The Court of the Gentiles Part 4

CHAP. I. Of Prudence, the last End and chiefest Good, Use, Fruition, and Delectation.

§. 1. HAving discussed Plato 's Natural Philosophy, we now descend to his Moral, which regards the Morals of single Persons, Families, and Cities, or Republics. We find the Idea of Philosophy, as it relates to Morals, and Active Sciences, in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Philosophy is a prudent or studiose consideration of the Soul according to right reason. Wherein we may consider, (1) The Genus, (2) The Subject, (3) The Measure, or Rule of Moral Philosophy.

1. The Genus, in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophy, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies a prudent Inspection, studiose Consideration, and solicitous Care, communly styled by Plato 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Prudence, or Moral Wisdom; which we have thus copiosely described in the Platonic Definitions: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Prudence is a faculty of itself effective of human Happiness. Wherein we have, (1) The Specific reason, whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science, expressed by that notion Effective. (2) Its Ultimate End, which is to make men happy. Again, Prudence is defined in the same Platonic Definitions, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A Science of good and evil. Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A Disposition, whereby we judge what is to be done, and what is not to be done. In all which Definitions laid together we have these Considerables.

1. The Ultimate End, and supreme Object of moral Prudence or Philosophy, namely human Happiness, which is the measure of all moral Acts, and the first thing treated of in moral Philosophy, according to that of Aquinas: The end of moral Virtues, is the chief principe of Prudence, as Luke 10.41. Of which Chap. 2.

2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence, which are in general all Agibles or Practicables. (1) Singulars. (2) Things present. (3) Things in our power. (4) Things good, or evil.

3. Here is also considerable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence, which are according to Plato, (in his Charm. ) (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To do what belongs unto us. (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To understand a man's self. (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To use all things well, i. e. with respect to our supreme end. (4) Rightly to distinguish 'twixt good and evil. (5) To conserve the rectitude of the Will. (6) To moderate the Affections. (7) To govern the whole Life. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. s. 3.

4. This moral Prudence may be considered in its Integrals; which are, according to the Platonic account, four: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Providence, which, in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. is thus described: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Providence is a preparation (or provision) for somewhat future. Which implies, [1] An universal comprehension of all circumstances, means, difficulties, encouragements, which may make for, or against our end. [2] Serious consultation about, and prudent determination of what is to be done. [3] Prudent precaution of what may impede, &c. this is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Caution, according to that of the Stoics, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A wise man ought never to fear, but always to use caution, &c. (2) Another part of moral Prudence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Dexteritie in judging things: which in the Platonic Desinitions, pag. 413. is thus defined: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Facilitie of judgment, is a connate ability of reasoning, or discerning. And Plato, de Repub. 4. pag. 428. says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Facilitie of judgment is certainly some kind of Science, &c. (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sagacitie or perspicacitie of finding out things, which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence, or a natural Invention, which directs the Reason to find out things wrapped up in Nature: which he elsewhere calls a Sagacitie of Nature. So in his Epino. pag. 976.

This 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or natural Sagacitie, Plato makes to be the same with his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , good Nature: So Plato, Defin. pag. 412. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sagacitie is a natural generositie of mind, whereby a person is enabled happily to conjecture what ought to be done. Again 'tis styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an acumen of judgment. This natural Sagacitie, Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very essential to a Magistrate, in order to his more exact judging of persons and things, and final decision of Controversies. Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Sagacitie, even to admiration; which discovered itself in the decision of that arduous case between the two Harlots, 1 Kings 3.23, 24, &c. as also in resolving the Queen of Sheba 's questions, 2 Chron. 9.1. which kind of Sagacitie Politicians cal King-Craft. This natural Sagacitie is elsewhere styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a facility of judgment: which in the Platon. Defin. pag. 414. is defined 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A good judgment tenacious of what is determined by reason. Again, this natural Sagacitie passeth sometimes under the notion of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is defined, Platon. Defin. pag. 412. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , An habit elective of what is best. One great office of this natural Sagacitie, consists in the knowledge of men, their several Humors, Inclinations, Designes, Interests, and Combinations, &c. (4) Another part of moral Prudence is Experience, which Plato calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and makes very essential to a true Philosopher. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 582. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The experienced person endowed with prudence is the only true Philosopher. Then he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thence (in the same Repub. 9.) he joins Prudence and Experience together with Reason, which he makes the best Judges of human Affairs: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , We rightly judge by Experience joined with Prudence and Reason. And Plato, in his Gorgias, gives us the reason, why Experience is so essential to Prudence: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Experience makes our life to pass away according to Rules of Art; whereas inexperience makes us live casually. Again: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , There are many Arts experimentally found out among men, from several Experiments, &c. And because experimental Prudence is gained by sense and sensible observation; thence Plato Timaeus, pag. 103. defineth it a subtlety of sense, or good sensation of the Soul: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Prudence is a good sensation of Soul. Expetience is indeed the main Seminary of human Prudence. (1) In that it furnisheth us with the choicest observations of past and present times, whereby we are capacitated to make some prudent conjecture of what is likely to succeed. (2) Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wisdom to particular and proper use. (3) Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehension of themselves and others. Thence Plato makes this self-knowledge the highest piece of Prudence; which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a good sensation. (4) Experience does much greaten and add to the quantity of our knowledge, by furnishing the mind with fresh observations: whence Plato brings in Solon speaking thus, ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The longer I live, the more I know and teach. (5) Experience adds not only to the quantity, but also to the quality of our knowledge, by rendering it more clear and distinct. For experience reduceth particular observations, in themselves confused, unto a regular Series and Order; whence general Rules are framed, which makes our knowledge more distinct and certain. (6) Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things.

2. Having finished the Generic Notion of moral Philosophy, which is moral Prudence, we now proceed to the Subject thereof, expressed in the Platonic Definition by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Soul: for indeed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul, and therefore it is not unjustly seated therein; though the proper seat thereof be the practic Judgment, which Divines term Conscience; which is a petty God, or God's Vice-gerent, and Vicar in the Soul, to command, or threaten; to accuse, or excuse; to justify, or condemn. This Vicarious Divine office of Conscience, Plato seems to have had some Traditional Notices of: whence he terms Conscience 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Fame; and makes it to be a kind of Demon, or petty God in men. So de Leg. 8 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , This Law of Fame partakes of a marvelous faculty, seeing no one durst to breathe otherwise than according to the Dictates of her Law. Serranus here acquaints us,

Again Serranus adds: This Law or Light of Conscience is twofold. (1) Habitual, which is called in the Schools 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Synteresis. (2) Actual, which is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Syneidesis.

(1) The Synteresis, or habitual Light of Conscience is defined, in the Schools, a natural habit of active Principes. For as speculative Reason discourseth of Speculatives, so practic Reason of Practics: as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain speculative Principes, which appertain to Intelligence; so also are there certain active Principes, which belong to that natural habit of Conscience, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Synteresis, as Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conscience, is the same with Plato 's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Law of Fame, which is elsewhere by him termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Right Reason, as anon. (2) The actual Light or Law of Conscience called by the Ancients 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is Conscience strictly taken. So Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 79. Art. 13.

By which it appears, that the proper office of this Syneidesis is self-reflection; whence follows accusation, or excusation, &c. as Rom. 2.15. And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense, hence 'tis oft called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , sensation, also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Synesis, or sensate judgment. So Aquinas, So Plato, in his Theaet. makes all true Science to be a kind of Sensation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Science is nothing else but Sensation. And more particularly, in his Timaeus, pag. 103. he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Prudence, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a good Sensation: which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie, which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Phil. 1.9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . and thence Heb. 5.14. we read of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. The life of the new Creature, as well as of the old, consists in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience, which spring from inward sense and feeling. And Plato, in his Alcibiad. pag. 133, 134. tells us, In brief; Self-reflections, or our actions upon ourselves, are of all the highest and noblest, and those by which we live and work as men, and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience; which directs all we do, according to right Reason, &c.

3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence, we find it expressed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , according to right Reason. This Platonic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics, and others) right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature, which is twofold. (1) Subjective. (2) Objective.

1. As for Subjective Right Reason, Light or Law of Nature, it is no other than those commun Principes of Moralitie, seated in that part of Conscience which they cal Synteresis, of which in the foregoing §. 6. This Seminary of engrafted active Notions, or moral Principes is styled by the Stoics 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Commun Law; also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , right Reason; against which, say they, nothing is to be done; as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'It is termed by Plato 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Law of Being. So Minos, pag. 315. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , where, says Serranus, by this appellation 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Plato understands

He that consecrates this Law in his mind, as a certain sacred, is thereby furnished with an excellent remedy against the insolence and impotence of human lusts; as it was said of the Tyrant, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . These active Principes, contained in this interne Law of Conscience, are generally styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , commun Notions: they were named by Zeno 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Comprehensions; because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowledge. Cicero tells us, that Epicurus called them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Anticipations, (as he translates the word) because they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul. The Stoics used the same term likewise. Chrysippus defined this natural Law, or Conservatorie of commun Principes, a natural Intelligence of those things, which universally are. Cicero stiles these commun Notions, Inchoate Intelligences, of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also stiles these commun Principes fixed in Conscience, a Law; so Rom. 2.14, 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves, &c. And indeed these commun seeds of natural light are a private Law, which God has deeply engraven on men's Consciences, and is universally extensive unto all, though with a latitude of degrees; it being in some more, in some less, but in all in great measure obliterated, and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines generally termed the Light, or Law of Nature; because it flows in, and with, and from human Nature, either immediately, or mediately.

2. As for the Objective 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Right Reason (which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of) it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law, which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles. That Plato had received some fragments of God's Law; and that by his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Right Reason, he does import the same, seems very probable, both from that expression in his Minos, pag. 315. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The Law of Being, i. e. of the first Being, as he usually stiles God: as also from that other expression of his, Minos, pag. 317. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , This right Reason is the Royal Law, i. e. God's Divine Law, which is so styled Jam. 2.8. In this sense right Reason may be said (as the Schools will have it) to give 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 esse morale, or Moralitie to human Acts: so Stobaeus de Virtut. Ser. 1. fo. 9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue is a conformity according to right Reason, and Sin is a transgression against right Reason. Where, by right Reason we must understand not the subjective Light, or Law of Conscience, which is imperfect; but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law. In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Schools, That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Beings. Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophy.

§. 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophy, the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End, which is first in intention, though last in execution. Yea, indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence: For what is Prudence, but the right disposition and ordination of all means and actions? And is not the last end the rule and measure of all order? Is not everything then rightly disposed, when it is conveniently brought into a subordination to its last end? Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophy. And they say, that Plato was the first that used the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in this philosophic and strict Notion: for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to express an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection; but Plato restrained it so, as to signify thereby a final Cause, or that which is last in the series of things desired, yet first in intention. This Cicero interprets extreme, last, chiefest. What force, efficace and influence the last end has in Morals, Plato frequently inculcates. So in his Theaetetus, he assures us, That all Science is inutile, yea noxious, without the notice of the best End. This last End he makes to be, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the principal End of all things: which Proclus calls, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the End of Ends. And for the more full and clear explication of this last End, its universal influence and excellence, the following Propositions are diligently to be considered.

1. Prop. It is necessary, that we constitute some last End, as well posititively as negatively, in every Series of Actions. This Hypothesis is well argued by Suarez, Metaph. Dispute. 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident: for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means, we must necessarily at last stop in someone or more means, which are first in execution, though last in intention; so in Ascent from the means to the end, it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end, which is first in intention and last in execution. Again, as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause; so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End. For in Ends, and those things that conduce thereto, there cannot be a progress into infinite; but as there is a first means from whence the motion begins; so there must be a last end, in which it terminates. In Ends there is a twofold order, (1) of Intention, (2) of Execution: and in both orders there must be a first and a last. That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe, which moves the appetite, and gives bounds to it; and therefore can be no other than the last End: that which is first in the order of Execution, is the first means conducing to the last End. So that a progress into infinite is on neither part possible: if there were not a last end, nothing could be desired, no action of the appetite could be terminated, neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease: if there were not a first means, from whence the execution should begin, no Agent could begin to work, &c.

2. Prop. The last End of all things must be as extensive and ample, as the first Principe or Cause. Thus Plato, de Leg. 4 p. 715. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , God, (as the old Tradition testifies) having in himself the Principe, and End, and Medium of all things. In which he plainly indigitates, That God is the first Cause and last End of all things. That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evident, because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents: as they who are under God, ought not morally, neither can they physically move, but as dependent on the motion and concourse of God, the first Cause; so neither ought they to desire anything under God, but what may conduce to God as their last End. Such as the Universalitie of the first Cause is in giving Being or Welbeing; such is the Universalitie of the last End in requiring and calling for the emprovement of all. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause, farther than his regress thereto answers his progress therefrom. God as the first Principe gives Being, and as the last End terminates and sixeth the Being conferred. Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause, must tend to him as his last End.

3. Prop. The last End of all things can be but one. This Hypothesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in. And the reason is most apparent; because all things desire their utmost perfection, which consists in their tendence to the most perfect Being. Now the most perfect Being can be but one: For if there should be more than one most perfect, then the one would have somewhat which the other hath not; and so neither would be most perfect. Every good by the addition of some other good is made better and more perfect, except the most simple and perfect Good, by the participation whereof all other goods are made better. Hence

4. Prop. Every man, in every human Act, virtually, if not actually, intends some last End. This is manifest; because in every human Act something is desired for itself, which cannot be referred to any other thing: and what is this but some last end? Again, man naturally desireth the complement of all good: and albeit there may not be an actual elicit intention in every man as to his last end, yet there is a natural propension thereto; whence proceed all Acts about particular goods.

5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely, without end or terms. Thence Aristotle, (following Plato herein) in his Magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The perfect End is that, which being obtained, we neither desire nor need anything beyond it. So the Stoics, who were akin to the Platonists, define the last End, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That for the sake of which all offices are performed, but it for nothing else. So that the last End gives terms and bounds to all things, but admits no terms or measure. As to take away the first Cause of our Being, supposeth us not to be; so to take away the last End, supposeth a confused infinity as to acting. Therefore something must be simply desirable for itself and for no other: For that which a man desireth in order to a further end, the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end: but what he desireth for itself, towards that his desire is infinite: for the better it is, the more desirable: therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable, without terms or bounds. The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure: for the last End being the term of the appetite, it may not receive terms or limits from any other thing; but by how much the more it is loved, by so much the better is the love. In all things appetible the last End gives measure but receives none; because the proper reason of all things we desire is taken from the End. Hence

6. Prop. The last End is the term and measure of all things. What Principes are in Demonstration, the same is the last End in Action: for all means receive their Necessity, Goodness, and Specification from the last End. Whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportioned thereto, and so measured thereby. The last End has the same influence on the means, as the Aristotelean Form is said to have on the mater: They say the form gives the main of Essence, Distinction, Virtue, Operation, and Perfection to the body; and doth not the End give the same to the means? How little desirable are the means, as means, without their reference to the End? Is not the distinction and perfection of all things, morally considered, taken from their End? This is well expressed by Plato, Phileb. pag. 25. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al these things must be referred to the one infinite, i.e. the last End. So again, de Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But truly God is to us the chief measure of all things, i.e. God, as our last End, is the measure both of essence, faculty, and operation: all the multitude of means ought to be reduced to and governed by the Unity of our last End: which is the true meaning of that moral Axiom, Al multitude ought to be governed by Unity. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Everything is defined or bounded by its End. Hence the End is styled the Terme, which confines and fixeth the flux of things, which without it are full of confusion and indetermination. And therefore by how much the more the Soul departs from God, its last End, by so much the more instable, confused, and vagrant it is. Hence

7. Prop. God is the last End of all things. This Hypothesis resultes out of the former, and is in itself most evident: for everything is so far only an end as it is good: wherefore the last end must of necessity be the chiefest good: and what is this but God? Is not God the prime Cause of all goodness in every good? And is he not thence the Cause of every End? Must he not then of necessity be the last End of all things? For that for which everything is such, must needs be more such. Again, is not God the supreme and first in order of Causes, and therefore the last in order of Ends? Thence Plato, Gorg pag. 499. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Althings seemed to us to be undertaken for good. Art thou of the same opinion with us, that the end of all actions is good, and that all things else are undertaken for its sake; but the end itself is not undertaken for anything else? Wherein he proves, (1) That every end is good, and the last end the chiefest good. (2) That all things else are undertaken for the last end, but it for nothing else. Whereby it's evident, that God is the last end of all things; because the chiefest good, for which all things else are desired. Thence Proclus, that great Platonist, Theolog. Plat. lib. 2. cap. 4. calls God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The End of Ends, who convertes all Ends to himself, and subsistes in or about himself. Hence

8. Prop. The ultimate formal Reason or proper Motive of loving things is, not their own goodness, but the Divine Bonity. For the end having the reason of good, and the last end of the chiefest good, hence all things are so far desirable as they refer to the last end and chiefest good, which is God. The end as compared with its means has the same regard, that the formal reason has to its object: now is not the object specified by its formal reason? and must not the means also be specified, determined, and ordered by their last end, which is God? Althings are so far good as they come from and tend to the Divine goodness; which is the first effective Principe, Exemplar, and final Cause of all good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. tells us, That the chiefest good, which makes all things else good, is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which is desired for itself: yea, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Goodness itself and Being itself. Whence it necessarily follows, that nothing can be the ultimate formal reason of love or desire, but the Divine Bonity. For the necessity and goodness of all means is taken from their last end, which is the first Mover in the order of Ends, as the first Cause is in order of Efficients. Hence

9. Prop. Assimilation to the Divine Bonity is the last End of all things, specially human operations. For so far as anything participates of the Divine Bonity, so far it is made like unto the same: if therefore all things tend to God as their last end, that so they might participate of his Divine Bonity, it necessarily follows, that the last end of all things is Assimilation to God. What are all Creatures but Imitamens of the Divine Bonity? And is not everything so far participant of the Divine Bonity, as it is assimilated thereto? Do not all things then in their motions tend to the divine similitude, as to their last end? It's true, the tendence of inanimate Creatures and Brutes, yea of all Minkind in their natural state is only passive and remote: they are reduced to their last end the Divine Bonity, but they have no active power of adhering thereto. Hence all lower Creatures, yea man himself in his apostate state, have only some vestigia or dark shadows of the Divine Bonity; the bright image thereof being peculiar to pious Souls, and good Angels. That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Assimilation to God is the last end of human Nature, Plato frequently inculcates. Thence saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The end of good men is to be assimilated to God. So in his Theatet. pag. 176. he makes Assimilation to God the end of his Philosophy; which he elsewhere makes to be Contemplation, Love, and Imitation of God. Hence

10. Prop. Adherence to God as our last End imports not only subjection and dependence, but also the best Constitution, Complexion, and Perfection of a rational Creature. For by how much the higher the end is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the act: as the intention regulates and qualifies the Action; so the end regulates and qualifies the intention. Now Assimilation to the Divine Bonity being the ultimate end of the rational Creature, it necessarily follows, that Adherence to this Divine Bonity be his supreme perfection. The Divine Bonity, saith Proclus, Theolog. Platon. l. 1. c. 21. is conscrvative of all things, constitutive and fundative of all things, impletive of all things, and conversive of all things to itself. Such as the last end is, such is the wills motion: that is the best election, which doth most actually intend God as its last end. The nearer the Soul approacheth to God, the more perfect it is: the last end attractes the appetite to itself: for to tend to an end is to be drawn by that end: and by how much the more strongly the Soul is drawn by God as its last end, by so much the more intimately it adheres to him. The motion of the Soul towards its last end is much stronger than that towards the means; and therefore the adherence is the greater. What more natural than for a rational Creature to adhere to its last end? And O, what perfection ariseth hence! To be drawn by God as our last end, is to be drawn by our most noble, perfect, and best self; and therefore this speaks not only Subjection, but blessed Constitution and Perfection.

§. 3. Having summed up Plato 's Philosophemes of the last End, we now proceed to his Contemplations of the chiefest Good; which hath intimate connection therewith. His main Discourses of the chiefest Good he lays down in his Philebus, his Convivium, and de Repub. l. 26. c. 9. we shall reduce the whole to these following proprieties. 1. Plato stiles the chiefest Good 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Idea of all good. So in his Philebus, having proposed this Question, Wherein the chiefest Good consists? he resolves it into the Idea of Good. Which he elsewhere stiles 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Good, meaning the chiefest. He terms the chiefest good, the Idea of all good, (1) because it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a self-sufficient Good, yea Goodness itself, in the abstract: i. e. all Good, pure Good, Good by himself, and so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , perfectly Good. The chiefest Good is Good by his own Goodness, and not by any participated Goodness. Whence some of the Platonists style him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , superessential Goodness. Where ever is the chiefest Good, there is the Essence of Good: Goodness in the abstract, and the chiefest Good are convertible: you cannot find the one, but you will find the other also. Whatever good is predicable of any Creature is in the chiefest Good in the abstract: and all know, that Abstracts speak Forms and Essences. So that the chiefest Good must needs be essential Goodness in the abstract, and thence by consequence all Good in Idea. Thus Basil, in Psal. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The self-good [or Ideal good] is really blessed, unto which all look, and which all desire, as the measure of all good. (2) Plato stiles the chiefest Good the Idea of Good; because he is both the prime Efficient and Exemplar of all Good. [1] He is the prime Efficient of all good. As all Creatures flow from and reflow to God, as the Ocean or plenitude of all Being; so also their Goodness participates of the like flux from, and refluxe to the Divine Goodness. No Creature hath any good in it, further than it partakes of the chiefest Good: whatever you possess, if you want the chiefest Good, you possess nothing. Hence, (2) the chiefest Good is the measure of all Good. Every thing is so far good to us, as it corresponds with and refers to the chiefest Good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , We love the chiefest Good for its own sake, as also all things else that flow from it: meaning the chiefest Good is the only measure of our love. So Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. makes that the chiefest Good, which is chosen for itself, and thence the measure of all good.

2. The chiefest Good, according to Plato, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Beauty itself: or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the first Beauty. So in his Conviv. pag. 210. Whosoever is brought thus far, to contemplate things beautiful rightly and in their order, arriving to the end of things lovely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , he shall immediately contemplate that wonderful native Beauty, for the sake of which we have hitherto undertaken all our labors. Wherein he teacheth us, that we may not fixe our eyes only on these inferior Beauties, but by them, as by so many ascents, mount up to the contemplation of the first supreme Beauty, which is our chiefest good. That the prime Beauty is the chiefest good will be most evident, if we look into the nature of Beauty as opened by Plato, who makes all Beauty to consist, (1) in Symmetrie and Proportion. So in his Timaeus, pag. 87. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Every Good is beautiful: and what is beautiful cannot want measure, order or proportion. Aquinas makes this difference between Bonity and Beauty, that Bonity or Goodness properly regards the Will, but Beauty the Eye and Understanding: thence beautiful colors arise from that variety and convenance, which is in them to please the eye. That Symmetrie is essential to Beauty, Timaeus tells us, p. 103. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. The Principes of Beauty are Symmetrie or proportion of parts, &c. Thence Plato, Leg. 3. makes Wisdom to be most beautiful: because 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the chiefest of Symphonies, or Harmonies. So Conviv. pag. 205. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Wisdom is the greatest of Beauties. Now Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. saith, The chiefest Good is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of itself, with itself, the most uniform and simple Being; and therefore most beautiful. Again, is Wisdom most beautiful, because most concordant with itself? And is not God the chiefest Good also the most uniform Wisdom? The proportion required to Beauty is well expressed by Sales, de l'Amour de Dieu, l. 1. c. 1. Union, saith he, established in distinction makes order: order breeds convenance, agreament, and proportion: and convenance in things entire and accomplisht makes Beauty. An Army is beautiful, when it is composed of all its parts, so ranked together in their order, that their distinction is reduced to that agreament, which they ought to have together. To make Music beautiful, there is required not only that the voices be clear and well distinguished, but also that they be conjoined in such sort one to toother, that they make one just consonance and harmony, by means of the union that is in the distinction, and the distinction that is in the union of the voices, which may deservedly be called a discordant Accord, or rather an accordant Discord. Hence (2) Al Beauty ariseth from Perfection and Integrity of parts. Those things are most beautiful in their kind, which are most perfect: And is not the chiefest Good most absolutely and simply perfect? (3) The last and main Cause of Beauty is Splendor, Light and Claritie. Thence Beauty is defined by Plato the Fulgor and Luster of Good. Splendor and Brightness is essential to Beauty, to the end that it may be visible or intelligible. Obscurities, Shadows, and Darknesses are deformed, and render all things deformable; because nothing in them is visible or intelligible: neither order, nor distinction, nor union, nor convenance. So Job 10.22. in the description of the grave, he saith, It is a land of darkness, as darkness itself, and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness: i.e. There is no light, therefore no order and beauty. Light gives life to brightness; which is but a dead inutile thing, if splendor and beauty give not life and efficace to it, as we see in lively colors. So in man, his beauty is not accomplisht without a good grace and luster, which is the life of beauty. Thus in the sovereign Beauty of God, the Splendor and Brightness of his Perfections renders him most beautiful. Whence Beauty and Glory, both in profane and sacred Philosophy, have one and the same Idea: for what is beauty, but the effulgence, or shine of all perfections in any object? And if this fulgor or splendor be illustrious and most bright, it's termed Glory. So the beauty of the Sun, what is it but the glorious effulgence or brightness of its light? Whence it being a grand Question among the Ancients, What in Nature was most beautiful? it was answered, Light. Hence beauty is defined by the Orator, A due congruence, with a certain suavitie of color. This suavitie of color is nothing else, but the light or splendor of that perfection or goodness which is in the subject. Whence Aquinas defines Beauty, A certain bland face of Bonity or Goodness. And do not all these notions of beauty greatly illustrate the surpassing heart-ravishing Beauty of God the chiefest Good? What more glorious, resplendent and effulgent than the chiefest Good? Where may we expect more glorious light and beauty, than with the Fountain of Light, in whose light alone we behold light? Has not the chiefest Good the most sweet color and bland face of goodness? Yea Plato, Repub. lib. 6. pag. 509. discriminating 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 those things which are good by participation only, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the chiefest Good; he adds, That this has 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a certain infinite immense Beauty. So Conviv. pag. 211. he assures us, That all things else are beautiful, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. by participation and in some certain mode only; but the first Beauty is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. most sincere, pure, immixed; not contaminated with human colors, or other trifles. And then he breaks forth into this rapture of Admiration: O what a blessed sight would it be, to contemplate this divine, sincere, incontaminate, simple, uniform Beauty! Yea, he positively affirms, That God, who is the chiefest Good, has 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the most illustrious and amiable Beauty. Thus the spurious Dionysius, de Nom. Divin. cap. 4. saith,

God intending to render all things beautiful and good, hath reduced their multitude and distinction to a perfect unity, i. e. to subserve the enjoyment of himself as the first Beauty.

3. Plato makes the chiefest Good to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , most proper. So Repub. 9. pag. 586. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That which is best for everyone, that is most proper. Thus Conviv. pag. 205. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The chiefest Good is most proper to everyone, and yet commun to all: Proprietie with Communitie is proper only to the chiefest Good. There are several other proprieties of the chiefest Good mentioned by Plato, namely that it is the most pleasant, solid, substantial, vital, uniform, agreeable, infinite, eternal, necessary, divine Good: which by his own concession are applicable to none but God. Of which hereafter more in Aristotle 's Philosophy, B. 4. c. 1. §. 22.

§. 4. Next to the last End, and chiefest Good follows Use and Fruition; the former belonging to the Means, the later to End. Use properly consists in the subordination and reference of all things to our last end, which alone is the object of Fruition. The whole life of man is distributed into Use and Fruition. Use is a tendence or referring thing to our end. This by Plato is oft expressed under the notion of Temperance, which he makes to be the moderate use and reference of all things to our last end. So in his Gorgias, pag. 507. he begins thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The temperate Soul is good. Thence he collects, That the intemperate Soul is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , mad and dissolute. Whence he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The temperate man will do that which has a decorum both towards God and men. And he gives the reason of it: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For it is not the part of a temperate man to prosecute or fly from what he ought not; but to fly from and prosecute both things, persons, and pleasures as need requires; as also patiently to tolerate the same. Thence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. This seems to me to be the primary and chief end of a regular life, that Justice and Temperance be always present. In which we have these observables. (1) That the temperate Soul is the best, and the intemperate the worst. (2) That Temperance formally consists in giving all persons and things their just decorum, and measure. (3) That we then give all things their just measure, when we prosecute, or fly from them, in that manner and measure as we ought. (4) That we then prosecute and fly from things as we ought, when we use, or use them not in subservience to our last end, which is the measure of all things. This is well expressed by Aristotle, (who followed Plato herein) Eth. l. 3. c. 15. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Wherefore in a temperate man the concupiscent part ought to conform to reason: for moral good is the end of both. Thence a temperate man desires what he ought, and in that manner as he ought, and when he ought: which is the Constitution, Law, and Order of Reason. Whereby he fully confirms Plato 's sentiment, that Temperance gives all things their just number, weight, and measure, by reducing all to such an Order, as may render them subordinate to the last end. The Stoic expresseth this Temperance in the use of things by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , sustain what is grievous, and abstain from what is delicious. Which is thus expounded: The temperate man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , sustains without grief the absence of pleasures, and abstains from the fruition of them when present. This some make to be a great degree of fortitude: for the valiant man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , bears things terrible, and forbears things audacious. The sum of all is, that the temperate man is not inordinately afflicted for the loss, or excessively affected with the presence of any inferior good, but useth all things in measure and subservience to his last end.

This Temperance in the use of things Plato also illustrates by the notions of Order and universal Justice. So Gorg. pag. 506. The virtate of everything is its order: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That therefore which is constituted and conformed by order, is the virtue of everything. Wherefore the Soul that keeps its order is better than that which wants it. And what is it, in Plato 's sense, for a Soul to keep its order, but to use all things, servato ordine finis, in subordination to its end? This is well illustrated by Jansen, August. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 19. where he proves out of Augustine, That virtue is nothing else but the order of Love. For by Love, as a Divine Pondus, the Soul reduceth all things to its last end, namely God. This is incomparably well expressed by Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 24, 25. Whatsoever things seem to have excess or defect, more or less, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all those ought to be referred to the infinite Being, as the only measure. This he more openly expresseth, Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. God is to us the measure of all things, unto which scope and mark all our actions, as so many arrows, ought to tend. So Repub. 1. pag. 331. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I count the possession of things of great use, yet not for every man, but he who is moderate and temperate, i. e. who refers all to his last end. Thence he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That riches are most useful for a wise man, who can and will use all in subordination to his last end. Whence a thing utile, Definit. Plat. p. 414. is thus described: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A thing utile, is that which renders us capable of suffering well, or doing good, in order to our last end. So also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , conducible is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which conduceth to good, namely our last end. These and such like are Plato 's Philosophemes about Use, which may be all reduced to these following Propositions.

1. The Utilitie of any created good consists not in its own goodness, but in its reference to our last end. Herein consists the good of every inferior good, when it subserves and tends to our chiefest good. The good and evil of all things is to be judged by their relation to, or distance from the last end. Things are so far good as they enable us to do good by serving God. Al that we have, or can do is of God, and therefore ought to be for God. Nothing is to be loved or enjoyed for itself, but the chiefest good. Thus Aristotle, Eth. l. 4. c. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Those things that come under Use, we may use either well or il. Thus Riches are reckoned among utile goods. Now he that is endowed with virtue for the use of anything, doth use that thing in the best manner. Therefore he useth riches best, which hath attained to that virtue, which belongs to the use thereof. Thus riches and all other lower goods must be referred to God. Hence

2. To use anything, is to refer it to some other thing superior in our esteem. Herein consists the formal difference between Use and Fruition: Things are enjoyed for themselves their own goodness; but they are used in order to something else. We do not properly enjoy, but use the means, neither use but enjoy our last end. Hence it follows (1) That all Use of God as a means for the obtainment of some other end is inordinate. (2) That all Use of the Creature, which is not referred to God, is also sinful. This perversitie and inordination is found in every sin, whiles men enjoy what they ought to use, and use what they ought to enjoy. This Augustine makes to be the perversion of all order, fruendis uti velle, at{que} utendis frui: When men enjoy the means and use the last end. But of this more, Prop. 4.

3. Things are then used orderly when they subserve and are subordinate to our last end. Herein chiefly consists the order of Love, when it resolves all lower goods and actions into the chiefest Good. Al lower goods are to be desired not for enjoyment, but use; and when we have them, we must use them well. This is well explicated by Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 2. where he tells us, This is the Spirit of Philosophy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to keep the force of the mind free from the body and brutish affections, and to refer the use of all to the chiefest Good. Wherefore it doth allow the moderate use and fruit of externe things, which are estimed as good, so far as they agree with the true or best good: but yet so far as they differ therefrom, [ i. e. subserve not the chiefest Good] she commands, that they be rejected. A Philosopheme worthy of a Christian mind. This is the import of that Divine Admonition, 1 Cor. 7.31. And they that use this world as not abusing it: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as not overusing it. When ever we overuse any lower good, we abuse it, i. e. turn it off from its proper use. Man has a great liberty to use all things indifferent indifferently, yet so as all must conduce to his last end. And indeed we are no further master of anything, or free in the use of it, than it is brought into subservience unto God. Hence,

4. To use or enjoy any inferior good for itself is to abuse it. This lower Universe and each part thereof was not made for man's Fruition, but Use. It's true, Brutes have liberty to enjoy the good things of senses; because they are not capable of any higher good: but man's liberty lies in the using these inferior goods for an higher end, the enjoyment of God: and when he perverts this order, he falls under miserable cursed bondage. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 507. having laid down this Hypothesis, That Temperance consists in the regular use of all things, he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , And thus he must act, lest giving the rains to lusts, and suffering them to wander where they list, whiles he thinks to satisfy them, he fall into an infinite evil, and live a robbers life. Whereby he means, that when men's lusts grow irregular in the use of things, they soon prove infinite and insatiable. This inordinate love to the Creature for itself is usually styled Concupiscence and Lust: which is nothing else but a brutish desire after, and fruition of the Creature for itself, without reference to God, the chiefest Good. This tyrannic Concupiscence Plato accurately philosophiseth on, Repub. 9. pag. 574. where he describes it, as the greatest Tyrant in the world: Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 2. This perversion of the order of Love, and abuse of inferior goods Augustine sadly complains of, in that men hereby use what they should enjoy, and enjoy what they should use, i. e. they use God and what belongs to him as means to promote their inferior goods, the object of their fruition; and that against the order of true Charity, yea of human Nature, which requires, that we should use all lower goods in subordination to God the chiefest Good. Creatures, when they are used in subservience to God their last End, they are then in their proper place and amiable; but when they are made the object of Fruition, they are then in the place of God, and so most abominable. Jansen, August. Tom. 2. de Nat. laps. l. 2. c. 19. pag. 156. gives this reason à priori, why it is unlawful to love or enjoy any Creature for itself; because it is against that natural order, which is established by the eternal Law. For such is the natural condition of a rational Creature, that, according to the order of Nature, he is placed beneath God, coordinate with intellectual Creatures, but above corporeous Creatures. Wherefore seeing God alone is superior to the rational Creature, he ought, according to the Law of Nature, by the Pondus of Love to subject himself to God only: which so long as he continues to do, he remains just and virtuose, and most ordinate in his kind; sithat virtue is the best state of a rational Creature; or, according to Augustine, nothing else but the order of Love: and by Love, as by a weight, the Soul is kept in this middle state, under God the most supreme Being, and above inferior Creatures. This therefore is the bitter root of all inordinate motion, when the Soul doth by its love, as a terrene Pondus, move inordinately towards the Creatures, so as to become subject to them. Yea, doth not this perverting the order of Love bring the whole Creation under bondage, as Rom. 8.21, 22? Wherein consists the present bondage of the Creatures, but in this, that they are perverted and turned aside from that Order for which they were made, namely from the serving their Creator, to feed the lusts of men? The Creatures are not put to that use for which they were made by God, and this makes them groan to be delivered, &c. Herein consists the Liberty of all Creatures, and our Liberty in the use of them, that we are thereby made more free in the service and fruition of God; by subjecting ourselves and all inferior goods to God, for the serving and enjoyment of him, we gain dominion over ourselves and all things else. But if the heart be inordinate in adhering to or use of the most lawful comforts, we immediately fall under bondage to them. The way to have the Spirit free in the use of any created good, is not to use or enjoy it too much, by letting the Spirit to run too far into it, or loving it for itself: for thereby we become slaves it.

5. The more actually the Soul intends God as its last End, in the use of inferior things, the more perfect is the use of them. It's a great Saying, The most actual Intention is best: Intention is the most eminent act of Love: and the most perfect intention is that which most eyes God in the use of all things. To intend anything, as Suarez well observes, is to tend towards it by all manner of vehement desires, and important endeavors. Indeed intention differs not from efficacious desire of the end, together with the means conducing thereto: whereby it is differenced from Velleitie; which is only a conditionate, saint, imperfect volition of an end, without regard to the means. The more strongly and actually we intend our end, the sooner shall we arrive thereto in the use of means: a single strait intention keeps the Agent strait in its way to its end. Thus Mat. 6.22. If therefore thine eye, i.e. the intention of thy will, be single, i.e. if it hath a single end, namely God. Jansen, out of Augustine, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 20. pag. 162. informs us, that all things are to be referred to God, not only by habitual Intention, as the Schools determine, but also by an intention virtually actual. And he thus demonstrates it: because the mind, when it acts, must requiesce in the love, not of the Creature, but of God. For this is most certain, according to Augustine, that an habitual Intention only without actual or virtual will not suffice; because the just, when asleep, have habitual intention, yet they cannot then be said to refer their actions to God. Wherefore there is always necessary an actual, or at least virtual intention of referring all things to God. A virtual intention in human acts hath the same force as actual intention: for it acts in virtue and force received from some former actual intention. As when a man in a journey is carried on towards his end by a virtual intention, influenced by some former actual intention. A right intention is the deliberation of a bended will towards God as the last end: for where the intention is right, God is the predominant end. The end of an action discovers its kind: and the intention discovers the end: For intention properly belongs to the Will, whose office it is to refer all to the last end. The intention is the guard of the thoughts and desires, that which girds up the mind, and keeps it fixed on its last end, in the use of all means. He that doth not intend and eye God in his worldly concerns, will not intend him in his best duties and services. To have the intention of the Will actually directed towards God in all inferior goods is the Spirit of right Use. And herein indeed consists much of the Souls liberty as to means, to intend God in all. It's a good Notion of Aquinas, That the Soul, by intending temporals in order to God, is elevated and advanced; otherwise it is depressed and brought down, namely when it intends any temporal thing for itself. Thus also Jansen, in his August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. where he gives this difference between Use and Fruition:

This inferior visible World what is it but a Map of things invisible? And ought we not then firmly to intend God in all these lower things? And is not this the most perfect use, when the Soul doth spiritually and actually contemplate, intend, and adhere to God in all these lower goods of time? As Intention directs the Will, so Faith directs the Intention in the use and prosecution of all means: it is the Intention that regulates the quality of the action in the use of things; and it is divine Faith and Love that regulate the Intention. This is well explicated and demonstrated by Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. where he proves, That according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention of the Worker, we are to measure the bonitie or pravitie of the work. Which he demonstrates by these Conclusions: (1) That Intention only is right or morally good, whereby that is intended or loved for itself, which ought to be loved for itself. (2) Every Intention of a Worker, whereby anything besides God is intended for itself, that Intention is evil. And the reason is invincible, because every rational Creature ought to refer all his acts to God as his last end. Hence, according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention, we may take a measure of the bonitie or pravitie of Use: Every Intention of the Agent, wherein anything but God is intended as the last end, is a depraved Intention: because nothing is to be intended for itself but the last end. Whence it follows, that no Intention is right or morally good, but that whereby we intend or love for itself, that which ought to be intended or loved for itself, namely the last end and chiefest good, using and referring all things else, as means subordinate thereto, as it is acutely demonstrated by Ariminensis, in 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1.

§. 5. Having explicated the nature of Use, we may with more facility and expedition examine what Fruition imports. As to use a thing, is to intend, elect, and employ it for the acquirement of some other thing; so to enjoy a thing, is by love to adhere unto it for itself, without reference to any other thing. Thus Jansen, Aug. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. gives us this difference between Use and Fruition. He that useth a thing has dominion over it, to refer it to this or that end; but he that enjoys anything doth bring down his Soul by love unto a subjection thereto, and is in that regard inferior to it, though superior to whatever he doth use. This Ariminensis, in Sent. Part. 1. Dist. 1. Quaest. 1, 2, 3. has acutely determined: where he gives us the nature of Fruition, and its difference from Use in these Conclusions. (1) No Nolition is Fruition: because every Nil is the slight of the will, and that which is ordained for some other. (2) Every Volition is either Use or Fruition: because everything is willed either for itself or some other. (3) No Use is Fruition: because no one that wills a thing for another, can be said to will that thing as his last end: because the volition of the last end is the cause of the volition of that which refers to that end: but nothing can be the cause of itself: Ergo. (4) Fruition and Use may consist together in the Will, as to different objects. (5) The Will ought not to Use God: i. e. as a means conducible to some other end. (6) A Love of Fruition must terminate nowhere but on God. (7) To love anything for God, is nothing else than to love it, because God is loved: i. e. to love it as conducible to God. In Fruition there are four considerables, (1) Love. (2) Possession of and Union with the Object beloved. (3) Communion. (4) Delectation and joy. Of these in their order.

1. Al Fruition imports Love. For no man can enjoy what he doth not love: all Love tends to Union, specially with its last end: Yea, according to the Schools, there is a mutual Inhesion between the Lover and Beloved. The Lover lives in the Beloved, and the Beloved in the Lover: which is most true in regard of that Love of Fruition, whereby the Soul enjoys God: for God lives in the Soul that loves him, and the Soul lives in God, who is essential Love. This Love of Fruition is well expressed by Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But in that man, whose affections are greatly ravished with one object, they are infirm and remiss towards other things, as rivers, derived elsewhere. His mind is, that Love of Fruition is properly towards one object, namely the last end. But more expressly, in his Phaedo, he saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He that is wise desires always to be with and enjoy that which is better or his best good: i. e. Union and Fruition is the main thing his Love aims at. Everyone is strongly carried forth by Love towards his last end: yea those very acts of love and desire are fruition in part. Thence Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Because all are wont to be conversant about what they love. This intime connection between Love and Fruition is excellently well explicated by Jansen, August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. Love of Fruition ordains and disposeth the Love towards its Beloved: whom it regards as its first Principe or Cause, and its last end, in the fruition of which it expects perfect felicity. For what is Fruition but this, to adhere to and acquiesce in another as its first principe and last end? But now everything that is ordained to another, is in that respect necessarily inferior to that other. Whence Love of Fruition keeps the Soul in subjection to God its last end, but gives it dominion over every inferior good. This Jansen more fully explicates, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 16. pag. 149. Many, saith he, think they love not such things, to which they are indeed intimately and strongly united: but this is with facility detected by Fruition: for Love cannot be well understood without Fruition, nor yet Fruition without Love; because Love is the beginning of Fruition, and Fruition the end of Love. No man enjoys but what he loves; and no man loves anything as his last end, but what he would enjoy: whence, as there is no Fruition but what is sweetened with Love, so there is no Love but what tends to Fruition. Therefore Love, according to Augustine, is nothing else but the Will, by its Pondus, tending to Fruition. What is Love, but a secret Fountain streaming towards Fruition? And what is Fruition, but an Ocean of satisfaction, in which Love is immersed and swallowed up? Is not then Fruition near akin to Love? Thence Augustine, explicating the nature of Fruition, tells us, that to enjoy, is to adhere to a thing for itself: for if it be not adhered to for itself, it is not properly loved or enjoyed, but that other thing, for whose sake it is embraced. But to speak precisely, every kind of Love is not Fruition, but that only which solaceth itself in the embracements of its beloved: which if absent, the will moves towards it by desires. This is well expounded by Plato, Phaedro, pag. 251. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Wherefore every Soul, so long as it is pricked and wounded with desires, it feels grief, and is enraged thereby; and then again it is recreated with the memory of that first Beauty it once beheld. And thus variously affected, by reason of impatient fury, it cannot sleep, but wanders up and down with desire to see the first Beauty: which when it has once got a glance of, then breaking all bounds of Modesty it solaceth itself in the embraces thereof, &c. By all which it is apparent, (1) That all Fruition of, or love to any Creature for itself is sinful concupiscence. (2) That God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end; because he alone is to be loved for himself. He that loves anything with God, and not for God, loves him not as he ought.

2. The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Union with the Object beloved. Al complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Union: for if the object be absent, there can be only love of desire, not perfect Fruition: because to enjoy a thing is the term of desire. Plato, in his Timaeus, informs us, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Beatitude, consists in nothing else but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to have a good Demon dwelling in himself, &c. whereby he understands God. The like also in his Politicus, pag. 309. he shows how the Soul being united to the first Beauty or chiefest Good, it thereby becomes happy. And Thales being asked, What was most sweet? answered, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to possess, meaning the chiefest Good. This possession of the supreme Good, which belongs to Fruition, is well expressed by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art. 37. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For the virtue of possession and of work is not the same: For the virtue of possession is that it might be most estimed, precious and dear. Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition, as by work, Use. So Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men, their Fruition of riches as their last end, saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , They receive a great impression from the possession of riches: for they are so affected as if they enjoyed all good: i. e. possessing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good; and so have their spirits formed by, yea transformed into them: for all things are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possess and enjoy as their last end: Fruition breeds first imitation of or likeness unto, and then union with what we enjoy. Neither doth Fruition import possession only, but also union with its last end, i. e. moral and objective union at least, if not physic and real: for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possess. Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate, firm, and inviolable. For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firm than that of bodies among themselves, or with Spirits. The senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the externe accidents: Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether, but gradually and by parcels: therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only: But the Soul, in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good, being spiritual, and of the same nature with its object, has a more complete reception thereof, and intimate union therewith: whence the pleasures that attend the same are of all the most spiritual, pure, intense, and permanent, as hereafter.

3. Al Fruition imports Communion with our chiefest Good. For to enjoy a thing, according to the origination of the word among the Latins, is to participate of the fruits thereof. And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good, without communion therewith? Indeed all union, at least with the supreme Good, is in order to communion; which doth formalise, yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state. It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it, unless they enjoy what they possess. This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo, pag. 80, &c. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die, Socrates philosophiseth, even to admiration, on the Souls immortal state after death, and its felicity in communion with the chiefest Good. His words are these: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But the Soul, being a thing invisible, departs to such a place, as is most generous, pure, and invisible, namely to the state of the dead, where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good; where, if God will, my Soul must immediately go. Thence he adds, pag. 81. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like itself? I say, that divine, immortal, and wise Being? Where when it arrives, doth it not evade altogether happy, being freed from Error, Ignorance, Terrors, wild Loves, and other human Infirmities; and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds, spend the rest of its time in communion with God? This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated; whereas impure polluted Souls pass unto their place of punishment as he in what follows demonstrates.

This Communion with God Plato, Tim. 90. makes to consist, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in giving the Soul its proper food and motions: which he chiefly placeth, (1) in the Contemplation of God. This he more fully explicates, Conviv. pag. 211. where he makes, The Contemplation of the first Beauty, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. that divine, sincere, uniform, simple, pure, incontaminate, perfect Beauty, to be the most ravishing spectacle; and that which makes us perfectly happy. Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille, pleasant, congenial to the Soul, uniform, self-sufficient, and permanent. Thus Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 179. Art. 1.

To contemplate the first cause and last end of all things how delicious and agreeable is it! Contemplation binds the mind to its object, and thence insensibly transforms it thereinto. Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light? And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul? Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve all other objects we converse with? And are not all things hereby turned into God? Doth not the Contemplation of God, as our choicest Good, enable us to live in God, and to him?

(2) But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence, which is another part of the Souls communion with its last end. Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul; but divine Love carries out the Soul to it, by adherence to, and delight in it. The amorous Soul living in God by love, dies in itself. How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good? As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God; so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God, and satisfaction in him. Love to God settles the Soul in one point, out of which it needs not stir to find Felicitie. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it. The Stoic thinks it sweeter to love than to be beloved. Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective: it has a violence and pain, which is most sweet and delicious. The Soul by loving its last end possesseth, enjoys, and lives in it. Have not all things a desire of union and communion with what they love? And the more vehement our love is, if it be of the chiefest good, the sweeter our fruition thereof is. This love gains strength by opposition: it makes the most difficult service sweet. The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to itself, is to have no limits. Where ever the Soul turns it cannot but feel dolors, if it acquiesce not in God; but so far as it adheres to God, it feels no pain. Augustine, that great Doctor of Love to God, comprised all Christian Morals in Love; which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Duty. It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret, and penetrates things most profound: it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption. Whence also Augustine termed all Virtue but the order of Love: and its admirable efficace is seen in this, that it doth lift the heart above all things create, and yet at the same time depress it at the lowest center of self-nothingness. Al the labors of this Love are full of divine suavities, and carry their rewards in them: Afflictions blunt not its edge: cast it into an ocean of misery, and it swims above all: it estimates its misery only by the loss, and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end. Mediocritie, which in other things is estimed Virtue, is a Vice in Love to God, which admits no excess. These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God, as our last end. This Communion with God, the Romans, in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments, expressed by their Lectisternia, or Beds placed in their Temples, whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their God's: Of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 3. cap. 17.

§. 6. Lastly, Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures, Suavities, and Delights. No one properly enjoys a thing, who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof. The Quietation, Delectation, and Satisfaction, which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato, in his Philebus, where he treats professedly of this subject. So pag. 15. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He that being young having tasted thereof, like one overjoyed, as if he had found a treasure of wisdom, leaping for joy, and as it were under a divine Enthusiasm or rapture, he moves every discourse cheerfully and orderly. This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end. Thence Phileb. pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures: There are in the minds of wicked men 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , painted pleasures, but such as are altogether false. Whence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures; but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine. Wicked men's pleasures are sucked from some dirty terrene goods; and therefore only imaginary and spurious; but the virtuose man's pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good, and therefore genuine and satisfying. But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation, Joy, and Pleasure, which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good, we shall examine and inquire into, (1) The Causes, (2) The proper Adjuncts, (3) The Effects thereof; and that according to Plato 's Philosophemes.

1. Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy. (1) A sweet Good. (2) Possession of that Good. (3) Actions consequent to that possession. (1) There must be a sweet Good, out of which all true pleasure is formed: and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is, by so much the more perfect is the delight. Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the most amiable best good. This Plato frequently inculcates. Thus Phaedr. pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good, he saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Whom when it shall see, and instill the desire of him into itself, it shall then break all bounds of modesty, and having got liberty of breathing, it shall cease to be exagitated by pricking dolors. This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good, so that it can never depart from its embraces, neither doth it value anything more than its beloved. Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good. Perfect Joy cannot form itself out of any inferior good: it springs only from the best sweetest good, which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul. What but the first essential, universal, Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights? (2) Another Spring of Delectation is Possession; which as it is essential to all Fruition, so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same: for everyone is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves: and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is, and the possession more intimate, by so much the greater is the delight. Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato, That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite, i. e. to speak nakedly, from the Union of the Soul with God. This Plato, according to his allegoric mode, expresseth, Conviv. 206. Al men, saith he, in their manner conceive and are pregnant; and when they have gone their time, Nature desires to bring forth. Thence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beauty or sweetest Good, it is affected with joy, hilaritie, and pleasure; and brings forth and generates: but on the contrary, when it adheres to what is base and fordid, it is contracted by sorrow and grief; and thence, being not able to bring forth, it is tormented with pains and dolors. By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God, and to inferior Goods: upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures; but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows, but vexatious dolors and torments. This pleasure, that follows on adherence to, and possession of God, is well expressed by David, Psal. 25.13. His Soul shall dwell at ease: Heb. loge in goodness. When God dwells in the Soul, it then doth loge in goodness, or dwell at ease: where there is want, there can be no perfect ease and delight: but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodness, it then finds ease and pleasure. Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul: it can never loge with ease, til it loge in the chiefest Good by possessing the same, whereby all its wants are supplied. The Soul, when it sits most uneasy as to inferior goods, so far as it dwells in God, and God dwells in it, so far it finds ease. Properly we never enjoy anything, til we find rest in it: this the Soul finds so far as it possesseth God. Whence springs delectation and pleasure: Possession gives the obtainment of desires: and desires so far as obtained fil with joy proportionable to the desires.

(3) The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action. Whence Joy is defined by Cicero, a sweet motion in sense. Yea, things in themselves bitter and irksome, how sweet are they oft made by exercise! It is generally determined in the Schools, That operation and motion is the proper cause of Delectation: and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the sweetest good of all the most noble and perfect? Actings of the Soul on the chiefest good, O what sweet inspirations of Divine suavities are they attended with! Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 582. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. How great pleasure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it, none but a Philosopher can taste. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 249. speaking of the Contemplation of the first Being, he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , This is the most ravishing ecstasy and composed of the best things. That all true pleasure ariseth from virtuose exercises about the sweetest good, Aristotle, in imitation of his Master Plato, has well demonstrated. So Eth. l. 1. c. 9. p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful, or most valiant carries away the Crown; but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , but they that contend for Victory: So in this human life, they that do good, are made partakers of good things. And then he adds the reason: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Their life is indeed sweet and joyous of itself—He is delighted or recreated in just things, who by love embraceth justice— To those that are studiose of virtue, virtuose acts are of themselves pleasant and delicious: i. e. they carry in them their own reward, a divine suavitie. And he subjoins the reason: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. But their life needs not pleasure as an additament or appendix, but has pleasure included in it: For besides what has been spoken, he is not a good man, who is not delighted in good actions. Neither doth any cal him just, who doth not take pleasure in just deeds: or liberal, who is not delighted in liberal acts. So in other Virtues. Whence he concludes: If so then, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , virtuose acts are of themselves sweet. Whence he collects this general Conclusion: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , formal Beatitude is the best, fairest, and sweetest thing: i. e. Nothing so sweet as by virtuose acts to adhere to, and enjoy the sweetest and best good. And indeed herein Plato and Aristotle accord and agree with sacred Philosophy. For David assures us, that nothing was so sweet to him, as the Contemplation and Fruition of God, by acts of Faith, &c. So Psal. 27.4. One thing have I desired— to behold the beauty of the Lord: Heb. to behold with singular delight. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 construed with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in signifies, to see with great pleasure and delectation, as v. 13. O! how sweet and delicious was it to David to look on the golden Ark, the Symbol of Christ's Humanity, and there by Faith to adore the Deity! So Psal. 106.5. That I may see the good of thy chosen, that I may rejoice in the gladness of thy nation: Heb. to see in good, i. e. to enjoy the good seen with pleasure and satisfaction: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 construed with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies, to enjoy with pleasure. O! how deliciose is the fiducial contemplation of the sweetest Good! What is formal Beatitude, but the immediate, glorious, perfect Intuition or Vision of the supreme Beauty? And what infinite delectation ensues hereon? What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deity in the Ark of Christ's Humanity? What infusions of Divine suavities flow hence? Doth not the Beauty of the first Cause and fairest Good captivate all hearts that behold it? How much spiritual delectation is there in one glance on the sweetest Good? How soon is the holy Soul filled with divine suavities, when it can, in any measure, contemplate the Glory of the prime Beauty. Thus Psal. 104.34. My meditation of him shall be sweet: I will be glad in the Lord. Yea, would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God, the sweetest Good, turn Hel itself into Heaven? Such are the divine suavities, which attend virtuose acts, in the Fruition of the sweetest Good.

§. 7. We now descend to discourse of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts, which are various. (1) Al Delectation and Joy must be real and sincere: and the more real and sincere it is, the better it is. And doth not this give a great advance to those joys and suavities which attend the fruition of our last end and sweetest good? May any delices be compared with these, in point of sincerity and reality? What are all other pleasures in comparison of these, but painted shadows, yea mere lies? This is lively illustrated by Plato, Phileb. pag. 40. where he stiles all terrene pleasures, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Phantasms or Imaginations painted in our minds: as when a man conceits he has a vast treasure of gold in his possession, which he has not, yet takes pleasure in such a sick dream. Whence he adds: There are false pleasures in the minds of men, which yet, by men's ridiculous figments, imitate true pleasures. And then he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Neither do I judge, that we may consider pleasures in any other regard evil, but as they are false. B • which he invincibly demonstrates, that no pleasures are truly •• ch, but those that are sincere, real, and substantial; which he makes proper to virtuose men, who adhere to the sweetest Good. This real pleasure is elsewhere styled by him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , sincere genuine pleasure; which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the best Good. This he more openly expresseth, Repub. 9. pag. 580. where he assertes, That a wise or virtuose man only, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , doth taste of the most genuine and true pleasures. So pag. 583. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Neither is there any true pleasure, but that of a wise man. Whereby he, (as Solomon ) understands a virtuose man. Thus Plato the Jew, that great Platonist: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Because all genuine and sincere joy is found only in the minds of good men; therefore every wise man rejoiceth in himself, and not in things foreign. Thence, saith Seneca, Those things in which the vulgar sort delight themselves, have only a thin superficial pleasure; and sometimes an adventitious joy, which hath no funde or bottom. There is no solid substantial joy, but what slows from, and some way refers to the fruition of the sweetest good: all other pleasures are only opinionative, and grounded on false imagination.

(2) The Delectation that flows from the Fruition of the sweetest Good is most congenial, and proper to the Soul; and therefore most perfect. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 585. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , If therefore to be filled with things consentaneous to nature be sweets then that which is indeed filled with the first Being, and those things that partake most of Being, is more truly affected with true pleasure. His Argument lies thus: Nothing is more delicious to human Nature, than to be filled with such things as are most consentaneous and agreeable to its more noble part the Soul: Now to be filled with the fruition of the first Being and sweetest Good is most proper and agreeable to the Soul: therefore this is most delicious to human Nature. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 580. saith, A wise man from the contemplation of God enjoys, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , pleasures proper to himself, and therefore the best. The perfection of all human pleasures and joys ariseth from their connaturalitie to the Soul: for this being man's most noble part, yea indeed (according to Platonic as well as sacred estimation) a man's self, the more congenial our pleasures are hereto, the more perfect they are: Now the pleasures and suavities, which flow from the fruition of our sweetest good, are of all most connatural and congenial to the Soul. For by how much the more immaterial, spirital, and intellectile our joys are, by so much the more agreeable they are to our Spirits: and are any joys more spirital, than those that flow from the fruition of our last end and sweetest good, which is God? Can anything affect the Soul with higher delectation, than the fruition of the chiefest good, which is so agreeable to it, and which she receiveth immediately without the ministry of her externe senses? This is well expressed by Digby, of the Souls Immortality, pag. 459.

Are not mental pleasures, specially in the contemplation of the first Beauty, most savorie and delicious? Yea, do not these by exercise become as it were one with the Soul? Again, are not spiritual pleasures most rational, judicious, discrete, and wise? O! what a world of folie and indiscretion, yea, may I not say, for the most part, brutish passion lies wrapped up in sensual pleasures? Lastly, these pleasures, which flow from the fruition of the sweetest good, do most elevate, dignify, and ennoble the Soul; and therefore are most agreeable thereto: whereas sensual pleasures degrade and bring down the Soul, yea place it below the rank of Brutes, as Hos. 4.10, 11.

(3) Another proper Adjunct of that Delectation, which attends the Fruition of the sweetest Good, is Uniformitie and Harmonie. By how much the more uniform and concordant pleasures are, by so much the better they are: what makes Music so sweet and delicious, but its Concent and Harmonie? Hence Plato makes this a character of true pleasure, that it be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , uniform: and the Stoics, who were enemies to pleasure, yet allowed an uniform regular joy, which they made to attend, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the tranquility and undisturbed state of the Soul. And where may we expect this regular tranquille serene Joy, but in the enjoyment of the chiefest Good? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 26. makes these pleasures to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , symmetrous and harmonious, but terrene joys to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a discordant jarring passion. And he gives us a lively illustration, by the sweet Harmonie that is in Music; which, saith he, is composed of Acutes and Graves, swift and flow, with other infinite Tones, which conjoined make a complete Harmonie: So, adds he, True pleasure is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , symmetrous; whereas petulant false pleasure is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , dissonant, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , circumscribed by no bounds, without measure or order, &c. And indeed all sensual pleasures are extreme jarring and repugnant, not only to human Nature, but amongst themselves. Doth not the pleasure of Sensuality fight against the pleasure of Avarice, and both against that of Ambition? This is well illustrated by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 43. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Those things which seem sweet to the multitude, have an intestine war among themselves; because they are not such by nature: i. e. The pleasures of the multitude are difforme and repugnant each to other; because they are opinionative, artificial, and inordinate, not natural and regular. There is no joy uniform, regular, or natural, but that which flows from, or tends to the fruition of our last end, which is the measure of uniformity and harmony in Morals. Again, this delectation is by Plato made to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , impassible, i. e. such as receives not impression from, and therefore admits not conformity to the various mutations of terrene objects. For whatever receives impression from sensible objects, must needs fall under the same variations and vicissitudes, that those objects are obnoxious unto. And this is the true reason why all sensual pleasures are so variable, difforme and dissonant; because the objects, by which they are impressed and influenced, are most mutable and difforme. But now those pleasures that attend the fruition of God the sweetest Good partake of his Simplicitie, Immutabilitie, and Uniformitie. No Joy so regular, uniform and harmonious as those that proceed from the fruition of God.

(4) The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good is most pure and immixed, and therefore most perfect. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 583. makes the Pleasure of his wise man to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , pure; but that of other men to be, not pure, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , only an umbratile pleasure. The delectation which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Purity, (1) Objective, as it is fed and maintained by pure objects; whereas all the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirty; in that their mater is only sensible terrene good: but the joys and pleasures, which flow from the sweetest original good, partake of the crystalline purity of their object, which is most pure. (2) Effective, as it doth banish all sorrows and grief. So Plato, Phileb. 53. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief, it is more pleasant, true, and fair. Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Pleasure to be the cessation of grief, and grief the cessation of pleasure. So also, Phileb. pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , without mixture of sorrow, and pure. Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good: for all other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow; they being indeed but bitter-sweets; yea more bitter than sweet.

(5) The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong. Thus Plato, Phileb. p. 44. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , We must look, not to the least pleasures, but to such as are supreme and most vehement, if we will make a true judgment of pleasure. For the stronger any pleasures are, the better they are: and the more pure they are, the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent, because impure and mixed; but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement; because most pure. Again, the vehemence and intenseness of any pleasure is proportionable to the energy, power, and activity of the subject, which is assected with such pleasure, and to the Pondus, Bent, or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in. Now how vehement is the Pondus, Impetus, and Energie of the Will, whereby it shooteth itself into its sweetest Good; which when it enjoyeth, what an ecstasy, rapture, and transportt of joy is it affected with? Doth not Plato style this, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The best and strongest of all Ecstasies?

(6) The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excess. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 27. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For pleasure is not all good, unless it partake of an infinite nature. His design is to prove, that pleasure is not the chiefest good; because it is not in its nature infinite, so as to partake of all good: yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good, so far it is infinite. For as the chiefest good admits of no excess in our fruition; because it is in itself infinite and all good; so, by a parity of reason, the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excess; because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable. The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excess, which it endeavors to cure by change of objects. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 2.

How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford! And what remedy have they but intermission or exchange of objects? But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excess, either in the act of fruition, or in the pleasures that attend it; and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange.

§. 8. Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts, we now proceed to the Effects thereof, thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good. There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation, (1) Amplitude and Enlargement, (2) Quietation and Satisfaction.

1. The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement. Indeed all delight and joy brings Enlargement; which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject, or sacultie; specially if the object be ample, how doth the faculty spread itself to enjoy the same? When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated, what enlargement follows thereon? How diffusive are they? Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits. This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy, which attends the fruition of the best Good. There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good. (1) There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject. The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end, the more its desires are enlarged. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 45. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; But what? are not those pleasures most excellent, whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us? Whereby he shows, that those are the greatest and best pleasures, that most enlarge the heart in desires after them. Indeed there is an intime connection between true joy and enlargement; and therefore in sacred Philosophy one word is expressive of both. So Psal. 4.1. Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distress. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate: or to dilate by exhilarating. His spirit was straitened, narrowed and confined by distress; but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from God's presence. This Dilatation or Enlargement, which follows on spiritual Delectation, is well explicated by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 1.

(2) Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting. Al joy is vigorous and active: as it is the effect of precedent, so the cause of subsequent operation. Delight is the Spring of motion: it puts the Soul into a continual agitation: for by how much the more we delight in any object, by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it. Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good, and in all acts that tend thereto. What divine suavities doth it infuse into all our acts? Thus Plato, Conviv. pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beauty, doth no longer regard human affairs, but is as it were captivated thereby, &c.

2. The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good, brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction. These spiritual pleasures do not only amplify and widen the Soul, but also bring satisfaction. Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires, but never sil them with satisfaction: they may slater and tickle the senses, but never quiet the appetite: the best they leave behind them is repentance. This is well explicated by Digby, of the Soul, pag. 460.

Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen, but fil the Soul, and crown its desires with satisfaction. Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end: where there is no rest, there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction: and where there is want, there can be no rest: every want wrings the Soul, and keeps it in a restless condition. So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good. Thence Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. assures us, That the contemplation of the first, sincere, most perfect Beauty is formal Beatitude, that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction: for they who arrive hereto, are content to live alone, in conversation with this first Beauty, &c. Of which see Philos. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 1. §. 2.

CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts, and Moral Bonity.

§. 1. HAving dispatched the generic Idea and last End, which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics, we now pass on to the Moralitie of Human Acts, and their Bonity. And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts; namely the practic Judgment or Knowlege, Volition, Consultation, and Election: But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles, P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24. we shall not here undertake the discussion of them. As for the Moralitie of human Acts, there are great disputes in the Schools, Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consist? Suarez, in 1.2. (which vulgarly they style his Ethics) Tract. 3. Disp. 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads. (1) He makes the formal denomination, or that form whereby an Act is denominated moral, to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed, or a figment of men's minds, something in or appendent to the things themselves. This we grant. (2) He thence deduceth, That the Esse morale in the act of the Will, besides its Entitie and substance, adds a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting, and the Will freely working. This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction. It's true, the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Will as the subject of those Acts: for all moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts: there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being: As all moral capacity is subjected in natural, so all moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature, and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto. Thus Cyril Alexander. Compend. Dialog. de S. Trinit. Tom. 5. part. 1. pag. 673. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That which is holy by participation, being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie, that of itself existes primarily in proper nature: namely as Man and Angel, or any other rational Creature. So Damascene, Dialect. cap. 59. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That is first by nature which is inferred, but infers not, i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam: if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated; but if there be human Nature, it doth not necessarily follow, that there must be Grace. Thus the human Understanding and Will precede Virtue, as the subject thereof. Yet hence it follows not, as Suarez seems to conclude, that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Will. (3) Hence Suarez concludes, that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsically inherent in the moral act; but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Will: and in the very act of the Will, besides its physic emanation from the Will, it speaks denomination from the reason directing, and the Will acting with a plenary power. Though, as it has been granted, all Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Will, as their main Principles; yet it follows not hence, that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation. May we not as well argue, that all virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts; because they flow thence? But there lies a mystery in this Jesuitic Hypothesis, which when laid open will soon evidence its vanity and falsehood. The Jesuits, and some other Schole-men, in imitation, yet on mistaken grounds, of the ancient Philosophers, place the formal reason of all moral Virtue in conformity to right Reason. Hence no wonder if they make all Moralitie, formally considered, to be a mode dependent on Reason and Will. But the falsity hereof will appear by what follows.

If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato, it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a right Reason, which he seems to make the measure of all Moralitie, Bonity, and Vice. But what a vast distance there is between Plato 's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , right Reason, and that maintained by the Jesuits and some other Schole-men, we shall, when we come to discourse of moral Bonity, sufficiently evince. For the present we shall endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie, so much darkened by scholastic niceties, in the following Propositions. (1) Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to, yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament. Moralitie is but a mode or relation, which cannot subsist of itself, without a subject and foundation in Nature. Can a man know and love God, without reason and will? (2) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Will. For everything is specified and formalised by its formal reason: and what is the formal reason of anything but the Idea of its Essence? And wherein consists the essence of moral Acts, but in their conformity to, if good, or difformitie from, if bad, the perfect measure of Morals? and what is the perfect measure of Morals, but the moral Law? (3) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode, not absolute but relative, appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason, but something real is generally confessed, and that on invincible grounds; because it has real influences and effects. Moreover, that Moralitie is not an absolute mode, but relative, is as evident; because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else. Hence, (4) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end. For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe, Form, and Measure. It's a great Effate in the Schools, That the End specifies in Morals. Althings are defined and measured by their last End, but this by nothing. The last end, as a pregnant universal Principe, contains all Morals in its womb. (5) Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence, saith Aquinas, A moral Act receives its species from the object and end. And Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 165. adds,

To this of the object we may add all essential moral circumstances, which oft add much to the being and intension of Moralitie. (6) Prop. But yet we must conclude, That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of all Moralitie, formally considered, is the Law of God: This comprehends and gives measure to all other Rules of Moralitie: the last end, object, and circumstances are all measured hereby. Thus Scotus, and other of the Schole-men determine, That the Esse morale, or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law, unto which it is referred. And the reason is most evident; because all Moralitie speaks a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or relation to some Rule: And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts, but some moral Law? And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers, as also some late Divines, who make 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , right Reason the only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law will be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonity and its measure.

§. 2. Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general, we descend to examine their moral Bonity and Pravitie. Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule; but evil, so far as it comes short thereof: And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonity, but the divine Will and Law? Thus Plato, Repub. 9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That is most distant from reason, which is most remote from Law and Order: i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good, as they are conformed to Law and Order. Whence, Definit. Platon. pag. 4.13. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Law, is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just. Thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is also defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an obedience of virtuose Laws. And on the contrary, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Injustice is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an habit that over looks Laws. This Plato more fully explicates, Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the body consists may, as it seems to me, well be termed Salubritie; whence the bodies health ariseth: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodness of the mind consists, we cal legal and Law: whence men become legitime and orderly. He compares the Bonity of the Soul to the sanity or health of the Body; which as it consists in the order and regular temperament of all humors; so the goodness of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformity to Law. This is well explicated by his Scholar Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art. 9. pag. 44. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Righteousness truly is a virtue by which all have what is their own, and as the Law establisheth: But Injustice, by which men possess what is not their own, against the precepts of the Law. What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of all other Virtue, and Bonity, or Vice. But to bring Plato 's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophy, touching the conformity of all moral Good to the divine Law, we shall determine the whole in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. Al moral Bonity, whether objective or subjective and formal, denotes a conformity to some Law. The Schools distinguish moral Bonity or Honesty into objective and formal. The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object; but the later, that which constitutes an act as an act morally good. (1) In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodness, which agrees thereto as objects, as Suarez 1.2. Tract. 3. Disp. 2. strongly proves. And the reasons are demonstrative: For [1] If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful, the act conversant thereabout can never be good: because all moral good requires an integrity of causes: an irregularity in the object will render the act irregular. [2] The object of the Will is good as good: therefore that Bonity which moves the Will cannot slow from it, but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects. [3] This moral goodness of the object doth not only agree to human Acts, but also to all other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced. [4] This moral objective Bonity ariseth from the mater as clothed with all its conditions and circumstances, whereby it is rendered a meet object for the Soul to close with. [5] The moral goodness of any object consists in its conformity to or agreament with the Divine Law. (2) There is also formal Bonity or Goodness, which constitutes a man formally good. For [1] An object, though never so good, cannot constitute a man or his act formally good. It's true the Act receives some goodness from its object, yet only materially and terminatively, not formally, so as to constitute the Act formally good. [2] The Act is so far formally good as virtuose, i. e. proceeding from right Principes, tending to a right end, and measured by a perfect Rule. Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure.

2. Prop. That Law, which is the measure of moral Bonity, must be perfect. This Hypothesis is most evident, and will appear to be such, if we consider either the nature of a measure, or the condition of the thing measured. (1) As for the nature of a measure, Plato, Repub. 6. well explicates the same: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A defective measure of such things is no measure; for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of anything. Every Measure or Rule is indivisible, and therefore capable neither of addition or subtraction. Thus Phavorinus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure, admitting neither addition nor detraction. And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as the Hebr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Canna, whence it is derived, primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude, whereby they measured their Lands: and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure: as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Job 38 5. is rendered by Aquila 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , 2 Cor. 10.13. is explicated by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 such is its use, Gal. 6.16. Phil. 3.16. whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated. (2) That the measure of moral Bonity must be perfect, is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonity: for a plenitude of being, or integrity of Bonity is essential to all moral good. Moral evil ariseth from the least defect, but moral good requireth an integrity of causes and parts. If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed, it renders the act vitiose. Now if all moral good must be thus perfect and entire, then it necessarily follows, that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire. But of this more in what follows.

3. Prop. The perfection of a Law, as it is the measure of moral Bonity, consists in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater, end, and principes. The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good, as to its constitutive parts and causes. It was said before, that all moral good requires an integrity of Being and Causes. In the Schools they make four Causes of moral Good, proportionable to those in natural productions, namely Mater, Form, End, Efficient. We shall not at present think ourselves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution; but endeavor to demonstrate, that a perfect measure of moral Bonity comprehends each of these Causes and Principes. (1) It must comprehend the objectmater of all moral Bonity in its fullest Amplitude, Extension, and Universalitie. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equity require that they who will discourse of a divine Republic, determine, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that the Legislator has respect, not to one only particle of virtue, and that truly the least; but rather to all virtue, and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue: i. e. The Law of moral Bonity must extend itself to all the various Species and Offices of Virtue. If there be any moral Duty, which the Law of Moralitie extends not to, it is no perfect measure. And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us, and all human Laws, as hereafter. (2) As for the Form of moral Bonity, it consists in conformity to the Rule or Law of Moralitie; which if perfect, exacts the most perfect conformity. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this, to show, that this Legislator, and all other who will institute utile Laws, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ought, in framing Laws, to aim at the highest Virtue, i. e. at the highest conformity to the best Law. (3) That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident; because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals: all offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps, without a spirituose perfect end, as Jansen demonstrates out of Augustine. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue, but bad precipitate men into vice. Now he elsewhere assures us, That the end gives life and perfection to all virtuose Acts. Yea, Leg. 1. he openly saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al Laws are to be so constituted, as that they may promote the best end. (4) The Law of moral Bonity must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie: i. e. it must extend itself to the qualification of the subject, and its virtuose disposition: for as the end directs the act, so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end. Arist. Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the end of every act is according to the habit: i. e. if the mind be not well-disposed, or clothed with virtuose habits, it will never aim at a virtuose end. Thence that great Saying of Augustine, The intention of the best end makes the work good, and Faith directs the intention. So that the Law of Moralitie, if perfect, extends itself to all virtuose principes and moral habits, which the subject ought to be invested with.

3. Prop. Subjective right Reason, or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonity. There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined: (1) That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonity. To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant, [1] That Reason is the Organ of apprehending, albeit not the measure of our duty. [2] That practic Reason or Conscience, so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God, is the regula regulata of our duty: for Conscience is God's Deputy, and a Law unto a man's self. Yet we deny that there is an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or right Reason in nature corrupted, which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodness. I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature, or, as some term it, Right Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie. Thus Seneca would needs persuade us, That we have this merit of Nature, that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of all: yea those that will not follow, yet see it. And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days, but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them, as the Rule of Moralitie. The Schole-men also, in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle, generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good. But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , right Reason, understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses, I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate. Indeed all our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne, dreaming, tenebrous knowledge, as Plato stiles it. (2) That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonity, is also evident; because all human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to all the Causes and Principes of moral Goodness: how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good! What Restrictions, Emendations, and Alterations do they need? What an infinite number of particular cases are there, which no human Law can reach? Well therefore doth Androcles, in Aristotle, Reth. l. 2. c. 25. inform us, That all human Laws need another Law to correct them, as fishes need salt, to preserve them from putrefaction. This corrective Law they term 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Equity, which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature, as hereafter, cap. 5. §. 5.

4. Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonity is the Divine Law. This Hypothesis being the main will require more ample explication and demonstration. (1) The Divine Being is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the first essentially just and holy Being; and therefore the first essential rule or measure of all Justice and Sanctitie. (2) But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature, he hath therefore given us a divine Law, as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie, to be the rule of all moral Bonity as to us. (3) This Divine Law given us, as the Rule of moral Bonity, was concreate and connatural as to Adam, it being impressed and engraven on his nature, and so needed not any further promulgation. (4) Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam, in his innocent state, one and the same; he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Duty of man, and so became a Law unto himself. (5) But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature, as to supernaturals, and very far as to naturals and civils, retaining only some fragments or broken notices, our most benign Lord, out of his great clemence and pity to lapsed man, gave a new Edition of that natural Law, and therein fresh notices of his sovereign. will and pleasure, touching man's duty. So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature, albeit the subjective was lost in Adam. Yea, some Divines of great note conceive, that those very commun natural Notions, communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam, are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ. Thus they interpret, Joh. 1.9. of Christ's illightening every man: i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect, but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation. And the reason seems demonstrative; because our very Beings and all the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant, whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel, is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant, and Christ's Mediation, by which the whole World stands. So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature, by virtue of the first Covenant, as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ. The objective Light or Law of Nature is styled by the Hebrews, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; and its Offices, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the known Duties, i.e. by nature: to which they opposed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Divine, namely Institutes, or positive Commands of God. For Jus natural, the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural, but to positive Laws, as Grotius hath well observed. (6) This objective Law of Nature, in its second Edition, as contained in divine Revelations of moral Bonity, was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen: and that Plato 's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Right Reason, was but an Imitamen hereof, we now undertake to demonstrate. He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos, pag. 317. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That which is Right, is the Royal Law. (1) That by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 he means the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is to me unquestionable, and I think it will clearly appear so to others by what follows. (2) He saith this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Royal Law, which is the style the Hebrews gave their moral Law, as Jam. 2.8. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . And why doth he term it the Royal Law, but because it was the supreme Law of God, the King of Kings? Thence Socrates adds, We therefore rightly granted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that this Law was the invention of Being itself, or of the first independent Being. For this generally he understands by his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thence, Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sin is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an operation against right Reason, i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art. 6. pag. 76. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , And truly this, to act according to right Reason is commun to all, and let it be fixed as a Canon. So again, Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith, Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and so as right Reason shall prescribe. This right Reason he elsewhere terms, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the universal commun Law, which all by nature are subject to. So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art. 3. pag. 69. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. I say, Law is either proper or commun: proper or private Law is that written Law, which belongs to particular Nations. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature: for there is a certain commun Just and unjust, which all consent unto, albeit there should be no society, or confederation of men. This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first Principes, which are the foundation of all demonstration; so in Practics and Morals, there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes, which are the Rule of Conversation. Thus also we are to understand the Stoics, if we will make a right use of their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of which Diog. La • rt. in Zeno: The Stoics say, that to live according to nature, is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits, which is right Reason diffusing itself throughout all things. Where it deserves a remarque, That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason. Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason, but of objective it may. Again, they say, This right Reason diffuseth itself throughout all things. Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason, which is confined to individuals; but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature, which is diffused throughout the whole Creation, according to the various conditions of things. Thus Hierocles in Pythagor. Carm. pag. 106. saith, That the vices of the mind are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Aversions and Errata from right Reason: And pag. 209. he adds: This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of all human affairs, &c. And Stobaeus, de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informs us: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue is a Syntaxe, or orderly contexture according to right Reason; but Vice a Transgression against right Reason. Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature, not that dark subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind. Thus also we must understand Parker, Amyraut, and other Divines, who make 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue. Though I deny not, but that the Stoics generally, and perhaps Aristotle, as many of his Followers among the Schole-men, by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in men's minds; yet I am very apt to persuade myself, that Socrates and Plato, who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature, whereof some more commun Precepts were conveyed down by the posterity of Noah; but those irradiant and bright notices thereof, which shone among them, they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses, wherein Plato was not a little versed, and which by his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , royal Law he seems to allude unto.

5. Prop. That Divine Law, which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonity, is nowhere to be found but in the sacred Philosophy or Scriptures. Here, and here only is extant Plato 's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . This sacred Rule, whereof he had great notices, he sometimes calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Divine Word. Here also Aristotle 's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found. Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras, Lycurgus, Solon, Minos, and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature, and all divine Precepts is contained in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses, which is thence styled by the Hebrews 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the matrices of the Law and its roots. And indeed what are the Ten Commandments, contained in the moral Law, but a Transumt, Compend, Abstract, or rather extended Copy of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning, from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law? Is not the formal reason of all Equity prescribed and expressed in the moral Law? Ought not this then to be the term, measure, and scope of all Laws? To clear which we are to remember, that the Ten Commandments, contained in the moral Law, must not be taken literally as ten Words, but in a more ample extensive notion, as Christian Pandects, or commun heads of all moral Duties towards God and man, to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets, our great Lord, and his Apostles. Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Duty in the Gospel, yet it doth command obedience to all that are or shall be specified; and expresseth every particular Duty generically or synecdochically: and although it were not a Duty from the general Precept, til it was specified in the Gospel, yet when it is once a Duty, the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue. Indeed are there not almost in all the Precepts manifest Synecdoches? Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words? Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins, as Murder, Adultery, Theft, &c. and place them, as so many commun Heads, in the Decalogue, that so by these we may be instructed, how black and odiose all those other sins, reducible to those heads, are? Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments, we must in a particular manner inquire (1) What in every Command is treated of, (2) The end for which it was given, (3) What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God. And after all we shall find, that the moral Law is spiritual, holy, just and good, as Rom. 7.12, 14. reaching all the motions and dispositions of the heart. And indeed how absurd is it to conceit, that he, who made the heart, and knows all the diverticules, or turnings and windings of it, should make a Law to reach only the outward acts, and not the inward principes and motions? May we not then conclude, that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul, and all its Principes, Powers, Inclinations, Thoughts, Affections, and Operations interne and externe; directing the same to their right objects and ends; affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications; clothing them with their immutable circumstances; in such sort, that the action good by this Law can never be made evil; that which is evil by this Law can never be made good; that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent? Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power, as I take it, of the Law of Nature: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The Law is King over all both mortals and immortals. And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirms: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That the Law ought to command all. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law, that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Will, the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonity, that great bond of union, by conformity whereto man's Will becomes one with the Divine Will; yea, man himself one with God. Whence, as Tyndale, pag. 83. well observes,

Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable, universal Rule of moral Bonity.

§. 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonity, we now pass on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof. It was before suggested, that all moral Bonity requires a plenitude of Being, and integrity of Causes; albeit any defect render an action morally evil. This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonity. Jansen, in imitation of Augustine, makes two essential constitutive parts of all moral Good, (1) The Office or Mater of the Act, which he makes to be as the Corps: and the End, which he makes to be as the Form that specifies. (2) Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the well-doing of it: i.e. into Bonum, and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater: and the been or well-doing of it, as the form. (3) Others, according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes, make four causes of all moral Good, the Mater, Efficient, End, and Form. Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes, as to Naturals, every way absurd, and that which can never be defended; because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole, and yet also Causes thereof: so that it hence follows, the mater and form are causes of themselves, which constitute the whole: yet in Morals, where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts, we may admit this distribution: or else we may take the mater and form as parts, and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good. This being the commun and received distribution, I am not scrupulose in following the same, yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions.

1. If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good, it comprehends all human Acts, with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto, whether things necessary or indifferent. It's true, as to the Circumstances of moral Good, there are some that relate to the form; others to the efficient and end; yet some also that regard the mater. The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent: it is good when commanded by and conform to the moral Law, the measure of objective goodness as before: it is indifferent when neither good nor evil, but as it were in the middle between both. Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent; which, so far as it may concern moral Good, we shall inquire into. Plato, in his Gorgias, calls a thing indifferent, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , neither good nor evil, but a middle between these. So Diogenes the Cynic taught, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That things between virtue and vice were indifferent. And the Stoics held, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Of things some were good, some bad, some neither good nor bad, i. e. indifferent. These neuters, or things indifferent, they said, were such as neither profited, nor did hurt. Again, they affirmed, That things might be termed indifferent two ways. (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Such things as pertein not either to felicity or misery, as Riches, Glory, &c. (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus, nor aversation: as the extending the finger, or numbering the hairs of the head, &c. as Laertius, in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent, we are to consider, that things are said in the general to be indifferent, which in themselves are neither good nor evil, but equally inclined to either. Now this indifference of actions or things, may be considered physically or morally, according to the generic, specific, or individual nature of Actions and Things.

1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere & abstracto, in their generic abstract nature, without the supervenient determination of the moral Law, so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent: For all things physically considered, without their moral estimation and respect to the Law, are neither morally good nor evil. Thus all our Thoughts, Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered, without respect to the moral Law, (which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil) are said to be indifferent.

2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie, when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law. For as all things are of God, through God and for God, so it belongs to his regal Will to give moral or spiritual determination to them, whereby they are made good or evil in specie, as to the mater of them. Neither can any created limited power make that which is good, evil, or that which is evil, good, or that which is indifferent, good or evil, except on supposition of predetermination from him, who, being Creator of all, has an absolute dominion over all. Every Creature having terms to its Essence, has also terms to its dominion and operation: a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activity. Except man had being of himself, and a World of his own framing, he could not be a rule to himself, for the determination of his actions; but must be determined by the Law of his Maker, for the specific nature or quality of his acts as good, or evil, or indifferent. Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie, when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God, and so neither good nor evil: for all moral determination ariseth from the Divine Will expressed in the moral Law. Whence it appears evident, that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal, as some Platonists would fain persuade us; but dependent on the divine Will and Determination: for all things are therefore good or evil in specie, because so determined by the sovereign Will, promulgated in the natural or moral Law. Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion, among some Divines, That some things are good because commanded, other things are commanded because good. Indeed this Maxim may be of use, to express the difference between moral and positive Precepts, with this limitation, that positive Precepts, which regard Worship, &c. are good because commanded; but moral Precepts are commanded because good, i. e. agreeable to human Nature, not that they have any moral goodness antecedent to the divine Will and Determination. Hence,

3. No Action considered, in individuo, in its individual nature is morally indifferent: i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances, and in relation to its Principes, Manner, and End is either good or evil. That moral Indifference hath place only in specie, in the specific nature of Acts, not, in individuo, in their individual nature, is generally avouched by the Orthodox, yea among the more sober of the Schole-men. This was one of John Hus 's Articles, condemned in the Council of Constance, Art. 16. Quod nulla sint opera indifferentia, sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum, quod sint virtuosa vel vitiosa, That there are no works [in individuo] indifferent; but this is an immediate division of human works, that they are either virtuose, or vitiose. This indeed we may argue from Plato 's Placites, who strongly proves, That all our Acts ought to tend to some good end. So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It seems, that all things must be done for good, &c. So elsewhere he saith, That God is the marque and scope, unto which all our Acts, as so many arrows, ought to tend. This is well determined by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9.

Thus Gibieuf de Libertat. pag. 74. Again, p. 77. Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts, than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species. Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good: all the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil: all the Acts of man in Glory shall be good: all the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil: not one of all these indifferent. Were all our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law, they would be all good. Yea our very natural and civil Acts, as to their manner, so far as they are morally good or evil, are all regulated and determined by the moral Law. For albeit the Divine Law be not, as it ought not to be, a general sum of Arts and Sciences; nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts; yet the particular determination of all our Acts falls under the Divine Law, so far as they are moral and Christian; according to the nature of all Professions and Sciences, coincident for the most part in the mater, but distinct in the manner of consideration. Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph, that late compilator of Schole-Divinity, Thes. 167. acknowledgeth: The scratching of the head, or the taking up of a straw, is either good or evil. This seems a Paradox to some that are ignorant, and disgustful to Libertines, who would be so; yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines, yea scarce ever professedly denied by any, save some sew, who distinguish between Acts proceeding from mere Imagination, and such as are deliberate. That no Acts in individuo are indifferent, see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist. 41. and in Thomam, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9.

2. Having discussed the Mater of moral Good, we now proceed to its next efficient Cause or Principe; which is the Will, or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace. The moral Law requires, that to the constitution of an Act morally good, there concur a good Principe: now the Will or Soul as willing being the fountain of all moral efficience and operation, its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good. Such therefore as the disposition of the Will is, such will the action prove as to its goodness or pravitie. The bent of the Will is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad: when the deliberation and intention of a bended Will concurs in a good mater for a good end, the action is good: And what bends the Will in this manner, but virtuose habits? So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Will in any Act, so many degrees there are of moral Good therein. Moralitie, as well as Divinity, is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Will, which is the measure of good and evil. The bent of the Will makes a good or bad man, as also act. Thus Plato, Meno: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue is to will, and to be able to perform good. Again: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , If he will not to do unrightcously, this is sufficient; he shall not do unrighteously. But more particularly Plato, Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth: This is not to be desired, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that all things follow his Will, but that his Will follow Reason: i.e. that it prosecute what is good. This is well expressed by Simplicius, in Epich. c. 1. pag. 14. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For when the Will is free and pure in the power of Reason itself, on which our nature depends, then it is carried to things truly eligible; yea, to truth itself. Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue, because 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , properly desirable, and attained by real election. Simplicius here, in imitation of Plato, (whom he much follows) asserteth, (1) That the moral Goodness of human Acts depends on the purity and goodness of the Will. (2) That moral Good is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue, because most eligible. Which derivation he borrowed from Plato. What Virtue properly is, and how it disposeth the Will to what is morally good, will hereafter §. 4. and sect. 3. §. 1, 2. come under contemplation: at present this may suffice to demonstrate, that all moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof. And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophy doth assord, it might suffice. Thus Solomon (the wisest of mere men, since the Fal) Prov. 4.23. Above all keeping keep thine heart: for out of it are the issues of life: i. e. all spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes: where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring, there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God, but dead. Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and glorious as to the mater of them, yet if they flow not from this living Fountain, they are but as your Automata, those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits; which seem to move their eyes, hands, feet, &c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial foreign impresses: such are all moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed, morally dead, albeit they may seem to have shadows of life. Or look as no member of the body performs any action of natural life, wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not; so no action is morally good, wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Will. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring: no living virtuose Act can proceed from a dead corrupt Principe: Being, life, and motion go together in Morals, as well as in Naturals: such as the Facultie, Spring, and Principe is, such will the motion and operation be, both in Grace and Nature, as Medo has well observed, on Prov. 4.23. Thus Augustine, on Mat. 7.18. where by the good Tree he understands a believing Will, which he makes essential to every good Act: for if the Will be bad, the Act cannot be good: and every unbelieving Will is a bad Will: for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life, there can be no love to God as the last End: as the end forms the Will, so Faith forms the End. Thence that of the supposed Ignatius: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Faith is the Principe of life, Love the end: these two in unity perfect the man of God. And Chrysostom saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nothing is good without Faith.

3. To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 499. assures us, That all Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good, as before, Sect. 1. §. 2. This is well explicated by Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 2.3. Art. 8.

This is more nakedly laid down by Augustine: Whatever good is done by man, but not for that end for which it ought to be done, albeit the office itself [ i. e. the mater of the Act] seem good, yet the end being not right, it is sin. This is well explicated by Jansen, August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. So again he saith, Aristotle well instructes us, That the end is the measure of all things: which is true as to moral Good. Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 166. assertes, That an human action takes its Bonity or pravitie, not only from the intrinsec end of the work, which is coincident with the object; but also from the extrinsec, which is the end of the Worker. Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts, as Ends: And what is the last end of all good works, but the Glory of God? which, though last in Execution, yet ought to be first in Intention, at least virtually, if not formally, in all we do. Thence, saith Augustine, That is not true Virtue, which tends not to that end, wherein the best Good of man consists. And Gregor. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 29. Quaest. 1. proves that, Every volition, which refers not to God for himself, or to other things for God, is vitiose.

4. The last Cause, or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Form, which consists in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law. This may deservedly be termed the Form of moral Good; because it gives form and measure to all the former Principes and parts: For wherein consists the Goodness of the Mater, Principes, and End, but in their Conformitie to the Divine Will and Law? This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of all moral Good, whereby all difference and perfection is to be measured. Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tells us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason. Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of all moral Good, by this we are to take our measures of all differences or perfection therein. This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato, under various emphatic notions: as (1) it is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . So Protag. pag. 326. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie: i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law. Hence (2) In his Phaedo, he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al Virtue consists in Harmonie: whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularity. So in his Timaeus, pag. 47. he saith, That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul, it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum. So Stobaeus, Serm. 1. de Virtut. pag. 15. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum, or that which is most convenient, i.e. agreeable or conformable to the Law of Nature. Hence (3) This Conformitie is styled by Plato 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Symmetrie and Symphonie. Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Mediocritie, of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. §. 30. and Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 4.

Others place the Form of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing, namely that it be done well: and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato 's Theaetetus, pag. 187. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It's better to a little well, than much il. Where he seems to make the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the w • l doing, the form and measure of good. So Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. He therefore shall be a Grammarian, who doth what is Grammatic, Grammatically, i.e. according to Rules of Grammar. But yet he adds, by way of caution, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the well-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues: for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves, without regard to the perfection of the Artificer: but the perfection of Virtue requires, that the subject be so and so qualified. And then he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He is a righteous and temperate man, not that doth those things, but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them, i.e. rightcously and soberly. Hence that vulgar Effate, That good works are to be judged by Adverbes: for all must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophy, Tit. 2.12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , soberly, and righteously, and piously. This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions, where the mater is indifferent; because such have no goodness at all, but what is from the Adverb. So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , good, but it must have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a right manner of being done: and herein, according to some, the Form of its goodness doth consist, even in the manner of it; and any defect herein will render the action evil: according to those scholastic Maxims, The form gives being, and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good. So in the Canon Law they tell us, That the form must be precisely and punctually observed. And indeed this notion of the form of moral Good amounts to the same with the former, and must be resolved thereinto. For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or been factum, well done, when it is in all points exactly conformable to the moral Law: for all moral Good is a relation of conformity with the rule of Morals; but the least privation thereof is sin.

But, to descend to particulars, an human Act is then conformable to the Law and well done, when it is not only good for the mater, but also clothed with all those Circumstances, which necessarily attend its moral goodness. The particular form of moral Good consists much in the Circumstances that attend it. The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act, making it good or evil: sometimes they only make it better or worse. But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent, where the manner of doing doth chiefly specify the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts well expressed by Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue, saith he, consists in the well doing of things: for we may fear, trust, desire, hate, despise, be angry, pity, rejoice, and grieve, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , not duly. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But truly to be moved with these affections, when, and in what things, and towards whom, and for what end, and in that manner as we ought, this is the golden mean, and that which is best, wherein Virtue consists. Whence also Aristotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art. 5. pag. 160. assures us, That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But sins may be committed, some, when that is done that ought not; others, when not as it ought; others, because not at that time when it ought, or the like. Thence, art. 10. he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignity of the mater, and when, and in that manner as reason [or the Law of Nature] dictates. Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good, not only a right mater, but that it be clothed with all due Circumstances, whereby it may be rendered conformable to the Law as to manner. This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 7. Art. 2.

What these circumstances are he adds, Art. 3. In human Acts, Some explain these Circumstances thus: (1) Quis, who, must not be taken for the efficient cause, but for his condition and quality, as a private person, or public, &c. (2) Quid, what, must not be understood of the mater or object, but of the quality thereof. (3) Neither must Quomodo, how, be taken for the form or manner, but whether it be done openly or secretly, &c. Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. strongly assertes and proves, That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good. This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions. 1. Conclus. That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance, is truly virtuose. This he proves by showing that the contrary implies a contradiction. For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance, it is not as it ought to be: therefore it is evil. Due circumstances are communly said to be such things, as are required to this, that the Act be truly virtuose: and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conform to right Reason, or the moral Law: and if such, then it wants not any due circumstance: wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose, it will then necessarily follow, That it doth want, and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance: or, That it is truly virtuose, and yet that it is not truly virtuose. 2. Conclus. That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin. It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodness, namely its due circumstance. For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good, or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law. Thus much also Suarez grants us, That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei, as to the physic being, are yet essential in esse moris, as to its moral being. So Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 2. Disp. 5. pag. 169. He mentions this as the opinion of some Schoolmen, namely, that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered; but that all these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth, whereunto, though not fully, yet thus far he assents: Thence pag. 174. he tells us what Circumstances are essential. In which he plainly grants, That all those Circumstances which change the conformity or difformitie of an human act, are specific and essential: Which is all that we need contend for; because the Controversy is not about natural or civil Circumstances, but such as belong to the act morally considered: which if good requireth an integrity of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances: so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective, the whole act is changed and rendered morally evil. By the whole of which it is most evident, that all Circumstances due to the moral goodness of an human act, are essential and specific, such as concur to formalise moral Good; which requires a complete conformity to the Divine Law, not only in Mater, Principes, and End, but also in all Circumstances morally due to the integrity of such an Act: For all good (as has been sufficiently demonstrated) requires an integrity of Causes; whereas sin ariseth from the least defect: according to that known Effate of the spurious Dionysius, Divin. Nom. cap. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Good is from one and complete cause, but sin from many and singular defects.

§. 4. Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts, we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts, and Attributes, which we shall deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries. 1. Al moral Good, Virtues, and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniform Idea and Nature. For all moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes, tend to one and the same End, and are formalised by one and the same conformity to the Divine Law. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me, as it were in a Watchtower, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that the face or form of Virtue is one; but that of Improbitie, manifold and almost infinite. His mind is, that all Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face; but sins have variety, yea almost infinite deformed shapes. This Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved, that all moral Virtue consists in a Mediocritie and Uniformitie, he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Moreover we may sin many ways: (for as the Pythagoreans conjecture, sin is infinite and boundless; but good is terminate and bounded) but there is but one way of doing good. Wherein we may observe, (1) That all sin is difforme, boundless and endless: it hath no form, measure or number. (2) But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniform. Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet,

For good men truly are simply and uniformly such; but wicked men are difformely and variously so. Thus also Aristotle, Mag. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 25. affirms, That all Good is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , uniform; but all Vice 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , multiforme. Hence Plato asserted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That which is just, is equal and uniform. Whence that Stoic Hypothesis, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Al moral goods are equal and uniform, i.e. conform to the rule of Moralitie. Al this is well expressed by Augustine, who makes all Good to consist, in Modo, Specie, & Ordine, in Mode, Species, and Order, i.e. in a uniform conformity to the rule of Moralitie. Hence,

2. There is no real moral Good, or natural Virtue but what is supernatural. This Corollary evidently follows from the former, and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good. For if all moral Virtue or Good requires an integrity of causes, and is formalised by conformity to the Divine Law, thence it necessarily follows, that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniform simple thing. Thence Chrysostom, Hom. 4. in Gen. calls Grace, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a gift above nature, overcoming nature. And Cyril in Esa. terms it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , above proper Nature; as elsewhere, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Prerogative above Nature. I am not ignorant that many of the Schoolmen, and too many of our Divines, in imitation of them, make a twofold Good and Virtue; one natural and moral: the other spiritual and supernatural. The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may, by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes, attain unto: The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused. Albeit this distinction may, with due limitations, pass for orthodox; yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians, and taken up by their Sectators in the Schools, I should be glad if Jansen 's advice for the utter extirpation of it, were embraced: who, in his August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction, which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers, specially the Peripatetics and Stoics; who held, that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue, which being well cultivated, might arise up to perfect Virtue.

And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us, Hence,

3. To perform any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare. O! how difficult and rare is it for men to perform what is good, from good Principes, Ends, in a good manner as to Circumstances, and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law! Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; But of such as can arrive to the first Beauty, and contemplate him in himself, are there not very few? So Phileb. pag. 16. he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To explain Wisdom is not very difficult, but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult. So again: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , What way men may attain to be good is most difficult, i.e. to understand and practice Again, he saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It is difficult for a man to be made good, and to continue such. Whence in his Cratylus, pag. 385. he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , According to the old Proverb, things good are very difficult. Thence also, in his Epinomis, pag. 973. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here, except some few only. Lastly Plato, in his Repub. 6. saith, That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate form, and therefore it requires, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude? And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues? Thus Aristotle also, in imitation of his Master, once and again demonstrates the difficulty and rarity of moral Good. So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shown, That there were variety of ways, wherein men might sin; but one only way of doing good; he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Therefore it is most easy to offend, but most difficult to do good: for to err from the scope is most-facile, but to hit it, is most difficult. So in like manner, c. 9. pag. 108. he saith, Virtue consists in mediocrity, i.e. in one indivisible point of conformity. Whence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious: for it is an hard work to attain to the middle of anything. As everyone cannot find out the point of a Circle; but only the intelligent Mathematician: So to be angry, to give money, or the like, is easy; but to be angry, to give money, &c. to whom, and in such a measure, and at such a time, and for such an end, and in such a manner as we ought, this is not easy. Thence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The been or manner of doing good, is difficult, laudable, and beautiful. Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficulty of moral Good. (1) He supposeth all moral Good to consist as it were in one middle indivisible point; so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it. (2) That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean, but much more difficult to reach it by our actions. True indeed it's no difficult work to perform the act materially good, as to give alms, or the like; but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the well doing of it, i.e. from those Principes, for those Ends, and with those Circumstances, that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution, this is most rare, difficult, and only laudable. Hence,

4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans, and all such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed, are but lesser Sins. This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves, who require to moral Good an integrity of Causes and constitutive Principes: so that it sufficeth not, that the Mater or Office be good, but there is also required a good disposition and habit, the best end, and all such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act, or denominate it morally good. Now let us inquire, did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state perform any one Act thus morally good? What? can we produce any Pagan or natural man, who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love, as to act by force received from God, out of love to God and his Glory? Truly Augustine, and Jansen out of him; are not afraid to declare, that all those Heroic Acts and Exploits, which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues, are indeed but more splendid sins; because poisoned with pride and vain-glory. Yea, they rise higher and affirm, that the Stoics themselves, who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators of Virtue, did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation, Rom. 8.6, &c. of living after the flesh; because they made their carnal Reason, Free-will and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue. Lastly, all moral Virtue, according to philosophic Placits, is but one: so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural, or none at all, as before. Thence Greg. Nazianzen, Orat. 3. in Julian. speaking of the Platonists, Stoics, and peripatetics, saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue to them is only a speciose name, and in nothing more lasting than this life. Thus Chrysostom, Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived well— For if the hope of the celestial Kingdom, and the commination of Hel, with other such like solicitude, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , can scarce keep men in Virtue, those who are persuaded of none of these things, will not embrace Virtue. But if some of them counterfeit the same, this they do out of desire of Glory, &c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine; and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord, Mat. 7.18. Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. So contra Julian. l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving will, as every Christian grants, is an evil tree, which cannot produce any other than evil fruits, i.e. sins only. The like Cyril, in Hos. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward, and good manners tending not to true good shall be always reprehended by him. Not but that many Heathens, as Christian Hypocrites, may perform Acts and Offices materially good, which yet may be deservedly (as they are by the Ancients) termed Sins, as they proceed not from Faith in Christ, and Love to God, the main Principes of all true moral Good. So Chrysost. ( Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit. Paris. ) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , They are good works ( i.e. materially) but dead, because they have not Faith.

5. Albeit all Virtue, according to its formal Idea and Reason, be but one; yet, according to its objective material consideration, it may be variously distributed. Thus in sacred Philosophy moral Good or Virtue is distributed, as to its object or mater, into Holiness and Righteousness, Ephes. 4.24. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , In Righteousness and Holiness. Righteousness comprehends all Second-table-duties, which regard men; and Holiness, all First-table-duties, which regard God. This distribution is most ancient, and, I presume, was communly received among the Jews. Sure I am Plato has it, and, as I conjecture, from the Mosaic Institutes. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 507. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But now he that comports himself decently towards men, doth righteous things; but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God, doth holy or pious things: but he that doth both rightcous and holy things, must necessarily be righteous and holy. Wherein observe, (1) That he distributes all moral Good into just or righteous, and pious or holy. (2) That he makes Justice or Righteousness to regard men, but Piety or Holiness to regard God. (3) That some may seem to be righteous towards men, who yet are not pious or holy towards God; as on the other hand, some may pretend to be pious towards God, who yet are not just and righteous towards men. But (4) he that is just and righteous towards men, in giving them their due, as also pious and holy towards God, in giving him his due, such is indeed a virtuose man, morally good, just, and pious. Thus also Serranus, on Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 136. takes notice, how Plato distributes Virtue, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , into Piety and Justice; the former relating to the Worship of God, the later to men; whereby our whole life is duly framed and regulated; these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties. Lastly Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. saith, That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God: and then that we offend not against men, specially such as are divine. A Golden Rule for moral Duties.

CHAP. III. Of Virtue, and Moral Liberty.

§. 1. THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonity having been discussed, we now proceed to the discussion of Virtue, as it is the origin and cause of moral Liberty. Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno, the title of which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Virtue properly, according to its orgination, signifies a Power or Efficace; it being derived from Vir, which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man; answering to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among the Hebrews. So the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Mars; and this from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 arits, terrible, valiant, potent; or, as Vossius, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , marats, to wax strong. Hence in the N.T. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is used to express the Divine power and efficace of God, as 1 Pet. 2.9. and 2 Pet. 1.3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , i.e. by his glorious power. Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a divine power. So the LXX. translate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies the glorious power of God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Hab. 3.3. Zach. 6.17. Neither is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 used in the N. T. more than once, if ever, to denote a virtuose disposition of mind, namely Phil. 4.8. So curious were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding philosophic terms, which had been so much abused. But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conform to the Rule of Moralitie, the Divine Law. In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace, as Jansen, Ames, and others understand it. For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural, has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section, §. 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection, whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God, as Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 95. Others cal Virtue, the most regular and best state of a rational Creature. Whether Virtue be a Power, Affection, Habit, or merely Act, has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers, as well as Schole-Divines. But the communly received opinion is, that it is an Habit, or as Aquinas expresseth it, an Habitude of the Soul. That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates, Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 3. An Habit properly is of a middle nature between a Power and an Act, which gives the power an accidental facility of acting. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a power, Definit. Platon. is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which is of itself effective, or operative: but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an Habit, is desined, pag. 414. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a disposition of the Soul, whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting. So that every Habit is in order of nature at least, if not of time, before the Act, but subsequent to the Power. For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act. The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object, Subject, Mode of existing in their Subject, and Acts. For the form of the Act follows the form of the Agent: and such as the Habit is in relation to its object, such is the Agent. Hence, by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation. Whence Virtue is a supernatural Habitude, Habit, or active Form, whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Completive of Nature. This indeed might be evinced out of Plato 's Definition of Virtue, drawn into form by Serranus, Meno, pag. 68. Virtue is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power, the best work, and aiming at the best end. So that all Virtue requires not only the best mater or object, but also the best end. And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is, such will the end be, as Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. well observes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The end of every action is such as the habit is: as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts. Again, lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Such as every man is, such is his action, and speech, and such is his life: i.e. such as a man's habitual frame of Spirit is, such is his end, acts, and life. Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul, whereby it is strongly bent and inclined towards objects, ends and acts, suitable thereto. Al habitual Virtues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed, though different as to their proper objects and acts. The same habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God, is called Divine Knowlege; but as it facilitates to love God, it's called Divine Love; and so in the other virtuose Habits. That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinsically and essentially included in all virtuose Habits, is evident, because human Nature, specially as now corrupted, cannot reach an end or act supernatural: For if a natural power should have any activity in respect of a supernatural act and object, it may, by a parity of reason, by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts, as Alvarez, de Auxil. Disp. 65. demonstrates. Of the nature of Supernaturalitie, and how it is intrinsically and essentially included in the substance of all graciose Habits, see Choquetius, de Grat. l. 1. Disp. 7. & 12. Also Thomas Hurtado, Precursor Theologus, de Supernaturalitate Entis, Disp. 1. Controvers. 1, &c.

§. 2. From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows, that all moral Liberty ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with, and agreeable exercises flowing therefrom. What Natural Liberty is, has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. §. 11. How much moral Liberty differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same. The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man, and all human acts; but the former is proper to man as virtuose, as will sufficiently appear by what follows. Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God. Althings aim at Unity: God, who is the supreme Unity, convertes all things to himself: and everything is so far free and perfect, as it comes near to God. The human Soul has a twofold approach to God, (1) by Similitude, (2) by actual real Union and Fruition. (1) The more like the Soul is to God, the more one it is with him, and free: all similitude is a kind of Unity: and whence springs the Souls similitude to God, but from virtuose habits? (2) The Soul has actual real union with, and fruition of God by virtuose exercises. Hence ariseth a twofold moral Liberty: (1) As to State, (2) As to Exercice in that state. The former depends on habitual Virtue; the later on virtuose exercises. Of each in their order.

Moral Liberty as to state consists in virtuose dispositions of Soul, whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God. Thus the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hier. cap. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Seeing the Divine Nativitie or Regeneration is a certain Divine state, certainly he that has not attained to that divine state, shall never know, much less do the things delivered by God. Whence also he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . The principal progress of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consists in the most ineffable framing of our divine state. This Athanasius, Dialog. 1. contr. Macedon. terms, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The participation of sanctity by Grace. And the supposed Ignatius, ad Magn. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the forment of Grace: i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul. And Greg. Nyssenus stiles this State of Virtue or Grace 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Transelementation, or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life, or of the Soul, whereby it is made like to God, and capable of adhering to him. Whence Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man, as invested with the Image of God: God made man a little world in the greater, another Angel, an Inspector of the visible Creature, and Disciple of the intellectual; King of those things that are on earth: both terrene and celeste, temporal and immortal, and that which is supreme, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by access to God to be deified: but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence, but by participation of the divine irradiation. Thence Augustine stiles Liberty the best disposition of Soul. Similitude to God is the highest Liberty as to state: so far as any is made virtuose, so far he is made free: The connection between Piety and Liberty is so intimate, as that indeed they have one and the same beginning, progress, and consummation. By how much the more ample, spiritual, pure, and perfect the Soul is, by so much the more free it is: and whence springs the Amplitude, Spiritualitie, Purity, and Perfection of the Soul, but from virtuose habits? Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue, and moral Good: whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That according to Plato Virtue only was good. That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul, and that which brings with it most moral Liberty is most evident; because hereby it is rendered capable of adhering to its first Cause, and last End, which is the top of moral Liberty. For wherein consists the perfection of moral Liberty, but in its conformity to its most perfect Exemplar, which is the Divine Bonity? And is not this the privilege of moral Bonity or Virtue? Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas, Dispositio perfecti ad optimum, The Disposition of a perfect Subject, to the most perfect Exemplar and End. Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul itself: so Aquinas:

And Suarez saith: Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God, by so much the more sublime, free, and perfect its state and condition is. In sum, Liberty of state consists in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul, whereby it is enabled to understand, embrace and adhere to what is good, in that manner and measure as it ought. Take all the notions of true moral Liberty, and they agree to none but the virtuose man.

1. Liberty is defined by the Platonist, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Principalitie or Dominion of Life: also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a plenary power over all things. Which the Stoics interpret, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a self-moving authority or power. And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over itself and other things, but from virtuose habits? Plato assures us, That a virtuose temperate man is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , stronger than himself: i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part. Again, Repub. 9. he instructes us, That he who is best is most happy and august or royal; because he is able to govern himself, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : But he that is most wicked is most miserable, because he is a Tyrant over himself. May we account him a man fit to govern himself, who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts? The Orator defines Liberty, a power of living as men list: and who hath this power to live as he list, but the virtuose man, whose will is conformed to the divine Will? Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list, whose mind is distracted and torn in pieces by unbridled lusts, as by so many wild Horses? Can it be imagined, that the ambitiose man lives as he list, whose mind is still on the rack of ambitiose designs? Doth the avaricious man live as he list, who the more he has, the more he wants? It's most evident, that no man lives as he list, but the virtuose man, who has a will slexible to the divine Will. This Dominion that attends moral Liberty is well expressed in sacred Philosophy: So Hos. 11.12. But Judah yet ruleth with God, and is faithful with the Saints. (1) Observe, That Judah 's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim, who ruled also, but not with God, as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruins of God's Worship, by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel, &c. But Judah ruled with God, and was faithful with the Saints. (2) Judah rules with God: i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and all lower things: he lives as he lists; because his will is conformed to the Divine Will.

2. Moral Liberty consists in the moral Life, Health, Vigor, and Force of the Soul, which also ariseth from virtuose Habits. Al natural freedom supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres: and so, by a parity of reason, all moral spiritual Liberty supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject: and indeed life renders everything most beautiful, active, and perfect. Whence, by how much the more noble, excellent and perfect the life of anything is, by so much the more raised, noble, and excellent is its state, and all its operations. Life is that which seasoneth everything: and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature: so the spiritual, divine, virtuose life has Principes above human Nature, more noble and excellent: and herein consists moral Liberty as to state. Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. informs us, That the health of the body consists in the equal temperament of all humors, &c. So in the Soul, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue truly is a certain health, pulchritude and good habitude of Soul: but sin is the disease, turpitude and infirmity thereof. Health, according to Augustine and Jansen, consists in the vigor, force and strength of Nature: and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue? Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature, but from its Spirits? And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul? That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul, Plato once and again assertes. So in his Gorgias, pag. 467. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Power is of good, &c. Also pag. 470. he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To be able to do much is to be good. And in his Hippias, pag. 375. he saith, Righteousness is the vigor and power of the Soul: for the more righteous the Soul is, the more potent it is. Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World. In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light: and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue. Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence; but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul, which strongly impels it to its last end. What more potent than Love, whereby the Soul adheres to its last end? By how much the more spiritual and pure any faculty is, by so much the stronger it is: and is not Virtue the purity of the Soul? Again, the strength of everything consists in its adhence to its first Principes, and last end: departure from our first Principe and last end speaks impotence: And what is it that enables us to adhere to our first Principe and last end but Virtue? The strength of the Soul lies in its ability to do good and suffer evil: and whence is this but from Virtue? The better anything is, the stronger it is. Thence Prov. 3.7, 8. The fear of the Lord is said to be health to the navel, and marrow to the bones. The navel is the great organ, which conveys both food and physic to the infant inthe womb: also marrow gives strength and vigor to the bones, as Job 21.24. Such is Virtue to the Soul, both health and strength.

e. Moral Liberty as to state consists chiefly in a divine Amplitude and Enlargement of Soul, whereby it is made capable of enjoying its first Principe and last End. Indeed all Liberty, both natural and moral, implies Amplitude. Thence, amongst the Hebrews, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both Liberty and Amplitude, as Psal. 119.45. And whence comes all moral Amplitude as to state, but from virtuose habits? The first most ample Being is God, who has no limits to his Being, or his Felicitie: and so far as man is like to God, so far he enters into this Divine Amplitude of state. Hence the Platonists assert, that Amplitude is founded in Unity, namely God, and from this divine Unity it takes its origin and measures. For everything is by so much the more ample and extensive, by how much the nearer it comes to pure Act. Al mater and passive power brings with it limits and coarctation: everything is so far straitened and narrowed in its being and appetite, as it partakes of mater either physic or metaphysic: but on the contrary, so far as things approach unto pure Act, which is God, so far they rejoice in Amplitude and Enlargement, either of Being or Appetite: and who approach nearer unto God, who is pure Act, than virtuose Souls, who partake of the Divine similitude? Do not these then partake most of divine Amplitude as to state? How miserably is the Soul straitened, pinioned, and cooped up by sin? But O1 what a boundless moral Amplitude do virtuose habits bring with them? Subjection and Adhesion to God by Virtue brings the highest Amplitude and Dominion. For God being the first Efficient, that gives Being, and the last End, that gives blessed Being; it hence necessarily follows, that Subjection and Adhesion to God, in both these respects, must bring the highest Amplitude and Dominion with it. As man, by departure from God, is subject to a miserable necessity, and coarctation of sin; so by regress and return to God he passeth into Divine Amplitude. Is not the Assimilation of the Soul to God by virtuose habits, its ultimate perfection as to state? Must not then all divine Amplitude take its origin hence? This is well illustrated by Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 176. We may not presume, that sin finds place with God: wherefore we must endeavor to fly from it, as much as may be: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . But this flight consists in this, that we are assimilated and conformed to God, so far as possiby we may be: and that which assimilates us to God is Justice and Sanctitie conjoined with divine Wisdom. His mind is, that Assimilation to God by virtuose habits puts the Soul into a state of distance from sin, and conjunction with God, whence all moral Amplitude doth emerge. Thence Cyrillus, lib. 1. in Joan. terms Grace, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sanctitie infused from without by Grace, according to the divine and supermundane Image. And Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. terms it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Deification; also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Appropinquation of God. And the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hierar. cap. 2. saith, That in the divine Regeneration men attain, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to a divine state or existence. Whence Virtue is termed by Ammonius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as it were a Quality of the Divinity in us. Indeed what is the pious virtuose Soul, but an immense bosom and living receptacle of the chiefest Good? And O! what an infinite Amplitude must such a Soul rejoice in? It's a commun Saying among the Platonistes, That Bonity is a nexe or conjunction with Unity, i. e. God. And must not such an intimate conjunction necessarily bring with it the highest Amplitude? Again, Plato and his Sectators generally inform us, that all Virtue is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a participation of the divine Nature. So Plato, in his Phaedo, assures us, That a virtuose man is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , akin to God, because partaker of the divine Nature, as the sacred Philosophy, 2 Pet. 1.4. This he explicates at large, Repub. 6. pag. 501. as Gen. 1.26. Now then, if Virtue be such an expression and participation of the divine Nature, must it not of necessity also partake of the divine Amplitude and Liberty? In short then, the nearer and more like to God the Soul is, the more ample and capacious it is: and by how much the more virtuose it is, by so much the nearer, and more like to God it is: doth it not then necessarily follow, that according to the degree and measure of Virtue, such is the degree and measure of divine Amplitude as to state? Consinement to what is good, gives the greatest amplitude and enlargement of heart, for the knowledge, love, and imitation of God, as Psal. 119.45. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Amplitude, &c. The Soul never walks in greater amplitude and liberty of spirit, than when it most firmly and inviolably adheres to God and his Divine Will.

4. Moral Liberty as to state imports Nobility, Dignity, Eminence, Excellence, Singularitie, Separation, and Magnitude or Greatness of Disposition, and Condition of Life. And are not all these essentially and intrinsically included in Virtue, both as to name and thing? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue is derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Mars; as this from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , arits, a potent valiant man: which notes, that Virtue is most potent and great. So Plato, in his Cratylus, makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Good, to be the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , excellent, eximious, preeminent. And indeed all the notions of Virtue or Sanctitie in sacred Philosophy import Discretion, Separation, Singularitie, Preeminence. Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , holy, is derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to separate from commun use: and it is sometimes synonymous with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies peculiar, most pretiose, excellent, &c. Whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an holy people, Deut. 7.6. & 14.2. is there interpreted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a most excellent, eximious, noble people: by the LXX. as also, Tit. 2.14. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a select, peculiar, superexcellent people. And Psal. 16.3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Saints, is interpreted inwhat follows, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , magnisicent, eximious: which shows that none are truly magnificent but virtuose holy persons. Thence also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , holy, pure, is deduced from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , veneration, worship; and this from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to worship: which they also derive from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 azaz, to honor. That Sanctitie and Virtue is the Crown of all other Excellences, is evident from Zach. 9.16. For they shall be as the stones of a Crown, lifted up as an Ensign on his land: i. e. God will deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles; as also lift them up to that honor, which pretiose stones have in the Kings Diademe. The word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both Separation and a Crown: which notes here, that every Saint is separated by God, as a Jewel in his Crown. Thence God terms them, Mal. 3.17. My Jewels. Which notes both separation and propriety, as also dignity and excellence. Indeed Sanctitie and Virtue is the Glory and Crown of all other Excellences; because it implies separation from all impurities, and a comprehension of the highest perfections: It raiseth things and persons, otherwise commun and vulgar, to the highest degree of excellene, even to the Image of God, which is the perfection of human Nature. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonstrates, That conformity to the divine Image is the highest perfection of human Nature: Of which see Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 3. §. 5. But more particularly, That Virtue brings with it the highest Nobility, Magnificence, and excellence, is evident from many Platonic Philosophemes. Thus Definit. Platon. pag. 413. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nobility is desined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Virtue of generose manners. So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Magnificence, is pag. 412. defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Dignity according to the most august or venerable right Reason: i. e. according to Virtue. For indeed all the ancient Philosophers made Honor and Nobility to be but the shadow and reward of Virtue. A free man, according to the Hebrews is styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , nadib; which signifies also a Prince or Noble man, one endowed with noble, generose, virtuose dispositions. What more sublime and noble than Vitue? Is not that a generose Soul, that is well-disposed and inclined to generose heroic deeds? Is any Soul more great than he, who can despise great mundane things for Virtues sake? It is accounted by some a great piece of felicity to be able to do what they will: but is it not a greater piece of liberty to will what we ought, which alone belongs to virtuose persons? Is he not truly great, who has a great measure of Virtue? Hence among the Heroic Virtues, there was found out an Apotheosis; which was nothing else but an extension of Virtues and human conditions to a perfection not human. Virtuose persons are the greatest men in the world: they have the greatest Souls: yea nothing is really great, but what is good. The best Nobility lies in the mind endued with Virtue: what mind more great than that, which is subject to the great God? Who is greater than he, who is least in his own eyes? Is not such a Soul most great in divine favor? It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic: You are not therefore good, because great; but you are therefore great beause good.

5. Moral Liberty as to state implies Splendor, Beauty, and Glory. Plato makes Beauty to arise from the predominance of the form over the mater, which otherwise is distorme. By the form I understand the spirituose active Principe; and so indeed it holds true of the Soul, the Beauty whereof consists in the predominance of virtuose habits, which are as the spirits, and form of the Soul. For look as the Soul, which is the form of a man, gives life, vigor, perfection and beauty to the human body; so proportionably virtuose habits give life, vigor, perfection and beauty to the human Soul. Plato abounds much in this argument, that Virtue is the Beauty of the Soul. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 279. O Friend Pan [the Ape of the Messias] give me to be beautiful within: i.e. in my Soul. Thence pag. 250. he saith, The Beauty of divine Wisdom [which is the Spirit of Virtue] is so illustrious and amiable, that if it were seen with eyes it would stir up wonderful Loves. Al Beauty ariseth from Light, spirits, and proportion of parts: and what gives Light, Spirits, and proportion to the Soul but Virtue? Some define Beauty, the fulgor, or bland face of Goodness: and doth not this speak Virtue most beautiful? Cicero defines Beauty, a due congruence with suavitic of color: and what hath a more due congruence and sweet color, than Virtue? Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beautiful than Light: and O1 what a glorious illustrious Light attends Virtue? Is not divine Veritie the Spring of Virtue, the most virgin, unspotted, glorious, affective Light? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 64. saith, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Idea or face of Good is composed of three things, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Beauty, and Symmetrie, and Truth. Yea, he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The very Images of things beautiful, are beautiful. And is not God most beautiful, yea the first Beauty, as before Chap. 2. §. 2. And what is true Virtue but the glorious Image of this first Beauty? Must it not then be most beautiful? Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. assures us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , according to the Delphic Inscription, That which is most just is most beantiful. And Seneca, Epist. 115. adds:

So Plato and Aristotle: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , No man is voluntarily wicked for wickedness sake. Which shows, that Virtue in itself is most amiable. Greg. Nyssenus, Hom. 2. in Cant. terms Virtue, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Grace of the Beauty of the Soul flowing from God, the supreme Beauty. And Basil, in Psal. saith, That Grace is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Beauty of the Soul. Also Corysostome, ad Theodor. Paraen. 1. tells us; That a deformed body cannot be made beautiful, but a deformed Soul may be rendered such by Grace: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. To render the Soul beautiful, although it be fallen into extreme turpitude, to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude, and so to make it amiable and desirable, &c. In sum, what is Beauty but the splendor and luster of those perfections, which are lodged in any subject? And thence is not God the first Beauty, because most perfect? And are not all things so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodness? For what is all created Beauty, but a ray of the Divine Beauty? And among created Beauties, doth anything more ressemble the Divine Beauty than true Virtue? 'Plato, in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. saith, That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect state have little Light and Beauty: but in the future state, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , then we shall contemplate the most perfect Beauty, &c. And then he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , But now Beauty [of things divine] has gained this dignity, that it is the most illustrious and amiable of all things.

§. 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Liberty as to state, we now descend to consider it as to its Exercice, which consists in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philosophy, That the second Act follows the first: such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: As in natural and civil Liberty, such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: if a man be, sui juris, a free man, he may act as such in that Corporation wherein he is free: Thus in moral Liberty, such as are free as to state, by having their Souls clothed with virtuose habits, they will exert and put forth virtuose Exercices in that state. So that moral Liberty as to Exercice is nothing else but a liberty to act according to that dignity of state they are invested with. Now for the more full explication and demonstration of moral Liberty as to Exercice, we are, (1) To explicate what it is, and (2) To demonstrate, that it is the supreme Liberty of a rational Creature. As for the explication of moral Liberty as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propositions.

1. Moral Liberty as to Exercice consists in the spiritual, affectionate, permanent Contemplation of the first beauty or Truth. To contemplate the first Truth, as well according to sacred, as Platonic Philosophy, is one of the supreme parts of moral Liberty as to Exercice. Contemplation, according to the Platonist, is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible: and what more intelligible, than the first Truth? Thence Plate, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. tells us, That the mind 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , beholding for some while the first Being, and satiating itself in the contemplation of Truth, and giving up itself thereto, is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasure. As sight is of all the most noble sense, and most quick in apprehension; so contemplation or the sight of the first Beauty and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Liberty; that which brings in most tranquility, satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. Of all Contemplations there is none so powerful, so sweet, so free, as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End. As God is infinitely better than all Creatures, so the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of all the Creatures. That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Liberty is most manifest; because (1) Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul; and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object, must needs bring the highest Liberty and Perfection with it, Joh. 17.3. (2) The mind of man, when rectified, has a flagrant ardent desire to contemplate the first Beauty and Truth. Aristotle assures us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life. How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth? (3) The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise emprovement of all other Beings and Objects which occur. This spiritualiseth and draws out the Elixir of all objects, providences, persons and things we converse with. (4) The contemplation of the first Beauty is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto. If there were a beautiful Picture, which persons by looking on, should gradually be made like unto, who would not gaze thereon? And is not the first Beauty such, which makes all those as spiritually contemplate thereon, beautiful, and free? Joh. 1.14. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , We have diligently and attentively beheld his glory, as on a Theatre. The Human Nature is that glorious Theatre, on which the Deity descends and offers himself to our contemplation: and O! what a glorious contemplation is this, to behold the Deity in the golden Ark of Humanity? How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same glorious Image, as 2 Cor. 3.18? (4) Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo. Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation: and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind, by lively affectionate contemplation thereof? (5) Contemplation of the first Beauty is most influential on the divine Life, and therefore a main Spring of Moral Liberty. Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdom? Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men? And is not this most true in things moral and divine? Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine, The greatest Musers are the best Artists? and doth not this hold most true here? yea, doth not the Psalmist assure us, Psal. 39.3. That whiles the heart museth, the fire of divine affection burneth? Doth not contemplation on the first Beauty fortify the heart against every temptation, tune it for every service, and sweeten every cross? Is it not both food and physic to the Soul, the life of our life, yea universally useful in every state and condition.

2. Another Exercice of moral Liberty consists in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good. What the last End and chiefest Good is, with the proper Characters of each, we have, §. 1. of this Chapter, fully discussed: our present work is to explicate what moral Liberty the Soul acquires by adhering thereto. The last End possesseth the greatest Amplitude, Universalitie, and Liberty imaginable, as to all means: it is, as an infinite Ocean, an immense universal Principe, that contains all Morals in its bosom: all things receive bounds and limits from their last end: but this receives bounds and limits from nothing. Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Liberty, it necessarily follows, that the more intimately and firmly the Soul adheres to it, the more liberty as to exercise it is possessed of. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. saith, That God (according to the ancient Tradition, I suppose Judaic) is the Principe and End of all things. And then he adds, pag. 716. That he, who adheres, with a composed mind and sirme purpose, to this last end, is most blessed and free. And in what follows, he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God, namely, by conformable Acts of Piety, &c. And herein indeed his Philosophemes are consonant to sacred Philosophy; which frequently placeth moral Liberty as to exercise, in inviolable close Adhesion unto God, as our last End. So Psal. 63.8. My Soul adheres closely to thee, as the Original 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 imports. We find the same word in the same sense, Deut. 10.20. Ruth 1.14, 16. Job 41.17. Psal. 119.31. and it primarily denotes, that intimate inviolable conjugal Adherence, which is or ought be between man and wife, who are, by Law of Nature, one flesh, as Gen. 2.24. And that this Adherence to God as our last End, and chiefest Good is a main part of moral Liberty, as to exercise, is further evident from Psal. 73.28. But it is good for me: i. e. it is my chiefest Good, that wherein my highest liberty consists. To draw near to God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Appropinquation, Access, Adherence to God. Thence the LXX. render it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To adhere to God, to be as it were glued to God: So the word, in its primary notion, signifies. Thence it is frequently used to express that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife, as Mat. 19.5. yea Ephes. 5.31. it signifies the conjugal adherence and union between Christ and his Church. And we find 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 used in the same sense, 1 Cor. 6.17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He that is glued, or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good, as the precedent words import. And O! what an high piece of moral Liberty is this, intimately and inviolably to adhere to God, as our last End and chiefest Good? Is the heart ever more free, than when it doth most strongly, by all manner of affectionate exercises, adhere to its chiefest Good? So many grains as there are of a bended will for God, so much moral Liberty. A tenacious, resolute, invincible adherence unto our last end, by acts of love, desire, and other affections, makes the Soul exceeding free in all its motions. Thus Psal. 73.26. My flesh and my heart faileth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies to consume with desire, or, to fail with long expectation. This poor man's case was thus stated: He saw the wicked to flourish, and the godly oppressed, which brought him under anxious disputes about the chiefest Good: but, upon inquiry in the Sanctuary, he was resolved to adhere inviolably to God as his chiefest Good So it follows: But God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever. Some render it, the reck unto which my heart adheres: others, the firm adhesion of my heart is to God, my chiefest Good. Whence follows his liberty v. 28. Thus Psal. 86.4. Rejoice the Soul of thy servant: i. e. make me free for and in all moral exercises: and why? for unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my Soul: i.e. unto thee as my chiefest Good do I adhere. So Psal. 25.1. This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its last end, is lively illustrated by our Lord, Mat. 6.20-24. v. 20. He exhorts them, To lay up treasures in Heaven: i. e. to make God their last End and chiefest Good: to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bent of will: and he gives the reason of it, v. 21. For where your treasure is there will your heart be also. the heart and the Treasure are ever together. This our Lord illustrates by a lively notion, v. 24. He will hold to the one, and despise the other, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , mordicus adhaerebit. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly signifies, to hold fast a thing, in opposition to those that would pluck it from us: Thence, to be very tenacious in adhering to persons or things: So in Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates. It's emphatically here, as Luk. 16.13. applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its last End and chiefest Good. Whence it's added, and despise the other. A Soul that tenaciously adheres to its chiefest Good, despiseth all frowns or blandishments that may assault it. Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Therefore: i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefest Good, you will not be so anxiously concerned about the goods of Time. To sum up this Argument. Every Creature has an Element to live in: and when it s in that Element it is most free: The Souls Element is its last End and chiefest Good: and every man is more or less morally free, as he more or less adheres thereto. For such as a man's last end is, such is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil, and moral liberty or bondage. By how much the more we love, delight in and enjoy our last end, by so much the more free we are in all our ways. The liberty of a rational Agent consists, not in having variety of objects to adhere to, and take complacence in, but in transmitting all to his last end, which is his best good.

That a Will actually and strongly bended to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good is most free, will appear by the following Particulars. (1) The more the Will is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good, the more free it is from sin, which is the worst servitude. He indeed is truly noble and generose, who is not a vassal to any base lust. Al power to sin is the diminution of liberty. Impeccabilitie or an utter impossibility of sinning is so far from destroying liberty, as that it is perfected hereby. The sweetest and highest liberty is to have no power to sin. Now the more the Will actually adheres to its last end, the less power it has to sin. (2) Moral liberty consists in the Souls being preserved from whatever may damnify or prejudice it: and wherein consists the preservation of every things, but in its Unity? Doth not division ever bring dissolution? And what preserves the Souls unity so much, as actual adherence to God, the first Unity? (3) The moral liberty of the Will consists chiefly inhaving all inferor things subject to it: and when are all things more subject to the dominion of the Will, than when it is, by a resolute actual adherence, subject to the Will of God? (4) The more harmonious and uniform the Souls acts are, the more morally free they are? And whence springs this harmony, but from actual regard and adherence to the last end? (5) Where ever the Soul finds rest and satisfaction, there it finds moral libetie: and doth not the Rest of the Soul arise from its adherence to its chiefest good. Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Bonity [ or the chiefest Good ] convertes all things to itself: i. e. all things tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection. (6) The more the Will is conformed to the Divine Will, the more free it is: and whose Will is more conform to the Divine Will, than his, who actually and resolutely adheres to God? Doth not such a Will touch the Divine Will in every point, as two strait Lines?

3. Moral Liberty as to Exercice consists in an actual, total, and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of all things. Every Creature having something of Nothing, or passive Power, either physic or metaphysic and obediential; it thence falls under the Law of Mutabilitie, which is the root of Dependence. Novitie of Being, Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature, as Eternity of Being, Immutabilitie, and Independence is to the Creator. For every Creature being only Being by participation; hence Dependence becomes intrinsical to it, and inseparable from its nature, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates. Yea, Disp. 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates,

Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only, but also moral on its first Cause. We find both mentioned by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shows, That God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Principe and End of all Beings, whose conduct he that follows, shall be happy. And Epinom. pag. 980. he assures us, That he, who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie, shall act well. So in his Timaeus, pag. 27. he tells us, That all, who have anything of an awakened mind, when they attempt any mater either great or small, are always wont to cal on God. Which is an high act of Dependence. Thence Theages, pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God, thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ▵AIMONION, For there is a certain DEMON, which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do, &c. What this Demon of Socrates was, is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers, who have written Books concerning it. That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. §. 4. It certainly imports his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power, either Real or Imagiuary. Yea, Planto, in his Timaeus, saith, That Beatitude or moral Liberty is nothing else but to have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Demon dwelling in him. Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Shekinah, i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men. Thence the Greek Fathers term efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon, in imitation of sacred Philosophy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the inhabitation of the holy Spirit, also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , indwelling Grace. Which alludes to that of Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwell on me. It evidently alludes, both name and thing, to the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or habitation of God with and in men; which denotes the highest Dependence. And indeed herein consists one main part of moral Liberty as to exercise. Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth, yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause; so doth all true moral Virtue on its first Cause. Virtuose persons, who are most feeble in themselves, are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe. Where there is a subordination of Causes, either moral or natural, it is the liberty of the inferior to depend on, and receive from the superior. Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him? If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences, how soon do all moral Virtues wither and die away? What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first? Where there is a limited essence, is there not also a limited dependent Activitie? Can a dependent cause produce anymore than a dependent effect? Must not every mutable, variable, defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause? That which had not Being from itself, may it have Operation independently from itself? Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first? If the created Will cannot subsist of itself, may it expect the privilege of acting from itself, independently as to the first Cause? Is not the human Will a mere passive, though vital, instrument as to the reception of divine influences, albeit it be active as to its own operation? Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total? Yea, is not this Dependence immediate? And, O! how is the Soul enlarged, according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause? Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult; but with it the most difficult are most facile. The Soul is well compared to a Glass without a foot, which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken; but if God withdraws his hand, it soon sals to the ground, and is deshed in pieces: he need not take it, and throw it against the wall; it will break of itself. Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Munudaction; also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , assistent Grace: Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the energy and cooperation of God: Basil terms it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all manner of energy: Cyril, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the aide from above: Chrysostom, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the auxiliant or assistent Power. Greg. Nyssen. in Psalm. saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue. And Chrysostom, in Gen. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The whole of good is from the Grace of God. Whence God is termed by Cyril, in Esa. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Creator and Framer of all good: and his efficacious Grace is termed, by him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the multiforme Energie: also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the efficacious Aide: as by Chrysostom, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the invincible Assistence. Of which more hereafter. The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause, but continual effusions and insusions into the Soul, and in regard of man nothing else but constant regard towards God, and continual dependence on him. As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preserve them, when self-dependent; so the impotence of Human nature cannot prejudice us, so long as we are dependent on the first Cause. True moral Virtue is a celestial Plant, fed by some invisible root in the celestial World; from which it derives its influences. Members and branches live no life, but the life of their head and root: all divine and moral Respirations toward the celestial world, are from sweet Inspirations of divine Concurse. We cannot actively draw down divine influences, but we may enlarge our passive receptive capacity by actual dependence thereon. Al moral Beings, even the Angels themselves, as they have new services to do for God daily, so they are dependent for new assistances; and herein consists a main part of their moral Liberty. Those who are strongest in self dependence, are soonest foiled; as Peter.

4. Another Exercice of moral Liberty consists in actual conformity unto God, and imitation of him, both by obedience to his preceptive, and submission to his providential Will. (1) It's a great essential part of moral Liberty, to conform to the preceptive Will of God. God being the prime Exemplar and Measure of all Liberty, it necessarily follows, that the more we imitate and follow God, the more freedom we obtain: and who imitate and follow God more, than they, who conform most to his Divine preceptive Will? Nothing more commun in sacred Philosophy than this, That Adherence, Conformitie and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Liberty. Thus Psal. 119.45. I will always walk at liberty; because I seek thy precepts. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in amplitude: i. e. I will walk in all manner of Amplitude and Liberty both of heart and ways; because my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Liberty. The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God, a bond or cord of Love, whereby the heart is knit to God, and so made free for the fruition of him. Delight in and conformity to the Divine Law, by all manner of virtuose exercises, is the highest liberty. O! what a regal, glorious liberty is this, to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Will? What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Liberty in ways of sin? When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God, and transcribes it on the heart, and thereby makes it free to perform actual conformity to the externe Law, what a sovereign Liberty is this? Thus Rom. 8.2. For the law of the Spirit of life, i. e. engraven on the heart, as 2 Cor. 3.3. hath made me free from the law of sin and death: i. e. enabled me freely and cheerfully to conform to the Divine Law, &c. Thus also, Jam. 1.25. But whose looketh into the perfect law of liberty: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 denotes (1) an accurate inspection or prying into a thing, as they who bring their eye close to an object, in order to a more distinct perception thereof. (2) A dwelling on an object: as some curious persons, who spend much time in dressing themselves, do, as it were, let their eye dwell on their glass; just so the eye of the mind should dwell on the Divine Law, which is the glass, wherein we contemplate the Divine Will, Image and Sanctitie. Thence follows the object, the perfect Law of Liberty. (1) The Divine Law is called perfect, as it is an absolute perfect Miroir or Glass, wherein we contemplate the Image and Will of God, and whereby the mind is perfected. (2) It is termed a Law of Liberty, [1] As evangelised and sweetened by evangelic Grace. [2] As it makes those free, that conform to it. So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Commands, so far its actings in conformity thereto and free and cheerful. Hence a godly man is said to be a Law unto himself: i. e. if there were no Law extant, yet he would do the same virtuose acts, from that inward Law engraven on his heart. Whence Jam. 2.8. it's styled the Royal Law: and v. 12. The Law of Liberty: because conformity thereto, from an inward principe of Virtue, is the highest Liberty, according to Divine estimation.

And as sacred Philosophy, so Platonic placeth much of moral Liberty in actual conformity to the divine Law. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 592. assures us, that in Heaven there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a perfect Exemplar, for him that will behold it, and by beholding be conformed thereto. Meaning God the original essential Exemplar of all Sanctitie, whose sacred Will is the grand Pattern of our Conformitie. And leg. 4. pag. 716. he largely demonstrates, That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Will, by so much the more perfect and free it is. It is most evident, saith he, that every man ought mostly to attend this, how he may be of the number of those that follow God. What action therefore is it, that is most beloved by God, and most consentaneous to his Will? Truly but one, according to the old Proverb, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because like is beloved by lie, whereunto it is conformable, &c. Wherein he shows, that moral Liberty consists chiefly in following God; which is performed by actual conformity unto his Will. Thence Philo Judaeus, that great Platonist, in his Book, That every virtuose man is free, demonstrates at large, That to be free is to follow God by conformity to his divine Will. And indeed what is Liberty as to exercise, but adhering unto God? and who adhere to God, but they who conform to his divine Will and Law? Doth not moral Liberty arise from subjection to God? And are not they most subject to God, who conform most to his Law? It was a great Saying of Pythagoras, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Follow God. Thus also Epictetus, in Arian. lib. 1. cap. 20. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The end of Philosophy is to follow God, i.e. to conform to his divine Law. And the ancient Philosophers, specially Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, made Assimilation to, and Imitation of God the main end of all Philosophy.

(2) This actual Conformitie unto God implies subjection and submission to his providential Will, both Afflictive and Diretive. And herein also much of moral Liberty doth consist. Is not that mind most noble, great, and free, which can bear great crosses with equanimitie and patience? Doth not this give more liberty and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of? O! what a sweet thing is it to have a free generose mind under a straitened consined condition! How facile are burdens made hereby! A virtuose Spirit, that follows God in afflictive providences, becomes a King over his crosses: his losses prove his gain; his reproach, his glory; his confinement, his liberty. This is incomparably well expressed by Epictetus, in several Philosophemes. So Enchirid. cap. 38. Know, saith he, that this is the main part of Religion towards God, that thou conform thyself, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to obey him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and to acquiesce in all things that happen, and willingly to follow, as that which is best governed by the most excellent Mind. Thus also in Arian. l. 1. c. 12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . To submit the mind, to the mind that governs all things, as good Citizens to the Law of the City, this is liberty in its perfection. So lib. 3. cap. 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. I always rather will what happens; for I esteem what God wills, better than what I will. I adhere to him as a minister and sectator: I desire what he desires, and simply will what God wills. thus Seneca: That is a great and free mind, which has given up itself to God.

5. Moral Liberty as to exercise imports the using and referring all things in order to the service and fruition of God. Liberty, according to both sacred and Platonic Philosophy, consists 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the consent, harmony, symmetrie, and right order of all things: i. e. when all subserve our last end. And what is the last end of man, but to serve and enjoy God? Whence Plato, Protag. 3. pag. 326. saith, That the whole life of man should be composed of harmony and uniformity: i. e. all actions, means, occurrences should sweetly conspire and agree for the promoting our supreme end. The mind is morally free, not by extending itself to variety of objects, but by reducing all to unity, or God, who is the supreme Unity, which reduceth all things to itself. Again, Liberty implies Election: and is not that the best election, which refers all to its last end? the respect we have to Creatures depends on the respect they have to God: and so far as we refer them to God, so far we are free in the use of them. By subjecting ourselves, and all enjoyments to the service of God, we gain dominion and freedom over all things: but if the heart be irregular and inordinate in adhering to the use of the most lawful comfort, it is immediately captivated thereby. This is most evident from sacred Philosophy: as 1 Cor. 6.12. Althings are lawful to me. Paul seems to have taken up the commun Phrase of those Corinthian Libertines, who under a pretexte, that all things were lawful, did abuse their just liberty to the grieving of their weak Brethren. It's true, saith he, all things are lawful: I grant it: yet withal remember, that all things are not expedient: if you have not a great care, your desires and use of things lawful will soon prove unlawful. For my part, adds he, all things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Here is an elegant Paronomasie between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which the Corinthian Libertines boasted of, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies primarily, to be brought into bondage, under the power of another. They that use things lawful, without regard to their expendience and subservience to the service of God, are brought under bondage to them. Thence the Apostle adds, v. 13. Meats are for the belly: i. e. for the ventricule or stomach and intestines, to supply them with nutriment: and the belly is for meats: i.e. to receive and digest them. But God shall destroy both it and them: i. e. take away the use both of meats and ventricule in Heaven. The Apostle brings this as an argument to prove, that our Christian Liberty doth not lie simply in the use of these things; because when we are most free, there will be no use of them. God gives not men liberty to enjoy what they list, but what they ought: the free use of Creatures consists in this, to make us more free inthe service of God: herein lies the goodness of any Creature, in our being thereby enabled to do good. Those that subject their hearts to God in the use of Creatures, are most free therein: yea, you are never free longer than you serve God by them.

That to serve God is the highest Liberty that human Nature is capable of, sacred Philosophy doth abundantly assure us. It's an old Saying, but most true, that To serve God is to reign. This is a Kings life. Everyone hath his Talent from God; and as he doth more or less employ it for God, so he is more or less free. It's honor enough for the Creature to be employed by his Creator. Yet over an above this God rewards every degree of servicer with some degree of liberty, tranquility and peace. There is nothing that has greater dignity and liberty entailed on it, than the service of God. Thus Luk. 22.29. And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies to appoint or dispose by Will and Testament. The mind of our Lord is, that, as the Father appointed to him a Kingdom to be acquired by suffering and service; so in like manner he appointed to his Servants a Glory and Dignity next to his royal Majesty, to be acquired in the same manner and way. This our Lord adds to give check to their carnal ambitiose humor, v. 24, 25. It follows v. 30. That ye may eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones judging the twelve Tribes of Israel. There are two things wherein the preeminence of Nobles and Peers is most illustrious. (1) In the honor vouchsafed them by their Prince. (2) In their Power and Autoritie over others. Both of these are here mentioned, as belonging to Christ's Servants. (1) Their honor consists in sitting at Christ's table. (2) Their power, in sitting on Thrones, &c. Yea, we find a strange and unusual honor vouchsafed by Christ to his Servants, Luk. 12.37. He shall gird himself, and make them sit down to mean, and will come forth and serve them. O1 what an incomparable honor is this! The like Joh. 12.26. If any man serve me. Our Lord here speaks of himself as a great King, who hath many Ministers of State to order his Affairs: and every Minister of his is a King in his place. Thence he adds: And where I am, there also shall my servant be: i. e. in my Kingdom of Glory, if he follows me in the Kingdom of my Patience. yea, he adds: If any man serve me, him will my Father honor: i. e. he shall not only be happy, but most honorable. Neither is this Dignity and Liberty reserved only for Heaven, but even in this life God investes his faithful Servants therewith. Thus it was with Joshua, Zach. 3.7. And I will give thee walks among those that stand by: i. e. among the Angels, that stand by and minister to me, and my Church, as Tarnovius.

§. 4. Having explicated what moral Liberty as to Exercice is, we are now to demonstrate, that this is the supreme Liberty that a rational Creature is capable of.

1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are, the more morally free they are: for all moral freedom denotes order and reference to our last End: and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular? Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 504. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law: whence men are made regular and orderly: which belongs to Justice and Temperance: i. e. all Acts are so far regular, as they partake of Justice and Temperance, which give order and harmony to all our Exercices. Justice and Temperance, according to Plato, are universal cardinal Virtues, which regulate and dispose all human Acts according to the best order, wherein their freedom chiefly consists. Whence Plato makes mention of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Chorus of Virtues, wherein all move in the most regular orderly manner. Yea, he affirms, That the whole life of man should consist of Harmonie, Order, and Uniformitie. And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informs us, That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is most musical and harmonious: i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of Symphonie or Concent and musical Ryme: so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule, Words to Thoughts, and Actions to Words: and herein consists the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , good Order and Liberty of human Exercices. So again, in his Laches, pag. 188. he assures us, That is the best Music, when words and life concord, or agree among themselves, as also to the Rule. Virtuose Exercices consist in all equal tenor of life, agreeable to itself, and to the Law; which is always attended with a good order, and liberty. It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian, mentioned in his Life, pag. 133.

Again, pag. 175. So great was the consent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul. Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts: and the more of order the more of liberty. Now virtuose Acts are of all most regular and orderly; because they are measured by the exactest Rule, and directly tend to the last End, which is the first Principe in Morals. Thus in sacred Philosophy, Gal. 6.16. And as many as walk according to this rule peace be unto them. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground: also the white Line in the Grecian Race. And 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here signifies, so to walk as to keep an exact order, not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race. And what is the privilege of those who thus walk? Peace be to them: i.e. moral Liberty and Tranquillitie.

2. The Liberty of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie, Connaturalitie, Facilitie, and Suavitie. For all Liberty consists in an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a self-motion: and by how much the more spontaneous, connatural, facile and sweet the self-motion is, by so much the more free it is judged to be. And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous, spiritually connatural, and sweet, than such as are virtuose? Plato, in his Lysis, assures us, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Good is most proper to our nature, and what is better than virtuose acts? are they not then most proper or connatural? Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 411. Temperance is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a self-motion according to nature: i.e. connatural, or agreeable to rectified human Nature. And Plato, in his Timaeus, tells us, That the best motion of the Soul is in itself; because this is most akin to rational Nature. And when doth the Soul move more in itself, than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end? Is not the last end the best part of ourselves? Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it, doth it not move most in itself? It's a great Notion among the Platonists, That Virtue is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , most proper and congenial to man; but sin is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , most aliene and repugnant. And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates, That to adhere to God, as our first Cause and last End, is the most natural act of a rectified Soul: and is it not then most free? Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper: O! then how free are virtuose Acts? The Platonist instructes us, That to a good man God is a Law, but to the wicked Lust is a Law: Now if God be a Law to a good man, then all his motions toward God are most free. There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law: and therefore he most freely obeys it: for all obey what they love, as Plato assures us: Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself: he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul: and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Liberty: so that he obeys it not out of force, but choice: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , force cannot touch love. There is a service of Love which is most free: by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is, by virtuose acts, subjected to God, by so much the more free it is: for the very act of love, as terminated on the Creator, is formal moral Liberty, as Jansen acutely demonstrates, August. Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercises are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul, but also most facile, sweet and delicious. Plato, Timae. pag. 81. tells us: Whatever is repugnant to Nature, is most irksome; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet. Now that virtuose acts are most agreeable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated. What can furnish us with greater dexterity, facility, and alacrity in acting than virtuose Principes? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Alacrite is defined, Definit. Platon. pag. 413. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A manifestation of practic election: and who manifest more free practic election, than such as act virtuosely? Frequence of exercises both in Nature and Virtue give a great facility. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Customs are defined by Galen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , superadded Natures: and Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Custom is akin to Nature: whence he adds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Custom makes everything sweet. Now virtuose exercises frequently repeated breed a divine spiritual custom, which is attended with divine suavitie and delight. The frequent repetition of the same exercise makes it more facile, dexterous and sweet. Experience teacheth us, that whatever is long customary, turns into our natures, even diseases and poisons. How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customs and habits attending virtuose acts? Thence Heb. 5.14. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Virtuose customs and habits make the exercises of spiritual senses most familiar, pleasant and sweet, and therefore most free: for the freedom of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it. And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them, than virtuose exercises? O! what sweet inspirations, what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings? Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet: and is not the bitter cross sweetened by virtuose exercises? are not the most difficult services made facile hereby? Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure, and therefore of liberty in it? And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is, by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it. For all joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation: and the more raised and spiritual the operation is, the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is. The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end: for the nearer things come to their first Principes, the more joyful and free they are: and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts? Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free? Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious, real, solid, pure, spiritual, strong, self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights, as Psal. 119.14, 16, 20, 35?

3. The Liberty of moral Acts consists much in their Vitalitie. The more excellent and noble the life is, the more free the acts are: and the more virtuose the acts are, the more of the divine life they carry in them. Thus Plato, Charmid. pag. 171. Sin being banished from the Soul, and Rectitude presiding in every act, it's necessary, that those who are thus disposed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , do act well: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and that those who act well, do live happily. The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act, that so we may live blessedly. Whereby he intimates, that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free: no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To live well is to act well. The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests itself most in that operation, which is most proper to it, and unto which it is most naturally inclined: and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state? What is life, but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the body? And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercise? Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercises? Where there is natural life there will be some pulse and motion of the Spirits: So where there is a moral life of Virtue there will be exercise. By how much the more perfectly anything is moved by itself, by so much the more perfect it; mode of living is: and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves? Plato tells us, Phaedr. pag. 245. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . By which he shows, That it is proper to life, to move itself by itself. And when doth the Soul most freely move itself by itself, but when it acts virtuosely? And as all life consists in action, even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing; so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions. A virtuose Soul, as it has Principes of life above Nature, so also actings: for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is, by so much the more excellent is the operation. The life and motion of virtuose hearts, is upward, like that of fire, which is of all the most noble, active, and free life. Thence in facred Philosophy, Life is frequently put for a noble, comfortable, free, blessed condition of life, consisting in virtuose exercises. So Psal. 34.12. What man is he that desireth life, i. e. a blessed, free, sweet life. And how may such a life be acquired? That he tells you, verse. 13, 14. Depart from evil and do good, &c. The like, Psal. 22.26. & 69.33. & Psal. 119.77. Eccles. 6.8. 1 Pet. 3.10. And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie; namely, because there is no true life, but what is virtuose, blessed, and free. So that as there is no moral liberty without a divine life; so there is no divine life without virtuose exercises. Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts, by so much the more divine and free its life is.

4. The moral Liberty of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude. And are not virtuose Acts of all most ample and great? Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law imports not only subjection, but also enlargement and liberty. Thence Psal. 119.96. the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample: and why? because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Will, which is most ample. Whence the Soul, by actual adherence to the divine Law, rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Liberty. Thus Psal. 119.165. Great peace have they who love thy law. Or, ample peace, with liberty as to walking. Thence it follows: and nothing shall offend them. Or, they shall have no stumbling block: ie. They shall walk in the Kings high-way, according to the royal Law of Liberty, with all manner of liberty and boldness. It's a great Saying of the Platonists, That one free is moved from infinite, to infinite, upon infinite: i.e. a virtuose man, in all exercises of Virtue is moved, (1) From God, as the first Cause and original Spring. (2) To God, as the last End, and infinite Good. (3) Upon, or according to the infinite Will and Law of God, as the measure and rule of all his virtuose exercises. Whence also they tell us, That the motion of a free Soul is circular, from God, as the first Cause; to God, as the last End; and by God, and his divine Will, as the measure. Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in all the exercises of Virtue: So that it falls under no coarctation or confinement, either in regard of Principe, or End, or Rule; but partakes in its measure, of that Amplitude, which its Principe, End, and Rule rejoiceth in. For such as a man's first Principe, last End, and Exemplar is, such is he as to liberty, or servitude. By how much the more ample and sublime the end is, by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again, the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement. Whereas sin, being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End, puts fetters, chains, limits and confinement on the Soul.

5. Moral Liberty as to exercise consists in the freedom from vitiofe Inclinations, Affections, and Motions. Plato, in his Timaeus, persuades us, That the culture and cure of everything consists in giving it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , its proper diet and exercises: and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies, than to give it its proper virtuose exercises? When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful, than when it is most in virtuose exercitations? Althings are purified by perfective fermentation: and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections? Thus Rom. 12.11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , fermenting or boiling in spirit. Syr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is spoken of boiling waters, Job 41.22. So Job 30.27. LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , My bowels fermented or boiled. The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercises, the more free they are to serve God, and less obnoxious to the service of sin. By how much the less we serve sin, by so much the more free we are: And who serve sin less, than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercises? Plato, Tim. pag. 89. tells us, That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation. What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature? And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercise? And doth not this hold true as to the Soul? Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation? Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul? What makes the fire to conserve itself in its purity, but its grand and perpetual activity? Doth not also the running stream keep itself pure, whiles the standing Pool gathers mud? Are all things in Nature purified by motion? and shall we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercises? It's true, virtuose exercises do not purge out sin by their own innate force, as Physic purgeth out il humors; but by the divine promise, concurrence, and benediction. By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end, by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto.

6. Virtuose Exercices are most stable, firm and permanent: Therefore most free. Moral Liberty as to exercise consists much in the firmitude, stability, and permanence of such exercises. Whence Plato, in his Cratylus, pag. 415. derives 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because it is always in flux or motion: whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a facile and expedite progress: For, saith he, it always flows in an equal stable manner. The Soul, according to Plato, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an ever-moving Principe; and therefore it ought 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to be always in action. Now it is most certain, that no acts of the Soul are more stable, firm and permanent than virtuose acts. Thus Arist. Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtuose exercises are most permanent. And he gives this reason of it: Because blessed Souls live and dwell always in such Acts, without tediousness or oblivion. And Plato, in his Cratylus, tells us: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul, which obstructs all virtuose exercises. The firmitie and stability of everything ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End: and by how much the more the Soul departes from these, by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is: To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God, under all the vicissitudes and various changes of this World, argues great moral liberty as to exercise: and wherein consists the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End, if not in virtuose exercises?

7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue, and so by consequence moral Liberty. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. assures us, That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy, they are rendered more infirm and impotent; but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous. And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals, as well as Naturals? Doth anything render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous, than virtuose exercises? So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by labors and exercises. And are not virtuose labors of all most nourishing and corroborative? Thence, saith Seneca, Labor nourisheth generose minds. O! then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue! As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse, or twofold motion of the heart; so is Virtue by its exercises. It's a trite Saying in the Schools, Cessation from acts diminish habits, but continuance therein emproves the same. It's true, there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits, and virtuose, which come by infusion; because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts, but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts, but given in by God of mere Grace. God rewards virtuose exercises with farther degrees and advances of Virtue, or Grace, and that of mere Grace. So Mat. 13.12. For whosoever hath, to him shall be given. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here doth not signify the mere having of a Talent, but the employing, using, or occupying the same: for it is a good Rule among Grammarians, That Verbes, which primarily signify to have or possess, oft denote the using of what we have. So here Hath notes to use, occupy, or traffic with what we have. To such it shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: i. e. God will reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent, be it natural or supernatural, with much more in the same kind. If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations, he shall receive more in that kind: if true moral supernatural Virtues, his stock shall increase in its kind. Whence it follows: But whosoever hath not, i. e. employs not by exercise: from him shall be taken away even that he hath: i. e. his Talent shall be taken from him: his commun gifts and seeming virtues shall wither. Yea, virtuose exercises in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper. Thus Heb. 12.11. Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous, but grievous; but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousness, to them that are exercised thereby. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , exercised as in the Gymnade: whence it follows, v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension, firmitude, strength. It here denotes sloth and remissness as to labor, whereof the hand is the instrument. Thence he adds: and the feeble knees. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the paralytic knees, such as are as it were struck with a Palsy, and therefore unapt for motion. This later clause seems to refer to the Race, which required the exercise of the knees; as labor, that of the hands.

8. A great and main part of moral Liberty consists in virtuose exercises; because herein consists formal Beatitude. Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations. Thus Plato, in his Conviv. pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consist in contemplating, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. the most sincere, uniform, divine Beauty, &c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude, the exercise of the rational Soul, according to the best and most perfect Virtue, in the most perfect life. And Cap. 8. he adds, That to act well and live well makes man happy. And the demonstration hereof is most evident. For (1) Operation and exercise is the end of all virtuose Habits and Principes, and therefore their perfection: for every Form, Power, or Habit is ordained to its act, as to its perfection. Whence Basil terms Grace, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , completive or perfective of Nature. Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues, that formal Beatitude cannot consist, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in use and exercise. For a man may possess the chiefest good, and have habitual likeness thereto, and yet not formally happy, as virtuose men asleep. (2) The more Virtue is in exercise, the more it ressembles the Divine Liberty and Perfection. The Divine Being and Liberty is a pure simple Act, without the least habit or passive power, either physic or metaphysic: and therefore the more actuose Virtue is, the more like it is to God. (3) Virtuose exercises bring most satisfaction with them. Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us, That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , self-sufficient. They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul, as before Chap. 1. §. 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophy. Yea we are herein assured, that by virtuose exercises we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude, even in this life. This seems the import of that Exhortation, 1 Tim. 6.12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Exercise thyself in that famose contest of Faith. Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games, specially that of the Race, wherein they contended for a Crown. Thence he adds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , lay hold of eternal life. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here, as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , 1 Cor. 9.24. Phil. 3.12. in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race, who, when they came to the end thereof, laid hold on the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal. Thus Christians, by virtuose exercises, lay hold on eternal life, as the Crown at the end of their Race. Thus he speaks of himself, 2 Tim. 4.7, 8. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I have exercised myself in that famose contest. The double Article adds a great Emphase, and shows with what vigor and activity he had dispatched his Christian race, and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown. Such efficacious and sovereign influence have virtuose exercises on man's formal Beatitude and moral Liberty.

CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude.

§. 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good, Virtue, and Liberty, we now pass on to the discussion of moral Evil, and that Servitude which attends it. It's a good Notion of Aristotle, Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Parallel opposites illustrate each other. So in his Ethics, l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary. Which holds true here; in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformity of moral Evil. Doth all moral Good consist in conformity to the moral divine Law? What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law, as 1 Joh. 3.4? That all moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law, is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated, as well in Platonic as in sacred Philosophy. Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 416. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Sin is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a practice against right reason, which must be understood objectively, of the Law of Nature, as before. Whence Plato himself, Rep. 9. saith, That Sin is most distant from Law and Order. Again, Leg. 10. he affirms, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That Sin is an intemperate excess of the Soul. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is of the same import with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and signifies primarily the excess of any humor in the body: and thence the inordinate and irregular excess of the Soul and its Affections. For look as Virtue is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul; so sin is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Asymmetrie and Ataxie. Hence also Plato, in his Epinom. pag. 978. calls Sin, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. A motion void of reason, order, decorum, measure, yea a confused agitation, whereby the Soul is depraved, and contaminated. Whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , injustice, Definit. Platon. is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an habit over-looking, or despising Laws. Yea, Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 574. calls sin 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Transgression of the Law, as sacred Philosophy, 1 Joh. 3.4. Thus also Aristotle, both in his Ethics and Rhetoric, stiles sin 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Transgression of the Law. But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophy, whence Plato borrowed his choicest Philosophemes. Thence in the O. T. all the notions, whereby sin is expressed, signify a Transgression of the Law. We find three several notions of sin together, Psal. 32.1, 2. (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which denotes Defection, Rebellion, Prevarication against God. (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of God's Law. (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which imports Perversitie, Obliquitie, Iniquity, Privation of Rectitude. (4) Sin is styled, Psal. 101.3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a mater of Belial: i. e. a lawless mater, such as will not come under the yoke. From 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , without a yoke: which the LXX. translate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; and whereto Paul seems to allude, 2 Cor. 6.14, 15. (5) Sin is styled a Violation, or making void the Law, Psal. 119.126. Zeph. 3.4. & Hos. 4.2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 They break the bounds of the Law. An allusion to Inundations, and Land-floods, that break down all bounds. So great is the violence, which sin offers to the Divine Law. (6) Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law, Psal. 125.5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Obliquations or crooked ways. (7) Sin is called a Declination, Aberration, Deflexion, Psal. 119 51, 67. & Psal. 101.3. yea, v. 4. it is styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , perverse. (8) It is termed Rebellion, Psal. 5.10. & 66.7. Which terms, though different in themselves, yet they all import Transgression of the Law. Thus also in the N. T. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , with other notions, whereby sin is expressed, do all import Transgression of the Law. Hence the Stoics held, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That all sins are equal; because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression, as well as the greatest. Yet hence it follows not, but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins, according to their various objects, and circumstances.

Hence it follows, that sin, as to its formal Idea, Reason, or Nature is not positive, but privative. For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions. (1) Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good. For albeit there be pure good, which has no mixture of evil, either natural or moral, as the chiefest Good; yet there is no pure Evil, which has not for its subject some natural good. It's true there are some Acts that are intrinsically evil, that is, so far evil, as that they can never be good: as the hatred of God, and the like. Yet these Acts are called intrinsically evil, not as if their evil were intrinsical to the natural entity of the acts; for it's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts; but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin. (2) Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being, composed of positive and privative. The material Subject or natural Act is positive; but the formal Reason, or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative. The positive Act of itself, abstracted from the privation, is not sinful; but both together, as mater and form, make up one Compositum. It's a Question in the Schools, Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se, or per accidens? And Suarez well solves this difficulty, telling us,

(3) Every Privation as such is evil, as every Form or Act good. For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection? And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it? Every thing, if it want any good that belongs to it, is so far evil. (4) When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative, the term formal must not be taken strictly, but in a lax notion, and morally. For the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised, and yet not formally intended by the Agent, hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause: yet because this obliquity or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful, it may in a more lax notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause. (5) Sin, as to its formal reason, is not a Physic or Logic privation, nor yet pure nothing; but a moral privation, or deficience as to moral rectitude. In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive, not absolutely, as if it were somewhat subsistent, but relatively and morally, as it is opposed to pure nothing: for, say they, sin is a privation, which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful; and therefore it is not mere nothing. So Suarez saith, that sin is not a real Being, yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition. Thus indeed Plato, in his Sophist, teacheth us, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , non-ens may be considered as pure nothing, and so it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , unintelligible, and ineffable: or else it may be considered, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which truly is not, yet not simply, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , non-ens, or nothing. And such is sin, not simply and purely nothing, yet according to its formal reason, not a positive real Being, but a moral privation, or as others, a privative relation.

That Sin, according to its formal Idea and Nature, is privative, was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers, both Platonists and others. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the moral cause of sins; because there cannot be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a positive idea of sin. So Proclus argues from this place, That there cannot be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an Idea of sins; because then it would follow, that God should be the Cause and Author of sin. And Plato himself informs us, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sin is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an irregular affection; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , privation of order: also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Injustice against Law: Again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a privative Being: and lastly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , privation of moral Being, as the night is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the privation of the Suns light. But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis, than Simplicius, on Epicbet. cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates, that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sin really is not in the nature of Beings, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a privation of good. Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis, Sent. 2. D • st. 34. Quaest. 1. Suarez in 1.2. Tract. 3. Dispute. 7. sect. 3. pag. 275-278. & Barlow Exercit. 2.

§. 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin, we now proceed to its Causes; among which, if we will ascend up to its first Origin, we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature, as the original cause of all sin. For, to speak in the Platonic mode, Man, as all other Creatures, being composed of something and nothing, yea more of nothing than something; hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being. For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing. Where there is place for Proficience, there also remains a capacity of Deficience. Every Creature, because made by God, is capable of Proficience; but because made out of nothing, it is also capable of Deficience. It's true, Man, as made by God, was void of all moral deficience or sin; yet as Man, he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie: he had a moral free-will for good; but a natural free-will or defectibilitie as to sin: which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin. This is well explicated by Suarez:

That the Will of Adam, in his innocent state, was capable of sinning, was a natural defect, conjoined with a natural perfection: for it was also capable not to sin: and this mutable capacity being drawn forth towards a prohibited object, was the first origin and root of all sin. Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural liberty in itself good, but evilly applied.

Adam 's person being vitiated by that first Sin, he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature. Yea, his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation: whence there adheres a vitiosity to our natures, whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato, and other Philosophers. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in our head, [which I understand of Adam ] whereby our nature, from the first generation, is corrupted. And Timaeus Locrus, from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes, pag. 103. explicates the origin of this Vitiositie thus: Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes, rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners; because we never depart from those actions, which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents. A great confession of a Pagan, beyond what many that profess Christianity will allow. So Plato, in his Critias, saith, That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men [ i. e. in the state of Innocence] but at length it being mixed with mortal, [ i. e. upon the Fal] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , human custom [or sin] prevailed to the ruin of mankind: and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men. So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The greatest Sin is ingenite in men's Souls. And Grotius assures us, That the Philosophers confessed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin; whence the Platonist makes mention 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of an evil nature: which, Definit. Plat. pag. 416. is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Vitiositie in nature: also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the natural disease, or disease of nature. Thence Plato, in his Politicus, pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie, gives this demonstration of its necessity; because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved, and all manner of disorders infeste human Nature: and men being impotent are torn in pieces by their own lusts, as by so many wild Horses. And thence he concludes, That from this plague of vitiosity men were driven to great straits and confusions. The like Stobaeus, Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus 's Dictates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Phy! how depraved is man's nature altogether! otherwise there were no need of Laws. Dost thou think that man is anything more excellent than Bestes? Truly but little, except only in figure: Brutes look towards the earth; but man has an erect countenance. Thus also Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirms, That Souls living on the earth are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of a brutish nature. And it is said of Democritus, that he affirmed, The diseases of the Soul to be so great, that if it were opened, it would appear to be a sepulcher of all manner of evils. Yea Aristotle, albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature, yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiosity, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , naturally repugnant to right reason. But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature. So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive ourselves? our evil is not from without; it is fixed in our very bowels. Again, Al Sins are in all men, but all do not appear in each man: He that hath one Sin hath all. We say that all men are intemperate, avaricious, luxurious, malign; not that these Sins appear in all; but because they may be, yea are in all, although latent. A man may be nocent, although he do no hurt. Al Sins are perfect, [ i. e. in corrupt nature] before they break forth into effect. These and such like great confessions, touching the Vitiositie of human Nature, made Jansen break forth into a rapture of admiration, that Socrates, Plato, and other poor Heathens should leave us truer and better Philosophemes hereof, than the Pelagians and later Schole-men.

Yet it cannot be denied, but that many of the ancient and moderne Schole-men have given us great notices of this natural Vitiositie, specially such as were Sectators of Augustine, as Aquinas, Ariminensis, Bradwardine, Alvarez, &c. We may reduce the explication of the whole to the following Propositions. (1) Adams personal actual Sin becomes the natural original Sin of all his Posterity. This the Gentile Philosophers were ignorant of: they had some notices of the corruption of nature, but were ignorant of the originarie cause and manner of its traduction, as Augustine hath well observed. This Traduction of original Sin from Adam to his posterity is well demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gentiles, lib. 4. cap. 50. where he demonstrates, from Rom. 5.12, 19. against the Pelagians,

And Cap. 52. he farther explicates, how Adams personal, actual Sin, by imputation becomes our original and natural sin. This original Sin is termed natural; because congenite with, proper to, and inseparable from corrupt nature, as to any power of its own. It consists formally in the privation of original Righteoùsnesse: which privation is both our punishment and sin: as original Righteousness, upon the imputation of Adams Sin, is by divine Justice denied to us; so this privation is our punishment: but as it ought to be in us, and is wanting, by reason of Adam 's Sin become ours, so it is our sin. (2) The Vitiositie of Nature or original Sin is said to be voluntary as it inheres in the Will, and corrupts the same. Aristotle tells us, Acts are voluntary, because they pass from the Will; but habits, because they are received into the Will, and impressed thereon. Such is original Sin as to its Vitiositie, which is as an habitual Pondus impacted on the Will, and inclining it to all manner of vitiose acts. Others make original Sin to be voluntary, with respect to the commun representative Will of our first Parent, whose Will, as he was a commun Head, politically included ours. So Davenant, and the Schole-men. (3) The Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is seminal, radical and universal both extensively and intensively. As every man naturally considered is a Microcosme or little abridgement of the greater World; so morally considered, he is a Macrocosme or a great World of corruption. Yea, all that is of contagion in the greater World comes from the superfluity of Vitiositie shut up in the heart of man. If corrupt human Nature were not on the earth, there would be nothing in the World but what was good. Yea farther, there is more of Vitiositie in one corrupt Nature, than a world of Sinners can vent. Every man hath sin enough in his own nature to defile the whole Creation. And this corruption of nature is so deep, that all the fire in the World, yea of Hel, will not fetch it out. It is universal both as to extension of parts and degrees. The man is infected with it from top to toe: it poisons his eye, ear, tongue, hand and every part: it dogs him from place to place. This Plague of corrupt Nature is greater in some than in others, and usually greatest in those of greatest condition. Al sins in the heart do not act alike at all times; yet all are there in the seed and root of corrupt nature. Many lusts work indirectly as Principes that lie low: men act in the power of them, and yet observe them not. (4) This universal Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is the sovereign reigning Sin, which breeds, foments, and influenceth all other Sins. Adams person first corrupted our Nature; and human Nature being corrupted, corrupts our persons: and our persons being corrupted, corrupt all our actions, and thereby increase the corruption of our Natures. It is a great Question in practic Theology, What is a man's reigning Sin? But if we consider reigning sin simply and absolutely, it is no other than corrupt nature. It's true, there are in particular persons, according to their particular inclinations, temptations, and circumstances, particular sins that bear sway and rule: but these are but as Viceroys and Vicegerents under the vitiosity of corrupt nature; which is the supreme Sovereign and Lord, as a cruel best nourished in our bowels, ever ready to devour us. The main part of our enmity against God, and his enmity against us lies in the vitiosity of our natures, and its contrariety to God, Rom. 8.6.

§. 3. The first product of Original Sin, and that which has a malign efficacious influence on all sin, is practic Error, or Ignorance. How great, universal, and venomous the Ignorance of all Mankind by nature is, Plato frequently inculcates. He gives us a lively description hereof in his Repub. 7. pag. 514.

It's true, many attain to great speculation and contemplation of things divine, even by natures light and heat, assisted by commun illuminations; yet how defective are they as to all practic knowledge, which is the worst ignorance? Thus Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 689. What is the worst ignorance? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Lo, when a man loves not but hates, what he knows and estimes to be honest and good: but, on the contrary, loves and embraceth what he knows to be evil and injust. Wherein he instructes us, that speculative knowledge conjoined with practic error renders our ignorance most inexcusable and dangerous. And that which yet adds greater malignity to our ignorance is, when men fondly conceit they sufficiently understand, what indeed they are really ignorant of: such proud conceits are the worst self-deceits and errors: all the use such make of their knowledge is to conceal their ignorance from themselves and others: their very light adds to their darkness. And their terrible darkness is by so much the more deplorable, in that they take it for light; which they follow with pleasure, as children do the Ignis Fatuus, which leads them to Precipices. Thus Plato, Leg. 5. pag. 732. From the same sin this a so happens to men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that everyone counts his ignorance his wisdom: Hence it comes to pass, that whiles we know nothing, we think we know all things. And are not those greatly to be pitied, who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant? Is anything more worthy of compassion, than the blindness of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World? And whence comes this proud affected ignorance, but from men's not knowing God and themselves? Is it not a strange thing, that the Soul which knows all things else, should be so ignorant of itself, and of its Maker? Thence Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 144. saith, It is no wonder, that they who are ignorant of God, should account that which is worst best. Whence he concludes, That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil. And as to the ignorance of ourselves, he openly affirms, Theaecet. pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they think they are not, [ i. e. ignorant] by how much the less they think they are so. And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and ourselves is the root of all sin, he further demonstrates, Alcibiad. 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance, whereby a man thinks he knows, what indeed he is ignorant of. And he subjoins the reason: Those are left under error, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , who knowing nothing, think they know everything. Confidence of knowledge is a sure marque of ignorance. Whence he concludes, pag. 118. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins, and most opprobriose. Lastly, Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us, That when we attempt those things whereof we are ignorant, we grossly err. Such a venomous, malign, efficacious influence has proud, conceited, practic Error on all sin. Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darkness or ignorance: practic Errors foment and maintain lusts. The mind, like a silk-worm, lies entangled in those errors, that came out of its own bowels: when lust hath put out Reason, it soon takes the Chair: men of corrupt minds, are men of sinful lives: Mind and Will do reciprocally vitiate each other: whiles lust bribes conscience out of office, it cooperates with sin. Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience; which delights to spin out of itself sick dreaming errors, thereby to create its own chains and fetters: a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons all good convictious of duty: surely there is no duty done by that man, whose conscience doth not its duty: for there is nothing in man active for God, when conscience is not first active. It's evident then, that practic error of conscience opens the door to all sin.

And as Plato, so Aristotle, his Scholar, hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on all sin. Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance, and ignorant Sins. A drunken man, that kills another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly; and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance, because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted. Thence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain: and by this they are made unjust and wicked. And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds. (1) There is, saith he, an ignorance, the cause of which is in ourselves. As when drunken men sin ignorantly; which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkenness. (2) There is an Ignorance of Right or Law: when men are ignorant of their duty, which they ought to know. (3) There is an ignorance from our own neglect: which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided. (4) There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custom in sinning.

We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution. Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowledge, the one universal, the other particular: a defect in either of these causeth sin. Whence it follows, that a man may have an universal knowledge, that this or that is sinful in general, and yet want a particular judgment of its sinfulness in this or that case. So that particular ignorance is very well consistent with universal knowledge. But now, sithat universal knowledge, though most certain, is not so influential on our actions, as particular; because actions are about singulars; hence it follows, that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin, than universal knowledge has to prevent it. This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary: and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent, or that which is consequent to the act. Yea all ignorance which ariseth from the Will, may be looked on as voluntary. For what is involuntary, if it arise from some precedent voluntary act, it may be judged voluntary, according to moral estimation. As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard, whose ignorance is voluntary; because arising from the act of his own Will. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle, That those Acts whose Principe is in us, may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us. Lastly we may, with Aristotle, distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam, i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin: and such as are cum ignorantia: i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin, yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners will: The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance, but the later not; because the ignorance is voluntary. Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do, as will to do what they know. Reason may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the will of man not incline itself thereto, as oft as sensual passions, prejudice, or affected ignorance prevail. So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin: either because men do not practically consider all circumstances; or if they do consider them, yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil; but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion, That this or that sinful Act is sweet, or profitable. A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises, and yet dissent from the conclusion, yea consent to a bad conclusion. Lusts pervert Conscience, and sil it with partiality and prejudice in its inquiries. The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust: for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as will not distaste its lusts; nor yet its lusts molest it. There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart: It's easy for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison, and detain the truth of God in unrighteousness: to believe as it list, not as it ought. A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings, various coverts and hiding places for lust: Sometimes the veil of hypocrisy, yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin, as Mat. 23.14. Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing, or a bad design is justified by a good end: or a good cause is made use of to justify a bad action: or when men's lusts will not comply with the rule, men bring down the rule to their lusts. Again, sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors: Men's lusts make many controversies about sin: they make great sins little, and little none at all. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of all sin. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5.

§. 4. Not only practic Error, but also Self-love has a malign venomous influence on all sin. Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme. So Repub. 9. pag. 574, &c. he describes to the life,

So also in what follows, pag. 577. of which hereafter. Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That Self-love is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an ingenite evil, in which they who indulge themselves, have no remedy against sin. Then he adds: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , And to speak the truth, self-love is altogether the cause of all those evils, in which the life of man is involved. And he gives the reason of it: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves; and thence misjudgeth things just, good, and honest; being in this opinion, that there is more honor due to him than to truth. And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof; Because 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a self-lover acts a! for himself, according to his profit. Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self, which he makes his God, and the only Centre, in which all the lines of his Affections and Actions meet. Self is the last end of self-lovers, even in their highest acts of self-denial: if they give their goods to the poor, or their bodies to be burned for Religion, it is all to please self. They may cross their own wills, but never cross self as their last end: if they seek after God, it is to advance self: self-love forms all their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest. What makes superstitious persons so much to vilify, mortify, and with so much severity torment their bodies, but thereby to exalt their inward excellences? And as self-lovers make self the last End, so also the first Principe of all they do. Self-love ever affects self-dependence: it would fain have a World of its own to live, act, and breathe in: it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottom of its dependence: it would live and die within the sphere of its own activity, as well as interest. It's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with, and thereby merit divine favor. And alas! how soon are men overcome by temptations, when they are self-dependent and self-strong? He that thinks to keep himself from sin by self-strength, will soon be overcome by it. Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love, it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of all sin. Every self-lover is his own Idol: and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself, he is soon overcome thereby, and so hurried into sin. Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal, vile, and abominable to God. Where self is predominant, the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten: and a bad intention makes the best works bad. Where self rules, it forms even religiose services into a conformity to carnal lusts: wherefore he that cannot depart from self, will soon depart from God, and tumble headlong into all sin. Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence, and most directly opposite to divine love. The sovereign power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love: by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God: yea, the more men endeavor to humor and gratify it, the more tyranny it is. Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself, his carnal self, which is so potent to draw him into sin. It has always been the ambition of the Creature to defy itself, not by being equal in nature with God, but by being its first Cause and last End, which is the spring of all departure from God, and conversion to the Creature. And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policy and many artifices to conceal its self and sin. How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love, and thereby delude the Soul into sin? There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal: whence the later oft conceles itself under the vizard of the former. The more a man loves himself, the less he conceits he loves himself: as the more mad a man is, the less he judgeth himself so. Self-love is so artificial in its colors, as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice, and vice with virtues face. Thus by its frauds and deceits in conceling itself and sin, it greatly advances sin. The members of self-love are principally three. (1) Concupiscence, or adherence to the Creature as our last end. (2) Carnal confidence, or dependence on self as the first cause. (3) Spiritual pride, or an over-valuing esteem of self-excellences. Each of these have a venomous influence on all sin, as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others, Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 8, 9, 10.

§. 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds. Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary, or voluntary: again involuntary, into sins of Ignorance, or of Passion. We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato, Phileb. pag. 22. where he saith, That those who choose sin, do it either involuntarily and ignorantly, or out of a voluntary miserable necessity. 1. As for involuntary Sins, they are, (1) Sins of Ignorance, when the ignorance is not affected, either from prejudice, voluntary neglect, or custom in sin, as before, §. 3. (2) Sins of Passion or Infirmitie, when the passion is antecedent to the will, and doth as it were extort the consent of the will, being vehement and violent. For if the passion be consequent to the act of the will, or but a languid remiss motion, such as doth not force the will, the sin is not so much of passion, as voluntary: whence passions that arise from evil customs, and follow the will, do not constitute a sin of passion. Thence Aristotle. Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith, That every sin from passion is not involuntary. Thus also Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 5. Disp. 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse, in sins either of ignorance or of passion, takes away something of their aggravation: where there is real unaffected ignorance, passion or perturbation, there is less of sin. Where there is involuntary Ignorance, there is want of that which might help the understanding: where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin, there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance. Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said, That they who sin from perturbation, not voluntarily, deserve pardon, as Laertius. 2. Voluntary willful Sins, are such as proceed from a strong bent of will, without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof. Such sins are of greater aggravation, because of less provocation, and excuse. From a perseverance in voluntary sins, and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custom and rooted habit of sin, touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato, of which hereafter §. 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin.

§. 6. The Nature, Causes, and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open, we may with more facility explicate and demonstrate, what that moral Servitude is which attends it. That all moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophy, as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others. There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients: some were made servants by being taken in war; others were bought with a price; others became such by being borne in the house of servants, as Ishmael. Sacred Philosophy, in treating of the servitude of sin, alludes to all these three kinds of service. (1) Sinners are said, 1 Kings 21.20. & 2 Kings 17.17. To sel themselves, to work evil: i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin, and that with a full bent of heart: which is opposed to Paul's being sold under sin, Rom. 7.14. (2) The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin, 2 Pet. 2.19. (3) Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin, Eph. 2.2. Children of disobedience: i.e. addicted, devoted, given up to it. So Ephes. 5.6. & Col. 3.6. This is an Hebraic Idiotisme: for among them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Son, being put in the state of Regiment, and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing, is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it. Thus a child of disobedience, is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it. And Plato, Rep. 9. pag. 575. tells us, That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts, is the greatest slave imaginable: for he cannot do what he would; but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts. Therefore in his Cratylus, as he derives 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , always to flow, which imports liberty; so he derives 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Vice, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts. But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slavery which attends all Sinners by nature, we shall consider this servitude of Sin, (1) In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin. (2) In the proper Adjuncts, or Attributes that attend this servitude. First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin, we shall draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophy, in the ensuing Propositions.

1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature. The Civilian, Justin. Institut. l. 1. tit. 3. defines Civil Servitude, a constitution of the Law of Nations, whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature. And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin? What more against human Nature, than to be subject to the tyranny of irregular passions? Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemy to man, but also himself the greatest enemy to himself? That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature, may easily be evinced out of Plato 's Philosophy. Thence he calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Discord and Confusion; because it causeth an intestine war, discord, and confusion in human Nature. Thus also in his Lysis, he saith, Al good is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , proper and agreeable to human Nature, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , evil is aliene and repugnant to it. Good, albeit it slow not from Nature, yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature; whereas all Sin tends to its ruin. As all moral Liberty consists in Virtue, which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature; so all moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature. Thus Psal. 106.43. And were brought low for their iniquity. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies attenuated, depressed. It's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition. Then follows the cause of this their being brought down: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for, or in their iniquity. Their iniquity was not only the meritorious cause, but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down. Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature, as Sin. So Psal. 107.12. Therefore he brought down their heart with labor: they fell down, and there was none to help. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with toilsome labor. The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature. (1) Sin brings down human Nature, and is most repugnant to it, in that it imports an aversion and falling from God, who is our most laudable and excellent Being, our first Principe and last End. This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam, Gen. 3.9. Where art thou? In this Question we may consider [1] That it regards not Adams place, but state: Where art thou? Not in what place, but in what state? How is it with thee now Adam? How doest thou do? Is all well? What is the condition of thy Soul? Art thou in that state I placed thee in? [2] It's a question not of ignorance as to God, but of conviction as to Adam: it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor. Where art thou? Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength? Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride, thy unbelief has reduced thee? Thou aimedst to be as God, free from my yoke and Law. But is it so with thee? Art thou not fallen into a miserable bondage? Doth not thy fear, thy running away, and endeavor to hide thyself, discover thy guilt and servitude? [3] It is a sarcastic, biting, upbraiding question. Where art thou? O! how is it with thee now Adam? Hast thou not brought thyself to a sine pass? Where is the Deity thou affectedst? Plato seems to give frequent hints and intimations of this Fal of Man, and the servitude that attends it. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. he compares the Soul, in its innocent state, to a winged Chariot, that slies aloft; but in its lapsed state, he makes it to have lost its wings, and to be imprisoned in the body. And the Platonists generally complain of the Souls servitude in the body, as a punishment of some former sin. Which makes Steuch. Eugubinus and others to think, that Plato knew more of the Fal, than he would discover, which he disguised under that Hypothesis, of the Preexistence of Souls. So Eusebius, Praep. Evang. lib. 12. cap. 11. pag. 584. thinks that Plato, in his Symposium, expressed the Fal allegorically under the Symbol of Porus, of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 5. §. 1-6.

(2) Sin pulls down and is repugnant to human Nature, as it divestes men of the Image of God. Thus in sacred Philosophy, Gen. 3.7. And they knew that they were naked: i.e. they perceived themselves divested of the image of God. Thence v. 22. God said: Behold man is become like one of us! i.e. Ironically, most unlike unto us, a sad spectacle, a prodigiose monster, unlike the Creature made by us. It alludes to the words of Satan, v. 5. And ye shall be as God's. It is said, Gen. 5.1. That Adam was created in the likeness of God. But v. 3. it's added, That he begat a son in his own likeness, i.e. sinful, as he was. This deprivation of the image of God is well expressed by Paul, Rom. 3.23. For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , are deprived, spoiled, divested of the glory of God. This may be taken (1) Actively: Al have come short of the glorious image of God, and conformity to his Law, which Adam was at first invested with. (2) Passively, as to future Glory. The former sense seems primarily intended here. Adams Soul was filled with the glorious image of God; but ah! alas! how has sin defaced and dissigured the Soul! how far short doth it now come of that glorious Image! This Fal of man from the Image of God Plato was not altogether a stranger unto: for, in his Critias, he saith, that anciently there flourished in our first Parents, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a divine nature, which rendered them happy, but human custom or sin prevailing, an inundation of evils followed.

(3) Sin brings down human Nature and is repugnant thereto, in that it infuseth a Principe of confusion, enmity, and rebellion against God. The perfection of human Nature consists in an intimate adherence and subjection to God; but sin puts a law of enmity and rebellion into the heart, Rom. 8.7. The carnal mind is enmity against God, i.e. a complexe or system of all manner of enmity: yea nothing but enmity: enmity in the highest-degree: for abstractes speak forms and essences. Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. makes three Species of the carnal minds Rebellion and Reluctance against Grace. (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a servile departure from God. (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a contentiose aversion and obstinate reluctance against God. (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a stupor in sin: when men rush into sin, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , with a bare face. The carnal mind is the greatest enemy God has. Al sin in corrupt nature is a kind of Antipathie against God; that which puts men upon all acts of rebellion against, and aversation from him. Hos. 4.12. A spirit of fornication: i.e. of Idolatry, which is spiritual fornication. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Spirit denotes a vehement fervor, flame, or impetus of lust: such as carries with it the highest impetuositie, effort, and force. For the Hebrews cal all the extraordinary motions or perturbations of the mind, Spirit. Thence it follows: from under God: i.e. from under his Power, Empire, and Dominion. From under hath the force of a privation, and denotes their aversion from God. Thence he adds, v. 16. For Israel slideth back, as a backsliding heifer. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as a rebellious, contumacious, refractary heifer: such as thinketh herself free, casts off the yoke from her neck, and is impatient of subjection, as Deut. 32.15. The meaning is, that Israel, like a lascivious refractary Heifer, had cast off all regard to divine Commands, and wandered up and down according to her own lusts. Thence follows her punishment answerable to her sin: The Lord will feed her in a large place. She affects a wandering, vagrant, licentious course of life, and she shall have it: The Lord will feed her in a large place, or barren desert, not in a fruitful place. When Churches or people wander from God, he will feed them in a desert of affliction, as Hos. 2.14. Such is the state of those that wander from God. Sacred Philosophy and the Greek Fathers express this enmity of the carnal mind against God, by such expressions as these: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to resist God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to resist the Spirit; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to affect to overcome the power of God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to make void, or repel Grace; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to deride God. And what greater bondage can there be, than for a rational Creature to turn his back on God, and fly from his chiefest good? Doth not this pul down and impoverish human Nature? Thence Plato, in his Politicus, tells us, That after the Golden Age, i.e. the state of Innocence, had its period, sin brought into the world a deluge, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of confusion and disorder, &c.

(4) Sin is most repugnant to human Nature, in that it strips men of the right use of their Reason, Will, Affections, yea of their comfortable Being and Humanity. Plato, in his Theaetetus, assures us, That the excellence of man consists in his Ressemblance unto God; but so far as he falls short thereof, he falls under, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nothingnesse, and Inhumanitie. Sin reduceth human Nature to a kind of Inhumanitie and Nothingnesse, in that it spoils it of the right use of its rational Being and operations. For man having an intrinsec relation unto God, as his first efficient and last End, he so far enjoys his Being, as he doth adhere to God: he that bids farewell to, or departs from God, bids farewell to, and departs from himself, as to all right use of what he has. Man is then said to live, when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought; which sin deprives him of, in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed, and enjoy things that are to be used. Thus it invertes the order of things. Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates, as also the Stoics, That all Vice is against Nature; because human Nature as such, was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End; which state man by sin doth relinquish; and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being, Life, Reason, Will, Affections, and all human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature.

2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature, but to themselves. This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin: for all moral Liberty implies Order, Harmonie, and Uniformitie, which ariseth from Virtue: but Lusts are extreme jarring, dissonant and opposite each to other. Oh! what strange discords, confusions, and seditions are there among lusts in the heart? How is the heart distracted and as it were torn in pieces by them? Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawless; they keep no order. Thence in sacred Philosophy it is said, The corrupt mind cannot subject itself to the law of God. Rom. 8.7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , cannot keep the place, order, and rank the Law of God has put the Soul into. It alludes to Military order: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers. Yea it's added, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , neither indeed can be: namely, because the Law is the rule of order, but Lusts are all for disorder: they disagree among themselves, as well as from the Law of God. Lusts have no end, bounds, measure: what is sin, but a confused Chaos of all manner of disorders? How do sensual passions fight, not only against God's Law, but against each other? And oh! what a slavery ariseth herefrom? Thence sinners are described, Tit. 3.6. Serving lusts and diverse pleasures. These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number, but also as to Quality, as different and opposite each to other. Thence Jam. 4.1. Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in men's Souls, whence all externe wars and contests arise. Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts. So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Sedition of the Soul, or Insurrection. So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , pag. 214. he makes all virtrose persons to be like each other, and friends; but as for profligate wicked men, they differ as well from themselves, as each from other. And in his Phaedo, pag. 92. he saith: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Al sin is full of discord, but virtue is harmonious. The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this: Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God, who is the first Unity: so far as men depart from this prime Unity, so far they fall under confusion, difformitie, and disorder. And what greater punishment of sin is there than this, that it is displeasing, yea repugnant to itself? How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for, and then reassume what they relinquished? What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts? But of this more in what follows.

3. Sin is the Disease of the Soul, full of impotence and infirmity. Al moral Liberty implies health, vigor, force and strength: and wherein consists the vigor and strength of anything, but in adherence to its first Principes? The more anything departes from Unity, the more Division, Contrarietie, Dissolution, and Infirmitie. And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul? Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unity and strength? O! then how impotent and infirm is sin? This is everywhere intimated in sacred Philosophy. So Ezech. 16.30. How weak is thy heart! i.e. how sick, faint, and impotent by reason of lust. Yet it follows: Seeing thou doest all these things, the works of an imperiose whorish woman. She had potent imperiose lusts, but a weak heart to resist temptations. Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root, which sheds its malign influences on all our Affections and Actions. Thus Deut. 29.18. Apostasy is said to be a root bearing gal and bitterness. The Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 rendered Gal, signifies a poisonous herb; and so it must be rendered here, a root, whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter. Thence the LXX. render it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , springing up in gal, or poison and bitterness. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both gal and poison, answerable to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal. Peter alludes hereto, Act. 8.23. where 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature. So Heb. 12.15. Root of bitterness: i.e. poisonous root of sin. Nothing so poisonous and killing as sin. Whence sinners are said to be, Jer. 17.9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , desperately sick, even unto death. So Esa. 24.4. languisheth, as a feeble, crazy, consumtive body, as v. 5. Basil, in Psal. saith, That men are rendered by Virtue or Grace 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , without wound and blemish: whence they become, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , inexpugnable and free, as before, Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows, that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul, that which renders it most impotent and servile. That sin is full of impotence and infirmity Plato once and again inculcates. So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith, An intemperate man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , weaker than himself; whereas a temperate man is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , more potent than himself, i.e. than his sensual appetite. Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 86, 87. he proves, That the irregularity of our affections is the worst disease. So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informs us, That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things, but good conserves and relieves. And thence he concludes, That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound. Lastly, Repub. 1. he saith, Unrighteousnesse is the disease of the Soul.

4. Sin is the spot, stain and defilement of the Soul, and therefore the greatest servitude. Virtue gives a Nitor, Luster, Splendor, Beauty, and Glory to the Soul; but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature: indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin, and sinful Idols. Hence we find mention, Deut. 29.17. & Ezech. 23.7. of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , gillulim, filthy Idols. The word signifies both filth and Idols, or sordid, dunghill, filthy Idols, such as pollute by the very touch. So Levite. 26.30. Psal. 106.28. The Soul, by its lusts, running into and being made one with filthy Idols, is thereby made filthy and impure: as on the contrary, when it mingles with things above it, God and things virtuose, it's thereby made more pure and excellent. We read also, Tit. 1.11. of filthy lucre. Lucre is not filthy in itself, but being beneath the Soul, it defiles the same when it is coveted thereby. For when the heart of man runs down into things beneath itself, it is thereby defiled, whence such things are called filthy Idols. This also Plato observed: whence in his Minos, he tells us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , A good man is of all most sacred: but a wicked man most impure and polluted. Sin indeed pollutes the whole man. (1) It defiles men's persons: whence sinners are termed Swine, Mat. 7.6. which are the most unclean Creatures. (2) It defiles men's Minds and Consciences, Tit. 1.15. (3) It defiles men's Discourses, words, and communications: Esa. 9.17. Every mouth speaketh folie. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is rendered villainy, Chap. 32.6. signifies the flowers and leaves of plants putrefied and rotten. So Ephes. 4.29. No corrupt communication. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies rotten, stinking, noisome, like rotten fruits or stinking breath. (4) It defiles men's Actions and Fruits: Mat. 7.17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 malign fruits. (5) It pollutes whole Nations and Churches. Hence Israel in her Apostasy is said to be, Hos. 8.8. a vessel wherein is no pleasure: i.e. as some expound it, like such vessels as are most abject, and exposed to the most sordid uses, to retain only excrements. So Lam. 1.8, 9. Zeph. 3.1. (6) Yea Sin pollutes our very Righteousness and makes it unclean. Esa. 64.6. As an unclean thing, or person; because the term is masculine. As a lump of some filthy mater, or such unclean stuff, as by the Law was to be burned, Lev. 13.55, 57. or like some leprose person; or one laboring under some noisome disease, even from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, as Chap. 1.6. Thence he adds: And all our righteousnesses as filthy rags. There are different interpretations of these words: some take them as an allusion to Beggers Ragges: others, to Ragges polluted by putrefied sores: others, to garments defiled by blood: others, to menstruous rags: but all generally agree in this, that the term notes much defilement. In sum, there is this universal defilement on human Nature: Adams person first polluted our nature; and our natures polluted defile our persons and whatever procedes from us, or is inherent in us. Hence,

5. Sin is the Reproche, Dishonor, Shame, and Disgrace of the Soul. As God has entailed honor and renown on true Virtue, so shame and disgrace on Sin: neither can the wit and power of man cut off this Entail. This is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy, which teacheth us, That Sin doth degrade men, and strip them of their highest excellence, clothing them with shame and reproach. Thuch Esa. 32.5. The vile person shall no more be called liberal, nor the churl said to be bountiful. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 nabal signifies primarily a vile person, a man of no worth, like a withered flower, or leaf in Autumn. Thence it signifies a fool, as Abigail 's speech imports, 1 Sam. 25.25. Such a vile foolish sinner shall no more be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 nadib, i.e. free, noble, ingenuous, generose Prince. No Nabal or vile sinner, shall, in the days of Christ's glorious reign, (which this Text refers to, as v. 1, &c.) be called Nadib, free, generose Prince. This is more fully expressed, Esa. 14.20. The seed of evil-doers shall never be renowned. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , shall not be named: or shall not be men of name, or renown forever. The great God delights to clothe proud sinners with shame and reproach. Thus Esa. 22.17. Behold the Lord will carry thee away with a mighty captivity, and will surely cover thee. Hebr. in covering will cover thee. This repetition, according to the Hebrew Idiome, imports, (1) Certainty, (2) Expedition, (3) Abundance, (4) Continuance. He shall certainly, speedily, abundantly, and continually cover thee. Ay but with what? With shame and reproach. It implies such a covering as persons fallen into disgrace, or carried captive, or condemned to die were wont to have, whose faces were covered, as unworthy to see light. And who was it, who should be thus covered? It was Shebna the Kings Treasurer, a man covered and clothed with gorgeous apparel, and many Titles of Honor, as v. 18. God first or last clothes the highest of sinners with shame and reproach. Sin strips men of their highest excellences, and then God, in just judgment, clothes them with disgrace. So Exod. 32.25. And when Moses saw the people were naked. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , naked, in the shame of their sins, divested of the glory of God. So it follows: For Aaron had made them naked unto their shame amongst their enemies. Unto their shame, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or, unto their infamy. LXX. a rejoicing and mockery, namely to their adversaries. Sin makes men a shame, infamy, and reproach to their friends, and the scorn, mockery, and rejoicing of their adversaries. What more contumeliose and reprocheful to human Nature, than to be a voluntary drudge of Sin and Satan? Whiles Nations and Churches keep close to God, they are formidable and terrible to their enemies; but when by sin they depart from God, they are the reproach of all. Thus Ephraim, Hos. 13.1. When Ephraim spake trembling, he exalted himself in Israel. Some read it thus: Ephraim was a tremblement to him that heard him: i.e. so long as he kept close to God, he was formidable to all his enemies, he was exalted in honor and renown. But when he offended in Baal he died: i.e. he is now most abject and contemptible in the eyes of all. And why? because he hath departed from the Worship of God to worship Baal. Thence it follows, v. 2. And now they sin more and more. Hebr. They add sin to sin. O! what an ignoble thing is sin? Doth it not bring all under a scorn? Thus Israel in Babylon, Lam. 3.14. I am made a derision to all my people. Or, as others, to all people, namely round about. Thence Paul demands of the Romans, Rom. 6.21. What fruit had ye then in these things whereof ye are now ashamed? The state of sin is always attended with shame and bondage. This was also well observed by Plato and many of the wiser Heathens. Thus Plato, in his Phaedrus, calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , concupiscence, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the contumely or reproach of human Nature. So in his Gorg. pag. 477. he says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The pravitie of the Soul is the basest and vilest of all things. Yea, he affirms: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It is not only by Law, but by Nature more base to do an injury than to receive it. So in his Symposium, pag. 183. he saith, That love is of itself neither excellent nor vile; but if it be irregular, it is most vile. Whence he concludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It is therefore a vile thing, vily to obey any vile thing, such as sin is. And he adds, pag. 184. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , To lust after riches or civil power is most base and vile. The like in his Leg. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Injustice is the basest thing imaginable. And he subjoins the reason: For he that fills his Soul with sins, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth reproach it, and make it vile. Indeed nothing can make man vile, unless he first make himself vile by sin. Thence Anacharsis being upbraided by an Athenian, that he was a Scythian, of a base Country; he replied, My Country is a disgrace to me, but thou art a disgrace to thy Country: meaning by his vitiose courses. And is not this too true of too many Englishmen? It's true, many, by reason of their high condition in the world, may be exemted from the punishment of their sin, yet assuredly none is or can be exemted from the shame of it. Thence Basil, Psal. saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That there is a turpitude and impressed stamp or print of sin, as it were of an indelible tincture. Al other excellences cannot keep a man from being vile, if sinful. Antiochus a King is said to be a vile person, because wicked. Seneca tells us,

Pious humility exalts the Soul by making it subject to God, but proud self-exaltation brings down the Soul: nothing more servile and base than to be subject to the imperiose dictates of proud vile lusts.

6. Sin is the greatest Tyrannie, and therefore its servitude greatest. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 574, &c. gives us a copiose, lively, and emphatic illustration of the Tyrannie of Self-love: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. When the Soul has subjected itself to the Tyrannie of Love, it's hurried into all manner of flagitiose vices, neither can he abstain therefrom: but that tyrannic Love living in him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in all manner of Anarchy and lawless Empire, as a great Monarch, precipitates him into all manner of vices. So also pag. 577. The mind being subject to tyrannic Lust cannot do what it would, but is torn in pieces by violent assaults, &c. Yea he affirms, That by how much the more men indulge and observe the commands of Lust, by so much the more tyrannic and insolent it is. So in his Gorg. pag. 478. He must needs live miserably, who carries about with him unrighteousness, that imperiose Lady, whose commands he can never be free from. And indeed thus much sacred Philosophy informs us, That he who refuseth to be under the sweet Empire of the divine Law, falls under the miserable servitude of sins tyranny. Thus Rom. 5.21. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Sin is brought in as a great Tyrant, ruling with the greatest rigor imaginable, even unto death. So Rom. 6.12. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal bodies, that you should obey it in the lusts thereof. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , he brings in Sin as an infamous imperiose Lady, whom to serve is most unworthy of a free ingenuous Spirit. Thus Rom. 3.9. For we have before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin. Schmidius reads the first part thus: For we have been all long ago accused and convinced, namely Psal. 14.1, 2, 3. of what? That all are under sin. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to be under sin, is to be under the Jurisdiction, Tyrannie, and Subjection of Sin; which is here brought in as some imperiose domineering Lord, that delights to tyrannize over his Vassals. Sin is the basest thing in the world: O then how servile is subjection to its Tyrannie! A sinner addicted to any base tyrannic Idol he lusts after, doth not possess that beloved Idol, but that possesseth him, and brings him under a miserable Tyrannie, so that he can neither part with, nor enjoy what he lusts after: and by how the more the Idols he lusts after are multiplied, by so much the less power has he over himself, or the things which he possesseth. And the sovereign power and tyranny of sin appears in nothing more than in this, that men do voluntarily obey its dicates and commands. Such whose hearts are chained to any inferior Idol, have no power over themselves: they are not their own: they have no dominion over their own persons, actions, objects of use or fruition, in moral estimation. There is nothing that human Nature more abhors, than to be under the Tyrannie of others; and yet all sinners electively embrace a self-tyranny, to be under the power of tyrannic lusts.

7. Al Sin is full of Penurie, Want and Necessity; which is another attendent of servitude. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 577. tells us, That the Soul under the Tyrannie of Sin, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , must necessarily be always under an indigent insatiable condition. So in his Politicus, pag. 274. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , By all these things, [meaning such as attended the Fal of Man] men were driven into great straits. Thus also, Rep. 9. pag. 579. speaking of one under the tyranny of lust, he saith, He is a slave; neither are his lusts ever satisfied: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and he indeed appears to be a beggar, if any one knows how to look into his Soul. There is nothing so indigent and greedy as lust: the more it has the more it wants: which denotes great slavery. Thus we find exemplified in the Prodigal, Luk. 15.13, 14, 15. What is spoken here of famine, want, feeding on husks with swine, &c. demonstrates that great penury, slavery and misery, which those who are slaves to their lusts are obnoxious unto. This is in a more peculiar manner visible in such whose hearts are captivated by richesse, pleasures, or honors. The avaricious man has a vehement desire to be rich, and yet that very desire or lust makes him poor: yea, the richer he is as to this worlds goods, the poorer he is as to the real use and comfort of what he has: whiles he endeavors to increase an infinite treasure of riches, his lusts also are infinitely increased, which make him most poor. Thus also sensual and ambitiose men, the more they have the more they want: the increase of what they lust after makes them poorer as to real comfort and satisfaction therein. Sin indeed makes men most poor, in that it deprives them of God, who is the best riches. O! what a poor, shiftless, forlorn, miserable thing, or rather nothing is Sin.

8. Sin captivates the Soul, puts chains and fetters on it; which is a great piece of servitude. Al lusts do contract, pinion, and bind up the Soul, which is in itself most ample and extensive. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 83. saith, The mind, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is bound or fettered by sensual lusts. And he subjoins the reason: Because every pleasure and every dolor of the mind, being as it were armed with a nail, doth fasten it to the body, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and makes it corporeous, or sensual like the body. Wherein he gives us a lively symbolic image, how the Soul, by sensual lusts, becomes glued and chained to the body, yea transformed thereinto. Every Idol lusted after captivates the heart: so many lusts so many chains: yea every repeated act of sin brings the Soul under new fetters and bonds: the longer such go on in ways of sin, the greater slaves they are. It's true, some men's chains are lined with pleasures, or gilded over with terrene richesse; but yet that adds not to their liberty: yea, the greatest natures and most noble dispositions, if sinful, have the greatest chains: for by how much the more free such conceit they are, or affect to be, by so much the more they are entangled in their lusts, as Esa. 44.20. Such as feed on any Idol, are chained thereto, neither is it possible for them to deliver their own Souls. Thus Hos. 4.17. Ephraim is joined to Idols, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 bound, glued, chained. It alludes to the conjunction of unclean persons, whereby they become as it were one flesh, as 1 Cor. 6.16. Israel was chained to her Idols by indissoluble bonds of false Worship, and it was impossible to pul her thence. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Idols, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies grief, straits, trouble. Idols do greatly straiten, torment, and vex sinners, and yet they cannot part with them. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 579. tells us, That sinners are shut up in the prison of their own lusts, and fettered by their irregular desires. Yea, indeed every sinner is chained to the worst of Idols, himself, and fettered by his own lusts. This we find exemplified in Simon Magus, Act. 8.9. giving out that himself was some great one: i.e. potent in miracles, one that could do great feats. Ambitiose self was that unhappy Centre, unto which he was chained. And it is worthy our serious observation to consider, how this Idol chains and fetters his heart, even by and under a profession of Religion. The case stood thus: Simon perceiving the Apostles to outshine him in doing miracles, he has a mind to turn Christian, thereby to gain the same power, they were invested with, as v. 19. Give me also this power. Peter smelling out his ambitiose rank hypocrisy, tells him, in plain terms, v. 23. I perceive thou art in the gal of bitterness and bond of iniquity. This 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , bond of iniquity signifies, (1) a Covenant or compact with iniquity: such as is between Servants and Masters, or those who are in some deep conspiracy. And so the sense is: he was still a sworn slave of iniquity: one bound to sin by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacy. (2) It is used by the LXX. to express the bands of iniquity, or a chain, such as prisoners are kept in, Esa. 58.6. (3) It denotes, the binding up of many things together. Thus was Simon's heart bound up by the chains of many sins. And we find something like to this in Plato 's Cratylus, pag. 415. where he saith, That the vitiosity of the mind appears much in sloth: and he thence concludes; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Therefore sloth indicates, that the bond or chain of the Soul is most potent and tenacious.

9. Sin is the greatest servitude, in that it makes men sots, fools, and mad men: it deprives of the use of reason. Thus Plato, Protagor. pag. 332. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; Do not they who act irregularly, act foolishly and madly? So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 231. he makes inordinate love a kind of madness. Also in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ignorance, specially of the supreme Being and Truth, to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the disease and madness of the Soul. And the reason is evident; because the proper office and use of Reason is to unite the mind to its object Truth, and so by consequence to that Truth primarily, which is first, and most intelligible in itself, namely God, in the contemplation of whom the minds perfection consists. But now sin disunites the mind from God, and fills it with ignorance, folie, and madness. Hence the knowledge of the wicked is termed by Plato 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , nocturnal knowledge; because it neither illuminates, nor directs, nor delights them, which are the three main offices of knowledge. Thus our Lord, the first Light and Truth, assures us, Mat. 6.23. That the very light and knowledge of wicked men, though never so much cultivated and elevated by acquired notions, or commun illuminations of the Spirit, is but darkness, yea the blackest darkness. Stobaeus also informs us, That, according to Plato, nothing was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ridiculous or absurd but sin. And Grotius tells us, That Plato conjoined 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Luk. 23.41. so that nothing is indeed absurd but sin. Hence frequently in sacred Philosophy sinners are said to be without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an heart, i.e. practic judgment or conscience rightly informed, as Jer. 5.21. and in the Proverbs oft. Yea wicked men are styled, Psal. 5 5. as elsewhere, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , mad men. Thence it is said of the Prodigal, Luk. 15.17. When he came to himself, i.e. to an awakened conscience and sound mind: which denotes, that so long as he lived in sin, he was not himself, but like a mad man. And indeed the more wit men have, if under the power of sin, the greater mad men, fools, and slaves they are; because their wit doth but serve to entangle them in their lusts: their reason doth but fortify their minds with arguments and cavils against the means of their liberty.

10. Sin, when in its dominion and prevalence, transforms men into mere Brutes, which is the worst of servitude. Plato stiles sensual affections the brutish part of a man, which when they prevail, transform him into a best. For whatever the heart of man doth vehemently adhere unto, it receives a stamp and character from; yea is transformed thereinto: if the Soul strongly adhere to God, it has the impress of his image stamped on it: if unto the world, it is transformed into the spirit of the world. And the reason is evident; because all love is a kind of ingress, or running of the heart into what it loves: Thence follows first Union, and then, if it may be, Unity with its beloved. And where it cannot attain to Unity, it affects Ressemblance and similitude. Thus sinners having their hearts glued to the Idols of time, are transformed into their likeness: by loving sensual carnal objects, they become sensual and carnal. Hence we find sensual sinners styled, 2 Pet. 2.12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , natural brute bestes. Neither is this the case of sensual sinners only, but of the most refined spirits under the power of any base lusts. The Apostle speaking of all mankind in a natural state, saith that every man is, 1 Cor. 2.14. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an animal brutish man. Sin has made all human Nature inhuman and brutish: a man is not a man, in true moral and divine estimation, til he be virtuose: the wisest and best of men, if not sanctified, are but animal and brutish. Thence the Lord makes diligent inquisition throughout Jerusalem, If there were a man to be found, Jer. 5.1. How few men then are to be found in this sensual age! Al sinners carry the image of Satan or of Bestes: they are either like Satan in subtlety and malice; or like Bestes in sensuality. And ah! what a miserable Metamorphosis is this, for man to be made like a best! were it not much better for man to be a best, than to be like a best? For man by being like a best degrades himself, yea placeth himself below the condition of a best, which keeps in that state it was made by God.

§. 7. Having considered the servitude of Sin in regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend sin, we now come to consider this servitude in its own proper Attributes and Affections, thereby farther to demonstrate how miserable it is.

1. The servitude of Sin is most voluntary and willful, and therefore most miserable. Electively to espouse evil is the worst of evils. The slavery of sin is in this most miserable, that men voluntarily elect their slavery. They that take the most liberty in sinning are the greatest slaves; because voluntary slaves: Every sinner naturally estimes his Prison his Palace; his Hel, his Heaven. The will tamely and voluntarily puts itself into the fetters of sin, which renders its servitude most sordid: for the more there is of the will in sin, the more of sin and slavery: when the servitude of sin becomes a rational choice to the sinner, it is extreme miserable: when men hug and embrace their chains, love and delight in their sins, yea take a kind of satisfaction therein, what forlorn slaves are they! Who can pity such, who have no pity for themselves? Now that all the slaves of sin are voluntarily such, and so most miserable, Plato assures us, in his Phaedrus, pag. 238. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. It's altogether necessary, that he who voluntarily subjects himself to the empire of lust, be as a sick man, &c. i.e. restless in every condition. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 15. saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Old men voluntarily serve lucre or profit, as their Idol. This voluntary servitude of sin, the Scripture sometimes stiles a selling a man's self to do evil, as 1 Kings 21.20. 2 Kings 17.17. To sel himself to do evil implies a deliberate, voluntary, willful giving up himself to sin, which is the highest servitude: for he that sels himself to be a slave, is deservedly such. This is lively expressed in sacred Philosophy, Rom. 6.16. Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey: whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to whom ye yield yourselves servants. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is, so to yield a man's self a servant to another, as to observe every beck and nod of him to whom he yields himself a servant, with all manner of promtitude to obey his commands: yea it signifies, to seek an occasion of serving him. Thus those that yield themselves servants of sin to obey it in the lusts thereof become voluntary slaves thereof, and seek all manner of occasions to serve it. We find the same word used in the same sense, v. 13. Neither yield your members weapons of unrighteousness unto sin. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Neither observe all the becks and nods of sin, do not catch at occasions for the serving of it: be not ready to obey its irregular dictates; as it is the practice of those who are slaves thereof. The word is nowhere else used in the N.T. This voluntary servitude of sin is expressed Mich. 7.3. by doing iniquity with both hands earnestly, or strenuously, i.e. with a violent impetuose, deliberate bent of heart. The will is in everything the best or the worst: when men's wills are in their sins O! how loath are they to part with their chains, their burdens! how do they hug themselves therein! If men's wills be in their slavery, it is by so much the worse: men are never so much slaves, as when their wills are in their slavery.

2. The servitude of Sin is not more voluntary, than necessary; which adds much to its miserable state. The more voluntarily men sin, the more necessarily: and the more necessarily, the more voluntarily: the voluntariness of sin adds to its necessity; and the necessity to its voluntariness; and both to its servitude. This necessity, whereby the sinner is determined only to sin, ariseth from his own free and voluntary impiety. Its dura necessitas, as Augustine phraseth it; and therefore the more servile, because voluntary. As a person laboring under a violent fever the more he drinks to extinguish his heat, the more his heat and thirst is augmented: so sinners the more greedily they drink down sin, the more is the feverish heat of lust inflamed; thence the more necessarily do they thirst after it. Wherefore this wretched necessity, that attends sin, doth not oppose its voluntariness, but arise from it: the more the sinner delights in sin, the more he is enslaved to it: and the more necessarily he is enslaved to it, the more freely doth he act it. Such a miserable necessity is he under: For the more insuperable and inevitable any servitude is, the more miserable it is: and such is the slavery of sin: all the wit, power, and conflicts of corrupt Nature cannot deliver the sinner from it. Men are easily drawn into sin, but not from it. No man ever did by his own forces deliver himself from this slavery, and therefore no man can: an argument from the Act to the Power is here valid. Yea, this servitude of sin is so invincible and necessary, that the sinner wants not only an active power to deliver himself, but the next passive power and desire of being delivered from it. This necessary servitude of sin is termed by Plato, a miserable Necessity. So in his Phileb. pag. 22. he saith, That those who choose sin choose it either, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ignorantly and against their will, or from a miserable necessity. Wherein observe, (1) That he distinguisheth sins into such as are from ignorance and involuntary; and such as are voluntary and necessary. (2) He saith the necessity that attends sin is miserable. He elsewhere makes mention of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a blessed Necessity, which attends moral liberty, i.e. when men necessarily elect and adhere to what is best: but as for this Necessity, which attends men's voluntary adherence to sin, Oh how miserable is it! Men are tormented by their sins, and yet cannot leave them.

This miserable Necessity of sinning is both connate and adnate, arising partly from the corruption of Nature, partly from custom in sin. Continuance in frequent voluntary repetitions of sinful acts breeds a fixed custom and rooted habit of sin, whereby the servitude of sin becomes necessary and insuperable. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. The least prevarication, like a joke, secretly and easily creeps into men's minds, and by custom becoming familiar to us, by little and little steals into private and public manners: wherefore good education is necessary. Thence, Leg. 5. pag. 728. he saith, It is the greatest punishment to be assimilated to wicked men; for thereby they imbibe their customs, and come to have one and the same affection with them. So Leg. 7. he saith, Man is an Animal, which by good education is made tame and mild; but by bad, wild and fierce. Whence beholding some playing at dice, he greatly rebuked them for it: and being asked, Why he so severely reprehended them for such a small mater? he replied: But the custom is not small: meaning, that sinful customs, though about small maters, were not small, in that they drew on a necessity of sinning. So in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , By an evil habit or custom an evil man is made evil, in an high degree. Hence Antisthenes, being demanded, What was chiefly to be learnt? replied, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to unlearne evils, i.e. evil customs. Radicated customs produce a necessitude of sin and servitude, in that they occecate, indurate and harden conscience in sin. This occecation and induration of conscience was styled by Plato and others, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Apathy and Insensibilitie. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Apathy, Definit. Plat. is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , An habit, by which we abhor from affections. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Insensibilitie of sin is well expressed by Aristotle, Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The greatest sins are least sensible. By how much the more stupid and senseless conscience is, by so much the more necessary and incurable is the servitude of sin. This Apathy or Insensibilitie of conscience, is well set forth, 1 Tim. 4.2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Having their conscience cauterised, or marqued with a cauter. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to burn, signifies a cauter or hot iron, or whatever may be used by Surgeons to burn the flesh. Thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by burning to set a marque, or to dead the flesh. The sense is, that their consciences were burned, made dead and senseless by lusts; as proud flesh by a Cauter. Again, this Apathy of Conscience is in sacred Philosophy set forth by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which being derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a stone, signifies properly a callose concretion, like that of stones; thence Hardness, Insensibilitie, Inflexibilitie, Immobilitie. It is used metaphorically, Mar. 3.5. to denote the callose concretion and hardness of heart, by reason of sin. Whence it is expounded by Soudas, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , occecation. Thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is immediately deduced) is by Soudas and Phavorinus interpreted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to harden, and petrifie, or turn into a stone: by the LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to hebetate, Gen. 27.1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to darken, Deut. 34.7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to make heavy, 1 Kings 3.2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to exanimate, or dispirit, Ezech. 21.7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to excecate, Zach. 11.17. Yet according to the proper strict notion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 differs from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Joh. 12 40. By all which it appears, that frequent repeated custom in sin renders the conscience blind, obdurate, and senseless; so that the greatest moral evils are not felt, whereby sin becomes necessary and immobile. For when once conscience is, by frequent repetition of sins, cauterised, dispirited and made senseless, it leaves men to the swinge of their own lusts; whereupon follows a miserable necessity of sin and servitude; which ends at last in judicial hardness. Neither doth this immobilitie and necessity of sinning diminish, but aggravate the guilt of sin: for this necessity is contracted by the wills voluntary pursuit after sin: and is it not just with God to leave men under the power of their lusts, seeing they electively desire to be under them? The sum of all is this. (1) There is a natural obduration or hardness of conscience, which is innate and connate with corrupt Nature. (2) There is an adnate or acquired hardness by custom in sin, Heb. 3.13. (3) There is a judicial hardness inflicted by God as a punishment, which seals up sinners from the darkness of mind to the darkness of Hel. Each of these Hardnesses has a necessary servitude of sin attending of it, though gradually different. For the second superaddes to the first, as the third to the second.

3. The servitude of Sin is infinite. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated not only in sacred, but also in Platonic Philosophic. The servitude of sin is infinite, (1) If we regard the object of sin, as it is a departure from an infinite good. (2) If we consider the object or mater it turns unto, which is an infinite number of Idols. So Psal. 16.4. Their sorrows shall be multiplied, that hasten after another God. Their sorrows, or according to the Hebrew, their Idols: i.e. They that forsake the true God, shall multiply to themselves an infinite number of Idol-God's, according to their lusts: which indeed is a great piece of servitude; because every Idol is a great Tyrant. Thus Plato, Rep. 9. saith, An avaricious man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , whiles he endeavors to heap up an infinite treasure of richesse, involves himself in infinite evils. (3) This servitude of Sin is infinite in regard of the Subject, the Soul, its infinite insatiable desire after its Idols. Thus sacred Philosophy, Hab. 2.5. Who enlargeth his desire as Hel. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 amplifiath, extendeth, even to infinity. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 his Soul, desire, or lust 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Hel, or rather as the grave, which is never satisfied with dead carcasses. Thence it follows: and is as death, and cannot be satisfied. This infinite inextinguible thirst after terrene goods is well illustrated by Plato, in his Gorg. pag. 507. And therefore he must take care, lest that giving way to his lusts, and causing them to wander up and down unpunished, whiles he endeavors to satisfy them, he bring in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an infinite evil, and live a vagrant, robbers life. Natural desires are finite, but sinful infinite, as Seneca. (4) The servitude of Sin is infinite, if we consider the nature and kinds of Sin. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. I see as it were from a watchtower, that the face of Virtue is one, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , but the face of Sin is multiforme and infinite. Which his Scholar Aristotle well explicates, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. pag. 89. Moreover there are many ways to sin: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for sin is interminate and infinite, but good terminate and finite, as the Pythagoreans hold. This he expounds thus: There is but one way to hit the marque, but infinite ways to miss it. Thence, saith Seneca, Men follow sins without measure, without end: for indeed they have neither end nor measure. Al moral good is bounded and measured by God as its last end, and the Law of God as its rule: but sin knows no bounds either of End or Law. Virtue consists in number, weight, and measure; but sin is void of each. This infinitude of sin and its servitude is set forth to the life in sacred Philosophy; Amos 5.12. For I know your manifold transgressions and your mighty sins. Here is infinitude both as to multitude and magnitude. This infinite servitude of Sin is oft set forth by a miserable Amplitude. So Prov. 5.23. And in the amplitude of his folie, or sin, shall he wander. So Prov. 21.4. Esa. 57.10. Jer. 13.22.

4. The servitude of Sin is most penal and afflictive, and therefore most miserable. There were among the ancient Romans servi poenae, servants only of punishment, such as were condemned to dignity in metallic Mines, or to sight with wild bestes: and such is every slave of sin; he is obnoxious to the most severe punishments. This we shall explicate in the following Propositions. (1) Al moral Evil has guilt appendent thereto, as its immediate effect. Guilt is not a physic accident or mode inherent in the Sinner; but a moral debt contracted by him: which as to God imports a certain moral right he has to punish the offender. Whence Guilt is said to be a medium or middle thing between sin and punishment: for as to its term it belongs to punishment; but as to the judge, it belongs to sin: yet it more properly belongs to the sin than punishment; because it doth indeed antecede the punishment, but is inseparably conjoined with the sin. Thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both Guilt and Sin, denoting that guilt doth essentially and inseparably adhere to all moral evil.

(2) Punishment is an evil of passion inflicted for some moral evil action. Punishment is said to be the necessary debt of sin, and naturally due to the Sinner, as he stands in relation to divine Justice; yet the actual inflicting of this punishment is not absolutely necessary in regard of divine Justice, but rather the effect of his will: it is most just and morally necessary that the sin should be punished: but yet it is not unjust for God to remit or relaxe this punishment, for the greater advance of his glory. Every Soul that sins deserves punishment, and falls under an essential, natural, and necessary obligation thereto: and the execution of this punishment is morally necessary for the vindication of divine Justice: of which more fully, Chap. 11. Of the Justice of God.

(3) Punishment is either for the correction and emendation of the person offending, or for the satisfaction of Justice and the person offended: the former is usually styled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , castigation, which Plato makes to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the medicine of the Soul. So Plato, Gorg. pag. 478. tells us, That castigation is the medicine of impiety, &c. Thence Definit. Platon. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 castigation is defined, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The curation of the Soul from its sin. This castigatory punishment is well consistent with moral liberty: for it's a good Maxim among the Civilians, That by right no ingenuous man is a servant of punishment: i. e. albeit he may be punished as a free Citizen, yet he is not as a slave devoted and destined thereto. But vindictive, judiciary punishment, for the satisfaction of Justice and the person-offended, always carries servitude with it. Such offenders are properly poenae servi, according to sacred Philosophy children of wrath, i. e. sentenced and adjudged to punishment. Hence that Effate among the Civilians: A Servant, whiles he lives, is, according to the civil Law, reputed as dead. Whence Slaves were anciently by the Grecians called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Bodies, as Rev. 18.13. because they had no power over their own life, wills, or persons, but were wholly their Lord's. Hence,

(4) Every Sinner under the Dominion of Sin, is, Servus poenae, a Slave adjudged to the punishment of Sin. Punishment is the usual attendent of servitude, and the proper effect of sin. Indeed sin and punishment came into the world together, and all the art of man cannot separate them. Thus, Gen. 2.17. In dying thou shalt die. This reduplication, according to the Hebrew Idiome, notes the certainty, suddenness, perfection and perpetuity of this death. The righteous God never intended that any should purchase sin at an easy rate: he gathers his rods for punishment from the same tree, we planted by our sin: Sin is the proper soil wherein punishment grows: those that make bold with God's Law, must expect that he make bold with their peace and comforts: Sin is never so swift in flying from God, but divine vengeance is as swift in pursuing of it. Divine wrath, which is the sorest vengeance, lies in the bowels of every sin: Death is the proper wages of sin. So Rom. 6.23. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly signifies that stipend of fish or food, which they gave to their Soldiers, to eat with their bread. Death is the proper stipend, which Sin gives to its Soldiers and Slaves to feed on, to preserve life: it is the reward of all their labors and toil in the ways of sin: 'tis their sustenance and food; all they have to keep them alive unto all eternity. And O! what a miserable life is that, which is maintained by death?

(5) Sin is in itself the greatest punishment, because the greatest evil. Sin was the first evil that came into the world, that which opened the door to all other evils, and contains in it the spirits, venom, and malignity of all evils: therefore there cannot be a more severe punishment of sin, than to be left to a course of sin. This Plato once and again takes notice of. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 477. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The moral evil of the Soul is of all evils the greatest. This is an universal evil: nothing but evil is in sin: it is the Spirit and Elixir of all evil: all evil is in sin; and sin is in all evil. So pag. 479. Thou accountest unjust men happy if they escape punishment; but I account them more miserable. And he gives the reason of it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For not to be punished for sin is the stablissement of Sin. So pag. 472. According to my opinion, O Polus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an unjust man is of all most miserable: yet he is more miserable, who acting unjustly avoids punishment. For what greater misery or punishment can there be, than to be given up by God to the swinge of a man's own lusts, without check or rebuke? Are not such punishments, which seem most silent, most severe and desperate? Albeit men may enjoy security in their sin for a while, yet is not this the worst part of their punishment? Doth not the righteous God oft convey his worst curses and plagues in the sweet wine of temporal prosperity? There is no one blessing that such a Sinner enjoys, but there is a curse stamped on it. Divine Justice writes a piece of Hel on all his temporal comforts, as he writes a piece of Heaven on all the chastisements of the righteous. Thus also Plato, in his Meno, pag. 78. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; For what else is it to be miserable, than to desire evils and to possess them? And this indeed is a general Dogme with Plato, as in his Gorgias, That to be punished by a Judge for sin is not the greatest punishment; but even then when they are involved in their sins, they fall under the most severe punishment. That sin that is guilt in the commission of it, is punishment in the power of it: so much pleasure as men take in the commission of their sin, so much torment they find in the issue. The evil of punishment is answerable to the evil of doing: He that departs from God executes on himself his own doom: and the farther he departs from God, the more he is involved in chains of darkness. O! what an indissoluble connection is there between sin and punishment? Can any sin be so deliciose in the commission, as it is bitter in the issue? Is not sin a pregnant mother with child of misery? Yea, doth it not carry Hel in its womb? He that loseth his God by sin, doth he not lose comforts, life, yea self and all?

(6) Albeit the servitude of Sin be in itself the greatest punishment, yet there are many other punishments that attend it. [1] Al Sin is attended with fear and shame. As sin breeds guilt, so guilt breeds fear and shame. So Plato, Leg. 5. tells us, That he who fills his Soul with sin clothes it with reproach and shame, as before §. 6. Prop. 6. And that Fear always attends sin is frequently asserted by the ancient Philosophers; who tell us,

Sins may be safe, but not secure: it's a great portion of security to do no il. Thence Bion said: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That impiety is the worst companion of confidence. And it was a good observation of Tertullian, That Nature hath clothed all Sin either with fear or shame.

[2] The servitude of Sin is attended with Instabilitie. Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 59. saith, That such things as have no firmitude in them, are most instable. Such is Sin. The firmitude of the Soul consists in its adherence to its first Principe and last End. Thence by how much the farther men depart from God, by so much the more instable they are. He that leans on a thing instable must needs be instable in all his ways: and what more instable than Sin and sinful Idols? Whatever the Soul, by inordinate love cleaves unto, it is overcome by, and suffers changes, as that object lusted after changeth. As a Ship is poised by its ballast, and a Be poiseth its airy body by a gravel; so the heart is poised by virtue: but corrupt Nature and sinful passions are full of Levitie and Instabilitie, whereby the heart is kept in suspense, as a Meteor in the Air, as Luk. 12.29. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . This was Cain's curse, and a great part of his servile punishment, Gen. 4.12. A fugitive and vagabond shalt thou be in the earth: i. e. in an instable vagrant condition, both as to soul and body: and what follows? v. 13. And Cain said unto the Lord, My punishment is greater than I can bear. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 my punishment, or my sin. O, what an heavy piece of servitude is this to an awakened conscience, to have a wandering vagrant spirit! Jam. 1.6, 8. This instabilitie, which attends the servitude of Sin, is well illustrated, Hos. 6.2. But they all like men have transgressed the Covenant, Hebr. like Adam: i.e. like vain inconstant man. Adam had no sooner entered into Covenant with God, but he brake it. Thus all his seed turn after him.

[3] Another punishment that attends the servitude of Sin is Anxietie and Torment. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 579. speaking of the Soul under the Tyrannie of Sin, he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It is inflamed with perpetual sparks of Fears, Angors, and Agitations. So in his Symposium, pag. 206. he informs us, That the Soul, when it adheres to sin, is under dolors and torments, and yet brings forth nothing but wind, as Psal. 7.14. He travelleth with iniquity, and hath conceived mischief, and brought forth a lie. It's spoken of Saul's mischievous yet abortive designs against David: and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies hard toilsome miserable labor, such as poor slaves are tormented with. The LXX. render it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which in the Greek Glossary, (found at the end of Cyril ) is rendered dolor. So in the N. T. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies vexatious grief and torment, as Rev. 16.10, 11. & 21.4. Hence the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an evil man received its derivation. For every 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , conceives and brings forth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 miserable torments, David 's meaning here is, That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designs full of torment and anxiety; and endeavored by much travel and sore labor, like a woman in travel, to bring them forth and accomplish them; but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie: he was frustrated in all his mischievous contrivements. Note here an elegant Allegory in these terms, Conceiveth, travelleth, and brought forth: which argues the highest vexation, travel, and torment, which Sinners labor under, in all their mischievous designs, as Jer. 4.31. Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love, as with the fear of the punishment they hate: all their labor is pain. So Jer. 51.58. & Habak. 2.13. Sinners are said to labor in the fire, or for the fire: i. e. (1) In vain, without any profit: as if any one should weave a thread over the fire, which brings not only loss of labor, but of materials also. (2) To labor in the fire, notes a dangerous, tedious, toilsome, servile labor, such as is proper to slaves. What more tedious, irksome, and fruitless than the drudgery of sin? So Eccles. 10.15. The labor of the foolish wearieth everyone of them. As in Nature, it is not storms without, but vapors within the bowels of the earth, raised up by subterraneous fires, that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements; so in the Soul, it is not afflictions from without, but the interne fire of lusts and sinful vapors that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience. It's better to be possessed of the Devil in the body, than of lusts in the heart, which always breed labor and pain. No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at: he would be somewhat else than what he is; and these desires breed anxiety and torment.

[4] The servitude of Sin is of all most penal, in that eternal punishment is annexed to and entailed thereon. This is the top of all punishment, that Sinners shall be turned into Hel, with all their sins at their back. Neither was this kind of punishment altogether hid from Plato: for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this punishment thus described: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For a Soul to descend down to Hel laden with many sins, is the most extreme of evils. A great Philosopheme for a Pagan, and that which argues his acquaintance with sacred Philosophy; which more fully instructes us, that sin is eternally punished in Hel; because it makes a man eternally willing to sin. The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin, as men take in the committing of it: he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin, and therefore they shall have an eternal punishment for sin: As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin, so God lays up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment. In fine, what more just than that he, who by sin acts eternally against the will of God, should suffer eternal torments against his own will? And can there be a more penal afflictive servitude than this?

§. 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin, it now only remains to demonstrate that all mankind are borne in this state of servitude. It's a Maxim in the Civil Law, Just. Institut. l. 1. tit. 4. That among Servants there is no difference, so as one should be more a Servant than another: though among Free-men there are many differences. This holds true in moral servitude: for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state; because all are dead in sin; and death as well moral as natural admits no degrees: all dead men are equally such without difference. Whence the Civilians have another great Saying; That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives. Such are all the servants of sin, who are really dead, whiles they seem to live. Lapsed man is under a miserable, natural, yet voluntary necessity of sinning, wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue, as before §. 7. That all men by nature are dead in sin, is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred, but also in Platonic Philosophy. Thus Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that we are now dead, and that our body is the sepulcher of our Soul. By the wise men, I presume, he means the Barbarians, specially the Egyptians and Hebrews, from whom he received this Tradition, That men are naturally dead in sin. Thus Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophy they cal those dead, who have fallen from their Dogmas, and subjected their minds to lusts. This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin, which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his Schole, thereby to indigitate, that he was dead. Thence that other Symbol of Pythagoras: Abstain from the dead: i.e. from conversation with dead sinners, which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophy, according to that of our Lord, Mat. 8.22. Let the dead bury the dead. Moreover Plato calls the life of men dead in sin, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a life without life. Also he saith, That men's Souls are in this life, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of a ferine or brutish nature. Yea, Aristotle, Problem. S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nature doth all things that are wicked. Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis, That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, because all men by nature are dead in sins. Thus Clemens Alexander. Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus, those fore-runners of the Pelagians, That faith is not, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the good effect of freewill, nor yet the prerogative of Nature. But to explicate and demonstrate, how all men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin, take the following Propositions.

1. Prop. This Philosopheme, That all men are by Nature dead in sin, is not hyperbolic, but metaphoric and real. Plato speaking of the moral death of the Soul, he understands it, in his dark way, according to the mind of sacred Philosophy, whence he borrowed this as other of the choicest of his Philosophemes. Now in sacred. Philosophy this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic, but real, albeit metaphorically expressed. Thus Psal. 5.9. cited by Paul, Rom. 3.13. Their throat is an open sepulcher. What David ascribes to the throat, Plato, Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole body, namely, that it is but the sepulcher of the Soul. Whence he makes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be, by a Paronomasie, derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a sepulcher, as before. And Democritus said, That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest: which if men could open, they should find there, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a sepulcher full of evils. David calls the throat an open sepulcher, because (1) the heart or soul of all by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the body as in a sepulcher. (2) The Soul lying dead in this sepulcher continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smells: as if you draw nigh to an open sepulcher, where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried, you will soon scent their noisome sumes. (3) Men's mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulcher, by which men's dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smells. You may scent men's corrupt hearts in their words, which pass through their throats, those open sepulchers Again, that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is well illustrated, Esa. 1.4. Ah! sinful nation! a people laden with iniquity, as with a mountain of lead. But lest men should conceit, that all this iniquity comes only by custom and frequence of sinful acts, he adds: a seed of evil doers, or malign sinners. This notes, that men are borne sinners, a sinful brood; that sin is hereditary, and not only by custom. Thus Esa. 57.4. Children of transgression: i. e. (1) borne in sin, of sinful parents. (2) Addicted to transgression, given up to it: for according to the Hebrew Idiome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a child, being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives, is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing. Thence it follows: a seed of falsehood: i. e. a lump or mass of hypocrisy: wholly composed and made up of iniquity, an adulterous brood. Al sin is in the heart of man, and the heart of man is in all sin, albeit he be not always hurried into all acts of sin. Hence Plato mentions, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an innate and connate evil, or vitiosity of nature, commun to all, as before §. 2. of this Chapter. And Seneca assures us, That corrupt Nature has drunk in such deep draughts of iniquity, which are so far incorporated with its bowels, as that you cannot get it out, but by tearing out its very bowels. Hence,

2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life, no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature. Thence Cyril Alexander. terms Virtue or Grace 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Prerogative above the Creation. And Chrysostom, in Gen. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature itself. Where there is a spiritual death, there is a total privation, without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life. Free-will in corrupt nature is alive to do evil, but dead as to the doing what is good: it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil, as Jer. 4.22. but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good: it can find legs to run away from God, but none to run to him. And if the person be dead, can his acts or works be alive? May we expect a good thought, or word, or deed from such all their days, so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin? Is it possible for a dead corps to take up its coffin, and grave upon its back, and thence to arise and walk? And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose itself towards a virtuose life? It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy, That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature. A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human. The divine life and motion towards God must proceed from God. Mans sin and misery come from his own free-will, but all Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace: he that is not acted by divine Grace, is necessarily acted by carnal lust: corrupt nature is not only empty of, but contrary to all good; and therefore all works done by it are dead works; because they proceed from a dead nature, and tend to death: wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Nature. Thus Cyril Alexander. lib. 1. in Esa. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , It's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any heavenly gifts of Grace out of its own nature, but to enrich itself with the gifts of God above Nature. This Hypothesis, albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it, is evidently deducible from Socrates and Plato 's Philosophy. Thus Plato, Meno, pag. 99. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Virtue comes not by Nature, neither from the Institutes of Learning, but by divine Afflation or Inspiration, without the concourse of the human mind, in those in whom it's produced. It's true, the Stoics held, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That Virtue might be taught; because there were sparks or seeds thereof in human Nature, which might be drawn forth by good institution: but this Socrates greatly opposed, as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul, and divine concourse for the production of Virtue. And sacred Philosophy is most positive in this, that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man. Thus Psal. • .9. Their inward part: or the most sublime, refined, intimate part of the Soul, is very wickedness, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , wickednesses, pravities. The Plural for the Singular, and abstract for the concrete; which denotes (1) an Universalitie both of the predicate and subject: that all their inward parts were full of sin, and that all sin was in their inward parts. (2) The perfection of Sin. For abstracts, specially in the Plural Number, speak Essences and Spirits. The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature, Hence,

3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil, and its impotence as to what is good is universal and total. This naturally follows from what precedes: for if the Soul be morally dead in sin, without any seeds of spiritual life, or moral virtue, then it follows, that its impotence to good is total: for as in naturals death is a total privation of life; there is not the least seed for the reduction of the life lost; so in morals, such as are dead in sin, are under an universal privation of spiritual life, and total impotence to what is spiritually good. This Hypothesis may be demonstrated, (1) From the universal ignorance of the natural mind. Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme, as we have in what precedes §. 3. mentioned; but more fully, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5. Yea so great and sovereign is the natural ignorance of the mind, that those very commun notions of knowledge lodged therein are not to be estimed, as some cal them, the fragments of the Image of God, but rather effects of divine Bounty vouchsafed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator, who illuminates every man that comes into the world, as Joh. 1.9. That all true knowledge of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confessed by Platonists as well as Divines. Thence Clemens Alexander. calls Faith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a supernatural contemplation. So Chrysostom calls divine Grace, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that which instructes and illustrates the mind; Grace from above, not from human Nature. (2) From the formal Idea and nature of moral or spiritual good; which consists in a conformity to the moral Law, and that not only as to its mater, but also as to its end and manner: now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end, or conform to the moral Law. (3) From the disproportion and incapacitie of the subject. The natural power of the Will, as now vitiated, has no connatural capacity, next power, or formal capacity, for the production of what is spiritually good. Alas! what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects? And can an object be received into the mind, unless there be some proportion? Is not everything received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient? Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual; as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal? See 1 Cor. 2.14. Joh. 6.44. & 8.43. & 12.39, 40. So also for the corrupt will, it cannot possibly have any connatural virtue, next power or formal capacity for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible, that a natural power should have any causal connection with or connaturalitie unto a supernatural act or effect? (4) Should we suppose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue, would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dispensation of efficacious Grace? For [1] Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Free-will, and so variated according to its diversity. [2] Whence also the last differential reason whereby Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature. [3] Natural Free-will would, from this Hypothesis, be of itself and nextly flexible to spiritual good; and so Virtue not the gift of God. Aristotle himself, who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature, confesseth, all good to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the gift of God. (5) From sacred Philosophy. Thus Jer. 13.23. Can the Ethiopian change his skin? &c. Consider [1] That this is a proverbial speech, touching the vain attempts of such as endeavor to bring about things impossible. Hence that commun Proverb, To wash a Black-moor, relating to such as attempt things impossible. [2] The manner of expressing it is very emphatic: for such rhetoric interrogations carry in them more vehement logic negations. Then he adds: or the Leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil. And that this impotence is total and universal, on all mankind, is evident from that other Proverb, Ezech. 16.44. As is the mother such is the daughter, i. e. This contagion runs in the blood, it is an hereditary disease, commun to all mankind. Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin, Psal. 51.5. and to be in sin, Exod. 32.22. 1 Joh. 5.19. The whole world is said to be in sin, i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto. What this impotence to sin is, and how far natural, we have explicated Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1.

4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue. Thus Greg. Nyss. or de Scopo Christ. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , The force of human virtue is not of itself sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a form of divine life, unless God build the house, &c. That there can be no disposition, though never so remote, unto true moral Virtue from the alone faculty of Nature, is evident; because nothing can dispose itself to a condition above its nature, by its own force, unless it be influenced by a superior Agent. A man in the state of corrupt nature cannot by all his own forces natural or moral (1) overcome any one temptation: or (2) mortify any one lust: or (3) attain any one good thought, inclination, or desire: or (4) remove the Remora, or bar in his heart against conversion: or (5) by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace. I know it is a Position maintained by some, That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power, shall thereby obtain supernatural Grace. But for answer hereto [1] It's certain, that none ever did or will improve to the utmost their natural abilities. [2] Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost, what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace? Is God obliged by any law or promise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or condition which is in itself sinful, and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it? And have we not already sufficiently proved, that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace? That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is well demonstrated by Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not imply a contradiction in the Adject, that man should make a right use of his natural abilities, or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace? Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose, that God should fetch the commun rule of his giving or not giving grace from man's dignity or indignity? Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good, but also an immediate passive power to receive good: thence it cannot dispose itself to virtue, which is above its natural capacity. Is not all true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature? The Greek Fathers, such as were more orthodox, acknowledged, That the preparation to Grace was from Grace: whence it was by them termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the direction of the way: also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the preparation of the will: likewise, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the attraction of God. That man cannot either de condigno or de congruo merit the first grace, is generally asserted by the sober Schole-men, as Bradwardine de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 39. and Greg. Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Dist. 26. Quaest. 1. Thence the Dominicans in the Council of Trent, ( Hist. Counc. Trent, pag. 209.) denied, That the works preceding vocation are truly preparatory, and ever gave the first place to God. And Alvarez, Auxil. Disp. 36. Can. 1. demonstrates, that God never established any Law for the giving grace to such who should improve to the utmost their natural power. But none has more fully improved this Hypothesis, than Jansen, August. Tom. 3. l. 1. c. 5. where he proves, that men's actions in their natural state merit damnation; and therefore they cannot thereby merit grace. And sacred Philosophic informs us, Jer. 17.9. The heart is above all things fraudulent. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies to supplant and undermine, whence the word here signifies perverse, full of wiles, fraud, guile. Thence it follows: and desperately wicked: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , desperately sick, diseased, incurable, wicked. And if so, then how impossible is it, that it should prepare or dispose itself for the reception of virtue? See this more fully demonstrated, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. Hence,

5. Prop. Free-will in lapsed corrupt Nature hath no moral active power or faculty flexible to any spiritual or truly moral good. This Proposition is but the result of the former, and may be demonstrated from these following Heads. The Assertion of such a moral Free-will in lapsed Nature doth (1) raise up the human corrupt Will to the condition of God, and is the Nurse of all Sin. It feeds men's pride and affectation of a Deity, vain-glory, carnal confidence, security, Atheism, unbelief, ingratitude. It also cuts the nerves of all divine consolation and peace of conscience. (2) It pulls down God from his Throne of Grace, and reduceth him to the condition of a Creature. [1] It strikes at the very Being of God, making him to be dependent on, and moved by the human Will. [2] It subvertes all the divine Attributes; the Simplicitie, Immutabilitie, Infinitude, Omnipotence, Science, Goodness, Will, and all the Decrees of God. [3] It strikes at the Dominion of God over his rational Creatures, and ties him up by Laws and Rules of Justice dependent on the merits of his Creatures. [4] It cuts off God's Providence and Gubernation over the human Will, making it to be independent as to God's Concurse. [5] It abandons and banisheth out of the world all supernatural efficacious Grace: admitting no Grace but what will stoop and submit to the dominion of the human Will, and its sovereign Empire. [6] It is blasphemously injuriose to Christ, and all his mediatorie Offices. It subvertes his Priestly Office, by laying a foundation for human Merits, &c. It strikes at his Prophetic Office, by denying a necessity of divine Revelation and Illumination, in order to Salvation. It undermines his Imporial Throne as King, by denying him any Jurisdiction over the human Will. It dispirits his special Love to the Elect, by attributing to him universal grace and love to all, even Reprobates. [7] It takes away the office of the Spirit of Grace. [8] It enervates the whole Covenant of Grace, by reducing the whole of man's Salvation to a Covenant of Works. Yea [9] whiles it seems to exalt the Law of God, it doth really take away the use thereof as a rule of life. These and many other are the injuries which this Free-will offers to God and man. (3) Sacred Philosophy is positive and express in denying corrupt Nature any Free-will to what is morally good. So Joh. 1.13. Not of blood, i. e. by natural generation. Nor of the will of the flesh: i. e. Free-will in corrupt Nature, which is frequently in the Scriptures termed flesh by reason of its impotence and infirmity. So Joh. 3.6. Whatever is borne of the flesh, i. e. of corrupt Nature, or Free-will in its highest elevation and refinement, as adorned with the most raised commun illuminations and graces, as Esa. 40.6. Nor of the wi of man: i. e. the best of men or Ministers, as God's Ambassadors. But of God: i. e. by his glorious efficacious power. So 2 Pet. 1.3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by glory and virtue: i. e. by his glorious virtue or power. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Virtue in God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , his divine power, as Hesychius. So it's used by the LXX. Hab. 3.3. Zech. 6.17 where it answers to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifies Glory, Power, or glorious Power. And indeed it seems to be the grand design of sacred Philosophy to divest corrupt Nature and Free-will of all pretence to what is morally or spiritually good. Can a vitiated corrupt Will be supposed to have any natural connection with, or Virtue formally effective of a divine life? Is it possible that the new Creature should be borne of the will of the flesh, which is potent and good for nothing but sin? And must indeed the divine Will be subordinate to man's Free-will in the dispensation of grace? Is it not more becoming the human Will to be subordinate to the divine? Must we take the adequate reason of God's dispensing grace from the emprovement of Nature? Is not the gift of Grace a participation of the divine Nature? Must it not then exceed the whole sphere of create Nature? Is it not strange Theology, to reduce the discrimination of good and evil men to the contingence of man's ambulatorie corrupt Free-will? May we not justly apply Augustine's complaint against Cicero to such Divines, who, to make men free, make him also sacrilegious, and a robber of God? In sum, we deny not, but that the Will is naturally free as to its physic act, but we deny that it is morally free as to the mode or manner of acting well. Thus we see how this Pelagian Philosopheme doth elevate the Creature to the condition of God, and pulls down God to the condition of a Creature. Thence Cyril, Thes. assert. 32. to 5. pag. 268. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For we deny, that there is one natural operation of God and the Creature: that we may not elevate that which is create to the divine Essence; nor, on the contrary, depress the excellence of the divine Essence to a place agreeable to Creatures. Wherein he sums up the grand design of the Pelagians then newly started up. Clemens Alexander. Strom. l. 2. & 5. is very invective against the fectators of Basilides and Valentinus; because they hed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that Faith is natural: i. e. educible out of the potence of corrupt Nature. Which Hypothesis all the Assertors of moral Free-will are sond of. Theodoritus, in Psal. 118.32. saith peremptorily: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Neither can human Nature rightly perform virtue without divine aide. It's a great Effate of Basil, in his Homilie of Humility, where explicating that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4.7. And what hast thou that thou didst not receive? &c. he thus philosophiseth: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Here all the sublimity of pride falls to the ground: there is nothing left thee, O man, as mater of arrogance. Tel me, why doest thou lift up thyself, in reference to thine own good works; whenas thou oughtest rather to render thanks to the Donor of them? For what hast thou, which thou hast not received? And if thou hast received anything, why doest thou glory, as if thou receivedst it not? Thou hast not known God by thine own justice, but God hath known thee by his own benignity. Thence he adds: It is the greatest stupidity not to understand a man is partaker of grace, but to arrogate to his own Virtue what belongs to Grace.