Dr Creeds Voluminous Defense of Hammons Ektenesteron

Dr. CREED.

YOur third (to begin with that, for I shall not tie myself to your Method) is most ridiculously false. You say (not to trouble ourselves about the Mo • d and Figure (3) No one word can as a Gerus equally comprehend the efficient, and the effect: The habit of Love is the efficient cause, and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect: Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus.

Your Major, Sir, your Major; by all means have a care of your Major. For what think y • u, Sir, of all Univocal pr • ductions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn; when a Man begets a Man, and one Heat makes another; does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect? And is it not in these a certain maxim, tha • , Qualis est causatalis est effectus; such as the Cause is in nature, such also is the effect? And I h • pe you will think it lawful for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus: Nay, are not these distinguished from equivocal productions, because in these, Effectum est ejusdem rati • nis cum efficiente; but in the other, efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eadem forma, sed eminenter illam c • ntinet? Nay, does not your own Scheibler, as well as Suarez (both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor's perusal) tell you that Causa univoca, est quae pr • ducit effectum similem in specie? But methinks, Sir, if (since your more noble, more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholastical and Practical Divinity) you had thought sit to neglect such Vulgar Authors, and to forget the Common Notions and Maxims delivered by them; yet you should at least have observed, this in your reading of Aquinas, that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine, and makes very good use of it. And now, Sir, I hope you will think it lawful for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus; For where, I pray, will you rank the several individuals of the self-same Species (for such are all Univocall Causes, and Effects, as is plain from Sense and Experience) if not under the same Genus?

I might prove the gross and palpable falsehood of your Major. Sir, by divers instances drawn from equivocal productions, where the Cause and Effect must be placed in the same predicament, and consequently under the same remote Genus at least, which is sufficient to destroy your Major. When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver, and Brasse, and other Mineralls, when they produce S • ones of all sorts and kinds in the Bow • lls of the Earth, are not the cause and the effect, at least as species subalternae, placed under the si • ne Genus of substantia Corporea? When an Ass begets a Mule, or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrails; and when a Woman brings for m • nstr • ous births instead of L • gitimate issues, as Serp • nts, Moles and Frogs, and other such like (of which among Physicians there are ma • y true stories) I pray, Sir, must not the cause, and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal? So when light produces Hea • , are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Patible Qualities? To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversy. The habit of Love effectively concurs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love, and yet I say that love as a G • nas is Equally predicated of the habit, and the inwa • d Acts of Love, as has already been demenstrated, and may in due time b • further proved, notwithstanding anything you have, or can say to the contrary. And this is abundantly more than sufficient to show the fa • sho • d of your Major, when you say that no one word can as a Genus (whether proximum or remotum, s • mmum, or subal • e • um) (for you • bs • lutely deliver it) equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect.

The Major which you say Is most ridiculously false, and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry, I shall fortify by three reasons.

The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non praedicatur aequaliter dae speciebus. But now Analogy, viz. Attributionis Intri • secae, consists in dependency, from which Effective dependency is not excluded; as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists, by my Master, Scheibler. Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art. 3. cap. 3. tit. 5. art. 1. And by Scheibler 's Master, Suarez, M • taphys. di p. 28. s. 3. disp. 32. s. 2. n. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. By •• en • us a Frier Ca melite, Discep. in Univers. Logic. p. 113. Martinus Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Stalio Reg. Philosoph. p. 397. And upon this account is it, that Ens is made to be Gerus Analogum to Ens creatum, and increatum, to substantia and accidens. And I have read in the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the University of Oxford, that for this reason Quali • as is ge • us Analogum, because of the Dependency that Habi •• s hath upon Potentia.

I know this is to be understood with many Limita • ions, with which I shall not now Cumber the Reader: and besides, I am not Ignorant that 'tis Opposed by many Moderne Philos • phers.

But however it hath so Great and Learned Patrons, and they br • ng so good Rea • ons for this their Opinion, as that no modest man will Censure it to be a m • st Ridiculus Proposition.

Se • ondly, No word that is predicated of things Secundum prias, et p • sterius, is predicated of them equally, as genus univ • cum of its species, for the equality that distinguisheth genus univocum from analogium, is ae • ualitas ordinis, not dignitatis. But whatsoever is predicated of the Efficient Cause and the Effect, is predicated secundum prius and p • sterius: Erg • nothing that is predicat • d of the Efficient and the Effect, is predicated of them equally as genus un vicum.

Thirdly, Species totius generis univoci, are simul natura: but the Efficient Cause and the Effect, are not simul natura: And therefore they are not species of the same genus.

And thus have I sufficiently provided for my Major; as for your Arguments against it, they had need be very strong, and convincing, for otherwise indifferent Readers will judge your Vociferation against it, being with so full a mouth, to be Frontlesse. But let them be what they will, let us hear them.

Dr. CREED.

For what think you, Sir, of all univocal Productions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn, when a Man begets a Ma • , and one heat make another; does not one and the same word, as a genus, comprehend the Efficient and the Effect?

When I Read this passage, I was about, I confess, with a just indignation to throw away your book, as unworthy mine, or any other Scholars further perusal. I desire to have low and humble thoughts of myself, but yet I cannot think him a dompetent Adversary for me to Encounter, who is so Ignorant in Logic, as to say, that Man and Fire are genera: I propounded the Question to a Fresh ma • , an 〈◊〉 sit genus? and he answered no, and readily confirmed his Negative thus: Nulla species infima est genus: hom • est species infima; Ergo homo non est genus. I make no doubt but that our Defendant hath great abilities in other learning, but I shall never acknowledge him to be a Philosopher, or School-man, that thus trespasseth against the very A. B. C. of Logic. I shall give him this friendly advice for the future, that before his next attempt in Scholastical Divinity, he first con over Smith, Breerwood, Sanderson, or some other such comp • ndium of Logic, that so he may be able to avoid such mistakes as this, which will Expose him unto the Derision of every Boy.

If any shall Object in the Defendants behalf, that the Ramifts hold that every species is genus, and that individuum is sp • cies infima, as may be seen in Scheiblers T • picks: c. 28. n. 77, 78, &c. usque ad 85. This yet can be no sta • ting hole for the Defendant, for this proposition, every genus is predicated equally of its species, is a Maxim of the Aristotelians, delivered by them long before ever Ramus saw the light; and there is no doubt can be made that they take genus and species in a Peripat • tical, and not Ramistical sen • e.

If it be said again secondly, that even Dr. Sanderson in his Logic, l. 3. c. 24. confesseth that Topically species infima is genus.

Why this can as little avail the D • fendant as the former shift, for tis undeniable that we speak of genus as praedicabile, and the Maxim, Genus p • aedicatur aequaliter de speciebus, is delivered by P •• phy • y in his Isag • ge, where he handles the Doctrine of the Predicables.

In a third place it may be replied, that in that Interrogation of our Defendant, does not one and the same word as a genus comprehend the Efficient and the Effect? He is not to be Interpreted of any of the words immediately preceding Fire, Corn, a Man, Heat, but of some words that are to be underst •• d and Supplied as Elementum, which as a genus comprehends the Fire producing, and the Fire produced: and planta, or corpus animatum, which in like manner is predicated of the Corn bringing forth, and the Corn brought forth as a genus: and animal, which is predicated in the same manner as a genus of the man b • getting, and the man begotten: and qualitas patibilis prima, which in the same way is predicated of the Heat making, and the Heat made.

But First, what Reason have I to make this Supply in your Words?

Secondly, We cannot Supply, or understand these words, Elementum, Corpus animatum, animal qualitas patibilis prima: For Elementum is predicated of the Fire producing, and the Fire produced; Corpus animatum, of the Corn bringing forth, and the Corn brought forth, &c. and so Animal of the Father, and the Son, only as of Individualls: whereas the comprehension, and predication of the Genus, that we speak of, is only concerning its Species.

Unto all this I shall add Ex abundanti, out of Irenaeus, a Modern Thomist, that which will answer your Objection. And 'tis the more pertinent, because it speaks of one of your Instances, viz. Fires producing Fire; Cave tamen putes quamlibet dependentiam facere nostram Analogiam, nam ignis generat ignem, qui ambo un voice convenient in natura ignis, quia cum illa dependentia Physica non reperitur dicta inaequalit • s: Vel melius ista dependentia est solum quoad actualem existentiam, seu positionem extra causas, non autem quoad participationem secundum essenti •• , seu esse objectivum si enim quaeratur, utrum ignis B. genitus ab igne A. et ab eo dependens, ut generetur, et existat, ab eodem dependeat essentialiter spectatus, non considerata existentia? dicendum erit, quod non quia ignis A. non est principium igneitatis, altoqui esset principium sui ipsius. At vero accidens dependet a substantia essentialiter, ut sit ens. Qu • d fiet evidens comparanti singula hoc modo. Leo non minus erit animal, eti •• si homo sit impossibilis: At accidens non erit ens, si substantia sit impossibilis; cum enim accidens sit entis ens, cujus erit ens, si nulla sit substantia? ergo aliter accidens participat ens, quam l • o participet animal. Nec refert, quod sublato hommine tolleretur leo, quatenus rationale, & irrationale sunt relata, ac proinde simul sunt natura: Nam hic non considerantur ut relata, sed precise ut Animalia. Discept. in Univers. Logic, p. 113.

In the next place you tell us great news, of the difference betwixt Univocall and Equivocall productions, a thing that is known, and obvious unto every Puisny. But you spend many lines about it, and very gravely confirm it, by the testimonies of Scheibler and Svarez: Then you intimate that I forget this Notion, and therefore refer me for it to Aquinas his Summes. But what ground, nay color, have you to say that I forget it? The truth is, you have not so much as a shadow for such an imputation; but to Caluminate, is grown to be so familiar with you, that 'tis even incorporated into your discourse.

But what infer you from all this? Why forsooth, that Individuals, whereof one is the Efficient, and the other the Effect, may be comprended under the same word as a Genus. But what is all this to the purpose? Is it not clear, that my Major is to be understood concerning the comprehension of Species by the Genus? Indeed no Reader, but such a Dis-ingenuous Caviller, as Dr. Creed will understand me, concerning the comprehension of Individualls.

This supply of Species is no subter-suge, but may easily be gathered from the coherence of my words. For the Proposition which I undertake to prove, is that Love as a Genus, doth not comprehend as Species, the Expressions of Love, equally with the Habit.

But let us see next whether you have any better success with your Equiv • call productions.

First, Most of your instances are of Genus remotum; whereas Dr. Han. and I, are all along to be understood of G • nus pro • cimum, and the Maxim of Porphy • y, which is the foundation of all this argumentation, hath the same sense too.

But you next bring instances, wherein the Cause and the Effect, are both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal. When an Ass begets a Mule, or a Man produces Woe • mes and Vermin in his Head and Entrails, and when a Woman brings forth M • nstruous birth instead of Legitimate Issues, at Serpents, M • les, and Freggs, and other such lich like (of which among Phys •• ians there are many true Stories) I pray, Sir, must not the Cause and Effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal?

But fiest, that Animal is a Genus proximum unto an Ass and Mule, unto Wormes and Vermin, unto Se • pents, Moles and Frogs, is a gross falsehood, easily discernible by everyone that knows anything almost in the Predicament of Substance. For such a one cannot be ignorant, that b • u •• m intervenes betwixt all these and Animal: Arist • le in the 7th of his Meraph. text. 28. saith, That the Gerus proximum of Mulus, and Equus wants a Name. And the same may be said touching the Genus proximum of an Ass and a Mule.

Secoudly, All these instances are impertinent, because they are of such Efficients and Effects as are per accidens: Whereas 'tis undeniable, that I am to be understood of such only as are per • se: For so at e • habitual and actual Love, as also the sincere and cordial Expressions thereof. Thus in general.

But to take a particular Survey of the severals:

I. When an Ass begets a Mule, it is a Monstrous and Unnaturall production, and Monstra fiunt per accidens, as not being intended by particular nature.

II. That a Man produceth Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrails, as an efficient, is new, strange, and false Philosophy▪ For,

1. No particular cause can be the Efficient, viz. Principal, of any Essentiall form specifically different from its own. I • may concur thereunto dispositive, disponendo, • ut praeparan • o • ueri • n, nec 〈◊〉 cam praeb • nd • , or applicative applicando acti •• passivis, non effective, immediate attingendo productionem ipsius formae. Nay, 'tis a received Opinion, that no Angel can produce any substantial form, but only as causa applicans: and therefore the production of Animals out of putrid matter, is generally resolved to be by a Universal Cause, either the Heavenly B • dies, or the first cause.

But 2. That man is not the Efficient of Wormes and Vermin in his Head, &c. The Reader may see in Poncius. p. 3. pag. 22, 23. Causalitat • m effectivam respectu vermium, qui producuntur ab aliis causis extri • secis: Contra h •• ines habent activiratem respectu humoris, seu substantiae illius, ex qua preducuntur vermes: Ergo possunt dici habere activitatem respectu vermium; nec enim alia ration ma • es habent activitam, aut dicuntur principia productiva aliorum hommum, nisi quatenus habent actitatem productivam seminis ex quo f • unt.

Respondetur, negando corsequentiam ad cujue probationem dicitur, quod non pr • ptere • precise home dicatur esse p • incipium alterius k • minis exeo, quod producat, semen ex quo fit alter home, sed etiam, qu • a illud semen habet aliquam activitatem in ordine ad preducendum all •• m illum h • minem.

III. A Woman may bring forth monstrous births instead of legitimate issues, as Serpents, Moles, Frogs: but that she is the Efficient of them, viz. Pe •• se is a palpable untruth; and that for the same reason, that man is denied to produce Wormes, and other Vermin in his Head and Entrails. Unto this let me add, that the Effective dependanc • , which I speak of, is Necessary, and in some sense Essentiall. But the Dependance of these monstrous births upon a Woman, is per accidens, Fortuitous and Casuall; and so most impertinently alleged.

Now let us sum up the State of my Major Pr • position, and thus it runs. No word as a Genus proximum doth equally comprehend as its Species, the Efficient per se and the Effect. Unto this, now, let us see what a brave and gallant opposition you make.

You say.

1. That one word as species infima doth comprehend the Efficient and the Effect.

2. That one word as Genus doth comprehend, viz. Mediately, Individualls, whereof one is the Efficient, and the other the Effect.

3. That one word, as Genus rem • tum doth comprehend equally as species, the Efficient and the Effect.

4. That one word as Genus doth equally comprehend the Efficient per accidens, and the Effect.

Now none of all this doth in the least degree impugn my Major Proposition, as meant by me: And therefore I might here justly desire you to sit down, and sadly to consider, how groundless and soolish your Tragical Exclamation is against my Major Proposition. But I appeal from you and your ignorant and partial Admirers, unto the Learned and Unprejudiced Readers.

I go on unto the Defendants fourth and last Shist. There was, saith he, in Christ, a twofeld actual Love of God, The one agreeing to him as Compreh • nsor, being a sequel of the Bentisick Vision; this he grants to be always equally full and intense. But this love, saith he, was necessary, and therefore not meritorious. There is therefore belonging unto Christ another Actual Love of God, as he was Viat • r, which was free, and by which he merited: and this sprang from the infused knowledge of God, and the infused habit of Charity. And this▪ Love was more intense at one time then another, or one Act of it was more intense then another Act: and this distinction he prosecutes very largely, pag. 68. 244. 288.290. 333, 334, 33 • , 330, 336, 339, 344, &c. Usque ad 357, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 522, 524, 525, &c. Usque ad 540, 622, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629, 635, 636, 637.

1. This Answer I saw in Suarez, but could not foresee that Dr. Ham. would make use of it. Indeed I had no ground to think that he would: for it cannot do him the least service, as I shall show anon; and therefore I had no Reason to trouble the Reader with any mention of it.

2. Where you read this distinction in Suarez, you might have also seen an Objection against it, which might have deterred you from using it, if you had consi • ered how unsatisfying • uarez his answers are thereunto. The Objection is, that two accidents only numerically distinguished, cannot be at the same time in the same subject. But now Christ's beatifick love of God, and that which springs from the infused habit of charity, are distinguished only in number: And therefore they could not be at the same time in Christ.

The first Pro • osition, that two accidents cannot be at the same time in the same subject, is a proposition that you yourself acknowledge, p 196.256. to say the contrary, you say is a g •• sse absurdity, the salshood of which, reaso • itself a • the ve • y first proposal is able to discover.

But it may be said, that Saarez hath unto this Obj • ction two answers. B • t how unsatisfying they are, will appear by the examination of them.

The fi • st is, that th • se two loves differ, not only numerically, but also specifically: S • d hoe altero ex duabus modis probabilibus dissolvi pot • st. Primus est, d • cen • o actus illos differ sp ••• , quia actus amoris beatifici tendit in Deem propter o • nnem pe • fection • m, & rationem, propter quam amabilis est: nam to • a ill a per 〈◊〉 b • ata • dist n • te, & clare vid • tur, & proponitur voluntati; at vero amo, qui consequitur jcientiam insusam, vel tantum fertar in D • um sub specially aliq • â ration bon • , ut justitiae, misericordiae, &c. v • l solum sub rationae summi boni, qu • si confuse cognita, & non distinct p • opofita: quatenus in se con • inet omnem bo • it atem & perfectionem, Q • ae diversitas satis esse videtur ad diversitatem specificam illorum actuam. In certiam part. Thom. tom 1. disp. 49. f. 2. p. 622.

Unto this I shall reply in the words of Beca •• s Sum. Theol. Scholast. part. 3. trast. 1. cap. 22. q • aest. 5. having averred against Cajetan and Capreolus, that actus cha • ttatis, in via, and in patria do not disserre specie; he confirms his conclusion from the testimony of Aquinas, and from reason. T • rtia Co •• l 〈◊〉 . Actus charitatis non solum potest esse tam in • ensus in via, quam in patria, sed • tiam tam perfectus in essentiali perfection objectiva. Est contra Cajetanum, & c • prcolum, qui do • ent actum charitat is in patria d • ffe re specie ab actu charitatis in via, & essontialiter persectiorem esse. 〈◊〉 est, qu • a alter versatur cirea Deum clare visum, alter cirea D • i • m obscare cogni • am. S • out ergo clara visio, & obseura cognitio differunt sp • cie, ita etiam amo • viae, & amor patriae, qui in illis fundantur. Sed conc • usio nostra est D. Thom. in 2 quaest. 67. art. 6. ad 2. ubi asserit dilectionem sum • re suam sp • ciem, & essintiam, non ex cognition, sed ex re cognita: ac proi • de in via & i • pat •• ia esse • and • m sp • cie charitatem, quia licet cognitio sit diversa, tamen res cognita est eadem. Et confirmatur, quia diversitas essentialis in actibus voluntatis, praesertim quando convenient in genere proximo, debet swni ex diversitate objecti formalis. At in amore viae, & patriae, est idem objectum formal, nempe infinita benitas, qua Deus in se infinite bonus est: ergo in illis actibus non est diversitas essentialis.

The second answer is that duo accidentia solo numero distincta possunt salt • supernatur aliter esse in eadem subjecto, &c.

But this supernatural providence of God, is not to be fled unto without a man be necessitated thereunto by some cogent argument and if you can find any such argument in Suarez, good leave may you have to manage it unto your best advantage.

All the argument that I can find in Suarez, is, that he thinks it fit to extend the merit of Christ unto his love of God. Now his beatifick love of God, was not meritoricus, (saith he) bec •• se 'twas not free, but necessary: and therefore he thinks there must be another love of God in Christ assigned, which was free, and so capable of meriting. This argument you also propound very often.

Unto this argu •• here are in the School-men several answers, of which you take no notice: for which concealment I believe no probable reason can be rendered, but your late and small acquaintance with the School-men.

1. Some hold that Christ did merit by the beatifick act of his love of God, as terminated unto God himself. Suarez, in the place by you cited, quoteth for this opinion, Altisiodorensis, Gabri • l, S •• tus and Capreolus, unto whom you may s •• in Vasquez added, Almain, Occam Major. You refer the Read, to a short passage of Scotus, in the place cited by Suarez, which proveth nothing denied by me. But I shall now refer you to another paslage in the same place, which expressly contradicts you; for there Scotus declareth at large how Christ merited by his beaufice love of God, as he was Comprehensor, Dico (inquit) propter argum • nt • m, quod Ch • istus meruit secuadum portionem superiorem & secundum omn •• actum ejus. Hoe • tamen est difficile tenere propter alios beato • , qui tunc videntur posse mereri in infinitum: pro • o autem illud, quia omnis actu • , acceptatus 〈◊〉 Deo, tanquam actus • ow • s & landabilis, pro quo Deus velit a • quid retribuere illi, cujus actum acceptat, vel alteri, pro quo fit, est meritorius: bujusmodi est omnis actus Cbristi secundum naturam humanun: etiam actus beatificur, quo secundum po • tionem superiorem fruitur D • o: quia persona illa non secu • dum omnem conditionem sui, fuit simpliciter in termino; ideo potuit Deus omnem actum creatum illius personae acceptare tanquam dignum aliquo boto pro • co retribuendo illi personae, si indiguisset, vel alteri, scilicet nobis, pro quibus meruit. Et hoc tenendo, oporter dicere, quod si actus beatificus secundum portion • m superiorem Christi suit meritorius, quod non includit contradictiounn actum beatifieum Michaelis, vel alterius beati, pesse acceptari tanquam aliquid dignum retributione, quod retribu • um dar • tar propter mer • tum; puta daretur Michaeli aliquid propter actum meritorium custodiae quam exerces circa me, contradictio dico non esset; tamen de facto D • us, non sic • acceptat actum illum, quia persona illa est totaliter extra statum m • rendi secundum totum subjectum: non sic Christus, sed secundum aliquid suit in statu viatoris, & propter hoc omnis actus ejus creatus acceptus erat, & meritorius illis, pro quibus offerrebatur Deo.

O • e would think it very strange, that you should over see this passage in Scotus, in the very same question that you quote. I may here make use of your words concerning myself, p. 633. I can think of no other probable ground of the Defendants m • stake, but only his writing at random, and c • njectures upon other men's short notes and suggestions. But this over-sight is trivial, in respect of that which is in your Quotation out of Nicholaus Da Orbellis, p. 349. for in that there are words expressly gainsaying your opinion; for they assert that it was possible for the beati • ick act in Christ (that is, in the Scotist-language, his fruition of God by love consequent unto the beatifical vision) to be meritorious. Ideo potuit Deus omnow actum creatum illius personae acce • tare tanqu • n dignum pro se, vel pro illis pro quibus offertur Deo, etiam actum beatificum. Sicut enim meritum non tantum consistit in ipso actu clicito, sed in conditionibus per • se elieitis; sic acceptatio divina non solum respicit actum, sed conduioxes accidentales suppositi elicient is.

In pig. 637. with a great deal of gravity and scorn, you advise me for the future to let the School men and Scholast • cal Divinity alone, &c. But I have juster reason to advise you, that seeing you have been so unhappy in quoting Scotus, and his Epitomator, Nicholaus De-Orbellis; to get some able friend, if not to consture, yet to expound such passages, as you shall quote for the future our of School men: seeing you are so wonderfully prone to allege out of them such things as make nothing for you, but apertly against you. But to return to the matter in hand.

This opinion of Scotus touching the meritoriousneffe of Christ's beatifick love of God, is maintained by the generality of his followers, as may be seen in two renowned ones of them, Faber Favent • nus in Sent. lib. 3. disp. 48. p. 210, 211, 212. Kada Super 3. lib Sent. Controv. 12. a. 1. p. 338, 339. In Faber • Faventinus there are two other arguments, besides that already urged by S •• tus, Contra eandem assertionem recentiorum, quod Christus non merucrit actu beatifico, est aliud argumentum: nam certum est, quod Christus dilexit Deum ex charitate, & voluit illi bonum affectione • ustitiae, & in hoc praesertim consistit meritum, lit ait Scot. & ipsi saten • u • , quia radix omuis m •• iti • p • d Deum est charitas, & amor ipsius Dei, ergo non vid • tu • negan • um esse hoe meritum: 〈◊〉 Christo, at hic amor, & dil ••• io in Christo fuit fruitio beatifica, quia erat beatus, & videbat Deum clare, ex qua vision sequebatur dilectio, & fruitio perfectissima, quae est beatifica.

Praetercà est argumentum Sco • i, sieut in nobis meritum respicit partem intellectivam, sic in Christo, sed in nohis non est meritum, nisi sit in portion superiori, neque 〈◊〉 meremur acti • us nostris, nisi voluntas nostra perfectissime jungatur Deo actibus, qui respiciunt Deum, sicut nec peccamus, nisi • oluntas nostra • cedat a Deo, ergo Christus non potuit mereri secundum portionem inseriorem tantum, & non superiorem, si meruit autem superiori, hoc suit per dilectionem Dei, quia hic actus immediate tendit in Deum, ergo dilectio, quae est fruitio, fuit actus meritorius in Christo. loc. praedict.

Unto this some Modern-School-men answer, by distinguishing, as our Defendant, out of Suarez, concerning a twofold love of God in Christ. This distinction Faber Fav • ntinus, in the place but now cited, first propounds, and then refutes.

1. He propounds it. Respondent ad hoc Recentiores ubi supra diffingnendo de duplici actu amoris & dilection is in Christo, nam alter actus dilection is crat in Christo, quatenus erat comprehensor, qui sequcbatur visionem beatisicam; & hoc actu non meruit, quia non crat actus liber; alter vero actus dilectionis • rat in Christo, in quantum crat Viator, qui sequ • batur, non visionem beatificam, sed cognitionem insusam, & hoc actu m • ruit, quia erat actus liber, & hanc s • ntentiam • sserunt essa D. Th. multis in lo • is, sed p • ae •• rtim, 3. p. q. 19. a. 2. in responsione ad primum, uli ait, quod Christus per charitatem meruit, non in quantum crat Comprch •• ser sed ut •• ot Vi • o • r.

2. Having thus propounded the distinction, he replieth unto it. Sed contra hanc Responsionem est argum ntum secundum Sco • i •• in ipalc, quo probat, quod actus, quo anima Christi f • uebatur Deo, non poteran esse duo, sed unas tantum, quod argumentum est tstud: actus fru • ti • nis est actus adaequatus potentiae, quia voluntas creata fenitar quantum otest: seduna, & cadem potentia cirea id m • objectum, non hab • t actum 〈◊〉 adaequa um, & alterum in daequatum, & distinctum à primo, quia boc implicat co • radiction m, nam primus non esset adaequatus, • rgo voluntas Christi per actum s • uitio • is non po • est diligere Deum per se amo • e amicitie ad • qua • e, & per alium actum cundem Deum deligere per se amo • e a • icitiae, sed in d • q • ate.

N • xt he sets down the Rejoinder of the Adversary, and unto it sub, oyns his Triplication.

There are two considerable Objections against this doctrine of Scotus, which are at large propounded and ans • ered in these two eminent Scotists th • t • mentioned, Faber Faventinus and Rada.

The first is taken from a comparison of Christ's beatisick love, with that of the blessed Angels and Saints in heaven. If his beatisick love of God be meritorious, then also that of the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven is so too: But this is absurd, for then they should merit unto all eternity.

They both answer out of Scotus by denial of the sequel of the Major, and for this denial they give this reason: God's acceptation is requisite unto merit, Now God accepteth all the created acts of Christ as meritoriou • , whereas he made no Covenant with, or promise unto the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven, touching any such acceptation. And for this different dispensation towards them and Christ, they lay down out of Scotus this following congruence. Whilst Christ was here in this life, he was Viator as well as Comprehensor, and consequently all his created actions were capable of meriting: for merit regards not only the action meriting, but also the state and condition of the person performing the action: but now the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven were absolutely and altogether comprehensores, and so in termino extra statum merendi uncapable of meriting: You see then they resolve the meritoriousness of Christ's beatisick love of God into the condition of Christ's person: Christ merited by it, not so much because 'twas beatisick, but because 'twas the love of a person who was in some respect Viator, in viâ, which was a state of meriting

A second Objection is drawn from the necessity of Christ's beatisick love of God: Every merito. ious act is free; for freedom is essentially requlfite unto merit. But now Christ's beatisick love of God was not free, because 'twas necessary. And freedom and necessity are incompetible in the same act: It followeth therefore that Christ's beatisick love of God was not meritorious. This argument the Defendant inculcates frequently.

The Scotists answer by denying the Minor. Christ's beatisick love of God was, say they, free, though not with a freedom of indifferency, yet with a freedom of complacency, and that not only concomitant, but causal. I call that concomitant, which is in acts whereof the will is not a cause, qua voluntas sibi complacet in aliquo, etsi respectu ejus nullius causae •• ration • m habet: and such a freedom there was (say they) in the Fathers b • get • ing of the Son, the Father had a complacency therein, and was well-pleased therewith. But he did not beget the Son by any act of his will. I call that cansal, which is in acts whereof the will is a cause. This is that liberty which the Scotists call the essential liberty of the will, and is by Rada thus defined. Haec libertas est complacenter cognition finis sub propria finis ration, supposita, quasi se determinare ad agendum, sive con ingenter se determinet, sive necessario. In 1. lib. sent. Controv. 13. p. 207. This freedom the Scotists make to agree unto every elicit act of the will, and consequently unto the b • atifick love of God. And the reason that they give, is, because freedom is essential to the will, and is pred • cated of it quit • nus ipswn, and a quatenus ad de omni valet argumentum: What is predicated of the will as the will, is p • edicated of every act of the will. This reason is urged very acutely by Faber Faventinus against Cajetan, who saith that the will is a free agent only in respect of some acts, and not in regard of others, Contra: vel competit vol • ntati s • cundum essentiam, & abso • ute esse p •• ncip • um liberum, vel non, si non ergo volun • as accidentaliter est principium liberum, & tun • quaere, quaenam fit illa potentia, cui inest principium agendi libere per essentiam, vel est voluntas vel non dabitur principiu • liberum essentialiter, quod est absurdum, quia omne per accidens redueitur ad aliquod per se, datur principium liberum per accidens; ergo debet dari principium liberum per essentiam. Si dicas voluntaes respectu aliquorum actum est libera per essentiam, resp • ctu a • orum est natueale principium. Co •• ra quod inest alieui per ess • ntiam, & secundum quod ipsum inest • i universaliter. Ex

Unto Faber Faventinus let me add Rada, who Lib. 1. Contr. 13. p. 210, 211. proves largely, That the will, quatenus potentia est, cannot be considered prout natura est, as nature is an active principle distinct from that which is free, and therefore consequently cannot have any natural act, but all its acts are free.

Whereas 'tis added for the confirmation of the Minor, that Christ's beatisick love of God was necessary, as being a necessary consequent of the beatifical vision in him, and freedom and necessity are repugnant.

Unto this the Scotists answer, that there is no such repugnancy betwixt freedom and necessity, as is imagined: indeed a natural agent, and a free are opposite, and so also a necessary agent and cowingent: And therefore the same agent in the sane act cannot work naturally and freel • , w •• ssarily, and contingently. But now there is no such opposition betwixt natural and contingent, and betwixt free and n • cessary: and hereup on it followeth, that a natural agent may work contingently, and per accidens, as we see in Monsters, in casu, and so •• wta: and so again on the other side, a free agent may work necessarily; thus God loves himself most freely, and yet withal most nec • ssarily too. Rada hath four very shrewd Arguments, to prove the co • sistency of the highest freedom, with the highest nec • ssity, which I shall insert for the Defendant to try his utmost still upon.

The Defendant is pleased to say, page 68. That the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely, with a freedom improperly taken, for a liberty from co • action.

But first, the Scotists will tell him that freedom is attributed unto their love of God in the greatest propriety. For the beatisick love is the greatest perfection incident unto their wills: and freedom is an intrins • cal and essential condition of their wills. Now (say they) th •• which is int • ins • cal and esscut •• l unto a power or faculty, cannot be repugnant unto the greatest perfect on thereof: therefore the beatisick love of God which is accessory, and freedom, are no ways inconsistent.

Secondly, In their love of God there is a freedom, not only from coact on, but also from natural necessity, such as that which is in the metion of a stone downward, which prelupposeth no act of the understanding. The n • cessity which is in their love of God, is not such anecessity, but a voluntary necessity, which hath always foregoing anact of intellectual knowledge. And this for the first answer unto the difficulty propounded.

There is by some School-men given another, indeed a quite contrary answer: and 'cis, that Christ's love of God was not meritorious, and in asserting this they think there is no absurdity, because there is otherwise a very wide and spacious field for Christ's merit, in the acts of his love of man, and in the • cts of his other virtues. Of this opinion Beca • us makes mention, Sum. Theol. Scholast. tom. 5. c. 14. q. 3. Alij sic s •• t unt Christiam suisse viatorens, not solum ration carnis, & animae passibilis, sicut jam expl • catum est, sed etiam ration animae, quatenus amabat proximos. Comprehensorem vero, ration animae, quatenusamabat Deum clare visam. Ita{que} meruisse per actium charitatis circa proximos; non tamen per actum charitatis circa Deum. This opinionhe thinks to be probable, and Suarez in 3 ^am part. Thom. tom. 1. dis • . 39. S. 2. saith that it may easily be defended. The contrary opinion therefore, at the most is but a Scholastical Problem. But Vasquez hath a full defense of this Opinion, that Christ's love of God was not meritorious: and with it he joineth a refutation of this distinction, of Christslove, given by Suarez, and others: the passige is somewhat large, but because 'tis home, and accurate, I hope I shall have the Readers patience for the inserting of it.

Here Vasquez presupposeth two things already proved by him.

1. That in Christ there was no infused knowledge of the essence of God and the mystery of the Trin • ty distinct from the beatifical V • sion.

2. That Christ's beatifique love of God was not meritorious.

Having premised these t • o things, he next proves, that though there were in Christ an infused knowledge of the essence of God distinct from the beat • fical vision; yet it would not hereupon follow, that there should be in him a love of God distinguished from that, which was the sequel of the beatisical vision; and the reason is, because there was one and the same goodness propounded unto his will, by the infused knowledge and the beat • sique vision; and therefore the same effect of love, where the will is moved, and sti • ed up about an object known after a twofold manner, it is only allured, and wrought upon as 'tis known, after the more perfect way and man • , 〈◊〉 when I come to see by experience those good things in a man, which before I knew only by report, I then love him only upon mine own experimental knowledge, and no longer upon the relation of others.

Lastly, Suppose this distinction of Christ's love of God were true and sound, yet 'tis utterly unserviceable for the defense of D • . Hammond, and that by the opinion of the Defendant himself: For Dr. Hammond (saith he) is to be understood of the acts of Christ's love terminated towards man for God's sake: Now the Authors and Fauto • s of this distinction, understand it expressly concerning the act of Christ's love as terminated towards God himself, and they do distinguish it from the acts of his love of his neighbor. This is so plain in Suarez, out of whom the D • fendant borroweth the distinction, as that one would think it impossible for the Gentl • man to oversee it. But this oversight renders it very probable, that he never read Suarez himself, but had the distinction sent him from some friend, who knew not the consistency of it with his other distinctions.

Unto this we may add, that those that stickle for this twofold actual love of God in Christ, as terminated unto God himself, have not so much as one word or syllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator, touching the degrees, whereof all the indifferency that they assert therein, is Contradistionis quoad exercitium actus. So much is affirmed by Gregory De Valentia, tom. 4. disp. 1. q. 19. punct. 2. Hunc actum charitatis aiunt in Christo fuisse aliquo modo liberum: ita scilicet, ut posset ab eo certe aliquando desistere, &c. quam libertatem, modo diceudi in Scholis usitato, vocamus libertatem quoad actus excreitium tantum, &c. But our Defendant himself will not deny, that all the inward acts of the love of God in Christ, that were terminated immediately on God himself, were always at the highest equally intense: And therefore this distinction being meant of the acts of Christ's love of God as terminated unto God himself, can do Dr. Hammond no service at all in this Controversy.

Having beaten the R • fater from all his Evasions, I shall next examine what he saith unto my three Arguments.

The first is drawn from the all fuln • ss and perfection of Christ's habitual grace. The habits of all graces and virtues in Christ were always full • and perfect, most intense, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore so are the inward acts or actions of those graces and virtues too. Now what is said in general of the habits of all graces, may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity. That in Christ was always full and perfect, most intense, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore so were the inward acts, that is, actions thereof too. Here are two Enthymems implied, the latter subordinate unto the former: For habitual grace is the genus of divine charity, and not the equivalent thereof, as the Defendant fondly thinks. That I make it, p. 330. B. the Consequence of the latter Enthymem; I proved p. 3, 4, 12. from which the confirmation of the former may easily be collected. The said proof of the Consequence I shall briefly repeat, and somewhat re-enforce. And 'tis, that there can no other ground be assigned, for the intension of the action: of loving of God in Christ, but the intension of the habit of love: which Dr. Hammond and his Defendant both affirm, in Christ to be always so full, and intense, as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees: For an action is not capable of degrees of intension and remission, but s • condarily, mediante qualitate, which it produceth, or from which it proceedeth, vatione termini, or vatione principij: it cannot be ration termini: any quality that was the effective term, the product of the inward action of love; for that there is no such term or product of the action of love, hath now been largely confirmed. And if it be said, that it was ration principij, then it must be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love: for there are but two qualities, that are the principles of the action of loving God in Christ; the power or faculty of the will, and the habitual grace of love. Now the power or faculty of willing, cannot be intended in any man: and the habitual grace of love in Christ, was always so intense, as that in him 'twas uncapable of further intension; and consequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom, were of an equal intension.

Here your Answer unto which you refer, is, that I ignorantly, or willfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loying, &c. And that the Doctor speaks of the immanent acts of love, and not at all of the actions, p. 21, 22.

But first, I have proved, that there are no such things in rerum naturá, as the acts of love distinguished from their actions as their terms.

Secondly, Suppose that there were such terms, yet that the Doctor cannot reasonably be understood of them, hath been sufficiently demonstrated.

Unto this I add ex abundanti, the testimonies of some few Schoolmen, from which may be gathered, that the habit and the act, are always equal in gradual perfection: and from this it will follow, that if the habit be always equally • ntense, the act m • st be so too. But now for preventing all future mistakes, and to cut off the Defendants Objections, I shall lay down, of this a limitation, which might easily have been foreseen, and is usually in things of this and the l • ke nature. It is to be understood caeteris paribus, provided that all other ca • s • s concur equally, and uniformly unto the act, so that the habit be not hindered by them, but left to its natural way of working. Now in Christ caetera erant paria: there was no dis • arity but a most absolute and perfect equality, and uniformity in the influence of other causes, viz. The will of Christ, and God's assisting grace, in the production of his actual love of God, h • s will never willed any abatement of the act, and God never withdrew his assisting grace in the least degree or measure: and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him always equally and uniformly, as to the inward acts thereof. Having premised this limitation, which I shall entreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which followeth, Let us come unto what you say unto the testimonies themselves.

First, you quarrel me for that I cite not Aqui • as from his own writings, But quote him twice from Caprcolus, but I had very good reason for this, for the passages that I quote are not in Aquinas his S • m • nes or in his book Contra gentes, which is all that I have of Aquinas. The first passage he quotes out of Aquinas De Vertutibus, q. 1. a. 11. and the second is out of the same work, questio de charitate art. 10. I believe that if you had read Caprcolus, you would have been as much to seek to sinned these places in Aquinas as I was. If you can direct me to them I shall thank you, but I suppose 'tis a book not commonly to be had.

The first testimony you do not answer, but outface. From i • I truly (as you grant) concluded, that a greater vehemency in the operation of love, argued a greater participation in the subject of the habit of love. Now from this it undeniably followeth, that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another, then the subject doth more participate of the habit of love, at one time than another: and whether this be not to the purpose, Let any man judge.

The pertinency of the second testimony, is as evident as that of the first. For if it be, as you grant, an undoubted truth, that idem est cha • tatem augeri secundum essentiam, & ipsam habere essicaciam a • producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum; then 'tis also as undeniable 〈◊〉 truth, inevitably following hereupon, that if the habit of charity is efficacious in producing a habit of more fervent love, at one time than at another, the habit of charity is increased; according to its essence, at one time more than another.

In answer unto the third testimony you spend part of four pages, which is all nothing to the purpose: for you mistake the place of Aquinas, supposing it to be 22 ae. q 24 a. 8. Co • p. whereas it is not, (as I have shewn out of Capreolus ) in his Summes at all.

Unto the place out of Scotus, the Defendant, to amuse the Reader, talks a great deai: p. 341, 342. but I must needs profess, that I cannot pick out of all that he saith, so much as one syllable that is appliable in a way of answer. Unto what I urge out of Sco • us, Actus naturaliter elicitus (pray good Mr. D • f • n • ant mark the word naturaliter:) ab aliqua forma aeq • a 〈◊〉 in p • f • ction ill fo • mae.

But of what I urged out of H •• tado De Mendoza, that intensio actus secundi suppo • it aequalem in ensi nem i • actu primo, you have a very rare, and iubtile explication. His meaning is, say you, that the second act c • nnot possibly exceed the first, in gradwal persection, though it may come short of it; p 334, 337. Away Trister: before you write anymore Con •• ov •• siet, learn some Syleme of Logic: And indeed every Syste ne of Lugick will discover the foppery of this conceit, for it will teach that unequals are adequately opposed unto eq • als, and that inaequalia a • e minora, as well as majora.

But unto this first argument, you have as you think, a most satisfying answer, p. 331 ^b , 337 ^b , which you inculcate very often elsewhere, p. 24, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 185, 186, 209, 210, 247, 249, 250, 340. And it is, that though natural and a • c • ssa • y causes work a • w tyes equally and •• sormly ad extremam viri •• m, yet 'tis otherwise with fr • e agents: and such are all moral habits in general, and consequently the habitual love of God in particular, which is as free (you say) as the will itself, in which 'tis seated.

Unto this I have two things to reply.

First, that any habits, either intellectual, or moral, are free Agents, is new and strange Philosophy: for hitherto it hath been a Proverb in the Schools, that habitus agunt ad modum naturae, caeteris paribus. But having to do with such a mod • st Adversary as our D • sendant is, it will be necessary to transcribe some testimoties, otherwise I shall never stop his mouth; and I shall begin with Scotus, Scripto Oxoniens. Lib. 1. dist. 17. q. 2. p. 248. Operatio non elicitur libere, cujus princip • um activum est mere natural • , & agens per modum naturae: sed habitus cum non sit formaliter voluntas, nec per consequence formaliter liber, si est principium activum, erit mere natural; ergo operatio ejus non erit lihera; & ita nullum velle erit liberum, si eliciatur ab habitu, ut à totali principio acti • o. Scripto Paris. lib. 3. dist. 33. q. 1. p. 431. Q • ilibet habitus, quantum est de se, inclinat per modum naturae, & charitas per modum naturae suae ad actum supernaturalem inclinat naturaliter ficut habi • us acquisitus ad actum sibi proportionatum, quoniam babitus non est liber, sed tantum voluntas; habitus enim ita inclinat per modum naturae potentiam in objectum, sicut gravitas ipsum grave deorsum. Unto Scotus I shall add Suarez in his Metaphysics. At{que}, hine colligitur generalis regula, &c. scilicet uihil obstare libertati, vel contingentiae actus • scu affectus, quod aliqua causa naturali necessitate ad illum concu • rat dummedo aliqu • cum indifferentia efficiat, respectu cujus effectus denominetur liber. Ratio hujus satis declarata est explicando fundamentum secundae sententiae: amplius v • ro illastrari potest non nullis exemplis, &c. Simile quid dici potest de insluxu habi us concurrentis cum p • tentia libera; habitus enim ex so non habet indifferentiam, aut p • opriam libertatem, sed ex necessitate naturae operatur eperawe s • t potentia, disp. 19. s. 3. n. 20. Unto Suarez I shall subjoin a Modern Scotist Pon • us, who, Philos. Curs. part 3. disp. 13. q. 3. n. 39. page 552. expressly averreth that it is absurd to say that the hali of charity either infased or •• quired is fr • e. Probatur sequela, quia asias habitus chari • atis de f • cio tam insusus, quam acquisitus, esset liber, quod est absurdum. But I night have spared the labe •• . of quoting all these Authorities, for there is a place which I urged out of Scotus, that the D • fendant transcribes at large, p. 340. b that will strike the matter dead. The place in Scotus at large is this, Centra, possibile est illam anima • hab • re summam gratiam, ergo summam frurti • nem. Consequentia p • obatur; quia actus naturaliter elicitus ab aliqua forma equatur in persectione illi formae; fruitio est actus supernaturalis, & p • r consequence elicitus a causa supernaturali, quae est gratia, & patet quod naturaliter, quia gratia non est formaliter libera. Ergo see • dum quantit at • m gratiae potest esse quantitas fruitionis.

Here you see Scolus expressly affirmeth, that the fruition of God, which he makes to be the actual love of God, is naturally elicited from grace, because grace is not formally free: and is not this apertly contradictory unto our Defendants dictate? pag. 337. b that all the habits of grace, whether in Christ, or in all other men, are naturally free and undetermined in their operations. And now can any man think, that the Defendant understood this passage in Scotus? for if he had, he would in all probability have concealed it, as much as he could, and not thus have transcribed it at large, seeing 'tis so apparently destructive to his own Opinion. But by this the Reader may see, with what profound judgment he quotes the School-men.

Unto these Authorities I shall annex a Reason, taken from the Defendants own notion of freedom, for he makes it to consist in indifferency: and habits answerably to the degree of their intension and prevalency, take away and diminish the indifferency of both-contrariety and contradiction.

1. Of Contrariety: for by inclining to their own proper acts, they render averse from all contrary acts: by how much the habit of temperance prevails in a man, by so much he abhors all acts of intemperance.

2. Of Contradiction: for they incline unto frequency of their acts, loco & tempore debitis, and incline against sinful omission of their acts.

This Reason may, for the substance of it, be collected from what the School-m • n usually say, to prove that free-will doth not consist in a habit. I shall at present content myself only with a Quotation of Aquinas, Primâ part. q. 83. a. 2. Corp. Habitus dicuntur, secundum quos nos habemus ad p • ssion • s, vel ad actus b • ne, vel male, nt d • citur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam been nos habemus ad omcupiscenti • s. Per intemperantiam a tem male. Per scientiam etiam been nos habemus ad actum incellectus, dum verum cognoscimus, per habitum autem contearium, male. Liberum awem arbitrium indifferen • er se habet ad been eligendum, vel male; unde impossible est quod liberum arbitrium sit habi • us. This mutatis matandis will prove that no habit is formally free.

Secondly, Though habits be not formally free, yet I confess they are, in regard of their use and exercise, subject unto the impery of the will. So that the will freely useth or not useth them. But this will no ways advantage the Defendant: for all men are obliged to act the habit of love, as touching its inward acts, unto the highest, ad extremum virium. They are bound to love God with all their might and strength, therefore with all their habitual might and strength: and if their love fall short of this height, it is sin • ul and defective, which cannot without blasphemy be imagined of Christ, who was impeccabilis, and therefore fulfilled all righteousness; and therefore when he loved God, he lov • d him as much as he could: the all-fullness of his actual love, was for d • grees answerable to the all-fullness of his nabitual.

As for his Answer to my secon • Argument, drawn from the beatifical vision in Christ, that hath been sufficiently replied unto, in my examination of his distinction of Christ's love of God, as he was Viator, and as he was Comprebenso.

The third, and last Argument was fetched from Christ's impeceability. It was impossible for Christ to sin: but if the inward acts of his love of God, had been less intense at one time than at another, he had sinned; for he had broken that first and great Commandment, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, with all thy might and strength, Deut. 6.5. Mat. 22.37. Mark 12.30. Luke 10.27. In Answer unto this Argument, the Defdenant insists from pag. 357. us{que} ad 520. of examining which, his own concession will save the labor: for he grants that if we speak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himself, we are bound to love God to the utmost height we can, and that he who doth not so love him, doth not love him so much as he deserveth, or as much as man ought: and that therefore the acts of Christ • love, as immediately terminated on God, were always at the the height and one equal perfection, p. 71.

Now that Doctor Hammond is to be understood of this eminent act of holy charity, that is immediately terminated on God, I have clearly demonstrated: and unless the Defendant can answer my arguments, his accusation of my third argument, as guilty of that Sophism which the Philosopher calleth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , will pass but for an idle and ignorant calumny. The Defendants friends may be ready to say that 〈◊〉 decline the examination of that which followeth, because 'tis unanswerable, but alas▪ there's no such matter: for that it is a very • otten, e • roneous discourse, guilty of compliance with Pop • ry, in a great measure, I shall shortly demonstrate in a d • stinct Treatise, if God grant me life, health and liberty. The reason then why at present I take no further notice of it, is, because not only the Stationer, but divers good friends, have for several reasons much importuned me, to contract this Debate as much as I could, and I should now forth with put a period to it, but that I am desirous to give the Readet in brief, a further taste of the incons • q ••• ncies with which 〈◊〉 work of Doctor Creed is everywhere fraught.

First, p. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57▪ he concludes that a habit of divine love in Christ was not capable of further degrees because the act and exercise of it was capable of further degrees. If Christ's love of God (in the act and exercis • ) was capable of Deg • ees, more intense at one time than another, and had in its latitude, or amplitude several Degrees, one different from another secund • m magis & minus, all them comprehended in because issuing from) the habit of Divine Love, then this babitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect, always (pray Master Defendant mark the word always) in him so fall, and so perfect as not to want, and so not to be capable of further degrees. But the Antecedent is true, and therefore also the Consequent. The evidence of the sequel is supposed, and grounded upon two very • now • Maxims; Nihil est in effectu, quod non prius erat in causâ, and Nihil dat quod non habit. This is an argument silly and ridiculous beyond all comparison: for, mutatis mutandis, a man from it may argue against the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were, are, or shall be on the earth. If their love of God in this life, in the acts and exercise, was capable of Degrees, &c. then their habitual love of God, must be acknowledged all-full and perfect always in them, so full and perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees. As for the two known Maxims, they will do him no service, unless he put in the word semper. Nihil est in effectu, quod non erat prius semper in causa, Nihil dat quod non habet semper. And if you add the particle semper every fresh-man will soon discover their notorious falsehood.

Secondly, p. 57. he hath another rare consequence: The Apostle saith that Christ's being in the form of God, though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God, yet made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likunesse of man, and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross, wherefere God also hath exalted him. Therefore Christ's love, viz. actual and inward, was more intense at one time than another: v.z. i • his agony and dying for us more intense, than in his suffering nakedness and hunger for us.

Thirdly, in p. 18, 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I have these words. If this be your meaning, I must needs assume the boldness to tell you, that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the School-men. But perhaps you may mean such School-men, as such a Puny, as I never saw or heard of; however you cannot expect b • lief, until you produce their testimonies: And I shall entreat you to allege such as may be had in Paul's-Church yard, o • at least in the Library at Oxford. Now from this the Defendant concludes, • . 62. that I tell the world in effect, that I have all the School-men at my singers end: nay just as many, no more, nor no less than are in Paul's-Charchyard, and the L • b • ary as Oxford.

Fourthly, p. 88, 89. the Defendant saith, that I do not thoroughly understand a passage which I quote out of Raynandus: My words are these. Kaynaudus makes mention out of Gabriel Biel, of a distinction of love into aff • ctive, and eff • ctive: and • hat is this effective love, but the effects and expressions of love.

But now that he doth not take this to be a proper destribution of a G • nus into its Species, appeareth by what he saith out of the same Author concerning the division, &c. Well, where lieth my mistake in these words? why plain it is (say you ) from Raynaudus, that love effective is not only the outward sensible effects, and expressions, but also something else. For though it be true, that all the outward sensible effects, and expressions of love, be love effective, or in plain English the issues, and effects of love; yet the terms are not reciprocil, and convertible. For there are many effects of love, that are not sensible, and thus external. For instance good wishes, good prayers, are the effects of true love, so also are joy at the we fare of the beloved persons w • ll-doing, and sorrow, and grief at his miscarriage; and yet th • y are not always expressed, nor does any prudent man always show his joy or grief, or express his good wishes, thoughts and desires to him be most tenderly affects. Well, what of all this? Why saith the Defendant, the subject-matter of your discourse leads me necessarily to understand your interrogation of the outword sensible effects and expressions of love. Sir, you must put in the word only, or else you say nothing to the purpose: and if you put that in, what you say is very false. It is (I say) false that the subject-matter of my discourse, leads you necessarily to understand my interrogation, only of the outward sensible effects and expressions of love, and you can never prove it by any rule of argumentation. Indeed my design is, to prove that love is not a genus unto the outward expressions of love, or that the outward expressions of love are not a species of love, and may not this be very well proved, though in my interrogation the effects and expressions of love be taken in a general sense, abstracting from both inward and outward expressiens? may not that which is denied of estective love in general, that is all effects and expressions of love, be particularly denied of the outward and sensible expressions of love? Did you never hear of arguing à gen • re ad sp • ciem negative, grounded upon this Max • me Quod convenit aut not convenit generi, Convenit etiam, aut non convenit sp • c • e • ? Is it not a good argument to conclude, that hom • is not lapis, b • cause nullum animal it l • pis: because no effective love, no effects, and expressions of love are a species of love, will it not thence irref • agably follow, that no outward effects and expressions of love are a speci • s of love?

Fifthly, I had said p. 10. of my Refutation, &c. I am very loath to enter into a Contest with so great a Critick touching the meaning of a word: And from this innocent and harmiess passage, the Defendant concludes, That I contemptuously undervalue the Docto • 's excellent Critical learning, That with me a Critick is but a whisting Gramma • ian, an empty Pedag • gae, p. 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101. That the Doctor in my opinion is some petty Grammaticaster, that knows the meaning of Musa, and can tell how to decline Lapis, some great Critick for sooth, one fit to teach School-boys perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latin Author: but for any skill in the Arts, and Reserches of Philosophy, he is a very Dunce, and not at all seen in the curious speculations and subtleties of School-learning. But what color is there for these odious sequeles in my words▪ Indeed they can be drawn from no Topic place, but that of the Defendant's furious malice.

Sixthly, Whereas Dr. Hammond had said, that each of the expressions of Christ's love of God, had an act of internal love of which they were so many proportionably different expressions: I answered, that if the Doctors meaning were, that these different expressions in regard of intension, must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective acts of love, must be equal or parallel unto them; then I denied what he said, and called upon him for the proof of it. Now this my denial, which no rational man can or will deny, the Defendant himself most unnecessarily and idly confirms in 16. pages, p. 139, 140, &c. usque ad 155. and p. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154. he quotes the testimonies of many School-men for the confirmation hereof, and in the close of all this, he wonders at my omission of these, and the like testimonies: And hereupon he concludes my ignorance in School-men. His words are these: And therefore I cannot choose but wonder, that our Refuter should take no notice of these or the like passages, which to ordinary eyes would have shown more to his advantage, than all that he has quoted in his Panphlet from the School-men, and Suarez, and Scheibler to boot. But this and some other passages in his book, which offered themselves at first sight, make me not value his School-learning at the same rate and p • ice he has put upon it in the Title-page of his mixture. But old Homer was blind, though he were the Prince of Poets; and our Writer of Practical, and Scholastical Divinity sees not all things in those Doctors that may most serve for his advantage. Here by the way I deny, that I put such a rate and value upon my School-learning, in the Title-page of my Mixture, as the Defendant pretends: only I profess myself a Well-wisher unto Scholastical Divinity, desirous to revive the study thereof: but however there is not either in mine, or in his own discourse any foundation, (shall I say?) nay, not so much as any shadow, for either his wender or censure. The particle therefore (therefore I cannot choose but wonder) &c. plainly intimates, that what he saith, is a conclusion drawn from something foregoing. And for my part, I have most diligent'y sought for premises unto this conclusion, and can find none, and therefore must earnestly entreat the Defendant, to direct us where or what they are. In my fore-mentioned denial, I acted the part of a Respondent; and by what laws of disputation a Respondent, though a School-man, is obliged to heap up testimonies out of School-men, for the confirmation of every denial that he makes, especially if the proposition denied be apparently false, as this was, viz. That the outward expressions and the inward acts of love of God in Christ, must of necessity be of equal intension. And thus hoping that by the next we shall know why you fell into this fit of wondering, I pass on.

Seventhly, In the next place you tell us, that in men the inward affection commonly varies, according to the intension and remission of the outward expressions and effects: and in prosecution of this he spends, with a great deal of noise and triumph, about 16. pages more, p. 155, 156, &c. • usque ad 171. But what of all this, Sir? is this anything to the matter in hand? Can you from anything in this tedious discourse infer anything against my Denyal, vlz. that the outward different expressions of love, must of necessity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love? and if you cannot, (as undoubtedly you cannot,) to what end serves all that you say, but to waste time, pen, ink, and paper.

But you tell us often, that the Doctor is no ways engaged to prove, that the inward acts of love, and the outward expressions, are of necessity equal in point of intension, But the contrary will appear to every Pu • s • ny in Logic, that will but peruse the Doctors sequel, as 'tis in him at large, for thus it runneth: and from hence I suppose is unavoidably cons • que • t (pr • y Mr. Defendant mark the word unavoidably) that that act of internal love exp • es • ed by Christ's dying for us, was supe ••• ur to th • se • o • mer act (supply in intention) which only expressed themselves in his poverty: and so the same person that loved sincerely, did also love, and express that love more intensely at one time then at another: which was the very thing I said in another instanc • . Now choose unto this consequent what Antecedent you will, out of Dr Hammonds words: either those that are immed • a • ely foregoing▪ yet it being • e •• ain that each of these express • ions had an act, of internal love, of which they were so many propertionab • y different expression • ; or th • se that precede these. To this I subjoin that such as the expression wa • , such was the act of inward love, of which that was an expression and from it it is impossible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends, to infer th • s consequent. But you pretend p • 68, that you have done the feat yourself. And now because you p •• sesse, (and it is your third charge) that the reason of the Doct • rs consequenc • is to you invisible, and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate, u • til you be d • iven thereto by • educing his En • hyme •• e unto a Syllogism: I sh •• l • nce, for your better satisfaction, •• rs • r • e it; I • ordina • i • y there i • and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of In • er • ion and R • mission, betwixt the inward acts of love, and the outward expressions, then that act of internal love expressed by Christ's dyi • g for us was superior to th • se former acts which only expressed themselves in h • s Poverty, &c. But the Antecedent is true, as we have shown from reason and experience, and the Auth • rity of Gregory, and the Schoolmen. Ther • f • re also is the consequent.

First, for the major of this your Syllogism, I demand concerning the Consequent, whether you infer it from your Ante • edent necessarily, or only probably; If you say only probably, then your Consequent is none of Dr. Hamm • nds: for he supposeth that his followeth nec • ssarily from what he hath said. Hence I suppose it (faith he) unavoidably consequent (that is, necessarily consequent) that that act of intern • l love express • d by his dying for us, was superior to those former acts which only expressed themselves in his poverty. If you say you infer it necessarily, then the consequent is evidently false; you must then change in your Antecedent the word ordinarily, and in the room thereof put in the word necessarily, or else the consequent will not follow unavoidably.

As for the assumption, that is evidently false too, if you supply what is to be supposed, for then thus it runs. Ordinarily there is, and must be in all men, and was in Christ, a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and remission, betwixt the inward acts o • the love of God, and the outward expressions thereof. Now all men are by the commandment of God, which Christ fulfilled, obl • ged to love God, when they love him, with all their might, and consequently with all their habitual might. But by the opinion of both Dr. Hamond, and the Defendant, men are not bound in all expressions of their love of God, to perform then • with all their might: and therefore 'tis false, very false, that there must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intension and remission; betwixt the inward acts of the love of God, and the outward expressions thereof. And thus you see what a rare Syllogism you have made, both the premises of which are notoriously false.

By wh • t hath been said, the Reader may, (as discover the faishood of your Syllogism, so also) frame a true Syllogism, against the sequel of Dr. Hammond: and 'tis as followeth. If all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might, then that act of h • s internal love, viz. of God, expressed by his dying for us, was not superior, viz. in intension to those former acts, which only expressed themselves in his poverty: but all the inward acts of Christ's love of God, were with all his habitual might: therefore that act of his interral love of God, expressed by his dying for us, was not superior, ( viz. in intension) to those fo • mer acts, which only express themselves in his poverty. The Major is undeniable, and we may say as much of the Minor: because Christ fulfilled the commandment, which was to love God, with all his might and strength; Therefore with all his habitual might and strength: and this is confessed by yourself touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himself, of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be understood.

Eighthly, Dr. Hammond says that if it be proved that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , according to the vulgar translation, signifieth Luke 22, 44. Prolixiùs; the • e will yet be place equally for his conclusion, viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intense then another. But if there be any place for such a conclusion, then thus the argument stands. Christ in his agony prayed longer then before; therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intense then before. But this sequel (as is evident unto every ordinary Reader ) is very illogical and irrational, and yet the Defendant justifieth it, and in vindication of it spends twelve pages, p. 253, 254, &c. us{que} ad 265. But how unsatistying this h •• vindication is, will quickly appear, if he please to cast into Syllegismes what he takes to be argumentative therein. But this is a thing that he dates not so much as attempt, for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse. However in the mean time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument, as 'tis propounded by himself, and as 'tis reinforced by the Defendant. The conclusion to be proved is, that one inward act of Christ's love of God was more intense then another. Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer: for parallel to a gre • ter length, there's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer, compared with that which is shorter. All the proof that I can find of this, reduced into form, stands thus. Where there is a multiplication of Degrees, more degrees of the inward actual love of God, there's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God: but in a larger prayer of Christ, there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love, &c. more deg • ee of love, &c. then there was in a shorter: And therefore the • e was a greater intension, viz. of the actual internal love of God. The Major is confirmed from the nature of intension, which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject, an addition of one. Degree unto another.

And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend, where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love, viz. inward; where there are more acts of love, there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love: for in every act of love, there was some degree of intension, but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love, m • re acts of love then there was in a shorter; and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees o • love, more Degrees of love, &c.

My Answer unto th • s Sy •• gisme shall be, both unto the Major and the Minor.

First then, I answer unto the Major, by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees. It is either of the same numerical form, or fo fo • mes numerically different. Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical form, there is a greater intension; but not where there is a greater multiplication of forms numerically different, for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical form. The Major then, if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees, is false: but if understood of the former is true. But then th • Minor, if understood answerably of the same, will be false. And Dr. Hammond's proof of it will be most imp • inent. For the several inward acts of Christ's love of God, are forms numerically different, and therefore let them be multiplied never so much, this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees, in one act of love then there is in another: So that from this it can never be inferred, that one inward act of love in Christ, was more intense then another. But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affi • meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say, If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplied as the acts are, there must be a growth in their intensive perfection, and the last act, which has the greater number of Degrees in it, will be gradually more perfect then the former. Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplied as the acts are, there must be a growth in their intensive perfection, and withal you suppose, that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it: and here upon you conclude of it, that it will be gradually more perfect then the former. But, good Mr. Defendant, instead of saying and supposing, you should have proved what you say and suppose: but of such proof there is not in all that you say, any the least footsteps.

B • t • e this how it will, plain it is, you say p. 257. that I do not re • ch the Doctor 's meaning, and the force of his argument. I have made the most of his words that I could, but as for any hidden and invisible meaning, distinct from that which his words hold forth, I know not that I was obliged to search after it. And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant, who can see further into a Mill-stone then other Mortals.

But however, let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond 's. The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cause, thus, where th • z • ale is true and real, and not tersonate and counterf • it, (as in Christ without doubt it was most true) there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in them, argues a greater a den • y of inward affection, and true zeal. And for the truth of this ass • rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world.

Here if you supply what is to be supplied, touching the object of this inwa • d affection, This assertion, which you obtrude with such a confidence, is apparently untrue. I say 'tis apparently untrue, that a multip • cation of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in th • m, argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God, or love • f him. And for the falsehood of this assertion, I appeal to th • bosoms of all experienced, either Ministers, or Christians, who can t • ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense, in their shor • es, as it is in their longer prayers, and that the shortness of their prayers, many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God, but from regard to the infirmities of such as join with th • m, and for diverse other reasons. Mr. Paul Beyne was es • eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time, and 'tis said of him, that his prayer in his Family, was not usually above a quarter of an hour long: as having respect to the weaknesses and infirmities of his Servants and Children; and he used to dissuade others from tediousness in that duty. I believe the Defend • nt will not deny, but that a man may, in putting up the Lord 's Prayer, have his actual love of God every way as high and intense, as in the longest prayer either of a man's own or another's composition. But not to insist longer on other men, It is plain of Christ, that his shortest prayers, his shortest ejaculations, did proceed from an actual love of God, every way as intense as the longest. And for the truth of this, I appeal unto the Commandment of God, that enjoined Christ, and all other men, to love God with all their mig • t and strength: therefore with all their habitual might and strength. Now however other men may transgress this Commandment, Christ did not, could not; and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually, he loved him with all his habitual might and strength, ad extremum virium; and consequently one inward Act of his love of God, was not more intense then another.

Ninthly, p. 268 you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's, as guilty of that fallacy, which is called petitio principii If this be not (say you) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I know not what your great Master Aristatle mednes. But this is a most ridiculous and groundless crimination, for this, as every other fallacy, is a sault or defect in arguing, not in answering, 'tis (saith my •• rtle Master Scheibler) d • cept • o in syllogizando. De Sydogism, cap. 17. n. 6. 'tis, saith my great Master Aristotle, Elenchus Sophisticus. It hath always been observed for a rule in d • sputing, that when the Respondent denies a sequel, and gives a reason for it, it is the Opponents part to •• fute the reason, and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it. It is then a gross non-sequitur to conclude me g •• ltie of this fa • lacie, of petitio principii, because I do not confirm the reason, for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence. But, Sir, if you had not falsifted it, by adding must to may be, it is a Proposition so plain and evident, as that it needs no confirmation, and can be denied by no rational man. Thus it stands, my reason is, because in all these inward acts of Christ's love of God, (and we may say the same of the inward acts of other virtues and graces) there may be no gradual dissimilitude. Mark, Sir, the word may be, and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition, in several inward acts of Ch •• sts love of God there is no gradual dissimilitude; it there be, pray discover it, if there be hot, then give me leave to conclude, that in the multiplied acts of christs love of God, there may be no gradual dissimilitude. You say this is the controversy betwixt me and, the Doctor. But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a faishood: for you yourself state the controversy to be, whether one act of ch •• sts love of God were actually more intense then another? and yet if I had said, that in the inward acts of Christ's love of God, there could be no g • adual dissimilitude; this I have proved by three reasons, unto which you have given but • orrie answers: and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turn, for this would quickly swell my book to such a Volume as yours is.

Tenthly, he hath a passage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the least toundation: And will not every man think that our Refute • was a man of great judgment and parts, and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond? But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes, and that he never consulted the Authors he quot • s, but took them upon trust: otherwise m • thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived. But, pray Sir wherein, wherein is the • efuter so strangely deceived in Suarez? why 'tis clear and evident by Suarez, though every act of Christ, in respect of the person that performed it, was of an infinite, and so of an equal in ensive value, yet in respect of the moral goodness, that is intrinsically inherent in Christ's actions, nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely perfect then another, as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater then another. And therefore (say you) the same Suarez, even in that very page and columne, and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted, expressly says to this purpose. Primum omnium satendum esse, opera Christi fuisse inequalia in prep •• â bonitate intrinfec • , & essential, vel ••• ter inhaerente ipsi actai: quia ut dictum est, 〈◊〉 he bonites 〈◊〉 fini • a, po •• rat ergo esse major & 〈…〉 & allunde unum • pus Chris •• erut metioris objects quam aliud, & u •• m in • ths • u's 〈◊〉 , & sic de 〈…〉 , •• go 〈…〉 vol poter • nt esse inaequalta in h • c bonitate, &c. Why what of all this? h •• e I delivered a • y thing that contradicts this either expressly, or implyedly, or doth Suarez here oppose, in the least deg • ee, anything that I have said? doth not Su • rez all along assert that there is but one me • itotious value, in one act of Christ? and that in respect of meritorious value, one act of Christ was not better and more intensively perfect then another. Nay, do not you your fell • e p. 271. quote a place out of Su • rez, where in he affirmuth that the moral goodness inherent in the action • of Christ, is a thing distinct from their meritorious value Therefore Sua • tz (say you) acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote, Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum, esse quid distinctum • d realt boni • ate quae est d • ffe entin ipsius actû, prout cons •• ituitur in esse vi • tu •• c, • el illi a • rquo 〈…〉 inst • e inh • ret. Now Dr. Hummond is to be understood only of a meritorious value, for he is to be understood of a value, that was to be rewarded, and that out of debt: and such a one is a meritorious value. Nay, do not you yourself understand him to speak of a merito • ious value? p. 266. And now to show the app • sirnesse of the Proof. I must tell him what either he knows not, or will not observe, That the Doctor • gain a gues à poster • ori, from the effect to the cause, and the necessary rele ••• n betw • xt th • work and the reward. His •• gument is fun • ed upon a Maxune of d • s • ributive justice; not expressed, but suppesed and int ••• ted, and it is th •• ; where the reward does proceed of debt, as in Christ certainly it did and is properly wages, there must be a proportionable incre s • of thereward and the work, &c.

By this then the Roader may s • e, that all that you have concerning the moral goodness in h • rent in the actions of Christ, in respect of their re • l en •• y and good a •• se, is nothing at all to the purpose: for it is a thing quite different from their meritorious v • lue, as Suarez faith in the very Words that you your se • fe quote out of him. What hath been said is enough to convince the Defendant • greateft friends, that I Was not a jot deceived in Suarez. But yet for both his, and their further and fuller conviction, I shall compare the passa • e that he quote out of Suartz. with the Words fore going and following.

A little before he propounds a second Objection, against the infinite value and efficacy of Christ's W •• ks to sat • sle and merlt, Secund • Objectio est • b inconveni mi: nam si satisfactio Chr • sti infinita es • , se • u • tur unum vel •• fi • itum esse majus ulio, in ge • e • e • , in quo • nfiritu • • st, quod est contra Nationem infiniti, vel unum opus Christi no • esse majorts v • lor •• quà aliud: nec duo, quam unum, quod videtur ubsurdum: •• m quia totum est majus sua parte, tum e •• am quia unum opus Christ erat mellus alio, & unus dol • r major quàm alius quod muliùm resert and quantitatem satisfactionis: • um deniq • quiainde fieret, non magis redemisse nos Christum per passionem, & mortem, qu • m per alios actus vitae suae, quod est contra scripturam, quae passioni semper tribuit redemptionem nostram, ad Rom. 3.4, and 5. 〈◊〉 O • l. 3. ad Hebr. 2.9, and 11.

In AnsWer.

First he propounds a Concession, the very passage quoted by the Defendant, and therein he grants, that Christ's woe • ks Were unequal in regard of that moral goodness, Which Was intrinsical and essential to them, really inherent in them; and in regard hereof one Work might be better then another. Responde • ur, pri •• ùm omnium fatendum esse opera Christi fuisse inaequalia in prop • ia bon • tate intrinseca, & essential • , ve • realiter inhaerente ipsi actui quia, ut dictum est, tota h • c boni • as erat finita: poterat ergo esse major, & minor, & aliunde un • m opus Christi erat melioris obj • cti, qu • m aliud & unum i • tensius alio, & sic de aliis cercumstantiis, ergo erant vel poterant esse inaequelia in h • c bon •• a • e.

But then in the next place he showeth at large, quomedo st • t aequalitas meri • i, cum inaequali bonitate, as 'tis summed up in the margent; how an equality of merit or meritorious value, is consistent w • th the unequal goodness, that is really inherent in the actions them • elves. Nihilomin •• addendum secundo est, quod'ib topus Christi ex parte personae operantis fuisse infiniti valoris, quia licet • onitas, & aliae conditions actus c • nfer • t interdum ad hunc valorem, tamen quia haec dignitas infinits personae extollit hune valorem ad perfectissimum ordinem, & us{que} ad infin • tum gradum, ideo tollitur omnis alia proportie: illa enim person • , cùm in omni g • nere infini •• fit, eminenter continet omnia alia bena, & ide • consert actui, quidquid valoris omnes aliae circumstantiae conferrae p • ssent. Quo circa totum id, quoderat in opere Christi, ex p •• te ips •• s actûs, intelligendum est quasi materialiter se h • bere, personam vero esse quasi formem conferentem valorem, quae omnes illos actus aequaliter informat, & ideo omnibus consert infinitum, ái{que} ad •• equelem velorem. Exemplo explicari potest, fi pecunia tali regio signo figurata, tantum vale • e • , cujuscunq, esset materiae ration figurae.

And hereupon in the third place he infers, that which I cited out of him. Hinc ter • io fit, plura opera Christi esse quidem extensive plura merita, intensive tamen non esse plus valoris in mu • tis, quam in uno: ut si essent plures calores infinite intensi, essent quidem plures, non tamen efficerent unum intensiorem & pari ration, si in uno opere Christi quod successive pe • partes fi • bat, partes cum tot • comparemus, intensive tan • us valor erat in qualibet parta, sicùt in •• to opere, & in uno momento, sicùt in long • tempere: quia forma • quid erat v • lor, tote erat in toto, & tota in singulis partibus.

And now •• t the most partial Reader review this discourse of Suarez, and then let them sit down and sadly consider, whether the Defend • nt doth understand Suarez; or if he does understand him, whether his conscience inform him not, that I was not a jot mistaken in mine allegation of him, and if it doth, then what conscience is there in h • i affirming that I was.

Eleventhly, p 330. the Defendant pretends a grant of m • ne that I never made. Howsoever, saith he, I observe that in your first Argument you rightly understand the Doctors notion of the love of God, and take it here as he still does in the large sense, as it is all one with holy charity, as containing in its general • otion the acts of all graces and ver • ues whatsoever, and therefore because now h • be mus confitentem reum, I am resolved to hold you to your concession; You are, Sir, very quick sighted to observe that which never dropt from my Pen, nor was ever in my thoughts. Pray Si reflect once more upon my words; put them upon the Rack, and try your utmost skill in Logic, nay, call in what assistance you please; and if you an from them prove this pretended concession, then trample upon me with a much scotne as you please, and until this be done, I shall assume the boldness to tell you, that your pretence is a shameless untruth.

Twelfthly, p. 370. the Defendant hath two strange sequels from my wor • s, which until he can justify I shall look upon as slanders. If in the slate of Christ's

Here I do not say, that there was a cessation, interruption, or abatement of the be • tifical vision, but only a restraint of its influence, not upon his love of God, but upon the fullness of joy in his soul, in the time of his passion, and the redundancy of glory from his soul unto his body, in the whole time of his humiliation • excepting his transfiguration. Now from this the Defendant inferie • two Propositions, one in the neck of another, one immediately, and the other mediately.

1.

And 2. Consequently, his love of God could not be so ardent, so highly intense and perfect as afterwards, when now he sits at the right hand of God.

But now, if any should presume to ask for a reason of the consequence of these two Propositions, I must needs tell him that they are drawn from a Topic place, wherein the Defendant is wonderfully sk •• led, fallacia cosequentis. And in Keckerman 's Logic p. 543, 544. there are amongst others especially, two rare sequels instanced in, that are of the same stamp with these of our Defendants. Beculus stat in argul • , e • go • ra • pluet. Divus Gregorius edit cas • um. Ergo Div • Veronica salt • t. I find afterwards, p. • 22. that from this very same Proposition of mine, he hath two other like absurd and inconsequent inferences. His words are as followeth,

1. That Christ did not always enjoy the beatifical vision.

2. That sometimes the fervor of his love of God was abated. Now both these inferences are very inconsequent. For

First, this stands the first, there was some restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ. Therefore he did not always enjoy the beatifical vision, with as good Logic a man may conclude, that there was no heat in the fire, D • n. 3. because God restrained its influence upon the bodies of those three Worthies. It is very strange, that this our great Schoolman should b • so ignorant, as to confound the interruption or cessation of the beatifical vision, with the restraint of its influence: or to think the former a necessary sequel of the lat • er. Here by the way observe, that whereas the Defendant p. 523. quotes a saying of Leo, which he saith is approved of by all Antiquity, that at the time of our Savior's passion. Non dissolvit unionem sed substraxit visi • nem; It is to be understood warily, that the beatifical vision was withdrawn only in regard of influence, and never in respect of existence; for that in had a perpetual being or existence in the soul of Christ▪ i • upon very good reasons affirmed by the generality of both Papists and Protestants.

The second Inference is every way as inconsequent: for thus it stands. There was, by special dispensation, some restraint of the influence of his beatifical vision: Therefore there was a restraint of the influence of it upon his love of God; so that the fervor of his love was proportionablie abated, as the influence of his beatifical vision was restrained. Here is palpable fallacy, à dicio secund •• quid, ad dictum simpliciter; the restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ is particular, not universal. There was, I said, some restraint of the influence of this happiness, or beatifical vision, &c. And I instanced in the particulars, upon which the restraint of this influence was, of which his love of God was none.

Thirteenthly, p. 378, 379, 380, 381. the Defendant chargeth me

That you do me intolerable wrong the Reader may see, if he will but peruse my words. "Your Reader hath just reason to expect a confirmation of what you say.

"Because this very Answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us, Bellarm Tom. 2. De Monarchis. lib. 2. cap. 1. Tom. 4. de amissione gratie, & statu peccati. lib. 1. cap. 12. &c.

But to discover to every ordinary Reader, that he doth most grossly and palpably calumniate me; I shall reduce my words into two Syllogisms, and yet leave out that proposition, which he so maliciously imputes unto me. The proposition to be proved it, that it was fit that Dr. H. should acquaint his Readers what those cogent Reasons were that necessitated him unto the answer that he gave, and thus 'tis proved. If this answer were guilty of compliance with Papists then it Was sit that Dr. H. should acquaint us, what cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto But this answer is gu • lty of compliance with • apists.

And therefore it was fit that Dr. Hammond should acquaint us, what cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto.

For cons •• mation of the Minor the particle this, (this compliance) &c. carrieth us to the foregoing words, and from them we may craw this Syllogism.

That answer which is the sh •• t of Papists in several controversies between them and us, is guilty of compliance with Papists.

But this answer is the shift of Papists, in several controversies betwixt them and us.

And therefore 'tis guilty of compliance with Papist. And now my words being thus Analyzed, the Reader cannot but be astonished, a S • h • lar, a M • n of wi •• , and parts, a Minister, a Christian, should so forget himself, as to lay at my doors a proposition, that hath no bottom at all in my words, b • t is his own mere invention, that I say not forgery, and I believe h • can ha • dly tell which to wonder at most, the malice or ignorance that is in this crimination of the Defendant.

But I forget myself, thus to go beyond the limits that I have prefixed to myself, in the examination of this Volume. and indeed I believe 'tis very inksome unto the Reader, as well as unto myself, to take in such a Dunghil of Non-se • uiturs as this work is, and therefore I shall trouble the Reader with the Examination of but one Argument more, and that I am willing to in • st a little upon, because it seems at first blush • o be of more force and weight then the rest. And besides, 'tis concerning that which is the the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the matter in connoversie, 'tis dra •• from Luke 2.52. And Jesus ino eased in wisdom and stature, and in grate wi • h God and man. This Argument the Defendant prosecutes from page 188. usq • e a • 206.343, 344, 369, 370, 572 573. &c. us •• e • od 596. where he heaps up the • est monies of a world of Commentators, whereof many contradict one ano hen st no purpose, that I know, but to distract the unwary▪ and unlearned Reader, and to work in h • m a belief, that our Defendant is a man of vast reading.

The Argument for better distinction-sake may be branched into two parts.

First, he argue • h from Christ's increase in wisdom, he increased in wisdom; therefore he increased also in the inward actual love of God.

The reason of the consequence is, because love of necessity bears propotion unto knowledge, p 60 370 431, 512, 524. Unto this I shall return several Answers.

The first is▪ in the first part of my mixture, p. 249. The increase in wisdom h • re spoken of, is only extensive, not in • ensive, and from an extensive increase in wisdom, can never be inferred an intensive increase, in the inward acts of the love of God. Yea, but saith our Defendant, p. 191. how you will reconcile this with what follows, I will le • v • any man to judge: and so will I too, provided that he be a man that und • stands anything of an Argument 〈◊〉 for such a one will quickly perceive, that there is nothing in that which followeth, either in my own words, or else in those quoted one of Amos, which doth in the least degree contradict what I say.

Secondly, it is only an increase in the knowledge of the formal object of the love of God, viz. his infinite goodness in himself, that will argue and infer an increase in the inward actual love of God. Now that Christ increased in knowledge of the infinite goodness of God in himself; St. Luke never averred, neither will any man aver it, but an Ar • ian or Socinian.

The Defendant objects often against me, that I confess, that the fullness of Christ's knowledge in the state of hum • liation, was consistent with the nescience of di •• rs things. But, pray Sir, what were those diverse things he knew not as man? I say the day of judgment, the barrenness of the fig • tree, &c. p. 249. But do I, or any Schoolman, or any Orthodox Protestant say, that Nescience of the tormal object of divine love, God's infinite goodness in himself, was consistent w • th the fullness of his know edge. If not, all that you say is a mere extravag •• ce.

Thirdly, the increase in wisdom that Luke speaks of, is by none of all the Authors that you allege, applied unto the beatifical vision; and if Christ did not increase in his beatifical vision, then neither in his beatifick love, and consequently not in his love at all: for there was in him at the same time only one inward actual love of God, for accidenti • numero tantum diversa non p • ssunt esse si • nal in e • dem subject • : as for the acts of the infused habit of divine love, distinct from the b • a ifick love, they (as I have already shewn) are proved by Vasquez to be but a fig • nent, and as much may be said of that love of complaeency, that acquisite and experimental love, which you ascribe unto Christ, p 537. for you make it to arise from Christ's acquisite or experimental knowledge: And that Vasquez proves to be impos • ble, because the act of the love of God, seeing 'tis of a supernatural order, ought to arise from a supernatutal knowledge of God, and such is not that which is acquisite and experimental. Exscientiâ • cquisitâ nullum actam amoris circa Deum esse posse, •• nisestum est, quia actus charitatis cum sit supernaturalis ordinis, ori • i • d • bet exnotitiâ D •• supernaturali, in tertiam ••• tem Thomae tom. 1. d • sp. 73. c. 3. p. 790.

As for the Reason whereby your consequence is confirmed, our love must of necessity be • roportioned unto our knowledge; It is, I suppose, to be understood of a gradual proportion, in point of degree, and yet even so it needs limitation.

For 'tis evident that it fails, if it be understood universally of all men. For,

First the knowledge of many surmounts their love of virtuous objects: but this is a sinful disparity, and therefore I shall wave it.

But secondly, men's love many times doth, and sawfully may, exceed their knowledge in point of degree. A man's love of Philosophy, may be more intent then his skill in it. Aquinas 1.2. q 27. a. 2. the Question there debated is, U • um ••• ni • i • fit caus • amoris; the second Objection against the Affirmative is as followeth, Ejusdem ratio • is vid • tur esse, quod aliqu • d incognitum ametur, & quod aliquid am • tur plusquon c • gaoseatur: s • d aliqua amantur plusquam cognos • untar, sicut Deus, qui in hic vit • potest per seipsum amari, n • n autem per sespsum cognosci: ergo cogni • o nonest c • usa amoris. Unto this Objection A • uinas returns th • s following answer, Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid requi • itur adperfectionem c • g • itio is, quod non requiritur ad persectionem a •• is. Cognitio enim ad • a • onem perti • et, cuius est distingue e • interea quae secundum rem sunt conjuncta; & componere quodam • odo ea quae sunt diversa, unu • • lteri comparando, & id o ad persectionem cognitionis req • i • itur quod hom • c • gnoscat figilla • im qui • quid est in re, s • ut partes, & virtutes & propriet •• tes. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est U • de ad perfectionem ameris sufficit, quod res prout in se appreh • n litur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod • liquid plus ame ••• , quam cognosca • ur: qu • a potest perfect amari et •• msi non persecte • gnoscatur: sicut maxim p •• et in scientii • , quas aliqui amant propior •• iquam su • mariam cognitionem quem de eis habent, put a quod sciun Rhetorican • esse s • e tiam, • er quam homo porest persuadere, & hoe in Rhetorica am • nt E •• simil • ter est di • endum circa amore •• Dei. From the last words Irenaeus the Carm • lite d • Anim • c. 3. s. 6. p. 151. hath this inference, Inde fit, u • lic • t Deu • l • vite • cogn • scamus, vehementer t • men eum aliqu • ndo amemus. Against this doctrine of Aq •••• s Irenaeus propound, an Objection, and returns unto it an Answer, both which I shall insert, Dices, Tuncigitur voluntas fertur in incogni ••• rations excessûs amoris supa cognitionem. R • s • . Dist. aneced. sertu • in incogni • um simpliciter, nego: fertur in incognitum cognition distinctâ & perfectâ, conc • do. 〈◊〉 eti • m • i distinc •• & explic •• e non cognos ••• singula, quae sunt objecti; tamen implicit 〈◊〉 cogn • scit, saltem novit illud esse appetibile. Res • lara est exemplo. Plures enim ardenter appetunt scienti •• . v.g. Rhe •• ricam, Philosophiam, &c. Eis • viae sciant queles • a sint, sed solum quod doceant medum discrurrendi, &c Hinc etiam fit ut aliquando levis cogit • tio animi, aut propositio alicujus objecti intensum excitet amorem, eo qood m • gna sit convenientiatalis objects cum appeti • us, licet ill •• s notitia fit consusa in intellectu.

And thus you see this proposition, our love of necessity must bear propotion unto our knowledge, is not true, if it be understood universally of all men, and so 'tis understood by the Defendant, for he speaks not only of Christ, but of us: Our love of necessity, must bare proportion to our knowledge, &c. But now concerning Christ we shall readily grant, that his love of God was always for degree proportioned unto his knowledge o • God, his knowledge of God's infinite goodness in himself. But now that he increased in this knowledge, Luke doth not affirm, neither have you proved that he is to be understood hereof, by any of the School▪men in Paul's▪Church-yard, or in the Library at Oxford. Nor by any other of the Authorities, of which you make in the pages forecited, such a vain-glorious, but impertinent muster.

The second branch of the argument is taken from Christ's increase in grace, he increased in grace, therefore in the love of God, at least actual: for love is a grace of God.

But is it that grace of God, which Luke speaks of, let the Reader but look upon the words following, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which God and man, and the addition of them, (which addition our Defendant for the most part leaves our, in his quotation of the words) will soon inform him, that Luke speaketh not of the grace of the Spirit in Christ, either actual or habitual, but of the grace of God's favor towards him: and in our Translation 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is rendered in favor. Now in God's favor he did not increase otherwise, then in some effects, fruits and signs thereof, and from that our Defendant can never conclude a gradual increase in the inward acts of Christ's love of God.

The Defendant quotes me p. 189, 369. as saying, that Christ did as truly and really grow in the inward acts of wisdom and grace, as he did in stature. Indeed I said that he did as really increase in wisdom ask did in stature. But that he did as really increase in grace as in stature, I never said, I never thought, for I well knew that his increase in stature was proper, whereas he increased in favor or grace with God, only improperly and metonymically, in regard of the effects and tokens thereof. That Christ then increased in the inward acts of grace, as really as he did in stature, are none of my words, but foisted in by the Defendant, wi • h what truth and ingenuity, I leave unto the Reader to judge.

And now I shall dismiss the Reader, and take my leave of the Defendant too. The Gentleman is pleased ( p. 643.) to promise, that if I manage my Reply in a Scholastical way, then he will keep close unto our Ob. and So •• this indeed would be very acceptable, as unto myself, so also unto all judicious Readers. But when I consider how in this pretended Defense, he hath all a long vapored, bragged, railed, and raved, like a Bedlam, I have little reason to expect from him any such thing as a fair, candid, regular, and orderly disputation. However he shall have my hearty prayers unto God, to cure him of this his raging distemper, that 〈◊〉 the future he may as Paul (Act. 26.25.) speak forth the words of truth and sober ••• .