A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness

Mr. C's Animadversions.

I think it is the same as Praeceptum is called Voluntas signi, though some do not so clearly and fully explain this Distinction as others do.

R. B 's Reply.

I am glad you begin with this Distinction, that I may have my apprehensions of it more fully cleared; where they are right, confirmed; and if unsound, that they may be changed. For I confess, I make use of this Distinction, as a Key to my understanding of very many points in Divinity, to which it is not commonly applied. The confounding of our Ethics and Physicks, and so of their distinct Fountains, doth introduce confusion into the main Body of Theology, with those that are guilty of it: And it is easy to conceive, that it is necessary to the understanding of Theological Controversies, to avoid that confusion, and know to which of these the Question doth belong. It is easy to conceive what work it would make in Philosophical Discourses, to confound our Physicks and Ethics; and it will have no better effect in Theological. Therefore, as I take Debitum to be the direct proper Object of our Ethics; and Ens Reale, of our Physicks (for I take not the term [Physicks] in the common restrained sense, as its Object is only Corpus Naturale; but as it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as some call Metaphysics, and containeth much of Metaphysics, (for I conceive that which treateth de Eute Reali should be one entire Doctrine) Pneumaticks, and common Physicks all: So I take [Ethics] in so large a sense, as to comprehend Economics, Politicks, and all Morality:) So I do distinguish of God's Will here, according to these different Objects. As Ens Reale, is the Object, or Product of his Will, for want of a better name, I call it, his Decretive Will, or Will of Purpose: And because in most of our Theological Discourses, we are fain to speak of God's Will, according to the imperfect manner of man's will, as if it respected its Object as present, past, future; therefore Res futurae, & Rerum futuritio are usually made the Objects, or Products of God's Decree or Purpose (for man purposeth only de futuro:) (And indeed quoad hominem, the thing being truly future, so God may be said to Decree that quoad hominem it shall be future; though quoad ipsum Deum non est futurum.) But I sometime say, Eventus is the Object of this Will; meaning thereby Res eveniens, and so connecting the Thing with its Emanation from its first Cause; and intending the Comprehension of all Beings, past, present, and future. And also, that I may comprehend Privations, which as they are Reductively belonging to the Doctrine of Beings; so may they also to the Object of God's Will de Eventu. For as man's Will may be de Agere vel non Agere, de esse vel non esse; so we may conceive of God's Will: (Though Scotus hath shown the truth of this Conception to be very disputable.) Therefore when I say that Ens Reale is the Object, or Product of this Will of God, I mean both the Esse & non Esse, Beings and Privations; but one directly and properly, the other but consequenter & reductive: As in saying Debitum is the Object, or rather Product of God's Ethical, or Legislative Will, I mean both the Debere & non Debere; but the former only directly, the latter but indirectly, consequenter & reductive; as proceeding only from God's non-commanding or prohibiting, and properly being Nothing, and having no Cause in Morality: I mean, the [Non-d • be • agere;] for in the [Debeo non agere] which is caused by Prohibitions, the Debitum is Positive formaliter, though the quasi subjecta materia, vel res debita, be but nominal, and really nothing.

1. So that by God's Decretive Will, I mean only his Will de Eventu, vel de Ente qua tali; and by his Legislative Will, I mean only his Will de Debito: So that I primarily distinguish of the Objects, or Products of God's Will; and thence of his Will itself. This I expressed fully in my Aphorisms: So that my main scope is, but to keep open the difference between Naturality, and Morality in all our Discourses.

2. And I have there also manifested, that therefore I take the Act of Willing in God to be the same in both. Velle Debitum, is as properly Velle, as is Velle Eventum.

3. And that I distinguish of the Objects here, but formaliter: For Debitum is Ens quoddam (according to the common Doctrine: Though I think, as Burgersdic. Metaph. Relations are inter entia & Nihil:) But I mean therefore Debitum qua Debitum, & Eventum qua Eventum, vel Ens qua Ens.

4. And therefore as the Doctrine de Eventu vel de Ente, is far more Comprehensive than the Doctrine de Jure (Jus vel Debitum being but an inferior Species of Ens; taking Ens so largely as to comprehend Modalities and Relations:) so God's Will de Ente vel Eventu, comprehendeth his Will de Debito: But yet his Will de Debito, qua Debitum, may well be distinguished from his Will de Ente qua tali; as the Specifick nature from the Generieal.

5. I also (and principally) shown you, that I comprehend two things in my phrase of [God's Legislative Will,] or [his Will de Debito:] 1. The Immanent Will of God de Debito; which is as true, and as Eternal an Act, as his Velle Eventum. 2. The signal Will of God, which is his Law: This I told you, I call his Will but Metonymically.

6. Both these together, and neither alone, do Constituere Debitum; 1. Not God's Immanent act alone, or directly; for it is not properly Lex, till it be signified; much less Lex promulgata. 2. Nor the Law, or signum considered in itself, abstracted from the Will signified; but only considered Formaliter ut signum, and so with its correlate; viz. The Immanent Will signified.

7. My full meaning therefore is, but to distinguish God's Law, from his other Acts and Works. But I choose to call it [his Legislative Will,] rather than [his Law:] 1. Lest it should be thought I include only the Law materially, and exclude the Immanent Will, which was from Eternity de Debito. 2. Because if I should distinguish between [God's Will,] and [his Law] it would plainly sound as if I contradistinguished his whole Will from his Law, and so even his Will de Debito, which is the Soul of his Law, the Signum being but the Body.

8. And I fully told you, that therefore I call it his [Legislative Will,] rather than (as others hitherto) his [Will of Precept;] because the Law hath several parts, which constitute a several Debitum: Precept is but one of these parts, but I speak of all. The false Definitions of Law have long wronged the World; while men reduced it all to Precept, or to be Regula actionum moralium. The Law determineth (in the large, and yet proper sense, as I will take Law) de omni Debito, Moraliter & proprie sic dicto: 1. What shall be due from us; that is, in the Precept and Prohibition. 2. What shall be due to us; that is, in, 1. The Promise. 2. The Threat: Besides Fundamental Distributions.

So that the Product of God's Legislative Will, is, 1. Debitum rei libere & absolute Donatae. 2. Debitum officii nostri (in agendo & non-agendo.) 3. Debitum praemii. 4. Debitum poenae.

Thus I have all close together, and once again told you my meaning (as plain as I can with brevity) in this Distinction. And understand, that I undertake not to show you how far other men's sense of it is the same with mine: But our Question is, Whether this that I have opened, be the Schoolmens sense of their Distinction of [Voluntas signi & Beneplaciti?] I conclude, that it is not, and that for these Reasons.

1. Implere & permittere naturaliter (ut à permissione morali distinguitur) which are some of their signa, are utterly unreducible to this Legislative Will.

2. Both the terms of their Distinction, and their Explication, show that they intend not to distinguish God's Will ab objectis; Event and Right: But as it is in itself, and as it is manifested to us: And therefore Voluntas signi with them, is Voluntas significata, or signum Voluntatis: But not one act of that Will signified as distinct from another (as to our apprehension;) but the same that is before termed Veluntas Beneplaciti, is it as signified. And therefore some of them do again subdistinguish their five signs, noting, that some of them (Praeceptum, prohibitio, Consilium) do determine Duty; and the other signify Event. So Lombard himself more fully and plainly than almost any of his followers; And so Aquinas and many more also do. And so they may as well subdistinguish the Voluntas Beneplaciti, into Beneplacitum de Eventu, & de Debito. I could by multitudes of their sayings, manifest this that I say, of the plain importance of their words, were it not a vain loss of time and labor, specially to you that I know have so frequently read it.

3. And therefore they use the Distinction of Voluntas secreta & revelata, as the same in sense with Beneplaciti & signi: But it is not the same with mine; for Voluntas de Eventu est partim secreta partim (in prophetiis & Causis secundis) revelata.

4. And they plainly exclude the Immanent Act of God's Will de Debito, from their Vol. signi, by the very name. For the Immanent Act is not sui ipsius signum nec alterius.

5. And as plainly do they exclude it by saying, that Volunt. signi is but Metaphorice God's Will, Whereas the Immanent Act is properly his Will, and the signum is more Metonymice than Metaphorice his Will. I think I needed no more proof; but if these convince you not, the matter is of very small moment what they mean. Divers of our own more clear Divines indeed, do come near my meaning in their Distinction of Vol. Praecepti & Propositi: As Judicious Davenant Dissertat. de Redempt. Univers. pag. 126. Rivet. Exercit. in Gen. 107. pag. (mihi) 524. Vossius Hist. Pelag. l. 7. part. 1. Thes. 1. & 2. per tot. & in Thes. de Pelagianismo D. Chamier Panstrat. Tom. 3. l. 7. c 6. ad loc. 1 Tim. 2. & 2 Pet. 3. Conrad. Bergius Prax. Cathol. diss. 6. p. 888. Zanchius sometimes expresseth it one way, and sometimes near as I; as, Tom. operum ult. p. (mihi) 679. & de Natura Dei, l. 3. c. 4. p. 257, 258. per tot. & 254. Especially Rutherford (cited by you, who followeth Twisse) and Cameron pag. 642. Oper. in fol. Gen. cont. Tilen. most plainly: And Twisse most frequently, Vindic. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. §. 1. & §. 11. And Discovery of Dr. Jackson's Vanity, ad §. 2. pag. 535, & p. 536, & 550. And Consider. of Tilenus against Synod. Dort. pag. 166. & Vindic. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. p. (Volum. minoris) 173, 174. Amyraut Specim. Animadv. Special. p. 71. Learned Rob. Baronius in Philosoph. Theolog. Ancill. Exercit. 3. Art. 14. pag. 211. And indeed the first that made me sensible that this Distinction differed from the School-distinction of [Benepl. & signi,] was Twisse and Cameron: Yet it must be acknowledged, that Twisse himself (who makes more use of it than all others that I have read) overlooked (at least usually) the Immanent Will of God de Debito, and spake only of the Precept itself; and therefore calleth it God's Will Metaphorically. If I may prefer Truth before Modesty, I must say, that Dr. Twisse saw further into the nature and use of this Distinction than others before him had done; but yet his Notions were very imperfect of it, and his Improvement very short, in respect to its desert and use. And therefore he called it but Voluntas Praecepti, and applied it only to matter of Precept and Prohibition; but saw not that it belonged also to Promise and Commination, even to the whole Law. And though he makes Praecipere & Vetare to be the Objects of of this Will (which clearly implies, that he took in the Immanent Act of which they were the Objects) Lib. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. §. 11. yet he so often contradicteth it by speaking otherwise, that I doubt it fell from him ex improviso. One more let me name you, whom you must oppose with me, and that is Molinaeus Anato. Armin. c. 4. where he speaks against them that call the Decree God's Secret Will, and the Commandment his Revealed Will, as speaking inconsiderately. §. 8. & §. 9. he saith, Thomas and the Schoolmen do distinguish God's Will into Volun. Beneplaciti & Volunt. signi: The members of which Distinction fall one into another: For many things of his Vol. Beneplaciti, are signified too: Neither is the word Beneplaciti, which is in Gr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , sufficiently applied here; For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth for the most part include Love and Good-will, &c. And §. 3, 4, 5. he well explains the Legislative Will in part. And he saw, §. 6, 7. that even Promises and Threatenings were reducible to it. But yet he thought it was improperly; and so §. 6, & 7. it is plain that he did not fully yet understand the due extent of this Will: Else; 1. He would have acknowledged the Immanent Act, as well as the Signal. 2. And have seen, that the pars Legis praemians & puniens (i. e. Comminatio) do as properly Constituere Debitum praemii & poenae, as the Praeceptum doth the Debitum officii: and consequently are most proper signs of God's Will de Debito. 3. And he would not have turned here to dispute against Conditional Will in God; but would have seen, that God hath doubtless a Conditional Law, and so a Conditional Will de Debito, whatever he hath de Eventu. But enough of men's Opinions. To proceed.

Animadversion.

1. I do not see how Impletto, fulfilling; or Operatio, working, as Aquin. hath it, Part. 1. q. 19. a. 12. can be called an uncertain sign: For if God fulfil, or work a thing, it is a sure and undoubted sign that he doth will it. For he doth not work either against or besides his Will; so it is also in respect of Permission. For if God permit a thing to be done, it is certain that his Will is to have it done. Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotence fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciends. Aug. Enchir. c. 95.

2. Aquin. indeed (ibid.) a. 11. makes Volunt. signi to he Metaphorically called God's Will; and so doth Dr. Twisse, yet he understood (and so I suppose did Aquinas) the Distinction so, as to be in effect all one with yours. Voluntas signs proprie praeceptum dicitur, improprie licet usitate dicitur Voluntas. At Voluntas Beneplaciti Voluntas proprie dicta. Praecepta enim judicant quid Deus velit esse nostri officii ut à nobis fiat; non autem judicant quid sit decreti sui, ut ipse faciat, vel fieri permittat. Dr. Twisse. Vind. l. 2. digr. 2. c. 13. Voluntas signs Improprie dicitur Voluntas: Significat enim tantum quid ab homine fieri Debeat, aut quid placitum sit Deo, si fiat. At Voluntas Beneplaciti, proprie & simpliciter est Voluntas, q •• nempe decree • it, quid futurum sit, Deo aut efficiente, aut permittente. Ibid. l. 1. part. 1. sect. 12. §. 2. Observe, that he speaks of Voluntas signi, so far forth as this Signum is Fraeceptum; and in that respect I take Voluntas signs, to be the same with the Will of Precept, as you call it. And so (it seems) did Dr. Twisse take it; for you see he makes man's duty to be the Object of Voluntas signi, even as you do of God's Will of Precept. When therefore he saith, That Volunt. signi is improperly called God's Will; he means only, that God's Precept is improperly called his Will, it being properly the sign, or signification of his Will: Not but that God truly, and properly willeth that which the Precept containeth; Not always that it shall be done, but always▪ that it shall be be man's duty to do it, as the Doctor expressly speaketh, and (I suppose the Schoolmen meant no otherwise.) But, Rhet • rsortis doth yet more plainly describe Vol. signi, so as you do God's Preceptive Will. Voluntas approbans (seu signi) non revel • t nobis Intentionem seu decretum Dei. Haec enim & similia, [Cain, Saul, Jud • , obedi • e & Credite] non habent hoc pro re signific. itâ, aut volitâ à Deo, [Mea haec est Intentio, & Decretum est apud me ab aeterno, ut obediretis, &c.] Sed tantum dicit Deus; Hoc praecepto Caino, & Saulo, &c. proposito, igo indico & revelo, mihi gratam & acceptam esse obedientiam, ad quam ex lege & debito obligati estis Creatori Vestro, siquidem et accepti esse velitis, sive actu obediatis, sive non. Rhetorf. E • er. 2. c. 1. §. 5. quando Deus Jussit Abrahamum Immolare silium, non tenebatur Abrahamus credere Immolationem Isaaci esse Decretam & Intentam à Deo, sed sui esse officii ut Immolaret Isaacum. ibid.

Reply.

1. I never intended when I wrote that, to assert, That Impletion was an uncertain sign of God's Will: But the other four signs are uncertain, as to the Event. But I see I should have so cautelously expressed myself, that my speech might not have been so liable to misinterpretation. Yet if I mistake not the usual meaning of the Schoolmen, that under the Will Beneplaciti & signi, even under each branch, they comprehended God's Will about whatsoever Object; then Impletio Voluntatis Beneplaciti de Eventu non est signum Voluntatis Beneplaciti de Jure. The killing of Christ was no sign, that it was God's Pleasure that it should be the Jews duty to kill him. Your yielding the three first to be uncertain signs, shows that the Schoolmens Distinction is not the same with mine: For they are not uncertain signs of God's Immanent Will de Debito.

2. I perceive no proof of your Assertion, That Permission is a certain sign of God's Will de Eventu: [If God permit a thing (say you) to be done, it is a certain sign it is his Will to have it done.] I believe not this. Indeed, if a thing be done on God's Permission, it is a certain sign he would permit it to be done: But not, if he permit it, therefore would he have it done; that is, the event (that it is done) whether by Permission, or Efficiency, is a certain sign that he Willed that Event, or to permit that Event. But the Permission is no such sign that he Willed the Event, but only it is a sign that he Willed that Permission. For God permitteth that which never cometh to pass. Doth he not permit the wicked to amend? the Drunkard to be sober? &c. I think he doth permit it, and more than permit it. Indeed, where the Creature hath a natural, or adventitious inclination to the Act (as a stone to fall downward, a sinner to do wickedly, &c.) and there are the mediums at hand which are necessary thereto, there God's bare Permission is certainly connected to the following Event; and consequently, is a sign, that (in some sort) he willeth it. But where the Creature needs God's actual help, yea, his special Grace to perform any act, I think his bare Permission is no such sign that he willeth the Event. If it be, sure God willeth the Sanctification, or Repentance of Reprobates, when he doth so much more than permit it; (except we take up Dr. Twisse's poor conceit, that Actus elicitus volendi videtur proprie dici non posse impediri. Quia tum dici solet aliquis impediri, cum non sinitur facere quod vult. Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 2. Digres. 6. p. 360. As if the not-hindering of an Active Power to move, according to the inclination of its Habits, and the drawing of its Object, were not properly Permission.) If you take permittere, either properly for non-impedire, as it respecteth Acts; or improperly, for non-alteration, as it respecteth Qualities: In both senses, Permission is no sign that God willeth the Event. I believe you judge, that Twisse in his Digression hath justly questioned Perkin 's saying, Quicquid non impedit Deus, ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit.

All this I speak of Permission-Natural; for as for Moral-Permission, either per Legem, vel in Moribus, it is beyond all doubt, that it is no sign infallible of God's willing the Event of the thing permitted. And for Austin 's saying (cited so commonly) what is it to your purpose? If it be true, that Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotence fieri velit, vel sinendo, &c. (the [fit] is the signum;) doth it therefore follow, that Non permittitur aliquid nisi quod Deus fieri velit? But if Permission be a sign of God's Will, what shall we think of that Doctrine, that denieth that there is any such thing as God's Permission of any Action that ever was done in the World? I think the Doctrine of [The Necessity of Physical efficient Predetermination to every act of the Creature,] is guilty of this, as its direct Consequence (if I may so far excur) which yet some Divines, especially Twisse, do lay so great weight on; when it is not from Christ, or Paul, but the Dominicans. For how can God be said to permit that act, which he is the principal determining efficient Cause of.

As for your Allegation out of Aqu. Twisse, and Rutherford, that they mean as I: I answer, 1. Their making Voluntas signi but Metaphorically Voluntas, shows the contrary. 2. You confess that it is but [so far forth as this Signum is Praeceptum:] But then sure the Distinction, 1. Speaking de signo ut signo, & de praecepto ut signo; and 2. Of four more signs, cannot be the same with mine. 3. Twisse's is above half the same as mine; for indeed I received it from him: But, 1. He saw further into it than the Schoolmen (or than most of our own) and Rutherford follows him. 2. Yet he seems to take no notice of the Immanent Will de Debito, whereof the Precept is signum: Nor yet doth he extend it to the whole Law, but only to Precept: Nor do I find him speaking, as you friendly interpret him, that [It is properly the sign, or signification of his Will, &c.] I make God's Will de Debito (which I shall take leave to call, his Legislative, or Ethical Will) to stand at the top in the Series of our Ethics, indeed the Fountain of all Due: And his Will de Ente, vel Eventu, to stand at the top of our Philosophy de Ente. Lastly, I will not contend anymore about this, seeing I am glad if you be in the right: For as it confirmeth me, to have you of my Judgment; so will it do more, to have so many such as those named.

Animadversion.

I dislike not this: but yourself elsewhere seems to dislike it; viz. Append. p. 49. For it being objected, [But all these are rather Prophecies, than Promises.] You answer, If that which expresseth the engaging of the Word, or Truth of God, be not a Promise, I would you would tell me what is.

Reply.

In the last you persuade me, that others agree with me more than I was aware of: And here you agree with me, but I agree not with myself. If I can but so well accord with you, and others all along, I hope to be fairly reconciled to myself, and then we are all agreed.

1. How far this Promise belongeth to God's Legislative Will, and how far to his Will de Eventu, I fully told you my thoughts, Append. p. 43, 44. To which I need not add much more.

2. You know the chief part of my words there, are those which you leave out: I say, [If that which expresseth the engagement of the Word, and Truth of God, to bestow good upon a man, &c.] Mere Prophecies may discover God's mind to do good; and thence we may collect, that they shall certainly be fulfilled, because the Speaker is true. But they are not an engaging of God's Word and Truth, to bestow good on any man, or Society: For if they so engage, it is to somebody, and to them it is a Promise.

3. These Absolute Promises are directly Predictions, and so belong to the Will of Purpose, or de Eventu: But, as is explained Append. p. 44. they are also Promises, and therefore called by the Apostle, a Covenant; and so belong to the Legislative Will. There is nothing written in Scripture, but what belongs to God's Law, and respecteth Due one way or other: But then some parts are essentially and directly God's Law, and do directly determine of Due. Others do directly speak de Eventu, and do but indirectly speak de Debito; or it may be are but subservient to those parts which do speak de Debito, and so belong Reductive to the Law; or are Adjuncts of it: And so are all Scripture -Prophecies and Histories; as in men's Laws, the Preamble and Historical Narratives of the Occasion of the Law, is an Adjunct, and in some sense a part of the Law.

4. There are Promises that properly belong not to the Legislative Will, nor do speak de Debito: The English word Promise, compriseth all those three, or is applicable to them all; which Grotius mentioneth de Jure Belli, l. 2. c. 11. p. 210. 1. Assertio explicans de futuro animum qui nunc est. 2. Pollicitatio, cum Voluntas seipsam pro futuro tempore determinat, cum signo sufficient ad indicandam perseverandi necessitatem. Neither of these, as such, belong to Law, or speak de Debito Constitutive. But the last doth, which is, 3. Promissio perfecta: ubi ad determinationem talem accedit signum Volendi Jus proprium alteri confer, similem habens effectum qualem alienatio dominii. Est enim aut via ad alienationem rei, aut alienatio particulae cujusdam nostrae libertatis. Illuc pertinent promissa dandi: huc promissa faciendi.

Animadversion.

It seems you take the word [Precept] very largely, and improperly. For otherwise it might seem superfluous to add this. For how should a mere absolute Promise fall under the Will of Precept? This were to make a Precept of a Promise.

Reply.

Did I not tell you, that I choose to call it the Legislative Will, as extending it ad Debitum praemii & poenae as well as ad Officium, rather than by any other term? If I make any use of other men's terms, must I therefore be tied to their sense, contrary to that which I have fully expressed to be my own? But if you think that the Authors of that Distinction, or the uses, do so restrain it to Precept, how can you then think that they mean the same that I do?

Animadversion.

Whether most Divines be of this judgment or not, I will not inquire: By divers passages in your Book you seem to assent unto it, but so cannot I for these Reasons:

1. Adam by his Transgression became liable to the second Death: Therefore if he had been obedient, he had enjoyed the happiness of the life to come. For the Reward of Obedience should have (it's likely) held proportion with the punishment of Disobedience.

2. It seems incongruous, that a rational and understanding Creature, being perfectly righteous, and holy, and every way obedient, should always lead an Animal and Natural life and never attain to greater happiness than this life affords.

3. Adam persevering in the state of Innocency, should have procreated Children, and his Children other Children, and so on. Therefore if Adam and his Posterity should always have lived upon the Earth, how, in an ordinary way of Providence, could the Earth have been able either to sustain, or support all that ever should be born, all from the very first still remaining, and more and more continually succeeding to all Eternity? If you say, that after some continuance of time, the Propagation of Mankind should have ceased; viz. when the Earth was so full, that it could well bear no more: Where doth the Scripture warrant this conceit? Rather it intimateth, that many having lived some time upon Earth, should have been translated into Heaven.

For, 4. It seems that Paradise was a Type of Heaven, whither man, if he had kept his first estate, should have been translated: And that the Tree of Life was a Type of Eternal Life, Rev. 2. 7. & 22. 14. And though I like not to be peremptory in things of this nature, yet there may seem to be some probability in that opinion, which some of old have entertained; viz. That if man had not fallen into Disobedience, he should have lived a thousand years upon Earth, and then have been conveyed to Heaven. For though Adam, and divers of his Off-spring, lived many hundred years, yet neither he, nor any after him, did reach unto a thousand. See Mr. Mede, p. 284 Edit. Lat.

Reply.

Here are two Questions to be considered: 1. Whether Adam should have been translated to Heaven by a Local removal? This is it that I saw no Scripture for, or convincing Reason, and therefore durst not affirm, nor receive as certain. 2. Whether Adam should have attained to a far higher degree of Happiness in that Paradise he then was in, by God's fuller manifestation of himself to him, as to the Saints in Heaven: This I never denied, nor yet affirmed, nor meddled with. And indeed, since I wrote that Book, I am grown to a greater doubtfulness of the whole; and will not now dare to affirm or deny either of the Questions. For I do not know so much as to make me anything confident. I confess while I looked merely at express Scripture-words, I was loath to affirm what Scripture affirmed not; and therefore inclined to the Negative of the first Question. But since, upon the consideration of the drift and reason of Scripture-Doctrine, I am much staggered. And indeed, that which staggered me was none of the common Arguments brought against M. Ball, Gataker, Cameron, and the rest that go that way that I then did; but the mere Considerations de fine, and how far it is Natural, and how far not, as I was seriously reading Scotus, Rada, and others, of that weighty, knotty subject. I dare not now be so bold, as to affirm, That Adam was created in Patriâ, and not in Viâ; that is, in the full fruition of his Happiness; rather in the way to it, with an imperfect taste of it. But especially I am very jealous lest I should give advantage to Infidelity, and the denial of the Glory of the Saints in Heaven, if I should go too far in asserting the Supernaturality of it. If Adam had not a Potentia Naturalis of such a Beatitude, it would rai •• doubts whether we have; seeing he was as perfect quoad Humanitatem as we, and so potentially as capable of such a Blessedness: And if he had a Potentia Naturalis to it, then it would seem that it was not given him in vain; and that he had not attained the perfection that he was made for, if he had not attained all that he was made Potentialiter capable of. Some more such School-Reasons of late have staggered me in this, and made me most incline to think, that Adam should have had the same, or near the same degree of Glory as we. But yet I have much to say on the other side: However, I little know where he should have enjoyed it, or how removed to it, if removed. I must needs therefore confess my ignorance here, till God be pleased to remove it. But I confess I had before thought on your Reasons, and they seemed not cogent to me: For. 1. If by the second Death, you mean the same degree of Punishment which is due to the Despisers of Christ, I deny that Adam was liable to it: If you mean, the perpetuating of his Souls sufferings, I grant it: But all that will thence follow is, that his felicity should have been perpetuated, if he had not sinned. For it will not follow, that because Adam was to go to his perpetual Death, by the temporal Death which he had deserved, that therefore he was to go to Glory by a change, or removal. For the place where Adam 's Soul should have suffered, none knows it. And 2. God could increase Adam 's happiness, without any removal by a fuller Manifestation of himself to him. How far the Life hereafter shall be Animal, or Natural▪ is scarce well known by us now; nor how far God might have removed Adam 's state from present imp • r •• ctions, even in that Paradise. And, 3. I • seems v •• n to put such a Question, How God should provide room for Mankind, and so to object difficulties to God; especially considering, that God knew there would be no place for such difficulties, seeing he had decreed to permit Mans fall. And, 4. It follows not, [Paradise was a Type of Heaven, therefore Adam should have been translated to Heaven.] Lastly, where, or what that Paradise was, little do I know.

Animadversion.

You should say, [No more than the life then promised is the same, &c.] For otherwise your Comparison is not equal. Now to me it is more than probable, for the Reasons prealledged, That the Life promised in the first Covenant, was the same with that which the New-Covenant doth promise, and consequently, that the same Death and Damnation (for substance) is threatened in both Covenants. And do not many yet lie under the first Covenant, and that shall be punished merely as Transgressors of that Covenant, the New-Covenant having never so much as been made known unto them? See Rom. 2. 12. And shall not the Damnation of such, be (for substance) the same with the Damnation of those that transgress the New-Covenant? Shall not both go to the same Hell, and endure the same Torment, though not in the same degree? See 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8, 9.

In the Append. p. 10. you argue thus, [If you say that Adam should have died, and rose again to Torment, what Scripture saith so? 2. Where should he have risen? 3. You contradict many Scriptures, which make Christ the Mediator the only Procurer of the Resurrection.]

Answ. 1. The Scripture showeth, that man transgressing the first Covenant, should die the first Death, Gen. 2. 17. and 3. 19. And not the first Death only, but also the second Death, if it be not prevented by that Mercy which is held out in the New-Covenant. The wages of sin is death, saith the Apostle, Rom. 6. 23. And the Death which he speaketh of, is opposed to etrenal Life, which is the free-gift of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord; and therefore it must extend to that which the Scripture calls the second Death. And seeing the Body is co-partner with the Soul in the Transgression, it is not probable that the first Covenant doth denounce the second Death only against the Soul, and not against the Body also, on which (after the Soul is separated from it) it cannot be inflicted without a Resurrection.

2. Adam, and so others, should have risen either (as now they shall) in the end of the World, or when it should have pleased God to raise them.

3. Though Christ as Mediator be now the only Procurer of the Resurrection, yet it follows not, that if Christ had not been Mediator, there should have been no Resurrection; no more than i • doth follow, that then the Sentence of Damnation should not have been executed upon Transgressors. That which you cite in the Aphor. p. 30. from 1 Cor. 15. 12. & 21. 22. speaks only of Resurrection unto Glory, as is clear by Vers. 23. & 42, &c.

Reply.

I confess that I then supposed there was no other Life promised, than that which was enjoyed; and that the right to it was from actual Collation, and not by Promise: My Reason was, because I found no such Promise. And most Divines say, that the words of the Commination implying a Promise, are our proof that it was a Covenant or Promise. Now I found no Promise certainly implied in the words of the Commination, but the continuance of that Life which he had. For to say, [Thou shalt die,] implies indeed [otherwise thou shalt not die:] But no more.

I have shown you now what makes me suspend my judgment: And for your further Reason, [That many lie under the first Covenant, that shall be punished merely as Transgressors of that Covenant, the New-Covenant having never been made known to them. I reply far more confidently, that I am strongly persuaded you will never prove it while you live. I do not think that any man living, is now under the mere Covenant of Works, as Adam was, Sine Foedere novo, vel Gratiâ remediante. Prove that God dealeth with any one on these terms now only, [Obey perfectly, and live;] or, [If thou ever sin, thou shalt die everlastingly.] I do affirm indeed, That men may be said to be under the Law of Nature still; but not merely, nor alone, as Adam, without any Remedy. I could well find in my heart to join issue on this point, and stay longer on it, but that it would be a Digression, being on so light a touch. Only thus much,

1. The Covenant of Works doth not allow men (or God, according to that Covenant, doth not give men) such rich and numerous Mercies, as the poorest Indians do enjoy; therefore God dealeth not with them merely on the terms of the Covenant of Works.

2. The Mercies given, according to the mere Covenant of Works, are not given to lead men to Repentance; (for it alloweth no Repentance, but that of Desperation:) But the Mercies that Pagans have are given to lead them to Repentance; therefore they are not given according to the mere Law of Works.

3. If Christ, as Mediator, shall judge all, then all are some-way of that Kingdom whereof he is King, and under those Laws by which he ruleth: But, &c. therefore, &c. And therefore not under the mere Law of Works. The common Answer, [That he will judge the Devils,] is beside the business. He judgeth them as Captives, Enemies; but he judgeth all wicked men as Rebellious Subjects. It will not follow [He judgeth Foreign open Enemies as a Conqueror, and not as their King; therefore so he doth by Domestic Rebels:] All wicked men are Christ's Subjects de Jure, though not by Consent de Facto. They may have his Mercies also, though they know not him: As many are God's Subjects, and have his Mercies (as will be confessed) who yet know not God.

4. If all shall be judged at last, according to the well or ill-using of the Talents of Mercy, then not merely according the Law of Works: But the Antecedent is plain, Mat. 25. & Passim; therefore, &c. No Scripture that I know of, doth once intimate, that God will say at last to any men, [Go ye Cursed, because ye once sinned;] or merely, [because ye sinned,] but because ye sinned against Mercy that tended to Recovery. But much more might easily be said to this.

Rom. 2. 12. which you cite, hath not the least color for your Assertion, that I can see. The Law was of narrower extent, as to its Promulgation and Obligation, than the Grace of the Mediator is: Where doth God say, As many as have sinned without Mercy or Grace (that is, Mercy contra Meritum) shall perish without Mercy, or Grace? That is it that you should prove. And as little is, 1. Thess. 1. 7, 8. to your purpose; which plainly speaketh of such as obey not the Gospel, and persecuted the Apostles: Or if it had not; yet it speaks of none that partaked not of the Mercies of the Mediator.

To that you say against the passage in my Append. p. 10. I reply, Adam should have suffered perpetual Misery (call it first or second Death, as you please:) But your Conjecture at a Probability from the Bodies co-partnership, is no proof. Is it not as probable, that the Body being the Souls Instrument, and acted by it, that everlasting Dissolution should have been its punishment, its nature being also more subject to Dissolution than the Souls; and that Dissolution being a real and grievous punishment? Doubtless it would have been a Privation of its Perfection, and that for sin, and therefore a punishment; and the Soul that was chief in sin, to have suffered perpetually, according to its more durable nature. Philosophers commonly say, It is only the Soul that feels, and so suffers now, and not the Body itself. And if so, then the Body would not suffer pain hereafter, but only the Soul in that Body. But I am glad you seem not to be of Twisse 's opinion, that Melius est Miserum esse, quam non esse; or else you would not think it no punishment to the Body, to be forever dissolved, while the Soul is tormented. But here I assert nothing, but only oppose Conjecture to Conjecture, waiting for your better proof, seeing you affirm. And,

2. Your second is a bare Affirmation, without one Scripture-proof, That Adam should have risen again. And,

3. But it follows, that seeing Scripture mentioneth no Resurrection but what is procured by Christ, that therefore it is to us uncertain, whether there should have been any. And if all should have risen, whether Christ had died and risen or not; then how will it appear, that any man's Resurrection was purchased by Christ? For whereas you distinguish of Resurrection to Life and to Death, that is not de Re, but de Consequente. Indeed the Life following that Resurrection is then from Christ; But what need he procure a Resurrection for them which should rise without his procurement? And for the Text, 1 Cor. 15. 21, 22. I confess, the end of Paul was to confirm and comfort Believers; and therefore verse. 23. he applies it to them only: But it follows not therefore, that he speaks only of the Cause of their Resurrection. He seems to extend it to all that die in Adam; and many other Texts which I will not now stand on, seem to say as much.

Animadversion.

So also Mr. Mede doth expound it: And the Explication is probable from Rev. 17. 8. But so also is the other Exposition from 1 Pet. 1. 19, 20.

Reply.

There is great difference between [Fore-ordaining] before the foundation of the World, and [Slaying] before it. However, as long as we are agreed of the matter of Doctrine in it, the matter is but small.

Animadversion.

Though I could never see any necessity of having Christ's Active Righteousness imputed to us, yet this Argument seems not forcible enough against it. For though we should perfectly obey the Law in Christ, that (I speak of obeying, actively) seems not sufficient to satisfy for our disobedience in Adam, but that in that respect suffering should be requisite.

Reply.

Hitherto your difference with me is small, in comparison of our agreements. And seeing you yield, that according to that Doctrine [of the strict Imputation of Christ's Active Righteousness] there is no need of his Satisfaction for any sin, but only Original. I need not trouble myself and you in driving the Argument higher, there being enow more, and this Consequence sufficing to destroy the said Doctrine of strict Imputation. And withal, you must remember, that on your own Supposition (which is, that Christ obeyed not nostro loco, as we were in Adam before the fall, or in the fall; which is true) it followeth, That therefore Christ's Active Imputed Righteousness (were there such a thing in 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 the sense opposed) would be no sufficient perfect Righteousness to us: For it would not cover our unrighteousness Original, but only Actual. But I doubt you will make men angry with you, as they are with me, for your denying this Imputation of Active Righteousness: And yet I deny it less than you. For I judge that even Christ's Active Righteousness is for us, and so imputed to us quatenus Satisfactoria & quatenus Meritoria; as Mr. Bradshaw hath well opened it.

2. Yet I think that Christ's Satisfaction is here by them made needless. For did not Adam himself obey perfectly in Christ, according to that Doctrine. And then what need had Adam of Christ's Satisfaction. And do they not say, that Christ's Obedience is imputed to us, as it is a perfect Obedience pro omni tempore? and if so, then it must be a cover to our first disobedience in Adam, as well as to all that follows.

Adnimadvers.

You mean his Active Obedience: For there is also Passive Obedience, as well as Active.

Reply.

I do mean all Obedience, as Obedience: For I suppose you mean Christ's Sufferings as Penal (when you call them the Satisfaction, and exclude the Active Righteousness) and not directly as Obedience: Though, no doubt, they must not be separated from the consideration of their being Voluntary and Obediential. But to tell you my thoughts, I think the phrase of [Passive Obedience] is very dark, if you understand it in the same near sense as you do [Active Obedience:] For all Obedience is so called formally, in reference to some Law or Command of a Superior to which we obey. Now Poena, or Suffering, is not the direct and proper matter of any Precept, as a Precept: The Law doth threaten Punishment, and not command it. Yet as Suffering is the remote matter, so it may be called, Passive Obedience; (that is, God commandeth us to submit to Sufferings.) Submission and Patience is the direct matter of Obedience; and Suffering the Remote: And therefore I will not quarrel with the phrase of [Passive Obedience.]

Animadversion.

That place will evince nothing for you, because it may, and probably should be interpreted of Obedience by Suffering. He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, &c. Phil. 2. 8.

Reply.

1. But it seems to speak of Obedience, as Obedience: And then it is not much matter, whether the matter of it be doing, or suffering. For in Christ's suffering, if it were not only his suffering, as suffering or Penalty, but also as Obedience, which was Satisfactory: Then why may not his Active Obedience, as Obedience, also be Satisfactory? For à quatenus ad omne valet consequentia. However, there is the same formal Nature of Obedience in Active Obedience, as is in Passive. Nay, even Passive Obedience is more properly and nearly Active; and but improperly and remotely Passive. For the Act of Willing Submission, is that which is commanded, and is the materia proxima & propria of Obedience: The Penalty (as I said even now) is not commanded directly and properly, but threatened: And the pain, as pain, is but remotely the matter of Obedience, as the Object of our Patience.

2. And Rom. 5. 19. seemeth to include Active Obedience, as well as Passive: For it seems to intimate such Obedience as is opposed to Adam 's Disobedience. However, it is such as is opposed to Disobedience in general, and therefore it is (as I said) Obedience qua talis, and not as Suffering.

Animadversion.

Christ taking upon him the form of a Servant, and being made under the Law, I see not but he was bound in all things to obey the Will of God, and to observe his Law.

Reply.

No doubt of that: But, 1. The doubt is, Whether it were the Will of God, that any but sinners should be obliged by his Law to use those Ceremonies, which in their nature imply the Users to be sinners, and intimate a confession of sin, in ordinary performers; and in their end do tend to recovery from sin? And indeed, Christ did not perform these to the same ends as sinners did, and as they were mainly intended for such in their Institution.

2. I said he was not bound to perform them [in regard of himself:] that is, [finaliter, he was no sinner, and had no sin to pardon of his own, nor any sinful wants to be supplied; and so had not those ends of his own to move or necessitate him to use them, as others had:] But he used them, both to show his subjection, and take up that burden of tedious Ceremonious-Worship, which justly lay on us; and also to give us an example, &c.

3. It hence therefore follows, that seeing he used the actions (as Circumcision, Offerings, &c.) separated from their Legal ends, to other ends of his own, that his primary obligation to them was ex vi sponsionis propriae (as was all his obligation to suffer) and not ex Lege: (For else the Law would have obliged him to the Act and End together.) And then the Law did after oblige him upon his subjecting, and submitting himself voluntarily thereto; and that but limitedly and in part, so far as he submitted to it; that is, to the same Action, but not for the same Ends: Because it could not oblige him beyond that his undertaking, and voluntary submission. So that I conceive, if Christ had stood before God, only in the person of God man in Righteous • ess, he should have been obliged only to obey those Laws which belong to the Righteous, and have nothing either in the end of them, or burdensomness of them, which proceedeth from sin: But seeing Christ undertook to be in that low condition, and bear all that burden of penal Actions, and direct Sufferings which sinners had subjected themselves to by sin; therefore he would be made under the Law, and so undertake those Legal performances. And therefore it is in respect of us; as the Undertaker of our burden, that he used them; who otherwise, in respect of himself (though supposing him man) being perfectly righteous, should not have been obliged to those duties that were ordained for sinners, as sinners. This is my meaning: But for the thing, it being of no greater moment, I leave it to your better judgment, and will not contend.

Animadversion.

Christ putting himself in the state of a servant, and under the Law, though voluntarily, yet now his Obedience is necessary: For it is necessary that the Creature should be obedient to the Creator.

2. Hence it follows, That not Christ's Active Righteousness, as such (as you affirm, page 54, & 55.) but in respect of his Condescension to that low estate, is part of his Satisfaction.

Reply.

This is the main thing that (in this point of Satisfaction) I differ from you in. I think (and that somewhat confidently) that his after-subjection, and the after-necessity of his Obedience, do not all evacuate or diminish the Meritoriousness of his Actions: Because that Necessity is an assumed, and not an aliunde- imposed necessity. And God is not unjust, to forget the state that the Subject was in while he was free; nor to separate in his Consideration and Valuation the after-action, from the former free▪ Engagement, and the Dignity and Freedom of the Person then engaging. If I being a Free-man, do bind myself to be your Servant, or your slave (I mean to be absolutely at your command quoad actiones serviles) on Condition that you give me for my service 20 l. per annum: Doth my service deserve none of this wages after, because I being once bound, my service is necessary? And remember, that thus Christ became bound by quasi-Contract, and so Conditionally; and the Condition was, That his service should be accepted as Meritorious and Satisfactory, towards the Recovery of sinners. To say therefore, That his Service, or Actions ceased to be Meritorious; is either to say, They lost their Dignity (which may not be imagined;) or God ceased or failed to accept them as Meritorious and Satisfactory, and so broke his Covenant (as we may call it) which is as little to be imagined. Jacob 's service (as service, and not only as suffering) deserved Leah and Rachel, &c. nevertheless because he became bound to serve. Nay more, among just men, it is not only the wages agreed on by Covenants, that is deserved by a painful servant; but if he do much more, and so benefit his Master more, he doth truly deserve more, and the just Master will pay him more; though not by virtue of the Obligation of the Covenant, yet by virtue of the Obligation of the Law of Nature, which is before it: So great is the difference between the service of one that doth voluntarily oblige himself, when he was sui juris; and one that is originally under your absolute Dominion: The one may sell you his service before hand, according to its value, which supposeth the future reality of that value and merit; but the other cannot, because he, and all that is his, is properly not his own, but yours.

Add to this what I before told you, that the Godhead was never subjected (either as to Propriety, ad Dominum; or to Obedience, ad Rectorem) in itself, but only it may by Communication be called subject: And therefore the Actions of Christ, receiving their chief Dignity from his chief Nature, which was never in itself subject, must needs be highly Meritorious, both, 1. Because of the Dignity. 2. And of the Freedom of that Nature.

2. And therefore I utterly deny your Consequence on these grounds, and affirm still, That Christ's Active Righteousness, or Obedience, as such, is Meritorious and Satisfactory. And indeed, the Question should rather be, Whether it be only Poena Christi, or Obedientia also, that satisfieth and meriteth: (as I before hinted.)

Animadversion.

I see not how Works which are otherwise due, can properly be Meritorious or Satisfactory. This seems repuguant to that of our Savior, Luke 17. 10. When you have done all things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done but what our duty was to do.

Reply.

1. We must distinguish of the Obligation or Cause of the dueness. 2. And of the Relation in which we consider the parties.

1. If the Obligation be merely imposed, per absolutum Dominum, then you may carry it your way: But where the Obligation is Self-imposed or assumed, or caused by Conditional Contract, and the Condition of this Contract doth express or imply the Acceptation of the Work, as Meritorious or Satisfactory; there (as is said) the case is plain against you.

2. But suppose it were not so: Yet, 1. Though it be granted, that I cannot merit of an equal, by doing my duty; 2. Nor yet of an Absolute Lord, as such: 3. Yet of a Rector qua talis, I may. Not that the Reward is due to me in sensu absoluto & simpliciter. But 1. Comparate & secundum quid it is. For a Rector is obliged to make a difference between the most perfectly obedient Subjects, and that do eminent service for the Commonwealth; and the disobedient, or less profitable, and that by rewarding and encouraging the obedient and useful. 2. And this is due principally to the Common Good, and to the end of Government: And so the Obligation seems to be a fine ad Media, and prudential. I have told you in the Aphorism, that I will not differ with you, if you call this (Merit of Governing, and not Commutative Justice) but Merit Improprie & secundum quid.

Yet, though this be less properly [Merit] where it is mixed with sinful demerits that may cloud it, it is more properly Merit, where the Obedience and Serviceableness to the Common-Good is absolutely perfect; as in Christ it was.

Animadversion.

Viz. Because it is an Infinite Condescension of the Person so partaking of the Divine Nature to do such Works; viz. Of Active Obedience (for of such I suppose you mean) so that still, not properly Christ's Active Obedience, simply considered, but his Condescension is Meritorious, and so Satisfactory.

Reply.

1. If the Interest of the Divine Nature do put a value on the Penalty as such, or on the Condescension as such, then also on the Obedience, or Good Actions as such; (for there is eadem ratio:) But the former you grant, therefore, &c.

2. If Christ's Condescension become Meritorious by the Interest of the Godhead, then his Active Obedience doth so: (If you mean that Condescension, not only as at his first Undertaking, but as manifested and exercised in the performance:) For his Condescension (so taken) is his Active Obedience: Condescendere ad poenam ferendam, is Consentire ad poenam aliter indebitam ferendam, and so not to murmur or resist. And this is somewhat antecedent to the Suffering itself. (Both Agere & Actionem suspendere, belong to that which we call Active Obedience, as distinct from Passive; and therefore which-sover you instance in, it comes all to one.)

3. What if I should prove to you, that no suffering, either as suffering, or as punishment can merit? It may satisfy, but whether it can merit, consider these things. If it merit, it must be either for the innate excellency of the thing, or for the ends obtained, or benefits received by it, by him from whom it so meriteth. In the former sense, it can merit but an acknowledgment, and estimation, and praise. And thus poena qua poena non meretur: 1. Because as it is in patiente, it is malum & non bonum. 2. It is involuntarium quid; and therefore not meritorious.

Object. It was voluntary to Christ.

Answ. Only indirecte, secundum quid, ad sinem ulteorirem: But poen • qua poena, he naturally continued to Nill: His Nature was against it; and his Will naturally, as it was malum sibi: And therefore he prayed, that the Cup might pass &c. yet submitted to it, at his Fathers will and his own. So that it was properly a willing of the end, but the penalty was more properly submitted to than willed; yet not as poena, vel malum, but as medium ad finem optimum. And then, that Good that Punishment hath, is as it is à puniente, & in effectu; and so it is the Punisher that meriteth for his Justice; and not the punished for Suffering.

Further, it hath no virtuous Moral Goodness in it, as it is in the Sufferer: For all such Goodness is the materia Praecepti, & non Comminationis. The Preceptive part of the Law only doth constitute the debitum officii, and so the moral Goodness: But poena qua poena non praecipitur.

2. And if you say, That it is for its Ends or Consequences, that poena meretur.

I answer, 1. So the Punisher, or the punished meriteth. The question is only of the punished. And whatever good followeth: 1. If the punishment be deserved by himself. 2. Or involuntary, no thanks is due to him, he merits nothing. And therefore poena culpae propriae cannot be meritorious. And therefore it was in Christ primarily and directly, his Obediential and Voluntary submitting to such a penalty, which being not for his own faults, did yet tend to such excellent ends, which made it meritorious. Take all plainly in this one word as the sum. Christ's sufferings, as sufferings, were not the immediate matter of his merit; but his Willingness the immediate, and the suffering-willed was the remote. His sufferings were first in order Satisfactory, and after that remotely Meritorious; and therefore Meritorious, because first Satisfactory: But his Active Obedience (or to speak more properly, his obedience, as obedience, or good-works) was first Meritorious (in order of Nature) and then Satisfactory; and therefore Satisfactory, because first Meritorious. Only further consider, Christ's Works have a double merit: One of God's Acceptance, and that he be well pleased with them, and ready to reward them in general: This goeth before their Satisfactoriness, and is it that I mean: The other is their merit of a particular benefit of Pardon, Justification, &c. for us sinners: This followeth after their Satisfactoriness. But in Christ's suffering, there is no innate merit (because no goodness) as suffering; but only as a Satisfactory suffering, conducing to those excellent ends which quatenus satisfactio it attaineth: So that punishment, as punishment, or suffering, merits not at all; but all Merit lieth in two things: Materialiter, 1. In rei dignitate, vel utilitate, ad alium. 2. In voluntate agentis: It is therefore Christ's obedience, and his suffering as voluntary, and conducible to those high and noble ends, and also as the matter (as it were, of the Contract between the Father and Son) which is the Meritorious matter.

Animadversion.

God hath not so committed all judgment to Christ, but that he also will judge, though by Christ, Rom. 2. 5, 6. Acts 17. 10, 31. that therefore in John 5. 22. is to be understood, that he judgeth no man immediately by himself, but hath committed all judgment to the Son; i. e. that the immediate execution of judgment should be from him: Or as Austin expounds it, Secundum hoc dictum est (sc. omne judicium dedit filio) quod in judicio non in forma Dei, sed in forma hominis apparebit. This is intimated, verse. 27. and hath given him Authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man; viz. Because so he is meet to execute judgment in an outward and visible manner, so that every eye shall see him, and they also which pierced him, Revel. 1. 7.

Reply.

1. The Text contains some kind of exclusion of God the Father, [The Father judgeth no man:] An utter exclusion it cannot be, nor an exclusion of the Person or Essence; therefore it must be an exclusion of him in a certain respect. Now your Interpretation containeth no exclusion: For to say, [he judgeth not immediately,] is to include the Mediant, but not to exclude God: As to say, [he judgeth not alone,] is to include an Associate, but not to exclude himself.

2. And were it otherwise, how will that agree with our common Doctrine, that [though God may uti mediis, yet he doth in, and by, and with them, agere immediate in omni action, & immediatione Virtutis & suppositi?

3. But yet I never contradicted your Interpretation of the Text, as part of the Truth, but it plainly seems to me to be but part; and the Reason you allege seems to be defective. For no doubt, God could have judged the World by convenient, sensible Manifestation of his Presence, Power, Justice, &c. as he did in sentencing Adam when he had sinned.

But I think the Text means plainly, that God as mere Legislator of the Law of Works, judgeth no man, but hath given all judgment to the Son, as Redeemer and Legislator of, or Judge according to a Law of Grace, or on terms of Grace. It is not now Deus-Creator secundum foedus operum solum, sine Remedio: Sed Deus-Redemptor. I think I could give you good proofs of this Interpretation.

1. The following words (which I think you misinterpret) seem to me to confirm it [Because he is the Son of Man;] that is, Because he is the Incarnate Redeemer or Mediator, and so because it belongs to his Office; and not merely, because he hath flesh or Human Nature.

2. If his Dominion over the dead and living, were the end of his Dying, Rising and Reviving, and so was thereby procured, then so was his power of judging (and consequently belongeth to his Office, or to Christ as Mediator, and not merely as being Man: But the former is certain, Rom. 14. 9. therefore so is the latter.

3. If as Redeemer or Mediator, he be the rightful King of all men, then he shall be the Judge of all men, as Mediator or Redeemer; (For it belongeth to his Kingly Office to judge, and appoint Judges:) But the former is certain, as I could show by multitudes of Scriptures. Though quoad consensum & voluntariom subjectionem, only the Church be Christ's Kingdom; yet de Jure, he is King of all the World, •• d he doth over-rule them, and partly rule them (for the very Law of Nature now is his Law) and that ut Deus Redemptor & misericors: They are not ruled merely per Deum Creatorem, unappeased and implacable for the breach of the first Law. They that deny this, will have a hard task to justify all the Wicked or Pagan World at last, as not-guilty of sinning contra Deem Redemptorem, vel misericordem: (For he showeth not Mercy according to the tenor of the first Law.)

4. If he condemn men at last for not taking him as their King to Reign over them; or for not improving the Talents of his Mercy, then he judgeth them ex Officio, as their rightful King: But the former is clear, Luke 19. 27. Matth. 25, &c. If any think those Texts reach but to those that have heard the Gospel; I think it reacheth as far as this, and to all that have received Talents of Mercy: But that is a subject that I may not now digress to take in.

5. The Scripture fully expresseth it, to be an act of Christ's power received by him as the Mediator, and so belonging to his Office; therefore only given him as Incarnate, or as accommodated with a Human Nature, Matth. 28. All power in Heaven and Earth, is given to me; therefore the power of judging the World: And this is given to him as Mediator, and on his Purchase, as the Text plainly intimateth, and Rom. 14. 9. fully expresseth. Rev. 1. 18. He hath the keys of Death and Hell. There is comprehended the power of judging: And to have these keys, is undeniably belonging to his Office. But I pass over much more.

And Calvin saith, that Judicium pro Imperio ac Potestate accipit Evangelists, John 5. 22. Secundum phrasin linguae Haebraicae & nunc firmum tenem •• , quod traditum sit Christo Regnum à Patre, ut Arbitrio suo coelum ac terram moderetur. Nam omnia tradita sunt illi à Patre (saith Marlorate) Matth. 11. 27. & data est ei omnis potestas, Matth. 28. 18. And therefore if this be Christ's Kingdom, it must needs be his Mediatory Office.

And indeed the whole context, Vers. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, &c. show that it is a great part of Christ's Mediatory Office that is here expressed. And on Vers. 27. saith Calvin, Iterum repetit datum sibi fuisse Imperium à Patre, ut plenam & in caelo & in terrâ rerum omnium potestatem habeat, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 hic dignitatem significat: Judicium vero pro Regimine & Imperio accipitur. Ac si diceret, constitutum esse filium Regem à Patre, qui Mundum gubernet at{que} exerceat Patris ipsius potestatem. So also Diodate on the Text, verse. 27. [To execute Judgment;] namely, to rule and govern, verse. 22. [because he is the Son of Man;] not only in quality of true everlasting God, but also of Mediator, having taken Human flesh upon him, Acts 17. 31. 1 Cor. 15. 28. in which Nature also he is the Fathers Grand-deputy, Dan. 7. 13.

And Grotius in v. 22. Judicare Mundum Dei est, &c. sed nunc judiciariam potestatem filio dedit, Acts 17. 31. 1 Pet. 4. 5. Nempe ubi ipsum Regem constituet, Apoc. 1. 5. Nam Regum est judicare, Psal. 72. 1. &c. Et illud 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 recte forte accipias de his quibus Evangelium praedicatum est, &c. Whether that be right or not, it seems he thought it was Christ's Mediatory official judgment that is here meant, and not only his Deputation in general. Vid. eundem in verse. 27, &c. and in Matth. 25. 32. So Pelargus in Matth. 25. 31. part. 3. expounds this Text, Christo datum esse judicium quatenus filius hominis notum est ex Joh. 5. 22. quia vero judicem universalem contra tot iniquos judices & mundi principes armatum esse oportet, &c. And Pareus in Matth. 25. 31. Ipse enim constitutus à Deo judex vivorum & mortuorum; quia Pater omne judicium dedit filio, &c. And no doubt the Judgment there described, is by Christ as Lord-Redeemer in his Kingly Office, and not merely because his Humanity fitteth him to be the Fathers Delegate quoad executionem.

Animadversion.

Though Christ had not died, yet the rigorous execution of the Law (for anything I see) should have been suspended. For if death had been immediately inflicted on Adam, how could Mankind have been propagated by him? [The immediate execation of the full sentence of the Law upon Adam, would have prevented the Being, the Sin, and the Suffering of his Posierity;] as yourself argues against it, page 33.

Reply.

1. The present death of Adam would not have been the rigorous execution of the Law; (for the Reasons alleged.) How can you call that the Rigorous execution, which would have prevented all the following sins of Adam himself, and all the sin and suffering of his Posterity? Do not you in your Rabbinical Commentary, mention their Exposition of Morieris, to be Reus eris Mortis? &c. And before out of Mede, you make the time to be [a thousand years] that Adam should have lived: And you may as probably say so of [the day] that death was threatened him, that it was a shortening of that time.

2. If we should speak of God, as of man, that must have time for his Consultations (which is not so;) and so that while he was consulting of the terms and way of our Redemption, he should in mere mercy suspend the execution: Yet, 1. That is not the Suspension that I now speak of. 2. Nor is that without respect to Redemption, but in order to it (if there were such a thing;) much less do I mean a continuance of a sinful miserable life, which is a preparative to greater punishments, which is rather the execution of the Sentence, than the suspension: But I mean all that which is properly a suspension, following Christ's interposition and undertaking: That God doth not while they live give them over to as much sinfulness and misery as they deserve, and as far abdicate them, and desert them by the withdrawing of all that may abate their misery, and that he gives them not over as forsaken to despair, and their lives on earth did not presently begin to be a Hell. If wicked men are freed from deserved misery, and that in a way in itself, tending to their full recovery (but that they wickedly frustrate it) without any procurement of the Mediator, then it seems God can relax his Law, and forbear the full execution, and confer Grace; (i. e. Mercy against desert) without Satisfaction; which though Dr. Twisse affirms, most others do deny. Could I stand on it, I take it to be no hard matter however to prove, that de Facto God showeth no man such Mercies but through Christ.

Animadversion.

They are not so contradistinct, but that they may be co-incident. Some punishments may be afflictions of love; viz. Such as are for the correcting, purging, and reforming of the party punished. Castigatory punishments are Afflictions of love; Whom I love, I rebuke and chasten, Rev. 3. 19. Whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth, Heb. 12. 6. Some indeed (not only Antinomians, but others also) seem to make Chastisements no judgments or punishments; but the Scripture is clear against them; When we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, &c. 1 Cor. 11. 32. I will correct thee in measure, yet will I not leave thee wholly unpunished, Jer. 46. 28.

Reply.

1. You are a favorable Animadverter, who so ordinarily take my part, and defend what I say, under the name of Animadversion. You say as much as I; and in these words have fully expressed the sum of my sense. Only once or twice I carelessly, in compliance with the common Language, use the term [Affliction,] for [Chastisement;] which is all the occasion of exception that I yet see.

2. But it was a great oversight in you, to impute the alleged opinion or words of those that I oppose, to me, as if they were mine. These are my words, [The common judgment is, That Christ hath taken away the whole Curse (though not the suffering) by hearing it himself; and now they are only afflictions of love, and not punishments. I do not contradict this Doctrine through affectation of singularity, but constraint of judgment, &c.] Had it not been very easy to know that those are not my words or opinion, which I so professedly oppose? The same which you say some, [not Antinomians] hold, I called [the common judgment:] For indeed Peter Martyr, Zanchius, and multitudes of others against the Papists, besides late English Writers, commonly say so. But yet we have very many accurate Divines that say as much as I, and contradict them, as you do: And sometimes they contradict themselves. My full scope therefore is to prove, that Chastisements are a species of Punishment.

Animadversion.

Though those things that befall the Children of God be in their nature evil, and a curse, yet to them they are not such, because they are sanctified to them, and made to work together for their good, Rom. 8. 28. 1 Cor. 11. 32. Phil. 1. 22. Poison being so tempered, as to be an Antidote, is no Poison, but a Remedy. Blessings to the wicked, become curses; so curses to the godly, prove blessings, Psal. 119. 71.

Reply.

Omne malum est alicui malum: Aut igitur infligenti, aut patienti: At non infligenti; ergo patienti: If they be Poenae, they are malum Poenae: for Bonum qua tale non est Poena. But you say (out of Scripture) they are punishments. If you will denominate the whole Work from the sole prevalent respect, effect and end, then they are to be called Blessings: God's heavy Judgments on David for his sin, was not malum Poenae, but a Blessing; so you mean, I doubt not: And so I agree with you in sense. But if (as you should) you keep still a distinct conception of their penal Nature, and their accidentally▪ procured Effect: Then in regard of the former, you must still say, they are mala Poenae; and in regard of the latter, they are Paternal Love-tokens.

Animadversion.

But not to his hatred. Anger may consist with hatred. There is Castigatory Anger, as well as Vindicatory, Isa. 57. 17, 18.

Reply.

I have little Reason to quarrel with you, when you say as I, and almost repeat my words.

Animadversion.

Why then do you distinguish them from Punishments, p. 68. Afflictions of Love, and not Punishments: They are (as I have shown) Castigatory Punishments, but not Vindicatory, or Satisfactory.

Reply.

Why do you say, I so distinguish them? merely because I tell you, that I oppose them that do so? I had rather you had made me the Author of your own words, because you and I are both of a mind. But this I know was your oversight in reading, and therefore I pass it.

Animadversion.

1. This is not consistent with your other words even now cited, wherein you make Afflictions of Love and Punishments contradistinct one to the other.

2. Neither is it true in itself. For are no afflictions incident to the Reprobates? or are they loving Punishments, and sanctified to them?

Reply.

1. You should have said, It is not consistent with the words and Doctrine which I oppose; and that's no wonder.

2. I confessed before, that here I put the word [Afflictions] instead of [Chastisements;] which I will not excuse, though custom may easily make it intelligible: For that Language is not singular. If therefore you mean it of Afflictions in general, I doubt not but they are more incident to the Reprobates than any; or else they should not be damned. If you mean it of [Chastisements,] I answer, 1. As God in a larger sense may be called the Father of all those to whom he showeth mercy, provideth for them, beareth with them, offereth them Christ, and Grace, giveth them in his Covenant of Grace a conditional Adoption; and so far he may be called the Father of Mankind, or of Reprobates (as many Divines on the Preface of the Lord's Prayer:) And so far he may be said to love them, and to chastise them. But not in that strict sense, as he is the Father of Believers, and loveth and chastiseth them.

2. So far as God doth good to Reprobates, he loveth them. But he doth them good, he giveth them mercy. Else they never sin against mercy, which who dare say? therefore they may partake of loving punishments; no doubt punishments may do them good.

3. Yet will I not say, that these are sanctified to them. As if there were no good below that of Sanctification: But if you will needs extend the word [sanctified] to all good, I contend not. But till God lay by his Philanthropy, I will not say, he loves not all men, at least, in this life.

4. And if you had put the case of [Unbelievers,] and not only of [Reprobates] it might easily have appeared, that they are loving punishments to many Unbelievers; viz. to the Elect before Conversion (as Paul 's striking down by the way, and Manasseh 's chains were, &c.) for they are means of their Conversion; and in some sense may be said to be sanctified to them, and in another not. And yet God is not then strictly their Father (for they are not adopted till they receive Christ by Faith, John 1. 10, 11.) and therefore they are not so fatherly Chastisements. Where also you see, that it is not Christ's mere bearing the Curse for men, that makes it no Curse, or evil to them: For it is evil and a Curse to many of the Elect, before Conversion, for whom yet Christ died.

Animadversion.

Not so, seeing suffering, though sanctified, is suffering still; but so is it not still evil and a curse, because now it works for the good of those to whom it is sanctified; even as bitter pills and potions work for the good of sick persons.

Reply.

1. By [Curse] I mean, only the effect of the Commination of the Law of Nature violated, commonly called [the Curse:] I do not mean that which makes a man so unhappy, as we use to call men [Cursed] for.

2. If sanctified suffering be not still malum, then it is not malum poenae; and then it is not poena [which is a natural evil insticted for the defect of Moral good:] But you maintain it to be poena.

3. It's a natural evil effecting accidentally a greater Good. Here it remains still a natural evil when sanctified. The sanctifying takes not away all the natural evil; but by a less evil preventeth a greater. Death is not bonum natural, because sanctified. Pain is pain still, & malum vel disconveniens naturae, and punishment still: The good is accidental to the punishment, and therefore makes it nevertheless to be poena, vel malum per se, though at the same time it be by accident majus bonum. What is it that is accidentally good? is it not malum poenae? If so, it remaineth malum poenae still, or else you cannot say that malum poenae is accidentally good. And when all is done, it is but an improper speech to say, that Death and Pain are good, because they are accidentally made the means of our good. The goodness is properly in their end, and accidental effect (and the Sanctifier) rather than in them: And therefore they are more properly said to be submitted to for the good that followeth them, than desired or loved: It is not Pain, or Death; but Grace and God that I must love. Whereas, were they good indeed themselves, they might be loved themselves.

I do leave out the far greatest part of the Explication of my meaning on this subject, because I did it lately and largely on the Animadversions of another Learned Brother; and I am backward to repetitions, because it is most for my own information that I examine your Animadversions.

I will not contend with you about these phrases, but only I would advise you, that you take heed of arguing thus: That which works for our good is sanctified to us, and so is no more evil: But sin worketh to our good; therefore it is sanctified, and is no more evil, but good.

Adnimadvers.

1. Indeed if there were no sin, there should be no affliction; as if there were no sickness, there should be no medicine: Yet is not the Medicine evil, and a curse to the sick; neither is affliction to God's children.

2. The Scripture doth show us other reasons of our suffering; as, to conform us to Christ, Rom. 8. 29. with 17. to try us, 1 Pet. 4. 12. Rev. 2. 10. & 3. 10. and for the manifestation of God's glory, John 9. 3.

Reply.

1. An over seeing Answer. The Question is of sins interest as the efficient meritorious Cause: The Answer is of sin as the terminus amovendus, or privatio finis. We do not differ in that, Whether the curing of sin be the end of Chastisement? but where it is so, yet, Whether sin be not the meritorious Cause, so far as it is evil? You might better have instanced in Chastisement, than medicining of Children. No wise Father chastiseth his Child, but his fault is the meritorious Cause, as well as the final (Reductive) (his Reformation I mean.) You might therefore as truly have said, [There would be no Chastisement, if there were no sin meriting it,] as, [If there be no sin to be cured by it.] It is essential to Punishment (of which Chastisement is a species) that it be [for sin as the meritorious Cause, really or supposed.]

2. Your other assigned Reasons therefore are no Reasons; for they belong to the final Cause, and not to the efficient. And you do but leave me to renew my Question, What reason can you give, why God should have attained all those good ends (our Trial, Conformity, his Glory, &c.) without our suffering, which now he attaineth by it, if sin were not the meritorious Cause? and some wrath still in it? specially, when God hath fully told us, that he afflicts not willingly: that man suffereth but for his sin; that for the iniquity of Jacob is all this, &c. and that he will not afflict his Creature without its desert. If by [Conformity to Christ] you mean, not to his Holiness, but to his Suffering: I answer, That is no good to us of itself, but an evil: For it was the evil of Punishment that we deserved that he bore; and therefore if it be a good to be therein conformed to him, then it is good to bear God's Vindictive wrath. Indeed we may have comfort in our suffering, in that we suffer but what Christ hath suffered (in several respects that I need not stand on:) But the good is, that our Conformity in suffering, tends to make us conform in Holiness, and so in Glory, in our measure.

Animadversion.

Love and Anger are not opposite, but Love and Hatred: And you presently say, There is no hatred, though there be anger.

Reply.

They are not fully opposite, nor inconsistent; else I should not think Chastisement is from both. But sure there is some opposition: Let their Objects be judge. The Object of Love, is [Present Good;] the Object of Anger, is [Present Evil.] Is here no opposition? Indeed Ira being in the Irascible circa malum praesens arduum, and there being not any bonum praesens arduum, hath no perfect contrary.

But what you here dislike, or wherein we disagree, you give me not to understand. But how you will reconcile your Concession here, with your former speech, that [Sanctified Suffering is not evil,] I know not. For surely if it proceed from Anger in any part, so far sin is the Cause (and the fruit of sin is to us evil,) and the effects of Anger, as such, will be evil, malum poenae, to us. As therefore it comes from sin, and God's Anger, it still continueth evil to us: But as it comes from Christ's Blood, and God's Love, it is good Accidentally and Eventually, and the good to us is greater than the evil.

Animadversion.

Though Death be not fully and perfectly overcome till the Resurrection, yet to the godly it it not evil, nor a curse. The sting of it, viz. Sin, being taken away, it cannot hurt, but only convey unto a better life: To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain, Phil. 1. 21. The sting of Death is sin, and the strength, &c. 1 Cor. 15. 56, 57.

Reply.

1. This is answered already.

2. I confess the sting is taken out.

3. But if it be not evil; then, 1. How is it yet [an Enemy?] an Enemy, and no evil! 2. Why do you confess it a Punishment? If the sanctifying remove all the evil, and removeth the penalty; Good is no punishment. 3. Then it is a sin to have any fear of, or averseness to Death; (which I believe not.) For good cannot be the object of timor or fuga. 4. If it hurt not (as you affirm) why do men groan and fear it, and seek to avoid it? How doth sense deceive us, if pain hurt not? 5. Then why doth God make promises of longer life, and of recovery from sickness? And why doth he threaten death, and pain, and shame, and loss? &c. Is good, as such, the matter of Threatenings? 6. Then you may dare to forbear lamenting under God's afflictinging hand, or taking notice of it as an evil, and sign of his displeasure! 7. And then you may dare to say, that you are not beholden to God for delivering you from any evil of suffering! For if it had come (as sickness, death, &c.) it would have been no evil. 8. Yea, it would rather be an evil to you, to save you from them, if they be merely good. 9. Then you need (yea may) not pray against evil of suffering; for none may pray against good as good. 10. Then the godly are uncapable of Chastisements, because they are uncapable of evil. But I suppose you will take heed of these Consequents. But enough of this.

It is gain to die accidentally: Not because death is not evil, but because it leads to a greater good: That which is called Deaths sting, is not all the evil of it.

Animadversion.

If it be so managed, though in itself simply considered it be evil, yet to us as so managed, it is good.

Reply.

It is evil to some-body, or not evil. It is not evil to itself, though in itself to us. It is per se malum poenae to us; it is per accidens good. I doubt not but you will subscribe to this Explication, and that we in judgment agree.

Animadversion.

They mean (I suppose) so as that Believers are not to be tried by the Law, to stand or fall by it. See Rom. 6. 14. Gal. 3. 13. & 5. 18. 23. Your self says, page 81. [The alteration is not made in the Law, but in our estate and relation to the Law.] This is enough. Our estate and relation to the Law is not now such, as that we should either be justified or condemned by it. The Law, as a Covenant, saith, Do this and live, Rom. 10. 5. and, Cursed is everyone that continueth not, &c. Gal. 3. 10. Believers are not to live or die upon such terms; and therefore they are not under the Law as a Covenant of Works.

Reply.

This is a point of great difficulty and moment. I agree with your sense (if I understand you) wherein I have hitherto been happy almost all along. But what made you think that I oppose men that were of my own mind? Indeed they are two sorts that I here oppose: 1. Those that use constantly to say, The Law is abrogated, as to the condemning power of it, to Believers: But not to others, nor to them, as to the commanding power. These (if Truth may take place of Modesty) are the common sort of those Divines that I have met with, that never studied the nature of Laws, and understand not what Abrogation is, nor how they contradict themselves in saying, It is abrogated to Believers, &c. When Abrogation is the proper annulling of a Law; and when it is null or abrogate, it can oblige none. 2. Those that better understand themselves in Politicks, and say, that the Covenant of Works is abrogated properly, that is, nulled, so that no man in the World is under it. This is a very hard, yet weighty Controversy. I shall say little of it with you; 1. Because you agree with me. 2. I have newly writ largely of it with a very Learned Neighbor Brother, Mr. G. Lawson (a man as accurately verst in Politicks as any Minister I know) this being the main subject of a larger Contest between him and me; wherein I confess he puts me harder to it than any man that I have dealt with, and I have received much light from his Animadversions.

Animadversion.

There is such an absolute Discharge granted to some in this life, that there is no Condemnation belonging to them, Rom. 8. 1. They have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, Rom. 5. 1. they have everlasting life, viz. begun in them.

Reply.

Yet we agree. I am wholly of your mind. But, 1. Our Discharge before believing, is conditional, as to beginning and end; and therefore not actual: (For quod est in conditione, non est in obligatione: Et conditionale nihil ponit in esse.) 2. Our Discharge upon our believing is absolute and actual quoad primam possessionem: But it is still conditional quoad continuationem & consummationem, till we have finished our course, overcome, and endured to the end. Yet it may be sure in God's Decree of upholding us, that we may persevere, though it be conditional in the Law, or Testamental-Grant. For it is false which some assert, that, If the Condition be certain, it is no Condition, but absolute. For if it be contingent it sufficeth, though foreknown by the Donor.

Animadversion.

Your Reasons prove, that the first Covenant is still in force, but not that Believers are still under that Covenant, so as that either their Justification or Condemnation depend on it.

Reply.

1. I now say, the first Covenant is ceased. 2. Then they prove all that I desire. But why their Justification and Condemnation depends not on it, when yet the Law is in force, is worth the explicating.

Animadversion.

The Law doth threaten, but it cannot execute upon Believers what it threateneth: Christ hath redeemed us from the Curse of the Law, Gal. 3. 13. The strength of sin is the Law, but thanks be to God who hath given us the Victory through our Lord Jesus Christ, 1 Cor. 15. 56, 57.

Reply.

Still we agree as to the Law de futuro: But I confess Mr. L 's Arguments are yet very knotty.

Animadversion.

The Law is yet in force to show us sin, and the desert of it; but not to condemn us for it, if we be in Christ, who hath satisfied the Law for us, and freed us from the Curse of it.

Reply.

I accept your Concession. But, 1. The Law concurs to the Constitution of Guilt, as well as to the Manifestation. 2. I suppose you speak de condemnatione efficaci condemnationi judicis inseparabiliter connexâ; and so it is true, else not: For the Law doth condemn us, quantum in se, before Christ do pardon us per legem Remediantem. 3. We are freed by Christ's Satisfaction, only when the fruits of it are conferred on us; that is on our believing, but not on the mere payment. So your sense.

Animadversion.

I grant that the New-Covenant, promising Life on condition of Believing, may be said to threaten death only in case of final Unbelief; that is, except one continue in Unbelief unto the end, he shall not perish: 1. Yet when it is said, that Christ will come in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8. I conceive, that by obeying the Gospel, is meant obeying the Moral Law, to which even the Gospel itself doth require obedience, Matth. 5. 17, 18, 19. & 1 Cor. 9. 21. & Tit. 2. 11, 12. So that such as transgress the Moral Law, are liable to death, not only by the Law, but also by the Gospel, though the Gospel withal hold out pardon to those that believe, which the Law doth not. 2. Besides, few (I think) will deny, that the Old-Covenant is still of use to let us see what is due unto us for sin, and what need we have of Christ. But when it is said, that Believers are freed from the Law as a Covenant of Works; the meaning is, that they are not tied to those strict terms which are contained in that Covenant, namely, to obtain life upon condition of full and perfect obedience to the Law, or otherwise for any the least Transgression to incur eternal Damnation.

Reply.

This is the great Point that so many oppose; wherein yet you agree with me. 1. It is not only an implicit Threatning (implied in the Promise) to Unbelievers; but an explicit. 2. I believe not, that by the Gospel of Christ, 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8. is meant directly the Moral Law, as such: But obedience to the Moral Law, is implied in it, so far as it is the Law of Christ, to be sincerely obeyed, as a consequent of Faith, and implied in Faith. 3. I yet discern not that any is liable, or virtually-adjudged to death by the New-Law (as distinct from that of Works) for Unbelief or Disobedience, but on supposition that they be final. Indeed, whether it be final or not, men are at present children of Wrath that remain impenitent: But that is, because they are so by the Law of Works, and the Law of Grace hath not yet delivered them; but it saith not, that they shall not be delivered, but on supposal of perseverance to the end in that Impenitency. 4. The Old-Covenant is not only of use to let us see our Due: but first to constitute that Due, and then to manifest it.

Animadversion.

True: But not after they believe, as you seem to hold, p. 78, & 79. you plainly declare yourself to dissent from those learned and godly men, who exempt Believers from the Law, as a Covenant of Works. Yet you yield as much as they (I presume) desire. V. 87. you cite the words of the Apostle, They that are led by the Spirit, are not under the Law, and against such there is no Law, Gal. 5. 18, 23. Page 88. you say, [The Obligation to Punishment is dead as to us. Rom. 7. 6. but not the Law void or dead in itself. I know not why any should desire more than is here granted: Neither do I believe, that those learned and godly men whom yet you profess yourself to dissent from, did intend more.

Reply.

1. The intent of the first sort of them cannot be known by their words; for they are self-contradictory. The intent of the second sort is for much more; as you would be quickly brought to believe, if you did but read some Volumes of Papers written to me on this subject.

2. I am glad that I so far agree with you, that you can so hardly believe that any others differ from me (that are godly and learned.)

3. For my seeming to make Believers under the Law. I answer, So do you. They are so far under the Law, that it maketh them guilty, that is, obligeth them to punishment; which is Condemnatio Legis: But this guilt, as it accrues, is remitted; and this Obligation dissolved, when contracted; and this Condemnatio Legis, shall never procure the Condemnationem Judicis, because there is in force, and still at hand superaddita Lex Gratiae Remedians, dissolving the foresaid Obligation.

This is in brief my judgment of that great point. I dare not yield to them that say, The Law is abrogated (de Futuro;) nor to ordinary Divines, to say, It • s abrogated to Believers, lest I should utterly deny a possibility of any pardon, by denying all reality of guilt: For where there is no actual guilt (though there may be Potential and Conditional, as some speak) there is no place for pardon. Where there is no Obligation, there can be no dissolving of that which is not.

Animadversion.

No doubt, as in other Graces, so in Faith, perseverance is required. Now the just shall live by faith: But if any man draw back, my Soul shall have no pleasure in him, Heb. 10. 38. Yet Justification is promised simply to them that believe: By him all that believe are justified, Acts 13. 39. It is not suspended till a man be a Believer to the end. You will say, The continuance of Justification doth depend on the continuance of believing. I grant it: But true justifying Faith is never lost, nor true Justification ever reversed. Whom he justifieth, them he also glorifieth, Rom. 8. 30.

Reply.

Still we agree. 1. As if you marry a Beggar, your Riches and Honor is hers inceptively, or quoad primam possessionem (& primum Jus) on her consent or Marriage- Covenant: But the continuance is on condition of continuing that consent and fidelity. Our first, or begun-actual Justification in Law is on our first believing; but both the continuance and consummation, and the great Justification by Sentence at Judgment, and the benefit of Glory to be adjudged us thereupon, are all on condition of our perseverance and overcoming. 2. That justifying Faith is never lost, nor Justification hath any intercision, doth not contradict, but very well suit with the necessity of the said perseverance in Faith, as the condition of continued and consummate Justification. The Decree of God causeth that perseverance: But yet the Law (being the Rule for man to live by, and God to judge by, and not the opener of all his counsels) doth not (as a Law) always take notice of that. As God's Decree is, that all the Elect shall believe, and yet his Law doth most fitly require Faith of them, as the condition of their Justification and Glory.

Animadversion.

This seemeth to imply, that only an outward and earthly happiness was promised in the first Covenant, to which I have spoken before.

Reply.

It neither implieth, nor seemeth to imply any such thing, if by [outward and earthly,] you mean objective & materialiter, consisting of outward and terrene blessings only. But whether Adam 's high enjoyment of God, should have been on Earth, or in Heaven, I cannot tell. I will not pretend to be wiser than I am.

Animadversion.

Not in kind, but only in degree, as I have also shown before.

Reply.

1. That's all that I urge and desire you to yield to. The scratch of a pin, and the pulling off a man's flesh with pincers, are pains that differ not in kind, but degree: Yet in a Civil or Law sense, they differ in kind: For so a natural gradual difference, may constitute a Civil or Moral specific difference.

2. Yet, if poena damni be any poena, your Assertion is not beyond dispute. For to be an adopted son in Christ, and a member of the Son of God, and one with him who is one with the Father, are privileges which I cannot prove that Adam should have enjoyed, if he had not sinned, nor any of their kind.

Animadversion.

What conditions on man's part can be assigned, which are not implied, Jer. 31. 33. & Heb. 8. 10. I will put my Law in their inward parts, and will write it in their hearts? Where also it is expressed that God will work these conditions which he doth require; as presently here you acknowledge, saying, Or else it speaketh only of what God will do for his Elect▪ in giving them the first Grace, and enabling them to perform the conditions of the New-Covenant.

Reply.

Memorandum, That I have over, and over, and over professed myself of your judgment, as you confess, and I have fullier elsewhere expressed. Only taking it for more difficult than sometime I have done, I hold it not as so clear and certain a truth, but that in modesty I may take in the other opinion. If I must therefore argue against myself and you: I answer you, 1. If it should be but the Confirmation, Radication, or further degree of Grace that is here meant, then your Answer may be at hand. 2. What condition on man's part is there, that is not comprehended in circumcising the heart to love the Lord, and the heart of their seed? and yet it is promised conditionally, Deut. 31. 3. What condition on man's part is there, that is not comprised in the gift of the Holy Ghost? Yet God giveth his Holy Spirit to them that ask it. And how oft is the Holy Ghost said to be given to them that believe? And Christ promiseth, Prov. 1. Turn ye at my reproof, and [I will pour out my Spirit unto you.] But this is against myself and you.

Animadversion.

1. Yet in your Animadversions on Mr. Bedford about Baptsm, you seem to hold a Relative change in Infants, without any real change in them; viz. That they are justified and freed from the guilt of sin, and yet are not sanctified, as we usually take the word, by the infusion of Grace into the Soul. I cannot see but that generally, as well in Infants as others, Justification and Sanctification, in that sense, go together, 1 Cor. 6. 11. Rom. 8. 9.

2. But to take your words in the full latitude and extent of them, they seem not true: For in the members of the visible Church, generally there is a relative change; they have special relation to God; and yet in many of them there is no real change; i. e. they are no more inwardly holy than mere Aliens.

Reply.

I confess you have now met with me: I ought to have spoken so cautelously, that my speech might not have been so obnoxious to a misinterpretation. But yet thus far I may justly Apologize: 1. I did not mean it of Infants or Idiots, but only of the Aged and Rational. 2. I plainly speak of a real change only, as necessary to give title to the relative. And I do not see yet, but this is true of all, for all your two Exceptions. And first for Infants, I answered, 1. They have not the relations of [justified, adopted Church-member, &c.] but upon a real change or work, to give them title: But that work is on the Parents (and not requisite in themselves) which gives title both to Parent and Child to the relative benefits. I said not, that [God never makes a relative change, where he makes not a real on the same person. 2. And for my judgment against Mr. Bedford: 1. I do show my doubtfulness in that point: I have proved the relative change on Infants; when you have proved the real on them to be as common, then I will yield to you, and thank you. But you must be pleased to consider withal, how to resolve the difficulties on the other side; and answer both the Arguments of the Fathers, and Mr. Bedford, and Davenant, and Ward, &c. which are brought to prove the efficacy of Baptism to its just end nonponenti obicem, if you deny the ordinary relative change on Infants: or if you yield it, but withal maintain the certain concurrence of an infusion of Grace (as you speak) even into them that after perish; then be pleased to prove, that such true Sanctification (for so you call it) may be lost (which seems to be against your judgment) and answer the rest of my Arguments against Mr. Bedford. It is easy enough to see inconveniences seeming to clog an Opinion: But we must withal consider the inconveniencies of the contrary Opinion. If you maintain, that the Child of a true Believer, presented to God by Baptism, according to his Ordinance, in Prayer and Faith by the Parents, doth not receive Remission of sin (certainly;) I think you must either say, that Remission is not an end of the Ordinance, and so it is not a Seal of Remission, or of the Remitting-Covenant of Grace (which is not true;) or else, that God's Ordinances may miss of their ends, without man's causing-fault; and that God's Covenant to his People and their Seed, may be broken; or else (incline to the Anabaptists, and say) that All the Seed of true Believers are not in the Covenant of Grace with God, nor should be baptized; and we know not which of them it is that are in Covenant: Or else devise another Covenant of Grace, containing only Church privileges, and not Remission (which some call an external Covenant) as to the benefit promised; and say, that the Seed of Believers are only in this, and Baptism sealeth only to this: Which leaveth the Children of Believers in as hopeless a case as the Anabaptists leave them: which contradicteth Scripture, which appointeth Baptism for higher ends, viz. for Remission of sins; and which hath given the Anabaptists that advantage to insult, by playing upon that new-devised Covenant; and even baffle us, when we cannot prove it from Scripture, and so doth much harden them, and increase their number (as I know by experience of them.)

For the Text you cite, that 1 Cor. 6. 11. speaks expressly of the Aged; and I think so doth that Rom. 8. 9. The Word saith also, He that believeth not, shall be damned, and yet that is not extended to Infants. Besides, those Infants that have only Remission, and not the Spirit, will lose it (this may be said;) and therefore are not Christ's in that strict sense, as those that have both. If you say, What if they die in Infancy? Those of that judgment will answer you, That then (if the Parents were true Believers) it is a certain sign that they had the Spirit as well as Remission. So much of Infants.

2. And for your second Exception, I reply, 1. My speech fully shows, that I meant not all Relations, but only saving-Relations; as, Remission, Justification, Adoption, &c. But yet I see no appearance of strength against it in your Argument, if I had meant so. For is there no real change in the members of the visible Church? Of Infants I have spoke before: And if there be none in the rest, then the Church differs little from the Pagan World, if they differ only in Relation; and then any man may be be baptized, whether he profess Repentance and Faith or not? Is the solemn Profession of believing in Christ, and repenting of all sin, and covenanting to forsake the World, Flesh and Devil, and to fight under Christ's Banner faithfully to the death, is this no Real change?

But I know you will say, It is not true Sanctification.

I reply, 1. Our Question is only of a real change, and not of true Sanctification. 2. As their real change is not true Sanctification, but Profession, or a common change; so their relative change is not true Justification, but to be annumerated to visible Professors, and partake of common Privileges. Not because the Covenant of God doth contain no more, or that they enter any other Covenant; but because they perform not the conditions requisite to the participation of more, in that they do not sincerely accept the terms of the Covenant, and accordingly re-engage themselves to Christ.

Animadversion.

You speak of a twofold Righteousness, requisite and necessary unto Justification; but (so far as I can judge) this Doctrine is not founded upon Scripture. For that shows us, that Christ's Satisfaction merely is the Righteousness whereby we are justified, though Faith be required on our part, that it may be imputed to us as ours, that so we may be justified by it. Faith is the condition whereby we are made partakers of that Righteousness, viz. Christ's Satisfaction; and in that respect we are said to be justified by Faith, Rom. 5. 1. with Acts 13. 39. But that Faith is a distinct Righteousness, by which, together with Christ's Satisfaction, we must be justified, seems to be as if we should make the Medicine and the applying of it two things co-ordinate each with other, when as the one is but subordinate and subservient, as it were, to the other, to work the cure; the Medicine being to no purpose, except it be applied. It cannot, I think, properly be said, that we are cured partly by the Medicine, and partly by the Application, but by the Medicine as applied: So neither is it proper to say, that we are justified partly by Christ's Satisfaction, and partly by Faith, each of them being a distinct Righteousness whereby we are justified, but that we are justified by Christ's Satisfaction as our only Righteousness in that respect; yet not by it simply considered; but as that whereby it is made ours, that we may be justified by it.

Reply.

You come now a little nearer the quick; and therein seem very strongly to dissent from me: But when all is examined, it proves most but in words, while you grant in sense all, or most that I desire. Yet because this is a point of so great moment, and you think here lieth my 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I think necessary to handle it more fully. And because you pass over (without taking notice of it) the Explication of my sense of Righteousness, I must briefly repeat it.

It is not the particular Virtue called Justice, by which we give suum cui{que} distributively or commutatively, which we now are handling. It is in sensu forensi that we speak of Righteousness and Justification. And in that sense, Righteousness is either causae vel personae. The persons Righteousness is joined in the Righteousness of his Cause, and ever supporteth it. The Cause is sometime only one Action or Habit, or some few only; and then the person is justified but secundum quid, or as to that Action of which he was accused, and no further (by the Righteousness of that his Cause.) Sometime the Cause is all a man's Actions or Dispositions which are called in question, which he is put to justify: And if he justify all, he fully justifieth his person, which is called Justificatio personae in the most usual sense of that phrase. But yet a man's Cause may lie in other things than Actions or Dispositions: (of which anon) and he may have other ways to be justified.

The Righteousness in question is contrary to guilt. Guilt is twofold, 1. Reatus culpae. 2. Reatus poenae: The first so called, in reference to the Precept or Prohibition: The second, in reference directly to the Sanction.

So is there a twofold Righteousness, and in either of them is considerable, both the form, and the quasi-materia. The Precept commandeth to do, or not do. He that obeyeth accordingly, is righteous, and not reus culpae. The Sanction containeth Promises and Comminations, or determineth de praemiis & poenis: He that is not obligatus ad poenam, is righteous in respect to the Commination; and he that hath jus ad premium, is righteous as to the premiant act of the Law.

As Justification supposeth Accusation; so Righteousness supposeth (in the Judicial sense of the word) a possibility of Accusation.

As the Law consisteth of these two parts (the preceptive (de agendo vel non agendo) and the Sanction;) so there is a twofold Accusation that we are liable to: 1. That we have sinned, or have Reatum culpae. 2. And that we are therefore Obligati ad poenam, and have no title to the Reward. To be righteous, in respect of the former Accusation (if it be according to the Law of Works at least, that we are accused, or (as I think) the Law of Grace either) is to be Non-peccator, or to be Innocent. To be righteous, in respect to the latter Accusation, is to be Non-obligatus ad poenam, or non-condemnandus; or to be rewarded, if the Accuser deny his title to the Reward: Or, if this last be questionable, whether [Just] signify [Rewardable?] yet none can question the former, Whether it signify [non obligatus ad poenam.]

The formal nature of [Righteousness] therefore is relative: Even such a transcendental relation is it, as is Reatus, to which it is opposed; and as Debitum is, which is the common formal nature of all proper Morality. And for the fundamentum and subject of this relation: The first subject of Righteousness which is opposed to Reatus cupae, is Actio vel Actionis suspensio (under which is comprised the Disposition:) And from the Action, it resulteth to the Agent or Person, who is the last subject of it: The Person is therefore righteous (in this first sense) because his actions and dispositions are righteous.

The subject of the latter sort of Righteousness (which is opposite to Reatus poenae) is only the person.

The immediate fundamentum of the former Righteousness, as it is personae, is the justitia actionum & dispositionum, as being his own: And so it is a relation founded in a relation, and both Moral.

The immediate fundamentum of the Righteousness of his actions, is yet another relation; viz. Their Conformity to the Precept or Rule (considering this Conf •• mity in esse Reali, as it is presupposed to the esse Morale.) For it is presupposed, that my action be the same that is commanded, considering both the Command and Action merely in genere entis, before we consider that action as debitum in generis moris: And the fundamentum of this relation of Conformity, is immediately the proportio quantitativa vel perfectio adaequata actionum quoad regulam. So that the remote fundamentum of this Conformity, is the same with the subjectum, that is, the Actions themselves, or the Dispositions: Et ita remote fundatur in action & qualitate: And the nearest fundamentum is that degree and number of actions, wherein consisteth that perfection which is the Adaequation to the Rule; and so it is founded in quantitate vel graduali perfection. For this Conformity containeth, as it were, a conjunction of a twofold relation, that is, similitude (remotius) and equality (propius.) So much of that first Righteousness, which is a Conformity to the Precept as Precept.

Where observe next, that this is none of our Righteousness, as I have proved, I think, in the Aphorisms: That we have no such Righteousness, as in our own Works, is beyond doubt among all good Christians. And that we have no such Righteousness of Christ (in this form, or as such) imputed to us strictly, and in itself, I perceive you and I are agreed. (Though I will not be so peremptory as to condemn them that maintain, [the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness of this kind, as made ours only by Faith, upon the right of Union, as being Civiliter one person with Christ;] yet I utterly renounce their Doctrine, that make this Righteousness ours, on the ground of our interest in the mere payment, before any Faith; as if Christ obeyed in nostrâ personâ, and so make us one with Christ before Faith: For I could show, that this overthroweth the main substance of the Gospel. I judge that God doth not for Christ's Righteousness esteem us to be non peccatores, but to be non condemnandos, and so to be quasi non peccatores quantum ad reatum poenae.

It is therefore the second kind of Righteousness (non Debitum poenae) which is ours, and which we have here to inquire after. The relative form of this I have spoke of. The subject is the person himself. (To say, that Christ is righteous for us, if we ourselves be not also righteous, is no more to our comfort, than that Christ shall be glorified for us, when we ourselves shall perish.) The fundamentum of this relation is twofold: The first and immediate, which is the efficient cause of our Righteousness, is without the person, viz. the Donation or Constitution of the Law or Covenant. The second subordinate, more remote, and less proper Foundation, is in our title to that Donation: (I call it Titulus in the Lawsense) (though duo fundamenta immediata faciunt duplicem relationem, tamen duo fundamenta subordinata non item.) Or, if you, will call the Law or Gift only the fundamentum and title, and the other but the condition. This Titulus containeth in it two things considerable: 1. Rationem formalem Tituli. 2. Rationem fundamentalem, vel causalem. Titulus ad beneficium ex conditione datum (praeter ipsam donationem) est conditionis praestatio. Hic igitur ratio fundamentalis est duplex: 1. Causa conditionis, quâ conditio est. 2. Causa praestationis vel conditionis quâ praestitae. Causa conditionis quâ conditio est itidem duplex. 1. Remotior & quasi materialis quae est Aptitudo rei ad hoc officium. This Aptitude is denominated in its respect to the ends of the Legislator: which ends are two, 1. That himself and Laws receive no dishonor or wrong. 2. That the subject or party obliged, have a meet way to receive the benefit. Accordingly, the condition is naturaliter apta, 1. Which consisteth in the Creatures performance of its duty in perfection (as in the Old-Law;) or else, which supposing the wrong of the Legislator repaired, doth give the Repairer also the honor of his Grace (as Faith doth in the New-Covenant:) The former containeth a meritorious Dignity; the latter presupposeth it elsewhere. 2. Which containeth a fitness to the ascertaining our benefit (this is but subordinate, or less principal.) 2. Causa conditionis qua talis Proxima, est Institutio Legis vel foederis: This is the very immediate fundamentum, whence the formalis ratio conditionis doth result. It is a Condition, because the Legislator or Donor doth constitute it such. It is the immediate result of his Constitution, or discovered will.

Where note, that this Act of the Law [Instituere conditionem] is quite different from that other Act which I named a little before, viz. [Constituere debitum praemii vel poenae.] Both are contained in one sentence, [If thou obey perfectly to the end, thou shalt live;] or, [If thou believe, thou shalt be justified, and not come into condemnation, nor perish.] But the former part of the sentence, [If thou believe,] or, [Whosoever believeth,] doth institute the condition: And the latter part doth institute the debitum praen • ii, and so for the debitum poenae. Also, this Institution of the condition as a condition, is quite different from the Instituting of the dueness of the same thing ut officium, as a mere duty: Which is done by the Precept as a Precept absolutely; and not in connection to the Sanction, the performance whereof doth only institute the first sort of Righteousness opposite to reatus culpae, which I before spoke of. So much de fundamentali ration conditionis quâ conditio.

2. And then for conditio qua praestita, or the performance itself, which doth most immediately make it to be Titulus secundarius; it is the Actus praestantis: The interest of the party receiving the benefit, is in all this implied (else is it not conditio praestita.)

Prop. 1. The form of this Righteousness, is neither the Law, nor the Title, nor any Habit or Act which make up the Title; nor any Merit or Satisfaction prerequisite to the Title: But only the [non debitum poenae,] to be [not guilty;] non obligatus ad poenam, [non condemnandus:] or, Jus ad impunitatem (quoad poenam damni & sensus; jus ad vitam aeternam, per Christi justitiam promeritum & gratis (sub conditione receptionis congruae) donatum.

Prop. 2. Man's own Actions are not the fundamentum immediatum of his Righteousness: But the Constitution or tenor of the Law or Covenant is it. This will be thought strange by some perhaps, that Adam's perfect obedience did not immediately constitute him righteous, or non reum poenae; but that we should be made righteous by God's Law without us, more properly and immediately, than the Habits and Acts of holiness within us, and performed by us. But it is clear: For Righteousness (now in question) is but the debitum praemii, or non debitum poenae: And debitum is the immediate result or product of the Law or Gift, and not of our Actions.

But you may object, At least our Acts are the material cause.

I answer, If by the matter, you mean the subject, then they are not here: For here only the person is the subject righteous (non obligatus ad poenam:) But the matter of our Title-condition they may be.

Prop. 3. In several senses therefore the Form, the Fundamentum and the Title may be called, [our Righteousness:] But so, as one be not taken for the other; 1. When we say, the Form is our Righteousness, it is but an explicatory Proposition de nomine; for otherwise nihil praedicatur de seipso: The same thing is not the subject and predicate. 2. The Gospel-Donation or Constitution de non condemnando fideli, may be called our Righteousness fundamentaliter, as being the direct efficient thereof: As the Law's Constitution de non condemnando perfect obedienti, was the fundamentum of Adam 's Righteousness. 3. But most commonly we give the name to the conditio praestita, which is our Title secondary to Righteousness. Of which in particular we must speak more anon.

And thus I have given you my thoughts about the nature of Righteousness in general, and the first distribution of it from the two parts of the Law, Precept and Sanction. Now I come to the second necessary distribution of it, which is from the two distinct Laws or Covenants; which is the thing that you deny: And here I will, 1. Prove, that there is a twofold Righteousness necessary in respect of the two Covenants. 2. And show you the nature of them, and the difference between them. 3. The necessity hence of a twofold Justification; and in particular, of a Justification by Works. 4. I shall tell you of some Learned Divines that fully hold forth this Doctrine as I do. And,

1. That here are two distinct Righteousnesses necessary, I shall prove now to you from these fix several Mediums; which I think best, both for speed and strength, to lay all together. Where there are, 1. Distinct Laws, which our Righteousness must respect. 2. And distinct Legislators or Judges. 3. And distinct Accusations. 4. And distinct Termini proximi. 5. And distinct Termini remotiores. 6. And distinct Titles: there must needs be distinct Righteousnesses: But so it is in the present case; therefore, &c.

Yet one of these alone will be a sufficient proof. And, 1. If there be distinct Laws from whose condemnation we must be freed, and which require distinct conditions of that freedom, then there are distinct Righteousnesses: But, &c. therefore, &c.

Yet here is a great difference (of which more anon.) The Law of Works doth not justify us, nor cease to condemn us, because Christ satisfied not the Law properly, but the Lawgiver: For the Law knows no satisfaction strictly so called; but requireth solutionem vel officii praecepti, vel poenae comminatae (si ita dicam.) It was neither of these that Christ performed: For Actio Noxialis sequitur caput. But yet Christ satisfied God as the Legislator of that Law, and so satisfied the ends of the Law; so that though for all this Satisfaction, the Law condemns us still (as knowing no such thing as Satisfaction; it being a supra- legal act to admit of Satisfaction which is redditio aequivalentis, loco ipsius debiti;) yet Deus ut judex secundum hanc legem, condemneth us not: The condemnatio legis, is but condemnatio virtualis & impropria: Condemnatio enim strictissime sumpta, est sententia. It is therefore condemnatio judicis that is the full proper condemnation; and this we are freed from. Not ne sit, that it be not at all; for God sentenced man presently on the fall in part: But, 1. ne sit plena & rigorosa, God did not fully then sentence according to the sense of the Law. 2. Ne sit executio vel plena, vel continuata: So that though it be ex post-facto, when the Sentence is past, that Satisfaction is given, yet it is the ground of our Deliverance, and so that we are not plene & ad poenam perpetuam condemnandi per judicem propter violationem istius legis. The execution would have been full and continued, and that in rigor, if Satisfaction had not been made. Besides, though God had past Sentence on man for his sin at first, yet not on particular persons for all the sins of their lives, which are after committed against that Law: So that the Legislator will call Satisfaction [Righteousness,] as attaining his Legal ends, though that Law itself will not: And the Law itself did necessitate it.

2. And here is a distinct Legislator and Judge. Deus Creator makes the first Law, requiring perfect obedience; and for want of it, beginneth Sentence and Execution, and admitteth of Satisfaction for the stay of it, and for our full deliverance from the incurred misery. Upon which Satisfaction received, 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 he giveth up all to the Redeemer, and himself judgeth no man, but giveth all judgment to the Son: And at the Sons Judgment, it will be part of our deliverance to be freed from the Judgment or Condemnation of God as Creator. I mean, as Judex secundum solam legem primam: So that though he judge not, yet that is our freedom; for non judicari hoc modo, is non condemnari.

3. But most plain and undeniable it is, that we are liable in Judgment to distinct Accusations; not only circumstantially distinct (for I will not distribute à Circumstantiis) but even as to distinct Laws violated, or distinct kind of sins, and distinct Comminations against us, and distinct penalties incurred, and distinct conditions unperformed (of which after.)

1. We are liable to be accused as sinners in general, and so as having broken the first Law, and thereby deserved the penalty. This is a true Accusation, and against it directly there is no Justification. But against the annexed Accusation, that [therefore we are per judicem condemnandi ut obligati ad poenam] we must be justified, as by pleading the Dissolution of the Obligation per legem remediantem, as the efficient cause; so by pleading Christ's Satisfaction as the meritorious cause, and quasi materia of our Righteousness; and as being a valuable consideration for the dissolving of our obligation to punishment.

But then we are liable to a second Accusation; viz. That we have no right in Christ, and the benefits of his Satisfaction: That we are not Believers, and that therefore we are guilty of that far sorer punishment. Is not this Accusation toto Coelo different from the former? If this Accusation be true, the sinner must be condemned for want of title to Christ; and that on two grounds, 1. Because he is left undelivered from the condemnation of the first Law. 2. Because he is found guilty by the tenor of the New-Law, both of the said non-liberation, and of the additional punishment. But if this Accusation be false, we are justified, as we next show, by pleading Not guilty.

Furthermore, this Accusation may be threefold;

1. That we are non-Credentes, not Believers at all, but Pagans.

2. Or that we are not sincere Credentes, but Hypocrites, and not true Believers.

3. Or that we were solifidians, and added not sincere obedience to our Faith, and that to the end. Surely against these several Accusations, we must have several ways of Justification.

4. There are also several Termini or Sentences, from which by Justification they are to be freed; that is, both from being sentenced by God-Creator, as Legislator of the first Law; and from being sentenced by Christ the Redeemer, as Legislator of the New-Law.

5. The Termini remotiores also are distinct: One Condemnation which we must be justified against is, that Death threatened Gen. 3. The other Condemnation that by Justification must be prevented is, a far sorer punishment.

6. And lastly, there are several Titles or Pleas against these sentences. Do you think, if Satan accuse you to be a final Unbeliever, or an Hypocrite, that it will justify you to plead, [Christ hath satisfied?] Or if he say, [Thou art a sinner,] is it enough to say, [I do believe?] No: But when he pleadeth, [Thou hast sinned, and therefore shouldest be condemned according to the Law:] We must plead, [quoad Meritum; Christ hath made Satisfaction, and the merit of that sufficeth, against the demerit of my sin; and, quoad legis constitutionem, the Obligation of the first Law is dissolved by the Grant of the latter. [So that Christ's Satisfaction as to the point of Merit, (which is the Aptitudo ad officium conditionis in the first Law) is loco conditionis à nobis praestitae: And so far is our Title. But then because it being not of our own performance, there must concur our actual interest, to make it to be formaliter Titulus to us; and this interest is by God conveyed by a New-Covenant or Law, and this New-Law or Grant, is again conditional. Hence it followeth, that we are devolved over to the New-Law, before our Justification and Deliverance from the Old is absolute and complete: And so, though Christ's Satisfaction be complete, and perfecta satisfactio, and nothing be wanting quoad meritum; yet it is but Titulus aptitudinalis, vel conditionalis; wanting nothing in itself, but something to appropriate it to us to apply it, and give us interest: And that is, 1. On God's part, his Grant or Promise. 2. On our part, the performance of the Condition of this New-Law or Promise. So that as to our Deliverance or Justification from the Condemnation of the first Law, we have a threefold Title necessary to plead; or a Title thus divided: 1. Quoad Meritum, Christ's Satisfaction is our only Title. 2. Quoad Appropriationem vel Applicationem: 1. God's gift, in Christ's Testament. 2. Our performing the Conditions (though the last be most imperfectly called Title.) As if Adam had perfectly obeyed, there would have been in his Obedience: 1. The meritorious Value. 2. The personal Interest. So now Christ's Satisfaction is imputed to us for Righteousness, as to the Merit and Value. But the New-Covenant giveth the personal Interest: And because it gives it but conditionally, therefore our performance is of necessity to our personal Interest as the Condition.

But then here being a New-Law (Lex remedians) made for this Conveyance, here is occasion of a New-Accusation, New-Plea, and so a New-Righteousness and Justification: So that here is nova causa, and therefore must needs be nova justitia & justificatio. The Question was in the first cause, [Whether the Prisoner or accused be condemnandus as a sinner, for breaking the Law of Works?] Quoad meritum, it is presently determined for all: Christ's Satisfaction was sufficiens pretium. But the case cannot be fully decided by that, for then the personal Interest is questioned: Whereupon the cause is devolved to the New-Law, and the performance of its Condition. And there comes in the second cause: [Whether the Defendant have performed the Condition of the New-Law or Covenant?] And here the Condition hath not ad aptitudinem, rationem Meriti: Here he must be justified by producing his Faith in the Redeemer, which is the Condition: Which is the