The Logic Newly Translated
The source for this document is https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A05111.0001.001
Project Note
This is licensed under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND. This license allows reusers to copy and distribute the material in any medium or format in unadapted form only, for noncommercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.
The source of this document is the Early English Books Online (EEBO-TCP) website. Those books were transcribed in a character for character manner and can be very cumbersome to read since there was no standard spelling during that time. Many spelling variations such as "unlesse", "vnlesse", and "vnles" regularly appear.
This project was conceived to clean up those books as much as possible and make them more accessible to the interested reader, leading to the creation of a massive list of variant spellings and their corrections. This was used to clean up the text, but is of course only as complete as the list itself. Because of the nature of the original transcription, some words have missing characters or places where the original language (e.g., Greek) was not transcribed. This effort does not change that. Be aware that the original transcription can also be faulty and in some cases entire sentences may be missing.
Although this is no substitute for a properly compared, proofed, and scholarly edition, I believe that the result is a document which is far more accessible, particularly for searching for terms using standard spelling. The document has been cleaned and presented in what I hope is a pleasing and useful format for the vast majority of Christian brothers and sisters who just want access to read these spiritually nourishing works.
However, a word of warning: The Puritans were a very diverse group of people and their age was characterized with godliness, but also much upheaval, disputation and strife. They disagreed on many doctrines and some of these works contain less orthodox or Scriptural views than others. The reader is strongly advised to read with discernment, particularly if it is unknown whether author is trustworthy.
This project took a huge amount of time and skill to bring to fruition. I would particularly like to thank David Jonescue for the initial list of Puritans he found on EEBO and the concept behind this project as well as the continuous, unceasing efforts toward seeing this complete. Without his labor, this would not be available. Alex Sarrouf was invaluable in providing the initial list of over 7,000 spelling variations he had identified and corrected, as well as continuing to review more than 16,000 additions to that list for any typos.
Logan West
(with David Jonescue and Alex Sarrouf)
www.puritansearch.org
THE LOGIKE OF THE MOSTE EXCELLENT PHILOsopher P. Ramus Martyr, Newly translated, and in diverse places corrected, after the mind of the Author.
PER M. Roll. Makylmenaeum Scotum, rogatu viri honestissimi, M. Aegidij Hamlini.
Imprinted at London by Thomas Uautroullier dwelling in the Blackefrieres.
ANNO M.D.LXXIIII.
CVM PRIVILEGIO.
TO THE WORSHYPFVLL M. ROBERT WYKES OF Dodyngton in the Countye of Glouceter Esquyer.
A Lexander Kynge of Macedone (most Worshipful Mecaenas) not so much for his valyaunt and martial facts (although they were most victorious) as for his great love and ardent zeal which he bare to virtue and knowledge, hath been of all men hade in moste worthy estimation and goodlye memory. Job called the servant of God, although he was worthy to be praised of all men for his justice and equitye, yet he was moste commended for his singular patyence in time of tribulation and great calamytie. But when I consider with myself your insatiable desire and moste fervent love, not only in the following of your own study, but also in the promouinge and furtherynge of others: your great patience and incredible constance, in suffering affliction and abydyng aequitie: I am compelled to confess that there is none neither amongst the profane and ethnycke authors, neither amongst thecclesyasticall and spyrytuall fathers (of what estate or quality so ever they were) with the which ye may not be compared, yea or rather preferred. For if Alexander were praised that in the myddest of his triumphant victories he did bear abroad with him Ilyas the famous work of homer containinge the battayles and destruction of Troye: How much more are ye to be commended that in the myddest of your calamity do both night and day where soever ye be, carry and read a more worthy and precious work? Alexander in prosperity took pleasure to read Homere treactinge, of martial facts, to the end he mought guide his army according to the exacte rule therein declared: ye take pleasure in adversity to read the holy Scrypture and word of God, to the end ye may govern your life according to the will and commandment of God. Where Alexander was, there was profane Homere: where ye are there is the holy Bible. When Alexander did sleape Homere was his bolster: when ye do sleape, the Bible is your pyllowe Alexander for all his riches is praised for the continual reading of one book: what shall I then say of you that have bestowed no little parte of your goods in buiynge of most worthy works. Job which is set before our eyes thexample of a singular patience being extremely afflicted in outward things, and in his body, through his great torments and afflictyons brasted forth into many inconuenyences both of words and sentences, and shown him self as a desperate man in many things, and as one that would resyst God, Ye having no less occasion to complain being moste unjustly spoiled of your goods troubled in mind and conscience, threatened daily by your enemies do notwithstanding constantly resyste acknowledgyng God to have secret judgments, to chastyse those fatherlye whom he loveth, and to let the reprobate run to destruction. These and other your moste singular virtues having considered and experimented the good will and mind which you bear to the furtherance and setting forth of all sciences, I could find none more apt, or worthy under whose name this golden treasure should come abroad, then his whose virtue and good behavior, might give some place and authority to the same. For although there be many more adorned with riches and possessions of this world yet in setting forth of virtue and singular patience I find none at all. Now therefore to conclude (Sythens, I know you to be most alienated from all ambition) I beseech you to receive, this my small present in good part, having rather respect to the mind of the giver then to the gift itself, although most precious. So I committee you to the protection of God almyghtie wishynge his heavenly Majesty, that ye may constantly persevere as ye have begun, both in your spiritual and temporal affairs, to the end that ye living godly in this world may obtain that heavenly Crown of glory which our Savior Jesus Christ hath prepared to all those that do patiently: watch for his appearynge to whom withe the father and the holy Ghost be all laude, honor & praise world without ende.
THE EPISTLE TO THE READER CONTAINING the occasion of the setting forth of this book, the utility and profit of the same, the use and facility, with the declaration of three golden documents or rules appartaining to the matter of every art, and last a brief declaration of the method and form to be observed in all arts and sciences.
S EING it is the dewtye of all Christians (beloved Reader) to labor by all means, that they may profytte and aid their bretheren, and to hyde or keep secrete nothing, which they know may bring great utility to the cōmō wealth: I thought it my duty (having perceived the great commodity which this book bryngethe to the Reader of what state and quality soever he be) to make thee and all others to whose knowledge it shall come per takers thereof. But least thou think that thy labor and pain should be lost in reading of the same, seeing so many books going abroad under glorious names, having in dead little or no utility, but wrapped all together with innumerable difficulties: I shall in few words show the, the matter contained in this book, the method and form of the same, howe easy it is above all others to be apprehended, howe thou shalt apply it to all arts and sciences, and shortly that no art or science may either be taught or learned perfectly without the knowledge of the same. As fore the matter which it containethe, thou shalt understand that there is nothing appartayning to dialectike either in Aristotle's xvij. book of logic, in his eight books of Phisike, or in his xiv. books of Philosophy, in Cicero his books of Oratory, or in Quintilian (in the which there is almost nothing that doth not either appartayne to the invention of arguments a disposition of the same, but thou shalt find it shortly and after a perfect method in this book declared. For thou shalt find no argument which is not either referred to one of the nine arguments artificial, or to the vnartificiall: no sort of disposition which doth not appartayne either to the judgment of the proposition, sylogisme or method. But thou wilt say howe is it possible that this little book is able to contain all that, which the forenamed books (being so many) doth entreat? In deed thou hast no little occasion to marvel, but (having more deapely considered the matter) I believe thou shall not marvel so much. For in this book there is three documents or rules kept, which in deed ought to be observed in all arts and sciences. The first is, that in setting forth of an art we gather only together that which doth appartayne to the Art which we entreat of, leaving to all other Arts that which is proper to them, this rule (which may be called the rule of Justice) thou shalt see here well observed. For here is all which doth appartayne to logic, and nothing neither of Grammar, Rethorike, Physic, nor any other art. This is that documente which Apelles many years ago did signify to us, for when as the Shoemaker reprehended the shoo of Apelles image, Apelles took it in good parte, because it did appertain to the Shoemakers art: but when passing his bounds he began to find fault with the clothes also, Apelles said to him, Nihil Sutor vltra crepidam, which signify the that the Shoemaker should keep him with in the bounds of his art. And therefore (beloved Reader) all those which either write or teache either divinity, Physic, the law or any other thing do violate and break this documente, when they degresse from their purpose and do rail upon other things nothing partayning thereto. For howsoever they write or teache (so it be from their purpose) it is to be had of no estimation. Is he not worthy to be mocked of all men, that purpose the to write of Grammar, and in every other chapiter mynglethe something of Logic, and something of Rethoricke: and contrary when he purpose the to write of Logic doth speak of Grammar and of Rethoricke? that takethe a text to preach of fasting and disputethe the most parte of his hour of images or swearing? that promysethe to show me the causes and signs of the stone, and tellethe me many tales pertainning to the gowte? that when he is asked of contractes or obligations, aunswerethe of liberty or bondage? Or if the Astrologian being asked of the eclips of the son, should answer me something concerning the motion of the stars? And yet we see the most parte of our learned mē both in their teaching and writing (to the great hurt and domage of youth) most vnshamfullie do use the same which I would to god were amended. The seconde document (which diligently is observed in this book) is that all the rules and precepts of thine art be of necessity true, which Aristotle requirethe in the seconde book of his Analitikes and in diverse chapiters in his former book. Thou shalt violate this document, whensoever amongst thy precepts in writing or teaching, thou shalt myngle any false, ambiguous, or uncertain thing: as if in theaching me my logic, which consistethe in rules to inuente arguments, and to dispone and judge the same, thou shouldest begin to tell me some tricks of poisonable sophistry: and when thou shouldest teache me the word of God truly, thou goest about to deceive me by telling me man's inventions: and if thou shouldest (being destitute of good arguments to prove thy matter) be lie some aunciant writer to beguyle the rude and ignorant people, or forge some Authors to color thy knavery which never was, or wrote at any time. I doubt not (gentle Reader) but thou hast read of such fellows: always call thou upon god that it will please his heavenly Majesty to plant this our rule of verity in the hearts of all men, but most chiefly in the breasts of the Pastors of the Church, who have the charge and dispensation of his holy word. The third documente which thou shalt note herein observed, is, that thou entreat of thy rules which be general generallye, and those which be special specially, and at one time, without any vain repetitions, which doth nothing but fill up the paper. For it is not sufficient that thou keep the rule of verity and justice, without thou observe also this documente of wisdom, to dispute of everything according to his nature. Do not entreat therefore general matters particularly, nor particular matters generally, for in so doing thou playest the Sophistes parte, as Aristotle teachethe in the first book of his posteriors, and shalt be compelled to use tautalogies and vain repetitions which thow knowest to be most pernicious to all arts and sciences. For if I ask thee what is Logic? and thou aunswerest, that which teachethe to inuente arguments, thou aunswerest truly but not wisely, because thou intrearest a general thing particulerlie: I ask the for the definition of the whole art, and thow givest me the definition of invention, which is but a parte of the art. And contrary, if I ask the what is invention, and thou aunswerest an art which teachethe to dispute well, surely thou aunswerest not wisely, for thou intreatest a particular thing generally: I ask of thee, the definition of a parte of the art, and thou givest me the definition of the whole art. Note well these three rules in reading of thine Authors: see, if they • ntangle them selves, with things nothing appar • eining to their purpose: if they trouble thee with • mbiguous or deceitful speakings, and do not handle everything after his nature. Take the forena • ed books, and with thy rule of justice give to • very art his own, and surely if my judgment done not far deceive me, thou must give some • hing to the art of Grammar, something to Re • oricke, something to the four mathematical • rtes, Arithemeticke, Geometry, Astrology and • usicke, something also (although but little) to Phi •• cke, natural Philosophy, and divinity. And yet all •• at is in these books (only the fore said digressions •• cepted) doth appartaine either to the invention • f Logic, or else to the judgment. Now gather • geather that wich remainethe, after every art 〈◊〉 the received his own, and see if there be any false, • mbiguous or vncertein thing amongst it, and if • here be (as in deed there is some) take thy docu • ente of verity, and put out all such sophistical •• eakinges. And last perceive if all things be hand •• d according to their nature, the general gene •• lie, and the particular particulerlie, if not, take thy rule of wisdom, and do according as the third documente teachethe thee: abolyshe all tautalogies and vain repetitions, and so thus much being done, thou shalt cōprehende the rest into a little rome. And this much concerning the matter entreated in this book. The form and method which is kept in this art, comaundethe that the thing which is absolutely most clear, be first placed: and secondly that which is next clear, & so forth with the rest. And therefore it continually procedethe from the general to the special and singular. The definition as most general is first placed, next folowethe the division, first into the partes, and next into the forms and kinds. Every parte and form is defined in his own place, and made manifest by examples of ancient Authors, and last the members are limited and joined together with short transitions for the recreation of the Reader. This is that only perfect method which Plato and Aristotle did know observed by many noble writers, both Historiographers, Orators, and Poetes, and now last (being suppressed by ignorance many years) raised as it were from death, by the most learned and Martyr to God, Petrus Ramus, who hath not only proved with strong arguments, but in very deed set before our eyes that this perfect method may be accommodate to all arts & sciences. What shall we say then of those, that in teaching and writing (to the great hurt of the memory) doth put as it were the tail formest, having no regard how every thing is placed, but even as it chaunsethe to come into their Mouthes, so lettethe it go. Dyd ever Plato or Aristotle so? no in deed. But that thou mayest a little the better perceive the utility of this art, and howe far the use of it doth extend, I will shortly show thee howe thou shalt accommodate the same to all arts and sciences, setting before thine eyes one or two for an example. And first what art so ever thou purposest to entreat of, thou must come garnished with thiese three, Justice, Veritie, & Wysdome, as before is said: and then if thou be a divine this method willethe thee that in place of the definition, thou set forth shortly the sonme of the text, which thou hast taken in hand to interpret: next to parte thy text into a few heads that the auditor may the better retain thy sayings: Thirdly to entreat of every head in his own place with the ten places of invention, showing them the causesi, theffectes, the adioints and circunstances: to bring in thy comparisons with the rest of artificial places: and last to make thy matter plain and manifest with familiar examples & aucthorities out of the word of God: to set before the auditor (as every head shall give the occasion) the horrible and sharp punyshing of disobedience, and the joyful promises appartayning to the obedient and godly. If thou be a Physician and willing to teache (as for example) of a fever, this method willethe thee to show first the definition, that is, what a fever is, next the deuisiō, declaring what sort of fever it is, whether the quartane, quotidian, hecticke, or what other: thirdly to come to the places of invention, and show first the causes of the fever every one in order, the efficient, as may be hot meats, the matter as melancolie, choler, or some rotten humor, and so forth with the formal causes and final. The seconde place is theffecte, show then what the fever is able to bring forth, whether death or no. The third place wishethe thee to tell the subject of the fever, whether it be in the veins, artiers, or else where. The fowrthe to show the signs and tokens which appear to pretend life or death: and to be short, thou shalt pass thorough the rest of the artificial places, and do that which is required in every of them: And last come to the confirmyng of thy sayings by examples, aucthorities, and (as Hippocrates & Galen have done) by histories and long experience. After this method Heraclitus the Philosopher examined the physicians which came to heal him, and because they were ignorant and could not answer to his interrogations he sent them away, and would receive none of their Medicens: for (said he) if ye can not show me the causes of my sickness, much less are ye able to take the cause away. So the lawyer shall plead his cause, in prouyng or disprouyng after as his matter shall require, with these ten places of Invention, & dispone everything orderlie into his propositions, syllogisms, and method. So shall the Orator declayme: the Mathematician set forth his demonstrations: and to be short both in wrytyng, teaching, & in learning, thou mayest always keep these three golden documentes in intreatyng thy matter, and this most ingenious and artificial method for the exacte form and disposition of the same. After the exacte observation of the forsaid material documents and natural method thou hast this little book set forth to the, which being well perused is able to bring more profytt to the (I speak after experience) then all thy four years study in Plato or Aristotle as they are now extant. And besides the great utility wiche thou shalt apprehēde of this book, the facility and easynes of the same is not a little to be commended. For hear thou hast nothing to learn (and yet thou shalt learn all) but only ten places of invention, with the disposition of the proposition, syllogism, and method. Every place of invention and every sort of disposition is made so clear and manifest with examples chosen out of the most auncyent Authors, that almost by thyself (if thou have any quickness of spirit) thou mayest attain in the space of two months the perfect knowledge of the same. Hear I will speak nothing of the envious, that thinkethe it not decent to write any liberal art in the vulgar tongue, but would have all things kept close either in the Hebrew, Greke, or Latyn tongues. I know what great hurt hath come to the Church of God by the defense of this mischievous opiniō: yet I would ask them one thing that thou mayest know their deceitful policy, and that their saying hath no ground of verity. Whether wrote Moses (the Hebrew and divine) and after him Esdras in the Hebrew and vulgar tongue or in some other strange tongue? Did Aristotle and Plato Greke Philosophers, Hipocrates and Galen Greke Phisitiōs, leave the Greke tongue, because it was their native language, to seek some Hebrew or Latin? Did Cicero who was a Latinist borne write his Philosophy and Rethoricke in the Greke tongue, or was he content with his mother tongue? and surely as he testifiethe him self he had the perfect knowledge of the Greke tongue, yet he wrothe nothing therein wich we have extant at this day. Shall we then think the Scottyshe or English tongue, it not fit to wrote any art into? no in deed. But peradventure thou wilt say that there is not Scottyshe words for to declare and express all things contained into liberal arts, truth it is: neither was there Latin words to express all things written in the Hebrew and Greke tongues: But did Cicero for this cause write no philosophy in Latin? thou will not say so, lest I take the with a manifestly. What then did Cicero? he laborethe in the Latin tongue, as Aristotle before him did in the Greke, and thou envious fellow ought to do in thy mother tongue what so ever it be, to wit he amplified his native tongue, thinking no shame to borrow from the Hebrucians and Grecians such words as his mother tongue was indigent of. What, shall we think shame to borrow either of the Latin or Greke, more then the learned Cicero did? or find some fit words in our own tongue able to express our meaning as Aristotle did? shall we I say be more unkind to our native tongue and country then was thiese men to theirs? But thou wilt say, our tongue is barbarous, and theirs is eloquent? I answer thee as Anacharsis did to the Athenienses, who called his Scithian tongue barbarous, yea saith he, Anacharsis is barbarous amongst the Athenienses, and so are the Athenienses amongst the Scythyans, by the which answer he signified that every man's tongue is eloquent enough for him self, and that others in respect of it is had as barbarous.
Thou seest (good Reader) what a ground they have to defend their opiniō, and howe they labor only to root out all good knowledge & virtue, and plāte mere ignorance amongst the common people. Now for to conclude, it shall be thy duty to receive this my little pains in a good parte, and to call upon God that the use thereof, may tend to the glory of his holy name, and profit of our bretheren.
THE FIRST BOOKE OF DIALECTICKE.
CAP. I. Of the definition and divisions of Dialecticke.
D Ialecticke otherwise called Logic, is an art which teachethe to dispute well.
It is diuyded into two partes: Invention, and judgment or disposition.
Invention is the first parte of Dialecticke, which teachethe to inuente arguments.
An argument is that which is naturally bente to prove or disprove anything, such as be single reasons separatly and by them selves considered.
An argument is either artificial or without art.
Artificial is that, which of itself declareand is either first, or hath the beginning from the first.
The first is that which hath the beginning of itself: and is either simple or compared. The simple is that, which symplie and absolutely is considered: and is either argeable or disagreable.
Agreable is that, wich agreethe with the thing that it prouethe: and is agreeable absolutely, or after a certain fashion.
Absolutely, as the cause and the effect.
CAP. II. Of the cause efficient.
THe cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therefore this first place of invention is the fountain of all sciences: for that matter is known perfectly, whose cause is understanded: So that not without good reason, the Poet doth say:
The cause is either efficiēt and material, or formal and fynall.
The efficient is a cause from the which the thing hath his being. Of the which although that there be no true forms, yet a great abundance we find by some certain means distinct.
And first the thing that engendrethe or defendethe is called the efficient cause. As Ouide, in his first book of the remedy for love callethe Slouthfullnes the efficient cause of love, which being taken away love ceasethe: for thus he there saith.
The father also, and the mother which engendrethe, and the nursses which bring up, ar causes efficients. As Dido. in the 4. book of Eneidos being sorely offended with Aenee, and seeking a cause of his cruelty, denyethe him to be Venus or Anchises son, and faynethe other parents to him.
So Romulus was builder of Rome, and after him, Kynges, Cōulls, Emperors and Tutors were the upholders of it: which all are called causes efficients.
CAP. III.
SEcondlie the cause efficient is either solitary or joined with some others, of the which some be principal and chief doers, others helpers & seruers to the principal. An example of the cause solitary we have in the 9. of Eneidos:
For often time (saith the Orator) some vsethe to extenuate martial virtues by words, and pull them away from the Captain and principal doers, and comunicate them to Soldiers, that they should not be proper to the Governor of the war: And certainly in war, the fortitude of the Soldiers, the opportunity of places, the aid of the Alies, nauyes, and provision of victuals helpethe much: and fortune lawfully doth ascribe to herself the greatest parte, so that whatsoever is prosperouslie done, that almost all she estemes her own. But of this glory (o Caesar) which thou hast not long ago obtained thou hast no fellow: for all howe much so ever it be (which verelie is most great) all I say is thine, for neither the Centurion, the Captain, the bonds of men, nor yet the troupes, may pluck anything of this away frō thee: yea that more is, fortune that mystres of all things offerethe not herself in the society of this glory. She geuethe thee place, and cōfessethe this glory wholly to be thine own.
The instruments also are numbered amongst the causes adiuuantes. By this argument the Epicure prouethe that the world was never made, as Cicero testifiethe in his first book of the nature of Godds.
With what eyes of mind (saith he) might your Plato behold that composition of so great a work, by the which he maketh the world to be made of God: what laboring: what toolles: what bars: what scaffoulds: who were servants of so great a work?
This ungodly Epicure knew not that God was able to make the world without any instrumente, or other causes either material or adiuuante.
CAP. IIII.
Thirdly the cause efficient workethe by itself, or by accident.
The efficient by itself is that, which workethe by his own strength, such as by nature or counsel do work. As for example the natural working of the winds is set forth in the first book of the Eneidos.
The confession of Cicero containethe an example of counsel, as.
The war being taken up, yea and almost ended (o Caesar) by no strength of hand, but of mine own mind and will I come unto thiese wars, which were raised against thee.
By accident the cause workethe, which by some external power workethe, as in those things which are done by necessity, or by fortune.
By necessity, when the efficient is compelled to do, Suche a one is the excusation of the Pompeyans:
If I would seek (saith the Orator) a proper and true name of this our sorrow, there appears a fatal calamity to be suddenly fallen, which hath prevented unawares the minds of men: So that no man ought to marvel that the counsels of mortal men are overcome by the fatal necessity of the Godds.
Fortune is a cause by accident, when besides the intent of the worker, some other thing chauncethe: as,
By chance (saith Cicero in his 3. book of the nature of Godds) Jason was healed by his enemy, who with stroke of sword opened his rotten impostume, which the Physicians could not heal.
Amongest thiese sort of causes, ignorance or lack of forsight is numbered: as, Ouide, in the 2. book of sorrowful matters excusethe him self and lamentethe that he had seen by chance some of Caesars secretes: as,
Here rysethe the asking of pardon, as Cicero for Ligarius.
Pardon and forgive father he hath erred, he hath done amiss: he thought not to do so: if ever he shall do such a thing again? &c. And a little after, he saith, I have erred: I have done rashelie: I repent me of my doing: I fly to thy clemency, I ask pardon, I pray thee that thou wilt forgive me.
The ignorance of the cause raysethe the opinion of fortune. For when anything chanceth beside the hope & entension of the doer, it is commonly called fortune. And therefore wysely it is said of Iuuenall.
CAP. U. Of the material cause.
THe matter is a cause of the which the thing hath his being: as, Ouide in the 2. book of the Metamorphosis, settethe forth the composition of the Sons house, by the material cause, as gold, carbuncle stone, yuorie, and silver.
Caesar in the first book of civil wars commaundethe his soldiers to build Shippes of such a matter as they had learned before in Brytayne, To wit, that they should make the keele and bottom of some light and lieger matter, and the rest of the body of the Shippes with twigges covered with leather.
CAP. UI. Of the formal cause.
THe efficient and material cause being expounded, now folowethe the formal and fynall.
The formal cause is that by the which the thing hath his name and being. And therefore everything is distingued from another by his form.
The form also is engendered together, with the thing itself: as, a reasonable soul is the form of man, for by it Man is man, and is distingued from all other things. The Geometrical figures have their form, some being triangles, and some quadrangles. So hath natural things: as the heaven, the earth, trees, fyshe and such others. So that everything is to be expounded as the nature of it is, if we may attain to the knowledge thereof, as in artificial things is more easy to be found. Caesar in his 7. book, settethe forth the form of the walls of France.
The walls of France are almost builded after this form: The beams of one piece direct in longitude, everyone being equally distante from another, are set on their two ends in the earth, hard bound within, and covered with a great countermure. The places betwixt the beams are stuffed up before with great stones: Thiese being so placed and set together, there is added, to over above the same another rank, so that the same space and distāce is always kept, that none of the beams do touche another, but eche beam being distant from the other by an equal space, is fast joined together with stones, set in betwixt beam and beam. And so consequently, the work is joined together, until the height of the walls be accomplished and filled up. And this work is both well favored, by reason of his form and variety: having here a beam and there a rank of stones one after another, observing their ranks in a straight line: And also it is much convenient for the profit and the defense of cities. Because both the stone doth keep it salf from danger of burning, and likewise the stuff and matter from rushing or beating down: Which for the most parte being made fast forty footes inward with continual ranks of beams, may neither be broken through, nor beaten a sundre.
On this manner doth Virgil describe the form of the heaven.
CAP. UII. Of the final cause.
THe fynall cause is that for the which the thing is made or done. The ende, of natural things is man, and of man God. Also every art hath the final cause: as, The ende of Grammar is to speak congrouslie, Of Rethoricke, eloquētlie, and of Logic to dispute well and orderlie. Juno. 1. of Eneidos, promysethe to Aeolus the fair Nymphe diopeian for solace and procreation of children.
In the defense of Ligarius, Cicero vrgethe his accusator Tubero, with the fynall cause of the wars raised against Caesar, and surely (saith he) he joined battle against Caesar in arms.
What did thy naked sword (o Tubero) in the Pharsalike army? whose sydes pierced the pointe thereof? which was the sense and fealing of thy weapons? what mind, eyes, hands? what fervency of spirit? what diddest thou couett or desire? what didest thou wish?
CAP. UIII. Of the effect.
THe effect is that which rysethe of the cause. And therefore the moving of things that are engendered, corrupted, or by any other manner of way moved: and the thing also that by the mouyng rysethe is called the effect, as for example, Christ in the 11. chap. of Math. prouethe himself by this place, to be the true Messias promised: being asked of John Baptists disciples, Art thou he that should come, or shalt we look for another? And Jesus answering said unto them.
Go and show John what things ye have hard and seen: The blind receive their sight: the halte go: the leapers are clēsed: the deaf hear: the dead are raised up: and the poor receive the Gospel: and blessed is he that shall not be offended in me, the sayings and works of men ar contained under this place as the wise men's seynges and Plato's and Aristotls works, counsails also and deliberations although the never take effect.
Virtue also and vice have their effect, as Horace in the first book of his Epistles, settethe forth the effect of drunk̄nes: as,
CAP. IX. Of the subject.
NOw folowethe the argument which doth agree after a certain fashion: as the Subject and the Adioynt. The Subiecte is that which hath anything adjoined unto it, as, the soul is the subject of knowledge, ignorance, virtue, vice, because thiese are added to the soul, besides the substance of the same. The body is the subject of health, sickness, strength, infirmity, beawtie, deformity, and such others. A man, is the subject of riches, poverty, honors, infamy, clothes, & of his trayne. A place is the space in the which the thing placed, is contained: So the Philosophers do attribute to their divine substances (although void of all magnitude) a place: So the Geomatricians unto their figures Geometricalles, give both place, & the differences of places. The natural philosophers also more accurately in the heaven, simple elements, and compound things, doth acknowledge a place: Which is nothing else, but the subject of the thing contained in it: as for example.
The lande of Canaan (a subject) is praised in the 12. of Numeri by the adioyntes or things adjoined unto it.
So Moses sent them to spy out the lande of Canaan, and said unto them: go up this way toward the southe, and go up into the mountains, and consider the lande, what it is, and the people that dwell therein: whether they be strong or weak, either few or many. Also what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad: and what Cities there be that they dwell in, whether they dwell in tents, or walled towns: And what the lande is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be Trees therein or not, and be of good courage, and bring of the fruit of the lande. And after fortye days they retorned again and toulde Moses, saying, we came into the lande whither thou hast sent us, and surely it flowethe with milk and honye: and here is of the fruit of it, never thelesse the people are strong that dwell in the lande, and the cities are walled, and exceeding great: And moreover we saw the sons of Anacke there: The Amelekytes dwell in the sowthe countree, and the Hethites and the Jebusites, and the Amorites dwell in the mountains, and the Canaanites dwell by the sea, and by the costs of Jordan.
Here Canaan is the subject: The people of the lande, the cities, the fruits, trees, and the goodness and badness thereof is the adiointes for the which it is either praised or dispraised.
CAP. X. Of the adiointes.
THe adioynt is that which hath a subject to the which it is adjoined: as, virtue and vice are called the adioyntes of the body or soul: and to be short all things that do chance to the subject, beside the essence, is called the adioynt: as, time, quality, either proper: as laughyng to men: barking to dogs: or common: as in the example following. Cicero in the Oration for Rossoius Comodus.
Dothe not his very head and over brow altogether shaven and scraped so clean, signify that he is malicious and sauorethe of knaneuerie? do they not utter and cry that he is a crafty fox? Dothe he not appear frō the top of his head to the sole of his feet (if the proportion and figure of the body without any speaking or uttered words may bring a conjecture) that there is nothing in him but craft, deceipte, and lying: who therefore hath his head & over brow always scrapen and shaven, least some should have the occasion to say that he had an hear of an honest man. So doth Martial in his 2. book, mock Zoilus.
Clothes also, and things partaining to our trayne are numbered amongst the adiointes: as, Dido, passing to the hunting, is set forth magnifickly by her adiointes, in the fowerthe book of Eneidos.
CAP, XI. Of differing arguments.
THe agreeable argument being expounded, now followethe the disagreable, which dissentethe from the matter. The arguments disagreable are equally known among them selves, and disprouethe equally one another: yet by their dissention, they do more clearly appear. They be parted into differing arguments, and gaynesettes.
The differing arguments be such, as be disagreable by some fashion only: and are known by thiese notes: not this, but that: although, not withstanding: as, Cicero for Pompey.
They did not bring home the victory, but the signs and tokens of the victory. And Ouide 2. of love: Ulysses was not fair, but he was eloquent. Also Virgil. Althoughe Priamus was almost dead, yet he did not abstain: Lykewyse Terence in Eunuchus: Althoughe I be most worthy of this contumely, yet thou art vmworthy to do it unto me. Also Cicero for Ligarius, Callest thou it a myscheuous act o Tubero? Why? surely as yet it was called by no man so: some in deed called it an error, others fear: some namyng it more hard, either hope, desire, hatred or obstinacy, those that call it most hard, name it rashness: a myscheuous act, no man as yet but thou.
CAP. XII. Of gaynesettes, or opposita.
GAynesettes are arguments always disagreing, so that they may not be attributed to one parte of a thing after one respect, and at one time: as, Socrates cannot be white and black on one parte: father and son of one: sick and whole at one time: yet he may be white on a parte, and black on another, father of one man, and son of another: hole this day, and sick tomorrow: And therefore upon the affirmation of the one, followethe the negation of the other. And contrary wise also. Gaynesettes are parted into disparates and contrary arguments.
The disparates are gaynesettes of the which the one is opponed to many: as, grene, ayshe color, read, are mydde colors betwixt white and black, of the which everyone is a disparate argument both with the extremities, and among them selves also. So liberality, a Man, a tree, a Stone, & other things innumerable, because that one of these cā not be said to be the other: as, Virgil 1. of Eneidos.
O Uirgyn what should I call thee, for thy visage and voice declarethe that thou art no mortal woman, Truly thou art a Goddess.
CAP. XIII. Of Relatiues.
COntrarie arguments are gaynesettes, of the which the one is only opponed to the other: and be parted into affirmatiues & negatives. They are called affirmatiues whē they both affirm: as the relatives & repugning argument. The relatives are contrary affirmatiues, of the which the one hath his being of the mutual society & affection with the other, for the which cause they are called Relatiues: as, he is a father: which hath a son, & he is a son which hath a father for by this mutual relation they are and cease to be both at once. So that whosoever knowethe the one perfectly, knowethe the other also, as Martial against Solibian.
Athanasius prouethe the eternity of the son of God thus: as, It is not possible that a father may be before the son (meaning of the relation) But the father hath ben father from the beginning (as all men do grant) ergo the son hath ben from the beginning. And Quintilian in his 5. book the 10. chapiter saith thus, If it be honest to the Rhodians to set out the custom, it is honest also for Hermacrion to hyer it Here (set forth) & (hyer) are relatives. After the same manner Cicero in his book de Oratore saith: Is there any danger (saith he) lest some should think it filthy, to teache others a glorious and excellent art, the which to learn was most honest. Here (teache) and (learn) are relatives. Thiese also the advocate and clyent: the lessor and the lessee: free and bond: byg and little: the host and the guest: the husband and the wife, with such others.
CAP. XIIII. Of repugning arguments.
THe repugning arguments are contrary affirmatiues, which among them selves do repugn continually: as, Eneid. 11.
There is no health in war, therefore we ask the peace. So hot and could, white and black, virtue and vice, repugnethe. Likewyse Cicero in Parad. against the Epicuriās. They held this opinion stowtely & diligently do defend, that pleasure is felicity, which appears to me to be the voice of bruyte beasts, and not of men, for thou when God or the mother of all things nature, hath given to thee a soul of all things most excellent and divine, so thou contemptously castest away and abasest thyself that no difference thou esteamest betwixt thee and a bruyte beast.
Here Cicero opponethe beasts and men, as pleasure is beasts felicity, therefore it is not man's, So liberty and servitude: as in Tibullus 2. book.
CAP. XU. Of denying arguments.
COntrarie negatives, are when the one affirmethe and the other denyethe the same. And are parted into denying and depryuing arguments.
Denying arguments are contrary negatives, of the which the one deniethe everywhere: as, Just not just: a beast, not a beast: blood not blood: as Cicero in the defense of Murena.
Thou shalt forgive nothing, yes some thing, not all. Grace shall have no place, yes when office and duty requirethe. Be not moved with mercy, yes in dissolving of severity, yet there is some praise of humanity. I stand to my purpose, yea surely, without a better get the victory.
Also Martial in his first book,
Lykewyse Cicero in the first book of his Tusculane questions compellethe the Epicurian by this argument to grant that the dead are in no misery: which thing the Epicurian defendethe. Now (saith he) I had rather thou shouldest fear Cerberus the dog with three headdes porter of hell, then that thou shouldest so unadvisedly speak these words. Atticus. What his the matter? Marcus. The same which thou deniest to be, thou admittest to be. Where is the Sharpnes of thy understanding? For when thou sayest that the dead be in misery, that thing which is not thou admittest to be. And after a long disputation, Atticus saith, Now I grant that they are in no misery which are dead, because that by strength of argument thou hast obtained that those which be not at all, are nowyse in misery. This fellow (saith Terence in his Eunuch.) sometime affirmithe and sometime denyethe.
CAP. XUI. Of depryuing arguments.
DEpryuing arguments are contrary negatives: of the which the one denyethe upon that subject only, in the which the other which affirmethe, is naturally contained. And the affirmative is called the habit, the denying argument, the privation. So moving and quietness: Sobrrietie and drunkenness: as Martial in his 9. book.
There is no sober man that would do so, Ergo thou art drunk.
So to be blind and to see: Ryche and poor: as Martial in his 8. book.
If poor thou be, thou shalt always be poor Aemilian, for nothing is now given: but to the rich. Of this sort be life & death: as Cicero for Milo. Sitt you reuengers of this man's death, whose life if you thought it mought be restored ye would not.
To speak also and to hold peace: as the first for Catiline: Why dost thou wait for the authority of the speakers, whose minds, thou perceivest by holding their peace.
CAP. XUII. Of equal arguments.
COmpared arguments are those which are compared amongst them selves, and are equally known, although the one be sometimes more manifest and clear then the other.
The comparaison is either in quantity or quality.
Quantitie is that whereby the things compared are known how much or how little they are.
And quality is either of equal or unequal things.
They be equal which be of one quantity. The equal argument is, when an equal is declared by an equal: whose signs and notes be, equal, alike, the same that, as well as, as much as, asmanye as, neither more nor less: There is a great abundance of such comparisons in the holy Scripture, as the most parte of the parables which Christ vsethe: as in Matthew. 11.
The Kyngdome of heaven is like a grain of muster seade, Deut. 11. Also I will cause thy seade to multiply, as the stars of heaven. This argument is diversely, used by the Ethnic authors: as Cicero for Silla:
Neither may I perceive wherefor thou art moved against me: if because I defend him whom thou accusest: why am I not moved with thee also that accusest him whom I defend: if thou say I accuse mine enemy: I answer a like, I defend my friend. So the 5. of Tuscul. When as they grant no little strength to be in vice, to live a miserable life: must it not be also granted, the same strength to be in virtue to live godly? This also I pray thee tell me Xenophons wife (saith Aspasia) if thy neighbor had gold more precious then thou hast, whether had thou rather have hers then thine own? hers saith she, and if she had clothes and the rest of the ornaments of women, of greater estimation then thou hast, haddest thou rather have hers? yea saith she: Go to then if she had a better husband? then thou, haddest thou rather have her husband also? here she was ashamed to answer. Then Aspasia began to speak to Xenophon, I pray the saith she, if thy neighbor had a better horse then thou, whether haddest thou rather have his or thine? his saith he: and if he had a better ground then thine, haddest thou rather have his? his, to wit the best: and if he had a better wyffe then thou, haddest thou rather have his also? here Xenophon held his peace also.
CAP. XUIII. Of the more.
THey be unequal which be of a diverse quantity.
The unequal be either more or less: That is more, whose quantity exceedethe: whose notes are, not only, but also: I had rather this then that: seeing this much more that: as, Eccle. 24. Behold that I have not labored for myself only, but also for all them that seek wisdom. Psalm. 84. I had rather be a door keeper in the house of my God, then to dwell in the Tabernacles of wickedness. Rom. 5. But God settethe out his love, that he hath to us, seeing, that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us: much more then now (seeing we are justified in his blode) shall we be saved from wrath thorough him. For if when we were enemies we were reconsiled to God by the death of his son: Muche more, seeing we are reconcilied, we shall be preserved by his life. Not only so, but we also joy in God by the means of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have received reconsiliation. And Cicero for Milo: Not only he yielded him self to the people, but also to the Senate neither to the Senate only, but also to the stronghe garrison of soldiers: yea not to these only, but to his power & authority to whom the Senate hath given cure of the whole cōmō wealth, of the whole youth of Italy, & of the whole munition of the people Romaine. Ouide in the remedy for love,
CAP. XIX. Of the less.
THat is said to be less which another doth exceed by quantity: whose notes be thiese: not this only, but not that: this before that: as Cicero for Catiline. 2. There was no man not only in Rome, but in no corner of Italy ouerlayed with debt whō he had not associate to the incredible league of that mischievous enterprise. Cicero to Philippica 9. All men whatsoever age they be, which in this city have the knowledge of the laws, if they were gathered together in one place, are not to be compared with Seruius Sulpitius.
CAP. XX. Of the similitude.
THe comparison as yet hath ben in quantity, now folowethe the comparison in quality: By the which we know what kind of one eache thing is, whether like or unlike. These are said to be like which be of one quality: as Math. 23.
Who be unto you Scribes and Pharisees, ye hypocrites, for ye are like unto whytned tumbes which appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all fylthynes, so are ye also: for outward ye appear righteous unto men: but within ye are all full of hypocrisy and iniquity. Gen. 1. Furthermore God said, let us make man in our own image according to our lykenes. Phillip. 2. Let the same mind be in you that was even in Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God, but he made him self of no reputation, and toke on him the form of a seruante, and was made like unto man, and was found in his apparel as a man. And 1. Eneid. Bothe his mouthe and shoulders were like a God. And Cicero in 9. Philip. Althoughe Seruius Sulpitius might leave no monumēte more clear, thē his son, which is the very picture and shape of his conditions, virtue, constancy, piety, and engeyn. The similitude is either separated or joined together. The similitude separated is when the 4. or single terms are separated and distingued: as in Math. 23. Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which kyllest the Prophets, & stonest them which are sent to thee, how often would I have geathred thy children together, as the hen gatherethe her chickens under her wings, but thou wouldest not. And Virgil in Eglog. 5.
Here, as the hen to her chickens, so God is to the Israelites: And as sleep to the weary, so verse is to the hearer. And again Cicero ad fratrem 1. As the best governors of Shippes often times may not overcome the strength and rage of the tempest: So the most wise man may not always vanquyshe the invasion and violence of fortune. The joined similitude is when as the first term hath it self to the seconde, so the seconde to the third: as Cicero 3. Ligar. Perceiue ye not that the magistrate hath the power to oversee and prescribe good and profitable things agreing with the laws, For as the laws are above the magistrate, so the magistrate is above the people.
CAP. XXI. Of the dissimilitude,
THey be unlike whose quality be diverse: as 2. Peter 6. Lord God of Israel there is no God like the. And therefore the ethnicke Antistenes vsethe this argumēte. There is nothing like God, therefore God can no wise be known, by any image or sign made by men. The author of the book of Kynges 2. the 18. chapter. Having declared the good qualities, the which Esekyah was adorned with, saith thus: He trusted in the Lord God of Israel, so that after him, was none like him among all the Kyngs of Judah, neither was there any such before him, Cicero 2. Phillipic. Hathe a great company of dissimilitudes, speaking of Varro his grounds which Antonius had obtained by strong hand. O miserable buyldinges (saith he) by how unlike a master (but how is he a master?) were they with holden: Marcus Uarro they should have ben for his studies, and not a resorting place for filthy lusts, what excellent things were spoken before within that manner place, what things there written? The laws of the people Romaine: The monumētes of our forbeers, all manner of wysdō and learning: But now sense thou hast dwelled on his grounds (having no right thereto) all the house ryngethe with the clamour of dronkardes, the flour overfloweth with wine, the walls be moyste: children of good inclinations with those that were set for advantage, and whores amongst men's wives were dwelling.
CAP. XXII. Of ofspringes.
WE have hitherto expounded the first arguments: Now do follow those which have their beginning of the first, which bearethe them selves to the thing that they prove or disprove: as the first whence their are driven. Suche be ofspringes: the etimologie, distribution, and definition.
Ofspringes are arguments which do begin alike, but ende diversely: as just, justice, justly: freedom, free, freely: love, lover, lovely: good, goodness, goodly: man, manlynes, manly: as, Justice is flede out of the Realm, therefore there is no man just whithin the Realm. Propercius lib. 2.
Here freedom is the cause why thou art free. Cicero 3. book of the Nature of godds, when he speak the of Dionysius the tyrāte: Now (saith he) he chargethe that all the golden tables should be taken out of the Temples in the which (after the fashion of the Grecians) it was written of good godds, saying he would use their goodness. The godds are good, therefore their goodness is to be used. Here he disputethe from the effect to the cause also, He is a man, why may he not be then manly.
CAP. XXIII. Of the notation or etimologie,
THe Etimologie is the interpretation of a word: For words are nothing else but notes of matters signified: as Isaac, was so called because his mother laughed at the promise of God made to her. And in the 25-of Genesis, is said, After ward came his brother out, and his hand held Esau by the hele, therefore his name was called Jacob: that is to say: an ouertbrower or deceiver. And therefore Esau being twice deceived by Jacob, saith thus in the 27. of Genesis. Was he not justly called Jacob, for he hath deceived me now two times: He toke my birth right: and lo now he hath taken my blessing. Exod. 2. And she called bis name Moses, because said she, I drew him out of the water. The Hebrews use to give their sons and their daughters names which might ever put them in remembrance of some point of religion, and know when they come to perfection, that they were of the chosen people. And therefore Nabuchadneser 1. of Daniel, commaundethe the chief of the Eunuchs to give other names to Daniel, Anania, Misaell, and Azaria, which were chosen to stand in te Kynges palace, and teache the learning and tongue of the Chaldeans. The Grecians did use the same, for some were called Timothy, that is to say, an honorour of God: some Philotheus which is a lover of God: some Demosthenes, the strength of the people: & therefore (some say) that Aeschines his mortal enemy should have said thus: shouldest thou be called Demosthenes? no not so, but rather Demouorus, that is a deuowrer of the people. So do we in the Scottyshe tongue (to stir the youth to the imitation of them whose name they bear) call some Abraham, others Isaac or Jacob, and some Susanna after the Hebrews: And again other some Timothy, and Christofor after the Grecians. This argumēte is copiously used amongst the Ethnic authors: as Cicero 4. Verr. O trymme Swyppinges? for to what place didest thou ever come, to the which thou didest not bring with thee this day? To what house, to what city, yea and shortly to what Church? which thou didest not leave spoiled? clean swipped behind the? Therefore these thy doings may well be called swyppinges, not so much for thy name (although thou be named verres, which may signify a swypper) as for thy manners & nature. Cicero 2. Philip. Bambalio was father to thy wife, a man of no estimation, and above all things contempned: who for his stutting and stamering of his tongue and dullness of spirit, had this surname Bambalio, for a rebuke and a taunte. The phisicions also do give names to their herbs: to some from the cause: as Hirundinaria, from the inuentor: Filipendula, from the form: To other some, from the effect and working: as Selfwhole, and such like: from the subject and place: as parietaria, and sea trifolie. From the adiointe and quality: as styncking marubium dead nettle: from the similitude which they have with other things: as Mouse ear, fox tail, dogs tongue: And so forth from the rest of the places of invention. The use then of this place is, to prove or disprove, praise or disprayse anything by the Etimologie of it: as in the former examples, thou mayest perceive.
CAP. XXIIII. Of the distribution.
YEt there remainethe of the arguments which have their beginning of others. The distribution and definition: both the one and the other doth reciprocate: in the distribution, the whole with the partes: in the other the definition, and the thing that is defined. Distribution is a division of the whole into his partes. The whole is that which doth contain some partes within it. The parte is that which is contained of the whole: And as the deviding of the whole into his partes, is called distribution: So the collecting of the partes to the whole, is called Induction. The distribution rysethe of arguments, which doth agree with the whole, but among them selves doth disagree. And therefore howe much the whole with the partes agreethe, and the partes among them selves disagreethe: so much is the distribution the more accurate.
CAP. XXU. Of distribution taken from the cause.
THe first sort of distribution is of those that agreethe absolutely, to wytt the cause and the effect. The distribution is taken from the cause, when the partes are causes of the whole. So Grammar is parted into Etimologie and Syntaxe. Rethoricke, into Elocution and Action: Dialecticke, into Invention and Iudgemente. For of these partes the arts do consist: So Virgil deuidethe his Georgickes into four partes: as,
CAP. XXUI. Of the distribution from the effect.
THe distribution from the effect is when the partes are effects, as in the similitude of Cato, wherein he showeth them to have erred that said, old men did nothing. Those (saith he) that affirmeth old men cōstitute overseers of the common wealth to do nothing, saith as much as if they should say the Governor of the ship doth nothing, when some of the Maryners clymethe the mast, others run the hatches up and down, some do make the pomp empty the Governor in the hynder parte of the ship guydethe the rudder and stern. Hear the distribution af the general argument into the special doth excel. The general is the wohole, of one essence with his partes: The special or kind is a parte of the general, as Animal, a living thing is the whole, whose essence or definition, (to wytt, a corporal substance having life and senses) doth alike appartayne to men and beasts, which are the specialles contained as partes under the general animal. So is Man the general to single men, and a lyon to single lions: and again single men are the specialles of man, and single lions, of the lyon. The general argument is either chief general or subalternall. The special argument is either subalternall or most special. The chief general is that which hath nothing a boue it more general: as in our division set forth in the first chapter, the argument is chief general of arguments artificial, and of the inartificiall: The most special which might not be divided into other inferiors was the marter and the form. The subalternall which may be the general in respect of one, and special in respect of another as the cause contained under the artificial argument, as a special, and was general to the matter and form which it did contain under itself. The general and the special are notes and signs of the causes & the effects. For the general containethe the cause, which doth equally appartaine to his specialles: and again the special containethe the effect of their general. This is then the reason wherefor the universal excellethe in dignity, by reason it containethe the cause, as, Ouide in his Metamor. deuidethe the general, to wytt, A living thing into his specialles, as stars (to the which he geuethe a life, as the Philosophers do) fowls, beasts, fyshe, and men: as,
Therefore at last was man borne, &c. So, Cicero, in the first book of his Offices, deuidethe virtue, into four special kinds: Wysdome, Justice, Fortitude, & Temperaunce. All things (saith he) that are honest, doth rise of one of thiese four partes, either it consistethe in the perfect knowledge of the truth and quycknesse of wytt, or in the defending of the Society & felloweshipp of mā, by giving to every man his right, & fulfilling of things promised: Or in the noble courage and strength of a valyante and mighty spirit: Or last in observing a good manner and order in all things, either done: or said, in the which modesty and temperancie consistethe.
Sometyme we argue or reason from the general to the special: as, All men may marry who have not the gift of Chastity, ergo, Preistes and ministers may marry. And contrary from the special to the general in a parte: as, Abraham was justified by faith, therefore man may be justified by faith.
CAP. XXUII. Of the distribution from the Subiecte.
NOw folowethe the distribution of those that after a certain fashion doth agree: as of the Subiecte and the adioynte. The distribution is said to be of the subject, when the partes are Subiectes: as, The xii Trybes of Israel had the Lande of Canaan, which was a subject parted among them, unto the Rubenytes the plain of Medeba, &c. unto the Gaddes, Iazer and Gylyad, &c. unto Manasseh the Kyngdom of Og, &c. unto Judah was given the wilderness of Zin, &c. unto Ephraim from Jericho to the wilderness, &c. unto Benjamin from Jordan up the side of Jericho on the northe parte, &c. unto Semeon was given Beersheba Sheba and Moladah, &c. unto Zebulon from Sarid eastward unto Chisloth, &c. unto Issachar Izreelah Chesulleth, and Shunen, &c. unto Assur, Naphtali, and Dan, everyone his portion: as is described the 13. 15. 19. 18. and 19. chapiters of Joshua. Cieero 5. Tuscul. There be three sortes of goods: Goodes partaining to the body: goods partaining to the soul. & external goods. He who doth attain the heavenly goods partaining to the soul, is rather to be named most blessed, then blessed.
CAP. XXUIII. Of the distribution taken from the adiointe.
THe distribution from the adiointe is: when the partes and members of the distribution are adiointes: as Of men some be whole, some sick, some rich, some poor. So Virgil 1. of his Georgickes, partethe the world after the adiointes into five partes, whereof the myddle is parching hot, the two extremities could, and the rest temperate.
Caesar the first book of French wars. Gaul (now called France) is parted into three partes, whereof the people called Belgi, do hold one: Aquitani another parte, and Celti, the third parte.
CAP. XXIX. Of the definition.
THe definitiō is an Oration which doth clearly declare what the thing is, The definitiō, is either perfect and called properly definition, or imperfect and called description. The perfect definition is a definition which consistethe of the sole causes that accomplyshed the substance of the thing defined. Suche as be the general argumēte and the special or form. So Man is defined a reasonable living thing: Here (by living thing) which is the general argument, we understand a corporal substance partaker of life and sense, which is the matter of Man: and parte of the form: unto the which, if ye will put to (reasonable) yeshall comprehend the whole form of man: So that the perfect definition is nothing else but a collection of the causes which do constitute and parforme the substance and nature of the thing defined: such as be the definition of Arts. Grammar an Art which teachethe to speak well and congruouslye: Rethoricke eloquentlye: Dialecticke, an Art which teachethe to dispute well: Geometrye, to Measure well.
CAP. XXX. Of the description.
THe description is a definition which definethe the thing not only with the causes, but with other arguments also: as, a Man is a reasonable thing mortal, and apt to learn: Here with the cause are joined both the common and proper adioynte. This compendious and short briefnes is not always to be fownde in this sort of argumēte, but desyrethe sometimes to have a more excellent & magnificall explication: as Glory, is described by Cicero in his oration for Milo. yet of all the rewards of virtue, if there were a respect to be had of rewards, I judge glory to be the most great: which only doth comfort the shortenes of this life with the memory of the posterity to come, which doth make us when we be absent, to be as present, and when we be dead doth make us to live. And likewise fame is that, by whose occasion and mean, men seam to ascend and mount up to the heavens above. So fame is described by Virgil 4. Eneidos.
Suche be the descriptions of plants, and beasts in natural things: Of flowdes, mountains, and towns in geographicall and historical.
CAP, XXXI. Of divine testimony, The first sort of the vnartificiall argument.
THe artificial argumēte being expounded followethe consequently the vnartificiall. The argumēte vnartificiall or without art is an argument which prouethe or disprouethe not of his own nature, but by the strength which it hath of some argument artificial. And therefore when the matter is deapelie considered, it hath but a little strength to prove or disprove. In civil and temporal affairs, the authority of the disputer geuethe no little creditte there unto if he be wise, virtuous, and have the benevolence of the auditor: all these by one name may be called a testimony. The Testimony is parted into a divine and human. Amongest divine and spiritual testimonies are numbered not only the Oracles of the godds, but also the answers of prophets and deuinours: as Cicero the third for Catiline. And to omit (saith the Orator) the lightning torches which did appear by night in the Occident, the vehement and parching heat of the heavens: as thrawes of lightninges, and fire breaking out of the clouds, earthquakes, and many other such tempests, which (I being Consul) did appear, so that the godds with a loud voice seamed to sing those things which be now present. And a little after, he saith: At the which time when out of all Hetruria the Soothsayers being gathered together, concluded that great slaugther and burning did approach, the destructiō of the laws, both civil and domestical wars, and the utter ruin of the whole town and impire: without the immortal godds by all means appeased had by their divine power, changed almost the very fatal necessity. Tibullus.
CAP. XXXII. Of human testimony.
THe testimony human is either general or singular. General, as the law, and famous sayings. There is an example of the law, both written & unwritten in the oration of Cicero for Milo: as, There is a law (honorable Judges) not written, but naturally spronge up, which we have not learned, read, nor received of others, but taken, received and drawn from nature itself, the which to attain, we are not taught, but made: not instructed by other, but taught by nature. To wit, That if our life should fall into an ambushe or cōspiracie, into the power and weapons, either of robbers, or of our enemies, that we should by all honest means, deliver our selves from all danger. And a little after. If the 12. tables would a thief taken in the night to be killed by any means, and a thief taken in the day (if he by weapon defended him self) to be killed also without danger: who is he that think the Slaughter to be ponyshed, howsoever it be committed, seeing he may perceive, that the very laws them selves: do offer to us sometime the sword to kill men. Proverbs are numbered amongst famous sentences: as like drawethe to like. The sayings also of wysewen: as, Knowe thy self. Mediocritie is best of all things. There is an example of the singular testimony. Cicero 1. ad fratrem. And surely that prince of engeine and knowledge Plato, had this opinion that the common wealths should then be most happy and blessed, when that either learned and wise men began to govern them, Or that those who had the care over them, should give them selves to wisdom and knowledge. So Christ him self, the Apostles, and Evangelists do confirm their doctrine, by the law of Moses: The Physicians, by the authority of Hippocrates, Dioscorides, Galen, and such others: the Philosophers, by Plato and Aristotle: the lawyers, by Justinian: and the mathematicians, by Euclides. So when there rysethe any question or controversy of lands or slaughter & such other matters, we use to produce their obligations, and bind them with their confession and oath, we have an example of Obligacion, of Cicero, in 5. Phillippicke. Yea I shall be bold to bind my faith to you (belowed Judges) & to the people Romaine, which if nothing compelled me I would not take in hand but would very much fear (in a most dangerous matter) the fame and suspicion of rashenes. I promise, I undertake, I bind myself (honorable Judges) that Caesar shall be at all times such a Citizen as he is this day, and such a one as you ought to wish and desire him to be. We may comprehend under the name of obligations, gages given for the surety of anything: as, Virgil 3. of Eglogs. A herdman having no artificial argument to prove that he could sing better then his fellow, braggethe that he will lay down an heyfer for a gage. The confession is either voluntary, or forced. Voluntarie, when we do grant anything of our own will. Forced, when by torments we are compelled to grant that which other ways we would not, and is properly called a question. Miloes enemy vsethe such an argument against him, but it is mocked of Cicero: Go too I pray you (saith Cicero) what was the question, or after what fashion? hoe, hoe? where is Rushio? where is Casca? hath Clodius wrought treason against Milo? he hath wrought, then a certain Gibbett for him. He hath wrought none, then there is a hope of his liberty. Hereto also may be referred the sort of argument which we use, whē we do offer to prove our sayings by experience: as Cicero 4. of Verren. Is there any body that would have given to Uolcatius (although he comethe of him self) the tenthe parte of a denyer? Let him come now and see: there is no man that will receive him within his house. Terence in Eunucho. Examyn in knowledge and learning, in wrestling and fygthing at the bariers I shall give you one conynglye learned in all things, which is decent for a gentleman to know. And Othe is also numbered amongst the testimonies: as, Virgil 6. Aeneidos.
THE SECONDE BOOKE OF DIALECTICKE CONtaining the disposition.
CAP. I, Of the definition and division, of the disposition and proposition.
W E have entreated in the former book the first parte of Dialecticke, which is invention: Now followethe consequently the other parte, which we did name Judgment and disposition. Disposition is a parte of Dialecticke, wich teachethe to dispone and place orderly the arguments invented, to the ende we may judge well and rigthly: for we judge of everything according to the disposition thereof. And therefore this parte of Logic is either called judgment or disposition under one signification. Disposition is parted into the proposition (otherwise called enunciation) or sylogisme and method. Proposition is a disposition in the which one argument is spoken for another. The proposition hath two partes, the first is called the antecedent, the secōde the consequent: Of the which the qualities of propositions do rise. And first the affirmation and the negation. The proposition affirmative, is when the consequent affirmethe upon the antecedent: as, a man is mortal. The proposition is negative, whē the consequente denyethe upon the antecedent: as, Man is not mortal: and here rysethe the contradiction of propositions, when one consequente doth both affirm and deny upon one antecedent
CAP. II. Of the true proposition and false, contingent, necessary, and impossible, and of the three documents of arts.
THe proposition is either true or false. It is true when the consequent is truly joined with the antecedent, or truly separated from the same: as here it is truly joined: all man are sinners: and here truly separated: no man is just. The proposition is called contingent, when the consequent be truly said of the antecedēt, so that sometime it may be false: as fortune helpethe hardye men, for granting it to be true today, it may be false tomorrow: So that the verity of this sort of prositions is only certain in things present, or past, and not in things to come. The proposition is necessary when the consequent may at all times truly be said of the antecedent: as, all men are mortal. And contrarywyse, the proposition impossible, is when the consequent may at no time be said of the antecedent: as, A man is a horse. The necessary is either of one kind, or of a diverse kind. The necessary of one kind is when the partes are coessential among them selves, as when the general is said of the special: as, A man is a living thing, or the difference of the form, as, a man is reasonable, or the adioincte of his proper subject, as, A man may laughe. And this sort of proposition is sometime reciprocate, when the consequent, not only may be said alway of the antecedent, and of all things contained under the antecedent, but of itself also, so that the antecedent contrariewyse may be said of the consequent, on the same manner: as Man is a reasonable living thing. number is equal or unequal. The proposition of diverse kind, is when the partes are not coessential: as, A man is black or white. And here we have three general documentes to be observed in all arts and sciences. The first is that all the precepts and rules should be general and of necessity true: and this is called a documente of verity. The seconde that every art be contained within his own bounds, and withhold nothing appartaining to other arts, and is named a documente of justice. The third, that everything be taught according to his nature, that is: general things, generally: and particular, particularly: and this is called a documente of wisdom.
CAP. III. Of the simple proposition.
THe proposition is either simple or compound. The simple with the which a simple saying is declared: and therefore it contaynethe a simple consequent: which if it do affirm, maketh the whole to affirm, and contrarywyse, if it denyethe, the whole denyethe: as, fire burnethe, fire is hot, fire is not water. Here, burnethe, hot, and water, are the simple consequentes: upon the affirmation or negation of the wich dependethe the affirmation or negation of the whole. And this is the first disposition of things invented, when the cause is joined with the effect, as in the first example. Or the subject with the adioynte as in the second: Or the disagreable with the disagreable, as in the third. After the which manner all sortes of arguments may be pronounced (except full comparisons and distributions) the agreeable by affirming, and the disagreable by denying.
The simple proposition is either general or special. General, when it speakethe generally. And here the one parte of the contradiction is not always true, & the other false. For in things contingent they may be both false: as, All man are learned: No man is learned. And in things also which be not contingent: as, All living things are reasonable. No living thing is reasonable. The proposition is special, when it speakethe specially and of a parte. And here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other false. The special is either indefinite, or proper: Indefinite when it speakethe of no certain thing: as, Some man is learned, whose general contradiction is, No man is learned. Proper when the consequent is said of some proper name: as, Fabella is fair, whose contradiction is, fabella is not fair.
CAP. IIII. Of the proposition compound,
THe propositiō compound is when moe sayings then one are joined together by some conjunction. And therefore upon the affirmation or negation of the conjunction, dependethe the affirmation of the whole proposition: and here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other is false. The compound proposition is either congregatiue or segregatiue: The proposition is congregatiue, when the conjunction gatherethe, and is either copulative or connexiue. Copulatiue, when the conjunction is copulative, as. Bothe Eurus and Africus rusht forth. Whose negation and contradiction is, not both Eurus and Africus rusht forth. And here is to be noted, that the verity of the proposition copulative dependethe upon the verity of both partes: for if one parte be false, the whole is said to be false, as in this example. Bothe man and beast are reasonable, the whole proposition is false, because the last parte is false. Hereto may be referred the proposition containing the relation of qualities, in the which the relation standethe in place of the conjunction: as.
As though he would say, Slepe is sweet to wearye mē, so is thy verse to me. Whose negation is,
CAP. U. Of the proposition connexiue.
THe proposition is connexiue, whose conjunction is connexiue: as, if thou have faith, thou must have charity: Whose negation is, not althyoughe thou have faith, it folowthe that thou must have charity. Cicero de fratre. Neither if a proposition be true or false, by and by it followethe that causes are immutable. The affirmation signifiethe that if the antecedent be, the consequent must be also. The negation or contradiction signifiethe, that although the antecedent be, the consequent must not be therefore. Whereby we must understand, that whensoever this sort of proposition is true, it must be necessary also. The necessity is known by the necessary connextion of the partes, and not by the verity of the same: for both the partes may be false, and the connection necessary, as this: if a man be an horse, he hath four feet, is a necessary connextion. But if the connextiō be contingent, and only for his probability supposed to be, there arysethe no necessary judgment, but only opinion: as, Terence in andria. If thou do that (Pamphile) this is the last day that ever thou shalt see me. The proposition containing the relation of time is hitherto referred: as, when Justice is maintained, then shall peace be in the Realm.
CAP. UI. Of the proposition segregatiue.
THe proposition segregatiue is, whose conjunction doth segregate: and therefore it speakethe only of disagreable arguments. It is parted into discerning propositions and vnioynyng. The discernyng is, whose conjunction doth discern. Cicero in Tusc. 5. Althoughe that by the sense of the body, they be Iudged, yet they are to be referred to the spirit: whose negation and contradictiō is, Not although that by the sense of the body they be judged, they are therefore to be referred to the spirit. This sort of proposition is true, when both the partes is true and discerned also. Otherwyse it is false and ridiculous.
CAP. UII. Of the proposition vnioynyng.
THe proposition vnioynyng, is a proposition segregated, whose conjunction doth vnioyne: as, either it is night or day: all living things, are either man or beast: whose negations are, It is not either day or night: all living thingeh are not either man or beast: Here the negatiō declarethe, that the one parte or the other is not true of necessity. For if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary, and the partes opponed imediatlie one to another. Yet although the true disjunction be necessary also, it is not required that the partes separated be necessary: as, This is a necessary disionctiō: A man is either good or not good: and yet this, (A man is good) is not necessary: Nor this, (a man is not good:) But the necessity of the disjunction dependethe upon the necessary opposition and disjunction of the partes, & not of their necessary verity. The disjunction is sometimes with a condition, as if one should ask, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? because it was so promised that the one should only come. And therefore if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but only opynable, such as oftentimes we use in common speaking: as, Ouide in Leanders epistle.
CAP. UIII. Of the Syllogism.
A Syllogism is a dispositiō in the which the question being disponed with the argumēte is necessarily infered in the conclusion. For if the propositiō be doubtful, it is made a question: And to prove the question, we take an argument, & dispone it with the question. The Syllogism hath two partes: one which goethe before, another that followethe, & may be called, the antecedent and the consequent. The antecedent which prouethe or disprouethe the question, and hath two partes: the proposition and assumption, otherwise called the Major and the Minor. The propositiō is the first parte of the antecedēt, in the which the whole questiō or the cōsequēt of the questiō is disponed with the argument. The assumption is the 2. parte of the antecedent, which is assumed under the proposition. The consequent is the last parte of the Syllogism, which containethe the partes of the question, and concludethe the same, and therefore it is called the Conclusion: if any of those partes be absent, it is called a mutilet Syllogism, or Entymema ) if anything be more then those three partes, it is called a Prosillogisme. Sometyme also the order is confounded: therefore if any doubt shall rise through any of these things, it is good to putto that to which is absent, and pull away that which aboundeth, and last to put everything in his own place.
CAP. IX. Of the first form.
A Syllogism is either simple or compound. Symple when the partes of the question are disponed with the argumēte, so that the consequent be in the proposition and the antecedent in the assumption. The Syllogism is affirmant, when the proposition & assumption affirmethe: And negant, when either the one or the other is negant. General, when they are both general: Special, when there is but one general: Proper, when they are both proper. The simple sillogisme is either mutilate or whole. Mutilate, when the conclusion is brought in after on proposition or on assumption: as,
- All men be sinners
- Ergo Socrates.
- Socrates is a man,
- Ergo hi is a sinner.
-
Affirmant general, as.
- Constancy is a virtue:
- But Constancy is Confidence:
- Therefore some Confidence is virtue.
-
Negant general, as:
- Folyshehardines is no virtue:
- But folyshehardines is Confidence:
- Some Confidence therefore is no virtue.
-
Affirmant special, as,
- A wyseman is to be praised:
- But some wyseman is a poor man:
- Therefore some poor man is to be praised.
-
Negant special, as:
- A fool is not always happy:
- But some fool is fortunate:
- Therefore some fortunate is not always happy.
-
Affirmant proper: as,
- Socrates is a Philosopher:
- But Soceates is a man:
- Therefore some man is a Philosopher.
-
Negant proper, as.
- Thersites is no Philosopher:
- But Thersites is a man,
- Some man therefore is no Philosopher.
But here, in common speaking to the ende we may judge the more easily, we use to dispone thus:
- Some Confidence is a virtue, as Constancy:
- Some is not, as, folyshehardines.
CAP. X. Of the second form.
THe second form is, when the argument being consequent affirmatively in the proposition or assumption, in the proposition definitelie: the conclusion is brought in like to the antecedent: as,
-
General. 1.
- The troubled man reasonethe not well
- The wyseman reasonethe well:
- The wyseman therefore is not troubled.
And Cicero in 3. Tuscul. As the eye (saith he) being troubled, is not able to satisfy his office very well: and the rest of the partes, yea the whole body being moved out of his good state, is not able to perform his office: evē so the spirit being troubled is not well disposed to execute his duty well and wisely, and the duty of the spirit is, to use reason: but the wise man his spirit is always so disposed that it may most perfectly use reason, and therefore he is never troubled.
-
General 2. as.
- Mortall things are compound,
- The spirit or soul is not compound:
- The soul therefore is not mortal.
As Cicero Tuscul. 1. prouethe the immortality of the soul by this sillogisme.
In the knowledge (saith he) of man's soul we may not doubt (without we be most dull and ignorant in natural things) But there is nothing admixt with the soul, nothing compacte or made of elements, nothing compound or dowble: Which, if it be so, surely it may neither be put a sunder nor divided, nor torn, nor pluckte in pieces. For death is nothing else but the departing, separating and division of those partes, which before death were coupled together by some copulation.
-
Special 1. as.
- The enuyous is not valyante,
- Maximius is valyante:
- Maximius therefore is not enuyous.
As Ouide in Elegia 3. doth conclude,
-
Special. 2. as,
- A daunser is Ryotous:
- Murena is not Ryotous:
- Murena therefore is no daunser.
Which Cicero for Murena, hath under this form. Almost no sober man without he be mad doth leap either when he is alone, or yet among a moderate and honest company: for immoderate daunsing is the companion and follower of inordinate bāketting, pleasante & delectable places, and shortly of all delytes, and pleasant phātasies. But thou captiously takest that which most neadethe be the extreme of all vice: and yet unawares leavest those things, without the which that vice is not to be fownde, for thou showest no filthy bankettyng, no inopportunate love, no feasting: no love of body: neither any extraordinary expenses. And seeing those things be not to be fownde, what may these words, voluptuousness or sensuality signyfie and those things which be vices? Beleuest thou to find the vmber and shade of ryotousnes in that in the which thou caest not find ryotousnes it self.
-
Proper. 1. as,
- Agesilaus is not painted of Apelles:
- Alexander is painted of Apelles:
- Alexander therefore is not Agesilaus.
-
Proper. 2. as,
- Caesar oppressethe his natyue countreye:
- Tullius oppressethe not his natyue countreye:
- Tullius therefore is not Caesat.
CAP, XI. Of the seconde kind of Syllogism.
WE have hitherto expounded the two sortes of the first kind of the simple Syllogism: Now folowethe the seconde. The simple sillogisme of the second kind is, when the argument definitely going before in the proposition, and following affirmatively in the assumption, the conclusion is brought in like to the antecedent.
-
Affirmant general.
- That which is just, is profitable,
- But that which is honest, is just,
- Therefore that which is honest is profitable:
Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludethe thus. The Philosophers of greatest authority, yea very sharply & honestly have by cogitation distingued these three, which be confused. For whatsoever is just, that also they esteem to be profitable: and that which is honest, the same to be just: Of the which it is concluded, that whatsoever thing is honest, the same to be profitable.
-
Negant general.
- That thing which is void of all Counsel, cannot be governed by Counsel:
- But love is void of all Counsel:
- Love therefore cannot be governed by any Counsel.
As Terēce saith in his Eunuche almost under the same form.
Affirmant special.
These Cōsulls which for their virtue are chosen, ought diligently to defēde the cōmō wealth: Cicero is chosen Consul for his virtue: Cicero therefore ought diligently to defend the Common wealth. So the Orator 2. Agrar. concludethe his own diligence and care: For seeing all Consulls ought to have a great care and diligence in keeping of the common wealth: Those ought most chieffly so to do, who not from their youth, but in open place are chosen consulls. My predecessors made no surety to the people Romaine for me: They believed myself: It is your duty to ask of me that thing which mine office requyrethe, and to call mine own self into judgment. For as when I sued for this office, none of my predecessors commended me unto yow: Even so if I offend in anything, there is no shyfte that may deliver me frō yow: wherefor, if God prolōge my days (although I am the man who is able to defend the same from their mischievous & subtille conspiraties) this I promise unto yow Quirites, that ye have given the charge of your common wealth unto a vigilant man, & no fearful fellow: To a diligent man, and no Coward or feyntharted.
-
Negant special.
- He that deceiveth a loving maid is not to be praised:
- Demophon is a deceauer of a loving maid, as Phillidis:
- Demophon therefore is not to be praised.
Phillis thus inferethe in Ouide.
-
Affirmant proper.
- Octauius was Caesar's heir:
- I am Octauius:
- I am therefore Caesar's heir.
-
Negant proper.
- Anthonius is not Caesar's son:
- Thou art Anthonius:
- Thou art not therefore Caesar's son.
CAP. XII. Of the compound Syllogism.
AS yet we have entreated of the simple Syllogism: Now followethe the compound: The compound Syllogism is, when the whole question is the one parte of the proposition affirmant and compound, and the argument the other parte. But the argument is sometime consequent to the antecedent of the question, and sometime it is the other whole parte of the proposition: and than it is only assumed in the assumption. The compound sillogisme is either joined or disjoined. The sillogisme joined is a cumpounde sillogisme, whose proposition is joined with this coniunctiō, if, and such others, and is of two sortes: The first affirmethe the antecedent, & concludethe the consequent, as Cicero concludethe. 2. Diuinat.
- If there be Godds, there is a divination:
- But there are Godds:
- Ergo there is a deuination.
Cicer. 3. offic. Suerlye if nature prescribe that man should wish the commodity & furtherance of man, whatsoever he be for that he is man, of necessity it is required according to the self same nature, that the utility and profit of all be common: Which if it be so, we are contained all under one law of nature: And if this be also, truly we are forbydden by the law of nature, that one should misuse another. But the first is true, therefore the last is true. Here often times the same is not assumed, but something greater. 1. Catal. If thy parētes should fear thee & hate thee, so that thou couldest by no means appease thē, I believe that thou wouldest get thee some way out of their sight. Now thy natyue country, which is the mother of us all, both hatethe & fearethe thee, & knowethe that thou thynkest nothing but her destruction and ruyne: Shalt thou neither fear her authority, neither shalt thou follow her Judgment, neither shalt thou be afraid of her mighty power? The same sort of concluding is, when the proposition contaynethe a relation of time, as Oenone concludethe her error of folyshenes.
The secōde sort of joined Syllogism pullethe away the consequent, that it may pull away the antecedent also.
- If a man were immortal, he would be a simple substance, without composition of elements:
- But he is never without the mixture of elements.
- He is never therefore immortal.
Alexander the great asking one of his wise men by what means a man might be God:
- If a man would be God, he must do that which is impossible for man to do:
- But the consequent cannot be:
- Nor yet the antecedent therefore.
CAP. XIII. Of the disioined sillogisme.
THe disioined sillogisme is a compound sillogisme, whose proposition is disioined: And is of two sortes: The first takethe away the one, & concludethe the other: as,
- It is either night or day:
- But it is not day:
- It is night therefore.
- Eather he must accuse or die:
- He will not die:
- He will accuse therefore.
The second sort of disioined sillogisme takethe one in the proposition for the most part affirmant, and pullethe away the rest: as,
- It is either night or day:
- It is day:
- It is not night therefore.
- It is not both night and day:
- But it is day:
- It is not night therefore.
CAP. XIIII. Of the method.
THe method is a dispositiō by the which among many propositions of one sort, and by their disposition known, that thing which is absolutely most clear is first placed, and secondly that which is next: and therefore it continually procedethe from the most general to the special and singular. By this method we proceade from the antecedent more absolutely known to prove the consequent, which is not so manifestly known: & this is the only method which Aristotle did observe.
CAP. XU. Of the illustration of the method by examples of arts.
THe chief examples of the method are found in arts and sciences: in the which although the rules be all general, yet they are distinct by there degres: for everything as it is more general is first placed. The most general therefore shall be first placed: thē next shall follow these which be immediately contained under the general, every one orderly unto the most special which shall be last disponed. The definition therefore as most general, shall be first placed: next followeth the distribution, which if it be manifold, and of diverse sortes shall be first divided into his integral partes, next into his forms and kinds. And every part and form shall be placed and described in the same order & place which he had in his division. It shall be expedient also if the prolixt declaration part them far a sonder, to gather them by a short transition, for that doth recreate and refresh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more easily understanded we must use some familiar example. If thou wilt ask (having all the definitiones, diuisiones, and rules of Grammar writ̄ in diverse tables, & mixed out of all order) what part of dialectick teachethe thee to dispone orderly these rules so confunded: first thou hast no need of the places of inuētion, seeing they be all ready found out: neither hast thou need of the first disposition of propositions, seeing they are disponed already: neither of the second disposition, which is the judgment of the sillogisme, seeing all things which might fall into controversy is proved and concluded: only the method doth remain. The Logitian therefore by the light of this artificial method, shall take a part out of this confused mass the definition (for it is most general) and place it first of all: As, Grammar is an art which teathech to speak well and cōgrusly. Then shall he seek out of the said mass the division of grammar, & shall dispone the same in the second place: Grammar is parted into two partes, Etymology, and syntax. And thereafter he shall find out the definition of Etymology, to the which he shall give the third place. Then he shall seek out the partes of the Etymology, & first the most general as letters: next syllabs & words. Having the partes, he must seek the forms: as words having number, & without number. And last he shall knyt and ioyoe together with short & apt transitiones the end of every declaratiō with the beginning of the next. And so having defined, divided & knyt to geather the partes of the Etymology, he shall make every thing more manifest and plain with most fit and special examples. And after the same order he shall entreat the syntax. This is a general method observed in all arts.
CAP. XUI. Of the illustration of the method by examples, of Poetes, Orators, and Historiographers.
WE do not only use this method in the declaration of arts and sciences, but in the expounding of all things which we would plainly set forth. And therefore the poetes, orators & all sort of writers how oft soever they purpose to teach there auditor, do always follow this order of method, although they do not everywhere insist therein. Virg. in his Georgicks parted his matter as we have said into four partes: & in the first book he entreateth of common & general things, as of Astrology, and things engendered in the air, & of corns and there manuring, which is the first part of his work: then he useth a little transition in the beginning of the second book:
CAP. XUII. Of the crafty and secrete method.
THis method then in divers enuntiatiōs of one kind, being known eather by there own disposition, or the disposition of the sillogisme shall be observed how often soever the matter is clearly to be understanded: But when with delectation or some other motion thy chief purpose is to deceive the auditor, then thou shall put something away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, divisions and transitions: & set in there places things appartaining nothing to the matter: as digressiones from the purpose, & long tarrying upon the matter: but most chiefly see that in the beginning thou inuerte thy order, and place some antecedentes after there consequentes. And surely this more imperfect form of method in respect of the exact rule observed in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the taking away of some of the matter: and redoundeth by the eking to of things extraordinary: but having some degrees of the order inverted, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.
FAVLTES ESCAPED.
- Page 8 line 2 Read argument or.
- pag. 17 lin. 21 declareth.
- pag. 24 lin. 11 again without interrogation.
- pag. 30 lin. 21 ignoranter.
- pag. 45 lin. 26 Seeing the, &c. his example ought to be put to the next Chap. 19.
- pag. 49 lin. 20 Marcus Varro would thei.
- pag. 72 lin. 1 of