Commentary on Genesis and Exodus

QUEST. I. What it is to answer a false testimony.

THou shalt not bear false witness, &c. The word here used is ghanah, or as Oleaster readeth, without any asperation at all, anah: which signifieth properly to answer: and accordingly it receiveth divers interpretations: 1. It seemeth specially to be understood of false testimony publicly, when one is asked of the Judge, and so answereth falsely. 2. It may be also thus expounded, that although he be his enemy that is known to hate him, yet he should not be answerable therein, in showing hatred again, in being a false witness. But the other sense is more fit and agreeable here. 3. Sometime this word signifieth to hear: as Psal. 143.1. Hear my prayer, O Lord, &c. and answer me: and in this sense this precept as well forbiddeth to hear and receive a false testimony, as to speak it, Oleaster. 4. Because the other word he •• used, ghed, signifieth a witness, as well as the thing witnessed, that is, the testimony it self; some of the Hebrews read thus in the vocative case: Thou shalt not speak, or testify, ô false witness! but then the sense should be imperfect: the better reading therefore is, the testimony of falsehood, or false testimony, than false witness, as Montanus, unless a word be supplied thus: Thou shalt not testify (as) a false witness, Calvin.

QUEST. II. Whether false testimony in judgment be here only forbidden.

R. Solomon thinketh that in this precept only such false testimony is forbidden as is committed publicly in judgment. But that cannot be, for these reasons: 1. Because backbiting and slandering also is a breach of the Moral law, and if it should not be restrained here, it cannot be referred unto any other precept, and so the Moral law should be defective: and that other kind of false witness bearing, than publicly in judgment, is against the Moral law, and not only against Moses Judicials, it is evident by this, because these offenses were even odious among the Heathen, that were not bound to Moses Judicial laws, Tostat. 2. Seeing God in the former precept shown, sibi curae esse omnium fortunas, famam, qua longe pretiosior, neglexisse, that he had care of all men's goods, it is not like he would neglect their same, which is more precious, Calvin. But the fame and good name of our neighbor is not only hurt and hindered by false testimony in public, but by private false reports also. 3. Coram Deo consentur false testes: They are held as false witnesses before God, who by what means soever do defame their brethren, Calvin.

QUEST. III. How divers ways a false testimony is borne.

THis false testimony or witness bearing, 1. is not only by word of mouth, but also by writing, libelling, and such like: for he that by any such means doth bring another's name in question, speaketh also by his pen and writing: yet the lively testimony by voice more hindereth a man's good name, and maketh him more infamous, than the discrediting by any libel: for he that slandereth by his own mouth, is sooner believed than a libeller, who is not known, and in concealing his name, he maketh the slander or misreport to be more suspicious, Tostat. qu. 25. 2. Yea this false testimony may be in the suspicion of the mind: when men are too ready to think evil of their neighbors, and apt to believe false reports against them: for herein charity is violated; which is not suspicious, it thinketh no evil, it believeth all things, it hopeth all things, 1. Cor. 13.7. Calvin.

QUEST. IV. Who is to be counted our neighbor.

ANd our neighbor, 1. is every man, whosoever: Secundùm naturam omnes propinqui sumus: By nature we are all neighbors, Tostat. and even strangers are our neighbors, as our Savior expoundeth in the parable of the Samaritan; who was found to be more neighbor unto the man that fell among thieves, than either the Priest or Levite, that were of his own nation. 2. But there are degrees in neighbourhood: Magis tenemur been agere vicinis, qui sunt proximi, &c. We are more bound to do well to those neighbors, who dwell near us; and among them, consanguineis, to those which are our kinsmen, than unto others, Tostat. So the nearer in kindred, or acquaintance our neighbor is, so much is the sin the greater, and more unnatural, in speaking evil of them: as Psal. 50.20. Thou sittest and speakest against thy brother, and slanderest thy mothers son. 3. Yea if a man be a false witness against himself, he hath transgressed against this precept: quando regulam diligendi à seipso accipit, &c. seeing a man taketh a rule from himself of loving his neighb • ur: Thou shalt love thy neighbeur as thyself, August. lib. 1. de civitat. Dei, cap. 20.

QUEST. V. What conditions must concur to convince one of falsehood.

A False witness. As generally in this precept, we are commanded to speak the truth, as Psal. 15.2. He that speaketh the truth in his heart, is one of those that shall dwell in the Lord's Tabernacle: so all falsehood and untruth is condemned, Proverb. 12.22. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: and in making of a lie, or telling an untruth, there are three things to be considered: 1. In respect of the matter, that it be false, which is testified or told, and so the signs agree not with the things, nor the words with the mind: 2. The mind must be considered: there must be Voluntas fallendi, a desire to deceive, therefore S. Paul promising to go into Spain, though he went not, because he was letted, being kept in prison at Rome, deceived not, because he had a purpose to go, if he had not been hindered. 3. There must be also cupiditas fallendi, a desire to deceive, Simler. Therefore he which uttereth an untruth unwittingly, thinking it was a truth, is not guilty of willful falsehood.

QUEST. VI. Of the divers kinds of lies.

NOw there are usually made three kinds of lies: 1. Pernici • sum, a pernicious lie, which tendeth to the hurt of another, in his life, name, or goods; this is the worst kind of lie: such was that lie and dissimulation of Simeon and Levi, who falsely promised marriage with their sister unto Shechem, if they would be circumcised. 2. There is mendacium jocosum, a pleasant lie made in merriment and sport, which i • not so grievous as the other, because here is not cupiditas fallendi, a desire to do hurt, or deceive: as such a lie the old Prophet made, to bring back the man of God again, 1. King. 13. which tended to his great hurt, though the other intended it not: but this kind of offense is so much the greater, Cum quis ex assuetudine delectatur mentiendo, if one make a common practice and custom thus to lie, Tostat. as jesters and parasites do. 3. Mendacium officiosum, an officious lie, when one telleth a lie to do another good, as to deliver him from danger, as some think Rahab did, to rid the spies from that present peril: this kind of lie of all the rest is most excusable; yet it cannot simply be justified, for every lie in it self is evil, and contrary to the truth, and so displeasing unto God, Simler. Tostat. But this kind of lie hath no excuse or defense at all, if a man lie for his own profit and advantage, as Ananias and Sapphire did, Act. 5.

QUEST. VII. Some cases wherein the truth is not uttered, and yet no lie committed.

BUt there are some cases, wherein the truth is not according to the literal meaning of the words uttered, and yet no lie or falsehood committed: 1. As when some part of the truth is concealed: as he which hath a thousand crowns, lieth not, if he say he hath 600. So Jeremiah lied not, when he was willed by the King to tell the Princes, that he entreated him, not to be sent unto Iehonathans prison house, Ierem. 38.26. that was part of his speech with the King, but not all. Therefore the Philosopher is deceived, who maketh two extremes of the truth, the defect, and the excess: for there may be a defect, not in telling all the truth, as I have shown, and yet no lie. 2. Neither always in the excess is a lie committed: as in the Hyperbolicall speeches in Scripture, which must be understood not after an Arithmetical, but a Geometrical proportion, serving only to set forth the excellency of the thing so described: and so in other like figures and tropes, which are for elegancy of speech, Simler.

QUEST. VIII. How the truth may be uttered, and yet this Commandment broken.

SOmetime the truth may be uttered and testified against our neighbor, and yet this Commandment may be transgressed even in speaking the truth: and that is, 1. When any one discovereth the sins of his neighbor of rancor and malice: for then, Sinistra excusabimus, non nisi vera crimina nos protulisset We use a vain excuse, that we speak but the truth in ripping up his faults, Calvin. For we have broken charity in so doing: for the Wiseman saith, Hatred stirreth up contentions, but love covereth all trespasses, Proverb. 6.12. 2. When the rule of the Gospel is not observed, to tell our neighbor his faults privately first, before we make them public: therein we also offend, and that two ways: first, Quia transgreditur ordinem, quem Christus posuit in corrigendo: because he transgresseth the order set by Christ, in correcting of offenders, Matth. 18.11. And again, Quia ex mala intention agit, because he doth it of a bad intention to hurt his brother, Tostat. quaest. 25. 3. But two cases are excepted, wherein this private admonition is to be omitted: first, Si judicialiter inquiratur: if the offense be judicially inquired of; then one is not to conceal the faults which he knoweth by another: for in this case he need not tell it to the Church, that is, to the Judges and Governors, because it is known to them already. Another case is, where the offense, though not yet acted, but intended only, concerneth the whole State, wherein there is danger in concealing: in such offenses complaint may be first made to authority: for of such trespasses our blessed Savior speaketh not, but only of those which are private and particular: If thy brother trespass against thee.

QUEST. IX. Of the divers kinds of false testimonies.

BUt now let us proceed to examine the particular kinds of false testimonies, which are of two sorts: 1. In doctrine, which either concerneth God and religion, or the knowledge of human Arts. 2. In the affairs of the life: and that either public in judgment and making of covenants; or private, which is either in testifying falsely against others, or giving a false testimony of ourselves, Marbach. Simler. Of these now in their order.

QUEST. X. Of a false testimony in matters of religion.

FIrst, a false testimony is in doctrine: 1. In matters of religion: as, Cum in religione à vera fide disc •••• tur, when as in religion any depart from the analogy of faith, Marbach. As they which maintain heresy and false doctrine; or which for fear in time of persecution, deny the truth; or such as handle the word of God impurely, and mingle with it their own traditions, and fables: all these are false w •• nesses against God and his truth. And therefore Augustine inferreth well, Si mendacium quod adversus vitam cujusquam temporalem dicitur, detestabile est, &c. If a lie which is made against any ones temporal life, he detestable, much more, if it be against life eternal, as every lie is that is made in doctrine of re •• gion, &c. And to this purpose Augustine produceth that saying of S. Paul, 1. Cor. 15.15. We are found fa • se witnesses against God (namely, if the dead rise not again) for we have testified of God, that he hath raised up Christ: August. de m •• d • c. ad 〈◊〉 . cap. 12. But because this kind of lying in causes of religion is a transgression of our duty toward God, it more properly belongeth to the first Table, being a breach of the first Commandment, Simler.

QUEST. XI. Of falsehood and error in 〈◊〉

ANother kind of falsehood in doctrine, is, 〈…〉 artibus vel 〈◊〉 à vero 〈◊〉 , when 〈◊◊〉 in arts and disciplines, Mar •• ch. As when 〈◊〉 , and false opinions are maintained in 〈◊〉 , Physic, or any other 〈◊〉 and profession, as Anaxag ••• 〈…〉 that the 〈◊〉 was black. Now these errors are dangerous in three respects: 〈◊〉 . Because of the 〈◊〉 , Error 〈…〉 turpis, error of it self is a beastly and filthy, thing. 2. The cause thereof is arrogancy and pride: Sophisters, to show their wit, will take upon them to defend errors, and strange opinions. 3. But the greatest 〈◊〉 regard of the inconvenience that often ensueth, for by such error in opinion, many 〈…〉 seduced also to 〈◊〉 in action, and which is worst of all, such Sophistry from 〈…〉 oftentimes into Theology and Divinity, Simler.

QUEST. XII. How falsehood is committed in judgment.

FAlshood in judicial acts, is diversely committed: 1. By the false and unjust accus •• therefore the Law saith▪ Levite. 19.16. Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor: that is, accuse him wrongfully, and being his life in danger. 2. The Judge offendeth, in giving false judgment, 〈◊〉 . 19.15. Thou 〈◊〉 not the •• justly in judgment. 3. The actuaries also, and ministers of unjust Judges, and guilty of the same offense, Isaiah 10.1. W • unto them that decree wicked decrees, and write grievous things. 4. The Advocates and patrons of causes, that defend▪ false titles, and set a fair show on bad causes: as 〈◊〉 abused his eloquence in disgracing of Paul, Act. 24.1. 5. False witnesses especially transgress this Commandment, because upon their testimony resteth the whole proceeding in judgment.

QUEST. XIII. Of the danger of bearing false witness in judgment.

COncerning false witnesses: 1. He is not only a false witness, that testifieth that which is false against his brother, as such were the false witnesses against Naboth, but he also which concealeth the truth, of fear, hatred, or malice, whereby the truth is overthrown. 2. Yet there are divers degrees in bearing of false witness: for a false testimony is more heinous in causes criminal, and in those which are capital, and concern ones life, than in civil, and such as bring not the life in danger: and those which are brought to effect are more odious, than where they fa •• e of the effect, as when the Judge suspecteth such witnesses, and giveth no credit unto them, Simler. 3. But generally to be a false witness, is a grievous sin, for he sinneth against God, whose name he taketh in vain, he abuseth the Judge, oppresseth the innocent, condemneth his own soul, Simler. And three ways doth a false witness commit great impiety: ex viol • tione justitiae, because by his means justice is violated: ex persurio, by being perjured: ex mendacio, by his lying: so in every false testimony there is a treble sin, Thom. Aquin. 2.2. qu. 70. art. 4.4. The punishment of a false witness by the Law of God is retaliation, Deut. 19.19. You shall do unto him, 〈◊〉 he thought to have done unto his brother: So Haman was hanged upon the same gibbet which he had made for Mardoche: and Daniel's accusers were cast into the Lions den, whither he was condemned before. By the Roman Laws, which were contained in the 12. Tables, a false witness was condemned to be thrown down headlong from the mount Tarpeye.

QUEST. XIV. Of the detorting and wresting of words to another sense • another kind of false testimony.

NEither are they only false witnesses, which do bring in a false record against any of such things as were neither said nor done: but he also is a false witness, Qui non eodem sensu dicta intelligit, quo dicuntur, which understandeth ones sayings in another sense than they are spoken, as they are said in the Gospel, to be false witnesses against our blessed Savior, that detorted and depraved his words, as though he had spoken of the destruction of the material Temple, whereas he spake only of the dissolution of the Temple of his body, which he would raise up in three days, Matth. 26.61. The like false witness was suborned against Stephen, Act. 6.14. We have heard him say, that this Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy this place, &c. Basting. But Jerome observeth further, that they did not only pervert th • sense and meaning of our blessed Savior's words, but invert and change the words themselves: for Christ said, Solvite templum hoc, destroy ye this temple, John. 2.19. but they alter the words thus, I can destroy this temple: But he said, Destroy it you, not I: Non licitum est ut nobis ipsi inferamus manus, it is not lawful for us to lay hands upon ourselves: they add further, and build it again in three days: But our Savior, ut ostenderet animal • & spir •• s templum, &c. to show that he meant a living and breathing temple, said, I will raise it up in three days, Jerome. super Matth. 26.

QUEST. XV. Of the violating of faith in leagues and covenants.

THere remaineth another kind of public false testimony, which is in the violating of league • , 〈◊〉 , and covenants: 1. This S. Paul reckoneth among the sins of the Gentiles, Rom. 1.3 • . that they were truce-breakers: and for this special fault were the Carthagineans noted, with whom it was usual to falsify their faith, so that it grew into a proverb, Pu • ica fide • , the Carthagineans faith. Of the same kind was that sacrilegious and impious breach of faith, in that great massacre in France, and 〈◊〉 slaughter practiced by the Papists upon the Protestants, against their faith given, and covenants of peace made between them. 2. This violating of faith, as it is a breach of an oath, and so manifest perjury, is referred to the third precept: but in regard that promises are falsified to men, it appertaineth hither to this Commandment, Siml. 3. Of this kind was that dissembled covenant, and agreement 〈…〉 and Levi▪ and the Shechemites, and 〈◊〉 slaughter of the • ibeonites, contrary to th • 〈…〉 that Joshua formerly had made with them, for the which the Lord was angry, and 〈…〉 land with famine in David 〈…〉 . Sam. 21.1.

QUEST. XVI. Whether are more grievous, public or private false witness-bearing▪

NOw follow such false testimonies as are committed privately: in the which in general▪ 〈…〉 be observed: 〈…〉 false testimonies, which are public in judgment 〈…〉 than those which are out of judgment, both because public witnesses speak upon their oath, and so are more credited; and greater infamy followeth upon such a public testimony, than by a private slander: but this must be understood only materialiter, materially, in respect of the matter and action it self; and 〈…〉 other things being alike: for otherwise, intentionaliter, the private slander 〈…〉 a more malicious intent to 〈◊〉 than he which falsely deposeth in judgment: and beside, the 〈…〉 , if his false 〈◊〉 touch his neighbors life, is more injurious, than he which 〈…〉 falsely, where the crime bringeth not the life in question. 2. There is difference and in public false testimonies, in respect of the divers action: for there are three kinds of actions or causes: there 〈…〉 civil cause, as in an action of debt, or such like; there is causa criminalis civiliter 〈◊〉 , a criminal cause, but civilly intended, that is, when the crime only deserveth a civil punishment, as a pecuniary mulct; and causa criminalis criminaliter intent •• a, a criminal cause, criminally intended, • s to the punishing of the body, or loss of limb or life. The false accusation in the second is more grievous than in the first, where no infamy lieth: and in the third more than in the second, where there is infamy only; but in the third, there is both infamy and punishment, Sic fere Tostat. qu • st. 25.

QUEST. XVII. Of the divers kinds of private false testimonies.

OF slandering. Now the particular kinds of false testimonies privately given, are these: 1. 〈◊〉 , privy slandering and obtrectation of them that are absent▪ This special virtue is required of those that shall dwell in the Lord's Tabernacle, He that slandreth not with his tongue, Psal. 11.3. such an 〈…〉 Sib • , that accused Mephihoseth. 2. Sam. 16.1. and wicked Doeg, that by his malicious accusation procured the slaughter of 85. of the Lord's Priests, 1. Sam. 22.9. and Haman which incensed the King against the whole nation of the Jews, Esther 3.9.10. Pelarg. 2. Neither they only, which devise the slander are here faulty, but they which willingly receive it, and believe it: and therefore it followeth in the Psalm • 15.3. He that receiveth not a false report against his neighbor. Simonides the Musician, by the light of 〈◊〉 could reprove one that told him, that many spake evil of him: Et quando tu desines mihi 〈…〉 , &c. and when wilt thou leave to backbite me with thine ears? 3. They also which suffer one to be slandered in their hearing, and hold their peace, not defending the good name of their brother, are partakers in this sin: such were the servants of Saul, that held their peace when Saul charged Io •• than and David to have conspired against him, 1. Sam. 22.8. But Jonathan dealt faithfully with David, defending him in his absence, before Saul his father, 1. Sam. 19.4.

2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , evil speaking, and railing, which S. Paul biddeth to be put away, Ephes. 4.31. which is of divers sorts: 1. In manifest and open railing to the face, as Shimei cursed David, 2. Sam. 16. 2. In derision and scorning as Michel laughed David to scorn, 2. Sam. 6. Simler. 3. Or in hasty and rash judgment 〈◊〉 Potiphar upon the complaint of his wife, without any further examination, condemned innocent Joseph to prison, Basting.

3. Then there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , whispering: they which use it are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , whisperers, tattlers, Qui recitant quicquid audiant, who will tell whatsoever they hear, Thomas. Therefore the Law saith, Th •• shalt not walk about with tales among the people, Levite. 19.16. These are first busy bodies, that do curiously inquire and ask questions of things that belong not unto them, They go about from house to house, 1 Tim. 5.13. then they are pra • lers, that clacke in every corner whatsoever they know, and so they are the sowers of dissention, and makers of strife, which is one of the six things which the Wiseman abhorreth, Prov. 6.19.

4. Hitherto belongeth also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 flattery, who seek altogether to please, and do uphold them, upon whom they fawn, in their sins. 1. The scope and end of such flatterers is their own profit and advantage and therefore they attend upon rich men, and specially in Princes Courts: as such there were in Saul's Court, of whom David complaineth, They flatter with their tongues, and speak with a double 〈◊〉 , Psal. 12.2. 2. Of these there are two sorts: for there are some flatterers in the callings of religion as false Prophets, and flattering Preachers, that sooth up men in their sins: such were they whom Ezekiel describeth, chap. 13. that did sow pillows under all arm-holes. There are other flatterers in civil affairs: such was Iehonada • , that applied himself to 〈◊〉 filthy humor, 2. Sam. 13. thinking thereby to insinuate himself unto him, being the Kings eldest son, Pelarg. 3. A double mischief cometh by these flatterers; for they both corrupt them whom they flatter, and nourish them in their evil, and feed their humorous disposition, as the people puffed up Herod in pride, by their flattering acclamations, that it was the voice of God, not of man, Act. 12. So Alexander and Nero were corrupted by flattery, and of good Princes became most cruel Tyrants, Simler. Therefore Di • g •• s said well, that it was better to fall upon 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Crowes, than 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , flatterers: for they did but devour the body, these did devour the soul. And beside this mischief, flatterers procure great hurt unto those whom in their flattery they accuse and traduce: as Do • g was the cause that 85. Priests were put to the sword, Simler.

5. Another kind of false testimony is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all kind of lying, and false speaking: for lying lips are an abomination to the Lord, Prov. 12.22. The beginning of lying was from the Devil, John. 8.44. When he speaketh a lie, th • n speaketh he of his own: he is a liar, and the father thereof ; and the end of liars is to be cast into the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, Basting. Pelarg. Of the divers kinds of lies see before quest. 6.

QUEST. XVIII. Of a false testimony, which a man giveth of himself.

NOw remaineth the last kind of false testimonies, when one is a false witness of himself: and hereof there are two sorts: 1. Arrogancy and vain ostentation, when any maketh his boast of virtue, and piety, which is not at all in him: such the Prophet Isaiah meaneth, chap. 65.5. which say, Stand apart, came not near me, I am holier than thou. Such was the Pharisee, that vaunted himself before the Lord of his fasting and alms. 2. The other is coloured and cloaked hypocrisy: such was that of the Pharisees, that under pretence of long prayer devoured widows houses, Matth. 23.14. these 〈◊〉 gain and profit the end of their religion. Another sort of hypocrites make the praise of men the scope of their dissimulation: such were also the Pharisees, that caused a trumpet to be blown before them, when they gave their alms, and used to pray in the corners of the streets, that they might be seen of men, Matth. 6. Like unto these Pharisaical hypocrites were the Monks in Popery, that through a pretence of religion, gathered infinite wealth and riches, possessions and lands, unto their Monasteries and Cels. All these are enemies to the truth, and maintainers of falsehood, making a lie of themselves, Simler.

1. Doct. The particular virtues commanded, with their contrary vices forbidden.

IN this Commandment generally is commanded the love, confession, and defense of the truth: and contrariwise is forbidden all lying, falsehood, dissimulation: 1. The first virtue then here required, is the love of the truth, and the frank confession thereof with the mouth, and practice in the life: therefore the Devil though he sometime speak the truth, yet because he loveth it not, he is not of the truth, neither can be said to be true. The confession of the truth, as it concerneth the glory of God, belongeth to the third Commandment; but as it respecteth the good of our neighbor, it is referred to the ninth. Concerning this inward love, and outward profession of the truth, the Prophet David saith, describing a righteous man, Psal. 15.2. And speaketh the truth in his heart.

Contrary hereunto are, 1. In the defect, all kind of lying whatsoever, dissimulation, fraud, circumventing, flattering: such the Prophet noteth, Psal. 12.2. They speak deceitfully everyone with his neighbor, flattering with their lips, and speak with a double heart: the Lord cut off all flattering lips. 2. In the excess, there is 1. an intempestive and unseasonable confession of the truth: concerning the which, our blessed Savior giveth this caveat: Not to give holy things unto dogs, nor to cast pearls before swine, Matth. 7.6. not in all places, and before everyone to utter every truth. 2. Curiosity, which is to inquire things unnecessary, or unsearchable: as the Apostles were inquisitive after the time of restoring the Kingdom to Israel: to whom our Savior maketh this answer, That it was not for them to know the times and seasons, which the father hath put in his own power, Act. 1.7.

2. Here is required that virtue called Candor, which is a favorable interpreting of men's doings and sayings, taking all things in the better part, and hoping the best, where there is no evident cause to the contrary: which is an especial fruit of charity, as the Apostle showeth, 1 Cor. 13.7. It believeth all things; it hopeth all things.

Contrary hereunto are, 1. In the defect, first perverseness, taking all things in the worst part, and wresting men's sayings and doings to another sense than they meant: as the false witnesses did those words of our blessed Savior, Of the destroying the temple, and raising it in three days: which he meant of the temple of his body, they turned it to the material temple. Secondly, suspicion: when men are ready to take every occasion to suspect their neighbor of evil, which is contrary to charity, which thinketh not evil, 1 Cor. 13.5. it is not suspicious. Yet all suspicion is not condemned in Scripture: for our blessed Savior saith, Matth. 10.16, 17. Beware of men, &c. And, Be wise as Serpents, &c. There is then a good suspicion, and an evil suspicion, which are thus distinguished: 1. The evil suspicion is raised without any cause at all, or the same not sufficient: the good ariseth of a probable and sufficient cause. 2. The evil, when upon a bare suspicion anything is certainly concluded: the good leaveth the thing suspected in suspense and doubt. 3. The evil is, when upon suspicion followeth hatred, and an intention to work mischief: the good, when one useth his suspicion to charitable and friendly admonition. 2. In the excess here offendeth the credulous person, that is without all suspicion, where there is just cause: such an one was Godaliah, that would suspect nothing of bloody Ishmael that was sent to kill him, Ier. 40.16. Secondly, the flatterer erreth here, who upholdeth men in their sins, and will not tell them their 〈◊〉 : therefore Moses saith, Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but thou shalt plainly rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer him to sin.

3. Simplicity and plainness is commanded, which is a virtue, whereby one plainly and sincerely professeth that which is right and agreeable to the truth, without any colouring or cloaking: so in Nathanie •• commended for an Israelite indeed, in whom there was no guile, John. 1.47.

Contrary hereunto is doubling and dissembling, either in words, or works, sayings, or doings: so Ieh • nadab, that gave that lewd counsel to Amm • n, is noted for a crafty and subtle man, 2. Sam. 13.3.

4. Constancy here required, is a virtue, which persevereth in the truth, being once known and apprehended, and not changing, without necessary or probable cause: as Psalm. 15.4. That sweereth to his own hindrance and changeth not.

Contrary hereunto are, 1. In the defect, levity and inconstancy, without any just occasion to 〈◊〉 and change the opinion: as Saul in his phranticke fits hated David, and sought his life, having confessed his foolishness and error before, 1 Sam. 26.21. 2. In the excess, is pertinancy and obstinacy by no reason or persuasion to change an opinion or purpose once conceived: such was Herod's perverseness, in keeping his rash oath in beheading of John the Baptist.

5. Docilitie, or willingness, or aptness to hear and conceive the truth, is joined with constancy: hereof the Wiseman saith, Prov. 21.28. A false witness shall perish, but he that heareth speaketh continually. He may soon be seduced to testify falsely, that will receive no other information: but he that is willing to hear, and to be further instructed in the truth, cannot lightly err, or be deceived.

Contrary hereunto are, 1. In the defect, easiness to be lead and carried away with every tale, to be light of belief, as Patiph • r was against Joseph, without any further examination. 2. In the excess, not to hear at all what others inform: such an one was Nabal, who was so wicked that a man might not speak to him, 1 Sam. 25.17.

6. Taciturnitie, or discreet silence, is here requisite also: which is to conceal things secret, and not fit to be revealed in time and place. Herein Rachel and Loah, contrary to the weakness of that sex, shown a good example in keeping secret Jacob's purpose of departing from Laban, and consenting thereunto, Gen. 31.14.

Contrary hereunto are, 1. In the defect: first, garrulitie, prattling and talking, to be full of words, without reason, and out of season. Such light women the Apostle noteth, 1 Tim. 5.13. They are pratlers and busy bodies. Secondly, futilitie, in keeping nothing secret, but telling whatsoever they know: as the young man that discovered Jonathan and Ahimaaz, and told Absalom, 2 Sam. 17.18. Thirdly, trea • herie: as the Ziphius betrayed David unto Saul, 1 Sam. 23.19. 2. In the excess, are contrary, morosity, stubborn and willful silence, not to speak at all, or confess anything: Such was Cain, that being asked where his brother Abel was, stubbornly made answer, Am I my brothers keeper, Genes. 4.9. And concealing of the truth, when it ought to be revealed: against such unwise uncharitable silence the Wiseman giveth this rule: Answer a fool according to his foolishness, lest he be wise in his own 〈◊〉 , Proverb. 26.5.

1. Confut. Against the Origenists, that in some cases made it lawful to lie.

FIrst here that erroneous assertion, which Jerome imputeth to Origen, cometh to be examined: which is this, Homo cui incumbit necessitas mentiondi, &c. sic matur inter dum mendario quomodo condimento, at{que} medicamento, ut servet mensuram ejus, &c. He upon whom there lieth a necessity to lie, let him sometime so use a lie, as a sauce or medicine, that he keep a measure, and exceed not the bounds, &c. Jerome reproveth this opinion, and counteth it as one of Origen's errors, though Ruffinus therein find fault with Jerome. See Jerome. apolog. cont. Ruffin.

Contra. 1. But there is no necessity of lying at all: Moriendum est potius quàm peccandum ; We ought to die rather than sin, and so consequently to tell a lie: S. Paul's rule must stand, We must not do evil, that good may come of it, Rom. 3.8. 2. If a lie were tolerable in any case, then chiefly, when by telling a lie one may save his life: but even in such necessity, a lie is not justifiable. Augustine saith well, Me • tiri vis ne moriaris, & meutiris & m • r • ris, &c. Thou wilt make a lie, lest thou shouldest die, thou both liest, and diest too: for while thou wouldest shun one kind of death, which thou mayest defer, but canst not take away, thou fallest into two; first dying in thy soul, and then afterward in thy body, August. in Psal. 30. Jerome to this purpose writeth to Innocentius, of a woman suspected of adultery, that was tormented and racked to confess the fault whereof she was not guilty: who in the midst of her torments uttered these words, Tu testis es Domine Jesus, non ideo me negare velle ne peream, sed ideo mem ••• nalle, ne peccem: Thou art my witness Lord Jesus, that I do not deny it lest I should perish, but that therefore I will not lie, lest I should sin: Sic Jerome. 3. Whereas Origen urgeth the example of Judith, that deceived Holoser ••• , and of Jacob, Qui patris benedictionem artifici impetravit mendacie: who obtained his fathers blessing by an artificial lie: it may be answered, that Judah's example is one of an Apocryphal book, and therefore is of no force: and Jacob's example is either extraordinary, and so not to be imitated, or that therein he showeth some human infirmity, which is not to be commended: though it pleased God to use it, and dispose of it, for the effecting of his purpose.

2. Confut. Against the Priscilli • nists.

SEcondly, the Heretics called Priscillianists held that it was lawful for their, M •• dacio occuliare haeresius, & se Catholices singere : To hide their heresy by telling a lie, and to fain themselves Catholics: such a trick also that unreasonable sect of the Family of Love have taken up, who use so to wind away with obscure and intricate terms, when they are examined, that their heresy by their confession can hardly be found out. The Priscillianists reasons were these: 1. That it was enough to have truth in the heart, though not in the mouth. 2. And a Christian is bound only to speak the truth to his neighbor, but they which are of another religion, are not our neighbors. 3 John feigned himself a worshipper of Baal. Answ. 1. But S. Paul requireth both to believe with the heart, and to confess with the mouth, Rom. 10.10. Peter denied Christ only with his mouth, not in his heart: Et tamen laerymis hoc poccatum a •• uit: yet he was fain to wash away this sin with tears. 2. Licet aliqua 〈…〉 sint • era, &c. although some truths may be hid from him that is not yet initiate in the mysteries of religion; Non tamen dic • nda falsa sunt, yet false things are not to be uttered. 3. Augustine answereth, that Jehu had not a right hear before God, and therefore his example in every respect is not to be justified. So August. lib. commendatium. But to this last answer, thus much may be added: that Jehu his example here is much unlike, for he did not seek his own gain, or propounded his own safety, but did this in a zeal to the glory of God: but the Priscillianists intended their own safety only, and dishonored God, in spreading their heresy by this means: neither for the matter, did Jehu speak untruly: for indeed he had a great sacrifice for Baal, when he sacrificed his Priests: and in the rest he lied not, but used a kind of outward dissimulation, which in politic affairs, where the rule of charity is not broken, and God's glory sought, is not unlawful.

3. Confut. Against Tostatus that maketh lies in merriment tolerable.

IN the third place Tostatus is here to be dealt withal: whose opinion concerning some kind of lies, as namely those which are called mondacla j • c • sa, lies in merriment, is this: that they are tolerable, tumea necessitate, both for necessity sake, because they are made for delight and recreation, which is necessary: and nulli nocent, they hurt nobody, qu. 26.

Contra. 1. Though recreation and delight be necessary, which we grant: for as quies rest is necessary for the body, so recreation is for the mind: yet there are other delights and recreations, which may be used: there is no such necessity, to jest and make sport with telling of lies. 2. And though none other be hurt, yet the liar hurteth his own soul, because he speaketh not the truth: therefore this kind of lie is not tolerable. 3. But here we refuse not Tostatus distinction of the diversity of recreations that are used among men, and of the divers kinds of men that affect such delights and recreations: whereof he maketh four sorts: 1. Our blessed Savior needed no such delight or recreation at all, who as he is read often to have wept, so is he never found to have laughed. For whereas recreations and delights are to succor the infirmity of our nature; Christ being God Poterat se á conditione mortalinu • defectuosae elevare, quantum voluit: could rear himself up from all such mortal defect, as he would himself, without any such help or supportation. 2. There is another sort of perfect men, who are given to heavenly meditation: and their delight and recreation is not in jocosis mendaciis, in such jests and meriments, but in sanctis exhortationibus, & • astis colloqutis ▪ in holy exhortations, and chaste communications. 3. There is another sort in another extreme, who are altogether earthly minded, who, when they will recreate themselves, ad lud • s iniquitatis convertuntur, turn them to the sports of iniquity, as unto eating, drinking, wantonness, lasciviousness. 4. There are others, mediocrem vitam tenentes, &c. which are in the midst between these two: quiaed medias delectationes convertuntur, which turn them to delights of a middle nature, which are neither spiritual, nor altogether carnal, but honest and seemly recreations. Thus far Tostatus goeth on well: but in that he placeth merry jests and lies among moderate and tolerable recreations, therein is his error. For that no kind of lies at all are tolerable, thus briefly I will show out of Augustine, whose reasons (some of them) are these:

1. One reason is taken from the nature of a lie: Lex Dei veritaes, & quod à vero discrepat, transgredi • ur legem, &c. The Law of God is truth, and whatsoever differeth from truth, doth transgress the Law: therefore a lie being a swerving and declining from the truth, transgresseth the Law, and so consequently is sin. Lib. contr. mendacium, cap. 18.

2. By way of comparison with other sins. Cur magis mendacium faciendum, quàm aedulterium committendum, &c. Why should it be lawful rather to lie, than to commit adultery? Lib. de mendac. cap. 8. If it be not lawful to do the one upon any occasion whatsoever, then neither the other also: for by adultery, the body chiefly is corrupted, but by making a lie principally the soul.

3. Divers special cases are propounded, wherein, if lying were upon any occasion tolerable, it should seem to have the most just excuse: but being not allowed in these, it is lawful in none.

1. It is not lawful to tell a lie, and commit a less evil, Vt deterius mal •• ividetur, to avoid a greater evil: as if one had rather make a lie, and offer sacrifice to idols, than to ha • e his body defiled; which was Origen's case. For here the case is this, they which force a man to do any unjust thing, threatening that they will do a worse, do in a manner say thus, Fac tu male, ne nos faciamus ; Do thou evil, to prevent us from doing evil: but here this rule ought to be held, Dehemus propria peccata magis evitare, quam aliena ; We must rather shun our own sins than another's, August. ibid. cap. 9. Again, it is not in sins, as in matters of profit in the world, we call not that a loss which is lost upon hope of greater gain: but it is not so here, Vt non sit peccatum, quod admittitur, ne gravius admittatur: that it should be no sin, which is admitted, lest a greater be committed, cap. 19.

2. Neither is it lawful to tell a lie to save another man's life, for he that lieth slayeth his soul: Num ergo quis tenetur occidere animam, ut alius vitam corporis servet? A man is not bound to slay his soul, to save another's temporal life, nay a man is not bound to lose his temporal life, to save another's temporal life: Vt consequatur eternam nostra temporalis relinquend • ▪ We must leave our temporal life for another's eternal life; but to hazard our eternal for another's temporal, there is no reason.

3. Nay we are not to lie, though it be to preserve the chastity of the body. For, Magis servende castitat animi, quàm corporis : The chastity of the soul must rather be preserved, than of the body: And again, Magis cavenda in peccatis commissio facti tui • quam permissio facti alieni: In sins, we must more take heed of the commission of any fact of our own, than the permission of another's fact, ibid. cap. 20.

4. Non mentiendum, aeternae hominis salutis causa: We are not to lie, no not for another's everlasting salvation. As if one is in captivity, and not yet initiate by Baptism, nor perfectly won unto the faith; who is not like to be brought to the faith, unless the keepers be deceived by some lie, and he deli • ered out of their hands: for a lie is no more in this case to be devised, than adultery to be committed: Si • g • non violand • castitat, nec violanda est veritas: If chastity be not to be violated, much less is verity. If then in these special cases a lie is not to be admitted, as to avoid a greater evil, to save another man's life, to preserve the chastity of the body, nay not to save another's soul; then much less is it lawful to make a lie in jest, to show others sport, and to delight them.

5. Concerning the examples which are objected out of the Old Testament, as of Jacob's dissimulation with his father, when he got the blessing: of the Midwives excuse, Exod. 1. and Rahab's made for the spies received into her house; Augustine's answer is this.

1. Aut sigurate prolata sunt, at{que} ita non mendacia, &c. Either they are figuratively spoken, and so no lies: for we must consider, Non quid in facto dicitur, sed quid in sensu significatur: Not what is expressed in fact, but what is signified in sense: for as it is no lie in speech, when one word is put for another, as in metaphors and other tropes: so neither is it in matter, when one thing is signified by another.

2. Another answer is: they are not lies which are mentioned in Scripture, Si figurate sunt dicta, If they be spoken figuratively; Si mendacia, non sunt imitanda: Or if they were lies, they are not to be imitated, August. lib. de mendac. cap. 21.

3. Commendantur comparatione, &c. They are commended by way of comparison, not absolutely. 4. Concerning the excuse of the Midwives, and of Rahab, he saith, Non est remunerata fallacia, sed benevolentis, beniguitas mentis, non iniquitas mentientis ; Their fallacy was not rewarded in them, but their mercy, the benignity of their mind, not the iniquity of their lying; Thus August. lib. cont. mendac. cap. 17.

4. Confut. Against the Jesuits new trick of equivocating.

FOurthly, that late taken up trick of the Judasites, in equivocating, with their mental reservations, is evidently contrary to this Commandment: they think it lawful to dissemble with the Magistrate, and to delude him with their ambiguous and equivocating answers. As, if they be asked whether they were in such a place, as beyond the seas, in France or Spain at such a time, when and where it is certain they were, they will answer they were not, understanding to themselves secretly to such an end or purpose. The folly and falsehood of which their deceitful equivocations, doth diversely appear: 1. This was the very evasion of the old Priscillianists before confuted, that if they held the truth inwardly in their heart, it was no matter if the truth were not always in their mouth: but a right Christian is known by this, He speaketh the truth in his heart, Psal. 15.3. he hath the truth both in his heart and mouth. 2. By this device of theirs, they invert the order and nature of things, they make falsehood truth, and truth falsehood, they turn affirmatives into negatives, and contrariwise; as it is all one, to say, I was not in such a place, with a mental reservation, as to say, I was : and so as Augustine saith, Veritatem faciunt patronam mendacu, They make the truth the patron of a lie. 3. If everyone should take this licentious liberty, there should be no truth among men, no certainty of anything: all testimonies given in evidence, all promises and contracts might justly be suspected, lest some secret condition or reservation might be understood: for who can trust him at any time, that thinketh it is lawful to lie and dissemble sometime? for as Augustine saith, Volens, cum mentitur, esse aptior, fit, cum verum dicit, intertus: For while he applieth himself, when he lieth, aptly to the time, he is held uncertain, when he speaketh the truth. 4. And whereof cometh this doubling and dissembling, but of fear, and a bad conscience? what needed the Martyrs by their plain confession of the truth, to have adventured and lost their lives, if they had held such dissimulation and equivocating lawful? So Augustine saith, Si simulare liceret, quare id non faciunt Martyrs? If it were lawful to dissemble, why did not the Martyrs so? lib. cont. mendac. cap. 5. 5. But if they shall reply again, that they do thus equivocate ▪ for the maintenance of their Pope Catholic faith, and for the discovering of heresy, as they call the profession of the Gospel: we say again with Augustine in a case not much unlike, Melius occultaretur haeresis, quàm praetipitaretur veritas: It were better that heresy lay hid still, than that the verity should be endangered, de mendac. cap. 7.

6. But the example of our blessed Savior is pretended, who used such kind of dissimulation, and equivocation: as Mark. 5.30. Christ made himself as ignorant who had touched his clothes, whereas he knew it well enough, as well who touched them, as that they were touched. So Luk. 24.28. Christ made as though he would have gone further, and yet did not. Likewise, John. 7.8. he saith to his brethren, Go ye up unto this 〈◊〉 : I will not yet go up, &c. but immediately after he went up, verse. 10. Here Christ did equivocate with his brethren: he said he would not go up, whereas he did indeed go up, meaning, not with them.

Answ. 1. To the two first instances Augustine answereth; that they are figures of other things • as in that Christ maketh himself ignorant who touched him, therein the Gentiles were prefigured, who were a people whom the Lord saith he knew not. In the next, he saith, Christus non mente • us est, &c. 〈◊〉 in c •• loss profectus est: Christ said no untruth: for indeed he went further, namely to heaven, August. ibid. c. 19. But we are not driven here to such a strait with Augustine to find out a mystery: Our Savior in neither of these places dissembleth: for dissimulation is an hiding and cloaking o • the truth: but in both these places Christ 〈◊〉 by this means to bring the truth to light: in the first to try on • the faith of the woman that touched him in the other to make 〈◊〉 of the humanity and charity of his Disciples; as he did the like to Philip. John. 6.6. to prove him.

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1. Observ. Against the evil custom of lying.

THou shalt not bear false witness. By this strait charge and commandment of God, all men are warned to take heed of lying, and speaking untruth, under what pretence soever: and that for these four causes: 1. Propter diaboli assimilationem: Because lying maketh men like unto the Devil. For as God is truth, and all that love the truth are the children of God; so they that use lying are the children of the Devil: for he is a liar, and the father thereof, John. 8.44. He told the first lie that was ever made in the world, when he said to Eve: Ye shall not die, Gen. 3. 2. Propter societatis dissolutionem: Human society and intercourse is by this means dissolved: for how can one man trust another, if lying and dissembling should be used? This reason the Apostle urgeth, Ephes. 4.25. Cast off lying, and speak everyone truth unto his neighbor: for we are members one of another. 3. Propter fama amissionem: The liar loseth his credit, that he cannot be believed, no not when he telleth the truth: as Ecclesiastic. 34.4. Who can be cleansed by the unclean: or what truth can be spoken of a liar? 4. Propter anima perditionem: We must take heed of lying, for it destroyeth the soul, Wisdom. 1.11. The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul, Sic. Thom. in opuscul.

2. Observ. Not to conceal the truth, whether publicly or privately.

AGaine, it is a kind of false witness, as is shown before, when the truth is concealed, either publicly or privately: as when one suffereth his neighbor to be overcome in judgment, when he by his testimony might deliver him. As to this purpose may be applied that saying of the Wiseman, Prov. 24.11. Deliver those that are drawn to death, and wilt thou not preserve them that are led to be slain? And of this kind is that usual negligence and oversight of men, that privately do not one tell another of their sins: which duty is reproved by the law, Levite. 19. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart, but thou shalt plainly rebuke thy neighbor, and suffer him not to sin. He then which seeth his brother sin, in drunkenness, profaneness, swearing, or howsoever else, and holdeth his peace, therein offendeth against the rule of charity, and is found before God to be an hater of his brother. Augustine useth this fit similitude: Si hominem videres ambulare incautum in tenebris, ubi tu put cum esse scires, & taceres, qualis esses, &c. If thou shouldest see a man walking in the dark, without taking heed, where thou knowest there is a pit, and holdest thy peace; what manner of one wouldest thou show thyself? Pracipitat se quis in vitia sua, &c. One casteth himself headlong into vice, and vaunteth himself in thy hearing of his evil doing, and yet thou doest praise him, and smilest to thyself, &c. August. in Psal. 49.

QUEST. I. The last precept, Thou shalt not covet, whether two or 〈◊〉 .

THou shalt not covet, &c. 1. Some think that this Commandment is to be divided into two: and the first to restrain the concupiscence and desire of another's wife: the other the coveting of such things which do belong unto him, which are either moveable or immovable things: the moveable are of two sorts, either the things with life, and them either reasonable, as his man servant, his maid servant; or unreasonable, as his ox or asse; or without life, as his goods: his immovable are, his house, lands, possessions. Of this opinion is August. lib. de 10. chord. cap. 9. to whom consenteth Thomas Aquinas, and Tostatus, and it is the received opinion among the Romanists, and some other, as Pelargus, Osiander, Pelican. Their reasons shall first be examined. 1. Thomas useth this reason: Because there are but three Commandments in the first table, there must be seven in the second, to make up the number of ten. And that there are but three in the first table, he would prove by the subject or matter of the Commandments, which concern our duty to God; which is three-fold, Diligenti Deum tria necesse est facere: He that loveth God, must perform three things: 1. Quod non habeat alium Deum: He must have no other God. 2. He must honor him: therefore it is said, Thou shalt not take in vain, &c. 3. Libenter quiescat 〈…〉 : He must rest and settle himself in God: therefore it is said, Remember thou keep holy, &c.

Answ. 1. Thomas here omitteth one principal duty, which is the internal 〈◊〉 of God: for it is not enough to know who is to be worshipped, which is prescribed in the first precept, Thou shalt have no other God's: but after what manner he will be worshipped, that is, by a spiritual and internal worship: as our blessed Savior saith, John. 4.21. God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him, in spirit and truth. This manner of God's worship is prescribed in the second Commandment, Thou shalt make to thyself no graven image, &c. 2. Wherefore thus rather may the 〈◊〉 toward God be distinguished; his worship is either internal, or external: the internal showeth who is to be worshipped, in the first precept, and how, that is, spiritually in the second precept. The external is either private in the confession of God's name, in the third precept; or public, in keeping of his Sabbaths, Ursinus.

2. Lyranus thus reasoneth: Those things which are so divers, that one may be covered, and not the other, belong not to one precept: Aliquis habens pronitatem ad 〈◊〉 non habe •• ad alterum: One may have a proneness and aptness to one, and not to another: as he may covet his neighbors wife, and not covet any of his beside: therefore these two kinds of covetings belong not to one precept.

Answ. 1. This reason may be retorted: for so one may be guilty of idolatry and false worship, who yet holdeth but one Cod: and therefore by this reason the two first precepts, which they confound and make but one, which divide the last, must be distinguished. 2. Though in particular he that coveteth a man's wife, doth not always covet his ox or asse, yet in general he coveteth that which is another man's: for his wife is properly his, as anything that belongeth unto him: therefore the proposition will be denied, that the coveting of that, which is not joined with the coveting of another thing, belongeth not to the same precept: for one may covet a man's house, and ground, that coveteth not his ox or asse, as Ahab did, that desired Naboth's vineyard: and so by this rule, as many particular things there are which may be severally coveted, so many particular precepts there should be of coveting.

3. Tostatus thus argueth: Sicut se habet actus ad actum, &c. As one act is to another, the like respect hath one concupiscence to another: but the act of adultery and theft are divers, and belong to two divers precepts, therefore so should the divers concupiscence, tending to those divers acts, be divided into two precepts.

Answ. The argument followeth not, because the acts of adultery and theft are forbidden in two divers precepts, therefore the concupiscences tending thereunto should: for there is difference between the conception of sin, and the birth and perfection thereof: when sin is brought forth, and perfected, then it appeareth of what kind it is: but being yet in the body or in the seed, it cannot be so distinguished; as darnel and corn being but yet in the grass, cannot be so well discerned. Beside, another difference is, because the external acts of theft and adultery differ in the quality of the sin, and o • e is more heinous than another, and deserveth a greater punishment, and therefore the precepts are fitly distinguished: but the like difference of quality and punishment cannot be made in the original and first concupiscence, where the will hath not yet assented.

4. Pelargus addeth this reason: Duo sunt principia concupiscentiae, &c. There are two beginnings or occasions of concupiscence, one internal, the other external: the Apostle calleth them, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eye, 1. John. 2.16. therefore they are distinctly to be prohibited. Lyranus also saith, that there is Aliaratio boni utilis, alia delectabilis: One reason of coveting a profitable good, another of a delectable good: the coveting of the wife belongeth to one, and the coveting of the substance to the other.

Answ. 1. All this only proveth a difference and distinction in the several kinds of concupiscence, not a distinction of the several precepts. 2. And thus much may be inferred, that because they are distinct concupiscences, therefore they are distinctly to be expressed, and so they are: but it followeth not, that they are to be distinguished in two precepts. 3. And yet these concupiscences are not so distinguished, but that they may concur at one and the same time in the inward desire and motion: as one may have a carnal desire to his neighbors wife, and have a covetous eye also unto her substance. Wherefore this last precept, which forbiddeth all manner of coveting, is not to be divided into two precepts: but is one whole and entire Commandment, consisting of divers particulars. The reasons are these:

1. Origen thus reasoneth: Quod si ita putetur, non complebitur decem numerus praeceptorum, &c. If the two first precepts should be made all one, there would not be ten Commandments: ubi jam erit decalogi veritas? where then is the truth of the decalogue? Homil. 8. in Exod. The reason is this: that seeing there must be ten precepts, and there are four in the first table, there can be but six in the second: but if the last be divided into two, there will be more than six in the second, and so more than ten in all: but if we make but three in the first, there will be but nine in all: for Origen taketh this as granted, that it is all one precept that maketh mention of coveting.

2. Another reason is, because that which is here put in the first place, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbors house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbors wife, is put in the second place, Deut. 5.21. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbors wife, neither shalt thou desire thy neighbors house: which inversion of the order showeth, that they are all one precept: for otherwise Moses should have confounded the ninth and tenth precept together, Ursinus. So also Cajetan: Varia ••• ctura uxoris & domus, ex industria facta à Mose, &c. This mixture of the wife and house, Moses maketh of purpose in these two places, because they belong to one precept. This reason also is urged by Junius upon this place.

3. This precept, Moses periodis non distinxit, sed uno versiculo comprehendit, did not distinguish by periods, as the other precepts, but comprehendeth it in one verse, which showeth it to be one precept, not two, Ursinus.

4. Another argument is taken from the reason of this Commandment: which is added, Nor anything which is his: we are forbidden therefore to covet the neighbors wife, house, or ox, or asse, Quia alterius sunt, because they belong to another, Cajetan. Oleaster. There being then one common reason serving the whole, it showeth that it is one Commandment, not divers.

5. Omnes hae species sub uno genere comprehenduntur: All these several kinds of coveting are comprehended under one general head, Thou shalt not covet, therefore they are under one precept, Galas.

6. Pari ration in sex vel septem praecepta deduci posse videatur, &c. With as good reason may it be divided into six or seven precepts, as into two, because so many particular branches of coveting are rehearsed, Simler.

7. But one of the best reasons, that the precept of not coveting is one, and not two, is taken from that place of Saint Paul, Cum de concupiscentia tanquam de uno pracepto dicit, When he speaketh of concupiscence, as of one precept, Rom. 7.7. I had not known lust, except the Law had said, Thou shalt not lust, Ursinus. Basting.

QUEST. II. What manner of concupiscence is here forbidden, and how this precept differeth from the former.

COncerning the difference between this precept and the other, Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal: there are divers opinions: 1. Augustine seemeth sometime to be of opinion, that in those Commandments, Ipsum opus notatum videtur, in extremo autem ipsa concupiscentia ; The work only seemeth to be noted, but in the last the concupiscence only, quaest. 71. in Exod. But this is against our blessed Savior's exposition, Matth. 5.28. that a man may commit adultery in his heart, if he hath but looked upon a woman to lust after her: therefore in the other Commandments, not the external act only is forbidden, but the inward purpose also and desire.

2. Thomas Aquin thus distinguisheth concupiscence, that it may be taken one way, as it is actus voluntaetis, an act of the will, another, ut est actus sensualitatis, a sensual or carnal act: but here it is only forbidden in the first sense, as it is Consensus voluntatis, in opus vel delectationem ; As it is a consent of the will, either to the work it self, or in taking delight: But when the will hath once assented, sin is brought forth, and so it is a breach of the other Commandments: as our blessed Savior showeth, that if a man have but lusted after a woman, with a will and desire unto her in his heart, he hath committed adultery.

3. Some of the Hebrews think, that no concupiscence resting inwardly, though it have the consent of the will, is here forbidden: but such as cometh into some external act, beside the perfect act of any sin: as when one soliciteth another man's wife by gifts, speeches, gesture, kissing and dallying, though adultery be not committed. But the very consent and purpose of the heart, though there follow no outward act, is sin, as shall afterward be more fully declared, as Levite. 19.17. the very hatred of the heart is prohibited, though no mischief outwardly be committed.

4. Some think that there is no more forbidden in this Commandment, than before: but that the Lord thought good to rehearse and declare in plain words his will, for restraining of the inward concupiscence, for he knew, Arius stimulandos & urgendos homines ne sub umbra obscurioris doctrina latebra • quaererent, Lest men should seek some evasion in the obscurity of doctrine, that they were specially to be pricked forward and urged, Calvin. But it is not like, that in so compendious an abridgement of the Law, that the same things should be twice repeated: and Calvin himself only propoundeth this reason, he doth not much insist upon it.

5. Therefore that we may apprehend the true difference between this precept and the other, we must distinguish between these three, Prava • cogitations, assensum simplicem, & certam deliberationem: Evil thoughts, a simple assent, and a settled and certain deliberation. The first, evil thoughts, if as soon as they rise, a man reject them, he seemeth not to be guilty, though herein he must acknowledge his corrupt nature: but if he either give a simple assent, or be as it were tickled with a full desire▪ or do deliberately purpose of any evil thing, then he sinneth. So then all those sins, wherein there is either a full assent, or action, are forbidden in the former precepts: the very first desire and appetite is forbidden here. These three degrees then are to be made of sin, appetitus, assensio, actio, the appetite or first desire, the perfect assent, and the action: the first, the evil appetite is restrained here, Galas. Quamvis non plane acquiescamus desiderio, si tamen nos titillat, sufficit ad re • sper agendos ; Although we do not yield unto the desire, if it do but tickle us with delight, it is sufficient to make us guilty, Calvin. Here then such concupiscence is forbidden, as hath some inclination of the will, though no full consent: Concupiscenti • enim nunquam est sine affectu, licet non▪ plane succumbat voluntas: This concupiscence is not without some affection or desire, though the will do not plainly yield. So is Chrysostom to be understood: Aliud est concupiscere, aliud velle; concupiscere passionis est, velle arbitrii; frequenter enim conc • piscimu • quod nolumus: It is one thing to desire, another thing to will; to desire or covet is of passion, to will is of the disposition; for we often covet that which we would not, &c. In Matth. homil. 52. He speaketh of a full assent and purpose: for otherwise, with concupiscence here prohibited, there doth always concur some affection and desire. So then it is evident, that even those first motions of concupiscence, wherein any taketh delight, though there be no full purpose, are sin before God, and forbidden by this precept: for, even the Heathen did condemn impiam voluntatem, the wicked will and purpose of any, as to kill, commit adultery, and such like: but the Law of God is more perfect and spiritual, than any human Law. Again, it is not like that S. Paul was so ignorant, as to think at any time, that it was no sin, velle occidere hominem. to have a purpose to kill a man, or to commit adultery: therefore by concupiscence, he understandeth some more inward and secret disease, which he took not to be sin, before it was revealed unto him by the Law, Calvin.

QUEST. III. Whether involuntary concupiscence having no consent of the will, is here forbidden.

BUt here it will further be inquired, whether even those first evil thoughts which arise in the mind, without any inclination of the will at all, are counted as sin before God, and so forbidden in this precept. Here first, we are to distinguish of concupiscence and desire, which is either a good concupiscence, or bad; the good is of two sorts, either perfectly good, such as was given unto man in his creation, when he should have coveted nothing, but that which was good; or imperfectly good, such as now is in men, mixed with many infirmities and inperfections, which is either natural in man, as the coveting of meat and drink, and other things necessary for the life of man, Basting. Or supernatural, wrought in man by grace, as is the love and desire of virtue: or it is mixed, partly natural, partly supernatural, as matrimonial concupiscence for procreation, which both hath a natural cause or beginning, and is likewise guided by grace unto the right end: none of these kinds of good and commendable concupiscence are forbidden by this precept.

The evil concupiscence, as Bernard doth well distinguish it, is of three sorts: 1. Sunt cogitations • tiosa, & ad rem non pertinentes, &c. There are idle, roving and impertinent thoughts, which the mind may easily reject: 2. Sunt aliae cogitations violentae magis, & fortius adharentes ; There are other violent cogitations, which stick more nearly, as the immoderate cogitation of meat and drink, and such things as belong to the necessity of nature. 3. Sunt cogitations f •• tidae & immundae, quae ad luxuriam, invidiam pertinent, &c. There are filthy and unclean cogitations, which concern lasciviousness, envy, vain glory, and such like: the first kind is lutum simplex, as simple or thin clay, that cleaveth not: the second is limum viscosum, as a tough clay, that sticketh fast: the third is tanquam immundissimum coenum, as most unclean, filthy, and stinking mire and mud, Bernard. serm. de tri. ge. cog. na. Seneca maketh this distinction of the motions of the mind, not much unlike to the former: 1. Primus motus non voluntarius, &c. The first motion is not voluntary, as a certain preparation of the affections: 2. Alter cum volunta • e non contumaci, another kind is with the will, but the same not obstinate: as when it cometh into ones mind to revenge himself, when he is hurt: 3. Tertius motus est impotens, &c. The third kind is so impotent, and outrageous, that it will not be ruled by reason, as when a man is carried to revenge himself out of measure: the first of these can be no more ruled by reason, than such things as happen to the body: as when one yawneth, when he seeth another yawne, or suddenly winketh, when one putteth the fingers toward the eyes. Thus Seneca lib. 2. de ira, cap. 4. Now the question is, whether these motions, which Bernard calleth idle and wandering, Seneca involuntary, are forbidden in this precept. Hereof there are three opinions.

1. Some think that even these first infused motions, Etiam citra rationem ullius objecti, even without respect had to any certain object, are forbidden here, Iun. But it seemeth by the words of the Law, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbors house, that the concupiscence here prohibited, aimeth at a certain object, and is not without some inclination of the affection. 2. Others are of the contrary opinion: that if a man do at the very first reject these evil cogitations, nullius culpa reus erit, he shall be guilty of no fault, Galas. But seeing that Infants which have no such evil thoughts, yet are not clean before God, being conceived and borne in sin; it cannot be, but that these evil wandering and idle thoughts should carry some guiltiness in them. 3. Therefore the best solution is, that these cogitations which do vanish, •• tequam animos afficiant, before the mind be affected, be not comprehended in this precept, as actual sins: for until the will of man in some degree give assent, sin is in the conception only, not in the birth: as S. James saith, chap. 1. When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: but as the first fruits of original sin, together with that native corruption, they are contrary to this precept: wherein I find also some difference of opinion. Junius seemeth to think, that not original sin it self is here understood by concupiscence, which is as the habit, but only those involuntary motions, which are the first act of this evil habit, Iun. in Analys. But I rather subscribe to Ursinus, that thinketh original sin to be a breach of this precept, as original justice is therein prescribed, and commanded: because the Moral law is grounded upon the Law of nature, which was perfect in man by creation before his fall, from which perfection original sin is a declining defect. This then is the conclusion, that these involuntary motions, though they do not venire in rationem coram Deo, come into reckoning before God, if they presently vanish, before the will and affection incline unto them; yet they do show the corruption of our nature, that although they break not out into a flame, yet they are sparkles that fly upward, Job 5.7. our corrupt nature is as the coal, and those idle and wandering thoughts as the sparks that fly up: but if these sparks do not kindle into a flame, they shall never burn us, nor be laid unto our judgment: and so Chrysostom saith well Si concupiscentia non consentit voluntas, sola concupiscentia non damnat ; If the will consent not to concupiscence, concupiscence alone shall not condemn us, Homil. 52. in Matth. which is through God's mercy, for otherwise even original corruption is sufficient to condemn us.

QUEST. IV. Why there is no precept to direct tha inward passion of anger, as of coveting.

NOw why there is not the like precept given, to direct the inward act of the ireful power of the mind▪ as to forbid the first motion of anger and rage, as there is virtutis concupiscibilis, of the coveting and desiring faculty, these reasons are alleged: 1. The like is to be understood in other Commandments, that the very internal act, and first inclination of the heart unto evil is forbidden, but expressly the concupiscence is named, because it is more hard to resist the concupiscence, whose object is some apparent good, either delectable, or profitable: whereas the inward passion of anger, movet ad aliquid triste, moveth always to some heavy thing, not delightsome, or profitable. So Tostatus. The same reason is yielded by Thomas Aquin, Homicidium secundùm se non est concupiscibile, sed magis horrible, &c. Murder is not of it self a thing to be desired, but to be abhorred: but adultery, Habet rationem alicujus boni, scilicet delectabilis, furtum, boni scilicet utilis, Hath respect unto something that seemeth good, namely, delectable good, and theft to profitable good: therefore the concupiscence of these required a special precept rather than the other, &c. But this is no sufficient reason, for both it is as hard to resist anger, as any other passion, because of all other it is most violent and sudden: and beside, the angry man in purposing to do mischief, taketh delight therein, and thinketh it good for him so to do: so that this passion also, hath an object of something seeming good, for otherwise the will of man naturally is not carried unto that which is taken to be evil.

2. In this precept even that concupiscence is forbidden, which is involuntarie, and hath not the assent of the will: for as Chrysostom saith, Concupiscimus frequenter etiam quod nolumus: We covet often that which we will not. All other voluntary inclinations of the mind, to adultery, or theft, are prohibited in those other precepts: but there is no anger, without a purpose of revenge, and so hath a consent of the will, and so there need no special precept for that, it properly belonging to that precept, Thou shalt not kill: as our blessed Savior showeth, Matth. 5.22. To this purpose Tostatus saith well: Ira audit rationem syllogizantem, &c. Anger heareth reason disputing, whether it be meet to take revenge; and before reason hath thus concluded, anger riseth not: but anger hearing this first conclusion, that it is fit to take revenge, stayeth not to hear the second, whom, and how we are to revenge: but as a quick messenger, that goeth away before he hath half his arrand, and as angry dogs, that when they see one, do straightways imagine, that it is their part to bark, not considering who it is that they bark at, whether their master or no: so anger being an hot and hasty passion, resolving by reason of the thing, yet weigheth not every circumstance. Now concupiscence, when any object is offered, heareth no reason at all, but presently falleth to coveting of it. Ex Tostat. qu. 27.

QUEST. V. Whether sin properly consist in the internal or external act.

IT is here the opinion of the Hebrews, that if a man only desire another man's wife in his heart and go no further, he sinneth not: and Josephus lib. 12. Antiquit. reproveth Polybius the Historiographer, for saying that Antiochus died miserably, because he would have spoiled the Temple: adding further, Si solùm cogitavit, non egit peccatum: That if he only thought to do so, he sinned not: therefore he was not punished for that, but for other evils which he had done in Jerusalem. Ex Lyranus.

Contra. But it may be made manifest by divers reasons, that sin consisteth rather in actu interiori, quàm exteriori ; In the internal rather than external act. 1. That maketh a good or evil act, which is in a man's power, but the external act is not often in man's power, but the internal is, as the act of the understanding and will: as the Apostle saith, Rom. 7.18. To will is present with me, but I find no means to perform that which is good, &c.

2. Only it is proper unto man, beyond beasts, to do a good or evil act: but the external act brute beasts can do as well as man: therefore it is the internal faculty, of the understanding and will, that maketh the act good or bad.

3. If in the external act good and evil only were found, then Angels should do neither good nor bad, which have no external act, because they have no external faculties, powers, or instruments: the will therefore and understanding, which only are in Spirits, are the causes of good and bad actions.

4. The same external acts may be done as well by those that sleep, by fools and mad men, as by the waking, by wise and sober men: but the external act in those is not sin, because it proceedeth not from the will and understanding.

5. Both divine and human laws make a difference between voluntary and involuntarie acts: as in willful and casual murder; but the external act in both is all one.

6. Therefore, Actus exterior secundùm se nec bonus nec malus est: The external act of it self is neither good nor evil: but yet in men because of the connection which the external act hath with the internal, there is some goodness or evilness found, though not so properly as in the internal: for there are two acts of the will and understanding: the immediate act, as to understand, to will, which is called act •• elicitus, the act which issueth out: and there is a mediate act, as to kill, to commit adultery, which is act •• imperatus, the act commanded: therefore the external work being by this coherence and connection, an act of the internal powers, hath some good or evil in it, though not so properly as the internal, Sic fere Tostat. quast. 29.

QUEST. VI. The law of Moses did not only restrain the hand, but the mind.

BEside this opinion of the Hebrews, some other do hold that the law of Moses did only restrain the hand, and not the mind: and to this purpose they urge that place, Matth. 5.27. where our Savior saith; It was said unto you of old, Thou shalt not commit adultery, &c. But I say, &c. So that of old it seemeth the law only restrained the outward act: but Christ doth forbid more, even the inward desire, &c.

Contra. 1. Our blessed Savior, secundùm corum opinionem loquebatur, speaketh according to their opinion, because they thought they were only obliged and tied to the outward act, and therefore he doth deliver the law from their corrupt interpretations: he giveth not a new exposition: and this appeareth verse. 43. Ye have heard, that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy: but in all the Old Testament there is no such precept given by God, or liberty for any to hate their enemy: our Savior then meaneth not such sayings as were found in the law, but such expositions as they made among themselves. Now that even the law of Moses did bind not only the hand and external act, but the inward will and desire, it thus is proved:

1. None are said to repent but of that which is evil: but they under the law were to repent and to show themselves contrite, even for the internal acts of their mind: as Psal. 4.4. Tremble and sin not, examine your heart upon your bed, &c. Ergo, &c.

2. It is directly forbidden, Levite. 19.17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: which was an internal act: and many other such like sins of the heart are reproved by the Prophets.

3. The law doth not justify that which is naturally unjust, but forbiddeth it: now to covet another man's wife is naturally unjust. Ergo.

For the proposition, or first part of the argument, if the theft of the Israelites, the killing of Isaac intended by Abraham, the fornication of Ose, chap. 1. be objected: these were singulares casus, which the the lawgiver commanding, thereby declared, quod non includerentur sub lege communi, that they were not included under the general law: but if this whole law, Thou shalt not covet, had given a general liberty for the Jews to covet another's wife, Non jam declaretur lex, sed destrucretur: The law should not by this means be declared, but destroyed.

For the assumption, that it is against the law of nature to covet another man's wife, it is evident: 1. Because he faileth in the end, coveting her only of lust, not for procreation. 2. Matrimony est de jure naturali, is grounded even upon the law of nature: if then to break and violate matrimony be against the law of nature; then to will, and purpose so to do, is against nature also: yea the will and purpose is rather sin than the act it self: for it may fall out that the external act is sometime without sin, as when a man ignorantly lieth with another woman, taking her to be his wife, as Jacob took Leah for Rachel: but the will and desire is never without sin, Tostat.

Burgens. addit. 7. in cap. 20. would thus excuse this assertion, that Moses law, prohibebat manum, 〈◊〉 an ••• um, did inhibit the hand, not the mind: not that their meaning is, that in no part of Moses law, there is any prohibition to be found of the mind: for hatred is directly forbidden, Levite. 19.17. but that when any external act is forbidden, Non intelligitur ex vi illius praecepti prohiberi actus interior: The internal act is not understood to be forbidden by virtue of that precept: as in this precept, Thou shalt not kill, he is not judged to be guilty, which purposeth to kill, and yet killeth not.

Contra. 1. But our Savior saith, that even this precept is transgressed by the anger and hatred of the heart, Matth. 5.22. therefore the law intendeth even by the external act to forbid the internal also.

QUEST. VII. Whether any moral and natural duties were to be restrained by positive law.

BUt it will further be objected, that the old law was not to give precepts of moral duties: 1. The moral precepts are grounded upon the law of nature, and such precepts are known unto all: but the divine law prescribeth such things, as otherwise are not, neither can be known. 2. The keeping of the moral law giveth life, Galath. 3.12. but the old law was the ministration of death, 2 Cor. 3.7. therefore the old law was not to contain moral precepts.

Contra. 1. The law of God was not only to give rules of such things as men know by the law of nature, but to keep and preserve them also from error, in those things which they know. And therefore because men do err and swerve in such things as they know, their will and affection not giving way to reason, it was fit that a law should be given as well to rectify their affection, as to direct their understanding. 2. Beside, although these moral duties are grounded upon the law of nature, yet seeing the natural instinct is obscured by man's corruption, that dim light of nature had need of a clearer light by the law to help it. If man had continued in the perfection of his creation, he should not have needed any other law: but seeing man's natural knowledge is much decayed, it was to be revived, and renewed by the divine law. 3. The rules of direction of men's actions, are of four sorts: 1. Some are so well known by nature, as none can doubt thereof: as these, (that evil is to be shunned, and good to be desired, that no unjust thing is to be done) of such known principles it is not necessary that any law should be given. 2. Some things may so be searched out by the law of nature, as yet that many may err therein: such 〈◊〉 the particular precepts, of not committing fornication, not coveting another • wife▪ therefore because many may err in these duties, it was requisite they should be determined by the law of God. 3. Some things are so derived from the law of nature, as yet they are only searched out by those which are wise: such are the positive and judicial laws of men, that wisely can apply the principles of the law of nature to particular circumstances: of this kind are Moses Judicials. 4. Some things cannot at all be concluded by natural reason, but altogether depend upon the will of the institutor and law-maker: of this kind were Moses Ceremonials. So then for a full answer to the first objection, we say, that if moral duties were so generally and perfectly known, as that none could doubt of them, as are the first rules of direction, there needed not be any law given of them: but they are of the second sort, so known by the law of nature, as that many do doubt of them, and do err about them.

2 The old law was the ministration of death, not of it self, but occasionalite • , by occasion: because it commanded such things as were not in man's power to keep: and so the moral precep • s also did mortify and kill: Quia importabant difficultatem ad conservandum ea: Because they did bring in a difficulty, or rather impossibility to keep them: therefore in this respect there was no difference between the old law and the Moral law, Tostat. quast. 32.

QUEST. VIII. Of the perfection and sufficiency of the moral law.

BEside, it will be thus objected against the sufficiency of the moral law.

1. Because the law prescribeth only duties concerning God, and our neighbor, it speaketh nothing of the sins of man toward himself.

2. It forbiddeth perjury, whereas blasphemy and heresy were as needful to be forbidden.

3. The precept of the Sabbath is expressed, whereas there were many other festivities, as of the Passover, Pentecost and others, which the Israelites were bound to keep.

4. The duty toward parents is commanded, but not the love of parents again to their children.

5. The inward act of murder is not forbidden, as the inward act of adultery, namely concupiscence: therefore there is not a sufficient enumeration in the moral law, of all moral duties.

Contra. 1. That the Moral law is perfect and every way sufficient, it appeareth first by the general contents thereof, in prescribing all kind of duties both toward God and man. For first, as three things are to be performed to terrene governors, namely fidelity, reverence, and obedience; so likewise the like duties, but in an higher nature and degree, are required toward God: 1. Fidelitie, in acknowledging him our only God, which is commanded in the first and second precept. 2. Reverence in the third, not to profane his glorious name. 3. Obedience and service, which is performed in consecrating the seventh day wholly unto God's worship. Toward our neighbor our duties are either special toward those to whom we are bound by any special kind of benefit, as we are to our parents, and superiors, which is required in the fifth precept: or generally toward all, in forbearing to do them any hurt: first, either in deed, as in their single person concerning their life, or their coupled person, touching their wife, or in their goods, we must not steal: either in word, where false witness bearing is forbidden: either in heart, as in the tenth Commandment. There can be no duty rehearsed appertaining to God or man, which is not comprehended under some of these: therefore the Decalogue containeth a perfect law.

2. Now for answer to the objections in particular: 1. It was not necessary that any particular precept should be given as touching the duties of man toward himself: both because nature is not so corrupted in such duties (but that a man still retaineth love to himself) as it is in our love toward God and our neighbor: 〈◊〉 also for that the rule of our love toward another, is taken from a man's love toward himself: he shall love his neighbor as himself: therefore this is presupposed as granted of all, and as a ground of the rest, that a man loveth himself.

2. The law giveth instance of the more general and notorious transgressions, such as at the first would be acknowledged of all: and therefore because perjury is more general, and more easily discerned, than blasphemy or heresy, under that the rest are understood.

3. The other festivals were memorials of particular benefits which concerned the Israelites only, as the passover and feast of Tabernacles, of their deliverance out of Egypt: but the Sabbath is a memorial of the general benefit of the creation, which concerneth all nations: therefore this precept concerning the Sabbath only, of all other festivals was only to be inserted in the moral law.

4. The love of parents toward their children, though it be natural, yet the duty of children toward their parents is more agreeable to the law of nature, and the contrary, namely, their disobedience more unnatural, and therefore instance was to be given in this rather than in the other: and beside, the names of father and son being Relatives, the duties of each toward other are reciprocal; and one may be inferred upon the other.

5. The concupiscence is expressly forbidden, rather than the first motion of anger and revenge: 1. Because it is harder to resist the motion of concupiscence than of rage and revenge, and we are more apt to sin by that than this. 2. Because the inward wrath and purpose of revenge, N • scitur ex concupiscibili, beginneth with a desire, for there are two things in revenge, ipsa persequnti • . id quod persequimur, that which we pursue, and pursuit it self: that which we pursue, we judge to be evil, and so hate it; but the action of pursuit, we think to be good, namely, to seek revenge, and so we think it good, and desire it. Seeing then all kind of coveting and desire is forbidden, even that also is included, from the which rage and revenge taketh beginning: but in the other kind of coveting, when we propound unto ourselves an object of some delectable or profitable good; both the thing which is pursued with desire, is judged good, and the action it self of pursuing it with desire. Sic fere Tostat. quast. 24. But the better answer is, why the first motion of anger is not expressly forbidden, as of concupiscence, because anger never riseth, but with the consent of the will, and therefore being a voluntary motion, it belongeth to the other precept, Thou shalt not kill ; but concupiscence, which is involuntarie, and hath not the full consent of the will, is forbidden in the tenth precept. See more of this difference before qu • st. 1.

QUEST. IX. Of the abrogation of the law.

NExt unto this question of the perfection of the law, it followeth to consider of the perpetuity and continuance of it: for in some places the Scripture testifieth, that Christ came to fulfill the law, not to destroy it, Matth. 1.17. and some where again it so speaketh, as though the law were abrogated, a • Rom. 6.14. Ye are not under the law, but under grace: Heb. 7.12. If the priesthood be changed, there must of necessity be a change of the law. For the solution hereof, thus much is to be added here, though this question partly be touched before.

1. First then, concerning the ceremonial law, which was prescribed unto the Jews, to be observed in the worship of God, it is wholly abrogated: 1. Because the body being come, the shadow must give place: but all those ceremonies, in their sacrifices, purifications, festivals, and the rest were shadows, the body is Christ, Coloss. 2.17. Ergo. 2. Those ceremonial observations were tied unto a certain place; first, to the Tabernacle, then to the Temple of Solomon ; but now the worship of God is not tied to any certain place, as at Jerusalem, where the Temple was, John. 4.21. 3. Other Sacraments are instituted in place of the old, as Baptism and the Eucharist; therefore the old are abrogated. 4. The ceremonies did bind the observers to the keeping of the whole law, and the rites thereof: he which was circumcised was bound to keep the whole law, Galath. 5.3. but we are not bound now to the whole law, from which bondage Christ hath freed us. Ergo. 5. The ceremonies were a wall of partition and distinction between the Jews and Gentiles; but now that distinction is taken away, all being one in Christ: therefore that wall whereby they were parted and distinguished, is removed also, Simler.

2. As touching the politic and judicial laws of Moses, neither do they absolutely • ind now: 1. Many of these laws were peculiar to the policy of that Common-wealth, as the laws concerning their inheritances and possessions, which were not to pass from tribe to tribe: and they shown the fashions and manners of that country, as in building their houses with flat roofs, as Deut. 22.8. Of these positive constitutions, there is now no use among other nations. 2. The condition of all people is not alike: some are more stubborn and obstinate, some more civil and tractable, and therefore some have need of more strict and severe laws than others: one kind of political law then cannot serve for all nations. 3. The Gospel which is perpetual, prescribeth not a certain form of government to all nations, neither overthroweth their several policies; but in general commandeth obedience to all higher powers, Rom. 13.1. Ergo, much less the law, which was to be changed, Simler. But the judicial law is not abrogated, Quoad substantiam. finem, & universalem • quitatem, In respect of the substance, end, and universal equity, which is in punishing of vice, and maintaining of peace, Bucanus. See more hereof, quest. 4. general. cap. 1.

3. The Moral law is not now in force, quoad justificationem, in respect of justification, Rom. 3.28. A man is justified by faith, without the works of the law ; but it bindeth quoad obedientiam, In respect of obedience; we are bound to keep all the precepts of the law: but yet quoad terrorem & modum obedientiae, in respect of the terror of the law, and manner of obedience, which was to be obedient and subject unto it, for fear of punishment, we are freed now from it: and therefore the Apostle saith, The law is not given to a righteous man, 1 Tim. 1.9. because they of love rather than fear, do yield their obedience, and so are a law unto themselves, Simler. But this is a privilege only of the regenerate: As for carnal and unregenerate men, they are still under the curse and terror of the law, according to that saying, Cursed is everyone that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them, Bu ••• .

1. Doct. Of the particular contents of this precept.

THou shalt not covet. First, the things commanded here are these: 1. Original justice, which is an inclination and desire of the mind, to perform all duties unto our neighbor, Ursinus. 2. Diligent care and circumspection, even to take heed of the smallest sins, and to watch over the very thoughts: Prov. 3.23. Keep thy heart with all diligence, for thereout cometh life, Basting.

Secondly, contrary unto this precept: 1. Is original corruption, which is the general corruption and depravation of our nature, and that evil habit wherein we are conceived and borne, as David saith, Behold I was borne in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother conceived me, Psal. 51.5. 2. All evil inclinations of the heart, whereby it is solicited to do anything against the law of God: this evil concupiscent is of two sorts: it either hath principium internum, the beginning within, as is fleshly and carnal desire, or externum, without, by some external object, which are the concupiscence of the eye, and pride of life, as the Apostle calleth them, 1 John. 16. 3. And not only these kinds of concupiscence, but all other phantasies, and cogitations of the mind, which are contrary to the law of God, are here restrained, Basting.

2. Doct. Of the several properties of possessions and goods, and the distinction of callings.

FUrther, in that the Lord forbiddeth to covet our neighbors house, servant, &c. we see the Lord establisheth and confirmeth hereby, both the several rights in possessions, lands, and other substance: which right and property the Lord will not have violated, so much as in the concupiscence and inward desire: As also here it is evident, that the difference of callings, and distinction of degrees, as between master and servant, standeth with the will of God, as our blessed Savior and his Apostles also everywhere teach, Simler.

3. Doct. The difference between divine and human laws.

HErein also is set forth an apparent difference between the law of God and the laws of men: Lex humana judicat facta & dicta, divina judicat etiam cogitata ; Mans law only judgeth doings and sayings, but God's law judgeth the very thoughts: and the reason hereof is, because man judgeth only according to the outward appearance and evidence, but the Lord seeth the heart, Thomas. And the perfection of Divinity is hereby declared beyond Philosophy, which condemneth not the inward lusts and desires of the mind, neither holdeth a man for the same, whether they be good or evil, to be worthy praise or dispraise: But the law of God striketh at the very root of evil actions, which is the inward concupiscence and corruption of the heart.

4. Doct. Of the concupiscence of the soul, and of the flesh.

IT shall not be amiss, here to insert Chrysostom's distinction of concupiscence. As we have two natures, one of the soul, the other of the flesh: so we have two wills, one of the soul, the other of the flesh: habemus duas itas, & duas concupiscentias, &c. we have also two kinds of anger, and two kinds of concupiscence, one of the soul, the other of the flesh; the nature of the flesh cannot be separated from all these: Necesse habet irasci, concupiscere, &c. It cannot choose, but to be angry, to covet, because it is sold under sin: but the soul being created according to the justice of God, potest non irasci, &c. cannot be angry, nor covet; therefore when we are angry and covet, if we displease ourselves, and repress these passions, it is manifest, that our flesh only is angry, and coveteth, and not the soul. Such kind of passions then here are forbidden, wherein the soul consenteth with the flesh. To this purpose Chrysost. hom. 12. in Matth.

1. Conf. Against the Pelagians that deny concupiscence to be sin.

FIrst we are here to deal against the Pelagians, who did hold concupiscentiam non esse peccatum ▪ that concupiscence is not sin: whose objections were these:

1. Object. Such things as are natural, are not evil: but concupiscence is natural, therefore it is not evil, nor consequently sin.

Answ. This argument must be answered by a distinction: for by natural here may be understood that which was made natural in man by creation before his fall: and so the proposition is true, but the assumption is false; for inordinate concupiscence and appetite was not in man before his fall: or it is taken for that which is now incident to man's corrupt nature since his fall, and so the assumption is true, but the proposition false.

2. Object. Even in our nature, as it now standeth corrupt, the appetite or desire to such things as tend to the conservation of nature, and to decline and shun the contrary, are not evil: but such is the concupiscence to meat and drink, and such like, Ergo.

Answ. 1. Such motions and appetites of themselves are not evil, as they are natural motions: but if they be inordinate motions, and exceed a just measure, they are evil: as to have an immoderate desire to meat or drink. For as it was natural in Eve to desire to eat of the fruit of the tree, yet to desire it against the Commandment of God, was evil: so is it with these natural motions, if they be immoderate and inordinate, they are evil. 2. There are other concupiscences beside these; which are neither natural, nor tending to the conservation of nature: as coveting another man's house, or wife, &c. which can have no such excuse or preten •• .

3. Object. That which is not in man's power to avoid, is no sin: but not to covet is not in man's power: Ergo, it is no sin.

Answ. 1. The proposition is false: for sin is not measured by the necessity or liberty of nature, but by the disagreement which it hath with the will of God. 2. When God first printed the law in man's nature before his fall, then were the precepts of God given unto man, in his power to keep: though man by his voluntary corruption hath lost his power and liberty, yet God forgoeth not his power and right of commanding. 4. But that concupiscence is sin, it is both evident by this law, that would not forbid it unless it were sin: and by the Apostle, who useth the same argument: I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust, Rom. 7.7. Ursinus.

2. Confut. Against the Papists, that deny concupiscence to be sin in the regenerate.

SEcondly, the Papists are herein Semi-Pelagians; who generally affirm and hold, that concupiscence remaining after baptism, is not properly sin, nor forbidden by commandment: Rhemist. 〈◊〉 . Rom. 6. sect. 6. So was it decreed in the Tridentine Synod, that concupiscence, non est vere & proprie peccatum in renatis, is not verily and properly a sin in the regenerate, but that it is so called, quia ex peccato est, & in peccatum inclinat, because it cometh of sin, and inclineth to sin: Session. 1. cap. 1. They object thus.

1. Object. Sin maketh men guilty before God of eternal death: but the regenerate are not guilty of eternal death, therefore concupiscence in them is no sin.

Answ. 1. By this reason there shall be no sin at all in the regenerate: for there is no condemnation at all to them that are in Christ Jesus. 2. Neither concupiscence, nor any sin else shall condemn the regenerate: but that is not because concupiscence is no sin, but that both it and all other sins are pardoned in Christ, and so not imputed.

2. Object. Original sin is taken away in Baptism: therefore concupiscence in the regenerate is no sin.

Answ. Original sin is not simply taken away in Baptism, but only quoad reatum, in respect of the guilt: and as the Schoolmen say, it is taken away formally in Baptism, but not materially. There are two things to be considered in original sin: the disagreement or repugnancy which it hath with the law of God, and the guilt of the punishment. This latter way original sin is remitted and released in Baptism, it shall never be laid unto the charge of the faithful: as S. Paul saith, Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's chosen, Rom. 8.33. But the other remaineth still in God's children: as S. Paul confesseth of himself, Rom. 7.23. I see another law in my members rebelling against the law of my mind ; but yet, though it remain and have a being in the faithful, it doth not reign in them: as the same Apostle exhorteth, Rom. 6.12. Let not sin reign in your mortal body.

3. But that concupiscence is sin in the very regenerate, it is evident by this precept, Thou shalt not covet: which commandment is given generally to all both the regenerate and unregenerate. S. Paul also calleth the rebellion of his flesh, which he felt in himself being now regenerate, the law of sin, Rom. 7.23.25. And the Apostle speaketh to men regenerate, when he saith, Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, Ephes. 4.23. which renovation needed not, if concupiscence in them were no sin.

4. But that place of Augustine will be objected: Quamvis insint, dum sumus in corpore mortis hujus, peccati desideria, &c. Although while we are in the body of this death, there be in us the desire of sin: yet if we should give assent to none of them, non esset unde diceremus, &c. dimitte debita nostra, we should have no cause to say to our heavenly Father, Forgive us our debts, &c. August. epist. 200.

Answ. 1. Augustine must be understood to speak of actual sins: that if so men had grace never to consent to their concupiscence, they should not need to pray for remission of such sins. 2. And who is there that liveth, who sometime is not carried away with concupiscence, to give assent unto it? So that, if Augustine should speak generally of all sin, yet his speech being conditional, if we should give ass •• to none of them, and that condition being kept of none, this proveth not concupiscence not to be sin. See more of this controversy, Synops. Centur. 4. err. 16.

3. Confut. That no concupiscence is a venial sin in it self.

THirdly, Thomas Aquin his assertion cometh here to be examined: Not a quod cupiditas tun • est peccatum mortal, quando sine ration, &c. Note that concupiscence is then mortal sin, when as the things of our neighbors are coveted without reason: but when they are reasonably desired, it is venial, Thomas in opuscul.

Contra. 1. This distinction of mortal and venial sins, being understood in their sense, that some sins in the condition and quality thereof are mortal, some venial, is contrary to the Scripture, which maketh death the wages of sin, Rom. 6.23. that is, of all: but to the faithful, through God's grace, all sins are venial, and shall never be laid unto their charge: and so no concupiscence is mortal. 2. There can be no reasonable coveting of another man's things: for reason is grounded upon the law of nature: against the which such concupiscence is: therefore the coveting of our neighbors goods, being a transgression of this moral precept, is in it own nature mortal: but through God's mercy in Christ, both it and all other sins to the faithful are venial and pardonable, and not otherwise.

4. Confut. That Marie was not void of original sin and concupiscence.

FUrther, Thomas Aquin hath another position: Post peccatum propter corruptionem nullus evadit concupiscentiam praeter Christus & virgo gloriosa, &c. After sin entered, because of corruption none can escape concupiscence, beside Christ and the glorious Virgin: Thom. in opuscul. So the Rhemists All men are borne in sin, Christ only excepted, and his mother for his honor, Annotat. Rom. 5. sect. 9.

Contra. 1. The Apostle saith, Rom. 3.19. Whatsoever the law saith, it saith to them which are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world be culpable before God. But Mary was under the law, and culpable before God as others were: Ergo, the law also saith to her, Thou shalt not covet.

2. Again, the same Apostle saith: The law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, that we might be made righteous by faith, Galath. 3.24▪ But Mary was made righteous by faith, for she calleth Christ her Savior in her song, Luk. 1.47. Therefore the law also was a schoolmaster to her to bring her to Christ.

3. S. Paul further saith, Ephes. 2.3. We were by nature the children of wrath as well as others: He speaketh generally of all the faithful: therefore even Mary was by nature the child of wrath; and consequently borne in original sin.

4. Divers infirmities are discovered in Scripture in the Virgin Mary ; as Luk. 2.48. her finding fault with Christ: Matth. 12.46. her interrupting of Christ in his sermon: John. 2.2. her prescribing of the time to Christ to show a miracle in turning the water into wine: when Christ rebuked her, saying: Woman, what have I to do with thee? All these infirmities do show that Mary was not void of original sin. And therefore upon these reasons and testimonies of Scripture we infer, that Mary was conceived and borne in sin as others are, and Christ only is excepted: of whom only the Apostle saith, He was in all things tempted in like sort, yet without sin, Heb. 4.15. As Origen also well saith, Solus Christus sine macula: Only Christ was without spot: Homil. 1. in Levite. See more also of this question, Synops. Centur. 2. err. 79.

5. Confut. Against the Romanists, that it is impossible in this life to keep the law of God.

NOw whereas the law restraineth the very inward concupiscence and corrupt desire: herein appeareth the perfection of the law, and how impossible it is for any in this life to keep the law of God perfectly: as the Apostle saith, Rom. 7.14. We know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal sold under sin. There are two reasons, why it is not possible to keep the law: both because it is spiritual, not restraining only the external act, but the internal spiritual motions, and so is a most perfect rule of righteousness; and for that we are on the other side imperfect, full of weakness and corruption, and carnal. Here then is discovered another error of the Romanists, That the precepts and commandments of God unto a man justified, and in the state of grace, are not impossible to be kept: Council. Trident. sess. 6. can. 18. First then the truth concerning this point, shall briefly be opened: and then their objections answered.

First, here we are to consider a fourfold state and condition of man: 1. As he was created in a perfect state before his fall, when it was possible for man to have kept the law, and to have conformed himself in perfect obedience to the will of his Creator. 2. But man considered in his corrupt nature, before he be regenerate and restored, can by no means keep the law: as the Prophet saith, Can the black moore change his skin, or the Leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil; Jer. 13.23. So the Apostle, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin, Rom. 14.23. And, We are not able of ourselves to think anything, 2 Cor. 3.5.

3. In the restored estate of man by regeneration and new birth, the law is partly possible to be kept, partly impossible. It is possible two ways: first by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, who hath fulfilled the law for us: for he needed not fulfill it for himself, as he suffered not for himself: for he was perfectly holy and just, even from his conception, communicatione justitiae divinae, by the communication of the divine justice: Marbach. So the Apostle saith, Rom. 10.4. Christ is the end of the law (that is, the fulfilling of the law) for righteousness to everyone that believeth.

Secondly, the law is possible to be kept of the regenerate, Quo ad inchoationem obedientia internae & externa, in respect of the inchoation or beginning of obedience internal and external: as the Apostle saith, This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments, 1 John. 5.3. For he which without this beginning of righteousness, that is, without regeneration, saith he knoweth and serveth God, is a liar, Ursinus. This regeneration and inchoate obedience, being wrought in the faithful by the Spirit of God, though it do not wolly extirpate and root out sin, yet it keepeth it so under, that it reign not in them: and it so reneweth them, that they labor to resist sin, and to live according to the law of God: which obedience though it be in it self imperfect, yet is it accepted of God by faith in Christ, in whose perfect righteousness, whatsoever is imperfect in our obedience, is perfected, and our imperfections pardoned, Marbach.

Yet even in the regenerate the law is impossible to be kept, in respect of that perfection which God requireth: and therefore the Prophet David saith, Psal. 143.3. Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall none that liveth be justified. 1. The faithful do both imperfectly keep the law, committing many things against it: 2. Even in those things wherein they keep the law, they have some imperfections, as the Prophet Isaiah saith, 64.6. All our righteousness is as a stained clout, Ursinus.

But there is great difference between the regenerate and unregenerate, even when they sin. 1. God's purpose standeth to save the Elect, though they sometime slip; so is it not with the other. 2. Their repentance in the end is certain; so is it not in the unregenerate. 3. Even in the sins of the regenerate there remaineth yet some seed of faith, which is not utterly extinguished, nor they wholly given over: but the wicked and unregenerate are wholly sold over unto sin, and their very conscience is polluted, Ursinus.

4. In the glorious state of the Saints in the next life, the obedience of the Saints shall be perfect, and they shall wholly be conformable to the will of God: and then we shall be just, not only by the imputative justice of Christ, sed propria essentiali justitia, but by a proper essential justice, and then we shall fully be made like to the image of Christ, as the Apostle saith, Rom. 8.29. Those which he knew before, he also predestinate, to be made like the image of his Son, Marbach. Now the contrary objections are these:

1. Object. The works of the Spirit are perfect: but good works in the regenerate are the works of the Spirit: therefore they are perfect.

Answ. This argument proceedeth from that which is simpliciter, simply and absolutely said to be of the Spirit, to that, which secundum quid, after a sort is of the Spirit: the works of the faithful are not absolutely the works of the Spirit: but they are so the works of the Spirit, as they be also our works: so they are pure, as they proceed of the Spirit, but impure and imperfect, as they are wrought by man.

2. Object. They which are conformable to the image of Christ, have perfect works; The faithful are conformable in this life to the image of Christ: Ergo.

Answ. The proposition is true only of those which are perfectly conformable: but so are not the faithful in this life, but only in part, as the Apostle saith, 1 Cor. 13.12. Now I know in part: and as our knowledge is, so is our obedience, both imperfect.

3. Object. There is no condemnation to the faithful, Rom. 8.1. therefore their works are perfect.

Answ. The argument followeth not, for the privilege of the faithful, and their exemption from condemnation, dependeth not upon the perfection of their works, but upon the perfection of Christ's righteousness imputed to them by faith.

4. Object. Christ at his coming shall render unto everyone according to his works: but it standeth not with God's justice, to give a perfect reward unto imperfect works, therefore the works of the regenerate, because they shall be perfectly rewarded, are perfect.

Answ. 1. The obedience of the faithful shall be perfectly rewarded, not according to the law of works, but according to the law of faith, whereby the righteousness of Christ is imputed, and is rewarded in them, being theirs by faith, as fully as if it were their own. 2. Yet Christ shall judge also according to their works, not as causes of the reward, but as testimonies, and lively arguments of their faith, Ursinus.

5. Object. The Scripture ascribeth perfection to the works of the Saints, as it is said of Noah, Gen. 6.9. that he was a just and perfect man in his time: so Hezekiah saith, 2 King. 20.3. I have walked before thee with a perfect heart.

Answ. 1. These and the like sayings must be understood, de perfection partium, non graduum, of the perfection of the parts of obedience, not of the degree of perfection: that is, the faithful do exercise their obedience in every part of the law, but not in a perfect degree or measure. 2. They are said to be perfect, in comparison only of such as were weak and imperfect. 3. And further, their sincerity and perfection is understood, as being opposite unto dissimulation and hypocrisy, that their heart was perfect toward the Lord, that is, unfeigned, without any dissimulation: in which sense the Prophet David saith, Judge me according to mine innocence, Psal. 7.8.

6. Object. The Apostle saith, Whosoever is borne of God sinneth not, 1 John 3.9. the faithful then, being borne of God, sin not.

Answ. The Apostle understandeth here, not the dwelling of sin, but the reigning of sin, for otherwise he should be contrary to himself, who had said before, chap. 1.8. If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us: They which are borne of God sin not, that is, sin, though it remain in them, it reigneth not in them, as S. Paul saith, Though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh, Ursinus.

7. It is evident then, that the law was not given to justify men thereby, as the Apostle saith, Rom. 3.20. Therefore by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight, for by the law cometh the knowledge of sin. This then is the end and use of the law: 1. It showeth what God is, one that loveth justice, and hateth iniquity: 2. It is as a glass, wherein we may see that image, after the which man was at the first created, which now is defaced in him by sin: 3. It is a rule and line, after the which we should square out our life and actions: 4. It showeth the corruption of our nature, and so is as a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, Marbach. So Augustine saith, Hac est utilitas legis, ut hominem de sua infirmitate convincat, & gratiae medicinam, quae in Christo est, implorare compellat. This is the profit of the law, to convince man of his infirmity, and to drive him to seek the medicine of grace in Christ, Epist. 200.

6. Confut. That the Moral law nor any precept thereof may be by human authority dispensed with.

THere remaineth yet one point to be discussed, whether any of the precepts of the Moral law may be by human authority dispensed withal: wherein the Popes Canonists have heretofore given unto their terrene god an infinite and unreasonable power: for these were their conclusions, that Papa potest dispensare contra jus divinum ; The Pope may dispense against the law of God: contra jus natura, against the law of nature: contra novum Testamentum, against the New Testament: contra Apostolum, against the Apostle. Papa potest dispensare de omnibus praeceptis veteris & novi Testamenti ; The Pope may dispense with all the precepts of the old and New Testament, &c. But herein I prefer the judgment of Tostatus, a moderate writer of that side, who denieth unto the Pope any such authority, and answereth the contrary objections.

1. Object. As among men, the Law-maker may dispense with his law, so God that gave the Moral law, is therefore above the law, and may dispense with it: and if God may dispense, then the Prelates of the Church consequently may dispense, because they are in God's stead.

Answ. First to the proposition this may be answered: 1. That in human laws which tend unto the common good, the preservation of the public state, the maintenance of peace, and of justice, the Law-giver himself cannot so dispense, as to overthrow the end of those laws: as that it shall be lawful to disturb the public state, or such like; for this were to evert the very scope and end of the law: but yet in particular cases he may dispense; as where an order is, that everyone shall watch, which is intended for the good of the City: yet some may be dispensed withal, and exempted from watching, who may more necessarily be employed for the common good: for here, although the letter of the law be not precisely kept, yet the intention of the Law-maker is observed, which is to seek and procure the common good.

So likewise: 1. Universally the Lord himself neither will nor can dispense against his law: as to make it lawful to have other gods, to take God's name in vain, and such like: for this were for God to deny himself to be just, which were to deny himself: but the Apostle saith, God is faithful, and cannot deny himself, 2 Tim 2.13. but to make it lawful in general, to violate the precepts of the first and second Table, were to deny his own justice, and so consequently to deny himself: for God is most just, yea justice it self, and the law is a perfect rule of justice.

2. Yet in the particular determinations of the law, the Lord doth dispense, as with Abraham's sacrificing of his son, the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians, the fornication of Ose the Prophet: for the will of God which is most just, and the right which he hath in the lives, bodies, and goods of men, maketh these things lawful, being done by the Commandment of God, which otherwise should be unlawful: for as a man may use his Ox, or his Ass at his pleasure, because they are ordained to his use: so the Lord may do with men, take away their lives at his pleasure, and that by a double right; both because man by his sin hath deserved to die, and God as Creator may use the creature as it may best serve to his glory. And as a man may use his own goods, and that which is lent unto a man, precari • , freely and frankly, during the pleasure of the lender, he may when he will require again: so the earth being the Lord's and the fullness thereof, which he as it were lendeth unto man so long as it pleaseth him: the Lord may justly at his pleasure transfer things from one to another. So likewise in the third case of fornication: like as matrimony maketh carnal copulation lawful, so the Lord may, tale vinculum inducere, by his commandment bring in and supply the like bond, as matrimony is, as when he commanded the Prophet to take him a wife of fornications, Hose 1.3. the commandment of God made that lawful, which otherwise was unlawful.

3. But as God can make that which seemeth unjust, to be lawful and just: so yet can he not make a just and good act to be evil and wicked; as that he which worshippeth God aright, doth evil, or such like; and the reason is, because God by this means should be contrary to himself, in commanding one so to worship him, and yet to count him, so worshipping him, to do evil. Again, Impossible est Deum facere quae non potest velle, It is impossible for God to do that he cannot will: now the Lord willeth none evil to be done, therefore he cannot make that which is good to be evil, because he cannot deny himself, who is only good.

4. Further a difference is to be made between the precepts of the first and secood Table: God doth dispense with the precepts of the second, which are referred to the good of our neighbor, when he seeth it more to make for his own glory, which is the chief end and scope of the duties of the first and second Table; as when God commandeth to dishonor parents, rather than to dishonor him, and biddeth any kill, and so in the rest: but with the precepts of the first Table God dispenseth not, because they are immediately referred to God's glory, for that were to consent to the dishonoring of himself. And thus much for the answer to the first part of the argument.

Secondly, it followeth not, if God can dispense, that therefore the Prelates of the Church may: 1. Because the dispensation against a law must be by as great authority as the law was first made by: but the moral law grounded upon the law of nature, was founded by the Author and Creator of nature, and therefore by him only, and not by any else may it be dispensed with. 2. As in natural effects, ordinarily there must go before a natural cause; as a thing cannot be made hot, unless fire or some other efficient cause of heat be put unto it: so that the Pope himself cannot command a thing to be hot, but by such efficient cause of heat: yet the Lord without any such mediate or ordinary cause can make a thing hot, by his infinite power supplying that cause himself: so likewise in spiritual actions, the Lord may supply that which maketh the thing lawful, which man cannot do, unless some external cause or circumstance do concur, which maketh the act lawful: As to kill is an unlawful act in it self, neither can the Pope or any other make it lawful to kill, unless there be some cause, that maketh it lawful to kill, as when the party commanded to be slain hath deserved to die. But God, to whom all men are debtors, and who is the Lord of every man's life, may command to kill without any injustice: although there be no such apparent cause or circumstance, which should make that act lawful.

2. Object. Further it is objected thus, to restore that which is committed to a man's trust, is a natural duty: yet this is dispensed with, when as a man refuseth to restore to a mad man his sword or weapon, which he gave one to keep: so the Magistrate ordinarily dispenseth with that precept, Thou shalt not kill, when he commandeth malefactors to be slain: so the Maccabees dispensed with the Sabbath, when they resolved to fight with their enemies upon the Sabbath, 1 Macchab. chap. 2. as these precepts are dispensed withal by men, so also may the rest.

Answ. 1. For the first instance, there is in that particular case no dispensation against the law of nature, for then by such dispensation it should be made lawful not to restore that which is committed to trust, which cannot be made lawful by any dispensation, for this were to cross and overthrow the law of nature: but not to restore a sword to a furious man, is but a particular interpretation of that general law of nature, wherein the intent of that law is kept: for it is agreeable to the law of nature, to render whatsoever belongeth to another, and the reason thereof is, because it is just: so it is lawful by the same law nothwithstanding, not to give unto a mad man his own sword, because it is just also; the meaning and reason of the law is kept, because the furious man would do some hurt with his weapon, and therefore to minister occasion and instruments unto his rage were unjust.

2. In the other two particulars there is no dispensation, but an interpretation rather, or declaration of the law: in the first, that it is no murder, when one is justly slain; and in the other, that it is no breach of the Sabbath, when necessity compelleth to break the rest thereof. 1. This were a dispensation, to make it lawful to kill, where one cannot justly be put to death; and to work upon the Sabbath, where there is no necessity. 2. And a dispensation maketh that lawful afterward, which was not before such dispensation: but it was always lawful both for the Magistrate to put to death, and upon like necessity to intermit, or suspend the rest of the Sabbath. 3. Beside, these interpretations and declarations of these laws are not devised by man, but warranted in Scripture by the Lord himself, the maker and author of the law, and therefore they are not interposed by any human authority, Tostat. quast. 35.

1. Observ. Why covetousness is to be taken heed of.

THou shalt not covet, &c. Men must not only withdraw their hands from taking their neighbors goods, but restrain their inward coveting and desire, and that for these reasons: 1. Propter concupiscentiae infinitatem, because concupiscence is infinite, the desire of the covetous is never satisfied, as Isaiah 5.8. They join house to house, &c. till there be no more place. 2. Aufert quietem, it taketh away quietness, Eccles. 5.11. The sati •• ie of the rich will not suffer him to sleep. 3. Facit divitias inutiles, it maketh riches unprofitable: He that loveth riches, shall be without the fruit thereof, Eccles. 5.9. 4. Tollit justiti • • quitatem, it hindereth justice: For rewards do blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just, Exod. 23. 5. Necat charitatem, it killeth charity both of God and our neighbor: therefore the Prophet saith, Hide not thyself from thine own flesh, Isaiah 58.7. The covetous despiseth his brother, who is as his own flesh, 6. Producit omnem iniquitatem, it bringeth forth all iniquity, as S. Paul saith, 1 Tim. 6.10. The desire of money is the root of all evil, Thom. in opuscul.

2. Observ. Of the remedies against concupiscence.

THe remedies against concupiscence are these: Basil assigneth these two: 1. Si cogitaveris, quod dissolvendus es in terram, cessabit insana concupiscentia, &c. If thou bethink thyself, that thou shalt be dissolved into earth, unsound concupiscence will cease. 2. Meliorum desiderium minora cogit contem • ere ; The desire of better things will make thee contemn the less: as the love to the Word of God, which is more to be desired than gold, will withdraw our love from earthly things, Basil. in regula. Thomas Aqui • addeth four remedies beside. 3. Occasiones exteriores fugiendo, By shunning all external occasions, as Job made a covenant with his eyes, chap. 31.1. 4. Cogitationibus aditum non praebendo, In giving no way to the thoughts, as by humbling and afflicting the body, as S. Paul did, 1 Corinth. 9.27. 5. Orationibus insistendo, By applying prayer, as our blessed Savior saith, that even devils may be cast out by fasting and prayer, Matth. 17.21. 6. Licitis occupationibus insistendo, &c. By being always well occupied, for idleness brought the Sodomites to lust, it was one of their sins, Ezech. 16.49. Thom. in opuscul.

3. Observ. How the Lord hath punished the transgressors of his law.

THou shalt not covet. ] In the last place I will show, how the Lord hath punished and judged the transgressors of this precept, and likewise of the rest. The punishment then which is due for the transgression of the law is either divine or human. The human is that which is inflicted by the laws of men, which are divers, according to divers usages of countries and conditions of people, among whom one vice may reign more than another, and so more severity is required. But this defect generally is found in human censures; that the transgressions of the second table are more severely punished than those of the first: and those in the second, which do concern man's outward state, as theft, are more straightly punished than adultery, which Augustine found fault with in his time: and he giveth this reason of this partiality: Quia id pejus credimus, quod huic vitae nocet: Because we think that the worse or greater evil, which hurteth this life: Lib. de Mendac. cap. 9.

The divine punishment is of two sorts, it is either temporal in this life, or eternal in the next. And for the first, where human laws are silent or connivent, in censuring the sins of men, yet the divine justice showeth it self: As now shall appear in this particular enumeration of divers presidents and examples of God's severity, exercised and shown upon the transgressors of his law.

1. Pharaoh is set forth as an example of an Atheist and profane person, who would not acknowledge the God of Israel, but said, I know not the Lord, neither will I let Israel go, Exod. 5.2. who manifestly transgressed the first precept: his end was to be drowned in the red Sea.

2. Sennacherib, a most gross Idolater, as he was worshipping his Idol Nisroch in the temple, was slain of his two sons, 2 King. 19.37.

3. He which blasphemed the name of the Lord in the host of Israel, was by the Lord's commandment stoned to death, Levite. 24.11.

4. The man also which gathered sticks upon the Sabbath, because he did it with an high hand, and is contempt, was stoned by God's appointment, Numb. 15.31.

5. Absalom, both a disobedient child to his father, and a rebel against his Prince, was hanged by the hair of the head, and stricken through with darts: and so is made a spectacle unto all stubborn children, and rebellious subjects, that such should expect the like judgment at God's hand.

6. Cain, for killing his innocent brother, was cast out of God's presence, and made a runagate upon the face of the earth. Cruel Abimelech as he slew 70. of his brethren upon one stone, so his brains were dashed out with a stone, Judge. 9.

7. Ammon an incestuous person, was slain by the procurement of his own brother Absalom, for the deflowering of his sister Tamar, 2 Sam. 13. That whore and strumpet Jezebel was eaten and devoured of dogs, 1 King. 21.23. 2 King. 9.22.35. And as adultery is an abomination to the Lord, the punishment whereof God reserveth to himself, where the Magistrates hand is not extended: as the Apostle saith, Heb. 13.4. Whoremongers and adulterers God will judge: So the sin of drunkenness and glut • onie shall not escape the stroke of God's hand, as being the nursery and seminarie of filthiness and unclean lust.

Drunken Nabal for that sin, and others joined withal, was smitten of the Lord, and died, 1 Sam. 25.38. And that rich Glutton, who pampred himself, but was merciless toward poor Lazarus, was tormented in hell, Luk. 16.

And here I cannot omit to make mention of a strange judgment of God shown of late upon three persons for this sin of excessive drinking; which happened upon the 27. day of December last, being the Lord's day, next after the Nativitie, in the town of little Ashen, or Eason in Essex, in the house of a worshipful Knight there dwelling. The manner of it was this: One Thomas Rugesby, a servant of the house, with another that was a Retainer, and a youth about the age of thirteen years, did in the afternoon withdraw themselves into a private chamber, taking with them strong Beer, Aqua vita, Rosa solis, Tobacco; and shut the door close, that they might be private, and take their fill of drink without controlment: who so excessively and immoderately distempered themselves with drink, that they in most beastly manner vomited it up again: two of them, the servant of the house and the youth, were in vomiting strangled, and were found dead in the morning; the first sitting in his chair, the other lying upon the bed: that which they cast up, being by the cold of the night frozen to their mouths: the third, the Retainer, was taken up in the morning, wallowing up and down in his vomit, and in a manner half dead, whom they had much ado to recover. This example would not be forgotten, but carefully be laid up in remembrance, that other excessive takers of drink, and wanton abusers of plenty (which sins do now everywhere overflow) might receive warning thereby, and judge themselves by repentance, and leaving their sin in time, lest they be suddenly overtaken by God's judgments in like manner.

8. For stealing, Achan may be an example, who for his theft and sacrilege, was with throwing of stones put to death, and that by the Lord's extraordinary direction, in causing him to be found by lot, Josh • . 7.

2. For lying, the fearful examples of Ananias and Sapphira, would be thought upon, who were for that sin stricken with sudden death, Act. 5.

10. For coveting of Sara Abraham's wife, both Pharaoh King of Egypt, and Abimelech King of Gerar were punished of God, Gen. 12. and 20. though they were prevented of God, and kept from committing adultery.

Thus it pleaseth God to exemplify some, that others might take heed. But here concerning the temporal judgments in this life, these three observations are necessary: 1. That they which are temporally punished, are not always to be deemed the worst of all others, though it please the Lord to make them examples to others: as our blessed Savior saith of the Galileans, whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifice, and of those eighteen persons, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell in Jerusalem, that they were not greater sinners than the rest, but except ye repent (saith he) ye shall all likewise perish. 2. God neither punisheth all such offenders in this life, for then men would expect no judgment to come: neither doth he suffer all to go unpunished, lest worldly men might be altogether secure; and deny in their hearts the divine providence: as the Prophet David saith, Psal. 10.13. Wherefore doth the wicked contemn God? he saith in his heart, thou wilt not regard. 3. That they which go on still in their sin without punishment, should not flatter themselves: for there remaineth a greater judgment behind: and there is more hope of them which are chastised in this world. So the Apostle saith: Thou after thine hardness, and heart that cannot repent, heapest unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and the declaration of the just judgment of God, Rom. 2.5.

The other kind of judgment is in the next world: as the Apostle showeth, 1 Cor. 6.9. Be not deceived, neither fornicators, nor Idolaters, nor adulterers, nor wantons, nor buggerers, nor thieves, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners shall inherit the kingdom of God: and such were some of you, but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, &c. Add hereunto the like sentence and declaration of God's judgment upon the wicked: Revelat. 21.8. But the fearful and unbelieving, the abominable, and murderers, whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death. This so heavy a sentence there is no way to escape, but in being washed from these sins by repentance, sanctified by newness of life, and justified by faith in Christ. And thus much of this treatise of the law, which by God's grace I have thus happily finished.

QUEST. I. In what sense the people are said to have seen the voices, which are properly heard and not seen.

Vers. 18. ANd all the people saw the thunders, &c. 1. Some think that by sight here is understood the hearing, because it is usual with the Hebrews to take one sense for another, Vatabl. But the sight is no more taken for hearing, than to hear for the seeing. 2. Ambrose referreth it to the understanding: Interioris mentis videtur obt • tu: It was seen by the inward sight of the mind: like as our Savior saith, He that hath seen me, hath seen my Father, Job. 14.9. Ambrose. pro •• m. in Luc. So also Jerome will have it like unto that saying of S. John, 1. epist. chap. 1.1. That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, &c. of the word of life: Jerome. in Abdiam. But seeing Moses speaketh of outward objects of the external sense, as of thunder, lightning, he meaneth also the sense, unto the which such things are objected. 3. Ferus thinketh, that herein ostenditur oscitantia populi, the carelessness of the people is shown, who more regarded that which they saw, than the voice which they heard: and therefore they are said rather to see than hear. But it seemeth that the people well regarded the voice of God, because presently after they desire that Moses might speak unto them, and not the Lord anymore. 4. Procopius thinketh, that it is said they saw, because of the evidence thereof, as if they had seen it with their eyes: as it is said, Amos 1.1. The words of Amos, &c. which he saw, &c. Deus Prophetarum oculis res subjicit tanta evidentia, ac si oculis cernerent, &c. God doth so evidently set things before the eyes of the Prophets (that is, their inward sight) as though they saw them with their eyes. But this was not done in vision, as the Lord spake to his Prophets, here was a sensible demonstration. 5. Augustine therefore thinketh, Videre hic poni pro generali sensu, tam animi, quam corporis: That to see is here put for the general sense both of the mind and body: because Moses would speak compendiously: so we use to say, vide quid sonet, see what soundeth: so also is it taken for other senses: as Christ saith to Thomas, Because thou hast seen me thou believest, whereas Thomas touched him, Tract. 121. super Ioann. The reason hereof is, Quia visus primatum obtinet, in sensibus intermiscetur omnibus: Because the sight is the chief among the senses, it is as intermingled among them all: Interlinear. And, Sensus visus plures rerum differentias nobis ostendit, &c. Because the sense of the sight doth more distinguish things, than any other sense: for other senses do show but the differences of their own objects; as the hearing the distinction of sounds: but the sight showeth how one thing is discerned from another, whether by color, quantity, number, fashion, and divers other ways, Tostat. Therefore the sense of seeing is taken in general for the rest, but not in particular for any one sense, but as sensus conjuncti sunt in communi sensu, as the senses are joined toge • her in the common sense: Borrhaius. And so here to see is taken for percipere to perceive: Iun. The people saw these voices, that is, perceived them. So also Cajetan: Videre pro certa n • titia ad sensum quocunque sensu saepe ponitur : To see is often put for that knowledge which cometh by any of the senses. So also Simlerus. 6. The Interlinearie Gloss hereupon giveth this note: Nos doctorum ••• es audientes oculum mentis dirigere debemus: We also when we hear the voice of the learned, must also direct the eye of the mind: as here the people are said to have seen these voices.

QUEST. II. What is meant here by voices, whether the thunder or other voices.

THe thunder and the lightning. The word is koloth, voices: 1. which some do take for those voices and words which were uttered and framed by the Angels: and hereupon Tostatus taketh occasion to show at large how the Angels are said to speak and express the voice as of man: which sometime they do by assuming human shape, sometime by framing other organs and instruments in the air apt to make sounds: but neither of these ways do the Angels express conceptiones su as modo naturali, sed per modum artis, their conceits by any natural mean, but as it were after the manner of art: as men do use organs and instruments of music: Tostat. quaest. 36. All this discourse of Tostatus here is superfluous: for by voices here are understood the thunders, as the word koloth is taken, chap. 19.16. and because of the other word which is adjoined lamps or lightnings: and so read here and understand: Vata • . Iun. Montan. Cajetan. Lippoman. Simler.

2. Basil understandeth this of the voice of God: Quae non per aures verberato extrinsecus acre apprehenditur, &c. sed arcano modo insonante voluntate divina: Which is not apprehended by the outward beating of the air on the ears, but by the secret sounding and intimating of the will of God: in Psal. 28. But it is evident by the story, that this was a sensible sound, which all the people heard, and were astonied at it: as the Apostle showeth, Hebr. 12.19. which they that heard excused themselves.

3. Moses here setteth not down all which the people saw: for there were four terrible things beside: fire, which burned up to the midst of heaven, darkness, clouds, and mist, Deut. 4.11. The thick clouds were above the mountain, from whence might proceed the thunder and lightning: and upon the mountain it self was seen the fire mixed with smoke and darkness, thorough the which the fire shined, Cajetan.

QUEST. III. Whether there were a sound of the trumpet beside the voices.

ANd the sound of a trumpet. 1. Tostatus thinketh that the voices before spoken of, and the sound of the trumpet, were not two distinct things, but one and the same: for otherwise the trumpet would have hindered the people from hearing the voices, if they had come together: they are therefore called voices, and a sound of a trumpet, because the Angels by the sound of a trumpet did express words and voices: Tostat. qu. 37. 2. But that there were words uttered beside the sound of a trumpet, it is evident c. 19.16. where the sound of a trumpet was heard, before the Lord began to deliver the law: and verse 19. When the sound of the trumpet blew long, &c. Moses spake, and God answered him by voice. Likewise the Apostle maketh mention of them as of two distinct things, Heb. 12.19. Ye are not come, &c. unto the sound of the trump •• and the voice of words. And yet the voice was uttered in a loud sound, as of a trumpet: as John saith, he heard a great voice, as if it had been of a trumpet, Revel. 1.10. There might be then a double kind of sounding the trumpet: one without any expressing of voice, which sounded before the Lord spake, and ceased all the while the Law was uttered, and after began again: the other sound of the trumpet was that whereby the Lord's voice was sounded out, when he delivered the Law. It is like also that some of these ceased while the Lord was in speaking, as the thunder; and the loud sound of the trumpet: for otherwise it might have been a lot to the people's hearing: and after the Lord had finished and made an end, then the thunder begun to be heard again, with the sound of the trumpet: like as it is the manner of Princes to have a trumpet blown before their edict • are proclaimed, and afterward • to cause it to be sounded again, Simler.

QUEST. IV. Of the fear of the people, and their going back.

Vers. 18. ANd they fled, or moved themselves, and stood afar off. 1. The Latin readeth 〈…〉 & timore percussi: they were terrified, and smitten with fear: the Septuagint read 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , they feared: Chal. they trembled: Vatab. vacillabant, they waved: whereupon Tostatus maketh thes • degrees of fear: that first the mind doth timere, is said to fear▪ when any evil is expected: then terr • r • , it beginneth to be terrified, cum conturbatur, when it is troubled with the expectation of any evil: but then we are said •• m • re, to tremble, when totus corporis status vacilla • , when the body it self and all the joints do shake for fear. But this distinction of fear is here our of his place: for though this giving back of the people proceeded from fear: yet the word ••• gh here signifieth to move; they moved then and fled from their place; and the next words do confirm this sense, They stood afar off. 2. Here we see two operations of the Law, the one terrorem incut • t, it striketh fear because of sin: then hominem retrocedere cogit propter • am Iudicis, it maketh man to give back because of the wrath of the Judge, Ferus. 3. Some Hebrews think, that the Israelites were back certain miles, Ex Simler. But the people go back, Non per modum f •• ga, sed per modum retrocessionis, Not by way of flight, but by way of recoiling: neither herein did they break the commandment of God; for they were set certain bounds forward which they were not to pass, but backward they might go, Tostat. quaest. 37. 4. Neither is it to be thought that the people went back while the Lord was speaking unto them; but after the promulgation of the Law, there being some pause made, then the people gave way, Cajetan. 5. All the people thus spake not to Moses, but their Elders and the chief of them came in the name of the rest, Deut. 5.23. Iun.

QUEST. V. Why the people desire that Moses would speak unto them.

Vers. 19. ANd said to Moses, talk thou with us. 1. Some do here lay fault and blame upon the Israelites, in refusing to hear the voice of God, and choosing rather that Moses should speak unto them. But the Lord commendeth them for so doing, Deut. 5.28. They have well said, all that they have spoken.