various, but the modi rerum are not. There are but two modi rerum; the one we call contingency, the other necessity. You may say necessity is capable of variety as well as contingency. And indeed there is far greater variety of agents necessary, then of agents voluntary.

Agayne what is it to fit varieties, other then to produce them? For if you meant of fitting them after they were produced, it is like you would have told us, whereunto God doth fit them. Thirdly it is absurd in a Philosophers phrase to say God doth produce varieties; for variety is no fit object of production, it being a relation, which indeed results upon the producing of the foundation, rather then is produced. But suppose you understand it of the things produced in all possible variety: Yet this is directly untrue. For it is possible for God undoubtedly to produce things in greater variety then he doth.

Neither is this production eternally wrought, or the things you speak of fitted by God; for surely this fitting of varieties, as you speak, began not till the world began. And what you mean in saying that God doth immutablely fit them I well understand not, God I doubt not is immutable, but the things he fits are not, especially contingency, which includes mutability you say God is fitness it self; but either you consider not, that fitness is a word of relation, or if you did, you were to blame in not telling us, in what respect this fitness is. With great pomp of words filling up eleven lines you tell us, that God fitteth all things better by eternal immutable, and incomparable fitness, then it could be by any other measure fitted.

And do you think any man doubts whether that fitness, which is measured by incomparable fitness, should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferior measure of fitness? And what is all this, if we speak plainly, but to say, that rewards of obedience, and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted, as they cannot be amended. And this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in terms as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in. Not only rewards and punishments which are chiefly reserved for another world, but everything in this world we believe to be so ordered, that the wits of men and Angels were not able to mende it.

But yet whether the infinite wisdom of God might not exceed this, the Schoolmen in their disputation herupon, as I remember do generally deny. He is eminently all, in as much as he produceth all; but you may be pleased to except relations, such as contrariety and equality. For they are not termini producibiles but such as do usually result upon position of their foundation. When you say, As of his other attributes one truly and really is another, so in respect of man his measure is his judgment, &c. You seem to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one, which you call his measure; and this you say is not only the rule whereby he rewards or punisheth, but the reward and punishment it self. Rewarding and punishing are kinds of God's working. Now if we would know by what rule God works, the Apostle plainly informs us herein, when he saith, God worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will. Ephes. 1. 11. But when you say that his retribution of rewards and punishments is his measure; I pray of what? for measure is a term of respect; but you speak in a dialect of your own making; and if we had a dictionary too of your own making for the opening of your own dialect, perhaps we might understand you better then we do.

There is no composition in God, such as is between the subject and the accident, which founds the destinction of abstract and concrete. We admit God to be bounty it self, love it self, mercy and compassion it self, but to whom say you? only to those who are touched with the sense of their own misery; or only in soliciting men to repentance? As you would fain steal up your Arminian Tenets and cunningly obtrude them upon the faith of a credulous reader, of a weak reader. We say his mercy and love and bounty chiefly appears in causing man to be touched with the sense of his own misery, as also in giving repentance and not only in soliciting thereunto, not only in being gracious unto them that repent. A great deal of froth of words you spend, in amplifying the goodness of God in rewarding our repentance, when in the mean time you endeavor to drown all consideration of God's goodness unto sinners, while they lie weltering in their sins as in their blood, and draw away the minds of your readers from taking notice thereof, as if humility and repentance were a work of nature, not of grace, a work of flesh and blood and not of the spirit of God.

And all the way no touch of faith, your discourse savoring of the humor of a naturalist throughout, rather then of a Christian. To them that are sanctified, he is you say felicity and salvation; but what is he to them that are not sanctified? belike to them damnation. Yet the holy Apostle hath taught us, that God hath made Christ to be unto us, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. 1 Cor. 1. 30. And that God is he that justifieth the ungodly. Rom. 4. Alas, how often hath the best despised his bounty, love, mercy, grace, and salvation; yet is not he justice, indignation, and severity unto them, but bounty still, love still, mercy, and grace and salvation still, and at length overcomes them, and brings them from the power of Satan unto God. When for their wicked covetousness he was angry with them, and hath smitten them: he hid himself and was angry, yet they went away, & turned after the way of their own hearts: Yet after all this, He hath seen their ways and hath healed them. Es. 57. 17. 18. Yea he rules them with a mighty hand and outstretched arm, and makes them pass under the rod, and brings them under the band of the covenant. Ezech. 20. 37. He takes away their stony hearts and gives them an heart of flesh, and putteth his own spirit within them, and causeth them to walk in his statutes, and keep his judgments and do them. I am sory to find so little evidence throughout your discourse, that yourself have need of this.

What did the heathens understand by their Nemesis? God? or a creature? If God, surely he is not more powerful then himself. If a creature, is it strange that the power of a creature should be inferior to the power the Creator? When the Apostle saith, God shall be all in all, he speaks only of his elect, to fill them with the joys of Heaven, and with God himself. Will you take boldness to apply this presence of God to the very divills and reprobates? It is true we look for the coming of the mighty, God, who shall be glorified in his Saints, & even then shall he show himself from Heaven with his mighty Angels, in slaming fire rendering vengeance to them that do not know God, as also unto them which obey not the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ: which shall be punished with everlasting perdition from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power: When he shall come to be glorified in his Saints, and to be made marveylous in all them that believe (and because his servants testimony towards us, was believed) in that day. Then shall the Heaven depart away like a scrolle, when it is rolled and every mountain and yle be moved out of their place. And the Kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief Captains, and the mighty men, and every bond man, and every free man, hide themselves in dens and among the rocks of the Mountains; and say to the Mountains and to the rocks, fall on us and hide us from the presence of him, that sitteth on the throne, & from the wrath of the Lamb. For the great day of his wrath is come, and who can stand? Anno Dom. 1629. Aprilis 30.