A Second Parcel of Objections Answered

The first Letter.

THe scope of your late writings seem's to be the giving of satisfaction to such as are scrupulous about the new Engagement: Give me leave (being emboldened thereunto by your ingenious invitation, p. 29. of your Re-prop. ) to acquaint you with the thoughts of divers godly Ministers (whose names you may have if need be) touching your two last pieces: and to show you wherein they remain unsatisfied. Only let me premise thus much, and speak it as in the sight of God; that although my acquaintance hath been but little with you (being once only in your company with Dr. Wells ) yet I have always highly honored you in my heart, since I had any knowledge of you; and have often said to my friends, That if I would rest upon any man's judgment living, (at lest in points of this nature) it should be upon yours: so deeply was I possessed with the persuasion both of your ability and integrity. And for those, whose thoughts I represent to you, I may truly saize of them, they are such as are led into their doubtings by no design, but the design of keeping a good conscience; and that the tie of conscience arising from 〈…〉 gements, whereby they have tied themselves to God, is the principal (if not only) thing that make's them tender this way. You may therefore pleas to take notice:

1. They think that the less self-confidence, and abounding in our sense, be used in things of so doubtful a nature, the more agreeable it is to the rule of love, and the more safe will our proceedings be therein.

2. They think that in your whole discourse on this subject, you take that pro concesso (and make it the chief basis and bottom of all your argumentation) namely, That the continuance of King and Lord's is inconsistent with Salus Populi; (whereto it's willingly granted other things must give place): but this is the thing altogether in question, as was otherwise determined by the major part of the Commons (when the House was full and free) who are our only competent judges in things of this nature.

3. They think it a sentence scarcely agreeable to the rule of charity and Christian compassion, that those who are afraid to engage this way (though they engage to live quietly, and obeie in lawful things) should have no protection or other benefit of law (as you seem to say p. 22. of your Considerations ) since, wherein is true tenderness of conscience, if it be not to be tender in those things wherein we have to do with God, and that in the most sacred and solemn manner, viz. by Oaths and Covenants.

4. Whereas you say in your Re-prop. p. 12. that there is no difference at all betwixt the things which the proposers themselves mention to be the duty of Subjects to their superiors, and the subscriptions required by present Autoritie; And yet p. 15.you say we mean to declare by our subscriptions our approbation of, our ratifying consent unto, and our obligation towards the present Establishment, (which are the principal things that the proposers scruple at, as appear's Sect. 39; And whereas yourself would not have it so much as questioned how far it doth imply an approbation of the present establishment, a ratifying consent thereto, and an obligation to act to the strengthening and promoting of it; and yet by subscribing you declare your approbation of it; they cannot see how these things are clear from contradiction and crossing one another.

5. They account it an hard censure by you, to say that those whom nothing can satisfy in their doubts, but a clear declaration made either by the Supreme Power, or by themselves, to be such as have no sincerity in them, (pag. 20. of your Repropos. ) since we cannot go too clearly and surely to work in acquitting our selves from the guilt arising from the violation of such oaths and promises as we have made to God.

6. They think it no less violation of the rule of charity, for you to say of the proposers (though altogether unknown to them) That in their Proposals they have covered a State business and politick design with a Ministerial cloak, p. 29. (where there seem's to be a mixture of some bitterness) then if the proposers should say of you, that you have put forth your late Papers to pleas a prevailing party. And if there be a liberty to censure each other in this sort, whose integrity shall be left untouched and unviolated?

7. They acknowledge that to be very true, which you speak p. 21. and that even good men are too subject to admit of self-mixtures in their best actions. But they see no reason to think that yourself should be so strong as not to be at sometimes subject to the like weakness: If you be, then you know it is the duty of the strong to bear with the infirmities of the weak: and the property of love, rather to cover and conceal them, then to lay them open to their shame, when so many are ready to rejoice in it.

To conclude, they are much afraid that the late writings on this subject, have not a little exasperated the higher Powers, and heightened the heat of their indignation against many that are truly godly (both Ministers and People that are tender this way) by increasing unjust jealousies in their minds towards them, and making things appear in a worse shape then needed, and so have made the gap greater and breach wider, which had far more need to have been closed and cured. It is conceived, that you can very hardly prove those things which you suggest against the proposers, and therefore (as yourself say) in doubtful things love should judge the best: And therefore it had been a far better office both of love to your brethren, yea, and of fidelity to Superiors, rather to have cast on water, then to have added fuel to the flame: authority being always apt enough to take high offense at such, who in all things agree not with it.

Sir, you cannot but know that the generality of the Church of Scotland have the same sense of this new Engagement with those that scruple it in England: whose judgment is not to be slighted. Neither is there reason for any to be carried on with such confidence in the maintaining of it, as to censure those who are doubtful. You cannot but know that in doubtful things, by reason of the diversity of apprehensions, there will be likewise a differing latitude in men's consciences (even in the consciences of such as are truly pious and most sincerely conscientious) so as those things which will satisfy one, will not satisfy another that desire's satisfaction (as it hath been heretofore between the non-conformists and conformists, (though both godly) and is still between the Independents and Presbyterians) so that in public subscriptions it hath been thought needful things should be as clear as the morning light. That therefore such who desire a clear satisfaction in such a business as this, that is involved with such difficulties, and perplexed with so many oaths and pre-engagements, should be censured for unsinceritie; is thought very little agreeing with the rule of love and equity.

It is therefore in all earnestness and loving humility desired of you, that you would lay no more load on such who already are even sinking under the burden of many doubts and perplexities, nor give any occasion to the hand of Autoritie to lie heavier upon them then heretofore; but rather that you would bestow some of your strength in dealing with Superiors as well as inferiors: and that in these respects:

1. Becaus it is in their power (by not pressing) to ease many that want power to ease themselves by untying the knots that pinch them: and it is no small charity, to yield ease to a tired, troubled conscience.

2. It will be their safety and prosperity not to lay heavy burdens on the consciences of such as desire to keep a good conscience: such as have always been their fastest friends, and constant intercessors at the Throne of Grace. A blow from a friend is far more grievous, then what come's from an enemy.

3. It will be very agreeable to those many promises and professions they have made to the whole Kingdom, touching their great care to use tender consciences tenderly. When the Prelatical yoke was broken, there was great hopes we should have been troubled with no more yokes of the like nature.

4. It's conceived, that now you have a price in your hands, (by reason you have ingratiated yourself with the higher Powers by the many good offices you have don for them) you have opportunity likewise to do some good offices for God's people, which they desire you may have a heart to improve.

Blessed is he that considereth or judgeth wisely of the poor (as the Geneva translation read's it) Psal. 41. 1. You know who those poor ones are, even such as many are, who are now struggling in their thoughts about the lawfulness of this now Engagement, and not able to find out a satisfying resolution.

Thus I have been bold to commend the thoughts of my friends, together with my own thoughts, unto you, which I hope you will accept with that Christian candor and meekness, which heretofore hath shined forth in all your carriages. If it pleas you to vouchsafe any answer, though but in three lines, I shall take it as a true testimony of your great humility and integrity. Thus desiring our good God still to make you a happy reconciler and peacemaker, I resign you to his mercy.

The Answer to the first Letter.

YOur Letter dated Febr. 9. I received not till Febr. 16. on saturdaie about noon, and I willingly confess myself really beholding to you for the ingenuity and freedom which you use towards me in it, and wish that God would put it in the heart of everyone of my brethren that find themselves grieved at anything which they find in me, to do as you have don. For I hope that God will never suffer me to neglect any admonition which shall be given me by any, without a due reflection upon myself to examine my spirit in his sight, by the light which it bring's with it, or without a solicitous care to give just satisfaction to everyone, whom I may see upon discovery that I have offended through weakness: for he was an Apostle that said, In many things we offend all, Jam. 3. (not excluding himself) and added, If any man offend not in a word, he is a perfect man: I am not conscious to myself of any conceit of perfection in anything which I have attained; therefore I shall willingly take notice of the first rule which you lay down, That the less self-confidence and abounding in our sense we use in things of a doubtful nature, the more agreeable our way will be to the rule of love; and the more safe will our proceedings be. By this rule I shall heartily desire to be judged; and if I have failed by being too confident in anything, my heart doth much deceive me, if I shall ever be ashamed to confess a fault, if made known unto me. I shall therefore desire to know the passages wherein self-confidence doth appear, that I may be humbled for them, and rectify them upon a further examination of my heart.

Your second point of admonition is, That I take that pro confesso which is in question; and that I make that which is not granted to be the basis and bottom of all my argumentation. Which if I do, I confess I am out of the way. But truly, by what you represent, it doth not yet appear to me that I have don so: for you say that I have pre-supposed this as the basis of all my argumentation, namely, That the continuance of K. and Lord's is inc •… sistent with Salus Populi: which to my best understanding o • • y self in what I have said or meant to say, I neither have said, nor intended to say; and I would be beholden to you, or those other brethren who make that observation, to let me see the ground of that assertion in anything which I have said. For I will clearly profess, that I do not think that there is any inconsistency between the Salus Populi, and the being of a King and of Lord's in a Nation; if they behave themselves not as Tyrants, to rule all at will, and without Laws: which are in the people's right to choose and settle for themselves and their Kings; and it is their King's only Prerogative, and the duty of their Lord's, to see those Laws observed: for to me it is clearly against the Law of God and nature, that any King or Lord's should be Magìs soluti Legibus, then any of the meanest Subjects; or de jure be less reproveable then they are. This being then my clear judgment, that Kings and Lord's are officers in a National sociëtie appointed by God through men, to see Laws kept, it never came into my mind to think that their being in a Nation should be inconsistent with the safety thereof: and if you willingly grant, that all human Constitutions or Ordinances of men, as the Apostle call's Kings, must give place to Salus Populi, I suppose, you and I shall very little disagree about the Tenure of Kings and Lord's; therefore when in the close of this admonition you say, that this is altogether in question, truly I understand not how it come's to be a question at all between us, or wherein I have given you a ground to think so; nor do I understand well what is meant by the words which follow thereupon, viz. And was otherwise determined by the major part of the Commons (when the House was full and free) who are our only competent Judges in things of this nature. I say, I know not well what you mean by the thing which was otherwise determined: for if I dissent not from you in this, then nothing was otherwise determined; as to my sense in this matter, then what you agree to. But if you would intimate, that the House when it was (in your sense) full and free, did determine that there should be a King and House of Lord's, remaining with the House of Commons in this Nation, as a lawful Government in their joint relations, according to the fundamental constitution of the State; if this be your meaning, I fully grant it, That once it was so determined by both Houses, and by the major part of the Commons, who were your competent Judges in things of this nature. And yet now we see it is again otherwise determined by another party of the same Commons, who declare themselves to be a full and free House (of which assertion now they are the only competent Judges) and according to their determination nothing is generally asserted, and in Thesi, That Salus Populi, and a King and Lord's are inconsistent; but only in Hypothesi, and particularly, That at this present, there is an inconsistency of a King and House of Lord's with the safety of this People: which how true or falls it is, ought not to be disputed, because it cannot be determined by you or me; for it depend's upon the cognizance of circumstance; whereof I conceive none of our coat are competent judges, nor any others that are in places of subjection; but only those that are betrusted with the higher Powers, and are about the management of their places of Trust. And if it cannot be denied, that those that have made the alteration of the Government, were persons betrusted with power able to do what they did, and did it in the Management of their places of trust, according to the best of their understanding, for the safety of the People, I dare not take upon me to be their judges, but must leave them to him under whom they pretend to stand; and must acknowledge that the alteration is of God, whose ordinatie cours it is to do, by a minor part, and by weak means, that which a major part of the world, and the greatness of the strength thereof, is not able to do. And if I perceive that a matter is clearly determined by those whom he hath employed, and who are in power to manage public affairs by their places; although it may be carried contrary to my private sense and expectation, yet I see no warrant for me to take upon me to make any other determination of the matter in my thoughts, then God hath don by them who have the management of his Power; nor can I see how it is lawful for any man who cannot bring his thoughts to close with that which hath been don by others, under whose protection he is obliged to live, to refuse to do things in themselves lawful, just, and undeniably tending to Common safety, only upon this account, because such things are commanded by men, whom they judge to have don that which is amiss, and beyond the line of their power. If they who presume to judge so, were by any right of God or men made judges of their actions, or able to call them to an account thereof before competent judges; or in a condition to stand free, and in no need of their protection, something, as I conceive, might be said for their practice: but when men can pretend to nothing of all this, but are mere Subjects, and under a Power which undoubtedly is Supreme over them; under a power in full possession of all places of trust about them, and in a capacity to manage the same, for the good of those that do well, and for the punishment of those that do evil; Now, I say, for men, when things are so, to stand out and to resist such powers, not in things of an unlawful, but of a most commendable, lawful, and necessary nature in themselves, and to think to be obliged to do so for conscience sake, is to me I confess, an extreme great Paradox in the profession of Christianity, as it is an unpartial and conscionable walking before God in conformity to his will. And if this is not the present case wherein some Ministers do stand in opposition to the present Powers, I would be glad to be rectified; and you will do me a favor to show me wherein I do mistake either the public or their private case in this matter.

The third matter of admonition is: That I seem not to deal charitably and compassionately with those who through tenderness of conscience, in reference to Oaths and Covenants, are afraid to engage this way (though they engage to live quietly and obeie in lawful things) by an owning of the Autoritie; and this uncharitablenes you charge upon me from my expressions in pag. 21. of my Considerations, where I seem to say, That such should have no protection or other benefit of Law. If I have said so of such persons, and to the end that they should be deprived of protection, and of the benefit of equal justice; I confess it would be somewhat rigorous and inconsistent with the spirit of compassion and charity. I am sure it was not in my design to deprive any tender conscience of any equitable favor which may be shown unto them, nay I have professedly and sincerely engaged myself, to use all my interest in those that are in places of power, to procure this unto them, as you may see more at large in the Reproposals, pag. 18. and 19. In the Paragraphs, which in the margent are marked for an Answer to the seventh and eight Sect. of the Proposals: and as I there have professed, so I have hitherto uprightly endeavored; but as for that which you allege out of the Considerations, pag. 22. of the second and third Edition, (for in the first Edition, it is page 24.) I shall desire you to consider the matter and scope of that which I say in that place; and if then you look upon the principle, which I had before (in page 16. of the same Editions) as a ground of Justice in this Case, perhaps you will see caus to excuse me from the uncharitableness, which you charge upon me, as towards tender Consciences; for there I speak concerning an objection against the subscribing of the Engagement, taken from the apprehension of offending godly people by subscribing of it; my scope is to answer that Objection upon this presupposal, that, he who take's it, is not, as to his own Conscience, scrupled at the taking of the Engagement; but is to be swaied merely by his consideration of others: here then to such a one I say, that caeteris paribus (for this is expressly supposed in the proposal of the Case) there is more caus to apprehend a danger of offense in not subscribing, then in subscribing; because there are more offenses (even three to one) in the balance, in case of not subscribing: for here I have caus as well as there to apprehend the offense, not only of many godly brethren, but also of Superiors, and of myself in point of safety; and these two last offenses I join in this, that the Magistrate to whom I refuse to give an assurance of my fidelity, may take that refusal, as a just caus given him to deny me necessary protection and safety. For I suppose that the Rule is without all exception, that Protectio trahit Allegianciam; & vice versâ Allegiancia Protectionem & e contra: now whether this be the same case which you charge upon me, I shall leave it to your second thoughts to consider; for here I presuppose myself not at all scrupled in my Conscience, but to be swaied by mere outward considerations of dangers: and that amongst other dangers I might justly apprehend this; that if I will not show myself faithful to the Magistrate, who is over me, I may fear to be deprived of the benefit which otherwise I might reap from his office which is necessary protection.

As for the seeming Contradiction mentioned in your fourth exception, you will easily of yourself reconcile it, and perceive your mistake, if you construe my words right, and leave not out the additional claus, put in of purpose to limit the approbation, the ratifying Consent and the obligation towards the present establishment, which I mean to declare by my subscription; the claus which you have left out in your quotation of my words (which make's them seem to you contradictory to themselves) is this; But thus far only as I have said. Construe then the whole period by a little transposition of their words in their order, thus, I mean to declare, by my Subscription, my approbation of my ratifying consent unto, and my obligation towards the present establishment; but only thus far as have said. viz. in the three paragraphs immediately going before, wherein I limit in the first, the approbation, in the second, the ratifying consent, and in the third, the obligation towards the establishment: to show, that although I think not myself bound up by my subscription of the engagement, to the particulars mentioned in the Proposals, which are said to be different from the Duties, which Subjects owe to Superiors; yet I am willing to acknowledge some kind of approbation of ratifying consent, and of obligation to the establishment included in the subscription; viz. such as is agreeable to those duties, and such as I formerly had described, although then I will not grant, that the subscription to the words of the engagement doth imploie those Consequences, whereunto the Proposers would strain them, which they say are opposite to their Oaths and Covenants: yet I refuse not to admit of some other Consequences which I limit, and declare to be consistent with the Oaths and Covenants; the particulars inferred upon the Subscription by the Proposers, I say, are things which go beyond a clear and known duty; and I conceive, that the words of the Engagement give no ground to interpret the Act of Subscription so; but that I may notwithstanding this rejection of those particulars, infer other particulars of the same kind, agreeable unto a Duty upon the same Act of Subscription, is nothing of Contradiction, as to my understanding, nor I hope will be to yours when you shall consider better of it; and shall not leave out the adversative particle, and the claus which refer you to the limitation, which I think should be heeded about those inferences.

The fifth thing which you offer, is the hard censure of want of sincerity, you think is pronounced against all those, that can acquiesce in nothing; but in such a Declaration, as shall be made either by themselves, or their Superiors to their content; but if you look well to my words, you will find also here a clear mistake of my meaning; for my aim is not to speak of all those that have any doubts or scruples about this business; as if none of them were sincere, that will or cannot acquiesce in anything else but in such a Declaration; I say, my words speak not indefinitely of all such; but they express only these proposers. For I say distinctly, that in the proposers aim will appear no sincerity in reference to these Proposals, if there is nothing, but this that will content them; because in their Proposals they seem by offering at a Treatie, and by desiring to have matters of doubt debated, and reconciled, to seek a rational way of satisfaction to themselves. Now say I, when this way shall be offered to them, and entered upon, if they then will not follow it ingenuously; but will stand peremptorily upon their own preconceived terms, and agree to nothing, but what they themselves have fancied, must be declared; In this case I say it is evident, that the aim of the Proposers in the matter of their proposals, is not sincere towards the procurement of a reconciliation, and a just way of satisfaction, which they seem to desire; if you observe then that you mistake the Case by your not heeding the particular Subject whereof I speak, and the presupposals which I lay as the ground of that Censure; I suppose you will absolv me from uncharitableness in this matter; for truly I believe many to be sincerely scrupled; and yet so weak that without making or receiving a Declaration in their own terms, they cannot be satisfied; nay, I have met with some such. God forbid, then I should condemn them all for this, to have no sincerity in their scruples; but if men make proposals of ways to have their Scruples taken away, and then will not at all observe the same; but without all rational and ingenuous proceeding will peremptorily prescribe their own terms to others; I think it no uncharitableness to say, that such men in making such proposals have no sincerity, and that this is my meaning in that passage; if you look over it again, I make no doubt you will find it to be so.

The sixth Admonition doth compare that which I say of the Proposers, in reference to the continuance of their Proposals, page 29. with what they might say of me in reference to my late papers; as for the expressions which I have used in that place, I shall not stand to justify them; I shall rather confess that they should have been spared, or otherwise delivered; for when I look upon them, and compare them with the design which I had in that last Section, I find that I am carried further thereby then I did purpose to proceed; for my purpose in the later part of that Section, was not directly to charge the proposers with any politick design, but only to let them see, as by way of Admonition, how far both the matter and the contrivance of the proposals might be liable to such an interpretation; if any would give way to suspiciousness, which I do iteratively profess myself to be free from, and through charity unwilling to entertein: yet upon the supposal, that it is possible some such thing might be in the mind of some of the Proposers, I would show the way how even in that Case they might receive satisfaction; but the expressions which you have noted; are I perceive more then this design come's to; for they rise up to a positive, and direct charge of that where of I intended only to give by way of supposition, a warning, as of that which possibly might be. Thus I observe by myself, that when our spirits dwell upon objects of evil surmises, although it may be for a good and harmless aim, yet they may easily be heated above their just measure, and lose their way towards the end of edification, which cannot be followed otherwise then in the Spirit of Love. As for my papers, if any will examine them, so as to find out the arguments, by which it may be probably suspected, that my aim is rather to pleas a prevailing party, then to advance Peace and Truth in righteousness towards all, without partiality, I shall not take it ill at his hands; but rather thank him, and blessing God for his brotherly care, try my heart, and judge my thoughts by the occasion thereof, which is all that I would have the proposers do, about the matter whereof I intended to give them warning.

As for the last matter, which you mention out of page 21. of the Reproposals, that even good men are too subject to admit of self-mixtures in their best actions; and that I am not to be exempted from this weakness, no more then others; I shall freely confess it, to be a truth, and declare moreover, that when I wrote that period of the discourse, I was not without that very consideration of myself; and therefore I did set it down the rather to be a Caution for myself; least I might neglect the observation of mine own spirit, and cours in these matters wherewith I have begun to meddle, which I declare to meddle withal for this only purpose; that I may hold forth the way, how to seek impartially peace by a rule, and to follow holiness with all men, without which no man shall see the Lord. I thank you then for putting me in mind of this my condition, and hope that God will enable me to observe also the rest of that, which you suggest in the close of this admonition.

To that which you add in shutting up these matters which you have represented; I shall not reply much, only should be sorry, that those fears, you speak of, should have any fundamentum in re, more then in the tenderness of your fear: I can truly say, that my labors, according to the best of my skill, do tend to prevent that, which may heighten the heat of the Magistrate's indignation against the truly godly, by setting before them the Rules of an unblameable walking, and by discovering the dangers of a deviation from the same; therefore to let them see the faults, in which some manifestly are taken, and which may bring guilt upon all, that they may avoid, prevent, and rectify the same, is no unfriendlie office; nor can the discovery of failings, which showeth the Caus with the Cure, make any breaches wider, but I conceive that a thorough-searching is the only sound way of healing, and closing of our wounds. I can say with a good conscience, that I have all along endeavored, upon all occasions, to cast water upon the heats of both sides, lest they might break out into a flame; and that I have solicited, and will solicit a moderation towards tender Consciences with the best of my industry: but the violence of some tumultuously-clamorous spirits spoil's all.

The Paragraph which begin's with a consideration of the generaltie of the Church of Scotland; and end's with a second complaint of my censuring all with unsinceritie, that take not the Engagement, is either assented unto for the main, or hath been rectified in that, wherein the mistake lies by that which hath been said heretofore; only this I would have observed, that although I will not slight the judgment of any Church, but think reverently of all, yet, that the general opinion of no Church, far less of a foreign Church ought so to be regarded, as to swaie any man's judgment concerning the Civil Sanctions of any State in outward matters: for in such Cases every man's Reason, and the Relations under which he live's, must guid his Conscience to the knowledge of his Duty; and what ever is don upon any other consideration, or implicit concurrence with the generality of others, doth ordinarily become a snare to the Conscience.

Lastly, the Arguments which you use, to persuade me not to lay anymore load on those, who are already sinking under the burden of doubts and perplexities, I do consider as true motives to that duty which you press upon me, whereunto, by God's grace I purpose not to be wanting henceforth, although I am not yet made to see, that heretofore I have been guilty of that Charge, which this exhortation doth presuppose me liable unto: but I can easily, without trouble of mind, God be thanked, bear with more then such surmises, and Censures amount unto; if I can but gain thereby an unprejudiciate hearing of that, which hereafter I may say towards the easing of those that are burdened with the troubles outwardly, and doubts inwardly, which they occasion to themselves, by walking either without, or contrary to a Rule; for give me leave to say the truth, that in the disquirie of these things which are agitated I pretend; truly I intend, and really endeavor to think nothing; far less to say, or act anything without a clear rule; and if any time I can give you no account of that, which I say or do, by a Rule which hath led my thoughts to bring forth those speeches and actions, I hope I shall be assisted with grace, patiently to bear the blame which I shall deserve for so doing; I give you therefore free leave to call me to an account; for I know I must answer one day at a greater tribunal then yours, and I count it a small matter to be judged by men; it doth not trouble me at all; yet I shall never despise the judgment of any that may reflect upon me; for I conceive, that God doth speak unto me by everyone who is conscionable, and take's notice of me, that I may be the more solicitous to approve my way unto him; As I therefore am very willing to bear the word of the exhortation in the duty, and motives which you lay before me; so I shall entreat you to do the like, in that which I shall briefly represent unto you. First, let me entreat those who desire the hand of authority not to be heavier upon them, then as yet it hath been (for as yet I know of nothing don to any) not to provoke Autoritie, but to dissuade those, that set themselves to incens the people against their rulers in their pulpits; one turbulent spirit in this way will procure more wrath to all, then ten intercessors can allaie; for such men make charitable intercessors ashamed to open their mouth towards the Magistrate, seeing they are manifestly seditious. Can a Magistrate be persuaded to suffer himself to be trampled upon? Moderate the fierce non-subscribers in the City and Country from being injurious, and I am confident God will caus them to find a reciprocation of love from Autoriti • . Secondly, let those who are not turbulent, and find themselves burdened, and pinched with straits, be entreated to condescend to the use of conscionable, and rational means of easing themselves, which by aimable Treaties and Conferences rightly ordered may be brought to pass; and what averseness hath been hitherto in some, against this way of finding ease (though they have been begged to it) I am loath to relate: but if it had been duly entertained, I am sure mistakes might have been rectified, which have heightened men's spirits, and brought us to extremities.

You may perceive, that my heart is enlarged towards you for your candor; the Lord grant us the conduct of his spirit, to make use of each other's good inclinations to allaie heats and jealousies; whereunto, although I have offered myself with all the candor and humility that I could imagine, to be required of God, or acceptable unto men; yet I have not been able to obtain any reciprocation from any of the Brethren here in London, who differ in judgment about the present Engagement; not so much as one meeting, to be able to speak together, though with much earnestness desired by me, and whether the iniquity (as I conceive) of this and some other unchristian usages from the brethren, hath not a little distempered me, when I wrote the last piece, whereat you are now offended, I cannot well tell; but when I call myself to an account of ym thoughts, it seem's some such leaven did lie then at the bottom, and was stirred to a paroxism of fermentation which brought up some froth: but God is able to turn all to the best, if we despise not one anothe'rs admonitions, but receive them as in his presence, and give them as in the name of Christ in his love: if therefore you will let me hear from you again, and let the other Brethren, whom I am sorry to have offended, for want of due consideration of all tempers, know, what I have said for their and your satisfaction, you will oblige me in the bowels of Christ, more and more to approve myself,

The second Letter.

I Return you many thanks, for your pains and patience, in seeking to give satisfaction to the doubts propounded, in the paper I directed to you, I acquainted some of my godly friends with it, who, though they be yet unsatisfied touching the main question; yet most of them are fully satisfied touching your own candor and integrity, and do now think, that which you did by your writings, was don upon conscientious grounds, or not to serv the times. I will not be so uncivil or unthankful, as to trouble you now with any tedious reply, (though much might be said) but only acquaint you with some scruples, as still do pinch some pious minds, who would be glad, if they could meet with any help for the right clearing of them.

First, they do not fully apprehend what you mean, by that known duty which you often urge; if it be, that we engage to live quietly & make no disturbance this hath been often offered, but will not satisfy. If it be to submit to the higher powers, because they are of God: you know a thing may be said to be of God two ways, namely, either in regard of his providence, or of his precept. Now the difficult is, whether providence alone may be the rule of own actions, or approbation of other men's: if it may, then we may approve of Absalom's incest, because God saith he did it, 2 Sam. 12. 12. And so all evil actions of evil men are guided by his providence: If precept be needful, they cannot see how the present higher powers are of God: because they were not called of God; but have chosen and set up themselves in these places; for however some of them were at first chosen for other purposes (as to contribute their help in making Laws, and seeing the Laws well executed) yet they were never chosen to be the supreme power of the Nation So that this new Government being neither grounded upon the old Law of the Nation, nor any new agreement of their representations (the greatest part of them being either by violence withheld, or deterred from coming) this make's it difficult to discern how the higher powers may be said to be of God.

Secondly, they think that Oaths to God do oblige not only for the present, but for the future, according to the sense wherein they were both imposed and taken: but it was neither the intention of the imposers, nor their's when they took them, that kinglie Government should be taken away, or that the present King and his posterity should be deprived of it, but the quite contrary; for they did swear that they would be drawn by no power on earth from their allegiance to them. Neither will the King's miscarriage be a sufficient ground to absolv them, from their Oath of Allegiance to him and his; because the Oath was absolute, not conditional. Besides, look how God command's obedience. So they did swear obedience; but all the commands of obedience to higher powers, both in Rom. 13. and in other places, are absolute, and not upon condition of their good carriage. In like manner, as he command's servants to be subject to their masters: not only to those who were good and gentle, but to those who were froward, and who did them wrong, 1 Pet. 2. 18. Neither would there be any place left for suffering, either by Subjects or servants, if obedience were only conditional.

Thirdly, They think that though they be not competent judges of State matters, yet they are competent judges of their own actions (for which they must give an account to God, and they know, whatever they shall do doubtfully, they do sinfully (for whatever is not of faith is sin) and the owning of the present power as of God is doubtful to them, (at least) upon the grounds before mentioned. Besides, by subscribing, they do not only own the present power, but also the imposing of the Engagement (if not directly, yet indirectly) which they cannot see how it agree's with the rule that require's higher powers, should be a terror to the evil, not to the good, as by this means they are.

Fourthly, for matter of offense, they think those whom the Apostle bid's us take heed not to offend, are the weak brethren, now he is a weak brother who think's a thing to be a thing unlawful (suppose it be lawful) because it seem's to be against some rule of the word (as this Engagement seem's to be against the rule, touching oaths and promises, that they should be kept though to our own hindrance. And thus the refusers only, not the imposers, or those who have already taken it, are to be accounted weak Brethren.

Fifthly, for the judgment of the Church of Scotland, or other Divines, they think, that in clear evident truths, any human judgment dissenting, is not much to be regarded, but that in difficult, doubtful things the spirits of the Prophets ought to be subject to the Prophets, else we shall overthrow all use of Synods, and follow the tract of Enthusiasts, and such as think themselves guided by an infallible spirit. Thus I have been bold to open the doubts of some good men unto you, hoping you will entertein them with some secrecy, and the like spirit of love and meekness as before, and at your convenient leisure you will not refuse to yield them a little further help. Our good God guid us so in all our thoughts and actions, that we may neither do, nor think anything that may be displeasing to him.

The Answer to the second Letter.

YEsterday's late coming home, I found yours of the 25 ^th of March; whereby I perceived that mine was come'n safe to your hands; and that you make a charitable construction of the things which I did write unto you; which is no small refreshment unto my spirit, in the midst of these heats wherein we are fallen, which God hath sent for our trial; and which will be a great advantage to the purifying of our souls, if we bebave our selves orderly therein. As for the scruples which you are pleased to acquaint me withal, that some help may be supplied for the clearing thereof; although they do not stumble me, but me think's I see light enough through them; yet I cannot say that they are not to be counted scruples; or that they are easily to be cleared; for although to me they are no great difficulties; yet I conceive to others they may be, who reflect not upon matters by such principles as I do; and with those considerations which I take up: nor is it in the power of any man, to make another capable of his Principles and Considerations; but God alone is able to do it; and all that we can be helpful to one another in, is to offer to one another so much light as we have received; and if we offer it in love, without partiality, and with a true meaning to advance Righteousness and Holiness, it may, by God's blessing, become useful unto Edification; chiefly, if we strive for one another towards God with our prayers, that we may become helpers of each other's joie, through the grace which he bestoweth upon us, to profit withal. I shall therefore, not undertake to resolv these scruples; for that would be presumption, God alone can do it; but I shall humbly offer to those pious minds, that are scrupled, my light; with all truth and sincerity, as it is in my heart; praying to God, that if it be from his spirit, it may so appear to them, as to clear their understandings from mistakes.

The first scruple you mention, is concerning my expression, what I mean by that known duty • , which I often urge. I wish you had pointed out a place or two, that I might have been able to speak more directly to your satisfaction, then now I can do; perhaps, I shall say therefore, that, till I be told, where that expression is used (for I cannot readily light upon it, having cursorily looked upon the considerations) I think that I have meant throughout, nothing else, but a seeking of the Peace and welfare of the society wherein we live; for I think it is a known duty in Christianity, that we should serv one another through love for our good; and not be taken off from this cours, so far as others are capable to receive good from us, notwithstanding the evil which may be in them, the duty which the Apostle mention's, Phil. 2. 14; 15, 16. is that, which I would have all men, but chiefly Ministers in these times to lay to heart: and you have the third, or fourth Edition of the Considerations, you will see at the end of it, the extract of a Letter; and my Answer thereunto, which containeth that duty, which I conceive to be clear, and known to all, who will look upon the Engagement in the obvious sense thereof.

By this you see, that I mean not only a passive, but an active dutifulness, in things good and lawful under the present powers, let them be what they will; as for that which you scruple, to submit to the powers, because they are of God, as if that reason were not sufficient, because, things may be said to be of God, either Prudentially, or Preceptively; now Providence alone (say you) is not the rule of our own actions, or approbation of other men's. I confess this to be so. But yet I find, that the Apostle's reason, why he command's all Christians to be subject to higher powers, to be none other but this; viz. Becaus there is no power but of God; and because the powers that be, are ordained of God; Rom. 13. 1. So that the exception which you make seem's to me, to be directly against the Apostle's reasoning, which I suppose you intended not to contradict: and if the Roman Christians under Nero would have disobeied lawful and Moral Commands, wherein the Apostle only bid's them submit, they might have made your exception against his being of God, as fully as this is made against the present powers over us. If then the scruple strike's rather at the force of the Apostle's Argument, then at anything else, I think, I am bound to vindicate his reasoning from the force of the doubt; which may be don thus; that God's appointment of a power over us, is a just caus to oblige us to submission thereunto, whether he doth it Providentially or Preceptively; or both ways: I say that in things lawful and good, Submission is due, because the power in place is of God; and he that resist's it, resist's God's ordinance, saith the Apostle. But you will say, if it be only providentially of God, so was Absalom's incest, and is no rule, either to warrant mine own, or for me to approve other's men's actions? to this I say; it is true, when you have a precept to walk by, you must not make God's acts of Providence over you a rule, to warrant any designs which contradict the precepts, which are given you to walk by; but when things are to be looked upon by you; not as your own, or other men's Actions; but as determined events, which God hath appointed to fall out, in a way of Justice and Judgment; then you ought not to set yourself against the same, but in things lawful ought to approve the same; so of Absalom's incest, we must say that God's providence ordered it for judgment over David, for a punishment of his Adultery; and in that respect it was good; but as it was the effect of Achitophel's wicked Policy to make matters desperate, and a satisfying of Absalom's lust, and a dishonor to his Father, and a shameless act, it was evil, and highly to be condemned; thus in the events of things befallen to us, which are the changes of powers over us; first the King, then the Parliament, then the Army; and now again the Parliament; these events in themselves are neither good nor evil to us, as God hath brought them about, and ordered their succession for judgment, they were all good; and every power in it's own time was to be submitted unto, by those that were under it, because it was of God for the time over them, and if in things lawful they resisted it: they did resist the ordinance of God, & might justly be brought under condemnation by it; but each of these powers, as they might be in the persons of unjust men, who by subtlety or violence (as Absalom and Achitophel did) thrust out others of the possession of their places to attain their ends; in this respect they were evil; and as men contrary in their walking to the will of God, they must not be approved of: that is to say, their ambition, fraud, violent practices, &c. are not to be approved of: Nevertheless, if God's Providence order it so, that they be set up as the higher power; I suppose they are to be looked upon as ordained by God, to that place, and obeyed in things good and lawful: their unlawful coming to their places, after that they have gotten full possession, doth not absolv any private soul from the obligation of being subject, and obedient in things good and lawful. Thus Providence, as to events become's a Rule to oblige us, to do things for our selves good and lawful; and to approve of the same in others.

You say, if precept be needful, they cannot see how the present powers are of God: because they were not called of God: but have chosen and set up themselves. To this I say, that certainly precept is needful for every man to walk by in all his actions, and what he doth without the warrant of a Rule, is don sinfully: but yet I must add this, that it doth not follow, that if the powers which are in place, are not so come to their place, that I can see that they are called by God to it, according to a precept, that therefore I must, or may think they are not of God; for although their Calling, or coming to their place is not to me clear, to be conformable to a precept; yet it may be so to themselves, and to others; and I am not to be a Judge in things of that nature; but I suppose that it is clearly contrary to all Rule and Precept, that which they have don to come to their places; and that not I only, but all men, and they themselves will confess it; and say as Caesar did; Si violandum est jus, regnandi caussâ violandum est; in caeteris pietatem colito. Suppose (I say) this to be so; shall I therefore say, that they are not the present power, when I see them actually in full possession of the place of all power over me? or shall I say that they are not of God; when I hear the Apostle saying clearly, without any limitation in the negative, first, there is no power; but of God; and then in the affirmative; the powers that be, are ordained of God: all powers then are of God one way or other; and being of him, I must not resist, but submit in things lawful. Look upon M ^r Perkins in his Treatise of Callings, where he speak's of Christ, and the Apostles submitting themselves to the powers, that then were in and over Judea; and Calvini. Justit. lib. 4. c. 20. parag. 28. speaking of Nebuchadnezzar, whom he set's up as a precedent of an usurped power to be obeyed; he hath these words, observandum est quâ ration ipsum Dominus stabiliat. Detuli, inquit, Nebuchadnezari Regnum; quare servite illi & vivite; cuicunque ergo delatum fuisse regnum constabit, ei serviendum esse ne dubitemus, atque simulae in Regium fastigium quempiam evehit Dominus; testatam nobis facit suam voluntatem, quod regnare illum velit, &c.

Touching the calling of these men to their places; and what the nature of their place is; how far they are autorized ordinarily, or extraordinarily to make Laws, or see them executed; and whether by their choice they be made the supreme power or no, is not a thing of every private man's cognizance, so as to be bound to determinate it; and according to his private opinion, to be obliged to act, or not to act for Conscience sake with them, or against them: I say, to me such considerations are heterogeneal to my calling, and whatever I think of them, and of their calling to their places, that is not material, as to the point of duty, which I owe them, as being in full possession of the government. As for themselves, they think their calling doth bear them out in everything which they have don; and I find not that my calling doth bear me out to argue, as some do, the matter against them: but if it may be a satisfaction to you, or to others, I shall be willing to let you know more at large, what they say for themselves in these particulars, which truly I know not how any body can well answer; but whether their allegations can be answered or not, it is not further heeded by me, then may serv to give others some in sight into that, which they seem rationally to allege for themselves.

Thus I have told you my sense of your first scruple; the second is concerning Oaths. The promissory Oaths which men make one to another, are obliging, or not obliging, according to the possibility and lawfulness of the intentions of those, that impose and take them; and I conceive, the taker of an Oath is no further obliged to the intention of the imposer, then either is clearly expressed by him in the words of the oath; or in some previous, or subsequent Declaration, assented unto by the taker; or then the taker doth declare himself to be obliged thereunto: therefore to prevent mistakes, I did for mine own part, both in the national Covenant, and in this Engagement declare my sense and intention in taking them; which being allowed, I find myself obliged thereto, now if it fall out, that the imposer's intention doth alter (as upon good and valid grounds men's intentions may be altered) from what it was at first (for if the thing intended, which was once lawful and possible, by change of circumstances become's unlawful, and impossible; and this be made known by the imposer of the oath to him that take's it,) then the Question must be, whether in such case the taker is not absolved from his obligation? there be many things in the National Covenant of different natures; some are by circumstances changeable, some altogether unchangeable, the Relation which the two Nations have each to other; if either of the Nations break it (as it is in the power of all Rulers, to break, or keep entire friendly relations with their neighbor Nations) how far the other is bound to keep it, I think it not difficult to be determined, friends are relatives; and I can be no longer in a relation of friendship to any, then he will own friendship with me; if he break his Covenant therefore, and make himself an enemy to me, I am not bound any longer by the tie of that Covenant to be his friend: yet other ties of an higher nature may be upon me, to keep me from being his enemy: for there is a midst between friendship, and hostility; and if the Rulers of the State, wherein I live, bring me under a National relation with a neighbor Nation, to be in friendship with it at one time; and at another time bring me to contrary relation towards it; I conceive that I am concluded by what they do either way; and that in such a case the breach of Covenant doth lie at their door, and not at mine, if I in my place have been careful not to give occasion thereunto, and thus I conceive all other actions of a public nature, that I am concluded therein; to stand under the Relations, which those that manage the same bring upon one thereby, as to outward matters: though not as to a professed concurrence of my intentions with them, further then they expressly call me thereunto, and I expressly declare my concurrence in that way, and when I have declared my intentions, then so far as I declare them, and as they remain possible and lawful by me, to be prosecuted in my way; I am bound to intend them; and I conceive, that they are not to be counted longer possible, nor lawful for me to be prosecuted in my way; then they are consistent with the main and fundamental Duties of my calling and place, as I am a Christian, and as I am a Subject and a profitable member to the Common-wealth wherein I live; for all particular obligations, whether confirmed by oaths, or otherwise, are perpetually subordinate in their nature, and presupposed by a tacit condition to be consistent with these, or otherwise to be ipso facto void. By these general Rules, and maxims concerning promissory oaths between man and man, in matters of public concernment; wherein, I by my place am to be concluded by others that are over me; I think myself free from perjury, if a change fall out therein, so as to make me incapable to prosecute the intentions once sincerely taken up; for the intention of the taker of an oath being constant, and sincere to that which he hath promised, according to the circumstances of matters which then were in being, when the promise was made, doth absolv him before God, and his own conscience, from perjury; for he will profess himself always bound to prosecute the same intention, and will endeavor it to the utmost of his ability, so long as those circumstances last, which make the intention lawful and possible; but if the circumstances which made his intention lawful at first, be afterward altered so, that the intention doth become unlawful, if prosecuted under those circumstances; then it is no breach of promise in him, if he doth not prosecute his first intention; for it is not lawful so to intend the prosecution of any outward human business; as to oblige our selves, in what cases and circumstances soëver to follow; Conscience can be obliged to follow nothing so absolutely, but the will of God; and although no condition be expressed in promissory oaths when they are taken, yet in the very nature of them, the conditions which I have mentioned are implied, and need never to be mentioned: if you will now apply these positions to your second scruple, and reflect upon the intentions, which then were taken up towards the King's Person and Autoritie, as circumstances then were; and the obligation in private persons, such as we are, to prosecute them as circumstances now are, you will perhaps find light to ease you of your scruple in this matter. For I shall for mine own part declare this; that, if things were now as formerly they were, when the Covenant was offered, I would find myself obliged to prosecute the effect thereof, in reference to the King now, as then I was bound to do; but things being so altered, that there is no King in being; but another Government over me, I am absolved from the former relation, by those that manage public affairs, and obliged to intend the duties of a true Christian, and good Subject, under the present relations wherein God hath set me. As for those that have taken away that object of my former Allegiance, which went under the name of a King, and brought upon me the necessity of this change of intention, by their acting in public affairs; I am none of their judges, but must leave them to him, to whom they are accountable of their Administrations; if they in making the change did according to that, which they thought in conscience to be their duty, they will fare the better for it in the end: but if they had another aim, then to discharge their conscience in their duty, it will be worse with them; and this is all that I am bound to say for them, as to this in general.

Now the particulars of your Scruple on this Subject run's out upon the facts of other men (which are not your Guilt) to show the guilt which they seem to have incurred by altering the government from Monarchy to Democracy: for you say that they swore never to be drawn by any power on earth from their Allegiance to the King and his Posterity; and that their intention was not to deprive, but to preserve the King and his Posterity in their government. I confess it was so; and yet you see that the relation once intended to be maintained towards him and his Posterity is altered; and if you ask them the Caus, they will tell you, that they have altered their intention justly and necessarily upon warrantable grounds; as that the nature of their promise of Allegiance to him and his posterity was not absolute, but Conditionate; that in the third Article of the National Covenant, the Conditions implicitly understood in the Oath of Allegiance are explicitly mentioned: that his (viz. the King's) Cross walking to these Conditions (although they intended to maintain their Allegiance) hath forced them from it, against their will, that it is no power, nor fear that hath made them to alter their purpose; but a necessary duty for public safety to discharge their trust; this they will say; and they will deny that which you say, that the Oath was meant absolutely and without all respect to Conditions; as if Allegiance should have been due unto him without any respect to his Legal standing and Capacitie; and if Allegiance was only due to him in this respect; then it was first due to the Law itself; and to the Law-making power before it was due to him; and to him only as subordinate thereunto: If therefore his Miscarriage be such as to intend the overthrow of that; by which he only could stand; then he overthrow's himself, and nobody can help him to stand without a foundation or is obliged to it. This they will plead to justify their proceeding to an alteration. And then to that which you say further; viz. that Obedience is commanded in an absolute sense, and not upon Condition of their good carriage: that it is commanded as that which Servants ow to froward Masters; Rom. 13. & 1 Pet. 2. 18. (I say) to this they will confess, that such a subjection is indeed Commanded to every private person, and due to the powers that are in plenary possession of the government; from their Subjects; but they will deny that the Parliament or those that are employed by their authority are to be looked upon as private persons, or as Subjects in their actings: they will tell you: that all the power of the King is virtually in the Parliament; and eminently above him in a higher sphere of trustees and representatives of the Nation; Whose sitting to act in a capacity above him doth not only subordinate him in his way of acting for the time of their Sitting: but doth in some sort suspend his whole influence upon the Subject as to government: which King James well understood, and therefore called the Parliament a Society of 400 Kings, and himself for the time as nobody: for he is but as a Servant to see the laws which are made executed; but that the trustees and representatives of the Nation have the law-making power in them by the law of nature and the positive Law of the Land. And lastly when you say that there will be no place left for suffering; if obedience be only conditional, they will tell you that Parliaments are not called by God and nature, nor in the intention of the Nation to suffer, but to rectify the Causes of unjust sufferings; and to reduce the exorbitance of Kings into a right order. Now when they, who are in places of power, say say all this, who is it amongst the private Subjects that can justly contest with them? or control them? except he have an immediate Commission to them from the most High; and if none without such a Commission is obliged to judge them, their failings are no matter of scruple to any private man's Conscience, they may be a matter of grief and prayer for them, for why must I be scrupled at doing that which is my duty at present, because I suspect another hath not don his duty, of whom yet I am not set to be a Judge.

The third scruple is this; that all Subjects are to be allowed a Competencie of judgment concerning their own actions, though not of State-matters: because unto God they are accountable for whatsoëver they shall do: and if they do anything doubtfully, they sin. Now the owning of the present power as of God, is doubtful to them; if therefore having the forementioned grounds of scruple they do own it, they will sin; it is therefore necessary for them either to have the grounds of their scruple cleared or not to own them, if the doubt cannot be cleared.

To all this I shall say; that it is a truth that men must be allowed to be Judges of their own actions, and that if they do anything without Faith, it is sin in them, if therefore they are in doubt of that which is offered to be don, I think they are bound to suspend the doing thereof, till they be clear, that they can do it without sin. But then also I conceive they are bound to use means to have their Scruple cleared one way or other; and that in the use of those means they ought not to entangle their Conscience into a judicature of matters which are beyond the sphere of their own actings; but should only strictly inquire what their own duty is in their special Callings; and if the Brethren would have don this; or could have been persuaded to have entered upon any rational cours tending to accomplish this. I am confident much of the danger, if not all, whereinto they have cast themselves and the public, might have been prevented, and they cleared in the scruples which they entertain and put into the heads of other men. I speak this concerning some, whose actings I know have had a great influence upon others; whose scruples have run out upon the interpretation of State-matters, whereof they were not at all made Judges, either in public to censure those that do manage the same; or otherwise to possess their fellow-Subjects by finister informations with jealousies against them; if these had not made themselves 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in this matter, but would have contained their thoughts within their own limits, and the bounds of the Rule; they would have prevented the snare's, whereinto by such considerations they have brought their own Consciences, and the Consciences of others that respect them; for mine own part, I did endeavor (foreseeing that the custom already taken up to meddle in these matters, would upon this occasion be more then ever followed) to prevent the further practice; or to take off by conscionable rules some that were too much inclined that way, by a Treatise upon that Subject, first in brief, and then more at large; but this was looked upon as a time-serving practice: and a cloak to sinful compliances for private ends: and afterward, when the House of Parliament begun to consider of an engagement, as a ground to settle matters and the minds of men, to entertein a mutual relation of friendship one with another, in a Common-wealth-way; before the Engagement was published while's men were full of fears, and apprehensions about it, what it might tend unto; I did negotiate with some of our chief leading men, for a private conference, to bring on, with their concurrence, a Treatie, between godly and dissenting Brethren, lest upon new emergencies (as is fallen out) we might be irrecoverably distracted, and divided within our own thoughts, and towards one another; or rather from each other by jealousies to incline them hereunto, I did represent, that nothing would be our preservation, but our right understanding of one another in that wherein we do agree, to hold forth our union therein to all the world; and our determination of some regular cours to prevent offenses, and breaches for the things wherein there might be some disagreement, and diversity of opinions, which upon new emergencies might arise, or be cast in perhaps to divide us; here then I proposed this Method, seeing it was apparent enough, that Satan's aim in all these confusions, was, to overthrow the profession of Christianity, and put down the Ministry thereof by gaining, and taking an opportunity in this change of Government, and time of licentiousness, to vent all manner of damnable Heresies against the fundamental Truths, which are after godliness in Christ Jesus; First by dividing the minds of the witnesses of this Truth about outward concernments, one from another, so that they should not be able, or willing to concur, or agree, about that which is their great and main concernment, viz. The testimony of Jesus. Secondly, by making them, through the neglect of their main concernment, (viz. the testimony of the life and death, and Resurrection of Jesus, and of the Covenant of Peace, between God and us in him) to become contemptible to the world; and through their meddling with heterogeneal concernments of the world, to become an eye-sore, and an object of jealousy to the secular Powers. Thirdly, by engaging them into parties about State-affairs, to make them the ring-leaders of designs, or at least, to be counted such (which is almost all one, as to his end) that the guilt of public evils, and miscarriages, may be imputed unto them more then to others. Seeing (I say) these were Satan's aims; I proposed this Method for us, to proceed in some conference, tending to prevent the evils, and to settle us in an agreement about future proceedings.

First, that we should consider and resolv, how to proceed unanimously, as one man, by undoubted scriptural Rules, in opposing fundamental Heresies, and upholding the fundamental truths of Christianity, and the practice of godliness.

Secondly, that we should consider and resolv, how to own unanimously, and upon what undeniable grounds, to profess our being in the Ministry; what to own therein, as jure Divino; and what to acknowledge to be but prudential.

Thirdly, that we should consider and resolv, how to maintain the Engagement which we lie under, by reason of the National Oath, and Covenant; what therein, as to us, in these times is altered; and what forever is unalterably to be prosecuted.

Fourthly, and lastly, that we should consider, and predetermine, in case a new Engagement be offered (for when I made these proposals to some, the Engagement was not yet voted) by what Rules we ought to walk; to be able to find out the inoffensive way of doing our duty towards all, as well Superiors as equals.

These proposals were made to more then one or two, as preparatives to bring on an agreement, between the dissenting godly parties about Church-Government, and Discipline: that the door which their division hath opened, to let in all manner of disorderlines, in the profession of Religion, might be stopit at last, and Satan lose the advantages which he hath gotten thereby against us: but they were not hearkened unto: either, because I was looked upon as a stranger; or as a subtle man that served Stateends, for some advantage to myself, and made this proposal a cloak only to some further design; or because men's spirits were straightened, and prepossessed with particular apprehensions, and could not be raised to an impartial contemplation of that which was truly public, and then seasonable to be don. But if these matters had then been thought upon, or could yet be determined, so, as to clear our judgments to one another; and to all the world, in that which concern's our duty in our sphere of acting; without reflecting upon others, in that whereof we are not made their judges; there would not be so much animositie, and so many mistakes, and destructive jealousies, as now are amongst us; nor could we be so much in the dark, and under so many scruples, and snares of conscience as now we do lie, for want of following this method of proceeding in determining the matters, whereof we are made competent judges; for if we had judged these matters by the Rules and Principles, wherein we are fully agreed; or did yet exercise our selves by the right use of these Rules and Principles, to judge our own actions in these matters, rather then other men's failings from their duties, wherein to us they are not accountable, we would find light to walk in these occasions without doubting; and see caus, to cast off the scruples which are raised upon the grounds before mentioned; as being matters whereof we are not competent judges, and without the consideration of which, our actings relating to the public, may, and ought to be regulated: and can be regulated by the rational and conscionable disquirie of the forenamed proposals; which I have offered now unto you, as formerly to others, that you may see, that I am so far from restraining my brethren to be competent judges of their own actings; that it hath been one of my designs, to bring them to a regular way of judging thereof; that they might not walk doubtfully therein, as now they do.

Those things being thus at large premised to what I am about to say, for the resolving of your third scruple; I shall entreat you to consider, whether the former scruple, concerning the alteration of the government against the oath of Allegiance, taken by those that did alter it; is not raised in us, by a judicature of State-matters, whereof you confess us not to be competent judges: and if no competent judges, then (I say) no judges at all; to define matters with reference to our conscience, to say, whether they have don well or ill; but I must say they stand or fall, to their own master in this business of the alteration of Government; I may, as a rational man, and a Subject concerned in point of Common-welfare, look upon their actions in altering the government, with the eye and judgment of discretion, to discern what they say, and what they do for the alteration: but when I am gone to the utmost extent of my discerning faculty, yet I must make none other definition, but such as keep's my conscience free from being obliged, to give a sentence which will scruple me in the points of duty towards them. If they say that the judicature of all the King's actions doth belong unto them, as they are the Representatives and Trustees of a free Nation, which he was to govern by Laws, which they shall choose, and not by will; and that he for raising war against them, and refusing to give an account of his actions, (to those whom they appointed as judges in their name, to call him to an account of treasonable enterprises) hath been deprived of the government wherewith he was entrusted, and of his life, and that, as in Cases of Treason, by the Law of nature, and of Nations, the prerogative which he lost for himself, was also forfeited for his posterity; and that their proceedings against him, and those that would support him in his pretended interest of absoluteness, above Parliaments, or of independencie from them; are such as they will answer to God for; and as they will undertake to show their grounds of, before all the world, and if according to these sayings, they do make Laws, to settle us in another relation one to another, and under themselves (that is under the constant government of Representatives) without a King, and House of Lord's; If (I say) I can clearly discern, that they say, and do all this, without turbulency of spirit, in a way of counsel, rationally and orderly behaving themselves; looking as well to God, as to men, and professing according to their light, a willingness to keep a good conscience towards both, at all times, if (again I say) when I use the judgment of discretion, I find things thus constituted with them, what shall I say other, but that this thing is of God; that his will must be don in earth as in heaven; that power belongeth unto him, and that he exalteth over the Kingdoms of men, whomsoëver he pleaseth: If I find them by these Principles, and actings in their places of trust over me, to intend orderlie courses; and mind the things belonging to commonsafetie; I cannot see what warrant I have to disown them to be of God. Sure I am, except God had disowned the King's exercise of power, and blasted his Counsels, and given him up to these men, to be judged by them, as he was, they could have don nothing unto him; if then God hath disowned him, and owned these in the sight of all the world, and doth intrust them with the management of all public affairs; who am I, to take upon me to disown them in the places wherewith they are actually possessed, except I had a commission from him, to let them see, that either their Principles of acting are not allowed by him, or that their actings are not according to their Principles? but if I am not enabled to do either of these two; but rather am convicted that the Principles, which they have taken up, are of God in them; and that their actings by these Principles, with Counsel and courage, by a professed confidence in him, have been carried on in an orderlie cours to this issue by his Providence; then I must own them thus far to be of God; and look upon them as instruments in his hand; to bring about this alteration of affairs, to fulfil his judgments one way; his mercies another way, and both ways his determined Counsel, which hath concluded me under their power, and doth subordinate me in my calling under their actings, to do my duty without grudging, or murmuring, without disputing and scrupulousity, being harmless and blameless in my way, as it becometh a child of God, holding forth the word of life and light, as the rule of my walking.

Thus then I conclude upon these grounds; that if I do own them in their places by any dutisul actings in my calling, I do not sin; but rather fulfil that which I am bound to think (according to the judgment of discretion concerning them; and the definitive judgment of duty in Christianity concerning myself) is the will of God, and the work of my present calling; for if I by doing my duty, and having none other aim, but to act within my sphere; do eventually set them up, and own them in their places; I must attribute that unto God's ordering of matters; and leave the effect thereof unto him; but if I should think, that because I suppose such an event will follow, that therefore I must not intend my present duty; I say if I should think thus; then I walk not in simplicity, but according to the wisdom of this world; and I predetermine in my thoughts, the events which are only in God's hands; and I follow not a clear and universal rule in my actings; but the rule of a design, which I have framed to myself, upon a conjectural apprehension of some event, which I would not have come to pass; for in effect, it is as much as if I had said thus; I do not see that these men are of God; and because I see it not;

which in my apprehension would be to drive a design against the present powers, by a sinful neglect of doing my duty to the public: which how it can be warrantable in Christianity, I know not.

The last part of the third scruple, is an aggravation of the doubt; When you say: besides by subscribing, they do not only own the power, but also the imposing of the engagement; (if not directly, yet indirectly) which they cannot see how it agree's with the Rule, that require's higher powers should be a terror to evil, not to the good, as by this means they are.

If in the first part of the scruple, when you said, that though private men be no competent judges of State-matters, yet they are competent judges of their own actions; you meant by their own actions, their owning or disowning the present power, viz. that they were to judge competently, whether the present power was to be owned or disowned by themselves, yea, or no; I shall in some sense grant this; as thus. First, that they were definitively to determine with themselves, what every private man is bound to do, as a Christian towards the present powers, to own them or disown them, according to the Rule of obedience, prescribed by God in the word. Secondly, that they were also definitively to determine with themselves, what the present powers are, that are actually over them, who are obedientially to be owned or disowned. In these two cases it is clear, that every man must be allowed to judge, who is actually over him in power, and by what Rule of obedience he ought to walk under him, as owning him in his place; but if the sense be this, that every man is competently to judge his own actions, in respect of the confequence which they may have, towards the owning, or the disowning of the present powers; and accordingly as he shall see caus, to own them or disown them, that he may act or not act, as he shall think his action conducing to one or the other end; so that the aim of owning or of disowning shall become the measure of the rectitude of his actions: if (I say) this be the meaning of those words, then I must deny any man to be a competent judge of his own actions: for no man is to judge of the rectitude, or unrighteousness of his actions by the eventualitie thereof, which he may propose unto himself will follow: for in this sense I take the Prophet's words: O Lord! I know that the way of man is not in himself; if is not in man that walketh to direct his steps. This is true, as to the event; no man can direct anything which he doth to any event; and therefore he is to measure nothing by the eventualitie thereof, in his own apprehension, but he is bound to measure it by a Rule and Precept, and in this sense the contrary is true, viz. It is in man that walketh to direct his steps, else this promise would be in vain: He that ordereth his conversation aright, shall see the salvation of God, Psal. 50. 23. and the Commandment; See that ye walk circumspectly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not as fools, but as wise, Ephes. 5. 15. it is therefore in a man as his duty, to direct his steps by a rule, but it is not in himself at all to direct his steps to any event whatsoëver; for it is said, that man's goings are of the Lord; how can a man then understand his own ways, Prov. 20. 24. God's providence doth order all men's goings to his secret ends, and by his own counsel to determined effects; therefore it is not possible for a man to understand the eventual tendency of his own way; and if it is not possible for him to understand this, then it is not lawful for him to measure, or judge the nature of his action by this; now if I do not mistake the matter and meaning of this scruple, it seem's first to assert that for them, to own the present powers to be of God, is a sin; upon this account; because it is doubtful to them upon the grounds before mentioned: (which were pure State-considerations) and what is not of faith is sin; ergo they may do nothing, which in their judgment tend's to own them as of God; for although they are no competent judges of State-matters, yet they are competent judges of their own actions; and if they judge their own actions to be an owning of them, as of God: then to them, to do these actions is a sin; and consequently, they must abstain from them, although in themselves the actions be never so good; only because they judge them to have a tendency eventually to speak, and own such a thing, whereof they doubt, and which they would not have them to speak; therefore they think themselves bound in conscience to abstain from them, which I think is a great mistake, as already hath been shown; and upon this mistake, the second part of the scruple assert's, that in the act of subscribing, there is more sin then in other obediential Acts: upon this account, because it doth tend, not only to own the present power; but also the imposing of the Engagement, at least indirectly. Now say you, they may do nothing, either directly, or indirectly, which may own the imposing of the Engagement; and why? because, say you, they cannot see how the Engagement agree's with the rule that require's higher powers should be a terror to the evil, not to the good; as by this means they are. If you had said, because they cannot see anything required in the Engagement, to be agreeable to the rule of a Christian's walking, or the duty of Subjects to the higher powers, the reason would have been to my judgment satisfactory; and we must have examined the nature of the things required in the Engagement; to know whether they were inconsistent with the rules of Christianity, and the Duty of Subjects; and upon the discovery of what is meant by being true and faithful to the Common-wealth, as it is now established, without a King and House of Lord's we might have come to some conclusion; for if there had been found in these words a sense consistent with those rules, and this Duty; then the scruple could have been resolved: and the Conscience settled; but now this cannot be don; because the Scruple is not fixed upon the material part of the Engagement; which is our private concernment, to see what we thereby are obliged to do; and so accordingly to resolv to be engaged or not to be engaged thereunto: but it is fixed upon a Construction which is made of the intention of the higher powers in proposing the engagement, and upon the disagreement of that which they do, by the proposal of the engagement, with that which the rule of their calling doth require of them. Now to me a scruple so fixed is wholly to be rejected: because I find it not lawful for me to make myself a Judge either of their intentions; or of their particular actings, how agreeable they are with the rules of their calling, I may tell them as well as other men what their intentions ought to be, and how they should take heed to the rule of their Calling; this I may, and ought to do in these; but in Hypothesi to judge positively what their intentions are (except I were one of their Counsel) and what their actings are in order to a rule (except I were made acquainted with all the Circumstances of their state) is a thing which I dare not undertake; far less then may I upon the supposal of such a judgment concerning their intentions or actings, be obliged to suspend mine own resolution from doing the duties of my calling, or scruple my Conscience about acting things lawful in my place. I dare not say then, that by the means of the engagement, they either intend to be, or are a terror to the good, and not to the evil, contrary to the rule given by God to higher powers. But I look upon the imposing of it with the judgment of discretion, to be a thing, which they think absolutely necessary for common safety; and therefore press with a severe penalty: which I must leave them to answer for, if there be no such necessity; but in the definitive judgment of Christianity, as the engagement relat's to me, I find a Duty in it; whereunto I am required to oblige myself; which in Conscience I cannot refuse to do; and so Subscribe it with a full purpose to perform the Duty which the law of Christianity and of a good Subject doth require. What Consequences may follow upon, and what interpretations others may make of this my action, I am not solicitous of, I look to nothing further then to the warrantableness of that which I do at present. For as in reason, Ex vero nîl nisi verum: So in morality and Christianity Ex bono nîl nisi bonum sequitur per se.

As for matters of offense (the subject of your fourth Scruple) which may follow per accidens upon lawful actions, in some Cases they are unavoidable; for if I think I am in Conscience bound to do something as a Duty, and another be so weak as to be offended at me for doing it, how can this offense be avoided? must I neglect a duty, and wound mine own conscience, because another is offended at that which I do? If he be so unreasonable as not to let me have the liberty to keep a good Conscience; in following the dictates thereof for myself; must I be so foolish as to give up the use of my liberty to his weakness? In matters of indifferency where I may choose to do, or not to do; and where nothing else come's in competition, but the mere pleasing of myself; with the danger of displeasing another; there I am bound not to pleas myself, but another to his edification: nay although it may be to my great bodily disadvantage, I must bear it, rather then my brother should have any spiritual disadvantage by me; for there is no proportion between a bodily and spiritual inconveniency; but in Case the inconveniency which I do incur, is not at all bodily, but spiritual; no law of Charity can oblige me to undergo it; for no man can be pleasured or edified by my spiritual disadvantage, this is to show why none ought to be offended at me for doing that which I think is my Duty. And why if any be offended, I nevertheless must own that which I have don and let them know, that the offense is not given, but unjustly taken. But your 4 ^th Scruple run's upon another strain of offenses, and tend's to another scope, which is to plead for the Non-subscribes under the Notion of weak Brethren, whom we are bid not to offend. Their weakness is to think that unlawful (which perhaps is lawful) because it may seem contrary to a rule of the word. As in this Case of the engagement; the rule of Oaths and promises seem's to be violated; which a man is bound to keep though to his hurt.

For mine own part, I do heartily wish and pray to God that the spirit of Christian compassion may be amongst us; and that the Non-subscribers may not only be looked upon by the imposers and subscribers, as weak brethren and those that ought to be dealt tenderly withal; but that also they may behave themselves so that all may have Caus, and chiefly the imposers of the engagement, to think that it is rather through weakness and tenderness of Conscience indeed, then through some other inclination that they refuse to subscribe. For I must tell you ingenuously that it is as hard a task as ever I have meddled withal, to make some of the imposers of the engagement believe, that it is more out of tenderness of Conscience, then out of a design that most men contradict the Subscription of the engagement: I truly believe it, to be that scruple which you allege in most of the Ministers, if not in all that are Godly; but the violence and cross actings of some doth bring an invincible prejudice against all.

As for these that are in places of power to provide for common safety, they say to this: that it is a matter of absolute necessity to press the settlement of some fundamental relation in the Common-wealth between the members thereof; and therefore they cannot in Conscience neglect their trust, but must indispensably endeavor the preservation of the public by this means; and if their Conscience be as strongly engaged one way, as the other's are another way; no Cours is in view, but a friendly treaty to prevent the inconveniency of mutual offenses, and further breaches; that mistakes may be removed and differences reconciled: which I shall not cease to pray for to God and Solicite towards men.

The last Scruple, or rather asspersion of yours in answer to what I had said in my last, I shall not contradict; for I willingly confess, that in doubtful matters and difficult cases the spirits of Prophets should be subject unto the Prophets: only admit of the limitation which I did add in my former expression; that no Church, far less a foreign Church, ought to be made a Judge of Civil Sanctions in a state. But that the spirits of Prophets ought to be Subject to the Prophets, is one of the great fundamentals which I mainly press as a means to rectify our endless disputes: nor is any man more avers from enthusiastical fancies then I am; yet I am not led by any implicit faith or resignation of my judgment to other men sopinions: but I seek light from them; and when I find that upon Conference I can neither bring them to my sense, nor they me by Conviction of my Judgment to their's, I think it my Duty to be silent, and to suspect mine own opinion as that which may be wrong, although I cannot see it to be so.

You may perceive by the largeness of my discourse upon the heads of these Scruples that my spirit is not straitened in Love towards the Brethren that desire some help; which as I said at first, God only can give, who is the Father of lights and of all good gifts; and if we lay one another's Cases to heart with tenderness and meekness, and cal upon him one for another, we may hope that he will bless our gifts for mutual advantage. The secrecy and cautiousnes which is requisite in this business you may assure yourself of, with all Confidence; as also of all other duties and offices of love, which in the fear of God may be expected from

The third Letter.

I Must still return you many thanks, and acknowledge myself much obliged to you, that you are ready to bestow such unwearied pains, in performing an office of love to your weak brethren: you needed not to have spoken anything touching the long stay of your Letter; for I had reason to wonder rather it came so soon, considering you had taken such pains in it; mine had been returnned sooner to you, but that I desired some friends might first have a sight of yours, that I might know their thoughts about it: for myself I may truly say, that I have caus to bless God for your labors, and from that light which I have received from them; some of my good friends are now satisfied in the business; others, who are truly godly still stick fast in their former doubts, and cannot see their way clear before them. I find it to be true which you mentioned, namely, that it is not in the power of man, but a privilege belonging to God alone, to be able to satisfy the scruples of a tender conscience: It is he that sit's (as it were) at the stern of every man's understanding, and can steer it which way he pleaseth; so as that argument which seem's to be very weighty to one man, to another seem's to have little strength in it: that distinction which seem's to one very fit for clearing of knottie scruples, doth seem to another to have little solidity in it: so that if we will not violate the rule of love, we must have the patience to permit others to be of a differing judgment from us in doubtful things, and yet like them never the worse, when their liking stand's as strongly to the best things as our own. Give me leave therefore to commend it to you, as a principal office of Christian charity, to do what lie's in you to take off the thoughts of such as are in place (whom you have any interest in) from that uncharitable apprehension, that such who refuse the engagement, do it not out of weakness, but willfulness: for such a pervers principle as this put on the Prelates in times past, to the violent persecuting of pious Non-conformists because (they having said much in defense of superstitious ceremonies) they took it as granted, that such as still stumbled at them must needs do it out of obstinacy, and peevishness, and not out of true tenderness; and when any shall have thoroughly digested this dangerous principle, they may easily be carried forward to the exercise of much violence, against the dear servants of God, whom they ought to cherish as their own children. Give me leave briefly to tell you what it is, that some godly men stick at.

First, It being taken as granted, that King and Lord's, and all the Privileges of Parliament must be subordinate to the public safety, yet who must be judges? what make's most for the public safety, but the major part of our representatives, who were chosen for that purpose, who when the House was full and free, (as before I told you) declared it to be most for the public safety, to agree with the King upon the best terms they could, and that there should be still a continuance both of him, and the House of Lord's.

Secondly, It is objected, that none are thought now competent judges of those actions, which have been don by such who are in power, but themselves, who are the authors of them, which crosseth the usual rule, ( vid. that no man is a competent judge of his own actions) and also their former practice; for heretofore, both King and Parliament, in many of their Declarations, did appeal to the judgment of the people, to determine whether of their proceedings did most agree to the preservation of Religion, and the liberty of the Subject, and accordingly to side with them, or against them; and now the whole Kingdom, Nobility, Gentry, Divines, Lawyers, and men of all ranks and orders, must be bound up to yield a blind obedience to a few men, that have gotten the Government into their hands, without their consent, and do exercise it in a far more arbitrary way, then ever the King himself did.

Thirdly, It make's them much doubt, whether those in power will be real for Religion or not, because they suffer such abominable blasphemies to break forth in divers parts of the Kingdom, and no condign punishment is exercised against the authors of them; there being a generation of men risen up in many places, who openly profess themselves to be deified; and therefore that the most hideous cursing and swearing, beastly drunkenness, or foul uncleanness are things not evil in them, because they are the actions of God: of whom they might be as easily informed, and take notice (if they pleased) as they are of such who refuse the Engagement.

Fourthly, They still stick at Romans 13. as not to be understood of usurped powers, on these grounds; First, if higher powers be of God only, by a common providence, though without a rule, this will make ill for the authority and credit of Magistracy; for then Magistrates should be no more of God, then plagues, famins, and other common calamities, all which come in a providential way.

Secondly, the powers here spoken of, are such as must not be resisted, but usurpers may be resisted as Athaliah was; these must be maintained by paying of tribute; usurpers not so.

Thirdly, these are said to be ordained of God; but lawful power only is God's Ordinance, not usurped power. Lawful Magistrates are, not only ordained by a secret providence, (as ungodlie men are ordained to condemnation) but by his written word and sanction. The sons of Aaron had another manner of Ordination, then Korah and his company, though they took upon them to exercise the Priestlie office.

Fourthly, The Magistrate here spoken of, is the Minister of God, Ergo called of God to that service, as Ministers are to their work; he is the Minister of God for the welfare of the people, usurpers not so; he is to take vengeance on evil doers, and execute wrath for God, Ergo, not by providence only (as thievs, robbers, and foreign invaders) but by place and calling.

Fifthly, by this reason, if Malignants, Levellers, Papists, or any others should get to be the strongest party, we must yield obedience to them, as to the powers that are of God.

Sir, I dare not desire you to clear these scruples, lest I should put you to more pains: but if your leisure will permit to do it, I shall be thankful, and leave you to take what leisure you pleas. I am sorry to hear that any good men should refuse so fair, and rational a way of accommodation, as you tendered to them; yet I dare not censure them, because I am ignorant of their grounds: but (I suppose) if you had made the like motion to M ^r N. N. M ^r N. N. or some other of their temper, it would have been lovingly entertained. Sir, I hope you shall not repent of your pains, if still you exercise more patience in seeking, how such a business may be brought about: and I know you have often made use of that promise, wherein blessedness is pronounced to Peace-makers. Thus desiring our good God still to enlarge you with affections, and abilities fit for making up these great breaches, that are still amongst us; I resign you to his mercy.

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and full, that it was most for public safety to agree with the King upon the best terms they could, and that there should be still a continuance both of him and of the House of Lord's.

Suppose this to be so, what then? then (say they) it follow's that the present constitution of affairs (being contrary to that which the major part of the house then declared) is not for public safety; and if this constitution doth not tend to public safety, then it follow's that the engagement by which it is confirmed ought not to be entered into; for no man should oblige himself to that which is contrary to public safety. This I conceive is the whole strength of the Scruple as it may lie in their conception.

But I shall freely tell you that with me it hath no weight at all, as to engage my Conscience in the business; as to take me off from taking the Engagement, for many things are here presupposed which are to me uncertain; and though they be granted to be true, yet they reach not at all to put an obligation upon my Conscience to abstain from the engagement as now it is offered.

They presuppose here that in a state of War as well as in a peaceable constitution of affairs whatsoëver is determined and allowed by a major part is most for public safety which is to me a very doubtful assertion. We find that matters have been carried on all along in both Kingdoms rather by a Minor then by a Major part of the Nation; and if this rule should be taken up universally; Whatsoëver the Major part doth is best don; and most agreeable to Justice in all things; it will go ill with the people of God in the world; and the narrow way, with the few that walk in it, will not be justified: this rule therefore is not in all Cases and at all times to be admitted; but it must needs admit of some restriction, whereby in matters of extraordinary concernment, a party which is most considerable, though fewer, may dissent from a party which is less considerable, though more in number. We see then that this first presupposal whereupon the whole Scruple is grounded is not sound.

Besides this presupposal, there is this also intimated in the Scruple, that what formerly was declared to be most for public safety, must now also be judged to be so; as if the several Emergencies in state affairs could not give caus to alter justly their opinions concerning the way of public safety.

Again a third presupposal is implied in this Scruple viz. That the house is not now free and full as then it was; which how I can take upon me to assert I know not, seeing they who are only competent Judges of their own freedom, do vote themselves to be free; and seeing it is an undoubted fundamental law of the Parlamentarie Constitution that forty Members regularly met are a full House to all intents and purposes, as well as four-hundred: now it is known that the House was never less then forty: therefore it hath always been full: and a full House may repeal it's own acts upon Emergencies as it seeth caus.

Fourthly, it is not only presupposed, but expressly asserted, that the House declared that is was most for public safety to agree with the King on the best terms they could, and that there should be still a continuance of Him and of the House of Lord's; Truly I believe that times were, when Votes did pass in the House to this effect, though not in those terms; which is clear by several public Declarations importing no less; but I believe also that upon new Emergencies their sense of agreeing did alter, and that since the King was at Holdenbie, and the Army took him into their custody, and that he still refused to yield to their Propositions, their sense of public safety did much vary, from what you here express it was, as was manifest by the votes of Non-addresses; and it is certain, that this which is alleged was not the vote in terminis; for which the Members were separated from the House: that Vote was in terminis, this; That the Answers of the King to the Propositions of both Houses, were a ground for the House to proceed upon, for the settlement of the Peace of the Kingdom. This was the fatal dividing Vote, which in the sense of some, I believe, did tend to that, which you say the House declared; but in the sense of others, it might tend to settle the peace of the Kingdom without him. Som thought it was best to agree with the King upon any terms whatsoëver, to carry on a design: but others thought it more safe, not to admit of the terms which he offered, for fear of that design.

It appear's by that which is fallen out, that although the party most numerous did vote in the first, yet the party most considerable voted in the last sense, and which of these two did vote most wisely and justly; if I should take upon me to determine, who am without doors, and not conscious to circumstances of State, nor entrusted with the management of public affairs, it would in mine own judgment be a very great presumption, and contrary to the Rule, by which I walk in a conscionable submission to superior powers; for I make this my Rule, that my conscience is obliged to nothing, but to judge of mine own ways, how they may, within my calling be made answerable to the will of God, by the Rules which he hath given me. Now I said, no Rule given by him to me in my calling, which doth oblige me to be a definitive judge of these matters; so as to fasten them upon my conscience, that except I be able to determine them, I may take no rest, nor intend the main duties of my profession. Nay, I find a contrary clear Rule. That I must not be a busy body in other men's affairs; That being free from all, I must become a servant to all, in that which is for edification; I must be subject to superior powers, and not speak evil of Dignities; and that I must not suffer my conscience to be brought under the power of wordly and outward concernments: for I am told that all things are mine, therefore I must not be brought under the power of anything, but being bought with a price by the Lord, I must not be (as to conscience) a servant of men; from which Rules I infer this, that, although I suppose all that is alleged, to be so, as it is alleged; and all the presupposals to be undoubted and certain, yet they must not reach, and come within me so far; as to become a scruple to my conscience; and to make no doubt, whether yea or no, I should behave myself as a Subject, towards those that are my superiors; obeying Magistrates readily in every good work, not speaking evil of them, nor brawling against them; but showing all gentleness and meekness, both to them, and to all men, Tit. 3. 1, 2. I leave then the judicature of public safety to those that are in public places: I pray to God for them; that they may be enabled to judge aright, and to see their way before them, and whether they do right or wrong in particular matters; I leave the judgment thereof unto God, and to their conscience; and look only to mine own walking in my private sphere, to be without blame, and to hold forth the word of life, and let the changes be, what ever they will or may be, in the states of this world, they shall no more trouble me, if I remain myself, then the changes of the air, when the weather is sometimes fair, and sometimes foul: the storm that bloweth over my head shall not make me stand still in the high way, nor lie down in the puddle, not going forward till the journeys end; as I am afraid, many who are angry at the changes of the times, being of a sullen humor, are ready to do, because they cannot get their wills; but I believe not that any of your friends are such: yet I cannot say, that all godly men are free from the snare of such a distemper.

The second scruple is this; that, although no man can be a judge in his own caus, and that although heretofore, both King and Parliament did appeal to the judgment of the people, to determine whether of their proceedings did most agree, to the preservation of Religion and Liberty, yet none are now thought competent judges of those actions, which have been don by such who are in power, but themselves; so that now all men are bound up, to yield a blind obedience to those who have gotten the Government into their hands; and exercise it in an arbitrary way.

To this I say, suppose all this be so, what then? then (say your friends) the Engagement ought not to be entered into, by which they will be established in the use of this power: and this I take to be the whole strength of this scruple also.

But hereunto I say, that I dare not take upon me, to censure them, so as your friends do in this scruple; and although the accusations which are alleged, should be made out, to be such crimes as they would make them to be; and that I should see no plea left for them, whereby they might justify themselves; yet the consequence which your friends make thereupon, would not follow as to my conscience: for suppose the matters alleged to be as ill, and their proceedings as irrational as may be, and that they abuse their power, as is alleged; yet I say, that it is not warrantable for me to refuse the Engagement: if it require in my judgment, a thing in itself good, and lawful to be don for common safety; for the supposed faultineses of these men in their places; (where of private men are not judges over them) cannot warrant me to refuse the performance of a clear and known duty towards the public in my place, which they may require of me.

But your friends will say perhaps to this: but if your entering into the Engagement will establish them in the power which they abuse, how can you do it with a good conscience? I answer, that whatever is a clear matter of duty, ought for conscience sake to be intended for itself without scrupling the event: because the future accidental effects, and contingent events of human actions are wholly in God's hand; nor can I know whether my taking of the Engagement shall establish them in the power, which they have or no: and if it doth, whiles I do nothing but my duty, I must leave that to God. Your friends that argue thus; we will not resolv to be true and faithful to the Common-wealth, as it is now established without a King and House of Lord's, because, if we do this, these men will be confirmed in the places wherein they are, do not in this matter guid their resolution by a rule, but by a conjectural interest, and the forecast of some event, which they would, or would not have to fall out, which is not to follow, but to predetermine Providence, a thing in our thoughts no ways to be allowed, and a thing which they condemn in others, and yet herein it's practiced by themselves: for when they refuse thus to do a duty upon this account, because happily these men will thereby be established; they seem to me to intend to oppose, and contradict Providence already determined; now whether Providence will establish these men, in the place whereof they are fully possessed, yea or no, is a thing that I am not to look after: I must leave that unto God, and intend nothing, but to follow in every present action a clear Rule; and if God will confirm them in their places, by my doing my duty, why should I take upon me, or settle in my thoughts to grudge at it, or to hinder that event? Shall I predetermine God's Counsel? Can I say to him they ought not to be confirmed? or shall I by the neglect of a duty, endeavor to cast down those whom he hath set up? Is not this to follow them that seek for changes? we may wish, and seek also for changes to the better; if by doing our duty, we have caus to conjecture that such a thing may fall out; but to the end that a change of public affairs may fall out, to neglect a duty is altogether unwarrantable; or to study in hatred to some persons, to bring a change in the Government is that which is forbidden, as I suppose, in the Proverbs by Solomon; as for mine own part, I freely declare, that I did not seek for the abolishment of Regal Government; but since God hath brought it about in his own way; I am bound to dequiesce, and as I sought not to bring matters to this state by a change; so I shall not seek to bring matters from it again, by a new change; but I must by the rule of my place and calling, as a private man, resolv to do my duty, in the settlement or unsettlement, which God doth give, what ever it is: so then you see, that if I must guid my conscience by a Rule, I must not measure the righteousness of my actions by the appearances of events, which I conjecture may follow thereupon, but by the precepts, which tell me what is my duty in my place at all times, in presenti, hic & nunc; nor must I look to other men's actions, by the constructions, which I, or others may make of them, but I must look unto mine own way; that is, to that which God require's of me, in my private station. This your friends seem not to do, when they argue thus: we will not take the Engagement, because we will not confirm, but rather disturb these men in their places: this to my understanding, is to make conscience depend upon a design, and not upon the observation of a rule, in reference to a present duty; now I dare not fasten any human design upon my conscience, nor make my conscience subject to anything, but to a clear Rule of God's word: therefore, except the argument were proposed unto me thus: You must not take the Engagement, because the action required in it, is in itself unlawful to be don, by you in your place; except (I say) it were thus offered unto me, I can see no just plea to pretend conscience in the business; if then nothing to my judgment be required of me, which is unlawful for me to be don, in my place and calling; I must be so far from pretending conscience, for not engaging thereunto; that I dare not for conscience sake, but be engaged heartily; by reason of the universal, and undeniable Rule, Rom. 13. 1. Let all souls be subject to the higher powers; because the powers that are, are of God; and again, verse 5. You must needs be subject for conscience sake. Thus then my conscience is not to be subjected to the consequence, which your friends make; but unto this Rule of the word; although I should grant, that the premises, upon which they infer it to be true: but if, when I look upon the Premises in themselves, and by the judgment of discretion, find them to be such, as may be mere mistakes, and misrepresentations of things, or at least great uncertainties, which I ought not to take upon me to determine, then I am abundautly cleared in the matter, that I ought not to be scrupled at the things alleged, as they are; nor do I think, that your friends, if they understood themselves rightly, would suffer their conscience to be scrupled at such considerations as these are; for if the Question be concerning the actions of these men that now govern, whether any can or may judge of them definitively, besides themselves; the answer must be, as I conceive, that if they are the higher powers, from whom none can appeal; then it followeth undeniably, that none can, or may judge of their proceedings but themselves. The supreme government; that is, the Law-making power (which no man looking upon them, can deny them to be possessed off) cannot be accountable unto any, but unto God: and if you will make them judges of their own proceedings, you must name some to be over them, able to call them to an account: but if none such can be found; then we must understand this Rule, that no man is a competent Judge of his own actions, cum grano salis: viz. of a single man, viz. that none is to be made the sole, and supreme judge of his own caus, and actions, but that he ought to be accountable thereof unto others, because no single man on earth, is either by the Law of nature, or by God's appointment made only for himself, or to be without doing service unto others; and therefore by other's, to whom he is appointed to do service, he may be judged, and is bound to give them an account of his stewardship; but in case a state, or whole nation by it's representatives, which by itself is free, and depend's upon none but God, doth contract itself into a Body, to whom it doth intrust it's whole power; this Body can be accountable unto none, but unto God; nevertheless, each member of the Body is accountable unto the whole; only the whole, as long as it hath the power, cannot be called to an account of their proceedings by any; else there would be a processus in infinitum, or this absurdity would follow, that the supreme power would be subject to it's inferior, that is no supreme, which is, contradictio in adjecto; it follow's then, that where a Nation doth intrust the supremacy of their power, so to any society of men, that they can do with it what they think good, there none can be judges of their actions definitively but themselves; else the judges and governors, which are actually supreme, would have Superiors over them, which is absurd. Potentially the Supremacy is in the collective Body of a Nation; but actually it can be nowhere, but in the representatives of the whole; and so long as the trust of the whole is in their hands, so long they must be allowed to be sole judges of their proceedings.

As for that which is said, that both King and Parliament did appeal to the people's judgment, to determine, whether of their proceedings did agree most with the preservation of Religion, and Libertle of the Subject; I grant they did so; but their meaning was not by so doing, to set up every private man above themselves, as a definitive judge of the whole matter; but only to justify their proceedings to the judgment of discretion, in every man, that he might for his own good, be inclined to favor the caus, which should seem in his eyes most just; from this appeal, of both King and Parliament to the people, may be gathered by the way; First, that all Superiors are some way accountable to the body of the Nation, of their administrations, and of the Reasons of their proceedings. Secondly, that all particular men may take notice, by the judgment of discretion, of the proceedings of their Superiors, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence in things required of them in their places. Thirdly, that no Superiors ought to think themselves so absolute, as not to be bound, to declare the grounds of their actions, that they may be understandingly weigned by their inferiors, for whose sake they manage public affairs. From these grounds then, let me offer to your discretion, that which I think rational, and tending to Peace, that seeing the Trustees of the Nation have disagreed amongst themselves, and those that had the supremacy of power in their hand, have determined matters, according to the ability which God gave them; it is lawful for me in my place, to look upon matters so far, as I discern them, to make the best thereof; but it is not lawful, nor conscionable, for me to judge definitively of their proceedings, to make the worst thereof.

You see then, that I cannot in conscience charge these men, that have the Government in their hand, with that which your friends judge them guilty of. viz. First, that all men are made to yield a blind obedience unto them; I cannot say so; for I see that they offer to all men, an account of their proceedings, and that they have carried on their resolutions rationally, according to emergencies, and are not unwilling to show the reasons of their proceedings, to such as inquire after the same. Secondly, that they have the Government without the people's consent: I cannot say so; for I believe, that all that are in place, were chosen to their places by the free consent of the people. Thirdly, that they exercise their power more arbitrarily then the King did, in some sense I cannot say so, and yet in another sense I may say so. I may not say so in the sense that your friends mean it, who I suppose, make all arbitrary power as in the King, so in them equally unlawful. I may not say so; because I am not a judge, either of him, or of them in their particular actings, and yet again, I may say, that I conceive it lawful in them to exercise an arbitrary power, which was not lawful in the King to do, because their trust from the Body of the Nation is above that, which was given to the King; and the whole power which he had, did primarily belong unto them, as they were representatives of the Nation, who upon emergencie, have seen caus to resume it; and of this they have given an account to the body collective; so then, although it is their right, as supreme in the Body, to do things arbitrarily; yet I cannot say, that they intend to rule without Law, as it was imagined the King intended, by opposing the Law-making power of the Representatives, or that they intend to oblige all men, to yield a blind obedience; for where Laws are made, and accounts given of public proceedings; there men cannot be justly said to be obliged, to yield a blind obedience: and thus you see, wherefore I am not staggered, at the second scruple of your friends.

The third matter here proposed, is not a scruple, but a complaint, with a suspicious conjecture of their intentions concerning Religion; that they seem not to be willing to advance it, because they punish not blasphemers, and sinners against the light of nature, so much as those that take not the Engagement; to this I shall say; that it is my duty to mourn, for the abominations committed within Jerusalem; to pray to God for a remedy against them, to warn, and admonish those that are in place of them; to encourage them to do their duty towards the public, and towards myself, by doing my duty in all things good and lawful towards them; and when I have don this, I must leave the event unto God; but if I will take up jealousies against them, because everything which I would have don, in public by them, is not don, as I would have it; and upon my private jealousies, I licentiate myself, not to do my duty in my place towards them, and make others rebellious against them; and in my heart depose them from their places; then I weaken their hands, and hinder them, what in me lieth from doing even that, which I complain is not don by them; and so make myself accessory to the guilt of that evil, which I lay unto their charge; and so, while's I accuse them, of the neglect of their duty, to the public, I neglect mine own duty, both to myself, and to them, and to the public, and abstract them also from doing their's.

The last matter here offered is the consideration of Rom. 13. where your friends say, that it is not to be understood of usurped powers, and you give me their grounds, why they think so?

As for mine own part, I cannot call to mind, that anywhere I have said, nor do I remember, that ever I was of opinion to say: that the place is to be understood of usurped powers; but I conceive, it is to be understood indefinitely, of the powers which are in place, what ever they are, whether usurped or not; if they be the higher powers; for the words which the Apostle doth use, signify nothing else; but that which is proper to a supreme Magistrate, implying nothing, either of usurpation, or lawful election to the place; but only of a being in it, of the ground being in it of the ground of that being, as it is from God, of the Acts proper to the being in the place, and of the ends of those acts; and the duties of Subjects to be performed towards them in reference to all this. I say not then that the Apostle doth intend to persuade us, to obeie usurped powers; but he doth declare, what we ought to do, as Christians in submission to the powers that are over us; that is, to those that bear Rule: for the words used by the Apostle are indefinite 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 verse 1. and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . verse 3. these denominations determine nothing concerning the matter of usurpation, or a lawful calling to their places; they imply only three things. Viz. First, the Notion of power, or force in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Secondly the notion of eminency, or superiority possessed, in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thirdly, the notion of acting above others, or before others, in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . So then, the object of our submission is indefinitely the might, which is possessed of the superiority, which is above us: and doth act in a way of Government over us. Of these mights, or mighty ones, the Apostle saith indefinitely, that none of them have their place of Superioritie, or their might but of God; and whatever superiority or might is in being, is ordained of God so to be, over those that are in subjection to it; and therefore none ought to resist the superior powers, that are over them for Government, because the Governors, or Magistrates are not a terror to good works, but to the evil; and this I take to be the clear sense of verse 1, 2, 3. If then the Apostle speak's of Magistrates, or Magistracy indefinitely, not reflecting upon the particular way, how they enter upon their places; but only upon the actual possession thereof: and in that respect will have us to look upon them, as such whom God appoint's to be obeyed in things that are good; I know not why we should trouble our selves further, then the Holy Ghost doth give us caus, by limiting and defining the title and right of the powers, into lawful and unlawful, with reference to their entrance therein, according to human Laws and customs; whereof in all this Scripture there is no intimation at all; nor was it then, nor is it now possible, for private Christians (to whom the Apostle write's) to judge of the lawfulness of the titles, of those that are in place, to the power which they have; but he refer's them only to that which was apparent, and whereof none could pretend ignorance, viz. to the powers which were actually over them, to rule them; these then as such, are to be respected as the object of our submission; and this is clearly Calvin's mind, lib. 4. Instit. cap. 20. parag. 24. till the end; where he make's the office of Magistracy to be the thing to be respected by all, although men come to the possession of it by means, and ways never so unjust, and do nothing less, then what become's their places; for the unjust acquisition of a place, although it is a sin in him, who come's unjustly by it; yet it derogate's nothing from that which is due to the place, that is, the office according to God's appointment; for the office is his ordinance, and he will have all souls to be subject to it, in good things: else we set up Anarchy.

Now if your friends will without prejudice look upon these things; they will perceive, that higher powers and rulers are to be looked upon only, as men in the office of Magistrates, and as such, to be obeyed: and this being granted, it will follow, whatever their personal faults may be, that yet, so long as they are in the office of Magistracy, they are to be submitted unto in all good things: whether then they are usurpers or no, that is not material to my conscience; this Apostolical Rule bind's me to respect the ordinance of God, which is the Ruler in his Office; to him, as such, I owe submission, nor am I to judge of anything further. By all which you may see, how I shall answer your friend's objections, which tend to show, that the higher powers in Rom. 13. cannot be meant of usurped powers; that is, of men come to the place of Government, by ways of usurpation; I shall say to this, that the Apostle doth not express anything at all of this, and therefore we may not assert, that he meant any such thing; nor doth he express anything to exclude usurpers, from having the title of higher powers; but his words, to my understanding, are indefinitely appliable to all, that are in the Office of supreme power; whether they be usurpers, or no: therefore it is not that which is to be looked upon; but if they be high and Ruling powers, they are to be regarded, as the Apostle doth enjoin, and for the reasons he doth allege.

As for the Arguments brought in to show that usurpers of the higher power cannot be included in the denomination, which the Apostle give's to Magistrates here, I conceive them far short of which they intend to prove.

To the first I shall say, that God's providence can have no Rule but his will; and it is no incongruitie, to say, that God hath but one rule of ordering all things; which is the Rule of Righteousness. Whether then he appoint's plagues and famines; or blessings, and plentiful seasons; and whether he give's good and bad Magistrates; usurpers, or lawfully called ones; all is don by the same rule of common providence, which is God's just and holy will. Nor is this at all ill for the Autoritie and credit of Magistracy to be thus appointed: for the highest authority is the supremacy of God's will; whose wisdom saith, by me Kings reign, and Princes decree Justice, Prov. 8. 15. and the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men, Dan. 4. 17. I shall confess, that as to men by the Principles of natural society, God hath settled Rules for Government, and for men to be placed in Government; and so the Autoritie and credit of Magistracy is built upon another basis, as to us, then, that which doth bring Calamities and plagues upon us, which come immediately from common providence, but that this man come's to the Government, either conformably, or not conformably, to those human Rules of election, is immediately from God; and no disparagement at all to the office, and the respect due unto it, because he hath given express Rules, both in the word, and in the nature of man, by which it is to be upheld amongst men; and herein the authority of Magistracy is differenced from plagues and calamities, and not in the reference, which it hath to common Providence; for by commons Providence all things have but one Rule, God's righteous will in judgment and loving kindness.

To the second, which saith, that the powers here spoken of, must not be resisted, but (say your friends) usurpers may be resisted, as Athaliah was, these must be maintained by paying of tribute, usurpers not so. I say, that it is not lawful for any private man, to whom the Apostle write's to resist the higher powers over him, whether the persons be usurpers or no; nor is he to make himself a judge of usurpation; but he is to be subject to the powers, that are in place and rule: As for Athaliah, she was not resisted by any private, but by public authority; for Jehoiada the high Priest, and the Sanhedrim was a public authority; and by the Law of Nature, being the King's Tutor and Protector, he was autorized to depose and execute the usurper; as for the assertion, that lawful Magistrates must be maintained by paying tribute, but usurpers not so; I say, that the duty of paying tribute is enjoined to Subjects towards Magistrates quâ Magistrates; and not quâ lawful Magistrates; and consequently, it is not lawful for any to refuse tribute upon this ground, because he doth judge him to be an usurper, who doth demand it; if he doth find him, in the place and office of a Magistrate, and if no law of nature, or Nations, or of God is contrary to what is demanded; he is bound to pay tribute, as to a Magistrate indefinitely, without this, or that respect to his personal qualities.

The third objection saith; that lawful power is only God's ordinance, and not usurped. This is to beg the Question: for God's Providence doth order the acts of usurpation (in themselves as to men unlawful) to a good end; and the Magistracy still remain's his ordinance, although seated in an usurper; and the highest power of might, which none can have, but by his giving of it, is his ordinance, although an usurper hath the management of it: Christ tell's Pilate, when he spoke of his power or might, to save or condemn him, that he could do nothing in that kind, except it were given him from above; God for judgment, give's and appoint's power to be in the hands of Tyrants: they manage it unjustly, and in due time are punished for it; yet that Supremacy of power, in their hand, doth not cease to be an ordinance of God. It is true, that the sons of Aaron had another manner of ordination, then Korah and his company; for Korah and his company were never permitted to have the Priesthood; but if God had not punished them, but permitted them upon the plea, which they used to have managed the Priesthood, as well as the service of the Tabernacle, and that they had been in a peaceable possession of the office, what respect would then have been due unto them is a doubt unto me, which I am not able, I confess suddenly to determine; for I find that Christ in his days, did respect the Autoritie of the High Priest; although he was but annual; and came into his place by another way, then God at first appointed Aaron and his sons to that office; Bribery, faction and politick practices had brought the office of the High Priest, to be annual and changeable, in respect of the men that had it, who perhaps, in those days could not be excused from usurpation upon one another; and yet the office was to be respected in their hand, and looked upon as God's Ordinance; the personal faults of men make not void the appointment of God.

To the fourth I say, that all men, whom God doth any way imploie, are in some sense his Ministers; the original word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is a servant; and whoëver hath the place of an officer under God, is rightly called his servant; and none can have it; but by some way of calling from God himself, either ordinary, or extraordinary: it follow's not therefore, that usurpers may not be called God's servants; Nebuchadnezzar an usurper, is called God's servant by the Prophet; he that doth service, and is employed by a master to do it, is a servant; all Tyrants in the world are employed for judgment, and all usurpers of power are under a Master, that is, higher then the highest, who make's use of them for the welfare of his people; for although we count not punishments our welfare, yet certainly in God's hand they are for the good of his people, and they execute the wrath which God hath appointed against evil doers; and this wrath they execute by virtue of their office. For God appoint's them to the office, that they should take vengeance of evil doers, as Jehu was appointed against the house of Ahab, in an extraordinary cours.

The last Argument alleged to prove, that no usurpers can be meant by higher powers in Rom. 13. is taken from a supposed inconvenient consequence, which is, that if Levellers, Papists, or Malignants should get the power, and become the supreme Rulers, we should be obliged to obeie them as the powers that are of God; whereunto I can say no more but this; that it would indeed be a sad case, if God should dispose of the Supremacy of power into such hands; but if he should for a judgment over this state be pleased so to do, I know none other rule for private men to behave themselves by, but this which the Apostle doth prescribe; for if the Turk were my supreme Magistrate, and my lot did fall to be under his civil Government, I would think myself bound, in things good and lawful, to submit unto him; the Reformed Churches in France are under a Papist Magistrate: yet they refuse not to submit in things good and lawful; If God give the Kingdom to the basest of men, and set me under him, I must not say, because he is base, that therefore his power is not of God.

Thus I have after a long delaie found some time, to offer your friends these thoughts for their satisfaction, the three first scruples I had answered above a month ago; the last which relates to Rom. 13. I intended to have answered by a full, and demonstrative Analysis of that whole context, which I had begun to make, but being severally interrupted with some other occasions, I did yesterday alter my resolution, and have added to that, which was don so long ago; what you find here, in answer to the fourth scruple: the Lord direct us in all truth, and teach us to discern the things that are most excellent; I rest, and desire you to remember me to your friends, as being

The fourth Letter.

I Received yours of the 17 ^th of Julie, for which I must acknowledge myself obliged unto you, that you are pleased still to continue your labor of love, and care to give satisfaction to such, as desire it in a loving way. The end of my answer at this time is to let you know that your Letter and Books came safely to my hands, and to return you many thanks for both of them, which I have already communicated to some friends, and shall do to others. I will not seek to create you anymore trouble, by raising up any new scruples, about those things you delivered in your letter, but only briefly acquaint you with their success, with some that I acquainted with them: Som think, that if what you hold forth about that place, Rom. 13. will hold firm, it will be a sufficient ground of satisfaction, for yielding obedience to the present powers. Neither doth the engaging to do it much trouble them; if they should oblige themselves to do it only in a passive, not in an active way: but they conciev, that by taking the engagement to be faithful to the present government, they bind themselves, not only to be subject to them in all lawful things; but to oppose, and resist any other, to whom (as they in their conscience think) the right of Government doth truly belong, when ever it shall be claimed.

Secondly, Others that are truly godly, think, that what you speak about the rule of being guided by the major part (that it is not always the best and safest way) holds true in rebus moralibus, but not in rebus politicis, else the foundation of all government will be overthrown; if in such things as are to be determined by Votes of divers persons, the major part may not carry it.

Thirdly, They think, that what you say in answer to the second scruple about judging (namely, that all particular men may take notice by the judgment of discretion, of the proceedings of their superiors, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence, in things required of them in their places; these being your words make's much for them, for in the judgment of discretion, they conceive, that the setting up of themselves to be the supreme, and sole higher powers of the Nation, and excluding others (to whom a right therein did properly belong, as well as to themselves) without the consent of the Kingdom, is not agreeable to the right rule, and therefore they dare not concur with them in doing, or approving of it, (as they shall do, if they take the Engagement) other doubts might be mentioned, but I will not be tedious; I find that the Treatise of the Lancashier -Ministers about the Engagement, seem's to be of great weight and strength with many good men, if a clear answer could be given, to what therein is most substantial, it would give great satisfaction. I do most freely and feelingly assent to what you say, and acknowledge that it is God's peculiar work, to make the wilderness of our spiritual estate a pool of waters, and to turn the dry land into watery springs: to him therefore I desire to look, humbly imploring him, (who is the Father of lights ) so to inform our judgments, that we may be able to see, and discern the things that differ, and to compose our affections, that we may both entertein every truth in love, and embrace one another in love, not giving way to any groundless prejudice, which may be an hindrance of either of these. And go on still (good sir!) to be the unchangeable, constant, and single-hearted peace-maker, not suffering yourself to be discouraged by any misapprehensions, that some (though good men) may have of you, for he that seeth the heart, and trieth the reins, will in due time recompe • s what ever is don in truth of heart, for preserving of the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. Inparticular, be not weary (as occasion serv's) in seeking to allaie the heat of indignation, that is stirred up in some in high place, against those that dare not venture upon the Engagement, (though forbearing upon grounds truly conscientious.) Our good God give unto all that fear him, that they may once come, to be of one heart, and one way, and all agree in that way, which is most agreeable to his will and word.

The Answer to the fourth Letter.

YOur's of the sixteenth of August was delivered unto me the three and twentieth thereof; after which day, I had occasion to go into the Country, which took me off from these thoughts, almost ever since; but now I am returned unto them, to let you know, that the expressions of love in your Letter, and the encouragements which you give me, to proceed in the way wherein I am, are no small refreshments unto my spirit, and a support against the obloquies and reproaches, which I meet withal in the mouths of others: whose bissaed affections will not suffer them to look upon me without prejudice: so that they cannot discern, in any way that simplicity, by which I endeavor; as to offer myself to all men, so to approve my conscience before God. But some comfort I have, that this is no new thing unto me; for all along, my lot hath been more or less, to be misunderstood by all, and thus to be looked upon a squint by one party or another: because, although I could not but approve always in some things, one party more then another, and consequently, for the main I did own them, as those amongst whom I was to be reckoned; yet I never did own them as a party, or in their partiships: but set my mind to cure them of the distempers, which proceed from the spirit of envy and jealousy, which dwell's in our flesh. Therefore so far as I understood my freedom in the spirit, I never was, nor ever shall be (I hope) restrained from making use of all parties, and owning them in that which is good and consonant to the truth of Christianity.

I thank you for the account you are pleased to give me of the success, which the papers I sent you have had with some; one of the chief aims which I have in this business (next unto the discovery of Truth, to unite our spirits therein, and give satisfaction to those who are scrupled) is to engage the affections of godly men, upon the thoughts of mutual forbearance, and compliance by showing, that as there is no caus of fundamental division, between those that differ in judgment, about the present civil transactions; so there ought not to be any such distance of affections, as to produce any unwillingness of being reconciled to each other; or of being reunited in the prosecution of their main design, which is a Gospel-Reformation of this Nation: to oblige therefore holy men to entertein the thoughts, which may lead them to this aim, is one of the causes, which make's me so willing to be larger upon this subject, then otherwise I would be; for what is it to me, whether I stand under the government of one man, or of many; if I can either way fulfil my race with joie, and serv my Generation in the advancement of the Kingdom of the Lord Jesus? whatever Government then God doth set over me, I look upon it, and upon my duty in it, with a reference, and subordination unto this aim; nor is it at all lawful for me, by any human Engagement whatsoëver, to abridg myself of this liberty, or to forestal myself in this resolution: so that I should be obliged to scruple the performance of any Christian duties for public edification, more in a Common-wealth, then in a Monarchy, or vice versâ: or that I may not (when God so cast's the balance of human affairs) determine it to be my right, to live as well under the one Government, as under the other, walking in Peace and Truth towards all men inoffensively. In effect by the scanning of matters relating to this subject, I find that I am fallen upon a branch of the study of Peace, which heretofore, in the pursuit thereof I never did reflect upon so directly: for in former times my direct aim was to mind only the Rules of religious Peace and unity amongst the professors of the Gospel, in reference to Christianity; but now I have been carried on to mind also the Rules, by which a Christian is obliged to behave himself peaceably, in civil and outward relations; which is, and will be a necessary point of knowledge, as we are in the flesh, and as long as Babylon is not fallen, and the New Jerusalem, the mother of us all, is not come down from above. I have therefore caus to thank God, that as I have not been led forth by any wordly end, in meddling with this Subject; So I have learned thereby, somewhat more of the ways of Peace, then ever I knew before. And that I may benefit myself by the occasion which you offer unto me in your last; although you oblige me not to tell you my sense, of that which your friends conceive of my last answers to their doubts, yet I shall briefly take into consideration, the thoughts which you have expressed of theirs, concerning some passages of my discourse.

The first is concerning active obedience, to be yielded unto the present powers, which upon the ground of Rom. 13. I think may clearly be made out; but they conceive (as you say) that by taking the Engagement to be faithful to the present Government, they bind themselves not only to be subject unto them in all lawful things; but to oppose, and resist any other, to whom (as they in their conscience think) the right of Government doth truly belong; when ever it shall be obtained.

I conceive, that the sense of the Engagement cannot rationally otherwise be understood; then as the authors thereof in the Act, by which it is imposed upon all, do explain their meaning; and conscionably it may, and ought to be understood none otherwise, then as it containeth a clear duty prescribed in the word of God: nor can any man, as a Christian, intend to be obliged otherwise unto it, then as it is in itself, and so far as it is to him a duty; nor ought any man (that will not injure his Superiors in his thoughts) that it is imposed by them in any other sense, then as it is such a duty; if godly men therefore should mind in simplicity themselves, and their own duties, what need they set stumbling blocks in their own way, by conjectural interpretations of things; which they conceive contrary to duty in others? Is not this a subtle corruption of nature to be so inclined; and a weakness of spirit to do so? and if we represent things so to our selves, that we become thereby disaffected to our own duty, because we are willing to conceive that something undutiful in others, may follow thereupon; do we not deceive our selves with the possibility of another's failing, in time to come, to make it a pretence to cover our own present failing? for if it be our present duty, to become faithful to the powers that are over us, by doing things good and lawful under them; to what purpose is it to forestal our thoughts with a thing, which we cannot say is; or which we know not, whether it ever shall be; viz. whether our Superiors will oppose any, to whom the right of Government doth truly belong? They that are in the full possession of power, are under God, at this time, our only Superiors and Governors: nor is it lawful for me at present to have any relation, and therefore I ought not to have any respect unto others; for it is clearly my duty, in my sphere, to observe with a single heart the relation, under which by God's appointment I stand at present; nor am I to meddle with anything else, as a matter of conscience, but with the observation of the Rule, Let all souls be subject to the superior powers, and the powers that are, are ordained of God, Rom. 13. If then I take upon me, to make it a matter of conscience to think, that the right of government in chief, doth truly belong to others, then to these that are in place; do not I depose them in my heart, and make myself the judge of their supremacy? and if I suppose that they do oppose, or will oppose those, to whom I have adjudged the supreme Right; do not I renounce the quality of a Subject, and of a private man, by taking upon me, to determine the highest controversy in our human affairs, which is, to whom the Right of Government in this state doth belong; and how I should be able, to warrant in myself (who am in no place) and to my conscience before God, this usurpation of Judicature over my Superiors, (who are undeniably in the full possession of all places of Judicature) while's I accuse them of another kind of usurpation, I am not able to imagine: for there is no Rule, either of God or man, that make's them subject to my tribunal. I would therefore entreat your friends in the fear of God, to examine the ground, and consider conscionably by what Rule, they dare take upon them to engage their conscience thus, to think, that the right of Government doth truly belong to any other, then to the present Parliament, which is possessed therewith. This presupposal of their's, determining the right to another, not only beg's the Question in debate; but contain's a high charge against all the Parlamentarie proceedings hitherto, prosecuted against the King's attempts, to rule without Law; It bewraie's therefore not only a great deal of presumption, but much unadvisedness of Conscience, to cast themselves thereby into a snare of disobedienee; and the State wherein they live, into all unsettlement and confusion. For private men, if they should be made judges of public quarrels: and obliged in conscience, to yield no active obedience towards the maintenance of the settlement, which is in being under their Superior powers, except the ground of the quarrel be referred to them to determine, it is not possible that there could be any settlement in a State at all; therefore private men are not to answer for the grounds of the quarrels, which may be between their own supreme powers, and others that pretend to the same Dignity; but all that they are obliged unto, is, by lawful means in their places, to defend and maintain in peace, the settlement which is in being, and to act with their Rulers to that effect.

The second is, touching the Rule of being guided by the major part; where it is granted, that in rebus moralibus my rule held true, but not in rebus Politicis; else (say they) the foundation of all Government will be overthrown, if in things to be determined by Votes of divers persons, the Major part may not carry it.

I said in matters of extraordinary concernment, a Minor part is not to be bound by the Votes of a Major part; hereunto your friends seem to agree so far, as matters are Moral, but not as they are Political; what they mean properly by Political, I do not well know; but I meant matters of Government, which relate unto the fundamental constitution of safety and liberty; which are always either materially, or formally complicated with Moral Duties, or elsimmediately depending upon the same; but in lesser matters, which relate not unto the grounds of liberty and safety, which perhaps your friends call Politica, I consent with them, that the Major part should carry it; and that all rational men should for peace sake, yield in things not worth a great contest: as in matters of mere order, what is to be don, or taken into consideration first, or last: in matters of circumstance, relating to forms of actions, to times and places, and to the manner of proceeding, which doth not alter the substance of things morally good: and in particular municipal constitutions, which have no influence upon the whole state of a Common-wealth; in all such things the Major part should bind the Minor to a concurrence, lest all the grounds of Society be dissolved; but when the business relate's unto the main end, and chief grounds of public safety and freedom, then although the thing to be settled may be called Political, in respect of the State for which it is desired; yet it will always be found in respect of the obligation, which thereby will be brought upon the cours of particular men's lives, a matter of morality.

The third thing which you mention, is their sense of my Answer to the second scruple, concerning the judgment of discretion, how far, and to what end, private men may make use of it; here I find in them, either a mistake of the Notion, which I have of the judgment of discretion, or else a misapplication thereof, in respect of the limits, how far it is to be extended, or of the end and use for which it is allowed. To clear their thoughts, I shall desire them to take notice, that, by the judgment of discretion, I mean a rational, free, and disengaged surveying of things, which offer themselves to our consideration, about matters whereof we may lawfully make inquiry; with an eye of indifferency to make some discoveries, but may not make any absolute and final determination thereof; so as to oblige our Conscience to follow the result of our discoveries: for we may lawfully inquire further then we may define; and it may be profitable and advantageous for us, as to the manner of doing our duties, to make discoveries of the ways of those, towards whom in those Duties we do relate; and yet not necessary for us, as to the performance of the main of the Duty on our part, to define anything by those discoveries concerning them. For herein the judgment of discretion, and the definitive judgment of Conscience differ in my Notion; that the one is necessary in reference to our selves, and is to be absolute about matters, relating properly to our own sphere of activity, wherein there is a clear Rule for every man to determine, what is his Duty: but the other is free and voluntary in reference to others, and is to be always conditional, about matters relating properly to the sphere of other men's activity; wherein, although the general rule of duty may be known, yet the particular circumstances of fact being unknown, no settled judgment can be made of the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of their proceedings; and therefore no consequences may be drawn from the discoveries made, concerning other men's actions, whereof we cannot be judges, to define matters of duty concerning our selves: because nothing of duty, relating to our selves in our places, can be suspended upon the doubtful circumstances of other men's actings in their places.

From all which you may perceive, what bounds I set to the judgment of discretion, viz.

First, that it must rise from our rational faculty, and not from our Conscience, that is, the motive which should put us upon the exercising of this judgment, must not be a tie of Conscience to resolv a scruple; but a rational contemplation of that, which may be advantageous to our understanding; by the discovery of those properties of things, which occur to us in our way, which will enable us to make good use thereof.

Secondly, that the object of the judgment of Discretion must be things without, and not things within; for things within, if they be our own, we are bound to judge these definitively; but if they be the secrets of other men, we must leave them to the judgment of him, that will reveal the hidden things of darkness: as for things without, which others do act; we are to look upon them discreetly, and with a limitation, upon certain conditions; leaving the definitive sentence thereof to the judgment of the great day.

Thirdly, that the judgment of discretion is only to be intended to the circumstantials of matters, to make a true discovery thereof; and not to the substantials, to pry beyond our line, into the secrets and main concernments of other men, as busy bodies in other men's matters.

As for the end and use, for which the judgment of discretion is to be allowed, I conceive thus.

1. It is to be exercised to enable us, to discern probably, what the nature and property of things are, which from without are incident to us in our way, as offered from others: that we may difference that which is useful, from that which is useless; lest we mistake the one for the other, in that application, which we shall have occasion to make thereunto.

2. That it is to be exercised, to keep our spirit in the use of our Liberty; so, as neither to fall under the bondage of an implicit credulity, to believe everything that is told us; nor to take too much upon us, as magisterial Judges, or controlers of men, or things not within our line; but discreetly to balance our thoughts, between a slavish belief, and a busy prying into, and censoriousness of other men's affairs.

3. That the result of it must not be to regulate the main of our cours, thereby either in our own place, or towards others; but only to help us in the manner of proceeding, to do things more completely, and satisfactory to our own reason, and the edification of others; it must not therefore give us the rule of that, which is, or is not to be don in our places; but it may discover unto us, that which may tend to the been or meliùs esse, thereof in reference to others.

These Notions I lay open to your friends, that they may perceive their mistake in the consequence, which they infer upon my words, whereby they confound the judgment of discretion, with that which is definitive; and misapplie the former to the object of the later: for because I say, that particular men may by the judgment of discretion, take notice of the actions of their Superiors, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence in things required of them in their places; they conclude (as they conceive) by the judgment of discretion, that, what the present powers have don, in settling themselves in the Supremacy, is not agreeable to the rule of righteousness: wherefore (say they) they dare not concur in doing, or approving of it, as they shall do, if they take the Engagement.

To this conclusion, I say it follow's not upon my assertion; but that they mistake the nature, and the use of the judgment of discretion; and misapplie it to make up an absolute definition of a thing, which is not within the line of their Judicature; for they determine upon the whole matter, that the superiority of their Rulers is unjust; whereas discretion and conscience, both should teach them not to determine anything of so high a nature; only they might modestly take leave to make a rational search into the circumstances, and a discovery of probabilities alleged in utramque partem, pro & contrà; Nor should that discovery, how probable soëver it may seem on either side, become a ground to bottom the main of their duty upon; but it should only serv to swaie their resolutions, to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence, in things required of them in their places. By things required of them in their places, I mean particular matters, which are to be don in order to their main and known duty, which is to be subject to superior powers, in all good things, and by a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence therein, I mean an intelligent discerning of our way, in respect of the manner, how to act, or not to act with others therein, for the public good, so as may be most advantageous, and acceptable to these, towards whom, and with whom the action is to be intended; therefore when they reflect upon the present powers, in reference to their Supremacy; so as to say, that in their judgment of discretion, they find, that what the powers have don for their settlement, is not agreeable to righteousness; they judge not discreetly, but rashly; because they indiscreetly apply their thoughts to an object, which is beyond the line, and against the use of the judgment of discretion; and furthermore, upon this their indiscreet judgment of that, whereof they they are not made judges; they infer as indiscreet a conclusion; for they say, therefore they dare non-concur in approving of the proceedings, by which their Superiors are come to be settled in the Supremacy: as they think they shall do, if they take the Engagement: here they having misapplied their judgment to a wrong object, they act not discreetly, but definitively about it: for they say, they dare not concur in approving of what their Superiors have don; but who doth require this approbation at the hand of their Conscience? For that only should teach them what to dare, or not to dare; and it would be well, if such as dare not concur in approving, should also not dare to concur, in disapproving what they have don: but when they have defined the matter to be unrighteous, contrary to the law of discretion; and then say, that therefore they dare not concur to approve; they declare sufficiently that they dare concur to the contrary, viz. to disapprove, which is to make themselves the supreme Judges of Supremacy; but neither the one, nor the other is to be required at their hands, or imposed upon their Conscience; for their duty is discreetly to leave that unto God, and to time to manifest, and in the mean time to do sincerely their duty. But now, because they are out of the way of duty in all this, and prepossessed with an indiscreet judgment; therefore they also misinterpret the taking of the Engagement, as if it should oblige their consciences to make a definition of things past, by way of approbation; whereas, by the very Act by which it is enjoined, it is evident, that the purpose of taking it, is only to look from the present state of affairs, foreward, and not backward,. to secure the public Peace and safety in time to come, by the present settlement, and not to oblige any to trouble himself with things past: therefore herein also is no right of the judgment, either of discretion or of definition, for the conscionable and definitive judgment should have taught them, to look upon the sense of the Engagement, only as it is a clear duty, so far as it is expressed in the words, declaring manifestly the purpose thereof, and not otherwise; but they having engaged their thoughts by prejudice, in another way of Judicature, have not at all regarded this Rule, but made a definition quite contrary thereunto, to take themselves off from due respect and obedience to their Superiors, upon a pretence of their failing in the highest point of their duty, which neither discretion, nor conscience will ever allow them to determine.

The greater faults.

PAge 17. line ult. for ym read my, page 28. l. 17. for follow, r. follow it. p. 41. l. 20. f. in these, r. in Thesi. p. 54. l. 20, 21. r. Rule is given. p. 85. l, 27. f. grant that the, r. grant the, p. 59. l. 9. f. will make, r. will not make, p. 81. l. 23, 24. r. right use of, p. 90. l. 7. f. arrest, r. wrest.

The lesser.

In the title for occasionably, read occasionally, p. 11. l. 35. f. implore, r. imply, p. 22. l. 28. f. prudentially, r. providentially, p. 46. l. 11. f. step. r. stop, p. 66. l. 5. f. commons, r. common, p. 93. l. 10. f. erection, r. election.