Thirty-Six Sermons

AD CLERUM.

The Fourth Sermon.

At a Metropolitical Visitation at Grantham, Lincoln, August 22d. 1634.

O NE remarkable difference (among many other) between Good and Evil, is this: That there must be a concurrence of all requisite conditions to make a thing good; whereas to make a thing evil, a single defect in any one condition alone will suffice. Bonum ex causa integra, Malum ex partiali. If we propose not to ourselves a right end, or if we pitch not upon proper and convenient means for the attaining of that end, or if we pursue not these means in a due manner, or if we observe not exactly every material circumstance in the whole pursuit; if we fail but in any one point, the action, though it should be in every other respect such as it ought to be, by that one defect becometh wholly sinful. Nay more, not only a true and real, but even, a supposed and imaginary defect, the bare opinion of unlawfulness, is able to vitiate the most justifiable act, and to turn it into sin. [ I know there is nothing unclean of itself: but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean, at the 14. verse of this Chapter] Nay yet more, not only a settled opinion that the thing we do is unlawful, but the very suspension of our judgment, and the doubtfulness of our minds, whether we may lawfully do it or no, maketh it sometimes unlawful to be done (of us,) and if we do it, sinful. [ He that but doubteth, is damned, if he eat; Because he eateth not of faith: ] in the former part of this verse. The ground whereof, the Apostle delivereth in a short and full Aphorism; and concludeth the whole Chapter with it in the words of the Text, [ For whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin. ]

Many excellent Instructions there are, scattered throughout the whole Chapter, most of them concerning the right use of that Liberty we have unto things of indifferent nature well worthy our Christian Consideration, if we had time and leisure for them. But this last Rule alone will find us work enough: and therefore omitting the rest, we will (by God's assistance with your patience) presently fall in hand with this, and intend it wholly; in the Explication first, and then in the Application of it. For by how much it is of more profitable and universal use for the regulating of the common offices of life: by so much is the mischief greater if it be, and accordingly our care ought to be so much the greater that it be not, either misunderstood, or misapplied. Quod non ex fide peccatum: that is the rule. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. In the Explication of which words, there would be little difficulty, had not the ambiguity of the word Faith occasioned difference of interpretations, and so left a way open to some misapprehensions Faith is verbum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as most other words are. There be that have reckoned up more than twenty several significations of it in the Scriptures. But I find three especially looked at by those, who either purposely or occasionally have had to do with this Text: each of which we shall examine in their Order.

First and most usually, especially in the Apostolical writings, the word Faith is used to signify that Theological virtue, or gracious habit, whereby we embrace with our minds and affections the Lord Jesus Christ, as the only begotten Son of God, and alone Savior of the World, casting ourselves wholly upon the mercy of God through his merits, for remission and everlasting Salvation.

And in this notion many of our later Divines seem to understand it in our present Text: whilst they allege it for the confirmation of this Position, that All the works (even the best works) of Unbelievers are sins.

A position condemned indeed by the Trent Council, and that under a curse; taking it (as I suppose) in a wrong construction; but not worthy of so heavy a censure, if it be rightly understood; according to the doctrine of our Church in the thirteenth Article of her Confession, and according to the tenor of those Scriptures whereon that doctrine is grounded, viz. Matth. 12. 33. Rom. 8. 8. Tit. 1. 15. Heb. 11. 6, &c. Howbeit I take it (with subjection of judgment) that that Conclusion, what truth soever it may have in itself, hath yet no direct foundation in this Text. The Verb 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to believe, and the Noun 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , faith or belief, are both of them found sundry times in this Chapter: yet seem not to signify in any place thereof, either the Verb the Act, or the Noun the habit, of this saving or justifying Faith, of which we now speak. But being opposed everywhere, and namely in this last verse unto doubtfulness of judgment concerning the lawfulness of some indifferent things; must therefore needs be understood of such a persuasion of judgment concerning such lawfulness as is opposite to such doubting. Which kind of Faith may be found in a mere heathen man: who never having heard the least syllable of the mystery of Salvation by Christ, may yet be assured out of clear evidence of reason, that many of the things he doth are such as he may and ought to do. And as it may be found in a mere heathen man, so it may be wanting in a true believer: who steadfastly resting upon the blood of Christ for his eternal redemption, may yet through the strength of temptation, sway of passion, or other distemper or subreption incident to human frailty, do some particular act or acts, of the lawfulness whereof he is not sufficiently persuaded. The Apostle then here speaking of such a Faith as may be both found in an unbeliever, and also wanting in a true believer, it appeareth that by Faith he meaneth not that justifying Faith, which maketh a true believer to differ from an unbeleiver; but the word must be understood in some other notion.

Yet thus much I may add withal in the behalf of those worthy men that have alleged this Scripture for the purpose aforesaid, to excuse them from the imputation of having (at least willfully ) handled the Word of God deceitfully.

And Thirdly, that they who interpret this Text as aforesaid, are neither singular nor novel therein; but walk in the same path, which some of the ancient Fathers have trod before them. The Rhemists themselves confess it of S. Augustine: to whom they might have added also S. Prosper, and (whose authority alone is enough to stop their mouths forever) Leo Bishop of Rome, who have all cited these words for the self same purpose.

But we are content, for the reasons already shewn, to let it pass as a collection impertinent: and that I suppose is the worst that can be made of it. There is a second acception of the word Faith: put either for the whole system of that truth which God hath been pleased to reveal to his Church in the Scriptures of the old and New Testament, or some part thereof: or else ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) for the assent of the mind thereunto. In which signification some conceiving the words of this Text to be meant do hence infer a false and dangerous conclusion; which yet they would obtrude upon the Christian Church as an undoubted principle of truth, That men are bound for every particular action they do, to have direction and warrant from the written word of God, or else they sin in the doing of it. For (say they) faith must be grounded upon the word of God ( Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, Rom. 10.) Where there is no Word then, there can be no Faith: and then, by the Apostles doctrine, that which is done without the Word to warrant it, must needs be sin, for whatsoever is not of Faith is sin. This is their opinion, and thus they would infer it.

I know not any piece of counterfeit Doctrine, that hath passed so currently in the world, with so little suspicion of falsehood, and so little open contradiction, as this hath done. One chief cause whereof I conjecture to be, for that it seemeth to make very much for the honor and perfection of God's sacred Law: the fullness and sufficiency whereof none in the Christian Church but Papists or Atheists, will deny. In which respect, the very questioning of it now, will perhaps seem a strange novelty to many, and occasion their mis-censures. But as God himself, so the Holy Word of God is so full of all requisite perfection, that it needeth not to beg honor from an untruth. ( Will you speak wickedly for God? Or talk deceitfully for him? ) I hold it very needful therefoe, both for the vindicating of my Text from a common abuse, and for the arming of all my brethren, as well of the Clergy as Laity, against a common and plausible error, that neither they teach it, nor these receive it; briefly and clearly to show, that the aforesaid opinion, in such sort as some have proposed it, and many have understood it, (for it is capable of a good interpretation, wherein it may be allowed;) First, is utterly devoid of Truth; and Secondly, draweth after it many dangerous consequents and evil effects; and thirdly, hath no good warrant from my present Text.

The Opinion is, that to do anything at all without direction from the Scripture, is unlawful and sinful. Which if they would understand only of the substantials of God's worship, and of the exercises of spiritual and supernatural graces, the assertion were true and sound: but as they extend it to all the actions of common life whatsoever, whether natural or civil, even so far as to the taking up of a straw: so it is altogether false and indefensible. I marvel what warrant they that so teach have from the Scripture for that very doctrine: or where they are commanded so to believe or teach. One of their chiefest refuges is the Text we now have in hand: but I shall anon drive them from this shelter. The other places usually alleged speak only, either of Divine and Supernatural truths to be believed, or else of works of grace or worship to be performed, as of necessity unto Salvation: which is not to the point in issue. For it is freely confessed, that in things of such nature the holy Scripture is, and so we are to account it, a most absolute and sufficient direction. Upon which ground we heartily reject all human Traditions, devised and intended as supplements to the Doctrine of Faith contained in the Bible, and annexed as Codicils to the Holy Testament of Christ, for to supply the defects thereof. The question is wholly about things in their nature indifferent, such as are the use of our food, raiment, and the like; about which the common actions of life are chiefly conversant: Whether in the choice and use of such things we may not be sometimes sufficiently guided by the light of reason and the common rules of discretion: but that we must be able, (and are so bound to do, or else we sin ) for everything we do in such matters, to deduce our warrant from some places or other of Scripture.

Before the Scriptures were written, it pleased God by visions, and dreams, and other like revelations, immediately to make known his good pleasure to the Patriarchs and Prophets, and by them unto the people: which kind of Revelations served them to all the same intents and purposes, whereto the sacred Scriptures now do us, viz. to instruct them what they should believe and do for his better service, and the furtherance of their own Salvations. Now as it were unreasonable for any man to think, that they either had or did expect an immediate revelation from God every time they eat, or drank, or bought, or sold, or did any other of the common actions of life, for the warranting of each of those particular actions to their consciences: no less unreasonable it is to think, that we should now expect the like warrant from the Scriptures, for the doing of the like actons. Without all doubt, the Law of Nature, and the light of reason, was the rule whereby they were guided for the most part in such matters: which the wisdom of God would never have left in them or us, as a principal relick of his decayed image in us, if he had not meant that we should make use of it, for the direction of our lives and actions thereby. Certainly, God never infused any power into any creature, whereof he intended not some use. Else what shall we say of the Indies and other barbarous Nations, to whom God never vouchsafed the lively Oracles of his written word? Must we think that they were left a lawless people, without any Rule at all whereby to order their actions? How then come they to be guilty of transgression? for where there is no Law, there can be no transgression. Or how cometh it about that their consciences should at any time or in any case either accuse them, or excuse them, if they had no guide nor rule to walk by; But if we must grant they had a Rule, (and there is no way, you see, but grant it we must) then we must also of necessity grant that there is some other Rule for human actions besides the written word: for that we presupposed these nations to have wanted. Which Rule what other could it be, than the Law of Nature and of right Reason, imprinted in their hearts? Which is as truly the Law and Word of God, as is that which is printed in our Bibles. So long as our actions are warranted either by the one or the other, we cannot be said to want the warrant of God's word: Nec differt, Scripturâ an ration consistat, saith Tertullian; it mattereth not much from whether of both we have our direction, so long as we have it from either.

You see then those men are in a great error, who make the holy Scripture the sole rule of all human actions whatsoever. For the maintenance whereof, there was never yet produced any piece of an argument, either from Reason, or from authority of holy Writ, or from the testimony either of the ancient Fathers or of other classical Divines of latter times; which may not be clearly and abundantly answered, to the satisfaction of any rational man not extremely fore-possessed with prejudice.

We are therefore to beware of it; and that so much the more heedfully, because of the evil consequents and effects that issue from it: to wit, a world of superstitions, uncharitable censures, bitter contentions, contempt of superiors, perplexities of conscience. First, it filleth men's heads with many superstitious conceits, making them to cast impurity upon sundry things, which yet are lawful to as many as use them lawfully. For the taking away of the indifferency of anything that is indifferent, is in truth Superstition: whether either of the two ways it be done, either by requiring it as necessary, or by forbidding it as unlawful. He that condemneth a thing as utterly unlawful, which yet indeed is indifferent, and so lawful, is guilty of superstition, as well as he that enjoineth a thing as absolutely necessary, which yet indeed is but indifferent, and so arbitrary. They of the Church of Rome, and some in our Church, as they go upon quite contrary grounds, yet both false; so they run into quite contrary errors, and both superstitious. They decline too much on the left hand, denying to the holy Scripture that perfection which of right it ought to have; of containing all things appertaining to that supernatural doctrine of faith and holiness which God hath revealed to his Church, for the attainment of everlasting salvation: whereupon they would impose upon Christian people, and that with an opinion of necessity, many things which the Scriptures require not: and that is a Superstition. These wry too much on the right hand, ascribing to the holy Scripture such a kind of perfection as it cannot have; of being the sole director of all human actions, whatsoever: whereupon they forbid unto Christian people, and that under the name of sin, sundry things which the holy Scripture condemneth not: and that is a superstition too.

From which Superstition proceedeth in the second place uncharitable censuring: as evermore they that are the most superstitious, are the most supercilious. No such severe censures of our blessed Savior's person and actions, as the Superstitious Scribes and Pharisees were. In this Chapter, the special fault, which the Apostle blameth in the weak ones (who were somewhat superstitiously affected,) was their rash and uncharitable judging of their brethren. And common and daily experience among ourselves showeth how freely some men spend their censures upon so many of their brethren, as without scruple do any of those things, which they upon false grounds have superstitiously condemned as utterly unlawful.

And then thirdly, as unjust censurers are commonly entertained with scorn and contumely; they that so liberally condemn their brethren of profaneness, are by them again as freely flouted for their preciseness: and so whiles both parties please themselves in their own ways, they cease not mutually to provoke and scandalize and exasperate the one the other, pursuing their private spleens so far, till they break out into open contentions and oppositions. Thus it stood in the Roman Church, when this Epistle was written. They judged one another, and despised one another, to the great disturbance of the Churches Peace: which gave occasion to our Apostle's whole discourse in this Chapter. And how far the like censurings and despisings have imbittered the spirits, and whetted both the tongues and pens of learned men one against another in our own Church; the stirs that have been long since raised, and are still upheld by the factious Opposers against our Ecclesiastical Constitutions, Government, and Ceremonies, will not suffer us to be ignorant. Most of which stirs, I verily persuade myself, had been long ere this either wholly buried in silence, or at leastwise prettily well quieted, if the weakness and danger of the error whereof we now speak, had been more timely discovered, and more fully and frequently made known to the world, than it hath been.

Fourthly, let that doctrine be once admitted, and all human authority will soon be despised. The command of Parents, Masters and Princes, which many times require both secrecy and expedition, shall be taken into slow deliberation: and the Equity of them sifted by those that are bound to obey, though they know no cause why, so long as they know no cause to the contrary. Delicata est obedientia, quae transit in causae genus deliberativum. It is a nice obedience in S. Bernard's judgment; yea, rather troublesome and odious, that is over-curious in discussing the commands of superiors, boggling at everything that is enjoined, requiring a why for every wherefore, and unwilling to stir until the unlawfulness and expediency of the thing commanded shall be demonstrated by some manifest reason, or undoubted authority from the Scriptures.

Lastly, the admitting of this doctrine would cast such a snare upon men of weak judgments, but tender consciences, as they should never be able to unwind themselves thereout again. Men's daily occasions for themselves or friends, and the necessities of common life, require the doing of a thousand things within the compass of a few days; for which it would puzzle the best Textman that liveth, readily to bethink himself of a sentence in the Bible, clear enough to satisfy a scrupulous conscience of the lawfulness and expediency of what he is about to do: for which, by hearkening to the rules of reason and discretion, he might receive easy and speedy resolution. In which cases, if he should be bound to suspend his resolution, and delay to do that which his own reason would tell him were presently needful to be done, until he could haply call to mind some Precept or Example of Scripture for his warrant: what stops would it make in the course of his whole life? what languishings in the duties of his calling? how would it fill him with doubts and irresolutions, lead him into a maze of uncertainties, entangle him in a world of woeful perplexities, and (without the great mercy of God, and better instruction) plunge him irrecoverably into the gulf of despair? Since the chief end of the publication of the Gospel, is to comfort the hearts, and to revive and refresh the spirits of God's people with the glad tidings of liberty from the spirit of bondage and fear, and of gracious acceptance with their God; to anoint them with the oil of gladness, giving them beauty for ashes, and instead of sackcloth, girding them with joy: we may well suspect that doctrine not to be Evangelical, which thus setteth the consciences of men upon the rack, tortureth them with continual fears and perplexities, and prepareth them thereby unto hellish despair.

These are the grievous effects and pernicious consequents that will follow upon their Opinion, who hold, That we must have warrant from the Scripture for everything whatsoever we do; not only in spiritual things, (wherein alone it is absolutely true) nor yet only in other matters of weight, though they be not spiritual (for which perhaps there might be some color) but also in the common affairs of life, even in the most sleight and trivial things. Yet for that the Patrons of this Opinion build themselves as much upon the authority of this present Text, as upon any other passage of Scripture whatsoever (which is the reason why we have stood thus long upon the examination of it:) we are therefore in the next place to clear the Text from that their mis-interpretation. The force of their collection standeth thus (as you heard already:) that faith is ever grounded upon the word of God; and that therefore whatsoever action is not grounded upon the word, being it is not of faith, by the Apostles rules here, must needs be a sin. Which collection could not be denied, if the word Faith were here taken in that sense which they imagine, and wherein it is very usually taken in the Scriptures; viz. for the doctrine of supernatural and divine revelation, or for the belief thereof: which Doctrine we willingly acknowledge to be completely contained in the holy Scriptures alone, and therefore dare not admit into our belief, as a branch of divine supernatural truth, anything not therein contained. But there is a third signification of the word Faith, nothing so frequently found in the Scriptures as the two former; which yet appeareth both by the course of this whole Chapter, and by the consent of the best and most approved Interpreters, as well ancient as modern, to have been properly intended by our Apostle in this place: namely, that wherein it is put for a certain persuasion of mind, that what we do may lawfully be done. So that whatsoever action is done by us, with reasonable assurance and persuasion of the lawfulness thereof in our own consciences, is in our Apostle's purpose so far forth an action of Faith: without any inquiring into the means whereby that persuasion was wrought in us; whether it were the light of our own reason, or the authority of some credible person, or the declaration of God's revealed will in his written Word. And on the other side, whatsoever action is done, either directly contrary to the judgment and verdict of our own consciences, or at leastwise doubtingly, and before we are in some competent measure assured that we may lawfully do it: that is it which S. Paul here denieth to be of faith, and of which he pronounceth so peremptorily that it is (and that eo nomine ) a sin.

About which use and signification of the word Faith we need not to trouble ourselves to fetch it from a trope, either of a Metonymy or Synecdoche, as some do. For though (as I say) it do not so often occur in Scripture; yet it is indeed the primary and native signification of the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Faith, derived from the root▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to persuade. Because all kinds of Faith whatsoever, consist in a kind of persuasion. You shall therefore find the words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifieth properly to believe, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which signifieth properly not to be persuaded, to be opposed as contrary either to other in John 3. and Acts 14. and other places. To omit the frequent use of the words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Fides, in Greek and Latin Authors in this signification: observe but the passages of this very Chapter, and you will be satisfied in it. At the second verse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , one believeth that he may eat all things: that is, he is verily persuaded in his Conscience that he may as lawfully eat flesh as herbs, any one kind of meat as any other, he maketh no doubt of it. Again at the fourteenth verse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I know and am persuaded that there is nothing unclean of itself. That is, I steadfastly believe it as a most certain and undoubted truth. Again at the two and twentieth verse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; Hast thou faith? have it to thyself before God: thatis, Art thou in thy Conscience persuaded that thou mayest lawfully partake any of the good creatures of God? Let that persuasion suffice thee for the approving of thine own heart in the sight of God: but trouble not the Church, nor offend the weaker brother, by a needless and unseasonable ostentation of that thy knowledge. Lastly, in this three and twentieth verse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith: that is, he that is not yet fully persuaded in his own mind, that it is lawful for him to eat some kinds of meats, (as namely, swine's flesh, or blo • dings ) and yet is drawn against his own judgment to eat thereof, because he seeth others so to do, or because he would be loath to undergo the taunts and jeers of scorners, or out of any other poor-respect: such a man is cast and condemned by the judgment of his own heart, as a transgressor, because he adventureth to do that which he doth not believe to be lawful. And then the Apostle proceeding ab hypothesi ad thesin, immediately reduceth that particular case into a general rule in these words, For whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. By the process of which his discourse, it may appear, that by Faith no other thing is here meant, than such a persuasion of the mind and conscience as we have now declared, and that the true purport and intent of these words is but thus much in effect: Whosoever shall enterprize the doing of anything, which he verily believeth to be unlawful, or at leastwise is not reasonably well persuaded of the lawfulness of it; let the thing be otherwise, and in itself, what it can be, lawful or unlawful, indifferent or necessary, convenient or inconvenient, it mattereth not: to him it is a sin howsoever.

Which being the plain evident and undeniable purpose of these words, I shall not need to spend anymore breath either in the farther refutation of such conclusions as are mis-inferred hence, which fall of themselves; or in the farther Explication of the meaning of the Text, which already appeareth: but address myself rather to the application of it. Wherein, because upon this great Principle may depend the resolution of very many Cases of Conscience, which may trouble us in our Christian and holy walking: it will not be unprofitable to proceed by resolving some of the most material doubts and questions, among those which have occured unto my Thoughts, by occasion of this Text in my Meditations thereon.

First, It may be demanded, What power the Conscience hath to make a thing, otherwise good and lawful, to become unlawful and sinful? and whence it hath that power? I answer, first, that it is not in the power of any man's Judgment or Conscience to alter the natural condition of anything whatsoever, either in respect of quality or degree: but that still everything that was good remaineth good, and everything that was evil remaineth evil; and that in the very same degree of good or evil, as it was before, neither better nor worse, any man's particular judgment or opinion thereof notwithstanding. For the differences between good and evil, and the several degrees of both, spring from such conditions as are intrinsical to the things themselves: which no Outward respects, (and much less then men's opinions ) can vary. He that esteemeth any creature unclean, may defile himself, but he cannot bring impurity upon that creature, by such his estimation. Secondly, that men's judgments may make that which is good in its own nature, (the natural goodness still remaining) become evil to them in the use: essentially good, and quoad rem; but quoad hominem, and accidentally evil. It is our Apostle's own distinction in the fourteenth verse of this Chapter: Nothing unclean of itself: but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, unclean to him, But then we must know withal, that it holdeth not the other way, Men's judgments or opinions, although they may make that which is good in itself, to become evil to them; yet they cannot make that which is evil in itself, to become good either in itself, or to them. If a man were verily persuaded, that it were evil to ask his Father blessing, that mis-persuasion would make it become evil to him: But if the same man should be as verily persuaded that it were good to curse his Father, or to deny him relief, being an unbeliever; that mis-persuasion could not make either of them become good to him. Some that persecuted the Apostles were persuaded they did God good service in it. It was Saint Paul's case before his conversion, who verily thought in himself, that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus. But those their persuasions would not serve to justify those their actions. Saint Paul confesseth himself to have been a persecutor, and blasphemer, and injurious for so doing, although he followed the guidance of his own Conscience therein: and to have stood in need of mercy for the remission of those wicked acts, though he did them ignorantly, and out of Zeal to the Law. The reason of which difference is, that which I touched in the beginning, even because any one defect is enough to render an action evil; and consequently a defect in the agent may do it, though the substance of the action remain still (as it was) good: but all conditions must concur to make an action good; and consequently a right intention in the Agent will not suffice thereunto, so long as the substance of the action remaineth still (as it was) evil. Thirdly, that the Conscience hath this power over men's wills and actions by virtue of that unchangeable Law of God, which he establisheth by an Ordinance of Nature in our first Creation: that the will of every man (which is the fountain whence all our actions immediately flow) should conform itself to the judgment of the practic understanding or Conscience, as to its proper and immediate rule, and yield itself to be guided thereby. So that if the understanding through Error point out a wrong way, and the will follow it: the fault is chiefly in the understanding for mis-guiding the will. But if the understanding show the right way, and the will take a wrong: then the fault is merely in the will, for not following the guide which God hath set over it.

It may be demanded secondly, Whether or no in every particular thing we do, an actual consideration of the lawfulness and expediency thereof be so requisite, as that for want thereof we should sin in doing it? The reason of the doubt is, because otherwise how should it appear to be of Faith? and, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. I answer, First: that in matters of weight, and worthy of consultation, it is very necessary that the lawfulness and expediency of them be first diligently examined, before they be enterprized. And secondly, that even in smaller matters the like examination is needful when there is any apparent cause of doubting. But thirdly, that in such small and trivial matters, as it much skilleth not whether we do them or no, or whether we do this rather than that, and wherein no doubt ariseth to trouble us; an actual consideration of their lawfulness or expediency is so far from being requisite, that it would rather be troublesome and incommodious. True it is, that all voluntary actions are done with some deliberation, more or less: because it is the nature of the will to consult with the understanding in every act; else it should be irrational and brutish. Yet there are many things which we daily do, wherein the sentence of the understanding is so quick and present, because there is no difficulty in them; that they seem to be, (and are therefore sometimes so termed) actus indeliberati: such as are to sit down and to rise up, to pluck a flower as we walk in a Garden, to ask the time of the day, or the name of the next Town as we travel by the way, or whether we eat of this or that dish at the Table, and the like, For the doing of every of which, it were a ridiculous servility to be imposed upon men, if they should be tied to district examination of the lawfulness and expediency thereof. There is not in them dignus vindice nodus: and a man's time ought to be more precious unto him, than to be trifled away in such needless and minute enquiries. It is even as if we should tie a great learned man that is ready in his Latin tongue, to bethink himself first of some Grammar Rule or Example for the declining and parsing of every word he were to speak, before he should adventure to utter a Latin sentence. But, as such a man is sufficiently assured out of the habit of his learning, that he speaketh congruously and with good propriety, though he have no present actual reference to his Grammar Rules: so here an habitual knowledge of the nature and use of indifferent things is sufficient to warrant to the Conscience the lawfulness of these common actions of life; so as they may be said to be of Faith, though there be no farther actual or particular disquisition used about them. A very needful thing it is the whilst, for Christian men to endeavor to have a right judgment concerning indifferent things: without which it can scarcely be avoided, but that both their Consciences will be full of distracting scruples within themselves, and their conversations full of unbrotherly carriage towards others.

It may be demanded thirdly, Since Whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin; What measure of Faith, or what degree of Perswasion is necessary for the warranting of our actions, so as less than that will not serve? I answer, that what is here demanded cannot positively be defined by any peremptory and immovable rules. There is most an end a Latitude in such things as these are: which may be straitened or extended more or less, according to the exigence of present occasions, and as the different state or quality of particular business shall require. There is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a fullness of persuasion, arising from evident infallible and demonstrative proofs, which is attainable for the performance of sundry duties both of civil Justice and of Religion. And where it may be attained, it is to be endeavored after, (though it be not of absolute necessity: ) for we cannot make our assurances too strong. The Apostle useth that word at the fifth Verse ( Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind ) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : it is a metaphorical word, and seemeth to be borrowed from a Ship under full sail, that hath both wind and tide with it, to carry it with a straight and speedy course to the desired point, and nothing to hinder it. But as men, when they are to purchase Lands, will desire and propose to have as good assurance as by Learned Council can be devised; but yet must be content to take such assurance as the sellers can make, or else they shall make but a few markets: so although we may desire ( ex abundanti ) a full assurance of faith in every weighty action we shall enterprize; yet ordinarily and in most things we must content ourselves to take up with a conjectural, probable, and moral certainty, or else we shall find very few things left for us to do. Fides Logica is not to be expected in all cases: in some, and those the most, Fides Ethica must serve the turn. Nay I say yet further, and I beseech you (brethren) to take notice of it as a matter of special use both for the directing and quieting of your Consciences: that ordinarily and in most things we need no other warrant for what we do than this only, that there is not (to our knowledge) any Law either of Nature or Scripture against them. As the Lawyers use to say of men's persons, Quisque praesumitur esse bonus, &c. The Law taketh every man for a good man and true, till his truth and honesty be legally disproved; and as our Savior sometimes said, He that is not against us, is for us: so in these matters we are to believe all things to be lawful for us to do, which cannot be shown by good evidence either of Scripture or Reason to be unlawful. Those men therefore go quite the wrong way to work, to the fearful puzzling of their own and other men's Consciences, who use to argue on this manner. [This I have no warrant to do; for where is it commanded? ] Whereas they ought rather to argue thus, [This I have good warrant to do; for where is it forbidden? ] Apply this now a little to those Ceremonies, that for orders sake, and to add the greater solemnity to sacred actions, are appointed in the Church; Wearing the Surplice, bowing at the Name of the Lord Jesus, kneeling at the Holy Communion, and the rest. Though I might say, and that truly, that these also are commanded even by divine authority in genere: that is to say, as they fall within the compass of decent Ceremonies, by virtue of that Grand Ecclesiastical Canon ( Let all things be done honestly and in order; ) and that even in specie too they are commanded by the authority of those Governors whom God hath set over us, and to whom we are bound in Conscience, and by virtue of God's commandment, to yield obedience: Yet I wave all this for the present, because it is not so direct to the point in hand. Only I ask, Where are any of these things forbidden? if they be, let it be shewn: and that not by weak collections and remote consequences, which are good for nothing but to engender strifes, and to multiply disputes without end; but by direct and full evidence either of Scripture text or Reason, which (for anything I know) was never yet done, neither (as I verily believe) will ever be done. But if it cannot be shown that these things are forbidden; without anymore ado, the use of them is by that sufficiently warranted. He that will not allow of this doctrine, besides that he cherisheth an error which will hardly suffer him to have a quiet conscience: I yet see not how he can reconcile his Opinion with those sundry passages of our Apostle, [ Every creature of God is good, To the pure all things are pure, I know nothing is of itself unclean, All things are lawful, &c. From which passages we may with much safety conclude, that it is lawful for us to do all those things, concerning which there can be nothing brought of moment to prove them unlawful. Upon which ground alone if we do them, we do them upon such a persuasion of Faith as is sufficient. Provided, that we have not neglected to inform our judgments the best we could for the time past; and that we are ever ready withal to yield ourselves to better information, whensoever it shall be tendered unto us, for the time to come.

It may be demanded fourthly, Suppose a man would fain do something, of the lawfulness whereof he is not in his Conscience sufficiently resolved; whether he may in any case do it, notwithstanding the reluctancy of his Conscience, yea or no? As they write of Cyrus that to make a passage for his Army, he cut the great River Gyndes into many smaller Channels, which in one entire stream was not passable: so to make a clear and distinct answer to this great question, I must divide it into some lesser ones. For there are sundry things considerable in it; whether we respect the Conscience, or the Person of the doer, or the Action to be done. As namely and especially, in respect of the Conscience, whether the reluctancy thereof proceed from a settled and steadfast resolution, or from some doubtfulness only, or but from some scruple? And in respect of the person, whether he be sui juris, his own Master, and have power to dispose of himself at his own choice in the things questioned; or he be under the command, and at the appointment of another? And in respect of the Action, or thing to be done, whether it be a necessary thing, or an unlawful thing, or a thing indifferent and arbitrary? Any of which circumstances may quite alter the case, and so beget new questions. But I shall reduce all to three questions: whereof the first shall concern a resolved Conscience, the second a doubtful Conscience, and the third a scrupulous Conscience.

The First question then is, if the Conscience be firmly resolved, that the thing proposed to be done is unlawful; whether it may then be done or no? Whereunto I answer in these two Conclusions. The first Conclusion: If the Conscience be firmly so resolved, and that upon a true ground (that is to say, if the thing be indeed unlawful, and judged so to be) it may not in any case, or for any respect in the world, be done. There cannot be imagined a higher contempt of God, than for a man to despise the power of his own Conscience: which is the highest sovereignty under Heaven, as being God's most immediate deputy for the ordering of his life and ways. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a heathen man could say. Woful is the state of those men (unless they repent) who for filthy lucre, or vain pleasure, or spiteful malice, or tottering honor, or lazy ease; or any other reigning lust, dare lie, or swear, or cheat, or oppress, or commit filthiness, or steal, or kill, or slander, or flatter, or betray, or do anything that may advance their base ends: nothing at all regarding the secret whisperings, or murmurings, no nor yet the loud roarings, and bellowings of their own Consciences there against. Stat contra ratio, & secretam gannit in aurem. It doth so; but yet they turn a deaf ear to it, and despise it. Wonder not, if when they out of the terrors of their troubled Consciences shall howl and roar in the ears of the Almighty for mercy, or for some mitigation at least of their torment; he then turn a deaf ear against them, and despise them. To him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin, James 4. Sin not to be excused by any plea or color: But how much more inexcusably then is it sin to him, that knoweth the evil he should not do, and yet will do it? There is not a proner way to Hell, than to sin against Conscience. Happy is he which condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth: but most wretched is he that alloweth himself to the practice of that, which in his judgment he cannot but condemn. Neither maketh it any difference at all here, whether a man be otherwise sui juris or no. For although there be a great respect due to the higher powers in doubtful cases, (as I shall touch anon) yet where the thing required is simply unlawful, and understood so to be, Inferiors must absolutely resolve to disobey, whatsoever come of it. God's faithful servants have ever been most resolute in such exigence. We are not careful to answer thee in this matter; (belike in a matter of another nature they would have taken care to have given the King a more satisfactory, at least a more respective answer: but in this matter) be it known to thee, O King, that we will not serve thy gods. Da veniam Imperator, &c, You know whose answers they were. If we be sure God hath forbidden it, we sin against our own consciences, if we do it at the command of any mortal man whosoever, or upon any worldly inducement whatsoever. That is the first Conclusion.

The second is this. If a man be in his conscience fully persuaded that a thing is evil and unlawful, which yet in truth is not so, but lawful; the thing by him so judged unlawful, cannot by him be done without sin. Even an erroneous conscience bindeth thus far, that a man cannot go against it, and be guiltless: because his practice should then run cross to his judgment; and so the thing done could not be of Faith. For if his reason judge it to be evil, and yet he will do it, it argueth manifestly that he hath a will to do evil, and so becometh a transgressor of that General Law, which bindeth all men to eschew all evil. Yet in this case we must admit of some difference, according to the different nature of the things, and the different condition of the persons. For if the things so judged unlawful, be in their own Nature not necessary, but indifferent, so as they may either be done or left undone without sin; and the Person withal be sui juris in respect of such things, no superior power having determined his liberty therein: then, although he may not do any of these things, by reason of the contrary persuasion of his conscience, without sin; yet he may without sin leave them undone. As for example: Say a man should hold it utterly unlawful (as some erroneously do) to play at cards or dice, or to lay a wager, or to cast lots in trivial matters: if it be in truth lawful to do every of these things, (as I make no question but it is, so they be done with sobriety and with due circumstances, ) yet he that is otherwise persuaded of them, cannot by reason of that persuasion do any of them without sin. Yet, forsomuch as they are things no way necessary, but indifferent; both in their nature, and for their use also, no superior power having enjoined any man to use them; therefore he that judgeth them unlawful, may abstain from them without sin, and so indeed he is in conscience bound to do, so long as he continueth to be of that opinion. But now on the other side, if the things so mis-judged to be unlawful, be any way necessary; either in respect of their own nature, or by the injunction of authority: then the person is by that his error brought into such a strait between two sins, as he can by no possible means avoid both, so long as he persisteth in that his error. For, both if he do the thing, he goeth against the persuasion of his Conscience, and that is a great sin: and if he do it not, either he omitteth a necessary duty, or else disobeyeth lawful Authority; and to do either of both is a sin too. Out of which snare since there is no way of escape but one, which is to rectify his Judgment, and to quit his pernicious Error: it concerneth every man therefore that unfeignedly desireth to do his duty in the fear of God, and to keep a good Conscience, not to be too stiff in his present apprehensions, but to examine well the Principles and Grounds of his opinions, strongly suspecting that wind that driveth him upon such rocks, to be but a blast of his own fancy, rather than a breathing of the holy Spirit of truth. Once this is most certain, that whosoever shall adventure to do anything repugnant to the Judgment of his own Conscience, (be that Judgment true, or be it false,) shall commit a grievous sin in so doing: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because it cannot be of Faith; and whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin.

That is now where the Conscience apparently inclineth the one way. But say the scales hang even, so as a man cannot well resolve whether way he should rather take! now he is in one mind, by and by in another; but constant in neither; right S. James his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a double minded man. This is it we call a doubting conscience: concerning which, the second question is, what a man ought to do in case of doubtfulness. Perfect directions here, (as in most deliberatives ) would require a large discourse: because there are so many considerable circumstances that may vary the case; especially in respect of the cause from which that doubtfulness of mind may spring. Many times it ariseth from mere fickleness of mind, or weakness of judgment; as the lightest things are soonest driven out of their place by the wind: Even as S. James saith, a double minded man is wavering in all his ways: and S. Paul speaketh of some that were like children, off and on, soon wherried about with every blast of doctrine. Sometimes it proceedeth from tenderness of Conscience, which is indeed a very blessed and gracious thing: but yet (as tender things may soon miscarry, if they be not the more choicely handled,) very abnoxious through Satan's diligence and subtlety to be wrought upon to dangerous inconveniences. Sometimes it may proceed from the probability of those reasons that seem to stand on either side, betwixt which it is not easy to judge which are strongest: or from the differing judgments and opinions of learned and godly men thereabout, and from many other causes: But for some general resolution of the Question, (what is to be done where the conscience is doubtful? ) I answer.

But secondly, if the question be concerning the very lawfulness of the thing itself, whether it may be lawfully done or no, and the conscience stand in doubt, because reasons seem to be probable both pro and contra, and there are learned men as well of the one opinion, as of the other, &c. as we see it is (for instance) in the question of Usury and of second marriage after divorce, and in sundry other doubtful cases in moral divinity; in such a case the person (if he be sui juris ) is certainly bound to forbear the doing of that thing of the lawfulness whereof he so doubteth: and if he forbear it not, he sinneth. It is the very point the Apostle in this verse intendeth to teach; and for the confirming whereof he voucheth this Rule of the Text: He that doubteth, saith he, is damned if he eat; he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , condemned of his own conscience: because he doth that willingly whereof he doubteth, when he hath free liberty to let it alone, no necessity urging him thereunto. And the reason why he ought rather to forbear than to adventure the doing of that whereof he doubteth, is; because in doubtful cases Wisdom would that the safer part should be chosen. And that part is safer, which if we choose, we are sure we shall do well; than that, which if we choose, we know not but we may do ill. As for example, in the instances now proposed. If I doubt of the lawfulness of Usury, or of Marrying after divorce, I am sure that if I Marry not, nor let out my money, I shall not sin in so abstaining: but if I shall do either of both doubtingly, I cannot be without some fear lest I should sin in so doing; and so those actions of mine being not done in Faith, must needs be sin, even by the Rule of the Text, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , For whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin.

But then thirdly, if the liberty of the agent be determined by the command of some superior power to whom he oweth obedience; so as he is not now sui juris ad hoc, to do or not to do at his own choice, but to do what he is commanded: this one circumstance quite altereth the whole case, and now he is bound in conscience to do the thing commanded, his doubtfulness of mind whether that thing be lawful or no, notwithstanding. To do that whereof he doubteth, where he hath free liberty to leave it undone, bringeth upon him (as we have already shewn) the guilt of willful transgression: but not so where he is not left at his own liberty. And where lawful authority prescribeth in alterutram partem, there the liberty ad utramque partem contradictionis is taken away, from so many as are under that authority. If they that are over them have determined it oneway, it is not thenceforth anymore at their choice, whether they will take that way, or the contrary: but they must go the way that is appointed them without gainsaying or grudging. And if in the deed done at the command of one that is endued with lawful authority there be a sin, it must go on his score that requireth it wrongfully, not on his that doth but his duty in obeying. A Prince commandeth his Subjects to serve in his Wars: it may be the quarrel is unjust; it may be, there may appear to the understanding of the subject great likelihoods of such injustice; yet may the Subject for all that fight in the quarrel; yea he is bound in conscience so to do: nay he is deep in disloyalty and treason, if he refuse the service, whatsoever pretensions he may make of conscience, for such refusal. Neither need that fear trouble him, lest he should bring upon himself the guilt of innocent blood; for the blood that is unrighteously shed in that quarrel, he must answer for, that set him on work, not he that spilled it. And truly, it is a great wonder to me, that any man endued with understanding, and that is able in any measure to weigh the force of those precepts and reasons which bind inferiors to yield obedience to their superiors, should be otherwise minded in cases of like nature. Whatsoever is commanded us by those whom God hath set over us, either in Church, Common-wealth, or Family, ( quod tamen non sit certum displicere Deo, saith S. Bern. ) which is not evidently contrary to the Law and will of God, ought to be of us received and obeyed no otherwise, than as if God himself had commanded it, because God himself hath commanded us to obey the higher Powers, and to submit ourselves to their ordinances. Say it be not well done of them to command it! Sed enim quid hoc re • ert tuâ? saith he; What is that to thee? Let them look to that whom it concerneth: Tolle quod tuum est, & vade. Do thou what is thine own part faithfully, and never trouble thyself further. Ipsum quem pro Deo habemus, tanquam Deum, in his quae aperte non sunt contra Deum, audire debemus; Ernard still. God's Vicegerents must be heard and obeyed in all things that are not manifestly contrary to the revealed will of God.

But the thing required is against my conscience, may some say; and I may not go against my conscience, for any man's pleasure. Judge I pray you what perverseness is this, when the blessed Apostle commandeth thee to obey for conscience sake, that thou shouldest disobey, and that for conscience sake too: He chargeth thee upon thy conscience to be subject; and thou pretendest thy conscience to free thee from subjection. This by the way; now to the point. Thou sayest, it is against thy conscience: I say again, that (in the case whereof we now speak, the case of doubtfulness ) it is not against thy conscience. For doubting properly is motus indifferens in utramque partem contradictionis; when the mind is held in suspense between two ways; uncertain whether of both to take to. When the scales hang even (as I said before) and in aequilibrio, without any notable propension and inclination to the one side more than to the other. And surely where things hang thus even, if the weight of authority will not cast the scale either way: we may well suppose, that either the authority is made very light, or else there is a great fault in the beam. Known (brethren) the gainsaying conscience is one thing, and the doubting conscience another. That which is done repugnante conscientiâ, the conscience of the doer flatly gainsaying it, that is indeed against a man's conscience, (the conscience having already passed a definitive sentence the one way:) and no respect or circumstance whatsoever can free it from sin. But that which is done dubitante conscientiâ, the conscience of the doer only doubting of it and no more; that is in truth no more against a man's conscience than with it, (the conscience as yet not having passed a definitive sentence either way:) and such an action may either be a sin, or no sin; according to those qualifications which it may receive from other respects and circumstances. If the conscience have already passed a judgment upon a thing, and condemned it as simply unlawful; in that case it is true that a man ought not by any means to do that thing, no not at the command of any Magistrate, no nor although his conscience have pronounced a wrong sentence, and erred in that judgment: for then he should do it, repugnante conscientiâ, he should go directly against his own conscience, which he ought not to do whatsoever come of it. In such a case certainly he may not obey the Magistrate: yet let him know thus much withal, that he sinneth too in disobeying the Magistrate; from which sin the following of the judgment of his own conscience cannot acquit him. And this is that fearful per plexity whereof I spake, whereinto many a man casteth himself by his own error and obstinacy, that he can neither go with his conscience, nor against it, but he shall sin. And who can help it, if a man will needs cherish an error, and persist in it? But now if the conscience be only doubtful whether a thing be lawful or no, but have not as yet passed a peremtory judgment against it, (yea although it rather incline to think it unlawful: ) in that case if the Magistrate shall command it to be done, the Subject with a good conscience may do it, nay he cannot with a good conscience refuse to do it, though it be dubitante conscientiâ.

But you will yet say, that in doubtful cases the safer part is to be chosen. So say I too; and am content that rule should decide this question: only 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 let it be rightly applied. Thou thinkest it safer, where thou doubtest of the unlawfulness, to forbear, than to do: as for example, if thou doubtest whether it be lawful to kneel at the Communion, it is safest in thy opinion therefore for thee not to kneel. So should I think too, if thou wert left merely to thine own liberty. But thou dost not consider how thou art caught in thine own net, and how the edge of thine own weapon may be turned upon thee point-blank not to be avoided, thus. If authority command thee to kneel, which whether it be lawful for thee to do, or not, thou doubtest; it cannot choose but thou must needs doubt also, whether thou mayest lawfully disobey or not. Now then here apply thine own Rule, In dubiis pars tutior, and see what will come of it. Judge, since thou canst not but doubt in both cases, whether it be not the safer of the two, to obey doubtingly, than to disobey doubtingly. Tene certum, demitte incertum, is S. Gregory his rule: where there is a certainty, and an uncertainty, let the uncertainty go, and hold to that which is certain. Now the general is certain, that thou art to obey the Magistrate in all thing not contrary to the will of God; but the particular is uncertain, whether the thing now commanded thee by the Magistrate be contrary to the will of God: (I say uncertain to thee, because thou doubtest of it.) Deal safely therefore, and hold thee to that which is certain, and obey.

But thou wilt yet allege, that the Apostle here condemneth the doing of anything, not only with a gainsaying, but even with a doubting conscience, because doubting also is contrary to faith; and he that doubteth is even for that condemned, if he eat. Oh beware of misapplying Scripture! it is a thing easily done, but not so easily answered. I know not any one gap that hath let in more and more dangerous errors into the Church, than this: that men take the words of the sa • red Text fitted to particular occasions, and to the condition of the times wherein they were written; and then apply them to themselves and others as they find them, without due respect had to the differences that be between those times and cases and the present. Sundry things spoken in Scripture agreeably to that infancy of the Church, would sort very ill with the Church in her fullness of strength and stature: and sundry directions very expedient in times of persecution, and when believers lived mingled with Infidels, would be very unseasonably urged where the Church is in a peaceable and flourishing estate, enjoying the favor and living under the protection of gracious and religious Princes. Thus the Constitutions that the Apostles made concerning Deacons and Widows in those primitive times, are with much importunity, but very importunely withal, urged by the Disciplinarians: And sundry other like things I might instance in of this kind, worthy the discovery, but that I fear to grow tedious. Briefly then, the Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter, and wheresoever else he toucheth upon the point of Scandals, is to be understood only in that case where men are left to their own liberty in the use of indifferent things: the Romans, Corinthians, and others to whom S. Paul wrote about these matters, being not limited any way in the exercise of their liberty therein by any overruling authority. But where the Magistrates have interposed, and thought good upon mature advice to impose Laws upon those that are under them, whereby their liberty is (not infringed, as some unjustly complain, in the inward judgment, but only) limited in the outward exercise of it: there the Apostolical directions will not hold in the same absolute manner, as they were delivered to those whom they then concerned; but only in the equity of them, so far forth as the cases are alike, and with such meet qualifications and mitigations, as the difference of the cases otherwise doth require. So that a man ought not out of private fancy, or merely because he would not be observed for not doing as others do, or for any the like weak respects, to do that thing, of the lawfulness whereof he is not competently persuaded, where it is free for him to do otherwise: which was the case of these weak ones among the Romans, for whose sakes principally the Apostle gave these directions. But the authority of the Magistrate intervening so alters the case, that such a forbearance as to them was necessary, is to as many of us as are commanded to do this or that, altogether unlawful, in regard they were free, and we are bound: for the reasons already shewn, which now I rehearse not.

But you will yet say, (for in point of obedience men are very loath to yield so long as they can find anything to plead,) those that lay these burdens upon us, at leastwise should do well to satisfy our doubts, and to inform our consciences concerning the lawfulness of what they enjoin; that so we might render them obedience with better cheerfulness. How willing are we sinful men to leave the blame of our miscarriages anywhere rather than upon ourselves! But how is it not incongruous the while, that those men should prescribe rules to their governors, who can scarcely brook their Governors should prescribe Laws to them? It were good we would first learn how to obey, ere we take upon us to teach our betters how to govern. However, what governors are bound to do, or what is • it for them to do, in the point of information; that is not now the question. If they fail in any part of their bounden duty, they shall be sure to reckon for it one day: but their failing cannot in the mean time excuse thy disobedience. Although I think it would prove a hard task, for whosoever should undertake it, to show that Superiors are always bound to inform the consciences of their inferiors concerning the lawfulness of everything they shall command. If sometimes they do it, where they see it expedient or needful; sometimes again (and that perhaps oftener,) it may be thought more expedient for them, and more conducible for the public peace and safety, only to make known to the people what their pleasures are, reserving to themselves the reasons thereof. I am sure, in the point of Ecclesiastical Ceremonies and Constitutions, (in which case the aforesaid allegations are usually most stood upon,) this hath been abundantly done in our Church, not only in the learned writings of sundry private men, but by the public declaration also of Authority, as is to be seen at large in the Preface commonly Printed before the Book of Common-prayer, concerning that argument: enough to satisfy those that are peaceable, and not disposed to stretch their wits to cavil at things established. And thus much of the second Question, touching a doubting Conscience: whereon I have insisted the longer, because it is a point both so proper to the Text, and whereat so many have stumbled.

There remaineth but one other Question, and that of far smaller difficulty; What is to be done, when the conscience is scrupulous? I call that a scruple, when a man is reasonably well persuaded of the lawfulness of a thing, yet hath withal some jealousies and fears, lest perhaps it should prove unlawful. Such scruples are more incident to men of melancholy dispositions, or of timorous spirits; especially if they be tender conscienced withal: and they are much increased by the false suggestions of Satan; by reading the Books, or hearing the Sermons, or frequenting the company of men more strict, precise, and austere in sundry points, than they need or ought to be; and by sundry other means which I now mention not. Of which scruples it behooveth every man, first, to be wary that he do not at all admit them, if he can choose: or, if he cannot wholly avoid them, that secondly, he endeavor so far as may be to eject them speedily out of his thoughts, as Satan's snares, and things that may breed him worser inconveniences: or if he cannot be so rid of them, that then thirdly, he resolve to go on according to the more probable persuasion of his mind, and despise those scruples. And this he may do with a good conscience, not only in things commanded him by lawful authority, but even in things indifferent and arbitrary, and wherein he is let to his own liberty.

Much more might have been added for the farther both declaration and confirmation of these points. But you see I have been forced to wrap things together that deserve a more full and distinct handling, that I might hold some proportion with the time. I had a purpose briefly to have comprised the sum of what I have delivered, concerning a gainsaying, a doubting, and a scrupulous conscience, in some few conclusions for your better remembrance, and to have added also something by way of direction, what course might be the most probably taken for the correcting of an erroneous conscience, for the settling of a doubtful conscience, and for the quieting of a scrupulous conscience. But it is more than time that I should give place to other business: and the most, and most material of those directions, have been here and there occasionally touched in that which hath been delivered already: In which respect I may the better spare that labor. Beseech we God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, so to endue us all with the grace of his holy Spirit, that in our whole conversations we may unfeignedly endeavor to preserve a good conscience, and to yield all due obedience to him first, and then to every Ordinance of man for his sake.

Now to this Father, Son, and blessed Spirit, three persons, and one eternal God, be ascribed all the Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory both now and for evermore.

AD CLERUM.

The fifth Sermon.

At a Visitation holden at Grantham, Lincoln, Octob. 8. 1641.

O UR Savior sometimes forewarneth his Disciples to beware of the leaven of Pharisees, Which leaven, as he expoundeth himself, (and he best knew his own meaning) was of two sorts: the leaven of Hypocrisy, Luke 12. and the leaven of corrupt and superstitious doctrine, Matth. 16. We read, 1 Cor. 5. of a third sort, and that is the leaven of maliciousness; which also usually accompanieth the other two. Where any of the three are in abundance, but especially where they all meet and abound, (as in these Pharisees ) it is impossible by any care or cunning so to keep them hidden, as not to bewray themselves upon occasion to an observing eye. As you know it is the nature of leaven, though it be hidden never so deep in a heap of Meal, to work up to the top, so that a Man may certainly know by the effects, and be able to say, that there it is. In the story of this present Chapter, the Pharisees discover all the three; Malice, Hypocrisy, and Superstition. Their Malice against Christ, although it appeared sufficiently in this, that their quarrelling his Disciples for eating with unwashen hands was with the intent to bring an odium upon him for not instructing them better: yet he passeth it by, without taking any special notice thereof. It may be, for that his own person was chiefly concerned in it. But then the other two, their Hypocrisy and Superstition, in rejecting the Commandments of God for the setting up of their own Traditions; because they trencht so near and deep upon the honor of God his heavenly Father, he neither would nor could dissemble. But themselves having given him the occa • ion by asking him the first question, [ Why do thy Disciples transgress the tradition of the Elders? ] he turneth the point of their own weapon full upon them again as it were by way of recrimination, not without some sharpness, Do you blame them for that? But why then do you yourselves also transgress the Commandment of God by your Tradition? which is a far greater matter.

2. That is their Charge, verse 3, Which having made good by one instance taken from the fi • th Commandment, (more he might have brought: but it needed not; this one being so notorious and so convincing) he thenceforth doubteth not to call them Hypocrites to their faces, and to apply to them a passage out of the Prophet Isaiah, very pat to his purpose. Wherein the Prophet charged the People of those times with the very same crimes both of them, whereof these Pharisees are presently appealed: to wit, Hypocrisy, and Superstition: Hypocrisy in their Worship, and Superstition in the Doctrine. The Leaven whereof, by how much more it swelled them in their own and the common Opinion, making them to be highly esteemed among Men, for their outward preciseness and semblances of Holiness; by so much the more it soured them towards Almighty God, rendering the whole Lump of their so strict Religion abominable in his sight. So true is that of our Savior, Luke 16. That which is highly esteemed among men, is abomination in the sight of God. Their Hypocrisy he putteth home to them in the Verses before the Text; Ye Hypocrites, well did Isaiah prophesy of you, saying, This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoreth me with their lips; but their heart is far from me. That done, he forgetteth not to remember them of their Superstition too; continuing his allegation out of the Prophet still, in the words of my Text, But in vain they do worship me, teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men.

3. This later verse I have chosen to entreat of alone at this time: for although Hypocrisy and corrupt teaching do often go together, as in those Jews whom the Prophet long before reproved, and in these Pharisees whom our Savior here reproveth: yet have I purposely severed this Verse from the former in the handling, moved thereunto out of a double consideration. First, because Hypocrisy lurking more within, we are not able to pronounce of it with such certainty; neither (if we were) have we indeed any good Warrant so to do: as we may of unsound Doctrines which lie more open to the view, and are allowed to our examination. Secondly, and especially, because hundreds of those my Brethren, whom I cannot in reason excuse from symbolizing with the Pharisees in teaching for doctrines the commandments of men (which is the fault reproved in this verse;) I cannot yet in charity and in my own thoughts, but acquit from partaking with them in (the measure at least of) that their foul Hypocrisy, wherewith they stand charged in the former verses.

The words themselves being one entire proposition; to stand upon the curious dividing of them would be a matter of more ostentation than use: and the truth thereof also, when the meaning is once laid open, will be so evident, that I shall presume of your assent, without spending much time in the proof. The main of our business then upon the Text at this time must be Explication, Application, and Use. First the Explication of the Words, then the Application of the Matter; and lastly, some Corollaries inferred therefrom for our Use. Which for your better understanding and remembrance I shall endeavor to do as plainly and orderly as I can.

4. As for the Words first. There are three things in them that desire Explication: First, what is meant by the commandments of men: Secondly, what it is to teach such commandments for doctrines: Thirdly, how and in what respect they that teach such doctrines may be said to worship God in vain. For the first; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Commandment, properly and strictly taken, is an affirmative precept requiring something to be done: the contrary whereof is a Prohibition, or negative precept, forbidding the doing of something. But in the Holy Scriptures, (as in our common speech also) the word is usually so extended as to comprehend both, ( Prohibitions also, as well as Commandments properly so called.) The reason whereof is, because Affirmatives, and Negatives do for the most part mutually include and infer the one the other: as in the present Case, it is all one, whether the Pharisees should command Men to wash before meat, or forbid them to eat before they had washed. We call the whole Decalogue the ten commandments, though there be Negative precepts there as well as Affirmative, yea, more Negative than Affirmative. And those Negatives [ Touch not, taste not, handle not ] are called the Commandments of men, Col. 2. 12. Which place I note the rather, because the appellation here used, and cited out of Isa. 29. according to the Septuagint [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] are not found anywhere else in the whole Testament besides in the relation of this story, save in that one place only.