Of Divorce for Adultery

VNTO ALL THOSE THAT EITHER are entered already, or hereafter are to enter into the holy estate of wedlock, E. B. wisheth as all other Christian graces whatsoever (such as are needful to everyone in his own proper Calling) so now especially rightly to know, of what force that bond should be among us, and, how fast we ought to hold it.

I F yet it be doubtful to any, what is the corruption of our nature, and how often it cometh to pass thereby, that in many things we are hardly able to conceive or to find out, that which is sound and right indeed: though there be divers other things besides, wherein we might see it plainly enough, yet we need go no farther, but only to that which at this present we have in hand: namely, how few of all sorts there are, that are able to see, how strict & insoluble the bond of wedlock is, after that once it be rightly joined together▪

2 The Fathers of old, before that yet the law was given, had among them the truth of that holy ordinance, how it pleased God at the first to ordain the same: of mā and wife to make but one; and that he ordained but only two, to make up the unity that then he spake of. And yet the story doth plainly show, that not only the common sort of them, but even the better also, did not account that bond so straight, but that they did, (for divers of thē) take others besides: though yet notwithstanding it must needs be true withal, that they knew well enough, & could not be ignorant, but that therein they swerved clean, frō that pattern that God had given them, & from the Rule that therein he left them.

3 When afterward the law was given to those that followed, though now that matter were made a great deal more plain unto them, than it was before: yet they also did as little find what they had to do therein; as did the others that had not the light that was given unto thē. They were Hebrews themselves, & the Law was given in their own mother-tongue: the Text it self must needs be very plain unto them, & some (we may hope) were diligent in the study of it, & that with unfeigned desire to know it, and in the fear of God withal; and yet, it appeareth, they did not see this that we speak of Curious they were (for diverse of them) in many things else of less importance, which without any breach of the law of God they might have omitted; but their diligence & watchful heeding of all those Books, words, syllables, letters, & characters also (or the manner of writing thereof) & even in the number of many words how oft they were used, did never yet (for ought that we find in any of thē) attain unto this. In one place it is clear (we speak now but of the Original, that is, of the Hebrew Text it self; & not of the Translations that since have been in use among us) that Moses did no more but only make mention of an usage that they had among them, of putting away their wives on dislike, and marrying again, he doth (I say) but only speak of it, and doeth nothing at all approve it unto them, nor alloweth them so to do: and yet a sort of the learned of them in the time of Christ (and so belike of old likewise) did plainly show, that they did take it, that Moses had allowed them, or given thē their liberty so to do. Howbeit there is fair ods, betwixt a bare mentioning of an usage among them (though then also he go not against it) & to approve the same unto them: & in many other things, there is no question (at the least, as they might be chosen) but themselves would soon have perceived a lesser and a daintier difference then this. And herein they have the Text it self in plain terms to give thē over, in that which they would build upon it; even the very words themselves chasing thē from that persuasion of theirs.

4 In another place indeed the words are for them, so far forth that they may seem, to have the sense with them also: namely, that there they are not forbidden, to take unto them anymore but one wife at once. For the words are but only of taking a sister to the wife that a mā already hath: insomuch that it only may seem to be forbidden; that is, a man to take unto him a couple of sisters to have them both in marriage together. But if the place had been better considered, and conferred with other Scriptures, besides, then might they have found, that the more likely sense of that place had been to have forbidden them, when any man had one wife already then to take another unto her. For first, that thereby we should be forbidden to take in marriage two natural sisters, may seem to be no part of the meaning: partly, because of somewhat that goeth a little before; and partly in respect of some other considerations that here we have in this place it self. That which goeth a little before, is, for that in the next verse but one before, it is forbidden to marry the brothers wife: which in equity may serve for this also, to forbid unto us our wives sister. Those considerations that we have in this place it self, are the reasons that here are given: and the limitation that is used therewith. The reasons are two: to afflict her withal; and to vncover her shame upon her. Which of all others do least agree to natural sisters, for that, if a woman could brook any other to be joined with h • r, she could best away with her own sister in those respects: the one, of that greater love that by course of nature is betwixt those that are so near; the other, for that such are (for the most part in all such matters) most familiarly acquainted also. The limitation, so long as she liveth, hath no place (without some harder construction of it) but only in this sense that now we speak of, for that by that former law of the brothers wife which is set down without any such limitation, we are forbidden to match so near, after death likewise. But then, that this other should seem to be the sense of it, is much more likely, both for that it doth so fitly agree to the institution of marriage it self at the first: and for that it is not, in the law, elsewhere forbidden generally, to have at once more wives than one. Unto kings it is; but not generally unto all: and of it might they have reasoned, that if it were forbidden unto kings (who, in divers respects, might most of all have it allowed unto thē) then were it much more forbid̄ to all others besides. If the manner of speech might be thought, justly to hinder them from conceiving such a sense thereon, because the text nameth but a sister, though that kind of speech may be somewhat strange unto us, to carry such a meaning with it; yet was it not so unto them, for that in their speech it was often used: as, of one swearing to another, of curtains that are fellows, of a pair of wings, and of soldiers that march together in their array. In all which (and in divers places besides, as Arias Montanus, and Tremellius, and Junius have noted) the Hebrew word is, brother or sister (according as the gēder therein doth require) for that which we say one another, or some such like, in things especially that go by paiers, couples, or fellows. So that in this also it is a wonder to see, that they never found their Polygamie to be forbidden, when as yet notwithstanding the institution of wedlock at the first, and the propriety of their own tongue did lead them unto it: and an advised consideration of the place it self did so strongly hold thē of, and chace them away from that sense that they would give it.

5 Since which time, there is greater light bestowed on us: evē on us all generally, for all matters of learning; & on many of us, the knowledge of the Gospel also, in plentiful I measure. And yet in this that now I speak of, we are almost as blind as they. We do not see but that it was allowed unto thē, to put away their wives (in divers cases) and to marry again: and make no question, but that in one case, Christ himself doth allow it likewise. And we lean so much unto this, that many of us are almost persuaded, that the other also is nowhere forbidden unto us. At least in this place, we never find it, notwithstanding the help that now we have in the knowledge of the tongue it self, & whatsoever diligence we have in weighing the Text, and in conferring one place with another: no, not when by other occasion (as whē the question is, whether two sisters may be taken in wedlock, one after another) we are specially urged to look into it. In so much that when as for that sense we are something crossed by those reasons and limitation that are joined withal: yet doth that also help us but little to find out the sense that now we speak of. Which for my part, I cannot see, whereunto we may rather ascribe, then to our own corruption of nature: being so much given (as we are) to that kind of revenge; and, our selves to have change likewise. And the less marvel, when we have such beams in our eyes already, if we cā so hardly see, that the bond of marriage should be of any such force unto us, as it is indeed.

6 Herevpon, when time was, and the present occasion did so require, in a Sermon I briefly noted, that the liberty, that in these our days many do take, of divorcing their wives for adultery and marrying of others, had not such warrant in the word of God as they thought that it had: and afterward, when that was hardly taken, I did more fully deliver the same in two other Sermons, only of it. Which then also being hardly taken by some, and not so fully allowed by others, as the truth of the doctrine might well have expected: gathering thereby, that such were like to be the judgment of others in that point also, and having good cause therein to extend that warning further, I thought good since, to write a little more fully of it, and so to let it go forth unto all. Whether therefore thou be married already, or art hereafter to enter into it, keep unity now, and make thy choice so well as thou canst: and I, for my part, would never wish thee to conceive any hope at all, that whē once that knot is rightly knit, thou canst afterward have any undoubted or certain warrant, that for the adultery of thy wife (if it should fall out, that thy case should be so hard) thou mayest be at liberty to marry again. For the farther opening of which matter, I now refer thee to the Treatise it self. And so in the Lord I heartily bid thee well to fare.

An Advertisement to the Reader.

1 COncerning this Treatice, whereas it is of such an argument, as wherein divers of great learning have already dealt, and yet myself had done thus much therein many years since (though I did never publish it til now) I have thought it needful, gentle Reader, to acquaint thee somewhat farther with either of them: both how it came to pass, that I also have thus far entermedled therewith; and whereupon it was, that it hath (as it were) kept in til now. That I have thus far entermedled therewith, it arose first, out of the nature of the thing it self▪ but then, somewhat farther of, by occasion. The former of these was, that a gentleman of those parts wherein most I reside, having such a purpose with him, and having already gotten (into a little paper-book of his) the hands of sundry of the Preachers of those parts, came to me also therewith, and desired my hand likewise: his case there being, that for adultery by his wife committed, he might sue the divorce, & marry again. His request I denied, & gave him some reason why so I did: but perceiving then, that I did not content him, a while after I wrote unto him a few sheets of paper of that matter; & so rested all the passage that was betwixt us. The latter of them was, that the most reverend Father (that in those parts then was) being minded to Visit, requested me to preach at the beginning of that his visitation: wherein, among other things more fully prosequuted, I gave a little touch to that point also; namely, that whereas divers were persuaded, that for adultery they might sue the divorce, and marry again, & some accordingly so did, if the matter were well examined, that liberty would not (in my judgment) be found, to have any undoubted warrant at all in the word of God.

2 There had been a few years before, of one family (but indeed, one of the greatest in those parts) or thereunto appertaining, about four several persons, and those of some note besides, who had thē so gotten divorce, & were married again. And besides those (who, it may be, had else where mo fellows also, than that heady course any way deserved) another there was of more special reckoning thā they, who so got divorce against his wife also, & married another: on whose behalf, on that my warning then publicly given, I found there was more dislike conceived, than might well arise on so easy a course, as (in my judgment) then was taken. Wherevpon I then resolved, when my time should be to occupy that place again, seeing that little warning was thought so strange then, so to unfold the matter it self whence it arose, as that the Auditory might better perceive, there was some reason, why it was given. That time fell out to be some few months after; at which time I only dealt in that matter, and made two Sermons of it: at that time showing, that the said presupposed liberty, so to put away their wives for adultery, & to marry again, was altogether without warrant in the word of God; and, divers other ways, faulty besides.

3 Herevpon the matter began to work: at home; & abroad. At home, though most of the Auditory were glad to hear the matter opened so far as it was, and conceived well of it: yet there wanted not also, who having some of their ways called into some question thereby, were much offended; one carrying himself so inordinately therein, that for it he was for a time committed. At which time (I mean, while that matter was in hearing, for which the party aforesaid was committed) there fell out this accidēt also. The honorable Personage, who then was in chief place for the execution of justice there, by occasion objected unto me, that although such liberty had no warrant in the word of God, yet did the laws of our country allow it whereunto I answered again, that his H. might perceive that was not so, for that neither those second womē were allowed any dowry, nor their childrē to be legitimate. His H. therein could not be said by me, but told me I was much deceived therein till some of the Council (then present) told him, that it was indeed as I had said.

4 See now the good nature, & plain dealing of that Noble Gentleman, right noble in deed. A right learned man (and of good parts besides) of this our own country, had before imparted, on special suit, to the gentlemā that before we spake of, his judgment (in writing) of the same matter; not, by putting to his hand to the gentlemans bosom-book, as others before, nor in some few lines of his own framing, which in such case is likewise used: but in a Treatice or Book, of just volume (& the most learned, that any yet, in that course, hath written) and so, with all of that sort, of special reckoning; even an undoubted warrant to hold on the way that themselves so much affected, and wished to be allowed unto thē. Wherein he is in deed more copious than others, to show that many have been of the same opinion: but in the principles or grounds of that whole building, the common reading and judgment of others, so far prevailed with him likewise, it seemeth, that so his resolution was nothing so suitable, to that learning & judgment of his, as otherwise it was like to have been. This Book fairly written had the same gentleman (as I understood) delivered to that Noble Personage, his Lord and Master, so to let him see, how clear and warrantable that course was, that he & others then were in. This Book did that Noble Personage cause one of his attendants thē to fetch: and presently he gave the same unto me; as giving up therewith, all the good liking, that of that opinion he had before conceived.

5 Abroad it so wrought likewise, that besides diverse others, one in the South parts (for this that we speak of, was done in York) in the heart thereof, and one of the chief in those partes also, hearing in some sort what I had there of that matter delivered, sent unto me to be acquainted with my notes: which I also accordingly sent; and heard, that there they were approved. But thereby and otherwise perceiving, that not only many of the learned were carried away with the oversight & prejudice of those learned that were for that presupposed liberty, and with the reverēce of their persons (which indeed, in many good respects, was in great measure due unto thē) & that some farther notice thereof was needful to be given to others likewise: I thereupon gathered this present Treatise, and sent it up to my Lord's Grace of Canterbury that thē was; to be published also, if so it should stand with his Graces pleasure. For the matter, his answer (I heard) was, that he was of the same mind himself: I heard likewise, that he imparted the same to some others of special note, & place; and that they were of the same mind also. But as touching the publishing of it, that he thought not good so to do: yet giving no other reason then, but that he would have as few controversies in the Church as might be; and that others had offered a Treatise of contrary judgment which he had stayed (that, of the learned man's that before we spake of; and great golden means used, to have had it allowed) and should then be thought partial, if nevertheless he should have admitted of this.

6 So there it lay for certain years, out of my hands: and I, having done my endeavor, to have entered in by the door of orderly proceeding; would not then attempt to clime in by a window of any inordinate course whatsoever. Nevertheless to make some use of that time also, whereas that learned man that before I spoke of, had by occasion written a set Treatise of that matter affirmatively, I thought good to acquaint him also, with that which I had conceived thereof negatively: and to that end both sent him a copy of that Treatise of mine, and by my letter sent withal, desired him to let me understand, if he found anything therein that was not sound. The Treatise, & my letter withal were both delivered: but the satisfactiō that I received thence again, was no more, but that, some reasonable time after, by another friend of mine, that Treatise of mine was sent me again, with this answer, that the party to whom it was sent, saw no cause yet, said he, to be of other opinion therein, then he was of before; that other friend of mine in such sort advising and wishing me besides, as that thence I might easily gather, that the Treatise it self was not so welcome, as I had hoped it might have been.

7 Speeding none otherwise there, then did I soon after put his Grace in mind, whether, as that kind of looseness began then to grow bold and heady, it were not unequal dealing, to stay that which by good right might well proceed, and was needful too, for that which might not, and were not without danger besides. To that I had no answer, neither was it material I should: but I noted, that soon after there was some farther order taken for it, by public authority. Others also of good reckoning, I heard, began openly to deal therein: both in one of their chiefest assemblies of all this land; and, in exercise of learning, evē in the University it self likewise. Wherevpon taking occasion again, to put his Grace in mind of that Treatise of mine, whether yet his Grace could not like of the publishing of it, his Grace thē readily sent it unto me, with his good leave to publish it all: at which time there was another impediment (which most did stay him) clean removed. But then me self was already advised of another good opportunity, the benefit whereof, to the better furtherance of it, my hope was then, that I might in reasonable time attain unto: & thereupon thought it best, to stay it farther with me, till then.

8 In which mean time, some of the favorits of that liberty, by stealth or secret means, have gotten a Copy of the Treatice of that learned & reverend man aforesaid, to be printed and published: and, by such means as they have used, have dispersed, and imparted the same unto many. By which inordinate course of theirs, there is no question, but that diverse may be endangered: as making no doubt, but that, as that indeed was his judgment; so his learning, and their inclination meeting so fitly & kindly together, the truth of the matter must needs be so also.

9 True it is, that many of the learned have been, and yet are, of that opinion, & accordingly have interpreted, & yet do, such Scriptures as they have conceived to appertain thereunto: but it is as true withal, that as many of the learned again, if not far mo, have been, and are, of other opinion, and have otherwise understood, & yet do, those Scriptures aforesaid. And as some other Territories or several Churches, it may be, there are, who are of opinion, that in such case divorce may be, & marrying again: so is it as evident too that the government of this Church of ours, & so of many others besides (if the same may not be cōceived of the whole generally) doth not allow it So that in truth if we go to the opinion or judgment of mē, there is no questiō but that the matter is very hard to be decided: but so far, as the more general & settled judgment, may cast the ballāce: as also in those Scriptures thenselves, which at the first sight do seem most properly to appertain thereunto, we have the same difficulty also, unless we repair unto those others besides, as whereby we may see see, that such sense doth hardly agree to some other duties that are required.

10 The controversy therefoe standing in such case as it doth, and so many being so ready to take fast hold of so plausible a liberty, and so little regarding so great inconvenience as inseparably goeth with that opinion of theirs: as it was a clear case with me before, that both the matter it self had need to be farther looked into, & that people did need to be warned of the danger that was therein, so it is still; and so much the more now, as this inordinate course of theirs may be more dangerous to many of our own Country-men here. And so far as the occasion hereof did set it self a working in those Northern parts of ours, & I thereupon accounted myself, in conscience and in duty bound, to give such warning as then I did: so far now, the like occasion being in these parts also so plainly given, I thought it my duty, to resume, or take unto me that purpose again; & now to discharge that point of duty, so far at the least, as in my hands it should lie to do. But now seeing the matter is, among the learned, in question already, and they are much more able, thē I, that have it in hand, & in all respects very well furnished to such a purpose, that I may not seem, now to take part, but rather to respect, evē originally, the truth it self, I have thought good to commend to the press, that very coppy of that my Treatise, that was then (those many years since) under the view, together with the Preface thereto, and the date thereof that it had before. So now I cease, and commend thee to God.

THE CONTENTS OF THE TREATICE ensuing, according to the several Sections thereof.

THe Argument of the whole Treatise following: and, that there be two sorts of places whereon those of the learned do rest, that are for Divorce or Adultery, a marrying again, Sect. 1.

What those places are whereon so they build. Sect. 2.

How ready divers are, without any farther inquiry first made, to rest thereon. Sect. 3.

That such as are of that opinion have little ground-work even in their Leaders, for that they are so much crossed by others as therein they are. Sect. 4.

How doubtful resolutions thenselves also for that matter have. Sect. 5.

Upon how weak reasons they have grown to such resolution. Sect. 6.

What Protestations they use withal. Sect. 7.

What we are to think thereof: namely, that where such things go with all, there is no likelihood to find any certainty of Doctrine whereon to build (especially, in so weighty a case as this.) Sect. 8.

Briefly declared that those places do little help: & that they do plainly mistake those two that seemed to be strongest for them. Sect. 9.

How those places of Scripture are taken by them. Sect. 10.

That, in such sort taking those places (it may well be) they did mistake them: both that of Deutrronomie. Sect. 11.

And that other of Malachi also. Sect. 12.

What our selves are to gather, on that their so taking of them. Sect. 13.

In those places that most are for marrying again, that they are so crossed by others, that those also are, likely to help them but little. Sect. 14.

How far they may be charged therein: namely, that their own defectes are such, as well may make their judgment suspected. Sect. 15.

How weakly they reason in such things as are in question, and so of the substance of the matter it self. Sect. 16.

How weakly they reason likewise in such things as are but accidentarie thereunto. Sect. 17.

How weakly they reason on certain other things also, as are of such a kind or so near unto thē, as that thence they draw certain reasons also. Sect. 18.

How, when they come the word it self, they much mistake it. Sect. 19.

That on some places also they gather amiss: first Erasmus. Sect. 20.

Then, M ^r Beza also. Sect. 21.

How weakly they do reason likewise on the authority of men. Sect. 22.

That they have divers inconvenient and hard speeches besides: especially Erasmus (who, in this age of ours, was if not the first, yet the greatest motioner of this matter) Sect. 23.

Then also, certain others of that company. Sect. 24.

In the places themselves, first of that sense that they conceive of them. Sect. 25.

Then, what we may think to be their meaning in deed: and first of that in the fifth of S. Matthew. Sect. 26.

Then, of that other place in the 19. of the said S. Matthew. Sect, 27.

In such doubts as may be conceived, that the Exception in such sense as we conceive it, will nothing at all help them. Sect. 28.

In the sense wherein they conceive it, that it will help them but little also. Sect. 29.

And in such case that they also must be very well advised, and take good heed what they do therein. Sect. 30.

And that they do nothing against any other Scripture, which they have strong against them. Sect. 31.

Nor against convenience neither, which in that case they cannot avoid. Sect. 32.

That whereas the Apostle also permitteth the faithful (by an infidel forsaken) to marry again, that it also doth nothing help them. Sect. 33.

The Conclusion. Sect. 34.

OF DIVORCE FOR ADVLTErie, and marrying again.

W Hereas that, which heretofore came (lightly) no farther, but only to be disputed among the learned, is now grown to so common a practice with many, namely to prosecute divorce for adultery, and to marry again: the greater danger that thereby we may see to grow up apace, towards the overthrowing of such integrity as yet we have left, and to bring in the Turkish liberty of putting away such wives as they like not, & marrying others; the greater cause have we so much the rather to see unto it, & not slightly now, but soundly to examine, whether it have any warrant at all in the written word. Which that we may the better find out, it shall be good to note, that as there be two sorts of places of Scriptures, whereon the learned that are for that opinion do commonly rest (some that chiefly respect divorcing or putting away, others that do rather respect marrying again) so are the judgments of the learned in such sort divided, likewise: all of them (to speak of) generally, allowing of divorce; and many of them, marrying again, in such case to stand by the word of God. And yet notwithstanding if we can for a time set aside the judgment of others, and consider of the thing it self, in what case it standeth in the written word, by help of that light that God in these days hath givē unto us, I make no doubt of it, but that soon we may find so good matter for the contrary part, that whosoever shall indifferently consider of it, he will not easily afterward think, that he findeth in any of that opinion, matter of worth to draw him back to that persuasion again. Which while we shall endeavor to show, because many themselves being given to that fleshly liberty, do nevertheless shroud themselves under the judgment of those learned that favor the same; therefore it shall be needful (the better to free them frō that prejudice) not to dissemble whatsoever weakness we find in the judgment of those that are for it: though otherwise they be (by very good right) of that reckoning with us, that we ought to uphold their credit, the best that we may. But because the truth ought to be much dearer unto us, and seeing it is a wonted policy in Satan, by the principal men (so near as he can) to hatch & rear up his errors among us: therefore the dearer the truth is unto us, & the more we should take heed, that we do not bear with the error of any, the bolder may we be in this case also, so far-forth as the nature of the case shall require, to examine their judgment, and not to spare for that small discredit that unto them may arise thereby. Which that we may do, with more perspecuity unto the cause that we have in hand, I hold it best, that we consider severally of those two sorts of places of Scripture that before we spake of, that so we may more plainly see how little warrant that perswasiō hath in either of thē: notwithstanding whatsoever help it hath in those learned, that are so much for it as they are.

2 In the former sort of places therefore we are to consider, not only of the places themselves that are by divers of the learned alleged in defense of such divorce: but also how weakly that same persuasion is grounded on them. The places themselves are, some of them such, as most of the learned do make little reckoning of them to confirm that doctrine to any: but others of them such as they do take to be of special force to that end; and accordingly lean not a little to them. Those that are such as of which most of themselves do make little reckoning to confirm that point of doctrine to any, are two: one, in Ecclesiasticus; the other, found (in the vulgar Latin translation) in the Proverbs of Solomon. That which is in Ecclesiasticus, is diversely read: but the effect is this, that it willeth the husband if the wife will not be ruled by him, to put her away. But this book is not Canonical: wherevpō as not many of themselves do seek any help thereby, so we also will not waste any needless labor about it. The other that (in the vulgar Latin Translation) is found in the Proverbs, is, that qui tenet adulteram stultus est & insipiens : that is, he that keepeth with him an adulteress, is a fool and unwise. But because this also is not found in the Original, and may be understood of such harlots as divers hold, but not by marriage, therefore as it is of no force in deed, so do most of them relinquish also the benefit of it: and therefore we likewise will not go any farther against it. Those others that they take to be of special force to that end, and accordingly lean not a little unto them, are divers, and all of them found in those Books that are Canonical, and therefore not to be denied to be of sufficient authority so far as they go. But thē we are to note therewith, that whereas there are 6. of them in all, 4. of them they account of less importance. And chiefly rest in the other two. Those four that are of less importance are of two sorts, some that hardly censure, that a Priest should marry with a woman divorced; others, that show the goodness of God to be much greater towards them in that kind, then was theirs towards their wives when so they offended. Those two that do so hardly censure that a Priest should marry a divorced woman, are Lev. 21.7. & Ezech. 44.22. whereof the former doth plainly forbid it: and the other doth greatly disgrace it also. For the former is, that the Priest (among others) may not marry with any quae repudiata est à marito, quia cōsecratus est Deo suo. &c: that is, such a one as is divorced from her husband, because he is consecrated unto his God. The latter likewise is, that the Lord promising such a Priesthood, as should diligently walk in the ordinances that he delivered unto them, among other things he reciteth that also, that repudiatas non accipient vxores, that is, that they should not take such as were divorced, to be their wives. Those two others that do show the goodness of God to be much greater in that kind towards them, then was theirs towards their wives when so they offended, are the one of Is. 50.1. the other ost Jeremiah 3.1. In that of Isaiah, the Lord demādeath, Ubi est libellus repudii matris vestrae, quodimiferim eam? that is, Where is that Bill of divorce with which I sent your mother away? meaning thereby, that he had never put away his people nor cast them of: alluding to the custom that they had among themselves, divorcing away their wives from them, which notwithstanding he had not done unto them. That of Jeremiah doth likewise allude unto the same custom of theirs: and showeth; that although such as had put away their wives might not have them again: yet the Lord himself would be ready to receive them. To that end he saith, Valgo dicitur, Si dimiserit vir vxorem fuam, & recedens ub eo duxerit virum alterum, nunquid revertetur ad eam vltra? nunquid non polluta & contaminata erit mulier illa ? that is, It is commonly said, if a man shall put away his wife, & she departing frō him shall marry another, shall he ever return unto her anymore? shall not that woman be polluted and defiled. Those two other that chiefly they rest on, are, the one in Deuteronomy▪ the other in Malachi. That in Deuteronomy, as they do allege it, is, Si acceperit homo vxorem & habuerit eam, & non invenerit gratiam ante oculos ejus propter aliquam foe ditatem, scribet libellam repudii, & dabit in manu illius, & dimittet eam de domo sua. That is, If a man have taken a wife and have her, and she find no favor before his eyes for some uncleanness, he shall write her (or, as others translate, thē let him write her) a bill of divorcement, and put it in her hand, and send her out of his house. That of Malachi is much like unto it, namely, Cum odio habueris, dimitte, dicit dominas Deus Israel, that is, Seeing thou hatest her (meaning his wife) put her away, saith the Lord God of Israel. By which they conclude that Moses first, and Malachi after, did in plain words of the Text, in such case allow divorce unto them.

3 The places being thus briefly noted, now if we would see how weakly that persuasion is grounded on thē, it shall not be amiss, first to note, how marvelous ready the common sort of those loose wantons of ours are, to sort themselves to that opinion, & yet how little groūdworke they have, even in their Leaders themselves. How marvelous ready they are to sort themselves to that opinion may sufficiently appear in this, that when as it is granted that such places there are, whereon the learned (that are for divorce & marrying again) do ground their opinion, even that only is enough for them, and doth so fully resolve them in it, that hardly can they afford their ears, patiently to hear anymore. For as we are all by course of nature given unto sin, and especially, unto revenge, & to the inordinate lusts of the flesh: so are there some (and those not a few) that have afforded so hard entertainment unto that good spirit of God, whereby only they should be preserved from so dangerous passions, that it is not of such to be expected, but that, (he not vouchsafing to tarry with them) easily they would settle themselves upon any semblance, that should fit their humor whatsoever it were: which if it be so, then are we so much the less to marvel, if, as when meat is set on the table, men commonly use to fall unto that which best doth like them, and, the more that themselves have their stomachs possessed with vnholsome humors, ofttimes unto that which is worst of all for them: even so in this likewise when diversity of opinions is broached unto us, then everyone to betake himself unto that which best liketh him; and, the more that any as yet abideth under the power of error or sin, the more to like the opinion of those, that best of all fiteth his inclination, though otherwi • e it be not so near the truth as is some other. And as in the one, such is the power of that distēperature, that one that is in such sort distempered, can hardly but think that that which he fancieth, is indeed simply the best of all the residue: even so in the other, it is no news to see, that such as are so strongly possessed of any such passion of humanity whatsoever they find that doth bear a show of the truth, ad yet doth sort it self nearest to that special disposition of theirs, do account that also the best Divinity.

4 How little groundwork they have, even in those that are their leaders themselves, may partly appear in that they are so much crossed by others, as therein they are▪ but especially, in that which thenselves have set down for that matter. That they have little groundwork in them, if they be so much crossed therein by others as they are, may likewise appear if we consider but these two things: first, how far they are crossed therein; then, what it is that followeth thereon. To see how far they are crossed herein, we shall need to go no farther, then to the plain confession of one of themselves, Erasmus by name. Who immediately after his very entrance unto that special discourse of his, doth plainly acknowledge, the general judgment of all Christendom to be against that which he was then to propound, to be further examined. Scio, saith he, receptissimum esse inter Christianos, ubi semel coijt matrimonium, nullo pacto posse dirimi, nisi morte alterius. I know, saith he, that it is the general or most received opiniō of all Christians, that whē marriage is once made, it can no way be broken again, but only by the death of one of the parties. And as here, in general terms he acknowledgeth the judgment of the whole Church, or of all the people of God generally to be against that presupposed liberty: so, in the next sentence following descending to particulars, he acknowledgeth there likewise, that that is the judgment both of Chrysostom and of the old Latins, and of S. Augustine especially: and, that the same judgment of theirs, is confirmed by the constitution of Bishops, and by the authority of the Laws Decretal; and allowed of by the consent of the Schools of Divinity. So himself granteth, that he findeth against that opinion (where unto notwithstanding he inclineth) many great Fathers, even all the Latins generally, the Ecclesiastical laws also, and (in effect) Divinity too: then the which I think we need no more for the reasonable proof of that assertion, then so plain a testimony of so special a patron of that persuasion. Wherein though divers of them besides have been more sparing, then to slip any so plain a testimony (belike, least so they might further let down, in the minds of many, the credit of their cause, then themselves were able, any way to raise it again) yet neither do they reprove him for it, and besides, both Peter Martyr abroad, & one other of our own at home (by very good right of special account for many good parts, with the learned and godly among us) have set down somewhat, not much abhorring from the same. The former of them, Non reperies in veteri Testamento ullos celebres aut laudatos viros divortio vsos esse, quantum historiae sacrae referant, that is, Thou shalt not find in the old Testament, any of the better sort of men to have used (the liberty of) divorce, so far as the holy Scriptures do testify. The latter of them, that S. Augustine, the School Divines, the Canonists, and the Church of Rome, though in case of adultery they allow of divorce, yet allow they not to marry again. And it is sufficiently known unto us, that though divers particular persons there be among us of other judgment (and divers of them otherwise, both learned and godly) yet that form of government which we have all generally agreed unto, to be in such case observed of all (as by our laws both Ecclesiastical and Civil appeareth) is directly against such marrying again, though divorce be for no less then for adultery. That which followeth vpō it, is this, that unless those that are for it, have such places for them, as are clear and without exception, they can prevail but little therein, but must needs leave the better end of the staff unto others. For if themselves will not deny but that there be many against it, and as many as there be with it, or rather more, then, as the scales when they hang indifferently, do show that the things that are weighed therein, are of one & the self same weight, but when they vary, that then the one of thē needeth more weight to be added: so howsoever that if our voices were even, or the matter but in question among us, & not over-ruled, then the allegations of either party, might be alike esteemed of those that stand indifferent; yet when as it may very well be doubted, that they are many more against it, then there be for it, and the matter is (with us) over-ruled against them, then unless their proofs be the better, they may not look to evict it from those whom they plainly find in possession already. The evidence (indeed) may prove tobe such, that neither the greater number of voices, nor possession of old, may stand against it: but unless it be such, whosoever it is that would claim thereby, may look for no more, thē it will be able, in equity and truth to win unto him.

5 Of that which themselves have set down for that matter, a good part respecteth most their own judgment therein: the residue, those places out of which they do gather it. In so much of it, as most respecteth their own judgment therein, we are first to note, what it is that they have brought us: then, to advise our selves thereon, how far forth we may take to our selves the advantage of it. That which they have brought us, is of two sorts: either to show us how hardly and doubtfully they are resolved; or such other things as follow thereon, that may be some warning unto us besides, to take heed that we rest not too much on their judgment. As touching the former, namely those hard and doubtful resolutions of theirs, I take it that the best order will be; to take those whom I mean to allege, in such order of time, as wherein themselves did write. And so beginning with Erasmus first, he began his Annotations on the New Testament 1515. in which book that Treatise of his is, that he wrote of this matter. In which he is so far from allowing of that course absolutely, that he doth no further; plead for it, but whereas the woman is flagitiis operta, quibus (maritus) nec causā dedit, nec mederi possit, and after again, qui nihil est commeritus ; after this also, that nihil non frustra tentatum sit ; and yet notwithstanding that then also it be not done by themselves, or any, other private persons, but ubi res erit acta per Episcopos, aut per probatos & graves Iudices ; that is, that the wife (that so must be put away) must be a very bad woman; that her husband (that may put her away) never gave her occasion to any lewdness, neither is able now any way to help it, nor ever deserved any such ill dealing of her; after this also that first he must have tried all good means, but can do no good on her, and that such divorce be never made but by Bishops or other approved and grave Judges. Musculus also setting forth his Commentaries on S. Matthews Gospel, 1554, though he grant that divorce may be, stupri causa, that is, for whoredom: yet he addeth withal, Casus hic habet varias circumstantias, quas hoc loco excutere propositum non est. Sed tamen admonuerim ut quibus tales conjuges divino judicio contingunt, recordentur se esse Christianos. Et primum cogitent de lucranda coniugis salute, si id fieri queat: si vero nequeat, tum demum libertate sua, ne{que} id sine animi dolore utantur. That is, this case (notwithstanding) hath divers circumstances, which my meaning is not here to sift out. But this would I warn them of, that those to whom by God's appointment such wives have fallen, would remember thenselves that they are Christians. And that first they would think to bring their wives to better ways, if it may be: but if that cannot be, that then they take the benefit of their own liberty, but not without their own harts grief in that case also. Peter Martyr hath two cautions; one, that the man had need to be honest himself; the other, not to go without authority therein. For the former, periniquū judico, saith he, ut vir exigat ab uxore pudicitiam, quam ipse illi non exhibet (which he saith was the law of Antonius ) that is, I take it to be very bad dealing, that the husband should exact chastity of his wife, who doth not yield the same to her himself likewise. For the latter, Si quis autem propter stuprum solus cogatur degere, &c, cum eifacere leges copiam nolint secundarum nuptiarum, &c: certe nō possunt ei occurrere nisi duo remedia: ut &c, jam arbitretur se à Deo vocationem habere ad coelibatum, &c: aut, &c, si putet sibi expedire, ut libertate à Deo concessa utatur, &c: conferat se in regiones ubi hoc liceat. That is, (so much as I thought good to draw out of the place it self) But if (by putting away his wife for whoredom) a man be compelled to live single, as in case, when the laws (of his country) will not suffer him to marry again, he truly can have his choice but of one of these two remedies: that now he account himself to have a calling from God to single life; or if he think it expedient for him to use that liberty that God hath given him, that he then get him into those countries that will allow him so to do. Again, Quin & in his quae Scriptura expressit, nihil abs{que} Magistratus approbatione audendum judico : or, as by and by after he saith, publicis legibus vetantibus, that is, evē in these things that the Scripture hath expressly allowed, I think that nothing is to be attempted without the Magistrates leave, or whensoever the Laws of the coūtry forbid the same. And his reason there, is, for that although marriage be the ordinance of God: yet for the circumstances thereunto appertaining, it hath diverse things that are to be governed by the positive laws. Kemnisius likewise, writing against that part of the Council or Chapter of Trent 1566. Omnino (saith he) quantum salva conscientia fieri potest, opera danda est, ut divortia etiam legitima caveantur, nexus conjugalis vel indissolubiliter servetur, vel si interruptus fuerit, redintegretur. That is, In any wise we must take heed, so far as with good conscience we may, that we take heed, even of lawful divorces also, and that the bond of marriage either inviolably be kept, or if that be (at any time) broken, that then it be made up again. And a little after, Et pijs omnibus probatur, ut non statim ad divortia prosiliatur, sed priùs tententur omnia quae reconciliationi & redintegrationi servire possunt. Omnia enim mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt, & aedificant, inquit Paulus. That is, And it is thought meet by all good men, that men do not forthwith set in hand with divorce, but that all things be first as • aied, that may help forward reconciliation, and to make up the breach again. For all things are lawful, but not all things expedient, and unto edifying, saith the Apostle S. Paul. Beza likewise, in that special Treatice of his on this matter published 1573. though he be much harder, than others of his fellows in this point, and thereupon setteth down, that although himself do pronounce them to be, veluti altero oculo captos, qui in hoc unum ita sunt intenti, ut nocentem innocētireconcilient, ut interim perexiguam habeant innocētis ration̄ : yet both he disalloweth of the judgment of those, that hold, that the innocent party is bound, dimittere potiùs quā illi reconciliari (which is somewhat:) and afterward more liberally he addeth, that of the two, he rather alloweth of them, qui reconciliandis potiùs, quàm sublata omni spe instaurationis, seperandis conjugibus student ; (a great matter.) So, his meaning is this, that although he account them all but one-eied men, that in such sort labor to reconcile the party offending unto the innocent, that they have but little care how to provide for the innocent also: yet neither is he of the mind of those, who account the innocent party bound, rather to put away his wife offending, than to be reconciled unto her again; and (that more is) doth also allow, much more of those that labor that atonement, than of those that labor to sunder them, without any hope of any restitution after. Afterward again both he saith, that it were praise worthy, not to do it without the leave of the Church, and going against that opinion of Bueer, that seeing the Lord would have an adulteress put to death, he would not have their husbands to keep them : he answereth, hinc minime consequi, nefas esse maritis (si cessent Magistratus) uxores resipiscētes ex charitatis Christianae norma recipere. Lex enim illa, quid facere Magistratus, non quid privatos oporteat, praescribit. That is, that it doth not follow thereon, that it were any great offense, unto husbands according to the rule of Christiā charity, to receive their offending wives, when they are penitent. For that Law (saith he) doth prescribe, what Magistrates, not what private men are in such case to do. Lastly, Zegedinus in those common places of his, which in tables were published 1585, moving the question, whether the innocent party, if he cannot contain may marry again, he answereth, Bona conscientia id facere potest, at non abs{que} Ecclesiae, ac etiam pij magistratus venia, ut infirmorum offendiculis occurratur. That is, with good conscience he may: but not without the Licence of the Church, & of the godly Magistrates too; that the weak be not offended thereby. In all which we see, that they do not so absolutely allow of divorce and marrying again, but that themselves also do something restrain it, less or more, as everyone is therein persuaded. So that if in the end it do fall out (as for my part I think that it will) that in the written word they have no warrant to grant so much as they do: then shall we less marvel to see, that they do so much abridge and take short the self same thing, that otherwise they are so willing to grant.

6 When in this sort they have resolved; then are we to see, what other things they have besides, which may be some warning unto us, to take heed, that we rest not too much on their judgments: and those may we account to be of two chief & principal sorts. First the reasons alleged to have induced them so to determine: then, the Protestations that they have joined thereunto; and, as it may seem to qualify the hardness of their judgment therein. As touching the reasons that induced thē so to determine, Erasmus, when first he opened that passage (to himself & to those that would follow) was so careful to set them down, that it seemeth others did not after think it needful, to prosecute the same any farther: and so shall we also content our selves to go no farther, but only to allege such reasons as he thought meetest to use. And those reasons that he allegeth, me think, we may reduce unto two principal sorts: whereof some there are, that simply arise out of the matter that is in question; others, that stand but only by the way of comparison. Those that simply arise out of the matter that is in question, do some of thē more specially concern the substance of it: others again, that are taken of such matters as are but accedētarry thereunto. Those that concern the substance of it, are all such discommodities as commonly haūt disorderly marriages (especially those, wherein the bond of wedlock is brokē) which he thinketh to be so many and great, that S. Paul himself would have borne more with them in that matter, as he is persuaded, if it had been propounded unto him. Quod si Paulo (saith he) proposita fuisset huiusmodi causa, stultus cum stulta, pure cum puella contraxit, intercesserunt lenae, vinum, temeritas, art in nassam inducti sunt &c, nihil inter coniunctos convenit, tunta est morum & ingeniorum dissimilit udo, rixae iuges, odium immedicabile, timetur venenum, timentur caedes, nihil nō malorum expectatur, neuter coelebs potest vivere, &c.: fortassis pro causae circumstantiis, aliud responderet Apostolus, & nonnihil relaxaret de rigor cōsilii superioris, suá{que} scripta civilius opinor nobis interpretaretur, quàm nos interpretamur. that is, But if this case had been propounded to Paul, one fool with another, a boy and a wench have married together; bauds, drunkenness, & rashness were doers therein; by craft they were so far entangled: being so married, now they agree not, so divers are they in their ways and disposition: continual chidings, extreme hatred; poisoning, and murder are feared also, and they look for none other but for all manner of evil (each from other;) neither of them can live single: it may be, that according as the circumstances of the case should require, the Apostle would give some other answer, & would let down a good part of the rigor of his former advise, and would interpret his writings unto us more courteously then we our selves do. In which his speech though there be some inconvenience besides: yet (leaving that to his proper place) now I bring it in but only to this end, to show of what force he took the calamities of disorderly marriages to be to the matter he hath in hand; namely, to break of, and to marry again. For so he saith, Si cohaerent, bis perit uter{que}: si mutetur coniugium, spes est utrum{que} fore incolumem. that is, If still they abide together, each of them doth certainly perish: if they may break óf, and marry again, there is good hope, that both shall be safe. Those matters that are but accidentarie thereunto, and out of which he draweth some reasons likewise, are the Scriptures thereunto appertaining: and the judgment of others thereon. Of the Scripture he saith, videbam Scripturam hac in parte, vt pleris{que} esse perplexam, & ancipitem, that is, that he saw the Scripture to be in this point, as in many others, intricate, and doubtful: and thereupon (belike) accounted that he might be the boulder to afford his patronage to this, when as he thought that the Scripture would not be against him therein. Out of the judgment of others he chooseth out two several considerations: one, that the old and the new did not agree together; the other, that such things as were objected by those that were of the contrary mind might easily be answered. For the former he saith, Videbam veteres interpretes doctissimos, à recentioribus dissidere ; and for the latter, that he saw likewise, ea quae obijciuntur, facile posse dilui, citra nostrae religions injuriam: and so reasoning from these (as I do conceive him) out of the former, that it should be no new, nor absurd thing for him neither, to dissent from others herein; and out of the latter, that there were no danger of hurt to come thereby, when as, by it, our religion should be nothing impaired. Those reasons of his that do stand only by the way of comparison, are of two sorts also: some, that stand in comparisō of persons only; others, that compare the matter in question with others not unlike decided already. The persons are of two sorts likewise: the Church or whole Body of the faithful; and the Bishop of Rome, then the supposed Head of the same in earth among us. From the Church he draweth two reasons: one, of the authority of it, that Christ did give it; the other, of the good direction that it hath by the Spirit of Christ her husband. For the former he saith, Videbam quanta sit authoritas Ecclesiae à Christo tributa, cui dederit claves regni coelorum ; and so, that she might well set it down, by the authority to her committed: and for the latter, that he accounted with himself, Ecclesiam habere sui sponsi Spiritum, ne{que} posse non recte statui, quod ad hominum salutem, illo author statueretur ; and so gathering thereby, that if she should take such order, it must needs be well ordained. From the Pope, he draweth other two reasons likewise: one, of a special good likelihood, that he would be most willing to help in time of need: the other, of the ability or power that he conceaueth him to have to do good therein. Of the former of these he saith, Videbam quàm esset ingens Romani Pontificis clementia, qui succurrat etiam iis qui apud inferos, citra periculum exitii aeterni, cruciarentur, thereon gathering, that seeing his compassion is so great towards those that are none of us now, it cannot be, but that much rather he will help those that are so much nearer unto him Of his praesupposed power, he reasoneth likewise two several ways: one way, out of the general consideration of the whole; the other, out of a more special consideration of it, as it hath been employed, and what force it hath had in matters of much like nature to this. Of the former he saith, Videbam hoc tribui Pontifici Romano, ut Evangelicam & Apostolicam doctrinam interpretetur, astringat, laxet, dispenset, & iuxta quosdam etiam abroget aliqua in parte : so gathering thereby, that seeing it is so commonly given to the Bishop of Rome, not only to interpret the holy Scripture, but also to enforce the same somewhat further, and to let it down again when he thinketh good, or to remit some part of it, as also to dispense therewith, and (in the judgment of some) even to abrogate some part of it also; then need not he (as I do conceive him) be thought to importune him too much, that doth but commond this to his good consideration, & no further neither thē himself shall think good to deal therein. In the latter he doth not only set down the ground of his reason: but himself also addeth (more then before) what it is that he gathereth out of the same. The ground of his reasō therein is, that he saw; per Romanum Pontificem person as reddi inhabiles, quos ne{que} natura, ne{que} lex divina fecerat inhabiles : that is, that certain persons were by the Bishop of Rome made unable (to marry) whom neither nature, nor the law of God had made unable. That which himself doth gather out of the same, is, that it seemeth to be eiusdem potestatis, hominis autoritate vetare ne coeat matrimonium; & efficere, ut dirimatur matrimonium. That is, of like power that by man's authority marriage may be prohibited to any, and to bring to pass, that when it is made, it be broken again. Those other matters not unlike to this, decided already, out of which he bringeth some reasons also, are first the allowance of divorce by men of great reckoning: then also the breaking óf, both of espousals and marriage also, in divers cases. For the former of those he saith, Videbam viros olim probatae doctrine, sanctimoniae que, non fuisse deterritos Evangelij, Paulique verbis, quo minus admitterent divortium: and (for further confirmation of their doing) he addeth, videbam quaedam secus posse exponi, quam hactenus exposita sint. That is, that he hath noted divers men in times past, of undoubted learning and godliness, not to have been terrified by the words of the Gospel, and of S. Paul, but that they have (sometimes) admitted divorce: & that certain places (belike that seemed most against thē) might be otherwise expounded, then hitherto they have been. (Which expositions if we may account thē those, that himself in that Treatice bringeth in, thē is it not unworthy the marking, whether most of those that are of that mind, do not since themselves also urge them unto us, as the truth indeed, without any great examining of them, how they stand with other Scripture.) For the former of the other two, espousals I mean, he saith that he saw, ob professionem instituti humani, ob mutatum pallium, sponsum legitimum fraudari sua sponsa : that is, that for the profession of some ordinance of man, even for the changing of the attire, a man lawfully espoused or handfast, should be defrauded of his espoused wife. And for the latter, that he saw likewise in that age of his, matrimonium dirimi ob errorem personae & conditionis, etiam consummatum coitu : and, ob lapsum in haeresim, etiam illud dissolvi, de quo dubitari non poterat, quin verum esset matrimonium. That is, that he had seen likewise, marriage to be accounted void, for the error either of person or condition, although it were consummate before with copulation: and that, for falling into heresy, such marriage also was held as brokē, which nobody might doubt of, but that it was true marriage indeed. In all which (these his last reasons I mean) it seemeth that his inference is, that if so many ways men make them so bold with that holy ordinance, to alter and dispose thereof in such liberty, as in these cases they do: thē may nobody think much with him, for no more but propounding of that, which he taketh to be much better warranted, even by the doctrine, and plain words of Christ himself. That upon these his aforesaid reasons he thought good to propound this matter to be farther thought on by others, and that thereupon he doth no more but propound it neither, may sufficiently appear both in the words that he useth withal: as namely, when a little before his reasons, and in the ende of handling the matter it self, he saith, Haec tamen paucis libuit delibare, quo doctis a • studiosis uberiorem cogitandi materiam praeberemus: and immediately after, His rebus commota charitas Christiana, proposuit ijs qui me plus cernunt, dispicerent, si qua ration sermo Evāgelicus ac Pauli dispensari posset ad plurimorum sulutem, &c. And anon after, Quod si hoc quod opto, fieri non potest, certe illud potest statui, ne matrimonia praeter veterum omnium morem, praeter aequitatem naturalem tam facile, ne dicātā temere, coeant. That is, yet these few things I thought good to give in as a taste, that I might give occasion unto the learned and studious, to think better thereupon: and, which followeth, that Christian charity being moved herewith, hath propounded thus much to those that do see farther thā I, to the end that they should consider, whether by any means that speech in the Gospel, and in S. Paul, might be dispensed, to the good or safety of many. But if that which I wish may not be obtained, yet certainly there might be order taken, that marriages should not hence-forth be so lightly, and so rashly made, so far vnlik • to all former good usage, yea and to natural equity it self. Which things I have more specially noted for two principal causes: one, concerning the validity or force of the reasons he bringeth the other, how far he buildeth thereon. The force of the reasons the greater it is, the iuster cause was there then, & yet is, to help forward that motion so well as we can: the weaker they are, the less need we to account our selves urged thereby, to follow the course that they may seem to commend unto us. How far he buildeth theron would be marked likewise, because he doth proceed no farther thereon, but to make this motion only: whereon, if others since have set an heavier building, by over-ruling that point as a manifest truth, that crept in but (as it were) two days before, as a poor and a doubtful question, it seemeth to me, either that they have more and greater reasons whereupon they are gone so far; or else (which I rather think) that they have raised more building thereon, than the foundation is able to bear.

7 What protestations they have thought good to join thereunto, (& belike to qualify the hardness of their judgment therein) is so much the more needful to be considered, for that otherwise we might either charge them farther than justly we may, or suffer our selves to be carried farther by them than we ought. Both which are (so much as we may) to be avoided▪ the on • , for the duty that we owe unto them; the other, for the care that we ought to have of our selves. In which although chiefly I mean to rest on Erasmus, also for that he was (so much as he was) our leader herein: yet shall it not be amiss, somewhat to hear some others also, especially one, that most of all hath advanced that persuasion in these our days. In Erasmus (we • inde, some part of those his protestations to appertain to that whole work of his wherein his Treatice is of divorce, & marrying again (his Annotations on the New Testament) and some part of them more properly to belong to that very matter, that now we have in questiō among us. Of those that belong to that whole work of his, I have noted a couple: one, that showeth how little he arrogateth unto himself therein; another that doth show likewise, what liberty he leaveth unto his Reader. For the former he saith, Nos ad utrum{que} juxta parati sumus, ut vel rationem reddamus si quid recte monuimus, velingenue confiteamur errorem sicubi lapsi deprehendimur. Homines sumus, & humani nihil alienum à nobis esse ducimus. That is, We are alike ready to both these, either to give a reasō of it, if anywhere we have advised well, or plainly and readily to acknowledge our error, if anywhere we be found so far to have slipped. For the latter he saith likewise (after that he craved but such indifferency as is afforded to all offenders at the Barre generally, namely, that his book may first be read, before it be condemned by any.) Legat prius ac inspiciat, deinde si videatur, damnet, ac reijciat. That is, Let a man first read it and look into it, and then, if he think good let him condemn it, and cast it from him. Of these that do more properly belong to that very matter that is in question, I have noted likewise a couple in the beginning of that his Treatice: & one other, towards the end. In those that he hath in the beginning first he protesteth his own good meaning therein, that he doth it but to inquire of the truth, and not to be contentious therein: then after, he setteth good reasonable bounds for the better deciding of it. As touching the former, his words are these, Ut semel in hujus operis initio sum testatus, perpetuo testatum haberi par est, in toto opere me nus quam esse velle contentiosi dogmatis autorem; tantùm juvandi studio monere studiosos: semper inconcusso, & illabefacto judicio sacrosanctae Ecclesiae; et eorum quibus uberius donum eruditionis et sapientiae contigit à Christo : that is, As once in the beginning of this work I did acknowledge, I think it mere to be acknowledged still, that throughout the whole work I will never be author of any contentious opinion, and that my meaning is but only to admonish the studious for their help: always reserving the judgment of the holy Church, and of those on whom Christ hath bestowed a better gift of learning and wisdom, altogether untouched by me. As touching the latter he saith likewise a little after, Caeterum, si semper hoc bonis viris cordi fuit, opinionem in melius commutare, & leges seu pharmaca cōvenit ad morborum habitum & rationem accommodare, consideremus an hic expediat idem fieri: &, si expedit, an liceat ut matrimonia quaedam dirimantur, non temere, sed gravibus de causis, neque per quoslibet, sed per Ecclesiae Praefectos, aut Iudices legitimos: & ita dirimantur vt liberum sit utri{que} cui velit iungi, aut alteri certe, qui divortio non dedit causam. that is, But if it ever pleased good men well, to change their opinion unto the better, and if it be good to frame our Laws even as medicines unto the nature or manner of our diseases, let us consider, whether in this also it be good so to do: and if it be expedient, whether (then) it be lawful or permitted unto us, that certain marriages may be broken asunder again not lightly, but when the cause is weighty, nor by any whomsoever but by the Governors in the Church, or other lawful Judges: and that those marriages may in such sort be broken asunder, that it may be free for either party to marry again where they think good, or at least for the one of them, the same that gave no cause of divorce. That which he hath towards the end, is much like to the former of these, and of the same nature with it. For whē he hath before protested, that he did propound this but to whet up the studious to a further consideration of it, he inferreth thereupon, Nec vllo pacto iudicio maiorum ob haec praeire conamur, multo minus Ecclesiae Catholicae. that is, Neither do we in any wise hereby desire, to prevēt the judgment of our betters, much less of the Catholic Church. Those others that I have thought good to bring forth to be heard in this cause besides, are two: Peter Martyr; and Beza. Peter Martyr though he run the self same course in effect, that Erasmus had before propounded and laid it open to those that would: yet both he would have the Magistrates leave first obtained as we saw before, & having then set down a good piece of his mind before for that matter, in five whole Sections, in the end of the fifth he addeth, Haec à me sictraduntur, ut melius, ac sanius consilium perpetuo sim paratus, & audire, atque admittere. that is, These things are in such sort delivered by me, that I am ever ready, both to hear and to admit any better & sounder advise. Which words of his if we restrain only to that point that immediately goeth (in that place) before, both I should think that we should do him manifest wrong, and that his own very words (not speaking of one, but of more) would much favor our conviction therein: and if we enlarge them unto the whole, or to the drift of his opinion in all those points before delivered, then may we see that he was not (as some others are) so peremptory therein, but that he professeth that he would be ready so far to change, as at any time he should see any better. Beza is more resolute in it, and hath more largely handled that argument; yet may we see, that he also doth something moderate himself therein: and that, both in his Epistle prefixed before the Book that he wrote; and afterward also, in a special point of the Treatice it self. In his Epistle it shall be good to consider, first what he saith for the matter it self: then, of his own dealing therein. For the matter it self he saith, that Nihil prohibit de istis quaeri & divers as eorū sententias audiri, quos apparet veritatis investigandae studio duci, modo publica authoritate receptis pertinaciter non obsistatur. that is, Nothing letteth, but that these things may be called in question, and the opinions of those be heard, who seem to be led with a desire to search out the truth, so that no stubborn resistance be made to such things, as are by public authority already received. Of his own dealing therein he saith likewise, both that he could not satisfy himself therein: and that his mind was not, any way to prejudice the judgment of others. For as touching the former, his words be these, Ne{que} vero ipse mihi in hoc argumento satisfeci: sed doctiorum theologorum studia mihi satis fuit commovisse. that is, Neither could I in this argument satisfy myself: but it was enough for me, to have stirred up the studies of more learned divines. As touching the latter, he saith likewise, Ego, quid mihi de istiusmodi multis videatur, quasi vnus quispiam exposui, nec cuiquam praejudiciū factum volui. that is, What my mind is concerning many such things as these, I have, as one of the rest, declared and would not that any should be prejudiced thereby. That which he hath in a special point of the Treatice it self, is, that there handling the question, whether the innocent party be bound in conscience utterly to abandon his wife, or if she repent, to take her again, though there he acknowledgeth that it is not his part to send them away doubtful therein: yet he taketh hold of another part of his function also (non vt leges cuiquam praescribam ) that he was not then to prescribe any laws unto them, & so may seem thereby to acknowledge, that albeit he then declared his mind therein, yet meant he no otherwise, but to leave them unto the freedom of their own judgment withal. Again Dixi quid mihi hic videatur: suum cui{que} liberum iudicium esto, modo ex verbo Dei quis{que} sapiat. that is, I have shown what is my judgment thereon: let everyone be persuaded therein as himself thinketh good, so that he ground himself therein, on the word of God.

8 Now that we may more orderly gather what we are to think of these resolutions, alleging of reason, and protestations, so doubtful, so limited, and so fenced speeches, and how far we are to take the advantage of them, and withal to show, why I have in this place presented a certain of them unto the view: I am here to admonish; first that one way there is, wherein it may be that some will take them, which in no wise is meant by me, but another there is, which willingly I do acknowledge to be my meaning indeed. That which is not meant by me, is, if any should so take them, as if I had alleged them in the way of disgrace to those that wrote them: a thing of that nature, that neither might I justly do it: neither would I though so I might. I might not justly do it, because there were no cause so to do. For the case being such as it is, they could write no more certainly, nor more boldly then they did so long as yet they did not espy how wrong they were, in some of the main principles of it. So that in such case they are so far from the desert of just reproof, for not being resolute, but using great wariness and limitation in all such speeches as thereof they deliver, that it rather deserveth right good commendations, that in a case so intricate, doubtful & strange (as they did take it) they framed their speeches so suitable unto it: that as those speeches of theirs were sufficient tokens to all, how hardly themselves took upon them to go so far as they did; even so might they be as good warnings to others, there to read with the better attention and judgment, & not so much to embrace the opinion that such have conceived, as to examine and ponder the reasons, whereby they suffered themselves to be thereunto induced. And although it be expected at the hands of all that are to lead others, that they be resolute in that which they teach: yet if at any time the case be such, that just occasion be given to give in their judgment of such things as yet are not (among the learned) so fully decided, then is there no more at their hands expected, then to deliver their mind accordingly. In a firm, plain, ready, & beaten way, howsoever men are wont more freely to ride: yet if it be covered with snow, rough, or stony, or yield any semblance of quicksands or miers, although in such case there are found sometimes, that then also will ride freely enough; yet was it ever, and ever will be accounted more wisdom, in all such cases to be more wary. Examples hereof we have very many, wheresoever the Scriptures have not so fully declared those things that nevertheless we think are enough decided by them; as, at what time the Angels were made: or, when the matters are prophetical, and extend to a farther time then is conceived; as, the manner of Antichrist and of his coming to the Fathers of old, and of the calling of the Jews and Turks to the knowledge of Christ before the last day, to us now. Of which things (and some others besides) those that have written (even the best of them all) may easily be found to have divers ambiguous and timorous speeches: and yet notwithstanding are not therein to be hardly cēsured neither, for that (as those matters are) there was nothing more that justly might be expected of them. And so to come to these others again, as in right I might not seek their disgrace thereby, as having no sufficient ground work unto it: so God forbid, that if I had, yet I should at any time have that meaning with me, being as they are, not only partakers of the selfsame Grace with us; but also such instruments to the advancement of the glory of God, and so comfortable lights to all the faithful in these our days, as that the Church of God hath seldom (if at any time) had, for those matters, a greater blessing. That other which is my meaning indeed, is, no more but to note, that seeing they are not, in that matter, more fully resolved, there is no certainty (nor any great good likelihood neither) for any to ground themselves upon, that gladly would take up that opinion with them. If we had found them so resolute in it, that, without any doubting, and without referring themselves unto those that might see farther therein, they had flatly & boldly pronounced, that it was the undoubted word of God, though therein also (in accepting of it) we might have been deceived, as not looking unto the matter it self, with our own, but with other folks eyes: yet had that been a more tolerable error a great deal, and more easy (by many degrees) to be excused, especially to those▪ that in such cases are (in many things) to depend upon others, either for that they are otherwise employed, than that they may give thenselves to such reading as such matters require, or, if they may, yet have they not that depth of judgment, that such things require. But when as themselves, whom we are content to make our leaders therein, being in other things resolute enough, and as bold as Lions, do not set down their opinion in this, but with great wariness, doubtfulness & fear, with so many cautions & allegations, with such submissions and protestations▪ it would be no final wonder to me (but that I know, how inclinable to such things we are by nature) not only that any should be so loose as to enter that course, but also that any should so much as conceive, that such kind of speeches should be likely to yield any such ground, as whereon a man that were willing so to do, might be bold to build, and to make no doubt but that he had his warrant with him. We know well enough (and in many other things strongly hold it against the adherents of the Church of Rome) that we may do nothing at all but only that, for which we have some undoubted warrant in the written word: and yet notwithstanding (I will not say that I wote not how it cometh to pass for that it is by our own bad inclination) we are so far bewitched in this that finding great staggering in those that are the strōgest for it, & most forward in defense thereof, we nevertheless conceive, that therein we have warrant enough. So easy a thing it is to bend those, that so handsomely crook to such purpose already: &, in the freedom we have in Christ so quickly to take hold, of an unseasonable liberty of the flesh. But here we must take heed we forget not that is yet we do not consider what it is that they bring but only, that whatsoever it be yet because thē selves are no better resolved, therefore may nobody be so bold as to build vpō them. We will not yet deny, but that, for ought we see yet, the truth indeed may be as they conceive: but if themselves be no better resolved, then though they have the truth therein, yet because it is more then themselves do know of, even that only is enough for the time to stay us, until we see farther.

9 That other part of that which themselves do set down for this matter, doth chiefly respect those places aforesaid, which they use to bring in for that opinion of theirs: and partly the first four places of them; but then especially, the other two. For seeing themselves do rest but little in the first four of thē, but yet very much in the other two we also may briefly dispatch those others, and follow them only in those wherein themselves do think that they have their chiefest strength. Those therefore that belong to the first four of them, are no more but these two: one, concerning the nature of those places thenselves; the other, as touching the gathering of them. Cōcerning the nature of those places thenselves, it is no more but this, that, to see to, they do make much more against them (for that they note such kind of divorce with so great reproach) than any way else they can make for them; take them to the best advantage they can. As touching the other, that is, how these do gather upon thē, it is no more but this, that from those places it is, that they gather some part of their weak conclusions, as elsewhere in a fitter place is declared: which also is, for anything that yet I have found, the only benefit that to that opinion of theirs, they seek to draw from these four places. Those that belong to the latter two only, are much like to the others: one of them, in like sort concerning the nature of those places themselves; the other, not how weakly they gather on these, but how clean they do mistake them. The nature of those places is such, as that although the text therein were such as they conceive, yet even then also do they make but little for any divorce: the judgment of the better sort of the learned being thereon, that neither Moses before, nor Malachi after, did simply allow it unto thē but only in respect, or to some purpose, namely, to avoid some further evil. But now, if they do mistake them withal, so that the Text (being better considered) can never be found to yield any such sense, as hitherto they have conceived, nor anything at all for the opinion that they have taken, then must their case be so much the harder, or rather their credit, on this behalf, so very much sunk, as that their whole judgment therein, may well be called in question for it.

10. This mistaking of theirs therefore being a matter of so special importance, it shall be good more specially to consider, first, whether they do mistake them, or not; then, if it fall out that so they do, what we are to gather thereon, concerning the matter we have in hand. That they do mistake them indeed, will soon appear, if first we mark how they do take them: and then examine that their taking of them, with such things as may be able to show us the truth therein. How they do take them will best appear by their own speeches of that matter. First therefore to begin with Erasmus, that was so forward therein, it shall be good to mark how he mistook it, not only when first he gave forth his judgment therein: but also, when afterward he was so impugned for it, that thereby he might have taken just occasion to have looked better unto it. When first he gave forth his judgment of it, Divortium, saith he, ipfa lex palam indulget: that is, The law doth plainly allow of divorce. Again, Lex permittat mari • is qualibet ex causa repudiare, modo dent libellum repudii : that is, That the law suffereth husbands for every cause to put away their wives, so that they give them a bill of divorcement. Again, Viro permittit▪ ob causam quamlibet, mutare vxorem. that is, He alloweth or suffereth the husband, to exchange his wife, for whatsoever cause he will. The same he hath in so many other places besides (or at least the effect thereof) that it is evident, that it was not a slip in him against his own knowledge or will: but his own very judgment, as he did then think that the Text it self would bear. As this one place more will sufficiently declare, wherein he doth not only affirm it, as before, but also doth further reason upon it. At mihi, saith he, non fit verisimile peccaturum fuisse Iudaeum si vxorem egregie soe leratam abiecisset, & alteram duxisset domum: quum id lex palam concederet, nihil addens, hoc datum duritiei cordis, praesertim cum ex sensu naturae, non posset fieri, quod nos interpretamur. Et si concessum est duritiei cordis, uti{que} licet, quod concedit Deus: praesertim si nullo signo declaret eos peecare, qui permisso vtātur. that is, But it should not seem likely to me that a Jew should sin, who had cast away his wife being a very wicked woman, and married another, when as the law did plainly grant it, not adding thereunto, that that was granted but for the hardness of their harts, especially when as, by natural sense, that cannot be known, that we gather of it (meaning, as I take it, that it was granted but for the hardness of their hearts, which we Christians know by Christ, but they could not know by natural reason.) And if it be granted unto the hardness of their harts, yet it is lawful that God hath granted: at least, if by no sign he declare, that those do offend which use the liberty granted unto them. By these we may see, that Erasmus, when he wrote that Treatice of his for divorce for adultery and marrying again, did plainly take it, that Moses in that place of Deuteronomy, had expressly or in plain words allowed husbands to put away their wives from them upon dislike, so that they gave them bills of divorcement withal. When afterward he was so impugned for it, that thereby he might have taken just occasion to have looked better unto it, yet then also, I do not find that ever he espied his former error, but that still he continued in it. Of those that did reprove him for it, we find that he doth complain of divers, and defendeth his doings against them so well as he can, as against Natalis Bedda, and another whom he doth not name, but he giveth a by-name unto him, as him self thinketh good. Among all which (for no doubt there were many more besides those) it shall not be amiss to consider somewhat more specially of his dealing about that matter, with one of thē, who may serve as a pattern thereof with the rest: as also I make choice of him rather then of any other, for that he was our own Countrimā, and by Erasmus but unthankfully used. It was one Master Edward Lee, at that time soiourning at Lovain for learning sake, and of so good towardness therein, that Erasmus himself when he came thither, sought his acquaintance, and imparted unto him, that having set forth his annotations of the New Testament before, he was purposed now to set them forth again, he craved his help to note unto him whatsoever he thought might be amended. Which while M. Le did, and (as those days were) in very good manner (as it seemeth by his own defense, in his Apology in the front of his Book, in divers of his Censures on Erasmus Annotations, and in his answer to a couple of Erasmus Epistles in the ende) Erasmus shown himself to be so nettled therewith, that even that only doth much insinuate, that himself did now see, that in some things he had lost the advantage. Else would he never so much have sought to shake him of with contempt as he did, charging him, that nondum vllum in profession Theologica gradum adeptus est, nec aliud quam artium liberalium septem professor, that is, that as yet he had taken no degree at all in Divinity, but only was a professor of the seven liberal Sciences, or as we commonly say, a Master of Art. As shortly after he giveth this frump withal, that whereas M. Lee had said, that he had left the study of those liberal Sciences, and had bid them farewell, eodem opinor tempore, saith he, quo dixit illis salve : that is even the self same time, I think, wherein first he bad them good-morrow: meaning thereby, that therein also he had profited nothing at all, as presently he saith more plainly (if more plain may be) that in those things that he had written against him, there was nullum vestigium honestae disciplina, that is, not so much as any one token of good learning in him: clean contrary to that which everyone may see, that shall read M. Lees writings against him. M. Lee himself doth also charge him with much other base dealing besides in that quarrel, and such as did not become the order it self, whereof they were both alike partakers. Vt caetera, saith he, omittam, quae non tam contemptim haberi oportuit, vel hujus Sacerdotii ratio fuerat habenda tibi, quo ne me Christū Domini, ipse etiā Domini, tam sordide foedares. that is, Omitting other considerations, in respect whereof you should not have had me in so deep contempt, you ought to have made some better accompt even on the order of Priesthood (only, though there were nothing else besides) than that you being anointed of the Lord yourself, should so foully bewray me an (other such like) Anointed of the Lord likewise. But for the quarrel that was betwixt them, I meddle not with it: but leave them both to their best advantage therein. Only thus much I gather, that whereas M ^r Le was of such towardness then, that Erasmus himself desired his acquaintance for his learning sake, and his special help therein, and not many years after became Archbishop of York besides, it seemeth to me, that some where or other (and as likely in this as in anywhere else) Erasmus did leese some special advantage to Master Le, and so had he found in this I perceive if Master Le had taken the advantage of it, and had called his adversary unto the Original. But Erasmus himself also being thus provoked, and much more thā so, yet he neither maketh his recourse unto the Original: which notwithstanding in this case had been much better, than so to labor the disgrace of those, that so well had occasioned him to take that course. And now not to trouble the Reader with the like sentences of others (which notwithstanding I thought to have done, & had provided them accordingly) least so I might have grown tedious therein, I will no more but note whō I have noted besides so to have missed, & the places where those misses of theirs are to be found: namely Musculus, on the fifth of Matthew, pag. 111. Peter Martyr, in divers places, on the 1. Cor. 7. 7. and, as it is placed in his Common Places Sect. 52. and 66. pag. 301, 3, 5, & 6. Calvin, in his Com: on the Harm. of the Gospels, on Mat. 5.31. and 19, 7. Gwalther, on Mark 10, & Malachi the 2. fol. 399.8. Chemnicius in his second part of the Exam: of the council of Trent. Sess. 8. Can. 7. pag. 286, 8. Beza, in divers places of his Book de repudijs & divortijs, among his Opusc. vol. 2. pag. 113, 15, & 17. And last of all Steph. Szegedinus in his Tables of Common places. pag. 348.49. For that of Malachi, I have not noted that Erasmus hath meddled with it, but Musculus, Peter Martyr, Calvin and Gwalther in the places before recited, and all others generally that are for divorce & marrying again (so many of them as yet are extant that I have seen) do even so take it, after one and the self same manner.

11 That in such sort taking those Texts, they do (it may well be, and is most likely) clean mistake them, it will best appear by the several consideratiō of either of thē: first, that of Deuteronomy ; then, that other of Malachi also. For that of Deuteronomy, first we have certain probabilities, that it was never intended there, to give any license of such Divorce: then also (as I do take it) much other good proof besides. Those probabilities that we have, are some of them, out of the Text it self: and one besides, out of the practice of the godlier sort among them. Those that we have out of the Text, are two: one, out of that place of Deuteronomy ; the other, out of the fifth of Numbers. In that place of Deuteronomy we plainly see, a kind of punishment to be cast on him that so had put away his wife, namely, that if she had married another, he then should never have her again: and, to be givē in, in reason thereof, that thereby she is defiled; and that her defiling, in the judgment of some, laid unto his charge also. If thē the self same Text do not only something punish him for it, but also charge him with defiling of his wife besides, evē only by that putting of her away at the first, it is most likely, that no such thing is in that place allowed. That other out of the first of Numbers, is that law of Jealousy, which (being an harder course than this, and a great deal more busy; and a peculiar remedy ordained when a man hath his wife in suspicion of adultery, or when as it was so indeed, but without any witness; and not allowing the man to go any farther, but to hold himself content, if she, in such sort as there is set down, should make her purgation) doth every way, me think, insinuate, that then there was no so easy a way as this, for a man (for lighter matters) to be rid of his wife when he would, and the same to stand good by the word of God. That which we have out of the practice of the better sort among them, is that same which the learned have noted (as before I have partly touched) that in all the Scripture we never read of any of the better sort, that ever used the help of divorce: which notwithstanding, it is most likely, that many would have done, if they had taken it, to have been so plainly, by God himself, permitted unto them. That other good proof that we have besides, is the Original or Hebrew Text and that by the judgment of divers learned; & some of those that were for this Divorce and marrying again, but since have amended the mistaking that they had of the Text. The proof that we have in the Original or Hebrew Text, and that by the judgment of divers learned, is, that now it is found to be otherwise in the Hebrew, thā our Trāslators, either old or new (a few excepted) of long have borne us in hand that it was: namely, that it is not, he shall write a bill of divorcement, or, let him write a bill of divorcement ; but only, that he putteth the case if so a man should do, and not that it alloweth the same. And the learned that now have mended this oversight of old that long hath stood as currant among us, are these. First, to my knowledge Franciscus Vatablus the professor of the Hebrew tongue at Paris, and after him Benedictus Arias Montanus a Spaniard, that had the chief oversight of the setting forth of that great Bible at the charges of the King of Spain, and last of all Immanuel Tremellius, and Franciscus Junius together. All which in their Translations have very plainly amended the same: & declared withal, that in that place there is no mention at all, of any divorce allowed unto them, if recourse be had to the Hebrew it self. Those that were for divorce & marrying again, and that first having erred in this Text that now we speak of have since amended the same again, are two, and those of special account among us, as of good right they ought to be: M. Calvin, the one; and M. Beza likewise the other. As touching the former of them, whereas, setting forth his Commentaries on the Harmonie of the Gospels in the year 1555. he then was of opinion (as before I have noted, and is there to be seen of any) that Moses had commanded, a Bill of divorce should in such case be given to the wife: afterward, having further occasion to look better unto it, by gathering four of the Books of Moses into an Harmonie also, which accordingly he did, and published it about eight years after, in the year 1563. he did then amend his former reading of the Text it self, and in his Commentary thereupon did set down his judgment accordingly also. As, among other things of that nature, he cometh in with these words following. Quidam interpretes non legunt hos tres versus vno contextu, sed plenam sententiam esse volunt, vt maritus testetur se divortium facere cum vxore, non ob crimen, sed quid formae venustas eius libidini, non satisfaciat. Si quis tamen propiùs attendat, facile videbit, vnum esse duncaxat Legis caput, nempe, vbi quis vxorem repudiaverit, fas nō esse iterum eam ducere si alteri nupserit. that is, Certain interpreters (among whom himself was one, a few years before) do not read these three verses (there be four in all, & so doth himself join thē) in one period: but will have one full sentence to be, that the husband testify, that he doth not divorce his wife for any crime, but because her beauty or favor did not content him. But if any do better mark it, he shall plainly see that the law that there is set down, hath but one branch only, which is, that whē any hath once put away his wife, it should not be lawful for him to take her again, if in the mean season she had married another (albeit the other were now dead, or had put her away likewise.) Where also it is to be noted, that now he accounted it to be very plain, for that he saith, that a man that heedeth it, may plainly perceive it; and that so he insinuateth, that it was but want of heed taking that therein deceived many before, as yet also it doth, where it is not the better heeded. Yet divers then began to espy it, and in Vatablus his Bible of 1557. it was plainly noted, above five years, before that M. Calvin published this that now we speak of. Master Beza, for anything that yet I have found, is not so plain herein, as is M. Calvin, yet hath he enough of this also, to content any reasonable man. For whereas in that Treatice of his, De repudiis & divortiis, which he published 1573. he showeth himself divers times so to have mistaken that place, as others before were wont to do, and that so strongly, that out of the same he reasoneth also, that it could not be that a man was bound to forgive his adulterous wife (by that example of God objected out of • he 3. Chapter of Jeremiah, and the first verse of it) for that then it should follow, illos peccasse quilegem illam Mosis servarunt, cuius ibi facit mentionem Jeremiah, quod absurdum est dicere, quum eam e contrario servari oportuerit : that is, that they should sin which did not observe that law of Moses, whereof mention is made Ier. 3.1. which were absurd to say, when as, on the other side, it was to be observed. (which whence it cometh, was apparent enough, if it be tried by the rule which M. Calvin before set down; and then so much the rather to be condemned thereby, as we may plainly see, by the consideration of the time, that that wonted oversight of mistaking that place was espied, & noted so near unto him, sixteen years before that he did publish this book of his:) yet afterward (whē Benedictus Arias Montanus also had publicly noted that wonted oversight again, two years before) he, in the year 1577, in that book of his which is entitled Lex Dei moralis, caeremonialis, politica, so setteth down the Text it self, as Vatablus, and Arias had done before, and Tremellius and Junius since (and according as the Hebrew it self is) saving that he maketh a full period at the ende of the first sentence, whereas there is none indeed, nor ought to be, till the ende of the fourth, which might easily be the fault of his Printer. And so, by his own reading now, it is no absurd thing to say, that those of the Jews sinned which then did put away their wives; neither was that law so to be kept, neither did Jeremiah make mention of any such law of Moses, neither did Moses ever make it. Thē the which, I think we need no more for this matter. But if we do, then himself also, even in that his Book de repudiis & divortiis doth acknowledge withal, that eiusmodi divortia etsi lege civili tolerabantur, tamen in foro conscientiae nunquam licuerunt. that is, that such divorces, although they were tolerated by the Civil Law, yet in court of conscience they were never lawful. Where we may note, that although it be restrained only to such divorces; yet now he granteth, that which he accounted the law of God before, is of no force in the court of conscience: a matter sufficient, being well considered, mainly to cross the force of the other.

12 Concerning that other of Malachi, we have not so much for it, in respect of the words or letter of it: but yet somewhat more, if we go to the meaning, as there it is applied against the people then. For as touching the words or letter of it, neither Vatablus, nor Arias Montanus did for this matter swarne from the wonted reading: but then we have, both the judgment of the Septuagint of old, and Tremellius & Junius of late that do. The Septuagint read thus (as Jerome himself doth set down;) Si odio habens dimiseris eam, dicit Dominus Deus Israel, operiet impietas cogitations tuas, dicit Dominus omnipotence. that is, If hating (her) thou shalt put her away, saith the Lord God of Israel: impiety shall cover thy thoughts, saith the Lord Almighty. By which reading of theirs we may plainly see, that they give not liberty unto him that hateth his wife to put her away: but plainly show, that the Lord misliketh it, if so he do. But Tremellius and Junius do plainly alter the reading also, referring the hating that there is spoken of, unto the Lord, that he doth hate all such putting away of their wives. For whereas the common and wonted reading of the place is, If thou hatest her put her away saith the Lord God of Israel : their reading now is, Sibi odio esse dimissionem ait Jehovah Deus Israelis. that is, That the Lord God of Israel saith, that he hateth such putting away. As touching the sense or meaning of this place notwithstanding the reading stand as it was wont, Siodio habeas dimitte &c, First M ^r Calvin saith thereon, Hic rursus Prophet a exaggerat crimen illud, quod pro nihilo ducebāt Sacerdotes, dicit enim gravius eos peccare quàm si vxores repudiarent. Scimus tamen repudium nunquam fuisse permissum divinitus, proprie loquendo, nam etsi fuit impunitas sub Lege, non tamen fuit permissic that is, Here again doth the Prophet exaggerate that crime, that the Priests did make so little account of, for he saith that they sin more grevously, then if they had put their wives away. But divorce we know was never permitted of God, if we speak properly. For although there was no punishment for it under the law: yet was it never permitted. And after again, Haec igitur ratio est cur Propheta nunc dicat, Si odio habeas dimitte: non quod veniam concedat repudio, quēadmodum diximus: sed vt hac circumstantia crimen augeat. that is, This therefore is the reason why the Prophet doth now say, If thou hate (her) put her away; not that he giveth them leave to divorce, as before we said; but that by this circumstance he showeth the fault to be so much the greater. Which also is the judgment of others. So in the former of these two places we find, not only the Hebrew it self and divers of the learned (of special account) to show that the place was clean mistaken before: but also, some of the chief of those that are for divorce and marrying again, in effect to acknowledge their former oversight therein. In the latter we have, both those seaventie Interpreters of old; & two of special account of late, to show the very letter therein also to be mistaken: and, though it do stand after the wonted manner of mistaking; yet that the sense is such, as in no wise alloweth them so to do, as the words do seem to leave unto them.

13 What we are to gather thereon, concerning the matter that we have in hand, is now to be seen: a matter that may be in few words sufficiently opened; but yet notwithstanding so much the meeter to have a distinct place by it self, as it is good that it should appear how far it stretcheth, or what bounds they are we prescribe unto it. For otherwise it might arise in the conceit of some to think, that my meaning is, out of the credit or learning of these that I have brought in, to show how far though • e that are for divorce and marrying again, have mistaken these places aforesaid, to conclude that those places must needs be so as these others have now translated them; or at least, that their opiniō therein is the likelier of the two: and therefore that those that otherwise took them, were therein without question deceived; or at least, of the two, most likeliest to be. And the truth is, that myself am so persuaded, as I have already declared: & have no doubt, but that therein I am not wrong. But yet that is not the thing that now herevpō I mean to infer, because I have no need at all so far to urge either their credit or learning therein. My purpose therefore is no more but this: to show that such as think they have warrant enough in the word of god to put away their wives for adultery & to marry again, for that so many of the learned (& of the reformed Churches, as some do like rather to say, though in this there be no reformation at all) are of the same judgment likewise; may nevertheless find hereby, that their warrant is not so sure, as they before had thought that it was. Unto which (so long as we go no father thē so) we have no need so far to urge them; but may well enough content our selves with this, that those places are not so taken by all, but that there is, among the learned themselves, a manifest diversity of judgment therein: leaving the deciding, or the over-ruling of the question it self, to fall out unto those that shall have the better part in it; and the desire of it, to those likewise that shall need it more than we. It is enough for us, unto the purpose that now we have in hand, to be able to show, that divers of the learned (and those of good account likewise) do not allow such help unto them, as out of those places they thought that they had. Now, whether those that do allow it, or those that now withdraw it frō them, are the righter, or nearer unto the truth therein, that will we not stick to refer to a farther time to be farther decided (if need be) among the learned themselves▪ urging it no farther at this present, but that it is not to be accounted an undoubted truth, or a point out of question, that any liberty was at any time given, by the law of God, so easily to put away their wives, as those places imported, as hitherto for the most part they were delivered unto us. For so will it plainly enough fall out, that whereas the most of our learned that are for this kind of divorce and marrying again, do much the rather, as I do take it, incline thereunto upon supposal that Moses first, & Malachi after, had allowed it for lesser causes unto the Jews (so inferring, that then those words of Christ, that are of that matter, might well enough be takē, as if Christ's meaning therein had been, that for adultery himself also did allow it unto us:) now finding, that it is not certain, that any such liberty, was at any time; by any word of God granted to any, it is not unlikely, but that themselves will be better advised of it, and rather search out some other meaning of those words of Christ, than to make him (as else they must be fain to do; and as after I trust to make it more plainly to appear) both the first and the last in all Scripture, that ever allowed any divorce and marrying again, and the only man of all the Prophets that went before, & of all the Apostles that followed after, upon whō not only that marrying again, but even divorce it self must stand; especially, when as they know, and readily grant, that he came to uphold all the whole righteousness of the law of God, and to loose none (though never so little) to any one jot of fleshly liberty whatsoever.

14 As touching those other places of theirs, namely, such as are for marrying again (wherein consisteth all the residue of the strength that they have, for this conceived opinion of theirs) they also are only two▪ both of them in the New Testament, and the words of Christ himself: & nevertheless such, as when they are well examined, I believe will help them but little neither. Which that we may the more orderly find, I hold it best, first to see what considerations we have, that may induce us to that persuasion then, to examine the places themselves, for the true sense and meaning of thē. Those considerations that now I speak of which may well induce us so to think, that in these also they have no sufficient groundwork of that their opiniō, are especially two: one, takenout of the judgment of others therein; another, arising out of that which themselves have set down for that matter. That which is taken out of the judgment of others, is, that same that by other occasion before I touched, that the most part of men are against them herein: and yet have those places as well as they, and are as careful to leave them untouched (even at the full) unto the sense that they ought to have. Who being as they are, both equal in learning (for anything that yet we know to the contrary) and more in mumber without comparison, may easily induce those that stand indifferent (so long as the others bring not better proofs to the contrary) to doubt less danger in abiding with them, unto that resolution that being tried by long 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 experience, is much more likely to be less faulty: than, so quickly to turn unto others, to the embracing of a latter judgment, so lately (to speak of) sprung up among us, and so newly broached unto us. By which kind of reasoning albeit no certainty be to be concluded: yet neither may the probability be well neglected. A certainty cannot be thereon concluded, because neither as yet is it to be taken as proved by us, or granted by them (for some there are, that so much as they may, do lean to the contrary) that they have the greater number against thē: neither, if they had, were that any certain proof that they were wrong. Yet, on the other side, the probability (for both) being so fair as it is, it leaveth so good a conjecture thereby, that such as take the contrary course, may find themselves to be excluded frō all good hope that they are right: at least, that it is not a thing out of question.

15 That consideratiō that ariseth out of that which themselves have set down, is no more but this, that even their own manner of handling this matter is such, as that divers defects appear therein, both in weak reasoning: and in divers inconvenient speeches besides. As touching both which, before we come to exemplify or to show wherein they do it, it shall not be amiss (especially to put away such evil surmises, as otherwise might arise hereon) more distinctly (yet briefly) to set it down, both how far we may charge them with those defects: and how far we may thereby justly conclude against them. As touching the former, we are not so far to charge them, as though (upon the principles that they conceive) they had no arguments to be regarded, or that orderly did conclude; nor that inconvenient speeches with them are so rife, as that therein only there is sufficient cause to condemn the matter it self: but that they do often use such, as are no good arguments indeed; and that divers times they have inconvenient speeches likewise. But yet by their patience (now to take in the latter withal) they have both these so much and so often, that thereby they may justly breed suspicion in others (even in as many as read with judgment, & stand indifferent) that they are somewhat partial therein, & are carried not a little with some private affection whatsoever: that in using so often so weak collections, they do plainly insinuate, their store of stronger was not so great; and that in adding such inconvenient speeches withal, others might justly doubt, that then they were so far out of temper, as that they might overshoot themselves, even in that also that is in question.

16 Wherein these defects of theirs appear, is now to be seen: and first how weaklie oft times they reason; then, what incōvenient speeches they have besides. Those reasons of theirs that now I speak of, do most of them depend either on the things hereunto appertaining: or, on the authority or testimony of others concerning the same. The things hereunto appertaining, are either the selfsame that are in question: or else certain others, of such a kind, or so near unto them, that from them they draw certain reasons to these likewise. Of the self same that are in question, there are two sorts: one, that is of the substance of them; others, that are but accidentarie thereunto. That which is of the substance of them, is the nature both of adultery, & wedlock it self in this respect. Out of the consideration of which because they do so usually reason, therefore it shall be good for us to note, both what reasons they are, and of what force we may take them to be. The reasons that thereon they bring are such as bind all upon this, that the nature of Adultery is such, as that it doth quite dissolve whatsoever band there was in marriage before: and that that was the cause, why Christ made his exception only of it. And so they reason, not only to take away an objection that otherwise would be strong against them: but also to express their own opinion or judgment therein. The objection that otherwise would be strong against them is that conjunction that God had put betwixt man and wife: whereupon it is inferred by Christ, Quod Deus conianxit homo ne separet ; that is, that which God hath coupled, let not man put asunder. For answer whereunto, Erasmus first saith, that nullo negotio solvi potest. Hoc Deus coniunxit, quod rite coniungitur : hoc Deus dirimit, quod rite dirimitur. that is, That doubt, saith he, may easily be loosed. For that, saith he, did God join together, which was rightly joined: and that doth God himself put asunder, which is well put asunder. And Musculus after, following the same, answereth, that illi non rumpunt coniugii vinculum ; but that the adulteress sua persidia iam ante adulterando ruperit: that is, that they, (who in such case put away their wives,) do not break the band of marriage; but that the adulteress by her disloialty in committing adultery brake it before. To express their own opinion or judgment therein, both these and others, do otherwise set down that same for the truth of their doctrine for that point, For first Erasmus saith; (Divortium) Christus astringit ad vnam adulterii causam, non quood non sint alia flagitia adulterio sceleratiora: sed quod adulterium tota ration pugnet cum coniugio. Matrimonium e duobus vnum facit: eam copulam dissecat adulteriū. Musculus likewise, being to show for what cause marriage may be dissolved, saith, Vna causa est quam Deus ponit dicendo, Nisi causa stupri. Nam hoc crimine conjugalis fides dissoluitur. Again, Excipit causam stupri, significans tū licere &c. Quia, quod Deus conjunxerat, per adulterium dividit, mariti fidem obnoxiam sibi iam amplius non habet, &c. Nam nemo alterius improbitate, ius suum quod à Deo habet, &c. amittere debet. Again, speaking of an adulterous wife Marito amplius non viuit, sedei cui perfida & adultera adheret. M ^r Calvin likewise, Merito abijcitur mulier, que perfide coniugium violauit: quia eius culpa, abrupto vinculo, libertas viro parta est. Again, additur tamen exceptio, quia mulier scortando se quasi putridum membrum à viro rescindens, eum liberat. Gwalther also, being of the same mind maketh his reason to be, for that the adulteress coniugii vinculum perfide dissolvit, or otherwise seeth not, but that adulteris & scortatoribus coniugii dignitas patrocinabitur, quod Deus vt istis vterentur, instituit. Last of all, Beza answering an argument, that so it might come to pass, that one man should at once have more wives: Respondeo, saith he, in hoc argumento esse petitionem principii. Praesupponit enim id ipsum, de quo quaeritur: manere nempe vinculum matrimonij etiam post divortium. Concedo igitur vni viro non licere plures vxores habere: sed addo, vxorem esse des • sse, quae propter adulterium se à viro separavit. And anon after, Coniugii vinculum abrupit, quisquis factus est scortationis membrum. And after that, Concludo igitur, adulterio abrumpi non tantum vsum, sed vinculum: quod nisi voluntate innocentis rursum coalescit, integram esse eidem innocenti, si continere nō potest, novas nuptias inire. &c. And lastly, Convictus adulterii, maritus esse desinit. The effect of all which, concerning the matter that now we speak of, is no more but this, that (in the judgment of all these) by the adultery of either of the parties, the bond of matrimony that was betwixt them, is now dissolved, and broken again. Which if now we may a little examine (notwithstanding that so great men have so resolutely overruled the same already) it seemeth much rather unto me, that the band of marriage is of that nature, that it is not in the power of either of the parties, nor of both together so to break it, that now it be to stand as altogether brokē betwixt them. For there are, if we mark, two sorts of bands wherewith they are bound the one to the other: one sort, that concerneth those parties themselves, that so do join themselves together; the other, that concerneth certain others, that join with them in that action likewise. Those that concern the parties themselves, are two: one, of the husband; the other, of the wife. For though they both do concur in time, so near as may be: yet, both some little difference there is, such as it is (the one going a little before, and the other following somewhat after) and well they may be severally considered, as distinct things in themselves; as when ships do grapple together, and not by the grapple of either of them, but when each of them do fasten their grapple on other. Those others that join with thē therein, are, God himself, and his vicegerents on earth among us: both which do join in that action with them; and, when first they have so tied them (and that, with a several band for either) then do they tie them also with other bands besides, even with one several band for either of them. And so cometh it to pass, that every party that is married, is, by the virtue of that marriage, bound fast to the other in four several bands: one of his own; the second, of his yokefellow; the third of the magistrate, or of the Government under which they live; and the last, of God, or of his holy ordinance. Wherevpon me thinketh that whatsoever it is, that may be thought to be of force to dissolve the band of matrimony, had need to be such, as wherein the whole interest of all these parties, and of every of them, is to concur in full, and lawful consent: or else, whatsoever is, or can be done, by either of those inferior parties, neither is it, neither cā it be of such force as to dissolve the whole band, which was knit not only by themselves (and by either of them, for their part severally) but also by others that are their superiors, and whose leave first they must have. Or otherwise, that it were in effect no better, but as if one should reason affirmatively from the part to the whole: that seeing one of the bands is by one party broken (and but so far neither as that party may) therefore the whole band is broken betwixt thē, and now as loose as ever they were. Which how vicious it is, we may (as I take it) much better perceive in some other such like, wherein we are not as yet by prejudice so forestalled, nor our affections so blinded neither: in that band that is betwixt the Master & the servant. For though the servant do behave himself as il as may be, and directly against the nature of his service, either generally or specially in that which more properly is committed unto him; and whereby himself hath so far deserved utterly to be cast off: yet, if either the Master have absolutely takē him into his service, and to do for him without exception, & not only for better, but also for worse, and much rather if God do require, that as yet he cast him not off, or if but the laws do not allow him so to do, in all these cases we may see some bond of duty, so far as yet remaining and standing in force betwixt them, as that it were hard for any to justify, that after such a lewd part of the servant, now there were at all no band of that duty remaining betwixt them. And the less there is to be said against it, but that in such sort a man might so reason against divers coniunctions besides (as of that which is betwixt Parents and children, and of that likewise that standeth betwixt the Prince and the Subject) the more heed should be taken, that no such gap should be opened to any, as whereby the looser sort, whē they should get their desire in this, should cast about to obtain the like in other things also of greater consequence. In which respect I do so much the more marvel that M ^r Calvin, so judicious a man as he was, & being in so good a way unto this consideration, as that time also he was, when he did set down that judgment of his, as before is declared: yet notwithstanding did not take the advantage or benefitof either of them, so as herein he easily might. For in that place before recited, his words that go immediately before, are these: Sanctius est cōiugij vinculum, quā vt hominū arbitrio vel potiùs libidine solvatur. Tamet si enim mutuo consensu sese conjungūt vir & vxor, Deus tamen nodo indissolabili eos astringit, ne postea liberum sit discedere. Additur tamen exceptio, Nisi obfornicationem. Merito enim abijcitur mulier, &c : that is, The bond of wedlock is a thing more holy, thē that it may be dissolved when men themselves will, or rather when their lust doth move them unto it. For although man and wife do join themselves together with mutual consent: yet doth God (farther) tie them together with a knot that cannot be loosed, that afterward they have no liberty to part in sunder again. And hitherto well: but then he addeth, yet, saith he, an exception is added, Unless it be for fornicatiō. For the woman is justly cast óf who disloialy hath broken wedlock, and so forth, as before. Wherein we see that he noted two distinct bonds in the parties thenselves by mutual consent, or that the man had bound himself to his wife, and the wife likewise to the man; then also, that God (above them both) had likewise joined them together never to part: and yet notwithstanding in the end he alloweth the bond to be (wholly) broken by one party only, following therein the judgment of others, and upon persuasion, that such must be the meaning of those words of Christ, which afterward I trust to show may rather have some other meaning. Again, put case that there were no band but one, even that alone wherewith the adulterous wife since, had before tied her self to her husband. Even in this case also me think it were hard for any to hold, that such lewdness of hers, had altogether broken whatsoever band of marriage there was betwixt them: for that in such case it is so generally held by all, that whatsoever lands the wife brought with her, they still are the husbands, even by the virtue of that bond that was betwixt thē. Whereas otherwise when the bond is dissolved by death indeed, thē (if he have no farther interest) he is to part with them likewise. So in such case the bond may in some sense be accounted to be broken indeed but rather, in respect of divers benefits that by her marriage she might otherwise claim, than that the bond in it self should stand as brokē, unto them both generally, or to set them as loose, or as free to marry again, as they were before. And so doth Erasmus himself afterward interpret one of those his speeches of that kind. For whē he is reproved by Natalis Bedda for that he said, I am vxor esse desijt, quae se miscuit alteri viro, that is, She doth now cease to be a wife, that hath committed adultery with another, his answer is this, Agnoscebat vulgatissimum tropum Bedda, sed captabat ansam calumniandi. Sic filium esse negamus, qui degenerate à paternis moribus, qui meruit abdicari, & tamen manet naturae vinculum. Sic episcopum esse negamus, qui indignus est hoc nomine, & tamen manet consecratio. Sic Christianum esse negamus qui moribus est impijs, & tamen non tollitur baptismus. Ita mihi dicta est vxor esse desijsse, quae se fecisset indignam vxoris nomine: that is, Bedda himself would not have denied, but that we use so to speak, but he desired to pick out some occasion of slander. So do we deny him to be a son, that doth degenerate from his fathers ways, who hath deserved to be cast of: and yet the bond of nature remaineth. So do we deny him to be a Bishop, who is unworthy of that name: and yet his consecration abideth. So do we deny him to be a Christian, that is of a wicked behavior: & yet is not his Baptism abolished. In such sense did I say that she ceased now to be a wife, who (by her own lewd demeanour) had made her self unworthy to be so taken. And thereupon bringing somewhat such like, both out of Chrysostom, and out of Jerome, he concludeth: ut igitur est vir non vir, vxor non vxor, ita est conjugium non conjugium: that is, As therefore a man is not a man, a wife not a wife, so is marriage no marriage. Which interpretatiō of his own words though himself, by that occasion, did afterward so plainly give, yet others that followed him (without any stop) in that manner of speaking, did frame their judgment also thereafter, and so gave in their resolution, and not after this latter qualification of his: a thing, in my judgment, unto the purpose that now we are in, right worthy the marking. And thus for them all. One thing more in one of them there is, that needeth to be warily taken, or else may easily breed a further error: namely, that Erasmus by those words of his, may seem not to allow, the joining together of man and wife, to be of God, but only whē it is orderly done. For out of it there might be a gap opened for men, to reason shrewdly for the dissolving not only of marriage, and but for adultery: but also of all other societies, and subiections, almost; and for less trespasses, and lighter indignities, then adultery also. So that, for this first argument of theirs, that, if here ether party commit adultery, then is there no further any band of wedlock standing betwixt them, I trust it appeareth, that it is not so clear, but that as yet some question may be conceived of it.

17 Those that are but accidētarry thereunto, are partly some abuses going before: but especially, divers inconveniences following after. The abuses going before are such as are already touched among the former reasons: namely, whensoever marriages are, either one way or other, so disorderly made, as that thereby occasion is given of so deep discōtentmēt, that to require the band of wedlock thereon to be broken, may seem to be a just request. And disorderly may marriage be made, when as it is made betwixt such, as in whom there can be no sound election at all, as in children and fools: or betwixt those, that, though they be such as might soundly choose, yet notwithstanding do so plainly bewray themselves to be carried away with ambition, covetousness, or inordinate lust, that thereby they make it clear, that therein they follow no sound advise. In which cases, and in such like, it is very true, that great disorder is committed, and that the same is ri • e amongst us. But yet if Erasmus, as before I noted, or any other would thereon conclude, that in reason some ready way should be had among us for divorce and marrying again, for the better amendment of those abuses, or that the Apostle himself were not unlikely to bear with us further therein, then now we will allow that he doth: this were no doubt but a weak collection, and in no wise to stand for any sound reason to urge us unto it. The inconveniences that follow after, are most of them noted to be in the parties themselves that are so unequally knit together: but one, that concerneth others also. Those that are noted to be in the parties themselves, are of two sorts: some, that do concern them both indifferently; others, that concern but the innocent or faultless persō only. Those that do concern both, are all such evils, as upon such marriages are wont to vex both the parties so joined together, which indeed are many and great. Of which Erasmus Videmus autem, saith he, tot hominum millia infoelici coniugio sibi cohaerere cum exitio vtrius{que}: qui fortasse disiuncti servari possent. that is, That we see many thousands that cleave together in their unlucky wedlock to the destruction of them both: who, it may be, if they were sūdred again, might so be saved. And thereupon he inferreth, that if it might be done citra iniuriam divini praecepti, that is, without any breach of God's commandment, then were it at least to be wished: and his reason is, because it is Apostolicae pietatis, omnium saluti quantum licet consulere, & infirmis etiam Ecclesiae membris sua cura succurrere. that is, appertaining unto Apostolic piety, so much as may be to endeavor the salvation of all, and especially to be helping unto the weak members of the Church. Those that concern the innocent parties, are such as more specially haunt them. For whom it is, that elsewhere he reasoneth, that tales saepe existunt causae, vt crudele videatu • non succurrere periclitanti: that is, that ofttimes there are so just causes, that it may seem to be no less then plain cruelty, not to help one that is in so manifest danger. Wherevnto the more to move us, he addeth, Christus nō gravatur ob vnam oviculam lustratis omnibus obambulare, quam humeris reducat: & nos gravabimur experiri, si qua multis pereuntibus succurri possit, praesertim quum Christus salutis sit author, & humanae leges non aliter valere debeant, nisi quatenus ad salutem conducunt hominum ? that is, Christ thinketh not much, for one sheep only, to go up and down, everywhere seeking, that having found it, he may bring it home again, even on his shoulders; and shall we think much to assay, whether any way we may be able to help those that are ready to perish: especially, when as Christ is the author of safety, and men's laws should be of no further force, but so far as they tend to the good of men? And a little before, somewhat more plainly, I am nemo poterit inficiari, saith he, leges Christi multo aequissimas esse &c. Wherevpon he inferreth, An igitur aequum videtur vt maritus cum vxore flagitiis operta, quibus nec causam dedit, nec mederi possit, cogatur vivere, cum qua vivere non sit vivere: aut si divertat, compellatur omnem aetatem orbus, destitutus, ac velut eviratus degere ? that is, Now there is nobody that can deny but that the laws of Christ are most upright &c. But then, may this be accounted to stand with any equity or right, that the husband should be compelled to live with a woman that is so marvelous ill, when as he never gave any just cause of that her lewdness, neither ever was able to make her better, with whom to live is to be accounted no life at all: or if he leave her, that then he should be compelled all his life long to live out of hope of propagatiō, without his help, and as it were to be turned out even of his very manhood it self? Beza likewise, if the woman after divers pardons do yet offend again, in such case quid iniquius, saith he, quam innocentis, quivratur netum quidem rationem habere? that is, What is more unjust, then even then also not to have any care of the innocent party? That inconvenience that concerneth others also, is in like sort noted by Beza: that if divorce for adultery & marriage again were so far restrained, it would make both harlots more bold & ready to offend; & those that had the wrong, quietly to put it up, and not to seek the punishment of it. Now, of what force these reasons are, may soon be espied of any that will a little mark them: both that which standeth upon the abuses going before; and those others that stand upon the inconveniences that follow after. For as touching that which standeth upon the abuses going before, as I have noted so much already, that if so we should use it, it would be but a weak reason to urge any to be of that opinion: so in it self it is clear indeed, that the abuses themselves were to be amended, and by force of good laws, or by good government to be taken away; and that no such liberty is to be granted for redress thereof, as may not stand by undoubted warrant of the word of God. So that, if they suppose this to be such which now they do urge, thē though they do require no more then justly they may generally; yet therein they mis • e, that first they take such hold of this liberty, before they have found it to be, by the word of God allowed unto them. The like may be said of the first sort of inconveniences also, such as concern both the parties indifferently: and of the last likewise, which were such as concerned others withal. But for the middle fort, such as concern the innocent parties (which seem to be the strongest of all) although it cannot be denied, but that their case is hard and much to be pitied withal: yet, as themselves do grant that they cast no further to help them, then it may stand with the written word (and so are therein, but only so weak, as in the other) so is it further to be considered, that even those inconveniences of which they would so gladly ease the innocent parties, may be either so just chastisements, or so needful exercises for them, that we are not so much to cast, how to ease them therein (by taking of that burden from them) as to encourage them, patiently to bear those crosses of theirs, and to teach them, that it is their duties so to do. So, for these reasons we are to suspēd our judgments awhile, until we see these two things: first that such liberty (of divorce for adultery, and marrying again) doth undoubtedly stand with the word of God; then, that those other inconveniences (as they are called) are no such things as of duty should be sustained. Otherwise it is very clear, that these reasons also do nothing hold.

18 Those other things that are of a kind, or so near unto these, as that out of them they draw certain reasons for these likewise, are divers: some of them such, as from which they reason, as from the like; and some others such again, as from which they reason, as from the less unto the greater. Those that are such, as from which they reason as from the like, are most of them taken out of the opinions or practice of men: but some of them also, out of the word of God it self. Of the former sort are those, whereof Erasmus bringeth reasonable good store: as namely, that the opinion of Johannes Andreae is, matrimonium, antequam intercesserit copula, posse dirimi, non solum ob professionem vitae monasticae, verum etiam sola Romani; pontificis authoritate: that is, that espousals, before the parties have lain together, may be dissolved again, not only for the professiō of the monastical life, but also, even by the authority of the Bishop of Rome alone, without anything else. Again, out of Hostiensis, Augustinus, and Pope Lion, quod lapsus in haeresim dirimat matrimonium, etiam consummatum: & ita dirimat, ut jus sit ei qui perstiterit in fide, alteri jungi: that is, that to fall into heresy, dissolveth matrimony, even consummate also: and dissolveth it so clean, that it is lawful for the party that abideth in the faith, to marry another. Thirdly, that Zacharias the Pope, dirimat matrimonium ob rem habitam cum sorore vxoris : that is, doth break of the bond of marriage, if the husband hath had to do with his wives sister: and farther grāteth leave to the wife, if she did not consent, to marry again. Lastly (so far as I think needful to allege at this present) that Hostiensis making a question, an Ecclesia possit hodie statuere, ut altero fidelium prolapso in haeresim, possit alter conjugum transire ad nova vota, definite posse: that is, that setting the question, whether the Church may at this day take order, that if one of the parties that are married fall into heresy, then may the other marry again, he resolveth, that the Church may so do. And then, having shown by those and such like, what opinions there have been, not unlike (as he taketh it) in matters of marriage, to that which he moveth, he is bold to go unto others also that are farther of: as that the Apostles, to pacify the Jews, took order with the Gentiles, for certain of those ceremonies to be observed of the Christians in Antioch; that the Bish: of Rome maketh other Bishops thā the Apostle alloweth of; & that the Church hath of late (to speak of) determined of divers matters, that were left at more liberty before, as Transubstantiation, the proceeding of the holy Ghost from the Son also, the Conception of the blessed Virgin, and that the holy Ghost is of the same substance with the Father and the Son. Al which he allegeth to this ende, to show that it is no new thing in the Church of God, as they see occasions to arise, so to take farther order in divers matters, than by those had been taken that were before them: and so would insinuate, that in that matter also they might do well to take such order as he commended, if so be that the word of God would bear it, as he was persuaded it would. Of the latter divers particulars are likewise alleged, out of that same part of the Sermon of Christ in the Moūtaine (wherein also we have the first speech that Christ did utter concerning this matter) out of which both he, & some others besides, do reason for the opinion they hold in the matter that now we speak of: both, of the liberty that our selves do take in other such like speeches of Christ; and of the perfection of those things that Christ doth there commend unto us. Cōcerning the liberty that ourselves do take in other such like speeches of Christ, he saith, that whereas he forbiddeth us to swear, to be angry, to reproach, to presume to come with our offering to God before that we are at one with our brother, to go to law, to requite displeasures, & to resist evil, and doth farther command us to love our enemies, to deserve well of them that deserve ill of us, and to pray for them that curse us, first saith, quum eodem in loco plura doceat, quae pure germane{que} Christianis digna sunt, cur in ceteris omnibus recipimus interpretationem, in uno divortio tam rigidi sumus, ut magis etiam astringamus verba Christi: that is, When as in the same place he teacheth many things which simply and plainly concern the duty of Christians, why do we in all things else admit of some interpretation, and yet are so crabbed in this one point of Divorce, that we do even farther restaine those words of Christ? Concerning the perfection of those things that Christ doth there commend unto us, reasoning otherwise, on it than others do, he saith likewise, Christus haec locutus est, non turbis, sed discipulis, id{que} in monte, depingens purissimam illam sui corporis partem quam appellate regnum coelorum cui nullis sit opus legib{us} : that is, Christ spake these things not to the multitude, but to his Disciples, & that in the mount, painting forth that most pure part of his body which he calleth the kingdom of heaven, whereunto there will be no need of laws. And by & by after, Pone talem populum qualem Christus optat, nec repudio fuerit opus, nec jurejurādo. Quod si ob infirmos quos in tanto numero plurimos habet Etclesia, nemo vetatur legibus jus suum persequi; nemo vetatur vim à capite repellere; nemo vetatur jurare modo ob rem, & ne pejeret; nemo cogitur been mereri de male merentibus: cur vnum hoc de divortio promiscue exigimus ab omnibus? That is, Admit such a people as Christ wisheth, and there shall be no need either of Divorce, or of swearing But if for the weak, whom the Church hath in so great abundance, nobody is forbidden to seek his right by law; nobody is forbidden to defend himself from violence; nobody is forbid̄ to swear, so there because, and that he forswear not; no man is compelled to deserve well of those that deserve ill of him: why do we exact this matter of divorce so generally of all? Others there be, that because Christ taught such perfection there, do therevpō gather, that if a man put away his wife for adultery, and marry another it may not in any wise be called in questiō, for that it is allowed there, where things of so great perfection are taught. Those that are as from the less unto the greater, are such as these. Because that Chrysostom giveth in the reason why the Jew is suffered to put away his wife, ne invisam occidat, that is, least that upon his hatred of her he also slay her, thereupon he reasoneth, Itáne prodesse debet apud Iudaeos flagitiosa sua malitia, & apud nos non proderit marito sua innocentia ? That is, Shall the Jew have that benefit of that wicked malice of his, and shall not an husband among us have like benefit out of his undefiled and honest dealing? The like again (and one strain farther) a little after, Saltem hoc apud nos detur infoelici innocentiae, quod apud Iudaeos datum est perversae maritorum acerbitati, quod Paulus indulget vidius intem • perantibus, ne quid admittant sceleratius. that is, At least, let that be granted that we also may have our miserable innocence so far relieved, as the Jews had their perverse crabbednes borne with, and so far as S. Paul himself bearethwith intemperate widows, least they commit some further evil. Of what force these reasons of his are if now we examine, first as touching the opinion of those others (for such like matters as he presupposeth) that he brought in, the reason is sufficient to stop the mouths of those that so hold: but not to establish that point of doctrine it self. That the Apostles themselves, and the godly Fathers after, determined more plainly of divers things, then those that went before them had done, they had the word of God for them therein, and then not to be reproved by any: but their doing therein may be no argument to move us to determine of this, but only so far (which appeareth not yet) as we may account, that we have the word of God to bear us out in it. But whereas he shuffleth in (among the rest) divers things that they determined & did against the word of God, we ought to be so much the more wary in suffering our selves to be led thereby, whenas the reason is of that nature, as buildeth on falsehood, as well as on truth. As for the liberty that we take in those speeches of Christ, we take none (in any doctrine that thereof we hold) but such as standeth by good warrant of the word of God in other places, and then can that be no sufficient reason to move us, to do the like in this, for which (as yet) we find in the word no warrant at all. And, though much be to be attributed unto him: yet in this it may be doubted, that himself understood not those places; else that never he would have so reasoned on them. The perfection that Christ might seem thereby, to commend unto us, was not to that ende so laid open by him to show in how many things we must be spared for our weakness sake; but plainly to show us, how we ought to endeavor our selves to walk in that holy calling: and then doth it leese the force of the reason for which he brought it. Neither doth Christ therein teach us so absolute perfectiō in those points, but that some others also there are, of an higher degree then those, of which he speaketh nothing at all. As in his first example of doing murder, though he forbid divers other branches of that evil root, yet neither doth he recite but a very few of them (to speak of) in comparison of the rest: neither doth he speak anything of the contrary virtues, or great care that we ought to have of the safety and good estate of others, which notwithstanding are by the commandment also required. And so likewise in all the rest. So his purpose was not there to teach all perfection; but to give them to understand, that he was so far from setting them loose from that strict rule of life which the law prescribed unto them, that he did require much more of them by virtue thereof, thē they did think they were bound unto: and that doth he content himself briefly to show, by those few examples. In which sense if we take it, then shall we soon espy, how weak also that reason is of those others. Those that are taken, as from the less to the greater, carry their own weakness with them so plain, that nobody need (as I do take it) any further to show it: being able to show, if need were, that one of them hath such a wem or gawl in it besides (that censure of his, of those his widows) that there is no reason why it should be (in this light that now we have) of credit with any.

19 The authority or testimony of others, whereon certain of their reasons rely, is either of God: or else of men. Of those that rely on the authority or testimony of God, that is, upon the written word, they have two sorts of reasons that are but weak: one sort, by mistaking of the Text it self; another, by gathering amiss thereon. Mistaking of the Text is (in this matter) a common slip almost with them all: and then, if they ground any reasons thereon, needs must they be of small importance. And first, Erasmus having conceived, as we saw before, that the law did plainly allow the husband to put away his adulterous wife (if she were very bad therein: for so he limiteth his judgment thereof) he urgeth further (as in that place also was declared) that it is not added there (fuisse) hoc datum duritiae cordis, praesertim quum ex sensu naturae non possit sciri quod nos interpretamur ▪ that is, that it was granted for the hardness of their harts, especially when as that which we do gather thereon (meaning as I take it, that which we have learned of Christ, that it was but for the hardness of their harts) cannot be gathered by sense or nature. And immediately he addeth further, Et si concessum est duritiae cordis, uti{que} licet, quod concedit Deus: praesertim si nullo signo declaret eos peccare, qui permisso vtantur. that is, And if it be granted but for the hardness of their harts; yet is that lawful, that God hath granted: especially if he do no way declare that those do offend that use the liberty that is permitted. In which notwithstanding he doth not so rest, but that he taketh hold of another help withal, adding thereunto as followeth▪ Verum haec utcun{que} habeant, ita conceditur, ut tamen impunt sit marito duxisse quam velit, nec vetantur utcun{que} repudiatae nubere. Inter dum enim hoc licere dicitur, quod Lex non punit : that is, But howsoever these things be, it is so far granted, that there is no punishment for the husband that (in such case) marrieth (another) whom he will, neither are these that are divorced howsoever, forbidden to marry again (it may be notwithstanding his meaning herein, that men are not forbidden to marry such as are any way divorced; but the other I rather think to be his meaning. Then he proceedeth) For sometimes that is said to be lawful, which the Law doth not punish. And so doth he reason before likewise upon that supposal of his, that such a liberty was by Moses granted unto them. Cur, quum idem si • morbus, non idem admovetur remedium? that is, What reason is there that, when we need that help as much as they it should not be granted to us as much as to them? Musculus likewise in such sort mistaking it, doth nevertheless build somewhat upon it. Moses, saith he, permiseret libellum repudit Judaeis: ex hoc permissu passiu • repudiabaentur vxore • , that is, Moses had permitted a bill of divorcement unto the Jews: by the means of that permission of his, it grew to be a common thing among them, for husbands to divorce their wives from them. And so mistaking another besides, nevertheless he maketh it the chief part of the ground of his opinion, that there is no divorce, but where the parties may marry again. For having that point in hand, that in the Church there is no other divorce by law allowed, but that uter{que} maneat incōingatus, aut reconciliētur, that is, that each party abide unmarried or be reconciled, he inferreth, that Christ spake de nullo ficto, sed vero divortio, per quod potestas dabatur denuo cum alia cōtrahendi conjugiū, &c. Nullū enim aliud divortiū noverāt Iudaei, &c: licuisse autē dimissae alteri nubere, vel hoc testimonij sufficiat, quod sacerdoti praecipitur in lege, ne dimissam ducat: quae lex supervacanea esset, sifas non esset repudiatae denuo nubere: that is, of no counterfeit, but of the true divorce, by which power was given to marry again with another. For the Jews knew no other divorce. And that it was lawful for her that was divorced to marry again, this one testimony only may be sufficient, that commandment was givē in the Law, that a Priest might not marry a divorced woman which law had been superfluous, if it had not been lawful for a woman divorced to marry again. Which also (among others) is the collection of Kemnitius himself, for the lawfulness of this liberty of Divorce and marrying again, against a contrary determination set down thereof by the Council of Trent a little before. But hereof this little taste may be sufficient, for that the chief part of the groundwork of their opinion doth rest thereon (for that which they have in the Olde Testament to build upon:) which was a great part of the inducement that led them unto it. Concerning which, & all such like, it is clear enough in it self, that mistaking the Text whereon they grounded, the opinion that they conceive thereon must needs be but weak, and needeth nothing else to discover the weakness of it, but only to show that they mistake the Text it self. But in Erasmus we have some things else to note besides. First that in these things he rested somewhat on the sense of nature: as perilous a guide in the matters that now we speak of, as (of those that are of some credit) a mā could lightly otherwise have chosen. For being by nature so much given as we are to the lusts of the flesh (and to have variety therein) and to be avenged of such displeasures as are done unto us (especially such, as touch us so near, as now we speak of) we are not to look for any other, but that we may be as easily blinded in this, if we lean to our own judgment therein, as in anything else that can lightly befall us. So that, in this especially, he should not have rested anything at all on the sense of nature, but have fought some better guid, whom he might more safely have followed. Then also, how readily he taketh hold on that permission, even only for that it was permitted (not regarding how far, not howe) though himself do find none other, but that it was only for the hardness of their hearts: a sufficient burn; to have discredited the use of that liberty to all that are godly, or that have any reasonable care, even of their honesty before mē. And yet whereas he doth so readily take such hold thereon, it may seem to argue, that his store otherwise is but weak. Lastly, that after a sort abandoning these, if they should not be thought meet to serve, he taketh hold of another almost as weak: namely, that because there was no punishment set down for it in the Policy of Moses, therefore it was after a sort, or in some sense permitted unto them. And yet is it sufficiently known unto all; that as in all other Policies whatsoever, even so in that of Moses also, there be divers things that are unlawful, which there have no punishment at all devised for thē: and therefore that we are not so to reason, that seeing it is not punished there (as neither it was to have many wives) therefore it is no offense to do it. For although such a reason might best hold from thence, of any other Policy in all the world besides: yet even that also would fail us herein, if any should rest so far upon it.

20 But now, if we come to consider, how far they have gathered amiss upon those several Texts that they have used, what others may think, I know not, but, for myself, I cannot but marvel at many things that I find therein. Which kind of gathering when I also had gathered, as needful to be commended unto the farther consideration of the learned, I found them in number to be so many, & to proceed from so many great personages also, that I thought it sufficient for the matter, and meetest also in some other respects, to take but some few of them (leaving the rest unto the search of those that desire to look farther into them:) and therein also, not to deal with all those or many of them that so are minded, but only with some few, & such as the equity of the cause it self shall most desire to be called unto such trial. In which respect. I have thought good to resolve on Erasmus for the one, and on M ^r Beza for the other: because that (of those that are extant, and yet I have seen) those two have of set purpose discoursed thereof, and most largely handled the same. And in these also to omit all such collections, as elsewhere by occasion may pass them, while principally they intend some other matter, I mean to deal but only with those (and but with some of thē neither) that belong unto the chief and principal points of the matter that is in question: namely, how they gather their opinion or judgment therein; and how they answer such Obiectiōs as may be alleged against it. And first as touching Erasmus, although he profess no more but only to propoūde it, and to commend it to the farther consideration of the learned, and to that end more largely showeth, both that divers before have been of that mind, or at least inclinable unto it; and that such like things they have in daily allowance among themselves: yet doth he plainly enough profess, that (for his part) he is of that mind himself; and laboreth also to take away such objections as seem to be of force against it. As touching the former of them, the truth is, that as there is none of them all, that do build this opinion of theirs on any other Text besides (excepting those which they did mistake, of which I have spoke before) but only on that exceptiō which Christ used two several times, namely, in the fifth, and in the nineteenth of S. Matthew: so he also (for that his opiniō) goeth no further but only to it, and thereupon buildeth that which he hath thereon conceived. But those words of Christ doth he account to make so plain for hispurpose, that because we allow not on such divorce to marry again, he chargeth us that in divortio tam rigidi fimus, ut magis etiam astringamus verba Christi. that is, That in divorce we are so hard or grievous, that we do further restrain those words of Christ. And his reason is, Etenim quum ill reliquerit marito unam causam repudiandae coningis, nos cam multis mo • is astringimus. that is. For whereas he left to the husband one cause for which he might put away his wife, we do many ways restrain the fain. And after again, Iudaei quod Moses • eri • serat de libetto repudi • sic interpretabantur, quasi ma • veis jui effet qualibet lecit de causa reijcere coinge &c. Id Christus astringit ad unam adulterii causam. that is, The Jews did so interpret that which Moses wrote of the bill of divorce, as though husbands might put away their wives for any cause though never so small. That did Christ restrain only unto the cause of adultery. And by and by after, Ergo suis Christus unam dunt axat causam indulget divortij. that is, Therefore Christ alloweth unto his but only one cause of divorce. And in these (so far as yet I have found) is his judgment most plainly declared. In which it is good to note those two things: first that he buildeth for that matter on no other Scripture, but only on that exception; then, that he so taketh that exception, that thereon he inferreth, that for adultery Christ himself alloweth divorce. If he build upon no other Scripture but only on that exception, thē our business lying within less room, & nearer unto us, we may so much the sooner find how it holdeth together that he gathereth thereon. If he so take the exception, that thereon he gathereth, that Christ alloweth the husband to put away his wife for adultery, thē, either must the place it self be of that nature that it can have no other sense but it: or, if it may have some other besides, thē is he to show what reason he hath why the place should rather be taken as he would have it, then as others have taken it heretofore. Whereas therefore it is evident (by the judgment of most men, in the Church of God, who did otherwise take it) that the place may have another sense, and yet himself, having shown no reason which may stand for any just proof, that the Text must needs be taken in that sense that he would have it, doth nevertheless so enter upon it, and will have that to be the meaning of it hence is it, that for anything that yet I do see to the contrary, he can hardly avoid the reproof of a forcible entry, or to look for so much courtesy at his adversaries hands, as first to grant him, that that shall be the sense of the place. And then having gotten so much for divorce, that in such case the husband may use the benefit of it, that is to put away his wife if so she have sinned, then will himself infer the other also (that then he may lawfully marry another) only by telling us plainly, what divorce it is that he meaneth. For he saith Divortium interim appello, not that, quo dirimitur domestica consuetudo, manente coniugij vinculo, but verum, & quale solum illa novit aet as, qua licebat, à repudio prioris, alteram dacere. Whereby he giveth us to understand, that he meaneth such divorce as altogether breaketh the bād of marriage, and not such as standeth by law all Christendom through (almost) if there be no other cause but adultery only. Which two if we lay together, namely, that Christ alloweth divorce in case of adultery, and then, that the divorce must also be such as giveth free liberty to marry again, the collection that he maketh on those words of Christ must needs be this, that Christ alloweth those that be his, to put away their wives for adultery, and to marry again: an opinion that is, notwithstanding all his submissions and protestations before and after, more boldly avouched; then it is with any of his proofs that yet I have found, or (as I am persuaded) ever shall, strongly confirmed. As touching the latter, that is, how, for his defense, he gathereth upon those places that do seem to make against him, we are first to note, that some there are with which at all he doth not meddle, and yet are of special importance against the opinion that he conceived: & then further we are to consider how he gathereth his defense out of those that he useth. If some there be that he meddleth not with, and yet are of special importance, then may we account, that his defense is so much the weaker: and those places that now I speak of are those two, the one of Deuteronomy, the other of Malachi, that I shown before to be most likely to be mistaken, in which the Hebrew in them both, & the Septuagint also in the latter of them, do so frame those Texts to speak, as that to one that would have cleared the questiō of the doubts thereof, those also had been as needful to be answered, as not many others more. Those that he useth, are certain of those speeches, which (concerning this matter) were uttered by Christ: and certain others of the Apostle S ^t Paul. Those that he taketh of Christ are three: two of thē in effect but one; but the other, a several one by it self. Those that are in effect but one, are those two so well known places, in the first and nineteenth Chapters of the Gospel by S. Matthew. Where Christ doth so much restrain the liberty of divorce, restraining it unto adultery only, as these men take it. Out of which how he gathereth for his defense, is a thing very specially worth the marking. For he doth not now gather, as the residue do, upon the advantage that is supposed to lie in the Exception; but out of the whole restraint generally: gathering, that the doctrine which was there delivered, did draw so near unto the perfection of true Christianity, that if we should exactly apply it unto our lives, to make it a rule unto us, we had need to use some favorable interpretation of many things therein; or that we had some dispensation to avoid the strictness of it. For the former he saith, Verùm quum eodem in loco complura doceat quae pure germane{que} Christianis digna sunt, cur in caeteris omnibus recipimus interpretationem, in vno divortio tam rigidi sumus, vt magis etiam astringamus verba Christi ? that is, But seeing he teacheth many things in that place which may right well become Christians indeed, how cometh it to pass, that in all the rest we content our selves with (some favorable) interpretation, and only in divorce we are so austere, that we do even further restrain those words of Christ. And anon after, when he hath shown how much we restrain, as he doth take it, those words of Christ, coming to that course again that he may give in some examples of it, he further addeth, Hac igitur una in parte tam mordicus tenemus summum, quod aiunt, jus, in caeteris quamvis recipientes interpretationem. Vetat inibi, Ne juremus omnino: vetát{que} multo severius quàm divortium, & pluribus verbis inculcat: & tamē ob tres drachmas juramus passim, sic excusantes, Non est jurandum temere. Cur non item, Non est divertendum temere? Vetat ill irasci: Mox subijcimus, Temere. Vetat ill compellare quenquam contumeliosius: nos etiam colaphos impingimus, deni{que} occidimus, & excusamus, Non laedendi sed castigādi animo &c ; that is, Therefore in this point we do so strictly cleave unto the uttermost that may seem to be urged thereby, receiving any interpretation in the rest. He there forbiddeth, to swear at all. And with greater severity he forbiddeth that, then he doth divorce, & with more words doth beat upon it: and yet for the worth of a shilling we commonly swear, excusing our selves, that we are not (indeed) to swear rashly. And why not as well, that a man, may not leave his wife rashly? He forbiddeth to be angry: and we by & by add (the meaning to be, that we do it not) rashly. He forbiddeth to reproach any: yet we even beat, and slay also: & then excuse our selves, that we do it but to chastise him only, and not to hurt him. And so forth bringing divers other such instances or examples besides: and so concluding on them likewise. For the latter he addeth likewise, Si ut conditus erat homo, perseverasset, nullum erat futurum inter vllos divortium. Christus revocans suos ad pristinam innocentiam, non vult divortium, quia non vult duros cord: & tamen Paulus indulget humanae fragilitati, relaxans saepenumero Domini praeceptum. Cur non idem facere possit Romanus Pontifex ? that is, If man had continued as first he was made, there would thē have been no divorce among them. Christ calling back those that were his to that former innocence, will have no divorce, because he will not have them to be hardharted: & yet Paul beareth with the infirmity of man, releasing ofttime the Lord's commandment. Why may not the Bishop of Rome do the same likewise? By which, I trust, it may sufficienly appear, that he rested not on that supposed allowance of divorcing for adultery, but (over and besides that) accounteth the residue of that prohibition of divorce so straight, as that it were needful for us, either to have some favorable interpretation for it; or at least to be dispensed with all for some part of it: and yet that in either of those his gatherings he hath one special slip besides. For in the former, when he pleadeth for such favorable interpretation, the only force of his reasoning standeth, as it were from the like, or else from the lesser unto the greater. Which he endeavoreth to confirm unto us by all those examples that there he bringeth, of which I recited but a few of them: showing, that seeing we do in such sort interpret them, as that we do not account our selves to be tied to the letter of thē (as indeed we do for the chiefest of thē, & those that give credit (that which he seeketh) unto the rest, & so may do by good Divinity; the rest being none of our interpretatiō of them, but only the fruits either of the ignorance of those days, or of the corrupt affections of flesh & blood) we should in like sort, if not much rather, interpret that of divorce likewise, as his own words do plainly declare. But now the truth is that that interpretation of ours which we give of the rest standeth by authority of the word of God, & that by other Scriptures we are forced so to take thē (as when there we are forbid̄ to swear at all, & yet elsewhere are taught to swear by God, & that it is a part of the worship that we must do him:) and that the interpretation that he would have us to make of the other, is not such as any other Scripture doth lead us unto; but such as all other Scripture directly crosseth as we do take it, and trust to make plain ere we have done. And then, if we have Scripture for the one, but not for the other, howsoever that motion of his may savor well of great humanity: yet well may we doubt, that such stuff would be but seelie Divinity. In the latter likewise, besides that he chargeth S. Paul to dispence ofttimes with the Lord's commandment (which would be hard for him to prove,) and thē he seeth no reason, but that the B. of Rome might do so also (wherein he spake according to the manner of those days, or else but offereth somewhat to ride him) he may seem to gather, that Christ did no farther restrain divorce unto his, neither himself had any farther meaning, but so far as their hardness of hearts should be also abolished, that thereby they should not stand in need of that help to their infirmity: which course if in other things also we should attempt, sooner should we show our selves to endeavor, rather to make our corrupt inclinatiō a rule to interpret the Scriptures unto us; than to allow, that the Scriptures should be a rule unto us, whereby to amend, or to call to the check, whatsoever ill ways there are in our own corruption. That which is a several one by it self, is that same that in the 19 of Matthew Christ also uttered, that it was not for man to put asunder, that which God hath coupled together. Concerning which he saith, Porro quod obijcitur ex eodem loco, Quod Deus conjunxit, homo ne separet, nō magno negotio solvi potest. Hoc Deus conjunxit quod rite conjungitur: hoc Deus dirimit quod rite dirimitur. That is, Furthermore, that which is objected out of the same place, that which God hath coupled together, that let no man put asunder, may soon be answered. That (only) hath God coupled together, that is coupled aright: & that doth God (himself) break a sunder that is well put a sunder. In which course also he then in such sort proceedeth, that although he well provideth that he will have no divorce to be made by the parties themselves, nor by any but only such as are in authority for those matters: yet he plainly showeth, that he would have it to be done for more causes than for adultery, and yet that it also should be God's doing too. Quod male, saith he, cōglutinavit pueritia, quod vinum, quod temeritas, quod inscitia, quod male per lenas ac lenones, suos Diaconos conjū cerat diabolus, hoc per suos Ministros recte dirimit Deus ▪ that is, that that which childhood, which excess in wine, which rashness, which ignorance had coupled together, that which by harlots and bawds his own proper Deacons the Devil had joined, those doeth God by those Ministers of his rightly put asunder again. To which ende also he told us a little before, that neither among the Gentiles, nor yet among the Jews marriages were accounted to be of force, without the consent of the parents or the principal friends unto them appertaining: & tamē apud utros{que} ali quo modo dirimi poterat matrimoniū. Apud Christianos facilime coit conjugium, & semel initum nullo pacto potest dissolvi: that is, & yet with thē both, marriage might some way or other be dissolved among thē. But among Christians marriage is most easily made, and yet when it is made, then is there no way to undo it again. In this therefore (pleading for so great a liberty to divorce, as he doth) he hath not only no Scripture for him, but now also even the most of those, that (in these days of ours) are for divorce and marrying again, flatlie against him: & so, his gathering herein not only in truth, but also to them, who only should have the benefit of it, sufficiently weakened. Those that he taketh out of S. Paul, are three likewise: but the first two of them, in effect, but one; and the third a several place by itself. The first two are, the one, out of the seventh likewise of the former Epistle unto the Corinthians. To the former of them, that showeth the woman to be bound to her husband so long as he liveth, his answer is, Non hîc agit Paulus de divortio, sed similitudinem adducit Iudaeis exipsorum lege, qua doceat ac persuadeat, antiquata jam Mosi lege per evangelium, non amplius illos teneri legis caeremonijs, quū Christo novo sponso nupserint. Nec est necesse similitudinem aut parabolam quadrare per omnia, &c : that is, The Apostle doth not here speak of divorce (which notwithstanding himself doth but say, & not prove) but he bringeth unto the Jews a similitude out of their own law, by the which he may teach and persuade, that the Law of Moses being now abolished by the Gospel, they are no more bound to the ceremonies of the law, being now married to Christ their new husband. Neither is it needful that a similitude or parable should in all things agree, a thing that is not in this required: and yet must the thing it self be true, if anything shall be proved thereby. To the latter of them (much like to the former) he answereth likewise, Ne hîc quidem Paulus tractat materiam divortij, sed adhortatur pro illorum temporum statu, ut quae liberae sunt à conjugio, praesertim vidus (nam ad harū causam videtur redire) abstineant à cōjugio, &c: that is, Neither here doth Paul treat of the matter of Divorce, but he exhorteth, as the estate of that time required, that such women as were free from marriage, especially widows (for he seemeth to return to them again) would abstain frō marriage, to the end they might be freer from worldly affairs, &c. Which assertion of his, besides that he hath not proved it, maketh little for him, for that though the Apostle did not to that end speak it; yet nothing letteth, but that so it may be applied. That which is a several place by it self, is out of the self same chapter also unto the Corinthians, where the Apostle requireth in the name of the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband, and that the husband do not put away his wife: which, as himself saith, is locus omnium difficilimus, that is, the hardest place of them all. Concerning which his best answer is, that S. Paul there doth not treat de gravibus flagitijs, quae crimen adulterij vel aequent, vel superent etiam: sed de levioribus offēsis, ob quas, apud Graecos potissimum, crebra fiebant divortia : that is, not of grievous crimes which were as great as adultery, or greater rather, but of the lighter offenses, for the which especially among the Grecians, there were often̄ divorces made. Alleadging also a testimony out of Juvenal, of one that had, by such dealing, eight husbands in five years. And the reason that he bringeth, why he taketh it that the Apostle spake but of lesser offenses, he gathereth out of the reconciliation that there is mentioned: which notwithstanding proveth it not; but leaveth it only on the credit of his own judgment. Which belike himself did somewhat perceive, because he rested not therein, but took hold of some others, and those also as weak as it: one, of difference of the sex, pleading that he gave that lesson but only to womē (which while he doth, he letteth slip a scape or two;) the other, his own guess, what the Apostle would have set down for such matters, if the case had been put unto him, as it is with us. And when yet he doubteth that this his answer will not content all, but that some may happily urge that the Apostle did not there mean to exclude the cause of Adultery, for that, it seemeth, he had no more to say but this, Cur non excipit quod excipit Dominus? Imo cur addidit, quod non addidit Dominus, Maneat innupta? Cur viro prohibit ne dimittat, cui permittit Christus, ut dimittat adulteram? that is, (altogether reasoning, if you mark it, on that which is in question among us, and yet grounding thereon as if it were either proved by him, or by us granted unto him) Why thē did not the Apostle except, which the Lord himself excepted? And more then that; why did he add, which the Lord added not, namely, Let her abide unmarried? Why doth he forbid the husband to put any away, when as Christ himself alloweth to put his wife away, if she be an adulteress? And thus much to show, how Erasmus hath gathered, both for his conceiving of that opinion at the first: and for the clearing of it besides, of those objections which he saw might be made against it.

21 M ^r Beza wrote long after Erasmus, when as the motion that he had made was now considered upon by many, and condescended unto by some: and he wrote so purposely of it, that if there be anything that may rightly be gathered for it, we may hope to find it in him; and, if that shall be sufficient to confirm that point of doctrine unto us, that then we shall find nothing at all, that will be wrong or hardly gathered. Here therefore it shall be good to consider, what he hath found, either whereon to build that opiniō of his, or to defend it against those Scriptures that are against it. What he hath found, for the grounding of his own opinion therein, we may sufficiently gather out of that which himself setteth down for that matter. For, after that first he hath sundered certain other things from the question that he hath in hand, which owise might have cūbred him very much therein, he plainly inferreth Adulterio igitur coniugium, recte & bona conscientia, dirimi posse affirmo, expressis hac de re Christi verbis. that is, Therefore I affirm, upon the express words of Christ, that rightly and with a good conscience, marriage by adultery may be dissolved: as resolute, and as plain an asseveration, as at any time needeth; and therefore likely enough to have some special good ground work whereon it is grounded. Which, by his quotation in the margent, himself doth show to be those very words that before we spake of, and which are in question betwixt us, & that they are those express words of Christ, that he did mean. Howbeit those are they, that, as touching the sense of them, are altogether in question betwixt us: and by what right may he then account them so express or plain on his behalf, when as he knoweth that that is plainly denied unto him. Which because he could not but know, that therein he was contradicted by many, therefore he addresseth himself immediately to prove, that that must be the sense of those his words: and needful it is, that we do well mark the force of his reason. Quum enim, saith he, videret Christus Legem de lapidandis adulteris latam (ut & alias pleras{que}) contemni, cavere tamen conscientiis voluit: ideo{que}, interrogatus, an, ut facere plurimi solebant, quavis ex causa divortij libellum tradere liceret, sic respondit, ut non tantum negaret id fas esse quavis ex causa, verumetiam exprimeret, nulla id ex causa nisi ob adulterium licere: quibus verbis nihil planius aut magis perspicuum dici potest. Ita{que} nullus adhuc est, quod sciam, inter Christianos, seu veteres seu recentiores inventus, qui non concesserit, probato adulterio, fas esse innocenti nocentem dimittere: sed pleri{que} excogitata distinctione inter separationem à thoro, & dissolutionem ipsius conjugalis vinculi, quod recte prius constituerant mox evertunt, qúā novi conjugij potestatem separatis non concedunt. Cujus sententiae quum etiam Augustinus ipse fuerit, necesse est imprimis ostendere, quam firmis rationibus omnia contraria argumenta doctissimi Theologi nostra memoria diluerint. that is, For whē Christ did see that the law of stoning adulterous persons to death (as divers other good laws besides) were not regarded; yet would he provide for the conscience therein: and therefore being asked, whether as many did use to do, it were lawful for every cause to give a bill of divorcement, he so answered, that he did not only deny, that for every cause it was lawful so to do, but also did plainly set down, that it was lawful for none other cause, but only for adultery: then the which, nothing can be more plainly, or perspicuously spoken. And therefore is there none found as yet, that I know of, among Christians, either of old or of late, which hath not allowed that adultery being proved, it is lawful for the innocent party by divorce to put away the offender: but divers of them, having devised a distinction betwixt the separation from bed, and the dissolution of the band of marriage it self, do by and by overthrow that, which rightly they did allow of before, seeing that they do not grant liberty to marry again, to those that are in such sort sundered. Of which opinion seeing even Augustine himself was, it is specially needful to show, with how strong reasons the most learned Divines in this age of ours, have clean wipt away all the arguments of the contrary side. And so, he presently setteth in hand to answer those Objections, that he thinketh to stand in the way of that resolution. But first let us see what proof it is he hath brought for his own. Forsooth that Christ, for that he saw that the law for stoning adulterous persons to death was despised, purposing to provide for the conscience before God, he therefore &c. What have we here, but only his own guess, that that was the purpose and meaning of Christ? Which if it were not, as then we have herein no proof at all: so if it be no more but doubtful; for that he might as likely have some other meaning (which after I trust will easily appear) yet then also this conjecture of his may not justly stand for any sound proof neither, although for his worthiness otherwise his judgment may be had in special reverence. And it is not to be denied, but that that which he bringeth in immediately after, of so general a consent of all, in the allowance of Divorce for adultery, doth much make for that judgment of his at the first sight; but then there is to be considered withal, both that they mistook those places of the Old Testament, which they thought to allow of Divorce for less matters; and that yet they did not allow of such divorce for adultery, as might dissolve the bond of marriage. For if they did so far mistake those places aforesaid, as that then they made no question, but that by the word of God divorce was allowed for lesser matters, then they might easily be of opiniō, that there was no doubt, but that much rather it was allowed for the greater: and in that they were so loath to allow, that even for it also the bond of marriage should stand as broken, it may seem thereby, that although they had in mind those words of Christ, as well as these, yet how plain so ever M ^r Beza doth account thē, they could not find that so they might take them. Now that S. Augustine was of that mind too, that doth weigh so much against him, as the credit of his judgment standeth with any. Whether therefore we may be bold to account, that here among these plain and resolute speeches we have any proof whereon to stay our consciences before God, or whether nothing could be spoken with greater perspecuity, when as so many (and so quick of sight) could never so find it, that do I refer unto others, & think it needful to be pondered of such, as any way have occasiō to use the benefit of sound judgment therein. But belike M ^r Beza did not mean much to confirm, that to be the sense of the words of Christ that he had gathered (for that he thought that matter clear enough in it self) but hastened rather to answer such Obiectiōs as he found to be made against it. And so are we also to see, how he contenteth himself therein. The Objections therefore that himself acknowledgeth to be brought against it, are half a score: where of the one half are brought out of the word of God; the other, out of other reasons besides. As for us, it shall be sufficient to take the assay only of those that are taken out of the word of God: and those are the very same (and none other) that Erasmus before had brought, both for the places of Scripture out of which they are taken, & for the order & disposing of them; and, excepting the first, for the matter also. These therefore are likewise taken, some of them out of the words of Christ: & some of thē, out of the Apostle S. Paul. And so belike we have all this while found nothing more in effect in the word of God for this matter, than Erasmus had found at the first, when he made the motion of it. Those places that are of the words of Christ are three: but the first two are here also joined together in one and so do both stand but for one, & the third for another by it self. Those two places of Christ that make but one, are those former places out of the 5. and 19. Chapters of S Matthew : but the Objection that M ^r Beza gathereth, is not like that which Erasmus gathered before, but varieth from it. For whereas Erasmus gathered out of the austerity or strictness of the whole, but that one way or other the strictness of it was to be mitigated unto us, M ^r Beza, on the other side, out of the liberty that he supposeth to be given by the one part of it, answereth an Objection that out of another part of it is made against them. As touching the Objection he saith, Primùm opponunt • lli istud Christi dictum; Qui repudiatam duxerit moechatur. Nam certe si penitus solutum esset vinculum, moechari vir ejusmodi non diceretur: that is, First they object that saying of Christ, He that marrieth her that is divorced, committeth adultery. For truly, if the bond of marriage were clean broken, such an one should not be said to commit adultery. Unto which his answer is, Exceptionem priori membro additam, in posteriori quo{que} esse repetendam : that is, that the Exception that is added unto the former member of the sentence, is to be repeated again in the latter part of it. But this is no more but only said: the proof doth follow immediately after, in this manner; Nam si qui dimittat uxorem extra causam fornicationis, facit ut ea moec • etur, consequitur eum qui uxore propter adulteriū repudiata aliam duxerit, non facere ut ea moechetur. Ex quo tur sum colligitur, id quod subijcit, apud Matthaeum de repudiata, non nisi repetita ex priore membro exceptione intelligendum, quoniam Dominus alioqui sibi cōtradixisset : that is, For if he that putteth away his wife, without the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery, it followeth (saith he, but let others judge, whether it do so or not) that he, which putting away his wife for adultery doth marry another, doth not make her to commit adultery. Out of which again it is gathered, that that which is there added concerning her that is put away, is not to be taken but with the Exception that is in the former member, because otherwise the Lord should contradict himself, or in one part of the sentence should go against that which he setteth down in another. Which proof of his though he do somewhat further back against one thing that is in that place objected besides: yet this is all the proof that he hath for this very point that now we speak of. But, if we mark it, me think it will soon show it self to be a strange kind of proof. For, admit that the Exceptiō that now we speak of, must needs imply (which notwithstanding we do not grant, but avow it to be the thing that lieth in question betwixt us) that for adultery a man might lawfully put his wife away: yet doth it not so necessarily follow that everyone might so do; or, that no case might be such, but that, if the wife committed adultery, then might her husband lawfully divorce her from him. For it is sufficient for the truth of the proposition (even in that sense takē) if any case be such, as that for adultery it may lawfully be done. As, though we may truly say (as the Scripture also in many places, in effect and meaning, doth, though not in the same terms) that God had no peculiar people for those days in all the world, except the seed of Abraham, or out of that stock or race of his: yet doth it not follow, that all those were of that fellowship; but only, that he had none other besides. Whereas therefore that exception may be satisfied with any particular (that, for adultery, as the case may be, it may be allowed) and yet he inferreth a general upon it, saying that he, that putting away his wife for adultery, marrieth another, doth not commit adultery (for though the proposition, in those terms, be but indefinite, yet is it an universal by nature) hence doth it follow, that his proof is of no better force, then an argument may be that is taken from a particular unto a general, or frō the part unto the whole: as, God for a time had no people in all the world to be his peculiar people, but only the seed of his servant Abraham: ergo, all the seed of Abraham were of his peculiar people. And therefore it is so much the more strange that Beza inferreth, that otherwise Christ had contradicted himself: as though it were any contradiction to say, that for adultery the case might be such, as that the husband might lawfully put away his wife for it; and yet, that in some other cases he might not. His other Objections, as they are the same that Erasmus had gathered before: so are they by him sent lightly away with the self same answer that Erasmus before had given them. For unto that other, of the words of Christ, that no man should part those whom God hath coupled together, whereas Erasmus before had said, that such were not parted by man but by God, Beza saith likewise, Concedo totum illud argumentum &c sed nego divortij propter adulterium authors esse homines, &c : that is, I grant, saith he, that whole argument: but I deny that men are (to be accounted) the authors of that divorce that is for adultery. So that, thus far, and so in the very answer it self that they made to this objection, they both agree. But then in the confirmation of it they vary, M. Beza quite giving over that course that Erasmus is in, and betaking himself to another. Erasmus building upon disorders that were commonly committed in making of marriages; and M. Beza, upon that law of God that adiudgeth adulterers to death, and upon that exception of Christ. Wherein whether M. Beza hath bettered his course or not, that I leave to be decided by others that will: but sure it is that therein he liketh not of that of Erasmus; in that himself hath taken another. For as touching that of Erasmus he saith plainly, that he doth not assentiriijs qui putant Magistratibus licere novas divortiorum leges condere. that is, That he doth not join in opinion with them, who think that Magistrates may make new laws of divorcements. And the proof that he will have for his opinion in this (namely, that, not mē, but only God must be thought to be the author of that divorce that is for adultery) is no more but this; Quum Dominus jam olim adeo express voluer it adulterio matrimonia dissolvi vt etiam adulteros morte punier it: & postea rursum Christus consulens conscientijs propter Magistratuum negligentiam; adulterium acceperit, quum de divortio non licito dissereret. that is, seeing that the Lord in times past, did so plainly declare that he would have (even the band of) matrimony to be dissolved by adultery, that he punished those that so offended even with death: and after again Christ providing for our consciences, hath for the Magistrates negligence therein, excepted adultery, when he treated of such divorce as was not lawful. Concerning both which we plainly see the latter of them to hold no further, that that same exception of Christ may be found to serve his purpose, which is the thing that is in question betwixt us, and seeing himself knew that so it was, it may seem that he doubted of the other also, when as he went about so hardly to help it in this. And the truth is, that in the other his reason holdeth but very weakly, that seeing God ordained that adulterers should be put to death, therefore the husband, if his wife have that way offended, may account himself loosed now from the band of marriage that was betwixt them: because, as it is a general rule with all the learned, so Erasmus himself his own partner hath set it down in plain terms, that, in his judgment, dispicere quodagat is qui loquitur, that is, to consider what is the intent or purpose of him that speaketh, is praecipua clavis ad intelligendam mysticam Stripturam, that is, the chief key to open unto us the secret sense of Scriptures. And then it is plain, that in that law the meaning of God was not, to show when the married might account themselves to be loosed of that band wherewith they were tied the one to the other: but how Magistrates should in such case execute his judgments among their people. Again, whosoever would so resolutely set down that the band of marriage were so clean dissolved betwixt man and wife, only for that, when either of the parties are found to have committed adultery, they ought by the law of God to die, they had need to be further advised, first as touching this present crime that now we speak of, whether that ought to be the determination of all estates for life generally (as when one hath that way deserved death, he that is in reversion should then account the right of the thing to be his, whether that the Magistrate and laws do nevertheless spare him his life or not,) and whether, such as owe any other duty besides, as children to their parents, servants to their masters, and such like, might likewise in such case be allowed to account themselves discharged of it: and then, as touching some others besides, when any men else have deserved death, either by those laws of God (as for blasphemy, profaning the Sabbath, or whatsoever else) or else but by the laws of the country wherein we dwell (though not against the law of God, yet further then it in those matters is wont to proceed) whether in such cases we were to allow that liberty; or otherwise, what reason we have to be so resolute in the one, & so doubtful in the other. These that are taken out of the Apostle S. Paul, are three likewise, but two of them (as in the others) in effect but one; the other, is of several force by it self. These that are in effect but one, are those two before noted, the one in the seventh to the Romans, that the wife is by the law bound to her husband so long as he liveth, the other out of the seventh likewise of the former to the Corinthians, tending to the self same ende in sense or meaning. And as they are in effect but one, so doth he give in effect likewise one answer to both: to the former, Atqui Apostolus ibi non agit de causis divortij. that is, But there the Apostle doth not treat of the causes of divorce: and to the latter, Respondeo, Apostolum ibi non agere de divorij causis. that is, I answer, that the Apostle doth not there treat of the causes of divorce. But though this in general be the substance of his answer to both: yet he proceedeth somewhat further in either of them. To the former he addeth, first that which he thinketh, the Apostle at that time meant; namely, that he did as it were but catch or pluck to himself, ex coniugio similitudinem, quatenus id argumento proposito conveniebat : that is, A similitude out of wedlock, so far as it agreed to the purpose that he had in hand. Then also, both that the Apostle doth speak there, non de matrimonio per adulterium soluto, sed de matrimonio constante, that is, Not of such matrimony as is dissolved by divorce, but of such as is still in force; and that a woman condemned of adultery may not be said to be under her husband, for that etsi adhuc is est superstes qui vir ipsius fuit, non est tamen amplius vir ipsius, nec ipsa potest esse simul mariti & adulteri caro, that is, Albeit he were yet living that was her husband, yet now he is her husband no more, neither can she be the flesh both of her husband & an adulterer. To the latter he addeth likewise, both that he teacheth widows there, soluto per mortem matrimonio, posse bona conscientia ad secundas nuptias convolare, that is, marriage being dissolved by death, they may with good conscience marry again: and that therein he had respect but to the usual and ordinary cause, praesupposing, inter fideles quibus scribebat, vix alia ration quàm morte matrimonia dissolvenda, that is, that among the faithful to whom he wrote marriage could hardly be dissolved but only by death. In the answer unto both which, what have we else to ground upon, but only his own opinion avouched again; and here also but weakly confirmed? He saith the Apostle doth not here speak of the causes of divorce. Who saith that he doth? What is that to the purpose, that of them he speaketh not now? By other occasion he speaketh that, which may show us, how vnadvised we are in this. And why should he speak of that which was not? We praesuppose that divorce was, by the law of God allowed unto them: and the latter Jews, in the time of Christ, seem much to be of the same mind also, though they might so say to some other purpose. But there was no such liberty given them indeed: and therefore we may not look that the Apostle should speak of it. And should we never suffer our selves to be better led, or our judgments to be rectified by any Scripture, but only by such as specially treateth of the matter we have in hand? If Satan might so far prevail, by any special ones among us, he would not only deprive us of a good part of that direction that we have by the word of God: but also might have an easy way therein besides, to bring in, and settle, many errors among us. When God spake to Moses out of the bush and said. I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, was it his meaning then, to deliver the doctrine of the Resurrection? and yet doth not Christ even only out of it notably deliver the same unto us? When God forbad the Israelites to muzzell up the mouth of the Ox that trod out their corn, was it his meaning then to teach men howe careful they ought to be to maintain a Ministry among them? and yet doth not the Apostle well apply it thereunto? But there were no end of such examples. In the former of them he addeth farther, that he doth but borrow a similitude thence, so far as belonged unto the purpose he had in hand. What then? Could his reason be good therein, unless that same, from whence he taketh the force of his reason, were sound it self. And if he cā thus put of his Readers, to say, that he doth speak of a marriage that standeth in force, & by adultery is not dissolved, doth it therefore follow, that marriage may be by adultery dissolved? If it be resolved and set down by him, that being found guilty of adultery and condemned thereof, she is now no more under a husband, or that having committed adultery she cannot be one flesh with her husband; have we here any sufficient ground at all to rest on, for the husband to account himself before God discharged thenceforth of all such duties, as by the reason of that his wedlock he was before bound unto? In the latter, was it so needful a point to teach widows in the Church of Corinth, after that the Gospel was now already received among them; & that had a great part of their light from so many of the ancient people of God conversing among them (with whom such marriages were very common, the Gentiles also being little behind them therein) that this sentence of the Apostle, which otherwise would serve us marvelous well to give us sound direction in this, and in diverse such other matters besides, must so be restrained to widows only, that we, in this case, may not look to have any benefit of it? Truly it is good to care for widows, & it is a thing that is much commended unto us, not only in the word of God, but in all other good learning besides: but in all things there is a mean to be kept; & widows themselves (it is to be thought) will be content, that wives also have all their due. Or did he so restrain those words of his, unto that which was then most commonly used, that, for the matter now we speak of, he would not have us to take so much of our direction thence? Or did the Apostle presuppose no farther on the behalf of the faithful as touching their holiness and constancy in wedlock, but only that hardly or scantly they accounted wedlock to be dissolved among them but only by death: or, if of the two, may not a mā that is careful to find the truth, rather doubt, that this is but an hard & a scant interpretation of this place of the Apostle? That which is of several force by it self, is out of this chapter also of that Epistle unto the Corinthians, where the Apostle saith, that not he, but the Lord commandeth women not to depart from their husbands, and, if they do, to seek to be reconciled again, or to abide unmarried: & that the husbands put not away their wives. Wherevnto he saith, Respondeo, Paulum hic nō agere de divortio sed de dissidijs quae propter simultates inter conjuges interdum oriuntur: adeo ut interdum una pars ab altera secedat. Quod si evenerit, nō vult Apostolus ejusmodi discessione solvi matrimonium: that is, My answer is, that Paul did not here speak of divorce, but of such contentions or debates as arise sometimes between man and wife upon heart-burning among themselves: so that sometime they depart the one from the other. Which if at any time it come to pass, the Apostle will not, that by such departing, matrimony be dissolved betwixt them. He proceedeth somewhat farther, I grant, to confirm his judgment therein, I mean, that this must be S. Paul's meaning: and so me think he had need in deed. For otherwise, besides that the Text it self doth not in appearācelead us to that cōstructiō (whatsoever it may do by implication, wherein we are to see anon how himself doth gather thereon) it seemeth to me, that, in either of the Apostles dealing in such matters, we have a great likelihood, that this should be no part of his meaning. For it had been a very great & an intolerable disorder (and such as, not only the people of God, but evē all the heathen also generally, did ever detest, unless it were some special od loose persons among thē, that now & then would not stick to break forth to such disorder) if that had been in use among them: and most likely then, that the Apostle would otherwise have stormed against them, as he did for other matters, as for the variance that was betwixt them, & for those disorders, in partaking that holy Communion, both which he might lay to the charge of many of them, and for suffering that incestuous person, though he were but one. Whereas therefore the Apostle is wont to be so round when occasion was given him, and gave so good experience of it even in this Epistle also in divers things else, it may rather seem, that seeing it were such a disorder, so easily upon variance to break of the bond of marriage betwixt them, that that was not the thing, that S. Paul there doth speak of, but some other thing that was more used & more tolerable also▪ and yet not to be allowed neither; as, for the woman so to depart, or for the husband to put her away, either for adultery, or at the least upon some great occasion or cause given whatsoever it was. Else I should hope, that among them, for any matter so apparently so fowl, even among the heathē also, the Apostle should not have need to have used the name of the Lord therein: or at least should think, as I said before, that he would have set his instrument on some other tune, for a matter of less importance then it. Now the reason that himself allegeth, why he is persuaded that that is the sense of the Apostle, himself in this manner giveth in unto us. Hoc autem ita esse, manifest indicant Apostoli verba, qui inquit in genere: Vir vxorem ne dimittito, & vxor à viro ne discedito. Quid si enim adulterio peccarit altera pars, annon innocenti licebit saltem à nocente discedere? Relinquitur ergo verum esse quod diximus, nempe, Apostolum de simultatibus & rixis, non de vero divortio loqui: quod mirum est Augustino in mentem non venisse. that is, But that this is so, the words of the Apostle do most plainly declare, who generally saith, or speaketh to all indifferently, Let not the man put away his wife, and let not the wife depart from her husband. For what if either party shall commit adultery, shall it not be lawful for the innocent party, at least to depart from the offēder? So it must needs be true that we said, namely, that the Apostle did not speak here of true divorce, but only of contentions and brablings: which it is marvel that S. Augustine did never think of. Whether these words of the Apostle do so plainly prove it or not let others judge; for betwixt us, I peceiue very well, that in no wise it can be decided. For what proof hath it at all, but only which standeth on this principle, that the innocent party may in such case at least depart from the other? But what warrant anywhere have we for that, either in the Old Testament or in the new? In policy, I grant and for the hardness of our harts it may after a sort be tolerated among us: and among the Jews before: but where have we otherwise any one authority for it, when it is rightly examined? Again, as yet I see no cause to the contrary, but that a simple man might so strongly hold, that thē especially the innocent party had more just occasion to stay, thē to go, that I think it might cūber the most learned that is, to bring in any reasonable probability against it: and much more, to evince it indeed, So strong is the charge, that all married couples have taken upon them, the one of the other; and so weak it is (setting our own private affection aside) whatsoever it is, that as yet is brought to the contrary. And therefore I believe that himself did not wonder more, that S. Augustine never conceived so much of it; then any indifferent one of his Readers will marvel that he should make it so clear a case as he doth.

22 Of those reasons of theirs that rely on the authority of men, we have two sorts likewise: whereof some of them stand on the authority of those that in some sense may seem to be with them; and others again, on the authority of those that are against them. Those that in some sense may seem to be with them, are of two sorts also: some that are directly with them; and others besides, that are not against them. Those that are directly with them, are of two sorts also: some, in their opinions; others in their doings only. Ofboth which by Erasmus, among others of that kind, we have noted unto us, that first among the ancient Fathers non defuerunt qui senserint à recte dirempto matrimonio, licuisse cum alia copulari. that is, That there were who thought that after marriage well dissolved, it was lawful for them to marry another: and namely, that Origen, Tertullian, Pollentius (whom belike because otherwise he was not to have his place in this company, he termeth Gravem & eruditum virum, that is, A grave and a learned man) & Ambrose, were all of the same opinion, or at least did at some time incline unto it; and that Augustine, though he wrote against the aforesaid Pollentius about that matter, yet that he dealt not with him as with an heretic, but as with an adversary in that opinion only, & did in such sort confute his opinion, that nevertheless he did not therein charge him with heresy. Again, that clare pronunciat sceleratius esse extra connubium libidinari, quàm à divortio novo marito junctam vivere, that is, that he clearly pronounceth, that it is more wicked, out of wedlock to play the harlot, then after divorce to live in marriage with another husband. Again, if a woman that after divorce marrieth another, that he doth not simply deny her bujus esse vxorem; sed magis esse illius quem relinquit, quàm cui nupsit: that is, to be the wife of this man; but rather to be the wife of him whom she left, then of him whom she hath married since. Then also that si recentiorum opiniones excutiamus, quibus hactenus plurimum authoritatis & fora & scholae tribuunt, comperiemus inter hos fuisse, qui putarint matrimonium posse dirimi, aut certe qui putarint hoc argumentum esse disputabile. that is, That if we examine the opinions of the latter writers, unto whom both Courts and Schools do attribute much, we shall find that some there are among those also, who thought that marriage might be dissolved, or at least that it was a disputable argument. Concerning which matter, though he have somewhat in John of Andrew for espowsals or marriage that is not finished by carnal knowledge: yet, in that which is consummate he findeth so little, that he is fain to hold him contented with that same John and two more, which are, Panormitanus, and Hostiensis: and hath no more in them neither, but only that one of them leaveth it to the judgment of others, having first brought arguments both against it, and with it; another but disputeth it only, and thinketh the contrary side to be the more probable: and the third doth but seem to be for it also, namely of that opinion, that the Church might do it. That such things sometimes have been done, he bringeth in two miserable examples: the one, that Pope Zechariah, in a case of incest allowed the innocent wife of the incestuous husband to marry again; the other, that that Antonius narrat, sibi conspectum fuisse diploma, quo Ro: Pontifex dirimeb at matrimonium ratum & consummatum, that is, Anthony reporteth, that he had • eene a Bul, wherein the B. of Rome did abolish or dissolve matrimony that was fully established, and (by carnal knowledge) consummate. And one other of good reckoning among us, hath (for the former) added thus much also, that the Pastors & Doctors of the reformed Churches have perceived, & shown, that in such case a man may put away his wife, and marry another. And true it is that divers of them have resolved on that opinion, and have published the same accordingly: but whether they have perceived or found it to be so indeed; and whether they have shown, or by any sufficient demonstration declared the same, let that (as yet) lie in question betwixt us, till we be further advised of it. Again, that the Fathers do not so fully consent & agree together against it, as the adversary that he hath chosen doth bear men in hand that they did: but were many of them for it; especially, for the first four hundred years. An argument, that the better it can be proved, the stronger it will be indeed; both against that adversary of his, & against all others of that company: but simply to beat out the truth of the question, a reasonable good presumption indeed, but that is all. Of those that Erasmus allegeth as not against him, he is if we mark it little better furnished: and his choice is of those two whom before he alleged: John of Andrew, and Panormitan. And, seeing, the weight of that matter hangeth not on that pin, I have not thought good to go any further, then to so much as himself hath gathered. And so as touching the former of thē, the help that he getteth ofhim is this, that proposito casu, an Pōtifex possit indulgere, vt filius unicus Regis monasticus, ducat vxorem, eám{que} habeat donec gignat prolē masculam: rationib{us} in utrā{que} partē adductis, pro neutra pronūciat, rē aliorū arbitrio relinquens. that is, propoūding a case whether the Bishop of Rome, may dispense with a Monk the only son of a King to take a wife, and to have her until he have begot̄ issue male of her, bringing in reasons on both sids, he determineth for neither, but leaveth it at large to the judgment of others. Which (we see) is but one special case, and doth not concern this of ours: and yet that in that case also, although he doth not pronounce against him, yet in that he maketh such dainty in so special a case as this, he showeth himself plain enough how hard he would be in the whole generally. And that doth the other more plainly acknowledge, who reciting the same of his, addeth thereto thus much of his own. Ego satis putarem, quod nullo casu Papa posset dissolvere matrimonium consummatum inter fideles, ita quod eligerē partem negativam : that is, I should rather think, that in no case the Pope might dissolve matrimony consummate both the parties being faithful, so that I should choose the negative part. So that all the help which (he conceiveth) he hath in him, is no more but this. Nec hic asseverat, sed argumentum ut disputabile proponit, cujus alteram partem ipse putat esse probabiliorem: that is, Neither doth this man affirm it, but he propoūdeath the argument, as disputable, himself thinking the other part to be more probable. And so likewise by and by after commending one special reason, for that out of it an argument may be taken, quod etiam Ecclesia nō posset illud dissolvere: that is, that even the Church cannot dissolve it, he gathereth thereon, Rursus hîc non affirmat Ecclesiam non posse dirimere matrimonium consummatum, imopotius innuit posse : licet ex hoc capite dicat posse sumi argumentum pro diversa parte. Ne{que} statim expugnatum est, quod oppugnari potest argumento: that is, Again he doth not here affirm, that the Church cannot break asunder marriage consummate already, yea rather he implieth that it may: although he say that out of this place an argument may be taken for the contrary side. Neither is it by and by won, that is at any time by reason attempted. How poor helps these are, I think that everyone will soon perceive: I for my part will so much spare them, that nothing at all I will disturb them. The argument that they take of the authority of those that are against them, is in effect no more but this, that whatsoever is brought by any against that cōceived opinion of theirs, it is all but weak & may easily be answered. And for this point I have thought good to note, not only that judgment before to have been in Erasmus abroad: but also, that yet it seemeth in part to remain in that one of good account among us at home (that before I spake of) upon whom, diverse I hear do rest not a little. That Erasmus was of that mind, his words are plain; Videbam ea quae objiciuntur, facile posse dilui, citra nostrae religions injuriam. Videbā rations quas adducunt hac in causa veteres & neoterici, non esse tam urgētes, ut adtantam adigant necessitatem hominum genus : that is, I saw that those things that were objected, might easily be answered, withou • doing of any wrong to our Religion. I saw that the reasons which the Fathers of old, & the late writers do bring for this matter, are not so urgent, as to drive mankind to such extremity. Wherein whether he were deceived or not, or whether he had but some over-weening conceit of that his motion, let it rest for me, until the cleerenes of the matter it self (being first beat̄ out) may teach us both, whether it be so, or not. But true it is, that before he had noted some things that might seem to be no small part of the foundation and ground of that his opinion: as namely, from what authors such persuasion came, and how wrong they were in some things else besides, even the best of them all. For the former of them, I am ut demus, saith he, conjugiū legis esse divinae, certe plera{que} quae circa matrimoniorum causas tractantur adjus positivum pertinēt, veluti de gradibus de impedimētis, de rescissionibus. Ne{que} haec decreta à synodis celebribus profecta sunt ad nos, sed à privatis Pontificum responsis, &c: nonnunquam à seipsis dissentientibus: that is, Now that we grant that wedlock it self is of the law of God, yet many things that are handled about the causes of matrimony, do appertain to the positive laws, as of degrees, of impediments, of undoing again. Neither did these decrees come unto us from the more famous Councils, but of the private answers of Bishops, disagreeing sometimes even from themselves. For the latter also, Nec mirum est, veteres illos tam iniquos fuisse divortio, quod & apud Ethnicos fuit odiosum, qui conjugium etiam aegre admiserint, aegrius digamiam, that is, Neither is it marvel, that the ancient Fathers were so hard to allow of divorce (which was an odious thing evē among the Heathen also) who did but hardly allow of marriage it self, & much hardlier of second marriages. In both which he showeth himself to be of opinion, that this restraint of such divorce as he would plead for, is only of men (one fowl gawle in the argument:) & then, that it proceedeth from such mē also, as whose credit (one way or other) is, in such cases, but very small; for which I mean not here to cōtēd, but will rather adiourne it unto such account in the end, as the issue of the cause shall then afford it. And yet so far as I am able to see into it, he needeth not so much to trouble himself in spying holes in that judgment of the Fathers of old, as, in this, to defend his own. In which respect I marvel the more, that he findeth so many faults with that kind of divorce which only in this case standeth by law among us, 1. Primum, saith he, ita licebit divertere, ut posteae vivat castratus & orbus. 2. Deinde si post suspicionem adulterij rem habuerit cum uxore, excidit à jure repudiandi. 3. Adhaet si ipse quo{que} fuerit adulter, cogetur cū adultera cohaerere. 4. Postremo, particulam exceptionis huc detor quemus, nō ut jus faciat marito repudiandi, sed ut sirepudiet, non facturus sit adulteram, quandoquidem jam adulteram abijcit. Nam id Augustini commentum est : that is, First we have divorce but so far allowed unto us, as that whosoever will use it, he must afterward live as a gelded man, and without (possibility of) children. Then if after suspicion of adultery, he nevertheless have to do with his wife again, then is he fallen from the right he had to sue the divorce. Besides, if himself have committed adultery too, then must he still clean unto his adulterous wife. Last of all, that particle of the Exception we wrest unto this, that it shall not give any right to the husband to put away his wife (for adultery) but, if he do it, then he doth not make her an adulteress, because he doth not put away but such an one as is an adulteress already. For that is, saith he, Augustine's conceit thereof. Wherein though he did seem to himself, then to have found many faults in that their judgments; and, in the last, with S. Augustine himself: yet I doubt not, but that in the end it will appear, that therein he troubled himself more thē he needed; and in the mean season, that everyone may perceive that he counteth those such faults, but only in respect of that presupposall, that such divorce as he requireth, doth undoubtedly stand on the authority of the word of God, which if it do not, will soon make those great faults of his to be none at all. As touching that other that is of the same judgment likewise, he also accounteth that to be weak which is brought against it; and accordingly dealeth therein: and especially against one, whom he hath made his choice adversary in it, for whom also, I for my part (but so far as he hath the truth) will crave no sparing. More specially whereas S. Augustine is accounted to be the strongest of all against the liberty of divorce for adultery and marrying again he noteth more weakness in that judgment of his, then others do that yet I have seen: both in his own confession after; & in mistaking a part of the Text. But how far that weakeneth the force of his judgment is not so needful for us to discu • se: as not so material but only to such as rest some parte of their judgment on him, which in this I mean not to do.

23 What inconvenient speeches they have besides, if now we examine, the truth is, that all of them (lightly that I have seen) have some▪ but yet that Erasmus, the leader of them, hath therein so far gone beyound them all, that none of them (so far as yet I have found) have attained unto him. And because inconvenient speeches, though they be no certain arguments that the cause is not good that is handled by such; yet are they fair warnings for any in such case to take heed, because they proceed from a troubled mind, and most commonly argue a want of the truth, and even by that only ofttimes are occasioned: therefore it shall not be amiss that we somewhat consider of them, but first of those that we find in Erasmus; then, of such as we find in others. Of those that we find in Erasmus, there are two sorts: some of his own, & for which himself is to answer; others, that are none of his, but belonging to such authors as himself bringeth in to help to bear out his own persuasion therein. Those that are his own, are of two sorts also: some concerning his own judgment in this matter; others, concerning the Scripture it self. Concerning his own judgment in this matter, he hath in such sort ordered his speech therein, that although he hath not plainly set it down, yet he seemeth to incline unto it, both that certain disorders in making of marriages should be good cause to dissolve them again: and that even the wickedness of a woman, want of children also (belike he meaneth of such as are legitimate; & that he may not so account of those that either he had or hereafter might have by his adulterous wife) yea & burning lust also, should be good causes likewise to marry again. For the former he saith. Apud ethnicos nō erat ratum matrimonium, nisi parentum aut tutorū authoritate comprobatum, ne apud Iudaeos quidem, & tamen apud utrosque aliquo modo dirimi poterat matrimonium. Apud Christianos facilime coit conjugium, & semel initum nullo modo potest divelli. • urtim inter pueros & puellas per lenones & lenas, inter stultos ac temulentos copulatur matrimonium, & tam turpiter initum indssolubile est, & quod magis est notum, sic initum fit sacramentum. that is, Among the Heathen there is no marriage accounted of force, but that which was approved by the authority of parents or tutors; neither yet among the Jews: and yet with both those might matrimony, some way or other, be dissolved again. Among Christians marriages are most easily made, and yet being made, may by no means be broken off. By stealth betwixt boies and wenches, by bawds and harlots, between fools & drunken persons have marriages been made: and yet, a marriage being so ilfavourdly made, may not in any wise be dissolved; and, which is the stranger of the two, is become a Sacrament also. To which ende soon after he doth likewise insinuate, that if the Magistrate or competent Judge should dissolve such, then were they rightly dissolved by the Ministers of God, which before were naughtily made by the Deacons of the devil. For the latter, he saith likewise, At interim seposita paulisper authoritate scriptoris rem ipsam mecum expendat lector, num hae satis graves sint causae cur innoxius maritus debeat alligari sceleratae mulieri, orbitatis molestiam, & libidinis incendium ferre per omnem vitam: ne vel parum prudens habeatur à quibusdam, quod rem quae non successerit, denuo sit aggressus (quasi turpe sit, qui semel tempestatem expertus sit, iterare navigationem; aut qui in deligendo amico erraverit, quenquam alium in amicitiam admittere) vel intemperans, aut avarus, qui formam aut dotem mutare voluerit, non vxorem. that is, But setting aside for a while the authority of the writer (meaning S. Jerome) let the reader consider with me the thing it self, whether these be causes of sufficient importance (that then men would easily take occasion divers ways, to break of and to marry again) that the husband should be tied to a wicked woman, or that he should suffer either the grief of the want of Children or the heat of lust all his life long, least he should be accounted of divers either unwise, that having taken in hand such a course before as did not fall out well with him, he nevertheless doth take it in hand again (as though it were a shame, that he which once had been in a tempest, should go to the seas again, or he that had been before deceived in choice of his friend, should never admit any other into his friendship again) or intemperate, or covetous, as though he rather desired to make his exchange of (more) beauty or (better) dowry thē of his (so bad a) wife. Which course of his if any people should establish by law among them, it were hard to find how it might be avoided, but that for matters of marriage, & all others thereto appertaining, some would all be clean out of order. For first as touching so large a liberty of divorcing their wives away from them, upon any of those so many branches of disorderly marriage, we may plainly see, that it would lay open a ready way to many divorces: for because those disorders are such, as that we may conceive no hope, that either they will or may be amended. So likewise for marrying again thereupon, if but the two first causes only might be allowed soon should we see, that such a liberty, so freely granted, would be (by many) as freely used: but then, if the third should be added withal, that so oft as it would require, it should still be allowed a new and fresh marriage, and not beaten back to the former again, then as we have a proverb in another matter, so should we quickly find it in this (to the shame of our faces that had so taught them) that but set a beggar on horsback, & we may be sure, that he will ride. Concerning both which, although it may be that if Erasmus had been, derectly demanded, whe • her he would have allowed suchliberty or not, he would have bethought himself better, & in the ende would have denied: yet seeing he hath fenced his speeches no better, but that in the heat of his reasoning for the other, he hath so far overslipped himself in these, that the reader may probably gather, that he was of that judgment indeed, therefore must he now be content, that these also be taken for part of his inconvenient speeches. Concerning the Scripture it self, he hath so many hard speeches of the same (such I mean as may be taken ill, and in appearance do most incline thereunto) that it may seem, that both he found that new motion of his to be very much crossed thereby, and that he could not quietly bear it, that so it should, and thereupon uttered those speeches of it: somewhat of the whole generally; but much more, of Saint Paul more especially. Of that which he uttered of the whole generally, I have noted no more but this, and that but only towards the ende of his Treatice. Videbam Scripturam, saith he, hac in parte, ut plerisque, esse perplexam & ancipitē. That is, I saw that the Scripture was in this point, as in many others, intricate and doubtful. Of which, for this point, albeit he had some probability so to say, so long as those places aforesaid were so much mistaken, & by so many, as they were: yet those places being duly considered, we may now plainly perceive, that the Scripture is plain enough for the negative of that Motion of his; and that all the hardness and doubtfulness of it, is for his Affirmative only. Which might and should (I think) have taught him, rather to have suppressed that his doubtful motiō, than for it so hardly to speak of the Scripture it self. That which he uttered of S. Paul more specially is dispersed almost throughout this whole Treatice, especially while he answereth the places (after this manner) that are brought against that opinion of his. For in answering the fifth of Matthew, Non probat Paulus, saith he, digamiam: & tamen, ob incontinentiam permittit, quod non audet exigere: satius esse judicans, nubere quàm uri. Et nos de rigor divortij, nihil omnino relaxamus? that is, Paul doth not allow the second marriage, or a widow to marry again: and yet for incontinency he suffereth (as I take it) the second marriage, which he dareth not require (or as I take it, as more agreeable unto his meaning, howsoever the words do somewhat vary, that he alloweth to marry again; because he dare not so strictly require that they contain) thinking it better to marry, than to burn. And do we release nothing at all, of the hardness or rigor of divorce? In which speech of his the inconveniency that I speak of, resteth especially in these two points: that Saint Paul allowed not of widows marriage; &, that himself accounted, that to allow of divorce no farther than it was then (which notwithstanding was as much, as any of us may lawfully challendge) was too hard and rigorous dealing. The text is the 19. of Matthew, wherein while he dealeth, there he saith again, Paulus indulget humanae fragilitati, relaxans saepenumero Domini praeceptum. Cur nō idem facere possit Romanus Pontifex? That is, Paul beareth with the weakness of man, releasing ofttimes the Lord's commandment (what? often: where once?) Why may not the Bishop of Rome do so likewise? what else? Cōming to those places that the Apostle hath, and beginning with that which he hath in the seventh to the Romans, there he findeth his motion so probably at least, but I would rather say so strongly crossed, that it must be, Paulo peculiare, nihil non torquere ad Evāgelij negotium, pia, Christianá{que} vafricie, &c : that is, Paul's fashion, to wrest anything for the Gospels sake, with a godly and Christian subteltie. And anon after, on that other place in the seventh of the first to the Corinthians, in effect all one with that to the Romans, he also is the same that he was before. For there the Apostle (with him) must be lubricus in disputando, nunc huc se proripiens nunc illuc: that is, slippery in disputing, shifting himself, now hither now thither: therein alleging Origen besides, something to accord to his judgment therein. And on the latter of those two places in that epistle to the Corinthians (which though it be in the Text before, yet is it commonly taken after as a several place by it self) there also both he calleth the law of God, the Apostles law, & by & by after, he doth charge him with rigor also. For as touching the former he saith, verùm haud scio, an Paulus tribuerit hac in parte nonnihil suae legi, &c: that is, But I know not, whether Paul in this point did attribute much to his own Law: and for the other, Quod si Paulus tribuerit hac in parte nonnihil suae legi, &c: that is, But I know not, whether Paul in this point did attribute much to his own law: and for the other, Quod si Paulo proposita fuisset hujus modi causa, stultus cum stulta, pure cam puella cōtraxit, &c: fortasse pro causae circumstantijs aliud responderet Apostolus, & nonnihil relaxaret de rigor consilij superioris, sua scripta civiliùs nobis interpretaretur, quàm nos interpretamur: that is, But if such a case had been to Paul propounded, one fool with another, a boy and a wench have married together, &c: it may be that the Apostle, according to the circumstances of such a case, would give us some other answer, & would remit unto us no small part of the rigor of that his advise, and would interpret his writings more civilly unto us, thā we our selves are wont to take them. Where also we may farther note, that he termeth it (if he keep to his place) but the Apostles advise or council, which the Apostle himself calleth the Lord's commandment : and that he doth something insinuate farther, both that the Apostles rule was not absolute (for that, in the case that he did put, he thinketh that he might have given it another answer) & that the Apostle himself were so flexible, that in courtesy he would have yielded something unto them in that matter. And last of all, towards the end of that Annotation or Treatice of his (that yet he may part with him in friendly manner) he giveth this special commendation unto him, that he is so careful of the salvation of others, that to that end, nonnunquam etiam detorquet sacras literas, that is, he often even wresteth the holy Scriptures. But the Scriptures, it is well enough known, do so directly tend to the salvation of us and therefore need so little to be wrested to that end, that we have here mo wonders thā one: first, that Erasmus could ever so write of the Apostle, and did not rather suspect his own motion, when he saw whether it brought him; then also, that others, so many, and of so special reckoning, did not take that as a warning to them to have seen somewhat better unto it, that therein they had not followed him so much as they did. As for those others, that are none of his own, but found in those Authors that himself bringeth in to help to bear out his own persuasion, I note no more but this, that whereas there he allegeth but only three of the ancient Fathers (Origen, Tertullian, & Ambrose) yet even in those, & in every of them, himself hath noted somewhat withal, that may crack their credit for this matter: a crazy point of doctrine belike to be tried by the Fathers, if it had no better help then he then knew of. And though he might have made better choice then so, yet that also, in this case had little holpen, because it is not by them, that the estate of the question standeth, as now we set it. So, for these we shall not need so much as to recite them, but may better refer those that would see them to the place it self; yet this notwithstanding is worthy the marking, that most of the learned (that yet I have seen) that since have followed that course, do in like sort rest on those Fathers also and lightly go no further neither: whereas we have one of our own, that hath so far enriched that point beyond them all, that although it be not such as is thought meet to be published, and was written but on special occasion; yet therein we may see more learning uttered for that matter, then in any of those that in other countries have written thereon, though we (in our wonted humor) have them in better account.

24 Of those that we find in others, there be two sorts: one, that is common generally unto all; and others that are proper only to certain of them. That one that is common generally unto them all, is, that they do so resolutely make it to be the duty of the Magistrate to punish adultery by death, & account it his negligence if he do it not. All which kind of speeches I account inconvenient in two respects: first, because so they do imply (withal) a point of doctrine, more then they ought; then also, for that most of the Magistrates of all Christendom are such, as, if it were wrong, yet could they not help it would they never so fain. That point of doctrine which those speeches do imply (withal) more then they ought, is, that the Judicialls of Moses should of necessity be observed in our government also; or, that Christian Princes are bound to observe the same: a point of doctrine that divers are ofttimes leaning unto, but such as may not be universally held (I mean, for all those Judicials) neither is it further urged by the better sort but according to the equity of them, & the negative plainly held by this Church of ours. That most of the Magistrates of all Christendom are such, as that, if it were wrong, yet could they not help would they never so fain, it is plain enough in it self, for that they deal with no power over those that are under them, for lands nor goods, life nor lim, but so far as those lands by which they govern allow unto them: & that no laws are allowed to stand in force among us, but only such, as whereunto all the estates do first condescend. And then, if the Magistrate (although it were a thing to be wished, and himself were, for his part so inclined also) be so little able to do it, they do by such speeches, not only farther charge him then there is on his part any cause, but also let down no small part of his credit or honor among the people, which they should rather seek to maintain, knowing that the people are ready enough (of themselves) to think so meanly of their Superiors, that they need no such provocation unto it. Those that are more proper to certain of them, are two: one, that they bring in so many things else, to dissolve the band of marriage; the other, that some of them account it so much against duty, to forgive their offending wife. If many ways else marriage may be dissolved in the judgment of divers of them, then (in their judgment) were it but a loose and a slender band: which notwithstanding the word it self maketh to be the strongest and fastest of all others, above that which is betwixt neighbors and friends, yea and betwixt Parents and their children, either by the duty of the one, or by the natural love of the other. That divers of thē account that many ways the bond of wedlock may be dissolved, Peter Martyr is of that credit among us, that his only voice may stand for many, and teach us also to conclude, that if he be a Patron of that opinion, then is he not likely to want other followers besides. He therefore, when he is handling of that point, that man & wife must keep together, addeth thereunto, that he doth not so say, quasi nunquam liceat conjugibus quando{que} à se invicem dividi, vel per morbum, vel per aliquas graves incidentes necessitates: sed ut cōjuges intelligant, nihil per suam voluntatē debere obstare, quin simul habitent, ne{que} refugere debent, ut unà vivant. that is, As though it were never lawful for married folk to be sundered again the one from the other; either by disease, or by some other special necessities that may befall them: but that married folk understand, that, by their own good will nothing should let, but that still they cohabit, and that never they ought to shrink from living together. And by and by after, putting the case of an Atheist, though a while he make some question thereof, quia non licet de quopiam, dū vivit animum despondere, &c. that is, because we may not despair of any man while he liveth, nisi manifesta & praecipua revelatio de damnatione illius intercesserit. that is, Unless some manifest and principal revelation shall be given of his condemnation (an hard case to be found:) yet afterward he plainly concludeth, that a faithful woman may depart from such an atheist husband, if in the mean season he blespheme and curse Christ, and will not suffer, either that himself be therein reproved, or the truth of Christ be by her acknowledged. But in the next two Sections following, both he setteth down the same liberty for the one that is weak, and by the other party drawn from that faith by little and little: and and answereth besides divers objections that he taketh to be strong against it. Item si contingat, saith he, ut conjux fidelis debilis sit, & sentiat ex eo matrimonio se de religione Christiana paulatim deijci ita ut abducatur quodammodo à fide, ac in idololatriam ex idololatrarum convictu in procliui sit ut ruat. that is, Also, if it fall out that the party faithful be weak, & findeth it self, by the reason of that matrimony, by little & little to be carried away from Christian religion, so that he be after a sort led away from the faith, and be in some special danger to fall unto adultery, by the reason of his conversing with idolaters: in this case his resolution is, Non opor tet ut maneat, that is, he is not bound in • uch case to tarry: and his reason is, for that we may not do evil that good may follow. To which ende also, upon that place of the Apostle he added further, that it is apparent, sententiam Christi, quae tantum excipit scortationem, non esse completam, cum hîc Apostolus alteram adjecerit: that is, that the sentence of Christ, whereby he excepteth no more but fornication only, is not complete or full, whenas the Apostle doth here add another cause besides; he meaneth, when the infidel departeth from the faithful, in cause of religiō. Zegedinus followeth the self same course to speak of, first in that same sentence of Christ: then in that presupposed liberty of divorce. On that sentence of Christ, Quidam, saith he, literae, seu dicto Christi mordicus inhaerentes, clamant propter solam fornicationem matrimonia dirimi posse. Verum, cum Paulus permittat repudium palam mulieri fideli, si propter religionem negligatur, & abjiciatur à viro infideli, ac significet, nō in fornicationis tantum & infidelitatis casibus, fratrem aut sororem ab altero separari posse sed & in similibus (ait enim, non est servituti subjectus frater aut soror in hujusmodi, ubi paria peccata intelligit) liquide ex his constat, Christum fornicationis nomen in genere accepisse per metonymiam, ac nomine fornicationis seu stupri includere ea scelera quae fornicationi paria, aut certe majora sunt, excludere autem minora: that is, divers cleaving unto the letter or speech of Christ over-precisely will needs have it, that marriage may be dissolved, for no cause else, but only for adultery. But seeing Paul doth plainly allow of divorce unto a faithful woman, if for religion she be despised, and cast out by her unbelieving husband; and signifieth withal, that a brother or a sister may be separated again, not only in case of fornication and infidelity, but also in others such like besides (for he saith, that a brother or a sister is not brought into bondage in such things as these, where he understandeth such like sins:) it doth plainly appear by these, that Christ by the figure of Metonymia did largely take the name of fornication, & that under the name of whoredom he did include all such crimes, as were as great, or greater than it, and that he did exclude or shut out of the same but only the less, and his reason is, Qui enim posset Apostolus contra praeceptorem suum docere? that is, For how can the Apostle teach that, which would be contrary to his Masters doctrine? In that presupposed liberty of divorce he saith likewise, Fieri non potest, ut rei foedae nomine intelligantur leves causae, ut vel morū culpa, vel corporis vitium quo maritus offendatur: excludantur vero majores causae, quibus matrimonia magis dirimi possunt: that is, It cannot be that under the name of some unclean thing (spoken of, Deut. 24.1.) small matters should be meant, as some fault in behavior or manners, or some deformity in the body, wherewith the husband may be offended: and that greater matters should be excluded, for which marriages might be much rather dissolved. That it should be so much against duty, to forgive the wife that so hath offended, M ^r Beza is both very plain and copious therein, as having of purpose handled the same: and yet more moderate therein than some other are, and therefore I rest only on him for this matter. And of this matter he setteth two principal questions: the one, of detecting such a wife to the Magistrate; the other, of receiving her again to favor. Concerning the former, first he setteth the question, An teneatur innocens persona nocētem defer, that is, Whether it be the duty of the innocent party, to accuse the other that hath offended unto the Magistrate. And his answer (in effect) is, Magistratui inprimis indicare maritum vel uxorem praecipue decet, ne dum praepostera charitate alienum peccatum fovent, justam lenocinij suspitionem incurrant : that is, that right well or chiefly it becometh either the husband or the wife to complain thereof to the Magistrate, least while they with a preposterous love do cherish the fault of the other, they incur a just suspicion, that they are no better than bawds themselves. And being then farther demanded, whether we may not privatam injuriam condonare, that is, forgive our own private injury, he so far entitleth the Common-wealth unto it, & maketh it to come so near unto Anabaptistry, that he cannot allow it: and he addeth in the end, Nā certe Christiana charitas malis non favet, that is, For certainly Christian charity favoreth not (either evil things, or as I should rather take it) those that are evil. So likewise, being further urged with the example of Joseph, that did not deal so hardly with Marie his espoused wife, and that he was commended for that his moderate dealing, he answereth that it was but doubtful in him, and that he had no certainty of it, and therefore, that in that respect, he did the best, as his case was. But what letteth, but that a man might rather think, that Joseph made no doubt of the matter (as then also himself had gone too far) but thought himself very certain of it? then is this obiectiō unanswered as yet. And M ^r Beza him self alloweth Joseph thus much to put him out of doubt of the matter (if that may serve) that uterus eminens praegnantem esse demonstrate, that is, that her belly being grown so great as it was did plainly show her to be with child: & so, that he, ejus videlicet rei quae extra ordinem contigerat ignarus, that is, ignorant of that matter which had befallen her extraordinarily, might well have thought (& without any doubting, with himself) omnino ab aliquo gravidatam esse, that is, that certainly ( omnino ) she had by somebody been got̄ with child. So it seemeth (even by that which M Beza doth allow him) that he was nothing doubtful of it: but only that he was therein deceived. Again, being further pressed, that in this case also private admonitiō should go before, at least among friends, & that rather the Church than the Magistrate (as themselves are wont to speak) or some certain persons should be first sought unto, he both liketh not of that neither, and bringeth in certain reasons to be assistant unto him therein: but yet in the end addeth thus much withal, Dixi quid hîc mihi videatur. Suū cui{que} judicium esto, modo ex verbo Dei unusquis{que} sapiat ▪ that is, I have said what I me self do think of this matter. Let everyone judge as himself thinketh good, so that no man go any further then he hath the word of God to lead him. Concerning the latter, he first likewise propoūdeath the question: and then setteth down his judgment on it. The question is, An, inforo conscientiae, nocentem personam convictam teneatur innocens ablegare; an vero poenitentem rursus recipere. that is, Whether in conscience (before God) the innocent party be bound, quite to put away the offender being once convicted of it; or upon repentance to receive him again. In which point, when first he hath granted that many of our great Divines, both old and new, do little agree among thenselves, and, in his judgment, illos quidem nimium adversus nocentem rigidos, istos vero nimium faciles videri, that is, That one sort of them seemed to him to be too rigorous to the party offending, & others to be over easy: yet thē he so taketh against those that he accounteth too easy, that little or nothing he differeth from those that he thought before too rigorous; rather showing (and that rightly in deed) that the reasons whereon they grounded that austerity of theirs were to weak to bear it, or, that, those reasons did not so conclude; then that he doth so much dissent from their judgment therein. For he findeth no more in them (in neither of those whom there he nameth, Jerome, and Bucet) but only the negative, that the offender may be retained (which he accounteth so great austerity) and yet himself, though in some case he doth qualify the same, yet in some other he draweth very near unto thē. His qualificatiō is, that, he doth not condemn him, qui uxorem resipis centem recipiat, that is, who receiveth his wife upon her repentance▪ and again, Deinde, vt modo dixi, non nego posse iterum admitti adulteram resipiscentem, that is, Moreover, as before I said, I do not deny, but that an adulteress, if she repent, may be admitted again. And elsewhere he yieldeth somewhat further also, as on other occasion before I noted. But as in this place he yieldeth thus much, so are we to note that he addeth withal that which doth (if it be marked) not a little impeach that which is granted: and first, though there be reap̄tance afterward found, in her that had committed adultery before; but thē especially, if the party offending as yet repent not. For though the adulteress do repent, yet first he saith, that multae aliae justae causae esse possint, cur adulteram quantumvis resipis centem, in thorum rursus non admittat, qui tamen alioqui illatam sibi injuriam ex animo condonavit : that is, that there may be many just causes, why a man doth not admit his adulterous wife to his bed again, though she repent never so much, who yet notwithstanding from his heart forgiveth the injury that is done unto him. Wherein seeing he setteth down, that there be many just causes, and that a forgiveness from the heart may be (betwixt man & wife) without bedding together again; though neither he name any of those many causes, nor showeth how such forgiveness may stand with such strangnes too: yet such as are corruptly inclined in those matters, may easily find matter enough to their contentment, wherewith to feed that humor of theirs, both in the one, and in the other, so rawly left as there they are. Then also he addeth further, that he is not of mind, that a man is bound in conscience to receive the adulteress again, though she repent, sed, post modestam Ecclesiae adhortationem adhibitam, unumquē{que} suae conscientiae relinquendum, that is, but after some sober exhortation given by the Church, that everyone is to be left to his own conscience, and that they used the selfsame order in the Church of Geneva: (such as most of thē are, that stickle so hard for the liberty that now we speak of) would in such case lightly desire, both in respect of the weakness of those (to restrain any disorder of theirs) that M. Beza here meaneth by the Church; and especially in respect of that liberty, that when the Church hath said what it will, then may these notwithstanding freely do as themselves think good. But before the adulteress repent, his judgment is plain, that the husband in no wise may receive her again: little differing from that rigor of those others before. For by another occasion speaking of receiving the offender again, ante resipiscentiae testimonium ▪ that is, before some proof of repentance be given, he plainly saith that fieri non potest, quin sceleri faveatur, that is, that it cannot be done, but that wickedness must needs be favored. A sufficient token, that so to receive an offender again, hath at all no favor with him: and thereby also a sword given into the hands of those that are of that humor, to be long enough avenged on the offender, til they may find tokens (to their contentment) of true repentance. So have we hitherto partly seen, both how weak reasons they have, and what inconvenient speeches (besides) they have now and then interlaced among them.

25 Now to examine the places themselves (for the true sense and meaning of them) for the better understanding of the order ensuing, we are first to acknowledge, that when we have gathered the meaning of them, and withal have made it reasonable plain, even out of the consideration of the places themselves, yet is it not unlikely, but that it will hardly sink in the minds of others, unless some doubts be answered withal, which otherwise will much prevail with many: and therefore are we first to set down the meaning of them; then, to consider of those doubts that seem to be so strong against it. And to find out the meaning of them, we are first to set by that which is not: then, afterward to declare that which is. That which is not, being first set by, both the most of the business will be dispatched, and the other will then more plainly appear: but herein also we are not barely to set down the negative, that I mean unto it; but also to add some such proof thereunto as may not well be wanting from it. The negative that I mean unto it is this, that whatsoever Christ by those words meant; yet this, in no wise, seemeth to be his meaning therein, that thereby he would give them liberty, so to divorce themselves the one from the other. That which I thought needful to ad thereunto, & is not meet to be wanting from it, least so it should stand as a bare negation, resteth on two principal grounds: one, that Christ himself should not seem to be so favorable unto it; the other, that the nature of wedlock doth not well bear it. That Christ himself should not seem to be so favorable unto it, seemeth to be a clear case, being well considered, for that we shall find, that there was never any such allowed before, nor after neither: namely that for adultery men might so part with their wives, as that thereby theywere at liberty to mary others. In thenew Testament we never thought that we had any such liberty but only so far as these words of his would help us. But in the Old Testament we thought we had many; at least those two: the one in Deuteronomy; the other, in Malachi. And therefore so long as those stood in that credit with us, we thought the sense of this Exception of Christ might well be, that he allowed that liberty for adultery to all, that was allowed by Moses and Malachi, for lesser matters, to the Jews before. And indeed that collection had been very good, for that both Moses and Malachi also wrote those things not of their own private motion, but as they were therein directed by God's holy Spirit, which spake by the Prophets. But now if we find, that these also do fail us, then must we grant, that now we have none: and so consequently, that, if Christ in this exceptiō hath allowed that liberty unto us, it is such a thing as himself hath only done, and not one of his Prophets before, nor Apostles since. Which thing (for my part) I think would prove a strange assertiō, that Christ in his holiness should give further liberty to that natural inclination of ours, then ever any other of his servants had done, before, or after. And for that matter we need go no further, then to themselves, that are for such divorce and marrying again: and not unto all them neither, for that fewer will serve our turn. M ^r Calvin therefore instead of the rest (and one that in weight may well stand, in matters of judgment, in most of his writings, formany of them) even in his Harmonie on the Gospels (which was, as I noted already, some few years before that we find that he had noted how that place of Deuteronomy was mistakē) saith reasonably well for that matter. Duobus capitibus (saith he) rem totam concludit: or dinem creationis debere esse instar Legis, ut vir conjugalem fidem tota vita co • at. Divortia autem esse permissa, non quod licita sint, sed quia cum praefracto & indocili populo negotium erat. that is, He shutteth up (meaning of Christ) the whole matter in two principal points: (one) that the order of creation should be instead of a law, that the husband all his life long should keep his promise made in marriage; (the other) that divorces are suffered, not as though they were lawful, but because they had to do with a stubborn and untoward people. But yet more fully, on that place it self in Deuteronomy. In the beginning of that his Treatice, Quod ad divortia spectat, saith he, quamvis per indulgentiam concessum fuerit Iudaeis, pronunciat tamen Christus nunquam fuisse legitimum, quia primae dei institutioni, ex qua perpetua & inviolabilis petenda est regula, palàm repugnat. that is, Concerning divorce, although by sufferance it were granted unto the Jews, yet Christ pronounceth, that it was never allowed unto them as lawful, because it doth plainly cross the first ordinance of God, out of which the rule of our life is to be taken, and ever inviolably to be kept. Again, Et certe scheda vel libellus divortij marito nonnihil asper gebat dedecoris, that is, And truly that instrument or bill of divorce did not a little discredit the husband. Lastly, even in the end, Ita admoniti fuerunt Israëlitae, quamvis impune vxores reijcerent, licentiam tamen hanc minime coràm Deo excusari. that is, So were the Israelites admonished that although they put away their wives without any danger of punishment for it, to be inflicted on them by law, yet that so to have used their liberty, they could in no wise excuse unto God. Quibus adijci potest, saith Gwalther, viros saltem in speciem bonos & honestos, libellos repudij non facile dedisse. that is, Wherevnto may be added, that such men as but in show (or as they would themselves be accounted) were good and honest did not easily give those bills of divorcement. By which speeches, and their hard (but just) censure of divorce, it appeareth, not only that no man of reasonable honesty did lightly use the benefit of it: but also that it was not thought a thing lawful neither before God. And may we then think, that Christ would grant any such? For if they reply that that divorce that they used was ofti • es for small matters, & so not this that now is spoken of which is for adultery: true indeed that they used it for small matters ofttimes (but then much rather, by all likelihood, for this also, seeing the judgment of death was so little executed among them) but yet that we know of none other besides; & then, that still it remaineth true which I said before, that if Christ allowed of such a divorce, himself is both the first & the last that hath done it. That the nature of wedlock doth not well bear it, it may appear by that which is said before of the weak reasoning of those, that conclude the bond of matrimony to be by adultery broken, which is notwithstanding but the offense of the one part only. Concerning which, although M ^r Calvin took not to himself the benefit of it, as we saw before: yet did he there set down both a very good rule; and a reason for it besides. The rule is this, Sanctius est conjugij vinculum, quàm ut hominū arbitrio vel potius libidine solvatur: that is, The bond of Marriage is a more sacred thing, than that it may be dissolved again, when a man thinketh good, or rather when his lust doth solicit him unto it. His reason is, Tametsi enim mutuo consensu sese conjungunt vir et uxor, Deus tamē nodo indissolubili eos astringit, ne postea liberum sit difcedere. Additur tamen exceptio, &c. : that is, for although mā and wife do join themselves together with their own mutual consent: yet doth God (otherwise) tie thē together with such a knot, as may not be loosed, that afterward they may not sunder themselves again. But yet there is added (saith he) an exception, &c.: meaning this that now we speak of, and so himself doth make little use of the benefit of that his good observation that he leaveth to us. For howsoever men & women may of themselves join together in holy wedlock: yet when so they are coupled, thē are they also in such sort joined together by God himself, that themselves cannot break the bond again, as before is declared. As M ^r Calvin again saith elsewhere, Penes virum non est, matrimonium facere irritum : that is, It is not in the husbands power, to make void his matrimony: though himself there also, desire no farther advantage of this general rule, but only that marriage by domestical contention be not dissolved: a small matter in comparison of that, which thereupon he might justly require. And therefore the council that in another place he giveth, is so much the rather in this case to be regarded, for that we may have good hope thereby, that this Exceptiō of Christ will rather sort it self to some other meaning, than to allow us so strange a liberty. Sed videant privati homines, saith he, ne sua vitia legum patrocinio tegentes, culpam eorum duplicent. Nam hic Dominus oblique Iudaeos increpat, quasi ipsis non sufficiat impune suam proterviam tolerari, nisi Deum iniquitatis suae authorem inscribāt: that is, But let private men take heed, that while they seek to cover their sins under the patronage of laws, they so make not a double fault. For here the Lord doth covertly reprove the Jews, as though it were not sufficient for thē, to have their naughtiness (therein) to be without punishment, unless they made God also to be the author of that iniquity of theirs. As Johanan and his company, being purposed before to go down into Egypt, yet would see if they could have obtained the consent of Jeremiah so to do, that so they might seem for to have done it, if not with the Lord's direction, yet at the least with his good leave and license first obtained. As Balaam also would fain have gratified the king of Moab in that his bad suit; but yet would first very gladly have had the Lord's allowance thereunto, if by any entreaty he could have obtained it: but he, for greediness of the reward; and these, for the love of their wanton pleasures.

26 What then should be the meaning of these two places that now we speak of, to the end that we may the better find, because they do something vary, therefore it is needful, that we take them severally. First therefore to begin with that in the fifth chapter of S. Matthews gospel, there will it be needful, first to search out his meaning therein: then to answer one special Objection that properly to this place appertaineth. To search out the meaning of Christ herein, we had need to consider not only how we may safeliest take it: but also, what we have to induce us so to do. As touching the former it cannot be denied (neither is it, that I know of, by any) but that in that notable sermon of Christ on the Mountain, calling his auditory from the looseness of those days, among other things of that nature, he also told them, that whereas it had been said of old, that whosoever did put away his wife, should give her a bill of divorcement, he now said unto thē, that whosoever did put away his wife except it be for fornication, should cause her to commit adultery, & that whosoever married her that was divorced, should commit adultery also. Which words, as it seemeth to me, we may safeliest take in this only sense, that Christ did show himself thereby, at that time to seek no more at their hands, but only so far to restrain that liberty of divorcing their wives, as that they did it but only for adultery: not meaning to show that he would allow that liberty unto thē; but only that now he would so far restrain it. That which we have to induce us hereunto, I mean, so only to take it, and not to stretch it further, resteth on two principal considerations: one, certain circumstances of this present place; the other, such like in many other places of the Scripture besides. The circumstances of this present place, are two: one, of the time; the other, of the persons who were his Auditory at this present. The time was shortly after that first he began to preach, having gathered many of his disciples, and done such miracles, that now the people began to resort apace unto him. At which time Christ might well think good, so far to bear with their weakness and rudeness, as not to require (at that time) of them, the uttermost of that which rightly he might. His Auditory consisted on two sorts: the common multitude; and those his disciples that then were. The common multitude we may very well think to have been so rude then, that well his wisdom might so far forbear them. The disciples were of the common sort before, & but lately come to Christ: and so consequently not unlikely to be almost as ignorant yet, as they were before; and almost as much wedded unto such liberty, as in the looseness of that time had grown up among them, as the residue for the most part were. His Auditory therefore consisting of such, it is no absurd thing to conceive, that he meant hereby to press them no farther than so, and not to grant as allowed unto thē, whatsoever now he thought good, to leave out of the bounds, that so he named. As, whē men are disposed sometime to take in some part of their land that lieth towards the land of others, though upon some special consideration they set not out their • ense so far as they might, yet doth not that by and by import, that they abādon the rest, or leave it to others. For in such case they may so take in that which in such sort they compass about with their • ense, that nevertheless they do not mean to disclaim in the other neither. So in this, Christ may in such sort restrain that looseness of theirs, within those bounds that there he set down: that nevertheless there may be much without them also, that he will not allow unto thē. And the rule is good, that we take good heed, how we do gather anything that is not said, out of that which is at any time said unto us. For, seeing it pleaseth God, not only to lead those, that seek unto him for the same, to all the parts of such holiness and righteousness as is accepted with him, but sometimes also, in an easier course to deal with the common sort, and so to restrain some things unto them, that nevertheless he leaveth them further liberty out of the restraint, then he can like of that they shall use: it may very well be, that Christ did not mean hereby to teach the uttermost perfection in that matter; but only as Civile Magistrates do, restraining such things as they hope they may obtain, winking at others, and altogether passing over thē in silence, if they fear that they can do no good therein. And seeing it is granted of all, that that presupposed law of Moses was political, what letteth but that this ofChrist may be so too? Zegedinus, one of those that is for divorce and marrying again, doth plainly say it, though unto another ende. Potest, saith he, & hoc responderi, dictum Christi de repudio, ad legem judicialem pertinere: quae pro ration temporis, loci, personarum, seu subditorum mutari, aut saltem mitigari potest. that is, This also (saith he) may be answered, that that speech of Christ which is of divorce, belongeth to the Judicial law: which, according as the time, place, and persons shall require may be either clean changed; or, at least, made more easy to bear. And then, if we may take it to appertain unto the Iudicialls, and to be political (as no doubt it is the fairest, in that sense that before I noted, neither can there be anything of moment, I am fully persuaded, brought against it) first Musculus, another of them, plainly faith, Civiles leges multa non bona permittunt, propter subditorum malitiam, ne status publicus perturbetur : again, nec omnia mala vetant, nec omnia bona praecipiunt. that is, Civil laws allow of many things that are not good, because of the untowardness of the people, least otherwise that public estate should be hurt thereby. And those laws do neither forbid all things that are ill, nor give in charge all things that are good. Master Calvin also, another of them, Perperam, saith he, sumebant pie sancteque vivendi regulam ex jure civili. Nam leges politicae interdum ad hominum mores flectuntur: Deus vero, legem spiritualem ferendo, non respexit quid homines possint, sed quid debeant. that is, They did il to take the rule of holy and godly life out of the Civil law (meaning the Iudicialls of Moses.) For political laws are sometimes framed to the ways or manners of men: but God in giving forth the spiritual law, did not respect what men are able to do, but what men ought to do. Again, Magistratus multa quae non probabit, cogetur tamen ferre: quia nunquam ita praeclare agetur cum genere humano ut cohibeantur omnia vitia. Est quidem hoc optandum, ut nullum vitium toleretur: sed videndum quid fieri possit. that is, The Magistrate shall be compelled to suffer many things which he cannot allow: because it will never go so well with mankind that all sin may be restrained. It is indeed to be wished, that no sin at all were suffered among us: but we must consider, what we may be able to do. And therefore as Musculus saith again, of that praesupposed Law of Moses, that Christ did teach, that it was not give • to any such ende, ut quod in se illicitum, coram Deo reddat licitum, that is, To make that lawful before God, that is unlawful in it self: even so, not only we may safely take this exception of Christ; but also it will soon be found, as I do take it, to be the most approved sense that any way else we are able to find, if indifferently we consider thereof as we ought to do. In many other such like places of Scripture besides, we may so plainly find such sparing of the rude and ignorant people to be of God, as that it need not to be thought any derogation to the glory of Christ, if so be we take that only to be his meaning therein▪ and first, in the Old Testament; then, in the new. In the Old Testament we find such like dealing in two special Prophets: Moses the one; and Elisha, or Elisha the other. Moses, so soon as ever he found, that God had put on him some special glory, that the people were not able to behold his countenance for the brightness or shining of it, by and by put a veil on his face while he was with the people: which notwithstanding he did put off again, when he talked with God. Afterward, when he gave them laws, and was not ignorant of their great looseness in many of their ways, and namely in taking more wives then one, and in divorcing such as they had, albeit he knew them well enough, and spake of them too: yet did he make no law against them, nor so much as reprove them neither. Elisha also, when his new convert Naaman did seek to have the Prophets approbation, that he might (in one case) a little halt betwixt God and Baal (at least, as it seemeth that his words did thereunto tend) the Prophet did nothing at all reprove him, but after the usual manner did bid him farewell. In the New Testament we have the like, not only in divers of his servants: but also, in the Master himself. In his servants we have such things, both in divers of them severally: and in the whole body of the chief of them all, jointly together. Of those that are several, first we have that faithful one that came before him, utterly denying (for the people's weakness, whom he found to be ready to have him in over great admiration) that he was Elias: which notwithstanding in two several places Christ doth as plainly ascribe unto him. An other that followed, being in hand to speak of Melchizedek, and then remembering that such things as were to be spoken of him, were many of them hard to be uttered, and withal that those to whom he should utter them, were of a dull & hard understanding, doth suddenly break off the course of his speech, even in respect of that weakness of theirs because yet they were not capable of so high points of doctrine as those. In the whole body of the chief of them all jointly together (I mean the Apostles and many other of the faithful assembled together, in a Council at Jerusalem, about the schism that a little before sprang up at Antioch) we have an example of wonderful bearing with the people's weakness, prescribing in a manner nothing else unto them, but only that which tended thereunto, and that not only in forbidding unto them, but such meats as had before been offered to idols (which notwithstanding may well be eaten but when offense thereat may be taken) and therewithal both blood and strangled (both which were but ceremonial, & by the death of Christ, with the rest of that kind cried down already, though the time seru'd not thē by & by to proceed for the funeral of thē, or to have their dead carkasies unto the grave:) but also, in setting down fornication (by the reason of the great looseness of the people therein) yet in like degree with those others, which notwithstanding is a great deal more odious by many degrees. So much were they led by the Spirit of God to bear with the weakness of the people then: so carefully they covered the brightness of their faces, least it should dazzle (if not clean put out) the weak sighted eyes of the ignorant people. In the Master of all, how oft do we find, that he forbiddeth, not only others, but his disciples too, and the best of thē all, not to be so much as acknown of divers things of special importance, until they should be farther strengthened therein? not that those things might not be by them declared, but that he would have them somewhat stronger, before they should meddle with them. How plainly doth himself likewise tell them, that he had many things to speak unto them, but that they were not able then to bear thē? & for that cause (as then) he did not trouble thē any farther with thē. How quietlie also doth he put up that dogged waywardness of the elder brother, only for that his father was so good to the younger, when he so little deserved the same, that sweet (but foolish) conceit of him, that thought he had so fully kept all those commandments of God: that froward wrāgling of those, that though they had their full due, yet were they not well, only because others had as much as they: that unseasonable & strange ambitiō of those two Apostles, and, the repining of the rest against thē? Al which, though of divers kinds, yet evē by it also, do so much the more plainly declare, that the infirmity or weakness of man is always almost very favourably regarded, not only of good men, but also of God. That one objection that properly to this place appertaineth, is, that in this place Christ was in hand to commend unto them a more strict observation of the laws of God, than the better sort of them (in common account) had inured themselves unto, or thought they needed to have done: and then, that it should seem thereby, that taking the Exception in that sense that they would have it in, and themselves using that liberty of it; they should therein do nothing against the rule of godliness, no, not only when it is but easily or with great liberty delivered unto us, but when it is in strictest manner exacted of us. Howbeit whosoever advisedly shall consider of the place it self, may plainly see that it doth not afford any such argument, because we may see, that it was not the meaning of Christ to teach the uttermost of perfection in those matters that he spake of, but only to cal them on much farther therein, than they thought any need to require, or at least that they in their ways regarded. This may sufficiently appear, in those other examples, that there he bringeth: whereof some there be that go before this that now we speak of; & others, that follow. Those that go before, are two: one, Thou shalt not kill, the other thou shalt not commit adultery. In both which he discovereth much more than they in that loose time regarded, but nothing so much as those laws require of us. For in the former he speaketh but of certain other branches that are likewi • e forbidden; and nothing at all of any of those that are required, which notwithstanding are both many, and of special importance besides: and in the latter he speaketh but of one branch only, and omitteth many others, as far from the common looseness of mē, as that which he nameth (and some of them further) and all those that are required. Those that follow are some of them in this fifth chapter: and some in the next. In this fifth Chapter there are three: one, of a several kind by it self; the other two, being both in a manner, of one kind. That which is of a several kind by it self is that of Not swearing: wherein he forbiddeth divers other branches also that are forbidden; but yet leaveth many others of those, and all on the other side that are required, untouched likewise. In those two others that are in a manner of one kind, he doth but reform their bad misconstruing of two special places: one, that because Magistrates were appointed & allowed to inflict the like punishment on the offender, as he in the way of private wrath or revenge had inflicted on another, as eye for eye, and tooth for tooth, thereupon they gathered, that so far they might in their private quarrels prosecute their own revēging desire, or at least that they might lawfully crave so much of the Magistrate, though but to satisfy their own desire; the other (not altogether unlike to the main point that now we speak of) that because the letter of the law did require their love but unto their neighbors, they thought therefore that they were allowed to hate their enemies. Those that follow in the next chapter, are other three likewise: one of them respecting some part of our duty towards mē, which is doing of our alms; the others some part of our duty to God, which are Prayer, and Fasting. In the first and last of which both he rebuketh the ostentation of it, and teacheth them how to behave themselves for that matter: and in the middlemost he rebuketh but it again, and vain babbling withal; and then teacheth them, both how to pray, and to remember, that so oft as they seek forgiveness of God, they also forgive such trespasses as others do unto them. Thā the which it is sufficiently known unto all, that there be in every of them many things else, that the rule of godliness, as it is set down in the word of God, doth also require: and then, there is nothing in this to the contrary, but that, although Christ cal them here to greater godliness, yet may such as put away their wives and marry again (though it were for adultery) account that they may well enough be great sinners therein.

27 In that other of the 19 of Matthew we are to go thus far also, both to search out the sense and meaning of those words of his there: and then to see, what reasons we have for to induce us so to take them. As touching the sense of those his words, it seemeth to be, not so much to teach any point of doctrine, as to elude that subtle practice of the adversary, and withal to stop their mouths. The reasons that we have to induce us so to take it, are divers: first because the authority, or judgment of others doth so direct us; then also, for that the circumstances of the Text it self do altogether seem to lean that way also. Concerning the judgment of others, Saint Jerome is reasonable plain therein, Igitur Dominus, saith he, sic responsionē temperat, vt decipulam cor um transeat: Scripturam sanctam adducens in testimonium, & naturalem legem primám{que} Dei sententiam secundae opponens: quae non voluntate Dei, sed peccantium necessitate concessa est. that is, Therefore the Lord doth so temper his answer, as best may serve to escape the pitfall that they made for him: bringing in the holy Scripture, and the law of nature to confirm the same: and setting the first sentence of God against the second, which it pleased God to afford them, yet not so much standing with his own good liking, as yielding therein unto the necessity of those that are so carried away with sin. Wherein that he speaketh of a second sentence of God, against which he saith that Christ opposeth the first, it seemeth thereby that as yet he had not espied that the Original was not so: which notwithstanding if he had better regarded, he might soon have found; and then being in a good way already, in that he had noted that Christ's purpose was to avoid their deceits, he might have given a fuller answer, if better he had followed on that course whereinto he was so far entered. Musculus likewise Quoniam autem quaerebant nō discendi, sed tentandi gratia &c. videamus quomodo respondeat: hoc est, quomodo sapientia Dei laqueor tentatorum Pharisaeorum evadat. that is, Seeing they came not to learn, but to tempt him, let us see how he doth answer them: that is, how the wisdom of God avoideth the snares of the tempting Pharisees. And so, in effect, M ^r Calvin too, though in fewer words. Christus, saith he, apt a responsione falsam invidiā diluit: that is, Christ, by a fit answer wipeth away that evil opinion, that they by their cunning would gladly have brought to pass to have conceived of him. The circumstances of the Text that seem to lean that way also, are of two sorts: one, that many besides have noted; & two others, that I have not yet found to be noted by any. That which many have noted, is, that the Pharisees indeed, did not at this time come to learn any doctrine of him concerning the matter that they thē did propound unto him: but only to tempt him, and to entangle him to some inconvenience, as to disgrace him unto the people; or to accuse him unto the Elders. And then, coming in such sort unto him, we have therein cause enough to take heed that we do not account, that in such case needs it must be that Christ would give forth any part of that which should be an ordinary doctrine in the Church: but rather, that he would frame them some such answer, as might be meetest for them, to requite them in their iniquity. Which that we may the better conceive, and resolve our selves accordingly therein, it shall be good a little to consider what we have in the Scripture to induce us thereunto, either of testimonies, that witness the same: or else of examples, that so God hath dealt with others already. For testimony hereof it may suffice that Christ is so plainly said to be a Stone to stūble at, even to both the houses of Israel, and that to the ruin and overthrow of so many as do not believe, or rest not in the word that he hath spoken: and that the Prophet is as plainly willed to infatuate the hearts of the people, to stop up their ears and to shut up their eyes; least they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and should be converted & he should heal them. Examples are many: but few will serve. In the Old Testament it is clear, that when, even the Elders came to the Prophet, not in so good manner as they should, they were not vouchsafed any good answer: and when those Captains with their Fifties in like sort came unto another, they received an heavier judgment, though so they were sent by the King their Master. In the new Testament we have some likewise, that are of such severity, in matter somewhat further off: and some of like severity too, in matters that are of the same kind that now we are in. In matters somewhat further off, not only Christ did use to speak in Parables unto the Jews, and himself gave in the reason, because it was not given unto thē, to know those things, that did appertain to the kingdom of heaven: but even the Apostle S. Peter also struck down with sudden death, both a man and his wife, that came with a contribution unto them, though not in such sort as they ought to have done. In matters that are of the same kind that now we speak off, we shall need (I trust) no more, but only to note, how Christ himself directed his answers in such like cases; and namely, when either they tempted him: or whenas he questioning with them, they would not acknowledge the truth when they saw it. Of their tempting of him, we need go no further, but only to these two: the one, of Tribute, the other, of the woman taken in adultery. In that of tribute it is plain, that they went about to entangle him in his speech, as himself also did tell them, and reprove them for it. Wherevpon in such sort he framed his speech, as was sufficient, both to clear himself, and to put them to silence: but yet not so full, for the doctrine thereunto appertaining. For though it be most true, that there he delivereth that we must give unto Caesar, the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's: yet both the doctrine is but general, not showing, whether that which they spake of be due or not; and that which might seem to be brought in by him to conclude it, served rather to stop their mouths then that they and others should thence have gathered, that the Prince having set his stāp on the coin, it is as thence forward made his so absolutely thereby, that none others can have any property in it. In that other, of the woman taken in adultery, as there also they came to tempt him, so they were accordingly served: first vouchsafing them no answer at all, but otherwise so employing himself, as if he would by his doings teach thē, that it were as good to do nothing, as to give any good answer to them that came so unto him; and, when that would not serve, but that still they urged him to have his answer (because they thought they had him now on their hip) then giving such an answer unto them as choked thē all, and made them to be glad to get them away. When he likewise did on a time so question with them, that they could not but see the truth, & yet when they saw it, would not acknowledge it (which was to show by what authority he did those things among them; which they pretended they would fain know of him) as then they plainly bewrayed themselves that they came to entangle him, and not to learn of him; so he likewise dealt accordingly with them, confounding them first in their own devise, & thē denying to give unto them any further answer. Those other two that I have not yet found to be noted by others, do the one of them appertain to this present time: the other, to a time that followed a little after. That which belongeth to this present time, is to note, in what sense the Disciples took it. For if the disciples then did not so understand Christ, as though he had by those words of his allowed the liberty of putting away our wives for adultery, and to marry again: then, of the two, I think that we also may safeliest take it, that he granted, no such allowance indeed. And that they did not so take it, but rather, that they might not part with their wives in that case neither, and much less marry again, it may seem by this, that they accounted thenselves to be so much straightened thereby, that thereupon they plainly said, that if the matter were so betwixt man and wife, then were it good not to marry at all. For presupposing that they were none of the loosest sort for such matters, but that a reasonable liberty might content them, it will so fall out, that if they had takē though • e words of Christ in that sense that these would have them, they would then never have accounted themselves to be straightened thereby. For such as were of any reasonable moderation, even among the profaner sort, did yet account it liberty enough to be allowed, for adultery to put away their wives, and to marry again: & we may well persuade our selves, that the Apostles were thē also much better than those: and therefore that if they had so understood Christ, they would not then have conceived such hardness as they did in the married estate. And then, if the Apostles did so take the words of Christ, as altogether forbidding divorce and marrying again, yea though it were for adultery also, even that only consideration may well weigh with us to conceive better liking of that sense likewise, if it should not over-rule us rather. That which belongeth to the time that followed a little after, is, that when the Disciples, by occasiō as it seemeth, of this his speech unto the Pharisees, did ask him again, concerning this matter, he then left out (unto them) the Exception that he had used before, & plainly told them, that whosoever should put away his wife, and marry another (not using the Exception of adultery to these now, as he did to the Pharisees before) he should commit adultery against her, and so should the wife likewise, if she should deal so with her husband. Wherein I note a manifest difference, in those to whom he hath spokē in these two places: the former being the tempting Pharisees; the others being his own Disciples, and inquiring (as it seemeth, in that they were so troubled before) for their own better learning. Of which difference we need not to doubt, but that Christ might well take occasion, so far to vary in his speeches unto them, as in those two places we see that he doth. And if now the question should be, out of whether of these two answers of Christ, it were safest for us to take our direction in all such cases, me think, there should be no question of it, but that this his answer unto his disciples apart by themselves, should be more likely to give the sense to the other, than thence to borrow a sense for it self.

28 The doubts that I speak of, that seem to be strong against the sense of these two places that now I have gathered, are especially two: one, the Exception that is used in both; the other, that the Apostle, allowing either party in some cases to marry again before the death of the other, may seem much rather to allow of this. Concerning the Exception that is used in both, we are to note that first if we take it in that sense which I have already given it, then do themselves perceive, that it doth help thē nothing at all: but then, that they on the other side may probably challendge, to have such a sense allowed unto it, as will somewhat favor them herein. If we take it in that sense which I have already given it, thenselves do then willingly yield that it helpeth them nothing at all, for that so in the former he doth but bear with the rudeness or weakness of them: & in the latter, vouchsafeth to give them no better answer, because then they came not to learn, but only to tempt him, or to disgrace him unto the people. And then, allowing this sense to rest upon it, we have no hardness but only in this, how to reconcile that kind of speech to stand with the sense that now we speak of. Which in my mind may easily be done, if we note, that the Scripture according to the aforesaid rule of S. Basil, when it speaketh of two things, as some way opposite the one to the other, doth oftentimes so deny the one of thē, that nevertheless it doth not thereby grant us the other: as many Examples do witness unto us, both in the Olde Testament, and in the New. In the Olde Testament (among others) we have one that concerneth Princes only: and more that concern all others generally. That which concerneth Princes only, is, that their King is so plainly forbidden to take unto him many wives, and to gather him much silver and gold. Where it is plain, that both those are so forbidden to Princes, that they are not allowed to others. Of those that concern all others generally, I have noted a couple: one, that forbiddeth usury; the other, that forbiddeth to marry two sisters. That which forbiddeth usury, is, that they were so plainly forbidden to lend their money on usury to their brethren: whereupon it had been an hard collectiō thence to have gathered, that to strangers they might, had they not had the same liberty in plain terms allowed unto them, as we see that it was in the next verse after; but yet in such sort (we are to gather) as otherwise was not against the law of God. For there are we thus to distinguish, that in that place which concerneth their brethren, they were utterly forbidden to take any usury; or any manner of advantage whatsoever: and in that other that concerneth strangers, that they were forbidden but only that which was unlawful or ill: & not such as was not against the rule of Charity. The like whereof we have before, Deut. 15. of which Lyranus noteth well, saying, Concessit dare ad usuram extraneis, ne fratres gravarent. Sicut ergo, qui non dat ad usuram nec extraneo, nec propinquo, facit magis secundum intentionem Mosis: ita ill qui docet uxorem non dimittendam, non dicit contra ejus intentionem, sed magis supplet & perficit illius legis datae imperfectionem. That is, He granted them liberty to lend upon usury unto strangers, that they should not be grievous unto their brethren. As therefore he that lendeth not forth his money to any usury at all, neither to the stranger, nor to his neighbor, doth better follow the intention or mind of Moses : so he that teacheth, that a man may not (for any case) put away his wife, he speaketh not contrary to his meaning, but rather accomplisheth & supplieth the imperfection of that law given. (Not seeing then, that Moses had in plain words allowed that unto them, which now we see, he did not, as before is declared.) But in this liberty that is so plainly given unto them, of lending on usury unto strangers, we may well take good instruction unto the matter that we have in hand. For as they, though they had that liberty granted unto thē, yet because it was otherwise so plainly forbidden, should therefore in that case diligently inquire, what kind; of usury it was that was so far allowed unto them, or in what measure it was permitted; and not (at adventure) rush at any: even so in this likewise, seeing divorce is a thing so contrary to all Scripture generally, if in this case we think that it is permitted, yet were it the duty of all that would take to themselves that liberty, first to make diligent inquierie, how far that liberty of theirs might be extended, not crossing any other word of God thereby; and not so resolutely to determine, that supposing such a liberty is granted, they thereupon conclude withal, that there is nothing against the course that they have taken, to obtain to themselves the enjoining of it. In that which forbiddeth the marriage of two sisters whe are not only to consider of the place it self: but also of M ^r Beza's judgment thereon. The place it self is, that everyone is forbidden, during his wives life, to marry her sister also: a place so taken by the general assent of all, that although it seem to forbid it, but only during his wives life; yet that no man thereon may gather, that it is allowed for any man so to marry, after his wives death neither. But now if we look somewhat further into it, we may find that (in the judgment of some, and those none of the meanest) the sister that there is spoken of, is not meant of a natural sister (that being in effect, and by the like forbidden before) but of any other woman; as, when a man hath one wife already, yet to take another unto her: as indeed those words in the Hebrew it self are divers times elsewhere so used (as they also have noted) and divers other good reasons there are why rather we should so take them. And then whereas the Turks (and such other libertines of that kind) are wont to reason, that to have more wines then one, is nowhere forbidden by the word of God in the Old Testament (and the new they do not much regard) and so take unto themselves the freer liberty that way to offend, if now the judgment of these (being more then any of the rest that I know of, have found) may be of force to weaken that resolute negative of theirs (not indeed gainsaid much by others heretofore:) what letteth, but that these also, if the exception that now we speak of, may have in the judgment of some of the learned another sense, may well doubt of so resolute conclusion, as they make thereupon, and so consequently not think their liberty so clear now, as they have presumed before that it was? M ^r Beza's judgment on this place I have rather noted, for that if he would afford us, but the same indifferency or measure in the matter of divorce and marrying again (that now we speak of) as he doth in this, the matter in question would soon grow to an end betwixt us. For himself doth call this kind of speech an exception also, and giveth so good an answer unto it, as our selves would desire no better for that other Exception in the speech of Christ that now we speak of. For moving the question, Cur igitur inquies, saith he, in alta lege additur exceptio, illa vivente, nisi ut intelligamus, una demum sorore mortua, alteram ducere fas esse. that is, Why then (will you say) saith he, in that other law is this Exception added, while she liveth, but that we may so take it, that when one sister is dead, then may we lawfully marry another, his answer is this: Respondet Basilius eadem illa epistola, non temere ex eo quod scriptum est, colligendum esse quod scriptum non est. that is, Basil answereth in the same epistle (he meaneth in his Epistle ad Diodorum which he cited a little before) that out of that which is written we must take heed, how we gather anything that is not written. And then himself also addeth his own approbation thereunto saying, Et sane it a est quoties saltem id quod consequi videtur, vel absurdum est, vel alio loco, sieve express sive tacit damnatum. that is, And truly so it is, so oft at least, as that which seemeth to follow thereon, is either absurd, or, by some other place besides, either expressly, or by implication condemned. Examples whereof he bringeth a couple: one, out of the last; another out of the first Chapters of the Gospel by S. Matthew. Promittit Dominus, saith he, se Ecclesiae suae affuturum, quamdiu seculum hoc perstiterit: an inde colliges, vel desinente mundo abfuturum illum à suis, vel illud frustrà adiectum fuisse? Non cognovit Josephus Mariam quamdiu praegnans fuit: an ideo efficitur, vel illam postea fuisse à viro cognitam, vel illud frustrà expressum fuisse ab Evangelista? that is, The Lord promiseth that he will be with his Church so longe as the world standeth: may a man gather thereon, either, that when the world shall have an end, he will thē absent himself from them; or else, that that (limitation) was added in vain? Joseph had no carnal knowledge of the blessed Virgin, so long as she was with child; doth it therefore follow, that either afterward he had such knowledge of her; or else, that that (limitation) was to no purpose set down by the Evangelist? In which judgment of his we have divers things (me think) right worthy the marking: some directly appertaining unto the matter we have in hand; and one other besides, out of which we may take some benefit also to that purpose, though it lie so far of from the same, that few there be that would so apply it. Those that do directly appertain unto the matter that we have in hand, are, the rule that he bringeth out of Basil: and his own approbation of it. The rule that he bringeth out of Basil is such, as that if he will afford it in this cause so far unto us, as in that other he taketh it unto himself, we may account our selves so fenced with it, for the matter that now we speak of, as that neither himself, nor any other shall easily be able to bring anything of force against us. In those words of Christ let them take heed, how they gather out of that which is spoken, that which is not, and then I trust that in the matter our contention also will soon be ended. That which is spoken, is plain, that no man may put away his wife, unless it be for adultery: but that for adultery a man may do it, though they think that to be plainly implied; yet unless that also, be either there, or somewhere else plainly said, let it then stand as not said as yet, and then let them withal take heed, how they gather it out of the other. In his approbation of it we see that he doth not only in plain terms approve it: but also doth add some examples unto it. If we go no further but only to the words of his approbation, we may see that as he alloweth of the rule generally: so doth he account it more strongly to hold whensoever it is either absurd, or against some other Scripture, that should be gathered thereupon. If it be good generally, even that only, I trust, will yield as much as we shall need. If it be stronger in those two cases, then howsoever it may be, that very few can account it a thing absurd, that for adultery a man should be allowed to put away his wife and to marry another: yet if they will put it to the trial of other Scripture, I trust themselves will not deny, but that they have none other for it; and that we do charge them, there is much against it. His examples do altogether stand with us, and are very strong against them, to bring them unto a better judgment in those matters: and, howsoever the former of them is without exception (for the matter that now I am to deliver) yet for the other, I think they may not deny, but that to let go the limitation in the latter of them, were not of so hard a consequence in the Church of God, as so far to enlarge the Exception that now we speak of. That one thing that lieth somewhat farther off, and yet is such, as out of which we may take some benefit also to this that I speak of, is, that notwithstanding M. Beza did (by this occasion) so specially look into this place that now we are in (I mean Lev. 18:18. ) yet did he never find that, which before I shown Tremel • ius and Iunins both, to have noted thereon. Of set purpose he disputeth it to and fro: and useth the authorities of S. Basil, Rabbie Solomon, S. Augustine, and M ^r Calvin therein; and conferreth it with some other Scriptures besides. And yet (being a good linguist himself) he looked not so far into the propriety & use of the tongue for that point, but that he let a good part of his matter to slip him therein, which otherwise he would have been loath to have missed. Wherein although he may well be excused, for that all generally (for anything that yet I have found to the contrary) were wont so to take it, and to make no question of it: yet thus much may we gather, to the purpose that now we have in hand that if we find, that in this God hath imparted to these a greater light in the Original, then to many others besides: then may it be so in that other place also that before we had out of Deuteronomy, whereon was laid a great part of the foundation it self of that opinion. But if these had published that judgment of theirs before (as it may seem that they had, or thereabout; for they published the second part of the Bible but 3. years after this book of M ^r Beza's) thenwas the oversight therein so much the more unhappy, for that then there was come abroad good means to amend it. In the New Testament we may be the shorter, because that M. Beza himself hath alleged a couple of good importance to that end if they be considered, and we will lay but two more unto them: one, of another speech of Christ; the other, out of the Apostle S. Paul. That other of Christ, is, of not coming thence, until the uttermost farthing be paid. That of the Apostles is, that a Bishop must be the husband of one wife. In both which we may see, that something is in such sort to be denied, as that the opposite is not to be accounted thereby to be granted: in the former, that the coming out thence is not so denied til then, that it may be thought to be affirmed, that thē it shouldbe; in the latter, that it is not so denied to a Bishop, to have mo wives thē one, that it is allowed to others to have. So in this it may be likewise, that it is not so denied to any to put away their wives, unless it be for adultery, that thereby it is granted unto them that so they may; but that herein also he doth so deny the one, that yet he granteth not the other, especially when as nowhere else we have any Scripture for it: but much, that (even thenselves do grant) hath a great show to be against it; and we nothing doubt, but that it is against it in deed.

29 If they will challenge the benefit of the other, than we are again to note, both how far it is, that the Exception that now we speak of may stretch to their help and then, what themselves must yield too withal, if so they will take it. How far it is that it may stretch to their help, may soon be said: namely, no more but only this, that in some case it were not ill, or at least might be tolerated, that for adultery the party innocent might break of and marry again. For though he meant in that Exception to grant that liberty, yet his words do not drive us, that we should so take it generally: but will hold thenselves contented or answered, if some cases there be, in which for adultery it may be permitted. For though the residue of the proposition be a general Negative; yet the Exceptiō is neither general, nor negative neither; but particular, and affirmative too. And thē the rule is good, that is used by divers of the learned, for the better quieting and establishing of men's minds in the truth of the doctrine, that concerneth things indifferent: namely, that howsoever, whē the general propositiō is Prohibitorie or forbidding, all the species or the special branches of it, are also forbidden, yet if generally it be commanded or required, thē the several branches thereof (at least many of them) may be indifferent, and are according to the circumstances thereunto appertaining, to be adjudged. As in the Commandments, they all forbid, but only two of them, the fourth and the fifth. In those eight therefore that do forbid, there is no special branch to them appertaining that can be indifferent, but is clearly unlawful (no branch I mean, of that part of it that is Prohibitorie: for every of them doth imply the commanding part withal; as those two likewise that first command, do also imply that which forbiddeth;) as also in those two that Commaund there be many branches which may be indifferent, till some such circumstances shall be added thereunto, as shall cast the balance the one way or other. For examples sake, the first commandment forbidding us to have any other to be our God save the Lord alone, leaveth not one of them to stand indifferent (in such respect unto us) but altogether, forbidden unto us: but the fourth, that requireth to keep holy the Saboth day, leaveth divers of those branches that belong thereunto merely indifferent, until, by farther order taken, it be more specially set down, in what sort it must be kept holy. And so consequently, so long as no farther order was specially taken, a mā that were careful not to trāsgresse against the same, had no way at all, but to make farther inquierie, in what manner he should keep it holy: & then to follow the rule prescribed. And so in this, seeing there is nothing said but generally, that for adultery a mā may put away his wife and marry again (for that sense now for the time, for reasonings sake, we are to admit) therefore whosoever would be loath to offend therein, he had need more specially to inquire, in what case, & in what manner, it might be done for adultery also. For he that saith, that for it, it may be done, doth not say that in all cases, and howsoever it may be done, so that once the occasion of adultery be thereunto given: but as he granteth that in such case there is a farther liberty than in many others, so doth he likewise by the same though closely, yet necessarily require, that if himself do not more specially declare what it is, then that there be farther inquiry after it. And then in this case, though the meaning of Christ in that Exception had been, not to deny, but that for adultery such liberty might be allowed, yet might no man in his own private case presume any farther thereon, than elsewhere in the word of God, he should find the same warranted unto him: & there is none of those that follow it (if themselves be honest, and have any judgment) but that do add such limitation & conditions unto it (as partly we saw before) as we may safely gather thereby, that they do not account it allowed indifferently, or, at large unto all. So that, though this sense were allowed unto them, so far as the words themselves should require: yet so also were it like to fall out, that very few of them should be able, to shroud themselves under any just protection of them.

30 Which that they may the better perceive, now are they to be put in mind of the other: namely, what it is whereunto themselves are to yield, if they would have any benefit of this latter sense of the Exception. And that may they plainly perceive to require these two things: first, that they be not too hasty to take unto themselves that liberty, but that seriously they advise them selves what they do therein; and, when they are advised of it, how far then they are to forbear it. That they be not then to hasty to take that liberty, but that well they advise themselves what they do therein, as themselves may see that they ought so to do: so have they good provocation unto it. Themselves may see that they ought so to do, even by the nature of the thing that they have in hand. For being so doubtful as it is, being by many of the learned, so plainly and resolutely gainsaid, even common sense will in such case teach any, that they ought to take good heed to their doings, and not at adventure to intrude themselves into that, which as yet they find not to befall unto them. The provocation that they have thereunto, is in such examples as of that matter we have: and in the experience that we have likewise of the great displeasure of God to divers of those, that have neglected that point of duty. The examples that we have are many, but few will serve to show us the way that in such case we are to follow: even David alone, if we heed him well; but we will add some others unto him besides. With David it was an usual thing, in matters of difficulty, not to medle at all, neither one way nor other, until he had first sought to the Lord, and thence had taken his direction: and that not only in the time of his trouble; but also, whē he was to enter into the possession of his Kingdom. In the time of his trouble we have good instruction of this kind in his example, first in helping certain others: then in recovering a loss of his own. Those others were the inhabitants of Keilah, whom the Philistines at that time besieged. Whereof when tidings were brought unto him he first inquired of the Lord, whether he should go to help them or not, though it seemeth that himself would otherwise very gladly have done it: and, when his company did cast some doubt of peril therein, he then inquired of the Lord again, before he would proceed therein. In Keilah likewise, when he had delivered the City, and in reason might think, that now among them he might account himself reasonable safe: yet, upon some doubt that himself conceived, that as then he saw a storm to be growing, he would not rest on his own reason and good deserts therein; but inquired of the Lord again, and so escaped a special danger. That loss of his own that he was to recover, was, that whilst he and the company atattended Achish King of Gath, to have gone with him to battle against Israel (a very great oversight in him) his own City Ziklag that the King had given him to sojourn in, was by the Ama lakites takē in his absence, their wives and children, and all that was therein taken away, and the City it self consumed with fire. Whereat his company were so grieved at their return (for they went not forward in that voyage, but were discharged and sent home again, God providing much better for him) that when they found what loss they had therein, especially of their wives & children, they were so impatiently grieved therewith, that they thought to have stoned David their Captain, as thē they were enraged against him. He thereupon again inquired of the Lord, whether it would please him, that he might be avenged on those that had done him this wrong, & recover the pray again or not: not resting on those perturbations, that the indignity of that fact had kindled in himself and his men: but seeking unto the Lord therein, and taking all his direction thence. Whē he was to enter into the possessiō of his kingdom, he observed (a wonder to see) the self same course. In so much, that when the kingdom was fallen unto him by the death of Saul: yet did he not presently hasten unto it; but first inquired of the Lord, whether he should make hi • entry unto it or not. And whē the Lord had resolved him for that matter, and had given him leave to go and make his entry unto it, he rested not there, leaving the rest to his own affections or choice: but inquired further also, to what part of the kingdom he should make his first repair, and where he should begin his kingdom. And yet he was before anointed by Samuel the Prophet (and that by the commandment of God himself) to succeed Saul in the kingdom: and then presently thereupon in token of it, and to enable him thereunto, he was endued with a special gift of the Spirit. Shortly after which, it pleased God to work mightily by him in the overthrow of Goliath, & therewithal putting to flight the whole army of the Philistines: and thereby not only to bring him unto the knowledge of the people; but also into special great honor among them. When thereupon Saul began to conceive hatred against him, and eagerly to pursue upon him to have his life, he plainly found that God had preserved him still, and oftentimes in wonderful manner: and had given him withal many secret friends with whom he did sojourn when he was chaced to and fro; of whom he might well have conceived opinion, that seeing they stuck so far unto him in his adversity, they would now undoubtedly have known him in that his entry into prosperity. In which case, even in the most moderate (that for the most part are among us) flesh and blood would soon have been doing: insomuch that few there are, that would not have resolved in thenselves to have made no further question, for matters of less importance then it. Those others that I thought good to add unto David, are these two: the Queen of the South; and Jehoshaphat. The former of which had divers hard questions, & was wise her self besides; but yet she would not rest in her self, nor in any of her own sages neither, but came unto Solomon to be resolved. The latter was so careful of this point also in an expedition against the Syrians, that even in those affairs he craved, that first he might inquire of the Lord, before they did set in hand therewith, &, though thē he had enough of Ahab's Prophets, and all those agreeing in one, yet all those contented not him, till he had that one Prophet of the Lord that yet was left, that by him also they might inquire of the matter they had in hand. What experience we have of the great displeasure of God against those that neglect this point of their duty, is so plain a thing in it self, that we need not to stand upon it, it doth so plainly of it self appear, as in many others, so namely in his judgment against those two sons of Aaron, & in David too; but especially in one of his judgments against king Saul. For howsoever the former were strange: yet was the last strangest of all. Those two sons of Aaron that now we speak of were Nadab and Abihu, who were then but newly entered into their office, and so not exercised therein before: and yet because that therein, they offended (not by doing anything against that which was prescribed, but only for not inquiring of a matter that was not givē them in charge, and which in reason they might have thought it had not been a matter of any such moment) they were both on the sudden destroyed with fire. Whervpon that Moses doth charge them, that therein they did not sanctify the Lord, and that this judgment did for that cause so fall upon them, it may teach us likewise, that it is over profane dealing with God, and very dangerous unto our selves, if we do not inquire of all such things as concern our duty to him, if otherwise they be not made plain unto us. David was about to bring home the Ark of the Lord, which was little regarded in the days of Saul, and to that end had gathered unto him a great assembly, that so it might the better be done: and yet because they did not well heed, in what manner they did it, the Lord with a sudden and fearful stroke, dashed all that whole solemnity of it. But the judgment of Saul is, as I take it the strangest of all, for that he was rejected for being king, for no other cause, then (according to the judgment of some of the best, & as the Text it self doth seem to import) but only for that he meddled too soon, and did not awaite the Prophets coming, who was first to show him what he should do. For besides that this matter was (at least as the case stood then) a matter of State (wherein it it is commonly thought that Princes may least have regard to their Prophets) Saul was before, by the Prophet himself anointed unto it, confirmed also by divers signs; him • else endued with a special gift of the holy Spirit likewise, whereby he was also enabled to prophesy; afterward chosen by lot in a special assembly of the estates; shortly after commended unto the people by a victory that he had against the anointed, and thereupon by the whole army acknowledged, being thē above three hundred thousand: having now also tarried the time appointed, in a manner, even to the full, if not to the uttermost of it (for it is said that he tarried on Samuel seven days, according to the time that he appointed) & last of all being so strongly urged as he was to hastē so much as he did, his enemies lying so near unto him, and his men for fear dropping away so fast as they did, that unless he had then addressed himself unto his business, he was in danger to have had none to have tarried with him. Whereas therefore we have on the one side so good examples, that lead us to so careful inquiry first, before we presume to determine whē so ever the matter is anything doubtful; and on the other, so fearful judgments withal, on so many of those that have neglected this point of duty: it may not justly be doubted of any, but that hardly he should be able to discharge that point of duty to God, i • in such sort he should take the benefit of that Exception unto him, as a sufficient warrant in that case to marry again; though there were no more in it thē this, that as yet it is not resolved, but is plainly in question, even among the learned themselves.

31 When therefore they condescended to this, that they must be better advised of it, to the end they may the better see how to determine, namely, how far they are to forbear it, so far as I see, they need go no further, to find that they are not in such sort to take it, then only unto these two points: first whether it may not well be doubted, that they have not some Scripture against it; then, if they had not, whether yet itwere not inconvenient. That it may well be doubted, that they have some Scripture against it (and that in large and plentiful measure) I account it to be so plain in it self that I do not think it needful to go any further, but only in brief and short manner to point unto it: and that, not only, when regard is had to those places, that directly treat of that matter that is in question, and so are held by very many, as learned & godly as any others; but also, if recourse be had to some other places, which are more general, and yet may specially be applied to this likewise. Those that directly treat of the matter that is in question, and so are held by very many, as learned and godly as any others, are such as either set down the nature of marriage, as God ordained the same at the first: or else do teach us the nature of it, after that once it is so ordained. Those that set down the nature of marriage, as God ordained the same at the first, are of two sorts: whereof one only is the Original; the others, are references thereunto. That which is the original, is that known place in the second of Genesis, how God cast Adam a sleep, took a rib out of his side, made a woman thereof, brought her to Man, and so joined them both together. Of whom it doth immediately follow, that she was bone of his bones, and flesh of his flesh: and that, in respect of that so near a conjunction (in that she was taken out of man, & to him delivered by God himself) a man should leave Father and Mother, and cleave to his wife; and that they two should become one flesh. Those others that are references thereunto, are divers, as namely that of Christ, wherein he repeateth the same again, and then addeth thereunto, whom God hath coupled together; let no man put a sunder ; and divers others elsewhere besides, which we need not here to reckō. Those that teach us the nature of wedlock (I mean for this matter) after that once it is ordained, are divers likewise: as namely, when the Apostle teacheth, that the woman, so long as her husband liveth, is tied unto him &c ; and elsewhere likewise, that the wife may not depart from her husband, &c, nor the husband put away his wife. Which also we need not to gather together, for that there is nobody that doth bring any of them against the doctrine that herein we are to set down: but shun them rather, as altogether going against them; or, otherwise, when they are pressed with them, then seek to qualify them so well as they can. Those that (in this respect) are but general, and yet may specially hereunto be applied, are divers: some that concern one point of our duty towards God; others, that concern certain duties of ours towards our neighbor. Those which concern one point of our duty towards God, are all such as reach us patiently to bear the cross that he layeth on us. Those that concern certain duties of ours towards our neighbor, are of two sorts, some that teach us, that we be ready to forgive him his offenses to us; others that call upon us to bring on (so well as we can) to all Christian integrity, those whom God hath to our charge committed. Having therefore these Scriptures against them, and divers others such like as these, I see not how they can avoid it, but that they are hereby forbidden in such sense to take that Exception unto them. For they both are one flesh, even in the nearest society of all coupled together by God himself:, and therefore not to be sundered by any, the wife to keep to her husband so long as she liveth, and the husband not to put away his wife. If by our vnadvisednesse before, or negligence after, or howsoever else, it so fall out, that herein God hath laid a cross upon us, what better service can we in such case do unto him, then truly, and quietly to bear it, til he be disposed to ease us of it? If therein there be offenses committed against us, we know who it is that hath forbidden us all revenge, and hath willed us freely to pardon. If we have an untoward piece in our hands, to make any good workmanship of, yet if we do our best endeavor, he will hold us excused; but not if we cast it out of our hands: and the worse that any such is, the more doth every such party need, that the other should deal accordingly with it, and the more work may the other see, that God hath laid him forth therein. So if we cast our eyes unto these either such as I have thus briefly remembered, or any others that are of that nature we are so far from finding any sufficient warrant at all, to that presupposed liberty of these wātons of ours, in such sense to take this exception we speak of, that we rather are flatly beaten, not only from hope of finding any help in these, but also, even from all expectation of it anywhere else.

32 That if there were no Scripture against it, yet that it were not convenient for us, I take it to be, though disputed by some, yet so generally granted almost by all, that whatsoever inward conceits divers may nourish (for the common corruption of nature in us, worketh, in that kind, strong & strange fancies in many) yet outwardly, very few, or none of them all, will seem to deny it. But then the truth is, that they pretend to have this meaning withal, that thereby they would occasion the Magistrate to punish that sin by death, so to make an end of this questiō betwixt us: or else, that on him should rest the blame of such inconvenience. First therefore it shall be good to consider, how inconvenient the thing it self would be among us: then, how little cause there is, under such pretense, so far to take that liberty unto them. How inconvenient a thing it would be with us, may soon appear, first in respect of the Public cause of all: then in respect of certain private persons besides. In respect of the public cause of all, it would be an incōvenient thing with us, partly for that we have already taken other order among us: but especially, for the disorder that would come in upon us thereby. The other order that we have already taken among us, is that part of the form of our solēnization of marriage, whereby each party is directed to take the other for better, for worse: which being the general act of us all, alloweth no particular persons so far to break it, or to call it in question, but that it concludeth such doing to be more, thē any such may well set abroach among us. The disorder that would come in vpō us thereby is, that it would open too wide a gap to all discontēted couples, to break of, and to marry again to their better liking (so long as we should have no stronger restraint of that sin among us) and rather to commit the sin it self, being so easily punished with us as it is, then otherwise to live all their whole life in so great dislike. Those private persons, in whose respect it were inconvenient also, are, themselves, and others. Themselves cannot live therein, but at the least in doubtful estate, not only before men, but also before God: or rather, as notorious sinners, in the judgment both of the most and the best. Those others are of two sorts: some, that are blemished; others, that are encumbered thereby. Those that are blemished thereby, are both those second wives of theirs, and the children that by them they have: the former of them being accounted no wives but only adulteresses by law; and their children illegitimate also. Those that are encumbered thereby, are partly those to whom their lands or goods should of right descend, who by such dealing should have their right very much encumbered: but especially, those discontented couples that before we spake of, who by a few such examples would be so tempted to do the like, that hardly would they be able to walk uprightly therein. How little cause there is, under pretense of that ordinance of God, to the childrē of Israel, that the Magistrates there were appointed to punish adultery with death, to defend their own usurpation of that liberty, as though thereby they might drive the Magistrate to take that order here also, or else himself to bear the blame of it may sufficiently appear in this, that themselves cannot but know, both that as yet we have not that law among us: and that there is no great likelihood neither, that ever we shall hereafter have it. If as yet we have it not, then must we needs forbear that liberty that now we speak of, or else quickly bring all (for those matters) to great confusion. That we are not likely hereafter to have it neither; it resteth on two principal grounds: one, the unwillingness of all men generally to yield thereunto, though otherwise we were never so free unto it; the other, that we are already entangled by one certain let that is in the way. If all men generally be so unwilling to yield thereunto, though otherwise we were never so free unto it (as most men will not stick to acknowledge; and may appear in the Israelites also, in that though it were so specially inioined to them, yet do we not read, that I remember, that ever it was put in execution among them) then, though the Prince himself would be willing, yet in what part of the world should we find a people, that (the most parte of them: for such must they be, that anywhere lightly are allowed to make a law) would be ready to join with him therein? That other let wherewith we are already entangled, is the liberty that we take to our selves (and have in some cases established the same by law among us) of marrying children, especially Wards, & of making other disorderly matches in disparity of years, or condition, for lands or goods. Al which, so long as they stand (& they are not likely yet to fall) are likely enough, so to entreat for their own estate therein, that it is not likely that the other shall ever get in any foot among us. If then it be not likely, that ever we shall have any such law, then the same reason that doth teach us to forbear that praesupposed liberty of ours until we have such law established, should teach us likewise, altogether to forbear the desire of helping our selves thereby, when as we are likely, never to have it (in any good manner) allowed unto us. And then, what else may we think that persuasion to be, but a special fetch of Satan, to bring in some special confusion, & to work much mischief among us? And if there be so great inconveniency hanging thereon, not only the wise of the world do resolutely determine, that of two evils, the lesser is rather to suffer a mischief in some few particulars, than while they seek to relieve them, thereby to bring in an inconvenience to all: but even the Apostle also hath plainly told us, that though things may be lawful, yet if they be not expedient or profitable, in that case also they are not to be attempted by us; and besides hath given in himself an example of it. As Christ also (no doubt) himself, by the selfsame rule, governed himself in many of his speeches and actions: and in effect prescribed the same unto others. In which respect Abrahā did well, to refuse that great bootie (even the spoil of all those cities, which for Lots sake he had recovered, and nowby the law of arms was his) even only for that he would not have the inhabitants of those parts to take occasion to think that their substance had made him rich: being careful to reserve the glory thereof, only to God, by whose only blessing indeed it was, that he was grown so mighty among them. Wherein also it is good to note, that in so doing he pleased God so marvelous well, that by and by he appeared unto him, promising safety from all his enemies (belike, especially in respect of those four kings, whō now he had so nettled) and to be unto him besides (in respect of the bootie, that in such respect he had refused) an exceeding great reward. David also in that respect did well to refuse the water that was brought unto him from the well that was by Bethlehem, understanding that three of his Captains had put themselves in so very great danger for it: though otherwise he was very thirsty, and longed more for it than for others. Far unlike therein to Cleopatra that dainty & wanton queen of Egypt, who (like unto her self therein) to satisfy her own inordinate lust, did not stick at once to sup of, in one draught, a jewel of inestimable price: of fifty thousand pounds, as some did value it; but, of six hundred thousand, as others esteemed it. And even so these wantons of ours, for a little beastly pleasure of their own for a time, little regard what infinite hurt they do unto others, by the example that they do give them. So that, although the exceptiō might have such sense, as to import, that in some case it might so be: yet, both we must needs be well advised of it; & we must take heed that we never do it, either whē those aforesaid Scriptures may not well bear it, or so oft as there is any so great inconvenience that hangeth thereon.

33 Concerning that of the Apostle, who in some cases alloweth either of the parties (not only the man, but also the woman) to marry again, & therefore may seem so much the rather to allow of this, we are first to consider only of so much of it, as belongeth to this that now we speak of: then, of somewhat else besides, that cometh in by occasion of it. That which belongeth to this that now we speak of, resteth but in these two points: one, the Objection that is gathered thereon; the other, the answer that may be given it. The Objection that is gathered theron, is this: that seeing the Apostle doth so plainly allow (in case of infidelity) that if the party that doth not believe, will forsake the party believing, that in such things a brother or sister is not in bondage, or, must of necessity be forced, to live without the help of wedlock, therefore if in this the bond of matrimony may be so broken, that the party forsaken may marry again, it should seem to be much more likely, that by adultery the bond should be much rather broken. For answer whereunto, I think we need no more but this, that there is not the like reason in the one, as in the other: whether we respect the offense that is committed, or the inconvenience that redoundeth unto the other thereby. The offense that is committed, is adultery, a very foul and great sin, both odious to God, and exceeding grievous to man, even intolerable almost unto many: in that forsaking that the Apostle speaketh of, an utter breaking óf of the knot of wedlock that was betwixt them, so far as in that party doth lie. The former of which sometimes proceedeth but of infirmity: the latter of them, is an hatred to Religion it self. Though therefore the Apostle allow the forsaken party to marry again, especially, when it is for hatred of the Truth, and where the other hath broken of already from the bond that was betwixt them: yet it may be, he would not allow (or at least it cannot hence be gathered, that he would allow ) of marrying again, where the party offending hath but only sinned against that holy ordinance, and therein was not purposed, nor yet is, to break of from the other, and when that sin (it may be) was done by infirmity also, and much provoked by some inordinate dealing of the other. The inconvenience that redoundeth unto the other party thereby, is by such forsaking much greater (in this kind) then is that other of committing adultery. For by such forsaking it cometh to pass, that the party forsaken is altogether deprived, not only of a comfortable fruition of the good things of wedlock, but also of the things themselves: of that needful preservation from sin; of children likewise, and mutual help. But it is not so by adultery, for that the innocent party, notwithstanding it, may have all those of the offender in some tolerable measure, though not in so good, and comfortable manner, as were expedient: he may have that needful help to preserve him from sin, and to accomplish divers of his affairs; and propagation of children likewise. If he cannot take the benefit of any such help of the other that hath been so unfaithful unto him, that is like enough to proceed but only of such perturbation of mind as some way casteth how to revenge, or cannot yet digest so great a displeasure done unto him: which, indeed, is justly deserved by the offender; but not justly entertained by the innocent party, for that he which hath forgiven us more, hath willed us also, for his sake to forgive. And therefore such perturbation is to be removed or at least bridled: & not any conceit thereon to be nourished, that now there can no such help be had of the party offending. His children (I grant) may be somewhat doubtful, whether they be his or not: but that is so general a case withal, that mē must rather hold themselves contented with that general determination of law that by marriage doth make them theirs, (which also is their own act too) then suffer themselves to be so carried away from the opinion that they are theirs, by such suspicion as il likelyhoods may easily breed. Else, if any will needs be so peremptory, let them first show, that their own descent is utterly void of all suspicion of any such blemish, before they deal so strictly with others. Albeit therefore the Apostle allow of marrying again, to such as utterly are deprived of all such good things as by marriage God ordained for men: yet is there no reason, why any mā should thereupon gather, that the like liberty were likewise to be granted to those that may have the use of those things in some tolerable measure, but so far as their own troubled affections do hinder them of it. That other thing that belongeth not unto this that now we speak of, but ariseth by occasion of it, is that hence it seemeth to me we may have a special good light, whereby we may see how to determine of one other point, that in all ages hath much troubled the learned, and yet doth: namely, for what causes divorce may be had, & marrying again thereon allowed. For many there are (and those of special account withal) that allow of no divorce, but only for adultery (and think that those that go any farther, do make themselves wiser than their Master) nor of marrying again, but only in that of adultery, and in this of being forsaken: others again, that allow both of divorce and marrying thereupon for divers other causes besides. In which extending of that liberty, there are of those that profess and teach the Gospel, that may well be doubted to go over far: as on the other side the Papists generally are for divorce so very liberal, that they without questiō stand in great need to be better shod for their so far over-reaching therein. But of this matter I mean not to treat: which would be sufficient it self to occupy another Treatice much greater then this. The thing that now I mean to deliver, is no more but this, that whereas the Apostle doth so plainly insinuate that the party that is in such sort forsaken may marry again, and then doeth not altogether rely on that case neither, but taketh in some other withal, hence, it seemeth, may best be decided, in what cases it may be permitted to marry again: so that the rule be not in this point exceeded, to grant it to such, as have such use of marriage already as need requireth. For we do not here find that the Apostle doth allow it to any, but only to such as otherwise were altogether deprived of it: and though he take in such like withal, yet must we therein have a good eye unto the original or pattern given, and not account any like unto it, but only wherein the one of the parties is as much otherwise deprived of the use or benefit of marriage, as in the case that the Apostle himself hath put. For howsoever divers such there may be, or at least some few, wherein it may be allowed to marry again: yet certain it is, that having none other Scripture for it but this we have then no warrant at all to go any further, or to extend that liberty to any other besides whatsoever.

34 But as touching the main, if now we gather the chiefest and principal points together, of all that hitherto hath been said, what have we (to speak of) but only the opinion of divers of the learned that way inclining? For the truth of the matter or any certainty whereon to ground, what have we else, but only a brittle show of certain places of Scripture, which for a while may seem to be for us: but so soon as ever they are examined, either plainly they turn to the contrary side, or at least assure us, that for any certainty of that point of doctrine, for which we have such recourse unto them, get it where we can besides, but in them shall we never have it. We hoped that Moses and Malachi too, would have holpen us

THE TABLE OF METHOD: WHICH SHEWETH, HOW the whole Treatise proceedeth; and where every member thereof doth lie.
• That such as are f • r Divorce on adultery and marrying again have two sorts of places which seem to be for them, but yet are not (in deed) being better examined: of which
  • The first sort is of those which do chiefly respect Divercing from those wives that we have wherein
    • First, those places themselves are set down. Sect 2.
    • Then it is declared, how weakly that persuasion is grounded thereon: and therein
      • First, how ready divers are to rest upon them, without any farther inquiry. Sect. 3.
      • Then, how little ground work they have, even in their leaders so to do
        • First, because they are so much crossed by others. Sect. 4.
        • Then in that which themselves have set down for that matter, and therein,
          • First, so much as respecteth their own judgment therein. In which
            • First what themselves do bring us, which
              • Either tendeth to this end, to show us how hardly and doubtfully they are resolved. Sect. 5.
              • Or else are some such other things besides, as may be some warning unto us to take good heed to their judgment therein▪ least otherwise we be deceived thereby, viz.
                • First, such Reasons as they bring in fo • themselves, why so they determine. Sect. 6.
                • Thē, what Protestatiōs they have besides, (beli • e to qualify the hardness of their judgment therei • . )
            • Then what we are to think thereof, namely that where such things go withal, there is no likelihood to find any certainty of Doctrine whereon to build. Sect. 8.
          • Then, the rest due, which most respecteth those places thē selves that they use for it. Wherein
            • First it is briefly declared▪ that those places do little help them, and that they do plainly mistake those two that seemed to be strongest for them Sect. 9.
            • Then, that same mistaking of theirs is more largely prosecuted, and in this order,
              • First, by examining of those Places, whether they be mistakē, or not and to that end,
                • First, how they take them, Sect. 10.
                • Then, that so taking them (it may well be) they do mistake them and
                  • First that of Deut • ronomy, Sect. 11,
                  • Th • n, that of Mal • chie also. Sect. 12,
              • Then, what we are to gather thereon Sect. 13.
  • The other of those, that withal respect marrying again: and therein
    • First what considerations we have that may induce us to think that in th • se also they have little help; which are,
      • First, the judgment of others, wherewith they are so much crossed. Sect. 14.
      • Then, their own defective handling hereof: and therein,
        • First, how far we may chardge them therewith. Sect 15,
        • Then wherein those defects of theirs do lie: namely
          • First, in weak Reasoning: of which their Reasons,
            • Some there are, that depend on the things thereunto appertaining, and those
              • Either the same that are in question: and then,
                • Such as are of the substance of them. Sect. 16.
                • Or such as are but accidenta • y thereunto. Sect. 17.
              • Or those that are of such a kind, or so near unto them, as that out of them they draw certain reasons also▪ Sect. 18.
            • Others, on the authority or testimony of others
              • First▪ of God,
                • Either mistaking his word therein. Sect. 19.
                • Or else gathering amiss thereon, and therein,
                  • First, of Erasmus▪ Sect. 20.
                  • Then of Beza also. Sect. 21.
              • Then, of men Sect. 22.
          • Then, in divers Inconvenient and hard speeches: to be found,
            • First, in Erasmus. Sect. 23.
            • Then, in certain others of them. Sect 24.
    • Then the places themselves examined: & therein
      • First, to set down the meaning of them, viz.
        • First, that that is not the meaning of them, which they would have. Sect. • 5.
        • Then, what is the meaning of them, namely,
          • First, that place in the fifth Chapter of S. Matthew Sect • 6.
          • Then, that other in the nineteenth of the 〈◊〉 Sect 27.
      • Then, to answer certain doubts that may seem to be strong against it, which are 2.
        • First, the Exception that is used in both, which (it is shown) will not help them. And
          • First, that it is clear in that sense that we do give it. Sect. 18.
          • Then also, even in that sense wherein they would have it; and therein,
            • First, how far it yieldeth to them; namely, but thus far, that in some cas • it might so be. Sect. 29.
            • Then how far they must yield unto it again which •• ,
              • First, to be well advised, and to take heed what they do therein. Sect. 30.
              • Then, that they do nothing
                • Neither against any other Scriptures, which they have strong against them. Sect. 31.
                • Nor against Conveniency neither, which in that case they cannot av •• de. Sect. 32.
        • Then, that the Apostle, permitting the faithful (by an infidel forsaken) to marry again, doth nothing warrant this • either. Sect. 33.

well, for divorce we had certain others besides: but we made most reckoning of these. Now we see, that not only those others, but even these also do give us over, and refuse to yield us any help therein. Which divorce had they granted unto us, we had made no doubt at all, but they had in like sort allowed to marry again: but now finding them so strong in the former; we have at all no hope of the latter. Even Christ also, we thought, did make no stay, not only at divorce (so it were for adultery:) but, in that case also, not at marrying again. But now we see not, with what face we may look for any such liberty at his hands, when as we doubt it would fall out indeed, that if he should grant so much unto us, he should grant us more therein, then ever any other of his servants did, before, or since. Whereas therefore, his words may indeed have another meaning, and such as agreeth with much other Scripture, we do not see, but that well, may we doubt, that such sense as agreeth with much other Scripture, is a great deal more likely to be his meaning, than that which standeth alone by it self, and hath nothing else in all the Bible neither in the Old Testament, nor in the new, that accordeth with it. Being thus strongly held of by the Scriptures, or rather clean abandoned by them, when thereupon we return again (as passing loath to be clean put down in this, if any way we might see how to help it) to that sorry help that remaineth, the judgment of certain of the learned, before remembered, to consider somewhat better of them, an • to see if we have not some further help in them, than yet we conceived (being so many as they are, and many of them so resolute in it, and in all their writings generally of so special account among us) there find we first, that they all mistook the Text it self, out of which the first and principal part of all their opiniō should have derived the warrant that they thought it to have: and that divers of the chiefest of them, have themselves so acknowledged since. If we look somewhat further into them, then do we in like sort find, not only that therein they go against the universal opinion of all others therein (that long hath stood in the Church of Christ, even frō the beginning, for the only truth of that point of doctrine) and against the practice in government of this Church of ours, and of all others almost besides: but also, that themselves give us in so weak reasons why they thought good to side themselves to that opinion, & such Protestations withal, the better to obtain to be excused for that they go so far therein; and when they are in the matter it self, so many of their proofs for that they affirm so very slender, and so inconveniēt speeches withal (boading such impatiency, that they may seem to arise of the weakness of the cause it self) that if we well advise our selves what comfort it is that there we have gotten, we hardly find anything throughout the whole that will afford us any one piece of warrant, to entertain any such conceit, for never so small a portion of time, or to give it so much as one nights lodging. The remain then will be none other but this, that our selves are carried so strongly away, with our own unbridled affections (with an hot desire, either of change, or of revenge and sometime with both) that it was an easy matter, for parcialitie and error in others, to settle us in that conceit, we being loath (for fear of disturbing our peace therein) to fall to any just examining of them. God give us grace that howsoever in all things we daily offend, by our common infirmity, and great corruption that yet abideth; yet we may so far abandon all fleshly lusts, that thereby we grow not to be so foul stains in the Church of God, nor so perilous examples to others: especially those, that have an unfeigned care to serve him indeed, or, no more but profess the truth of the Gospel.

AN OTHER NOTE FOR THE Reader.

THis former Treatice being thus finished, yet is there one thing more (gentle Reader) that farther I am by late occasion, to impart unto thee: nothing at all appertaining to the matter before; but only for that it lighteth on the time of the publishing of it. The matter is no more, but this.

I have already divers times heard, that certain of the favorites of R. P. (the supposed Author of the Resolution ) would not believe that I had made any answer unto him for such matters, as he, in the preface of his second edition of the same (which was, 1585) had charged me withal. And for these, I contented me self to let thē understand, that I had answered him many years before: as it is known well enough I had done (so far as an whole Impression might serve to witness it) now about twenty years since.

But now of late I perceive, that himself also doth not take with his Answer, or will not be acknowne of it: & this do I gather, for that now (a few days since) I find, that having set forth that Book again, but about two years past (namely, 1607) and having altered it again from that it was before (but the first, it may be, will ever prove the best) he nevertheless chargeth me a fresh, with many of those stale matters, answered so many years past already; but maketh no mention of that mine Answer.

Seeing therefore I came to the knowledge hereof, when this other was yet under the Press, I thought it good herewithal to wish this to be marked, that seeing that answer of mine was given forth and published, in the year of our Lord 1589; & that since I never heard anything frō him of the same, & that now he wrāgleth a fresh about some of those his stale matters again, and so grossly (though warily enough on his own behalf) dissembleth mine Answer to them and the rest: that all good & orderly dealing (of such a kind) was thē somewhat far to seek in him.

I make no doubt, but that there (in that mine Answer) he noted much more to be objected, than any way he was able well to answer (especially, the great uncleanness of all that crew generally; their bad dealing with the Fathers; and so many slips of his own withal:) and that therefore he would rather see, if, for a flourish, he could not cull out something of his former matters to gibe at again, to be in lew or steed of some just Reply, so long expected. But plain dealing is ever the meetest for all those that stand for the truth and so base shifting, much more suitable to the desperate weakness of the cause that he hath in hand.

And if any man shall lay thereunto his bold promise of those other two parts, of that which now he calleth his Directorie, & therein how many years he hath been hammering about it, & yet could never get out of the first part neither, and the seconde time made it worse than before (even in the judgment of his own favorites:) the less that this third time also he hath now again answered their expectation, the more may such a man see, what hope he may nourish in himself, as touching those others. But me self conceived long since (and so did reasonable plainly tell him) that it was not in him to do, as then he did bear the world in hand: namely, to frame such other two parts, as should be of that argument, and yet suitable to that, which he had elsewhere borrowed to the first part of it.

An other there is, one Radford by name, a fowl of that feather, who in certain discourses of his of other matters, published in the year 1599, hath been something chattering against me likewise, in the quarrel of his fellow R. P. before: & yet none otherwise but like to himself. Of whō notwithstanding I have already said something▪ somewhat more specially, in a larger Discourse of mine, which now (God willing) next unto this, & so but a few days hence, I trust, is to come to the Press: and so say I no more of that matter now. Yet that no man deceive his expectation therein, both it is but towards the end of that larger Treatice: and, as he, in those his other discourses doth no more, but as it were, by the way, take his pleasure on me; so I likewise, following the suit, or, in such like manner, do give him his answer.

So now again (gentle Reader) I commend thee to God.

THE ALPHABET TABLE: WHEREIN, not only the principal Matters, but also the Scriptures themselves, and the other Authorities do come in, in Alphabet order.

A
• Abraham see Better course.
• Abuses not the thing it self to be abolished, Sect. 7.
• Adultery, whether it dissolve the bond of Matrimony, Sect. 16. that so it doth, pl • inly set down, by Erasmus, Museulus, Martyr, Calvin, Gwalther, & Beza Ib. but yet that in some cases though it may be, those nevertheless a • e very rare. Sect 21. whether the Magistrate ought to punish with death. Sect. 24. See, Marrying again.
• To be well Adv • sed before we seek to be divorced thereon, for that it is at least much to be doubted, that the Scripture is much against it, both such as do • h more specially treat of that matter; and such as doth it but generally, Sect. 31.
• An Aim, for what things divorce may be, Sect. 3.
• Allegations: see Excusable.
• Allowed, see Lawful.
• Ambrose, see Origen.
• Amending his former reading: see Calvin.
• Amis, see Gathered.
• Johannes Andrea, that the bond of marriage may be oth • rwise dissolved, Sect. 18, Himself also, Panormitanus & Hostiensis, very little for them, Sect. 22.
• Angels, what time they were created, not certainly known, Sect. 8.
• Angry. see Divorce.
• An • ichrist ; what t • me he should come, not so well known of old, Sect. 8.
• Apostle, see disorderly; Erasmus; Objection and Ods.
• Archbishop ; see Edw Le.
• S. Augustine, acknowledged by Erasmus not to be of his mind, Sect. 4, Much against the opinion of marrying again after divorce Sect. 21. Again see Bond, and Wonder.
• Authority, see Divorce.

B
• Bad men, see Testimonies.
• Balaam, see Divorce.
• Ballance, see Scales.
• Ban • , see Bond.
• S. Basil, Rule, Sect 28. liked and used by M. Beza, Ibid.
• Be • ter course propounded in the examples of Abraham and David, Sect. 32.
• M. Beza, how he doth moderate himself in the matter, S. 7. His better ei • to the Original, S. 11. His Bo • ke De Lege Dei, c. 11. How he also reasoneth for dissolving of marriage on such inconvenience as doth follow disorderlie marriage, S. 17 Very resolute, as having express matter for him, yet knowing that the same very matter lieth in question, S. 2 • . What himself hath found, either to build his own opiniō upon, or to defend the same against others. Ibid. Objections by himself acknowledged. Ibid. Giving over the course that Erasmus took before. Ibid. Out of the Apostle S. Paul how he defendeth himself for his opinion. Ibid. His judgment of marrying two sisters more specially considered, S 28. His judgment in another case, somewhat strangely agreeing with his opiniō for divorce and marrying again. Ibid Himself bringeth examples of S. Basils Rule. Ibid. Again, see Adultery; S. Basils Rule; Deut. 24. De Lege. Dei; Erasmus; Jerome; Innocent; and Speeches of theirs.
• Bishops, see Constitutions, and Rome.
• Bond, Fowre several bonds wherewith those that marry are bound, so that though some break, yet the whole is not dissolved, S 16. That it may be dissolved divers ways, to be the opinion, of Hostiensis, Augustine, Pope Lion and Pope Zacharias, S. 18. That if the Magistrate the adulteres to li • e, yet that the husband may account himself to be rid of the bond of wedlo • ke, a perilous point, S. 21. The bond of marriage not relying on the parties only but on God too: and as it is of God, that it cannot be dissolved, S 25. Again, see Adultery; Lands, and Io. And • ea.
• Borne-with, or spared: see Weaknes.
• Bucer, see Jerome.

C
• M. Calvin, his better cie to the Original, S. 11. and so amending his former reading. Ibid On that place of Malachi. S. 12. Neere to the point, yet not lighting on it. S. 16. Again see Adultery; Came to tempt; Deut. 24. Divorce, Mal. 2. Meaning, & Political.
• Order for Ceremonies : see divorce.
• Chemnizi •• : see Deut. 24.
• Chief : see Places.
• Civil: see Pol • ticall.
• Christ, not likely to be so favorable to such divorce. S. 25. That if he should allow it, he were the first and last in all the Bible that so should do, Ibid. And so, though we made no doubt therein of him before, yet now (for that matter) to give us over▪ S. 34. See also, Divorce; Erasmus, & Liberty.
• True Christians, see Laws.
• Chrysostom, not in, that cou • se with Erasmus S. 4.
• Circumstance : see farther Iniquity.
• Circumstances, one of the time, another of the persons, to show that sense of theirs not to be the meaning. S. 26. One such circumstance noted before, as that the Pha • ises came not to learn, but to tempt. S. 27▪ Another, not noted by others, how the Disciples took it. Ibid.
• Not meddling with all their Collections of this kind, but only with such, as themselves did chiefly mean unto this. S. 20.
• Commaunding : see Forbidding.
• Conception of the blessed Virgin: see Divorce.
• The Conclusion. S. 34.
• Their Conclusions to be but weak. S. 9.
• So ready Consent of many others to that opinion, whence it may be. S. 21.
• Certain Considerations much against thē. S. 14.
• Constitutions of Bishops much against Erasmus. S. 4.
• Coupled, see put asunder.
• Corrupt ▪ see Interpretations.
• Course : see better; and Beza.
• Cumbersome, see Way.

D.
• DAvid▪ see better course,
• Death ▪ s • e Adultery.
• Decretal ; see Constitutions,
• Their Defense but weak, and how • o. S 20. and see Erasmus.
• Deus 24.1 • 4 Of divorcing (as it is conceived) of such as they like not. S 2. In what sense taken by Erasmus, Musculus, Martyr, Calvin, Gwalther, Chemnizius, Beza and Zegedinus. S. 10. See also, Hardness; Political; Probabilitie; and Translation.
• Such Scriptures as Directly treat of it: see Advised.
• Disciples, see Circumstances.
• Discontentment after • see Erasmus.
• Discovered, see Weakness,
• Disorder, see Inconvenient.
• Disorderly marriages diversely made. S. 17. A weak kind of reasoning on disorderly marrying, divorce to be allowed, and to marry again, yet by Erasmus used. Ib. By him also conceived, that the Apostle would in such case allow it. Ibid. By whom such marriages are wont to be contrived, S. 20. See also, Erasmus, and Inconveniences.
• Disorders before: see Erasmus.
• Dispensation. see Interpretation.
• Displeasure : see Divorce.
• Dissolu • the bond: see Adultery, Bond, Inconvenient, and Martyr.
• Dissolued : see Bonds,
• Dissoluing marriage: see Beza; & Erasmus.
• Distempered : see Inconvenient.
• Divers places, strong against that opinion, not meddled withal, S. 20.
• Divorce held, in a manner, by all. S. 1. Noted, that the Lord doth hate it. S. 12 Tolerated, not allowed. Ib. An unlike thing that Christ should teach both it, and thereupon to mary again. S. 13. Liberty thereunto over soon taken hold on, when first they do not find it to be clearly allowed. S, 17. Both it, and marrying again thereon, pleaded for, on the order that the Apostles took for Ceremonies, and making of Bishops, and afterward on determining of Transubstantiation, the proceeding of the holy Ghost, the conception of the blessed virgin, and the substance of the holy Ghost. S. 18. Pleaded for likewise on many particulars o • that Sermō of Christ on the mountain, as of Swearing, being Angry, Reproaching, Presuming, Lawing, Revenging, Resisting evil, on that it is commanded to love our enemies, to do good to those that do il to us, and to pray for those that cu • se us, S. 18. I • , and marrying again theron, conceived to be some spec • all perfection Ibid That it was permitted, but only for the hardness of their hearts, to be more thē may be gathered by sense of nature. S 19. That we need it as much as they, and therefore should have it as much as they. Ibid. It not to be made by the parties themselves, but by such as are in authority. S, • 0. Vrged for many more causes there • for • adultery▪ Ibid. By the free league of it, eight husbands, in five years. Ib. That upon divorce for adultery a man may put away his wife, to be the thing that doth lie in question betwixt us. S, 21, Of our kind of divorce how faulty they do account it to be. S. 21. Marrying again hereon misliked by M. Calvin Sec. 25. A reproach to the parttie that takeththe advantage of it. S. 23. Never any good or honest mā (though but in a second or third degree) thought to have done it. Ib. The nature of wedlock not to bear it. Ibid. To account that lawfully they do it, to be little better then to make God the author of their villain. Ib. Those that are such, to be like unto Johanan, and Balaam. Ib▪ To be conceived (as it may seem) to be a matter of special godliness S 26. Nothing at all for it, but that which cā little avail it, S. 34. See also, Aim; Bond; Christ, twice; Erasmus, Husband, Lyranus, Marrying again; Speeches, Vnlawfull; & warrant.
• To be justly Doubted, that there is Scripture against it. S. 31.
• Doubtfull speeches how ill to build upon. S. 8, yet see excusable. For doubtful cases, see Examples and judgments,

E.
• ECclesiasticus, 25.35 36. of a disobedient woman. S. 2
• To love our Enimies : see divorce.
• One farther Enquirie (as touching, divorce) what it was, that Christ said unto them, S. 27.
• Euthimius Zigabenus. S. 1, v. 1,
• Erasmus his opinion how far crossed by others. S. 4 How he prote • teth, S. 7. What indifferency he offereth Ibid. p, 31. For that opinion of his reproved by Natalis Bedda. S, 16. Himself doth better interpret one of those his venterous speeches, but yet is little followed therein by others of his opinion. Ibid. How he reasoneth for the dissolving or breach of marriage, on such inconveniences as do follow disorderly marriages S. 17 How he reasoneth on certain places of the word of God. S. 19. Of that company, but only himself and M. Beza called to trial. S. 20. That he resteth on▪ Mat. 5, 31 32, & 19.8, 9. to have his opinion thence S. 20. The places used for his defense not only those o • Christ, but some of the Apostle also. • b. Somewhat disposed to ride, it seemeth. Ib urging divorce for so many causes as he doth he h • th all men almost against him, Ib. How for hi • defense he gathere • h of the Apostle Ibid. His own be • p • s how weak they are. S. 22. Of certain disorders going before, and certain discontentments after. S. 23. Certain wondersin those speeches that he hath of the Scriptures. Ib. No more Fa • hers ligh • f • und by the foreign patrons of that opinion then himself had first a leaued but one of our own to have gone much • arther in, and in kind (though defective too) more commendably all • o Ib See likewise, Adultery, Bedd • ; Deut. • 4. Disorderly; Divorce, Hardness • f heart. Lawfull; twice, E • w. Le, Mal. 2.16 Marry again, Obi • ction, Reasons, Speeche • , and weakness
• More Examples then are alleged. Sect. 20, That such things have sometimes been done he bringeth in two poor examples S. 22. Divers others to justify or make good the Rule of S. Basil: as of many wives & much treasure, of vserie, and of marrying two sisters▪ S, •• . Others likewise to show, how carefully in doubtful cases, the Lord is first to be sought unto. S. 30. See also Testimonies.
• The Exception, in some sort, waived. Sect. 20. This i • ▪ though they had it in their own sense, yet that in some • cases might be, it would be for them, and not so generally as they would have it. S, 29. The • efore that in that case also, they be very wary, S. 30 See also Objections.
• Excusable notwithstanding, even those Resolutions, Allegations, Protestations, & all sorts of their doubtful speeches, S. 8.
• Ezekiel, 44.22. Priests▪ not marrying with divorced women, S. 2.

F.
• In the ancient Fathers but littl • for them: & that themselves do to acknowledge. Sect. 22. See also Erasmus▪
• Favorable se • interpretation.
• Fearefull: see judgments.
• Sōe Few of those ga • herings of theirs only noted. S. 20
• Any liberty of the Flesh some taken hold on by us S. 8
• Fleshly see liberty.
• Generally Forbidding, and generally commanding or requiring, to have a special difference betwixt thē, S. 29
• In such sort to proceed or deal, but as it were a Forcible entry: and that the adversary much grant unto them whereon to proceed S 20,
• The Former : see objections.
• Four ▪ see Bonds, and Places.

G
• How far they have Gathered amiss on those places that they have used, somewhat strange to consider S 20.
• Such Scriptures as in that respect are but General ; see Advised
• Generally: see forbidden,
• Geneva: see Seely.
• A Ghesse, instead of proof, what should be the meaning of those words of Christ. S. 21., Also, see Beza.
• God see Bond.
• To do Good unto those that do evil unto us: see divorce.
• Great ods betwixt their innocent party, and the Apostles forsaken. S. 33.
• Ground: see Principle.
• Their Groundworke to be so far weak, and those words may be otherwise taken: and clear it is that so they may. S. 20.
• Gwalther, see • dulterie; Deu • 24. & Mal. 2.

H
• Somewhat v • ged by Erasmus that where he accounteth divorce to be first permitted, it is not there added that it was but for the Hardness of their hearts. S. 19 And s • e Divorce
• Heed • o be taken to that interpretation of his S. 16 and s • e Adv • sed, Examples and Exception.
• H • l •• ▪ see divorce, and Seely.
• Honest man see divorce.
• Hostiensis : see John. Andreae and Bond.
• One of his helps not to stand, but that the Hos •• ensis must be no husband▪ S. 21. Not to be in the power of 〈◊〉 husband, • o break the bond of marriage with his 〈◊〉 . S. • 5,

I.
• 〈◊〉 , a law thereof. S 11. Much against the sense that they conceive of Deut. 24.1.4. Ibid.
• Ier. 32.1. God ready to receive. S. 2.
• S. Jerome, how he setteth, down the Septuagint, in • hat place of Malachi. S. 12. He and Bucer misliked by • eza. S. 24. See Came to tempt.
• The Jews, whether to be called before the come • ing of Christ, not so certainly known. S. 8.
• Inconveniences following after disorderly marriages. • . 17. Such as concern the innocent par • ie. Ibid. such as concern both parties, Ibid, Such as by disorderly mar • iage do reach unto others. Ibid. Such to be taken yeed of before: and marriage not to be for them dis • olued. Ib.
• Inconvenien • speeches much mingled withal, S. 15. Much found in those that opinion. S. 23. Some of them of the Scriptures. Ib. O • hers, that they talk of so many ways to dissolve marriage. S. 24. Some again belonging to all▪ others but to certain of them. Ib. Others • ow the innocent party is to deal with the offender. Ib. Though it might be done, yet that it were inconve • ient both in respect of the public cause of all. & in • espect of many private persons besides. S, 32. See likewise Erasmus; and Weak reasoning.
• Indifferency : see Erasmus.
• Things Indifferent, a Rule for them. S. 29.
• Innocent party, whether bound to seek to the Magistrate for the punishment of the offender, discoursed by Beza. S. 24. So likewise whether again to receive • he offender into favor. Ibid. See also, Inconvenience, and Inconvenient.
• Their Innocent party: see Od • .
• Innocence, see Malice.
• Insufficien • ie: see weakness.
• Intemperatenesse of a widow: see Malice.
• Vnwonted Interpretations, whàt is to be gathered out of them. S. 13. The interpretation to be favorable, otherwise the dispensation will be needful. S. 20. Corrupt in • erpretation Ib See also, Heed.
• Johanan. see Divorcers.
• Joseph. for Marry, called in question. S. 24.
• Isa • 0, 1. God not divorcing his people. S. • .
• Judgments of God, divers and fearful against those that in doubtful cases have neglected, first to seek unto him. S 30. And for judgment, see Opinion.
• Iudicialls of Mo • es of what force to bind others. S. 24.
• Junius : see Translation; and Tremellius.
• Iustifie S Basils Rule, see Examples.
• Iuvenall. S. 20.

K.
• Kemnizius : see Chemnizius, See likewise, Musculus, and speeches of others.

L
• LAnd • of an adulterous woman, remaining with her husband and by virtue of marriage, argue the bond not to be altogether broken S. 16.
• The old. Lat •••• acknowledged by Erasmus himself, not to to be of his mind. S. 4.
• Laws, Those that be decretal, to be against Erasmus. S. 4, That any also are laid, not to be needful for true Christians, had need to be warily taken. S. 18.
• To be Lawfull which God alloweth, how far urged by Erasmus. S. 19. That also sometimes to be lawful, which the law punisheth not. Ibid.
• Lawing, see Divorce.
• Ed. Le, about this matter vncurteously used by Erasmus. S. 10. Afterward Archbishop of York, Ib.
• Leàue out, see ground.
• Of the more Learned, that generally they mistook the Text whereon they built, and that certain of the chief o • them have so acknowledged since, S. 34.
• Lending on usury, see Examples.
• Lev. 21.7. A divorced woman, not meet for any Priest to marry, S. 2,
• Letting loosse to fleshly Liberty, not likely to be any work of Christ. S, 13▪ And for such kind of liberty, Farther see divorce, and Flesh.
• Like to this, see other things.
• Eras. how he Limiteth his judgment of divorce. S 19
• Pope Lion : see Bond,
• Love, see Enimies,
• Lyranus such for divorce, as for usury, S. 28, His judgment for usury how to be applied against divorce. Ib. See divorce,

M
• MAgistrats, see Adultery; Bond; Innocent party, and P • etense,
• Making Bishops, see divorce,
• The Mallice of the Jew, & the intemperatenes of the widow, thought by these to be more favored, then the innocence of the party not offending. S, 18,
• Mal. 2, 16. If they hate them, to put them away S. 2. v, 7. Erasmus not noted to have meddled with it S. 10. In what sense taken by Musculus, Martyr, Calvin, & Gwalther, S, 10. The place it self not to yield so much in the letter: but more in the sense, S. 12. See also, Words,
• Many, see wives,
• Of Marriages disorderly made divers noted, S▪ 6, again see Bond; disorderly, twice; Divorce, & Inconvenience.
• Marry That neither the mā is pun • shed if he mary another, neither divorced women forbidden to marry both these by Erasmus pleaded, S, 19, see also Christ &. Divorce.
• Marrying again, on divorce for adultery held by many of special account, S. 1, But many mo of the learned against it then with it, S, 14. such place • as seem to be for it Ib. again, see August dovorce, 4. times & warrant,
• Marrying two sisters, see Beza▪ and Examples.
• P, Martyr. that no men of any good sort, ever used divorce, S, 4. How he protesteth. S. 7. many ways to dissolv marriage. S. 4, see also, Adultery, D • ut 24. Mal. 2. & speeches of theirs,
• Mat. 5.31, 32. what we may rather take to be the meaning thereof. S. 26. See also, Erasmus, & Political.
• Mat, 19.3, 9. what may seem to be the meaning of this S. 27. See also, Erasmus.
• Meaning, see Mat, 5. Circumstances, & Perfection. Not Medled with: see divers places,
• Medling, see collections,
• Misliked, see Calvin,
• How far they Mistake, farther declared, S, 10, See also, Places,
• Moderate see Beza,
• Ari. Montanus, on that place of Mal. not suerving frō the wonted reading, S. 12. See also, Translation.
• How Musculus reasoneth on certain authorities of the word of God, S. 19.
• Vrged by Musculus first, and Chemniziusafter, out of that law that a Priest might not marry a divorced woman, that it was lawful for a divorced woman to mary again, S. 19. Again, see Adultery, came to tempt; Deut 24. Malae, 2, Meaning Objection, Political, and Speaches of others.

N
• Natalis Bedda, see Erasmus,
• Num. 5.13.31▪ A probability that Deut, 24.1.4. is not so to be taken, S. 11.

O
• An Objection strong against them, how Erasmus and Musculus do answer. S. 16.
• In that Objection that they gather out of the Apostle, allowing the forsaken to mary again (as the case may be) the matter to be clear, that the case is not like: the one being altogether deprived of the benefit of marriage, but not the other, S. 33.
• Objections but the same that Erasmus had gathered before, S. 21. Some out of the words of Christ, others out of the Apostle S. Paul, Ibid, Objections a couple, the former of them, of the exception used therein, S. 28, See also Beza, and opinion,
• Occasion of this Treatise, S, 1.
• Ods, see Great,
• Offender, see Innocent, How they gather their own
• Opinion or iudgem • nt, and how they answer such objections as stand against them, S, 20. The opinion of divers learned men that way inclining▪ S, 34.
• Order, see Inconvenient,
• Of the ancient Fathers Origen, Tertullian, Pollentius (by his welwillers in this cause, said to be a grave and learned man) and Ambrose all noted to be (at least) inclining to this opinion of theirs, S. 22.
• The Original, or Hebrew Text, against that • ense of Deut, • 4, 1, 4. S. 11,
• Divers Other things which they conceive to be like unto this, S. 18.
• Otherwise taken, see Groundworke,
• Others, see private persons.
• One of our Owne, see Erasmus,

P.
• Panormitanus see John. Andrez,
• Pard • n, see Innocent.
• Particulers, see divorce.
• Parties see Bond:
• Parties themselves: see Divorce,
• S. Paul. noted to let down ofttimes the rigor of that which Christ requireth, S. 20
• Perfection to what end commended unto us, S▪ 18. That Christ in that his discoursedid not mean to te • c • it, but to lead them on somewhat farther, to appear • by those examples that there are alleged, 526, se divorce
• A Perilous point. see Bond.
• Persons : see Circumstances,
• How ready men are to sort themselves to that Persuasion. S, 3.
• Pharisees tempting, see Circumstances,
• Some such Places as the learned do not lean much unto, S. 2.
• Of their first four Places, S 9, Much mistaken by thē. Ib. such as they thought to be strongest for them. S. 12, Such of the Old Testament as they thought to be • most for them, first to leave them. S▪ 34, See also Erasmus: Gathered, and Marrying again,
• That presupposed allowance of Moses to be but P • liticall, and then that that other of Christ may be so 〈◊〉 S, 26, If it be so then that the judgment of Zegedinu • Musculus, and Calvin doth make for that sen • e or me • ning, Ibid. The nature and Force of those laws that are but Political. Ib. See Meaning▪
• Pollentius, see Origen.
• Practice of the Jews before: a token of no such 〈◊〉 in Deut: 24 1, 4 S, 11.
• To Pray for those curse us, see divorce▪
• The Pretense they have of urging the Magistrate th •• by very weak S, 32▪
• The Principle it self to be yielded otherwise tha • they have no ground work for them S. 21. It to be craved. see forcible entry,
• Private persons: see inconvenient.
• Probabilitie. in the practice of them, that Deut. 24. • 4▪ is not so to be taken S 11 See Num. 5.13.31▪
• Proceeding of the holy Ghost. see Divorce.
• Prohibitorie see forbidding.
• Proof, see Ghesle.
• How it is Proved, that to be the sense of the words 〈◊〉 Christ, Sect. 21.
• Protest : see Martyr.
• Protestations, see Excusable.
• Prov. 8.22. Of keeping an Adulteres, Sect. 2.
• Not Punished, see lawful.

R
• D. Rainolds, that many, and those of special accoun • though they allow of divorce for adultery, yet in 〈◊〉 wise to marry again, Sect. 4.
• Rare, see Adultery
• Ready. see Perswasion.
• Reasoning, see Erasmus.
• Weak Reasonings, together with inconvenient & d • stempered speeches, what they boad, Sect 15.
• Reasons Such a • simple arise out of the matter itself • Sect. 6. Such as they have so to induce them. Ib. Most o • them all, set down by Erasmus. Ib Such as stand most by comparison. Ib. Such as they have in certain inconveniences, are but weak, S. 17. Such as they have on the Testimony of others: first of God, Sect. 19. then of me • See, Weakness.
• Reconcile. see Innocent.
• Reformed Churches said to be much with those that 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 Erasmus.
• 〈…〉 Calvin for Deut. 24.1.4 See and, • . • a • l, 〈…〉 Indifferent.

S
• 〈…〉 ••• tance▪ see Similitude
• 〈◊〉 of Divinity, against Erasmus, Sect. 4.
• 〈…〉 two sortes of places most appertaining 〈…〉 Sect 1. See, Doubted; & Inconvenient.
• Of certain Scriptures a britle show, & denying their 〈…〉 S. 34. See also directly; and General.
• 〈…〉 Meaning, and Words.
• The 〈◊〉 his, how they interpret that place of 〈◊〉 • ect. 12.
• 〈◊〉 of Christ on the mountain: see divorce.
• 〈◊〉 to the Lord: see Example; & Judgments.
• A 〈◊〉 help, for the matter in question, in the order 〈◊〉 the Church of Geneva, Sect. 24.
• 〈◊〉 of crooking to some special purpose, S. 8 〈…〉 and divers appetites, S. 3 Of the grap 〈…〉 together, S. 16. Of one that taketh in some 〈◊〉 of his • round, & leaveth out some part of it, S 26. Of 〈◊〉 ready & cumbersome way, S. 8. Of ballāce or scales, 〈◊〉 places, but two of them chiefly, that seem to be 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 may in fair possibility argue an 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 • o •• e wich.
• 〈…〉 of M. Beza for divorce: & whence 〈…〉 M. Calvin, Sect. 1 • .
• 〈…〉 of theirs, arguing thenselves to note 〈…〉 in their opinion, S. 5. See also, doubtful; 〈…〉 and Inconvenient, four times.
• 〈…〉 godliness: see Divorce.
• 〈…〉 clear of them: see Game to tempt.
• 〈…〉 see divers
• 〈…〉 of the holy Ghost: see Divorce.
• 〈…〉 put a Sunder whom God hath coupled, 〈…〉 , vn • erstand, Sect 16.
• 〈…〉 , how to be moderated, Sect. 33.
• 〈…〉 .

T
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 they came to Tempt him, he but stā.
• 〈…〉 stoppeth their mouths: so 〈…〉 and Calvin, Sect. 27.
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 and examples howe bad 〈…〉 with, Sect. 27.
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉
• 〈…〉 the Universal opinion of the whole Church; against the 〈…〉 here, bring us but weak reasons, are fain 〈…〉 protestations withal; and have 〈…〉 distempered speeches besides, Sect. 34.
• Turn : see Circumstances.
• The Translation of Deut. 24, 1.4. amended by divers: Sect. • 1.
• Transubstantiation ; see Divorce.
• Treatice ▪ see Occasion.
• Much Treasure forbidden to Princes: see Examples.
• Tremellius and Junius note the better reading of that place in Mal. S 12 In Tremellius far • he • see Trāslation.
• Trial : see Erasmus
• The Truth to be, that our selves were so impotently given to our own af • ections, that it was an easy matter to lead us to such opinion as whereunto our selves inclined, Sect. 34.
• The Turks, whether to be called before the coming of Christ, a thing that is to us unknown, Sect. 8.
• Two : see Places.

V
• Fra. Vatablus in that place of Malachi, not swerving from the wonted reading, S. 12. See also, Translation.
• A Villanous sin: see Divorce.
• Vncurtiously used: see Edward Le.
• Ods of Usury towards neighbors, and strangers, S 28. See also, Examples; and Lyranus.
• The protestations they Use therein, to what end it may seem that so they do, Sect. 7.

W
• NOt unlike, but there is at all no Warrant for them (in that opinion of theirs) in the word of God, S. 1. And a clear matter (it seemeth to me) that those places yield them no Warrant, Sect. 13.
• Way see Similitude.
• Weak reasoning much used by thē Sect. 15. How weak▪ notwithstanding they account all to be that • s b • ought against them: & that more specially noted in one of the chie • e, S, 22. Sir also, Conclusions, Disorderly, Erasmus, Groundworke, Pretence, Reasoning, & Reasons
• How Weakly by S Paul he helpeth himself therein S, 2 •
• Weaknes of Judgment in some wherefore to be noted S. 1. The weakness of those reasons of theirs, some • hing discovered, S. 18. The same again or the insufficiency of Erasmus his reasoning therein, in divers poi • ts noted S: 19. Weaknes of the people much borne with by many examples in the Ol • Testament, & in the new, S 26. See also▪ Reasons.
• Wedlocke : see divorce.
• Wiue: many, forbidden to Princes: see Examples.
• A Wonder with him, that S. Augustine never espied so much therein, S. 21. See also Erasmus.
• Those Words o • Mal, 2.16. though they should keep their wonted reading, yet that the sense were much against them, S. 12.

Z
• 〈◊〉 Zacha ••• see • ond.
• 〈◊〉 for dissolving of marriage, many ways, S. 2 • See also Deut▪ 24 Meaning Pol • ticall; and Speeches of 〈◊〉