A Treatise of Justification

CHAP. VII. Other Questions concerning merits discussed: as of trust in merits, and of an eye to the reward.

§. I.

A Nd yet here is not an end: For still ac ording to his Method, such as it is, he hath certain qu •… stions to discuss. In mine opinion, he being to dispute of merits, if he had meant to deal plainly and sincerely, should first have shown what merit is, and what is required to a meritorious work. Secondly, what sorts of merits there are, and what thereby is merited. Thirdly, whether the good works of the faithful be meritorious or not, and if they be, how far forth, and then in the last place the two questions might have been propounded, •… s 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that seeing, as he teacheth, good works do merit reward; whether it be lawful to do a good work, having an eye to the reward. Secondly, whether men may trust in their merits. But he first disputeth against us, that the good works of the faithful be truly meritorious of eternal life, which hitherto he hath endeavored to prove in his first sixth chapters. In the second place, he disputeth the t •… o accessory questions: the one, whether and how far forth men may trust in their merits, cap. 7. the other, whether it be lawful in doing good works to have an eye to the eternal reward, cap. 8, 9. Then he cometh to show against some learned men of their own side, among whom there is great dissention in this question of merit. First, what is required to make a work meritorious, and showeth that to a merit, seven conditions are required, cap. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Secondly, how far forth good works are either meritorious or rewarded. Meritorious, whether ex condign •… , cap. 16. and if so, whether in respect of the promise only, or also in regard of the work it self, cap. 17, 18. And as touching the reward, whether GOD doth reward good works supra condignum, cap. 19. In the last place, what those things are that are merited ex condigno, viz. eternal life. c. 20. and the increase of justice, but not the grace of justification, cap. 21. nor reparation after a fall, nor perseverance to the end, which three are merited ex congruo, as he saith, cap. 22.

§ II. His discourse concerning trust and affiance, whether it be to be reposed in merits, and how far forth, serveth to no other purpose, but to answer one of our arguments; and therefore I handled this question, so far as was needful, in our eleventh argument. Neither shall it now be needful to insist thereupon; first, because having, as I hope, sufficiently proved, that we have no merits, it is needless to prove, that we are not to trust in them. Secondly, because Bellarmine confesseth, that by reason of the uncertainety of o •… r own righteousness, and danger of vain-glory (for how can a man trust in his own merits, when he knoweth not whether he hath any or not, which is the condition of all Papists: or how is it possible, that a man who is guilty to himself of sin, should without pharisaical pride, trust to be saved in his own merits: and therefore to say, it is lawful to trust in our merits modo superbi •… caveatur, is as if I should say, it is lawful to worship idols with divine worship, modo id •… lolatria caveatur ) it is most safe to repose our whole affiance in the mercy and bounty of God; whereunto he might have added, the merits of Christ, by trusting in which we are taught also to rerepose affiance, not only in the Mercy, but also in the justice of God. And if our whole affiance be to be reposed in God's goodness, then no part thereof is to be placed in our own merits: or if our affiance be to be reposed in our merits at all, then it is not most safe to place our whole affiance in God's mercy. And if it be most safe to repose our whole affiance in the goodness of God, then are they unwise who place it in their own goodness. But besides the danger of pride, which cannot be avoided, and of being perniciously deceived, if we trust to our own merits as to a broken staff, we should also commit horrible impiety in making idols of our own merits, or rather of ourselves. For in what we repose our trust for salvation, that we make our God. So should we s •… bject ourselves to the curse of God, who saith, Cursed be the man, that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the LORD.

§. III. His other discourse de intuitu mercedis in the overt intention or pretence, which he expresseth, is a mere calumniation: in the covert intent, which he dareth not pretend, it is a mere aberration from the truth. The overt intention is to calumniate Calvin and all true Catholics, as if we held it unlawful, when we do any good works to have in the doing of them an eye to the eternal reward; when it is evident by the very places, which he allegeth out of Calvin, that he taught nothing in this point, but that which Bellarmine affirmeth to be the doctrine of the Council of Trent, and which himself acknowledgeth to be true; to wit that it is lawful in doing good to have an eye to the reward; but that this ought not be our chief respect. For our chief respect ought to be the glory of God, which we must seek by a godly life to advance, though there were neither heaven nor hell: but the desire of the eternal reward is but a secondary respect, which is subordinate to God's glory, and to be desired for it. Bellarmine saith well Cupimus Deum videre, atque ex ea vision felices effici, ut tanto ardentius & securius Deum diligamus. The glory of God we are to seek, though our profit were not subordinated unto it, and therefore though we were not to have an eye to the reward. Non sine praemio diligitur Deus, q saith Bernard, Etsi absque praemii intuitu diligendus sit. For those that do good, only, or chiefly for the •… eward, are led like hirelings by a mercenary respect, without which they would not serve him, which becometh not the sons of God neither doth their obedience or service proceed from the love of God or their neighbors, but from self-love; neither is eternal life to be expected as the stipend of servants, but as the inheritance of sons. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , saith Marc •… s Eremita, he that doth good and seeketh remuneration only or chiefly, he serveth not God, but his own will; neither doth he love or serve God propter ipsum, sed propter se, not for God's sake, but for his own.

§. IV. But that in a secondary respect, after the glory of God, we may and ought to have an eye to the eternal reward, it is confessed, or rather professed by us. And it is evidently proved, first, by God's promises o •… rewards and blessings, and by his threatenings and curses, which God doth therefore propound, as by threatenings to deter from evil for fear of the punishment; so by promises to allure us to the doing of good in expectation of the reward.

Secondly, by plain direction of Scripture, as Tit. 2. 12, 13. the saving grace of God doth teach us to perform the duties of sanctification in expectation of the happiness hoped for. So Luk. 16. 9. Make you friends of the Mammon of iniquity, that when you fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations. Col. 3. 23, 24. servants are to do, that which they do to their Masters, heartily, as to the Lord, knowing that of the Lord they shall receive the reward of the inheritance.

Thirdly, By the examples of the godly in the Scriptures, as first of Moses, who by faith refused to be called the son of Pharaohs daughter &c. because he had an eye 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to the recompense of reward, Heb. 11. 26. Of David, Psal. 119. 112. I have inclined my heart to do thy statutes, forever is the reward, or as the Septuagint's and the vulgar Latin read, because of the reward. Of Paul, Phil. 3. 11, 12, 13, 14. Of the example of all examples our Savior Christ, whom we are to imitate: who for the joy, that was set before him, endured the cross, and despised shame, &c. Heb. 12. 2.

Fourthly, In doing good works, which is the way wherein we are to walk we have an eye to the end of our journey, which is the end of our faith, 1 Pet. 1. 9. and of our sanctification, Rom. 6. 22. that is, the salvation of our souls. They who are in a journey (as we all are viatores ) travel, that they may come to their journeys end, and they who are in a race, do run, that they may obtain, 1 Cor. 9. 24.

Fifthly, Because as the glory of God is the sovereign universal end; so eternal salvation is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the supreme particular end of man, subordinate to the universal end. And therefore as in all our actions we are to have respect to the glory of God, 1 Cor. 10. 31. so we may have respect to our salvation, as subordinate unto it. And who knoweth not, but that the final cause, though it be last in execution, yet is the first in the intention.

§. V. The thing which Bellarmine covertly intendeth, is, that it is lawful to do good works with an intention to merit eternal life thereby, to which end if his discourse de intuitu mercedis be not referred, it is impertinent: and yet not any one of his testimonies or proofs doth conclude so much we are to perform good works, indeed that we may obtain and may gather assurance that we shall obtain the gracious reward, which God hath freely promised, and will freely bestow upon all those that lead a godly life: but not that we should merit any reward of God, as due in justice for the works sake. And this is one of the Papists chief quarrels against us, that we forsooth discourage the people from good works, in that we teach they do not merit; nor are to be done to that end, when notwithstanding we use betterarguments than they do, to encourage men to well doing. But we reply, that the Papists, by telling the people, that they are to do good works, that thereby they may merit eternal life, do teach them to mar their works, and instead of performing works meritorious, or well pleasing to God, to do that which is odious and abominable in his sight, as being derogatory from the all-sufficient merit of Christ. For if Christ hath fully purchased by his merit the kingdom of heaven for us, then our merits need not: or if they need, then Christ his merit is not sufficient for us. We are therefore in the performance of good works to have an •… ye to the eternal reward, they being the way wherein we are to walk towards it, and the means whereby we may gather assurance to ourselves that we shall obtain it. But we are no •… to do good works to that end, that by them we may merit eternal life, which is purchased by the alone merit of Christ.

CAP. VIII. Questions which Bellarmine disputeth against other Papists concerning merits. And first concerning the conditions of Merit.

§. I.

H Itherto Bellarmine hath opposed the true Catholics, whom he calleth heretics. Now, because merit, as the Papists conceive of it, is a fiction which hath no ground, either in the Canonical Scriptures, or in the writings of the ancient Fathers; it is not to be marvelled, if in this question, which is de non Ente, they be miserably divided among themselves. Bellarmine therefore in the Chapt •… rs following maintaineth that doctrine which he hath delivered against us as the received doctrine of their Church, against the private opinions of some learned men among themselves; who in some particulars, either agree with us, or at least disagree from the common tenes of the Papists. And first against Holkot, and a Doctor of Lovaine (whose private opinions were censured and condemned by Pius the fifth) and Guilielmus Al •… isiodorensis concerning the conditions required to a meritorious work. Which, as Bellarmine saith , are seven.

The first condition is that the work be good. For if it be bad, it meriteth nothing but punishment. I suppose he meaneth materially good as being a thing commanded, or good ex genere suo in respect of his kind, as prayer, alms, &c. For to a work formally good, he requireth all the conditions following.

Secondly, that it be done in obedience to God, and out of a desire to please him: (for so much the phrase in obsequium Dei seemeth to import,) otherwise we cannot expect a reward from him. This, as it is evident in the duties which immediately we perform unto God; so it is true in those which we perform immediately to man, and mediately to God, whom we are to serve not only in holiness, but in righteousness also.

Thirdly, the good works whereunto reward is promised, are the works of men living in this world; who are called viatores: to whom alone as the command •… nts are directed, so the promises are made. For of those who are in heaven the question cannot be understood, seeing they are comprehensores who have already obtained the reward. These three are, as he saith, agreed upon; the other four are questioned.

§. II. The fourth condition therefore is that it be liberum, free, disputed against Robert Holkot. This is indeed a proper condition, if by liberum be meant indebitum. For if it be debitum, it is not merit •… m, Luk. 17. 10. But by liberum, Bellarmine understandeth that which is willingly performed, meaning no more but that to merit is required free-will: without which condition the work indeed cannot be so much as morally good (for such proceed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from election) and much less meritorious. But though without this condition a work cannot merit, yet neither it nor all the rest which he nameth, are sufficient to make a work truly meritorious of eternal life. Howbeit, Bellarmine should have done well to express himself, whether he speak of liberum à coactione, or ab obligatione, or necessitate officii; and if the former, whether he speak of arbitrium liberum, or liberatum, whether free by nature, or freed by grace. For if the good work proceed from God's grace, it cannot merit at God's hand, as I have shown before. And it is the opinion of some Papists, as it was of the Pelagians, that the virtue of meriting, which they conceive to be in their works, proceedeth from the power of their own free-will, as I have shown before. Neither needed Bellarmine to have heaped up Testimonies of Scriptures and Fathers to prove that free-will is required to good works, unless he dispute of free-will by nature. For that all good works do proceed from the will free by grace, and are voluntarily performed by the faithful, there is no doubt to be made.

§. III. The fifth condition, that he, who must be thought to merit, be in the state of grace, and the child of God by regeneration and adoption which he proveth against the aforesaid Doctor of Lovaine. This condition is also necessarily required to every good work, not only meritorious of heaven (for how should he attain to the inheritance of heaven, who is not the son and heir of God) but also good and acceptable unto God. For without faith it is impossible to please God, Heb. 11. 6. and without it, whatsoever is done is sin, Rom. 14. 23. And it is certain, that until the person be accepted, his actions cannot be acceptable. Neither whiles the tree •… is bad, can the fruit be good. Neither can a man do anything that is good and acceptable to God, who is not in Christ: as a branch cannot be fruitful that is not in the vine. Neither is any man in Christ, but he that is endued with a true faith, whereby he abideth in Christ, and Christ in him. And this we hold, both against the Papists, that no works of men not regenerate, are good, and with the Papists against the Pelagians, that they are not meritorious: which point good leave hath he had at large to dispute against the Pelagians, and so I proceed to the sixth.

§. IV. The sixth condition proved against the said Doctor of Lovaine, that to the merit of eternal life is required the free and and gracious promise of God: which condition I acknowledge to be required unto every rewardable work.

For first, seeing God is our absolute Lord, to whom we owe our 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 selves and all that we have, or can do, who may exact from us what he pleaseth without any reward; we could not expect any remuneration from him, unless it had pleased him for our encouragement unto well doing, to promise a reward unto us. But we must remember, that his promise is not de debito, but de gratuito, not of rendering a debt, but of giving a free reward: for he needed not to make a promise for doing those things which he commandeth, which without a promise we are bound to do: and therefore in that he promiseth a reward, it is of his free grace; and when according to his promise he giveth the reward, it is wholly of his grace, and not of our merit.

Secondly, when there is no proportion of equality between the work and the reward, but the reward incomparably exceedeth the work; it is evident, that such a reward promised to such a work, can no way be due to the work, as merited thereby, but is wholly to be ascribed to the bounty of the Lord, who freelygiveth what he had freely promised.

Thirdly, when a superabundant reward is promised to a small work, and the party to whom it is promised is no way able either to do, or so much as to will the performance of it, but receiveth wholly his will and ability to perform it from his Lord: the thing promised cannot be ascribed to his merit, but to the gracious bounty of his Lord.

§. V. The seventh and last condition is that a meritorious work must proceed from charity, which we acknowledge to be required in every good work. But in the proof hereof he falleth into a nice dispute, proving against Guihielmus 〈◊〉 , that the virtue of meriting is to be ascribed more principally to Charity than to faith. And although this be but an idle dispute, seeing neither faith nor charity doth truly and properly merit: yet I durst be bold to affirm, that if to either merit were to be ascribed, that it were rather to be attributed to faith. For by faith, the merits of Christ are applied unto us, and not by charity. By faith, we are entitled to God's Kingdom, by 〈◊〉 we are not. By faith, we obtain the inheritance, which by charity we do not. By faith, we are saved and not by charity. Faith is the condition of the covenant of grace, upon which, and no other grace, salva •… ion is promised. Those that truly love are also saved; it being the proper cognizance, and as Basi •… speaketh, the character of the faithful, and none are saved without it: but yet they are not saved by it, nor for it, but only by the merits of Christ, which are apprehended by faith alone. Salvation which is purchased by the merits of Christ is promised to faith, as that whereby we are made partakers of Christ's merits; and are therefore said to be justified and saved by faith alone: but charity and the fruits thereof are the evidence, according to which God will save us. Christ is the foundation of our happiness, yea, he is eternal life. Faith is the only instrument whereby we are made partakers of Christ: all other graces are but notes and signs of our union which we have with Christ, and of happiness by him. By faith we have this inheritance, but it is had among those that are sanctified. When it is said, happy is she that believed, there the cause of happiness is noted: but when it is said happy is he that loved, orfeared, not the cause of happiness is signified, but a note or sign of it. Both faith and charity must concur to every good act: for as a work without charity is not good; so without faith it is sin. But if you compare the graces together, it is certain that charity proceedeth from faith, 1 Tim. 1. 5. and according to the measure of our faith, such is the measure of our love: for faith is the Mother-grace from which charity and all other graces, as from the root and fountain do spring and flow. It may seem indeed, that sanctification and inherent righteousness doth more principally consist in love, because charity is the fulfilling of the Law: yet sanctification it self doth flow from faith, which purifieth the heart, and worketh by love. But as for the grace of justification, whereunto merit (if we had any) ought to be referred (for justification is the entitling of us to the kingdom of heaven) neither charity, nor any other grace in us doth concur unto it, but faith is all in all. I will not follow him in his idle dispute: I confess the point, that to every rewardable or, as he calleth it, meritorious work charity is required.

§. VI. Now let us recapitulate his seven conditions. And because he shall not find me refractary, I do confess, that all and every of these conditions are required to every rewardable work. For first, it must be good. Secondly, it must be done in obeisance to God. Thirdly, it must be done by men in this world. Fourthly, it must be voluntary and not forced. Fifthly, it must be performed by a man who is in the state of grace. Sixthly, the expectation of the reward is to be grounded on God's promise. And lastly, it must proceed from charity. But now say I, that not any one of these conditions, nor all of them put together can make a work meritorious of eternal life before God. They are common notes and marks of all good works whatsoever: but the proper notes of merits are such, as I set down in the beginning of this discourse concerning merits. For works are not therefore meritorious, because they are materially good, nor because they are in obeisance to God, (for that is our duty and debt which we owe to God) nor for that they are performed by such as are viatores and pilgrims in this world, nor because they are wrought by men in state of grace, nor because the expectation of the reward is grounded on God's promise, which is of a free reward and not of wages merited by us, nor lastly, because they proceed from charity. For our charity, by reason of the imperfection thereof, cannot stand in judgment to satisfy the justice of God, and much less to merit. And whatsoever, or how great soever it is, it is not only a duty which we owe to God, but the only debt which we owe, or ought to owe to our brethren, and that for God's sake, to omit that we receive it, as a free gift from God, and therefore by it we cannot merit of him.

CHAP. IX. Bellarmine's dispute that good works are meritorious ex condigno, not only ration pacti, but also ration operis, examined.

§. I.

I N the fourth place Bellarmine discourfeth how far forth good works are either meritorious, or are rewarded. Meritorious, whether ex condigno; and if so, whether ration pacti solum, or ration operis also. That good works are meritorious ex condigno, which is the matter that hitherto he hath proved, he now maintaineth against Durand: affirming, that his Assertion, as it is refuted by the common consent of all, almost Divines; so also by all the arguments which formerly he hath used against us, to prove that the works of the godly are truly and properly meritorious, which I desire the Reader to take notice of, because some draw-backs, who notwithstanding would seem stiff defenders of merits, do bear the simple in hand, that it is but a School-point to say that works are meritorious either ex condigno, or ex congruo. When as in very truth it is the received Doctrine of that Church, that the good works of the godly are truly and properly meritorious of everlasting life. Now it is evident that meritum ex congruo, is not truly and properly meritorious.

§. II. In the next place, Bellarmi •… e now taking it for granted that good works are meritorious ex condigno, he disputeth whether they be so ration pacti tantum, or ration operis tantum, or ration utriusque: whereunto I answer, that they are not ex condigno, meritorious at all, as I have sufficiently proved before.

That they are condignly meritorious in respect of the work it self only, and not in respect of the Promise or Covenant, was the opinion of Cardinal Cajetan, and of Dominicus à Soto. That they are condignly meritorious not ex ration operis, but ex ra •… ione pacti & acceptatiotis divinae, was the opinion of Scotus, and some other Schoolmen, and of Andreas Vega. But both these opinions Bellarmine rejecteth, and embraceth the third, that good works are condignly meritorious not only ration pacti, but also ration operis. Howbeit, the former part of this Assertion seemeth to imply a contradiction. For that which is due ration pacti gratuiti, cannot also be due ration operis ipsius, unless there be an equal proportion between the work and reward. If I promise to a Labourer in the vineyard for a days work an hundred pounds, the sum is due in respect of the promise or covenant, but not deserved by the Labourer. Such or rather greater is the disproportion between our works and the heavenly reward.

Besides, that which is due ration pacti grat •… iti, is freely and undeservedly bestowed: but the reward which is rendered to condign merit is justly deserved.

§. III. And whereas Bellarmine propoundeth a distinction of eternal glory or happiness, saying, that it may be considered either as it is an inheritance, or as it is a reward: and saith, as it is an inheritance it is due to the persons of the faithful by right of adoption, but as it is a reward it is due to their works by promise or covenant: first I answer, that this distinction is imperfect, for eternal glory may be considered three ways, either as a free gift given unto us in Christ before all secular times without respect of works, and prepared for us from the beginning of the world, or as the inheritance purchased by Christ, or as a reward of our piety. Secondly, this distinction contradicteth three of his assertions: first, the main assertion, which in this plac •… he laboreth to prove, viz. that the good works of the godly do condignly merit eternal life, even for the works sake. For as it is our inheritance or as it is eternal life (which he calleth the first degree of eternal glory) himself confesseth both here in the seventeenth Chapter, as also before in the fourteenth, that it is not rendered to the merit of our works, but is due to the persons of the faithful jure adoptionis, by the right of adoption, as they are the sons and heirs of God; which right they have before they bring forth good works, which (as he truly saith) doth manifestly appear in regenerated infants, which die in their infancy. And therefore it is evident by Bellarmine's own confession, both in this place, and also in the fourteenth Chapter, that our heavenly inheritance (which is eternal life it self) is not merited by our works, but is purchased by the merits of Christ's our Savior, and therefore is one and the same to all that are saved. For as I have said heretofore, as the merit of Christ is equally imputed to all that believe, so the reward of Christ's merit in respect of the substance, as it is the eternal inheritance or eternal life, shall equally be given to all that believe.

§. IV. Again, as it is a reward, it is given ex pacto gratuito by a free promise, and therefore not merited by our works, but according to the promise freely given, and not ration operis, as deserved thereby. Secondly, in explication of this distinction Bellarmine saith, that whereas there are divers degrees of heavenly glory or happiness; yet the first only which is our heavenly inheritance it self, or life eternal is due to the persons of the sons of God by right of adoption; the rest are due to works by promise or covenant, which contradicteth two other assertions. For that which truly he saith here and in the fourteenth Chapter, that the first degree which is our heavenly inheritance, or eternal life it self or salvation, is due to the persons of the faithful by right of adoption, and not to their works; confuteth that assertion of his in his twentieth Chapter, that eternal life even in respect of the first degree is rendered to the merit of good works. And again, that which he truly saith in his nineteenth Chapter that God doth reward good works supra condignum, above their desert and that incomparabiliter & ineffabiliter, as he citeth there out of Fulgentius, confuteth that which here he laboreth to prove, good works do condignly merit the rewards of heavenly happiness, meaning thereby the degrees of eternal glory; and that not only ration pacti, sed etiam ration operis.

It is true that there be divers degrees of heavenly glory, wherewith God doth crown his children in mercy and loving kindness; neither is it to be doubted, but that to those whom God hath endued with greater measure of grace, causing them to be more fruitful of good works; and making them more excellent instruments of his glory and of the good of his chosen, he will give them a greater measure of glory, crowning as I have said before, his greater graces with greater glory. For as all that believe in Christ are equally justified, but not all equally endued with grace: so all the faithful shall be equally saved, but not all equally made partakers of glory. And as the greater measure of grace is the free gift of God, and not our merit: so is the greater measure of glory, wherewith he crowneth his greater graces wholly to be ascribed to his grace and not to our merit.

§. V. Now let us briefly examine his seven arguments which he bringeth to prove, that every good work of the righteous in respect of the work it self is condignly meritorious of eternal life. Briefly, I say, for they are not worthy to be stood upon, nor ye •… indeed to be mentioned, but only to show the weakness of the Popish cause, which admitteth no better proofs: which evidently appeareth by this, that our challenging Ie •… uit when he taketh upon him to prove the merit of condignity, contenteth himself with the very same arguments for want of better.

His first Reason, Because life eternal is grace for grace, John. 1. 16. that is, the grace of reward for the grace of merits, or charity of our country for the charity of the way. But between grace and grace sine dubio, without doubt there is great likeness and proportion. No doubt but there is some likeness between grace and glory, for grace is gloria inchoata, glory is gratia consummata. But where is the equality on which condignity of merit should be grounded, and which he propounded to prove, in the next words going before? And if both the work be grace, and the reward be grace, how can there be merit of condignity in the one to the other, that which is given 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is not given 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ▪ Rom. 4. 4. for debitum non est gratuitum. If eternal life be gratia, gratis data, si gratis datur, then is not due by desert. And if the good work also be grace, how can it deserve a reward, and so great a reward from him that gave it? For Bellarmine hath taught us in the beginning of this seventeenth Chapter, that if the work be much less than the promised reward, it should not be a merit of condignity in respect of the work. If, saith he, the Master of the vineyard should promise to a laborer for his days work, not the day-penny, but an hundred crowns, and yet the heavenly reward given to a good work doth incomparably surpass the unequal proportion, that is, between an hundred crowns and a days work.

§. VI. In his second argument he trifleth egregiously. He saith, there is a proportion between the fountain and the river running from it. Grace is the fountain, John. 4. 14. and eternal life is the river which maketh glad the City of God, Psal. 46. 5. where according to the Latin it is thus read, Fluminis impetus laetificat Civitate •… Dei, which Bellarmine himself expoundeth thus. Fluminis impetus laetificat Civi •… taem Dei, i. Non timebit populus Dei quando turbabitur terra, ergo, &c. Literally the place is understood of the Brooke Kidron and of the city of Jerusalem. But if it must be allegorized, then as by the fountain grace is to be understood, according to that of John. 4. 14. so by the river should be understood perseverance and increase of grace running to eternal life, as the sea, wherein the course of all rivers endeth. And therefore such as is the proportion of the fountain to the sea, such is of grace or of a gracious work to eternal life.

This was his first analogy; the second is no less ridiculous. Moreover, saith he, there is a proportion between the ascent and descent of water, for it doth ascend as high as it doth descend; and therefore the grace of the Spirit which descended from heaven will ascend as high. No doubt, if it be conveyed in a close conduit pipe.

§. VII. His third Reason, Eternal life is the day-penny of those that labor in the vineyard, Matth. 20. But the day-penny is the just hire of the days labor. So is eternal life. The day-penny which was given to those that wrought but one hour doth signify eternal life, which is thereby proved not to be an hire rendered as due to equal labor, but as a free reward bestowed by the bounty of the Lord, who •… may do with his own what he pleaseth. For if it were the just wages for the whole days labor, then he that wrought but one hour should have had but one twelfe part of the wages.

His fourth Reason, Seed in virtue physical is equal to that thing whereof it is the seed, and containeth it; Grace is the seed, and eternal life that whereof it is the seed, therefore i •… virtue moral Grace is equal to glory.

Answ. This argument is grounded upon a similitude of grace, and seed, which are not like in those things for which this comparison is brought. For neither is seed the meritorious cause of that whereof it is the seed, as he supposeth grace to be, nor grace the seminal cause of eternal life: for seed is the material principium. But grace, meaning grace inherent, is neither the material principium, nor the meritorious cause, nor any other cause of salvation, unless it be 〈◊〉 sine qua non, which is no cause. Yea, but grac •… , saith he, is called the seed of GOD, 1 John. 3. 9. Answ. The seed of God properly is God's word sown in our hearts as the seed of our new and spiri •… uall life in this world. This seed conceived by the power of the Spirit is the grace of regeneration, as the material principium of our spiritual life, meant in that place of S. John, which always abideth in the child of God, who being once borne of God, is never unborne again. The fruits, in respect whereof it is called seed, are the fruits of a godly life. For the seed of God's Word being sown in our hearts, and there conceived and taking root, fructifieth and bringeth forth increase, in some thirty, in some sixty, in some a •… hundred fold. The grace of regeneration therefore is called seed in respect of the fruit of good works, which it bringeth forth in this life. And further, the doing of good works is compared to sowing of seed, which hath relation to the great harvest, as also the committing of the dead bodies of the faithful to the earth. For even as he that casteth his seed into the ground, doth it in hope of increase at the next harvest, or as he that committeth the dead body to the earth as seed, doth it in hope of increase at the great harvest: so he which soweth in righteousness to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap everlasting life. And as the seed cast into the ground is not cast away, but is recompensed with increase at the harvest: And as the body, though sown in corruption doth not perish, but riseth in incorruption at the great harvest: so he that soweth the seed of good works, though he may seem to cast them upon the waters, as Solomon speaketh, he shall not lose thereby, but he shall be rewarded an hundred-fold, and at the great harvest he shall inherit everlasting life. But as the increase in harvest is not to be ascribed to the merit of the sower, but to the blessing of God; and as the raising of the dead body to incorruption at the last day is not to be attributed to the merit of committing it, as seed to the earth, but to the merit and power of CHRIST in whom we are made alive again: so the reaping of everlasting life at the great harvest, is not to be ascribed to our merit, but to the merit of Christ, who hath purchased it for us, and to the undeserved mercy of God, who crowneth his own graces in us. So if we sow to ourselves in righteousness, we shall reap in mercy, as the Prophet speaketh.

§ IX. His fifth argument concludeth nothing to the purpose. Eternal life, saith he, is a certain supernatural action in respect of the Object, and of the principles b •… th efficient and formal: But merit, which consisteth in love, is also a supernatural action in respect of the Object, and of the principles both efficient and formal: therefore they have aproportion between themselves, and the one leadeth to the other, as the right way to the end. Answ. I grant that the grace of sanctification is the right way to glorification, but no meritorious cause thereof. That there is a proportion of likeness in the respects mentioned, but no proportion of equality. And that which he speak •… h of love, in which he taketh for granted (w •… ich we deny) that merit doth consist, may be verified not only of the love of God, but of faith, and hope, and the fear of God, and affiance in him, and other sanctifying graces which have rel •… tion u •… to God.

§ X. His six •… h argument. It is God (in whom there is no want of power or wise •… ome to 〈◊〉 what he w •… eth) who decreed to bring the Elect to life eternal, as the pr •… ze, and as the crown of justice, by their meri •… . Therefore without doubt he giveth them such merits, by which truly and properly and even ex condigno, they may merit the crown. Answ. If God had decreed to bring us to eternal life by our merits: no doubt but he would have provided for us such merits of our own, as should truly and properly, that is, condignly merit the same. But God hath not provided such merits for us, as hath been before abundantly proved, neither hath he purposed by our merits (which indeed are none) to bring us to heaven, but only by the merits of Christ, which alone do properly and condignly, yea, all-sufficiently and super-abundantly merit e •… ernall life for us.

§ XI. His eventh argument: Our merits depend upon the merits of Christ, both because he hath merited for us the virtue or power of meriting, and also because we merit as the lively members of Christ, and by influence from him as our head, therefore they det •… act from the glory of Christ, who say that our •… erits are so imperfect, that they do not merit ex condigno, but in respect of God's acceptation. Answ. The power of meriting eternal life is proper and peculiar to Christ our head, and not communicable to his members, as I have h •… retofore shown. Neither doth it detract from his glory to say, that our works are not meritorious: but on the contrary to give that to the members which is proper to the head. Neither did he merit for good works that they should be meritorious (which is an impudent fiction of these latter times.) Neither was it his purpose to save us by making us our own saviors, but in his own person to merit our salvation by his own obedience, both active and passive, which being in themselves most sufficient, our merits are needless.

And these were Bellarmine's proofs against his own good Catholics. In the next place he answereth their allegations, which with many more I have urged before and maintained.

§ XII. After he hath disputed how far forth good works are meritorious, and hath after his manner, proved them to merit ex condign •… , and that also ration operis: now he questioneth how far forth good works are rewarded. And he telleth us, that it is the common and received opinion of divines, that good works are rewarded by God supra condignum, and evil works citra condig •… um. To the former I subscribe: and from thence disprove the merit of condignity. For if the heavenly reward even in respect of the first degree doth incomparably and unspeakeably exceed the worth of our best works, as hath been proved; then that it self, because it is given supra condign •… m, cannot be merited ex condigno. To the latter also I subscribe, if it be understood of the sins of the faithful, in respect of the faithful themselves. For the Lord doth not deal with us after our sins, nor reward us according to our iniquities, Psal. 103. 10. But in all his judgments he remembereth •… ercie, Lam. 3. 33. Hab. 3. 2. and ever correcteth us under our deserts, Ezra. 9. 13. I say, in respect of themselves, for in respect of Christ our surety, he exacted such a punishment, as did fully satisfy his justice for our sins. And therefore he never punisheth properly, that is, in ordine justitiae, by way of vengeance to satisfy his justice, the sins of the faithful, which he hath punished in Christ: neither doth he exact or expect any satisfaction from them for their sins, for which our Savior Christ hath fully satisfied his justice. Notwithstanding, it cannot be denied, but they are many times afflicted, and the judgments of God inflicted upon them: but yet when we are judged, we are not punished by way of vengeance, but we are chastized of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world. Now if God from our Savior hath exacted such a penalty, is satisfied for the sins of all the Elect; it may be thought, that he will exact from the wicked a less punishment, than will satisfy his justice. Some say, that God will not render to the wicked secundum rigorem justitiae, quos juste posset annihilare: but that also may be questioned; seeing of those, who shall be condemned, our Savior saith, that it had been better for them that they had not been borne.

§ XIII. In the last place Bellarmine disputeth of the things which may be merited, or as he speaketh, quae cadunt sub meritum de condigno: and first he saith, that the eternal life it self, the essential reward (which he calleth the first degree of heavenly glory, and which before he said was due not to the merit of works, but to the persons of the faithful by right of adoption,) it self, I say, and not only the degrees thereof (which are incomparably and unspeakably supra condignum ) may be condignly merited. Secondly, the increase of justice is condignly merited by good works: we deny not, but that by the practice of piety and exercise of good works men's inherent righteousness is increased, according to that, Luk. 19. 26. habenti dabitur, to him that hath (that is, doth exercise his talents) it shall be given, but that he shall ex condign •… , by his works merit his second justification, as they call it, and increase of justice, which is God's Blessing upon them, we have not learned out of the Scriptures; neither do we acknowledge that we can by our best endeavors merit any good thing at the hands of God.

§ XIV. And thus you see how in the last part of this controversy which is concerning works, the Papists have magnified, and as it were deified their own works, alleging, not only that they are good, but purely and perfectly good, such as not only do fully satisfy the law of God, but also supererrogate, and therefore such as do not only justify us before God, but also merit and deserve e •… ernall life at his hands, and that truly and properly, that is, condignly; and that not only ration pacti, but also ration operis, that is, not only by Covenant, because God hath promised such a reward, but also for the dignity of the work, which is in proportion equal to the reward: insomuch that it were unjustice in God, if he should not render heaven to their works, which do as properly deserve heaven, as the works of the wicked deserve hell; and that by their works they deserve not only eternal life it self, which they ca •… the first degree of heavenly happiness, but also the higher degrees of glory: and finally, which is a consequent of the premisses, that they may trust in their works, as being true causes of salvation. All which assertions are insolent and Antichristian.

§ XV. But we, being in ourselves most miserable sinners, say with Da •… iel, To thee, Lord, belongeth mercy and Justice, but to us, shame and confusion of face: and therefore we pray with David, Enter not into judgment with thy servants, O Lord, for no man living can be justified in thy sight, namely, if thou enter into judgment with him. For if thou Lord mark iniquities, who shall stand? If we should argue with God, we should not be able to answer one of a thousand: with Isaiah we confess, that all our righteousnesses are as polluted clothes, as being stained with the flesh, and therefore have cause to cry out with the Apostle, wretched men that we are who shall deliver us from this body of death. But yet with the same Apostlc, we thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord; with David we profess that with the Lord there is mercy and forgiveness, that he may b •… feared, and with him there is plentiful redemption, and he shall redeem the Israel of God from all their iniquities. We believe that Christ by his death hath satisfied for our sins, and by his obedience hath merited heaven for us; that he died for our sins, and rose again for our justification, that we are justified by his blood, and by his obedience we are constituted just: that he is the end and complement of the Law for righteousness to all that believe in him; that of God he is made unto us wisdom for our vocation, righteousness for our justification, holiness for our sanctification, and redemption for our glorification: that according as it is written, He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.

And howsoever we do teach, that those who are justified, are also sanctified; and that no man can be assured of his justification without sanctification: though we seriously urge, as our duty is, the necessity of good works, and of a godly life, protesting with the Apostle, that without holiness no man shall see God; though we teach that by our good works we are to make our Election, our vocation, our justification sure unto us: though we acknowledge, that they are the evidence by which we shall be judged at the last day: though finally in the doctrine of sanctification we urge the necessity and profit of good works as much as ever any other Christians, whether old or new: yet in the question of justification, if our works or our inherent righteousness be obtruded as the matter of our justification, and merit of salvation, then do we loathe and abhor them as polluted clouts, we renounce them as things of no value, we esteem them (or at least, as Luther said the opinions of them) as loss: And contrariwise our whole affiance for our justification, and all our hope of salvation we do entirely repose in the only mercies of God and merits of Christ ou •… most perfect and all-sufficient Savior, to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit be all praise and glory for evermore.