Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable

is the Relatum, and the Rock is the Terminus, it may be said, that [The rolling Waves pass by the Rock as its inconstant companions] And consequently, that [The Rock is an inconstant Companion of the Waves.] So you may say, that [the Eternal God or Eternity doth indivisibly co-exist with the temporary creature, or with time;] and thence that [the temporary creature or Time doth co-exist with indivisible eternity.] And yet that [the transient creature doth transitorily co-exist with God] and so that [God doth but temporarily co-exist with the transitory creature]; as the reason of the denomination is variously fetched in.

95. In like manner quoad locum it may be said, that [the finite creature doth limitedly co-exist with God] and so, that [God as the Terminus of the creatures existence, doth limitedly co-exist with the creature]. But also that [the Infinite God doth immensely co-exist with the finite creature] and [the finite creature doth co-exist with Immensity.]

96. But note 1. That as the denominations of a universal may be better distributed and restrained by its relation to particulars, than particulars can be denominated like the universal; so it is here unfitter to give the attribute of God relatively to the creature, than to speak of God as Relatively limited to the creature. And therefore it is more unfit to say that the creature co-existeth [eternally and immensely] with God, than that God co-existeth [temporarily and limitedly] with the creature in relation. 2. That the most proper expression is to fetch the attribute from the Nature of the subject, rather than borrowedly from the correlate: And so it is fittest to say, that [The Eternal and Immense God doth co-exist Eternally and Immensely with the Transitory, finite creature]; And that [the creature doth Transitorily and finitely co-exist with the Eternal Immense God].

97. As Time is no Real being, but the Duration of Beings, which is nothing but their Existence not ceasing; so Eternity is nothing really distinct from God himself; but it is God's existence considered as having no measure of duration, no beginning, no middle, no parts of duration and no End.

98. Eternity therefore is a Notion which may be called Indivisible and Divisible in several respects. It is Indivisible properly and in itself considered; for it is nothing but God himself as existing sine mensura tempor is perfectly and indivisibly: But it may be called Divisible Intellectually (by human, partial or inadequate conception; not by partition), as it is compared to transitory time; and because as man's narrow head must know one God suo modo by many inadequate conceptions, or not at all, so must he know Eternity suo modo, by conceptions drawn from partible Time.

99. By this much the great Objections of the Scotists may be satisfied by a Conciliation: They say, 1. That which existeth not, doth not co-exist; nor God with it. 2. That Eternity indeed includeth all Time successively as present in it; but not future Time. To the first I answer, 1. That it is granted that Time hath successions, and only the present Instant is: And that which Is not, co-existeth not with Eternity: But yet seeing Eternity is Indivisible, it is not part of it that co-existeth with one of our Instants and part with another; but All indivisibly with each instant. 2. And when it is said, That the Creature existed not ab aeterno, if you intellectually divide Eternity into past and present and future, like Time, it's true: But speaking properly, it is fallacious: For [Ab] aeterno implieth a division of Eternity, and a preterition of one part, which is commonly supposed false. But if the denomination be sercht from Eternity, seeing it is Indivisible, you cannot say that today it co-existeth with this day, and not with tomorrow, for if ever it co-existeth, it always co-existeth: For, ab & ad, & ante & post, & fuit & erit, are words of falsehood spoken properly of Eternity (according to the commonest doctrine.)

100. And to the second the same answer serveth; Denominating Time in itself, you may say that some is future, that is, Is not, but Will be, and so that it is not In Eternity till it come. But setching the Name from Indivisible Eternity, Future there is a word of false importance: There is no Futurity in Eternity. And it Indivisibly includeth all successions of our Time.

101. Yet we lay no stress on any of this as necessary to reconcile our Controversies: And we readily acknowledge and maintain, that by Extrinsick denomination from its Relation to our successive Instants, Eternity and God himself may have new and various denominations (of which more anon).

SECT. VII. Of School Curiosities and Uncertainties about God's Knowledge.

102. ABout God's Knowledge Scholastical presumption hath gone so far, as that I should rather with trembling fly from their questions, than seek to solve them, if the opposition of their curiosity and the defense of truth, were not by them made necessary to others, and consequently some consideration of the thing.

103. Some presume to tell us, that God knoweth Creatures only in his own Essence, and not in themselves, which must needs be false, if the Creatures are in themselves Intelligible: Because God's perfection importeth the knowledge of all that is intelligible.

104. Others tell us on the contrary, that God knoweth the Creatures only in themselves, and not in his own Essence: But doubtless so far as they may be said to be in his Essence, (which is at least Virtually) they are there intelligible.

105. Scotus with his followers hold that God's Intellect hath two Objects, one Primary, immediate, and motive, by virtue of which all other things are known; and this is God's Essence. The other secondary, mediate, and not motive, but terminative, and such is the Creature; known only in God's Essence, as per aliud prius cognitum in quo continetur, & non per propriam speciem. But here they are at the greatest loss.

106. For to the Question, How the Creature is in God, their necessary Ignorance bewrayeth itself by their divisions. It is agreed that all things were eternally in God as in the first cause virtually and eminently. But say some, The same numerical perfections are in God, as in the Creatures, viz. Infinitely in God, and finitely in the Creatures: But this maketh God and the Creature to be One, and deifieth Creatures.

107. This they are put to, for the solving of that great difficulty, Whether God and the Universe conjunct contain more Entity or perfection intensively or extensively than God alone, and the Worlds Being add any Entity besides Deity?

108. They that are for the Negative, judge it blasphemy to say, that God alone is Less than God and the World; For he seemeth not to be of Infinite Entity to whom anything can be added. The question is not Whether the World add any Divine Being to God, but any Being at all be so superadded, as that God is made a Part of the Universe. And I confess that Pars, and toto minor, are words that I dare not apply to God.

109. On the other side, saith Rada, Though Intensively nothing is added to God, yet Extensively we must say, that entity and perfection in the Creature is so added, as that God and the Creature are More than God alone; because else we must say, either that God and the World are one, or else that the World is Nothing, or hath no Being: which is false.

110. Who dare venture on either of these dangerous consequences; either that God is but a Part of Entity and Less than All, and so not Infinite; or that the World is God or Nothing? If we should say, that the Entity of the Creature being but Analogical Entity, is no Addition to God's being, Ens non dicitur Univoce de Deo & Creaturis; as the Sco • ists deny the antecedent, so it hardly satisfieth the mind: Because even this Analogical Entity is real positive Entity, and not nothing: And therefore though it add not Deity, it seemeth to add Entity; and both sorts to be more than One alone.

111. And if we should say, that the World is an Accident of God, (as a man's hair is of a man, supposing it were voluntarily Caused by him); And that it is no imperfection in God to have Accidents, as long as his Essence is no Accident, nor Compounded; And so that the World is no part of God, Essential or Integral; but being an Accident it is no Addition of Entity to God; Because as the word [Man] or [Peter] includeth not only his Parts, but his hair as an Accident, so the word [God] may include the World as an Accident: This would be judged novel, bold, presumptuous, and is not fully satisfactory, had it no ill consequents.

112. The only way therefore is to confess our Ignorance, and that it must needs be that the mind which cannot comprehend God's Immense Eternal Essence, must be unable to solve such questions as imply such a comprehension: And it were well if men's experience of their utter incapacity to understand some such Cases, would warn them more cautelously to meddle with others.

113. The Scotists doctrine is laid down by Rada in these Conclusions; 1. Deus cognoscit alia à se. 2. Cognoscit omnia perfectissime. 3. Non cognoscit alia à se per repraesentationem & motionem quam ipsa de se faciunt. 4. Creatura non est objectum primarium & immediatum Divinae cognitionis. 5. Sed tale est Divina essentia. 6. Distinctam tamen aliorum habet Cognitionem. 7. Deus cognoscit creaturas in su • essentia. 8. Cognoscit res in se ipsis & propriis earum naturis, si fiat determinatio cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. In all this it seemeth to me to be overbold presumption to conclude, 1. That God knoweth not the Creature immediately: And the reason he giveth is as bold, quia tunc vilesceret Divinus intellectus. None of this can be proved, though I presume not to assert the contrary. Yet it seemeth to us that the Creature is Quid intelligible in se immediate, and that it is the perfection of God to know all that is intelligible, and not a vilifving of him. As it is no vilifying of his Power to make everything as it is. The Creature no doubt is not the Primary intelligible object: But whether it be not Immediately Intelligible in se is the doubt.

2. And it seemeth to me a presumption to say, that else the Creature would move the Divine Intellect, and that God as the object moveth his own Intellect as agent; For Moving signifieth Causing, and there is in God (say all Divines) no Effects, and therefore no Causing of them; and so no such moving.

114. It is also an agitated Controversy with them, Whether it be God's Essence as such which the Creatures are Represented and known in, or in his Knowledge itself as such? They that are for the former say, that the Creature is represented in the Divine Essence before it is known (as in a glass) because the object is presupposed to the act: saith Cajetan, the Ruder ignorant sort thus imagine. The second opinion is thus delivered by Rada, Res non continentur in Divina Essentia ut prior est cognition actu & formaliter; nec ibi repraesentantur actu & distinct. 2. Creaturae in Divina Essentia non prius habent esse repraesentatum actu & formaliter, quam intelliguntur. 3. Creatura (formaliter loquendo secundum quod aliquid dicitur formaliter intelligible) non prius habet intelligible quam intelligatur; sed per intellectionem habet primum esse actual & formal, & proprium expressum & repraesentatum. And their similitude is, that as man's mind doth not presuppose second notions (Genus, species, &c.) but make them, so doth God the Creature as intelligible intelligendo.

115. This leadeth them to another doubt, Whether the Creatures have from Eternity an esse reale distinct from God's Essence? Where Henry. saith that they have a true esse reale essentiae, at non existentiae, because omne possibile est ens reale; & est in genere, &c. Thus do men play with the notions of their own brains. Scotus confuteth this by seven arguments, which is easily done.

116. But their next doubt is greater, Whether the Creatures have from eternity an esse intelligible & cognitum distinct from God's essence? What the esse Cognitum is, whether it be ens reale or rationis or quid medium? Scotus is the Author of this notion of esse cognitum as an esse formal & proprium quod creatura habet distinctum ab esse suae Causa; in quo in Divino intellectu creaturae ipsae per intellectionem producuntur; e. g. Lapid • m in esse cognito producit, sicut intellectus noster secundas intentitiones facit, & ita rebus ipsis esse cognitum tribuit: nam sicut lapis visus per visionem habet esse visum, ita lapis cognitus per cognitionem esse cognitum habet—sed ut primum ejus esse, per quod esse formal habent—Imo esse rerum Possibile in esse cognito fundatur. Who can read such presumptuous assertions of the unknown mode of Divine Intellection without dread? And what a dance and show is here made of mere words, while a Creature that is no Creature, is said to have an esse which is no esse (of them) and so confessed? For (though Cajetan and others mistook him,) Scotus confesseth that this esse congnitum non est ens reale, nec medium inter ens reale & rationis, sed est ens rationis purum, & omnino nihil, contra ens reale distinctum, ita, quod nullatenus aliquid realit at is habet. And is not here then a presumptuous play with words? Scotus thus explaineth it. If Caesar were annihilated, and the statue of him remained, Caesar would have an Esse repraesentatum in the statue, which is neither an esse essentiae vel existentiae total or partial. And saith Rada, Ex his manifest colligitur esse cognitum Creaturae in Deo secundum Scotum esse omnino nihil, prout nihil opponitur enti reali sive essentiae sive existentiae,—& non magis esse nihil Chimaeram quam hominem in esse cognito, quia utri{que} inest negatio totius entis. And indeed the esse repraesentatum Caesaris is nothing but the modus statuae, which per modum signi is apt to bring the shape of Caesar to the beholders imagination. And 1. Can they prove any such Modifications of God? 2. And if they can, should they so abuse words as to call that modus Intellectus Divini, an esse primum formal creaturae distinct from God? The sum of the Scotists opinion is thus expressed by Rada Esse cognitum creaturae est ens Rationis, solum habens esse in intellectu Divino objective, sicut secundae intentiones in intellectu creato—sed res in esse cognito non est objectum motivum sed terminativum secundarium. 1. As if God had any objectum motivum! 2. Or as if we poor mortals knew that God hath entia Rationis! Though we confess that we may so speak of him after the manner of men; if we confess the great impropriety of the speech.

117. From hence ariseth another Controversy, Whether to God's understanding the Creatures, there be necessarily pre-required in him distinct relations to the objects? which I will not trouble you with their agitation of.

118. But the great Controversy is of the Divine Idea's; especially Whether the Creature as in Esse cognito be a Divine Idea? Aquinas denieth it, and saith that an Idea is the Divine Essence as imitable by the Creature. Scotus, Gabr. Ockam, Gerson, &c. affirm it. Aquinas his opinion is thus opened by Cajetan, Rada and others, 1. Idea non significat solum fundamentum imitabilitatis. 2. Nec tantum respectum imitabilitatis. 3. Sed utrumque. 4. Essentia Divina cognita ut imitabilis à Creatura per modum exemplaris est Idea. 5. In Deo est idearum multitudo. 6. Multitudo ide arum in Deo non est multitudo rerum reipsa inter se, & ab essentia distinctarum. 7. Nec multitudo rationum formalium, sive rerum formaliter distinctarum. 8. Sed est multitudo rationum intellectarum. 9. Non distinguuntur ration per actum intellectus creati. Idearum multitudo est multitudo rationum à Deo intellectarum.

119. The Scotists think Augustine of their mind, and give us their sense in these conclusions, of Rada, 1. Ideas, hoc est, rations in mente Divina collocatas tam Graeci quam Latini tradiderunt. 2. Idea non est Divina essentia secundum se & absolute sumpta. 3. Non est quid aggregatum ex essentia & respectu imitabilitatis. 4. Non includit in sua ration respectum rationis nec tanquam aliquid sibi essentiale, nec tanquam modum intrinsecum. 5. Idea in mente Divina est ipsamet creatura cognita. And Scotus his definition is, Idea est ratio aeterna & incommutabilis in mente Divina, secundum quam aliquid est formabile extra tanquam sccundum propriam rationem ejus.

120. By this you see how widely they are disagreed what an Idea is in God: And yet they conclude (as Rada ib. p. 480.) neminem nisi his intellectis sapientem esse: Nam quamvis Deus Opt. Max. ex cognition suae essentiae sit Infinite sapiens, ac proinde ex cognition Idearum non efficiatur sapientior intensive, attamen si Ideas, quarum ratio incommutabilis est, ignoraret, non esset Omniscius. Et Art. 3. p. 470. he saith, [Deus esse nequit sine Ideis.] We all grant that without the Knowledge of all things Intelligible, God cannot be, nor be Omniscient. But the name of Idea's is fetched from man's mode of Intellection, which is ever conjunct with somewhat of Imagination or sense; which also seemeth included in our notion of Ideas, which therefore are usually called Images or Species. And as we are most certain that Intellection in God both in the form and mode doth so Infinitely transcend and differ from human Intellection, as that it is not the same thing; so we are very unfit in this woeful darkness to talk so peremptorily of things unknown, and to conclude that God hath not a more perfect knowledge of things, than by Idea's, or anything fitly so called. The world therefore should not be troubled with such presumptions.

121. The next doubt among them is of Future Contingents, Whether and how they are known of God. That they are known of him is past doubt: But how is the great difficulty. Aquinas his mind is thus expressed by Rada, Concl. 1. Futura Contingentia prout sunt in suis causis indeterminatis, solum conjecturali cognition cognosci possunt. 2. Futura contingentiae in seipsis possunt certa & infallibili cognition cognosci. 3. Deus non cognoscit praecise futurum contingens, prout est in suis causis indeterminatis. 4. Deus cognoscit futura contingentia ut praesentia in sua reali & actuali existentia, quae eis convenit extra suas causas. 5. Deus certa & infallibili cognition praescit futura contingentia.

122. The mind of Scotus he thus expresseth, after many notes and distinctions. 1. Deus cognoscit omnia futura contingentia quoad omnes conditions existentiae eorum, sic, quod quaecunque eis in tempore contingenter insunt, perfect ab aeterno attingit. 2. Deus non cognoscit certo & determinate futura contingentia per hoc quod sunt sibi in aeternitate praesentia. (Should I here recite you the reasons by which he and other Scotists and Dr. Twisse do propugn this assertion, and those by which Cajetan and many Thomists do oppugn it, I should tire you. It shall suffice to say that both sides talk in the dark of that which is utterly above man's reach). 3. Certitudo Divinae essentiae respectu omnium quantum ad omnes conditions existentiae, non habetur per ideas. (This also is on both sides tediously disputed in the dark). 4. Qui nosset causas naturales futurorum, etiam eorum quae necessarias causas habent, ut Solis, Lunae{que} defectiones, non proinde infallibilem eorum notitiam assequeretur, nisi determinationem divinae voluntatis circa hujusmodi eventus cognosceret. (That's true, because they are all but dependent second Causes). 5. Deus cognoscit futura contingentia certo & infallibiliter; quia Divina essentia ut ratio cognoscendi repraesentat divino intellectui rem determinate futuram ex determinatione divinae voluntatis. And this is Scotus his way, which Dr. Twisse propugneth.

123. Here Scotus supposeth things to lie in this order in the Divine Intellect, [1. The Divine Essence moveth the Divine intellect to know it self, and all that is formally in it. 2. To the simple Intellection of all that is Intelligible, as abstracting from existence, or any order to it. 3. To the knowledge of all necessary copulations, which are known by connection of terms, and this naturally and necessarily before the wills determination: because they are not True because God willeth it, but antecedently formally of themselves. But not so to the Knowledge of contingent copulations, &c.] How easy were it to open much uncertainty and figment in these bold assertions?

124. And here a great deal of dispute there is about the Liberty of God's will, and the nature of contingency. Some Thomists, (whom our Westminster Assembly follow, but it should not have been put into a Confession of faith) say that nothing is to be called Contingent in respect of God. But the Scotists contrarily say that there could be no contingency if it were not first from God's free will: and that he freely and contingently made all the world: All Actions being either naturally necessary or contingent; And if God had made all of natural necessity, they had been eternal.

125. And here they say that God's will hath first a Liberty of contradiction, (to will or not will.) 2. And a Liberty to divers objects, (which I call of competition or comparison) yea and to will contrary objects by the same act. 3. But not a Liberty to contrary Acts (Velle & nolle) because that would be mutability.

126. And here many maxims are used by them as sufficient to answer all objectors, which yet are ambiguous or uncertain themselves. 1. One is, that God receiveth not the certainty of his Knowledge from the Creatures: And therefore if their present co-existence in eternity were proved, it would no whit clear the doubts, or help the Thomists, who are here at a loss for a sufficient answer. My business is to side with neither, but to deter the Reader from the presumption of both parties; and to that end, to open the uncertainty of what they say. And so it is enough to answer, that As the Creature in being is no addition to God's being or perfection, so to Know the Creature is not any addition to God's Knowledge or perfection; but only the terminative acting of his perfect Knowledge ad extra. And that their word [Receiveth] hath a false supposition. For God Receiveth no Knowledge (though man's knowledge be partly Receiving); but the Infinite Light of his Intellect is emitted knowingly to the Creature. So that God's knowledge may be terminated on Creatures, and thence denominated This or That knowledge without Reception.

127. Another maxim is that of Augustine, Non aliter facta quam fienda novit, and no new mode of Knowledge is to be imagined in God: which both sides make use of. To which I say, that nothing can be called God's Knowledge, but either his Essential Intellection, or the termination of it on the Creature. The first is never changed: But the second, say the Nominals, is but an extrinsic denomination of it from the various terminating objects: And whether you will call them terminations, or Relations, or denominations, they may be New and various (of which more anon) without any change or variety in God: even as the Sun is not changed by the various Receptions or terminations of its influx here below.

128. Another maxim is, that God knoweth things even Intuitively eternally in himself (his Will) when they exist not. Answ. As Abstractive and Intuitive are words signifying the divers modes of God's knowing things, they are but presumptuous figments, for ought I see; It being past man's reach to know the mode of Divine intellection, more than above the reach of a bird or beast to know the mode of ours. But as we may more easily and safely distinguish and denominate God's Knowledge from the objects, so we may well say, 1. That he knoweth not that Creature to exist in nunc temporis which doth not so exist. 2. And that esse Volitum is not esse existens. And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter.

129. Yea it is here disputed Whether there be indeed any contingency or not (which the Doctrine of Hobs and the Dominican Predeterminants must needs exclude, which make all events to be necessitated by God). The Reasons against it are, 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth must necessarily be: but he fore-knoweth all that will be: ergo— 2. All things future are from eternity determined in God's will to one part of the contradiction: ergo necessario erunt. 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done, by the physical efficient necessitating insuperable predetermination of God the first cause: ergo, there is no place in such necessity for contingency (which is a posse tendere ad esse vel non esse.)

130. Many and different answers are given to these, and those of the Thomists and Dominicans are mostly shuffling and vain: But plainly and briefly, 1. God's fore-knowledge, 2. And his mere will, when they are not joined efficiently with power, or a will de efficiendo, do no whit at all Cause or necessitate the effect or event, or ponere aliquid in objecto. It is only a Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probandi that ariseth from them, which consisteth with contingency, and not a physical necessity in ordine essendi as from a Cause, called consequentis, or effecti. And, 2. God's Knowledge and Will rather prove contingency; For he doth not only know and will hoc futurum, but hoc contingenter futurum: Therefore it will be. 3. And the last argument from necessitating predetermination I shall elsewhere confute, and show their contradiction who say that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to pass.

131. But it cannot be denied but that God's will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event: And therefore that Necessitate existentiae the determination of it is eternally necessary: And therefore that which we call Its Liberty is but the perfect manner of its determination, as Bradwardine confesseth.

132. But what is all this stir about? The great business of all is to show how God fore-knoweth sin. For saith Rada, It's easy (from God's Volition) to show how he knoweth things that are not sin: but how knoweth he sin from eternity, seeing this was never in esse volito? And here the way of the Scotists proveth utterly insufficient. Dr. Twisse and Rutherford and some Dominicans say, that God fore-knoweth it, because he Decreed to Cause all the Entity of the Act with all its circumstances from which the form of sin is but a resulting relation. But this subverteth Religion. Rada ibid. and Twisse oft say, he Decreeth to permit it, (and that it shall come to pass ipso permittente, saith Twisse:) Qu • permissio (saith Rada) non accipitur in communi, sed pro eo quod est permittere de facto deficere & in peccatum ruere subtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus positis non foret peccatum. Quare haec est bona consequentia quantum ad illationem prcaise; Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic & nunc de facto: ergo, peccat: ergo, valet consequentia, Deus voluit ab aeterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali & tali occasion oblata: ergo peccabit: Dixi quantum ad Illationem praecise. Quia quantum ad Causalitatem non est bona illa consequentia . But to pass by their supposition of God's knowing consequences by argumentation, I shall confute all this anon.

133. And here the Thomists and Scotists have another skuffle, on the question, Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of existency in God, be Necessary in him, or free and contingent? The Thomists thus conclude, 1. Si futurum contingens secundum se, & suam propriam naturam consideretur, necessitas nullatenus ei convenire potest, sed sola contingentia. 2. Si futurum contingens consideretur secundum quod subest Divinae scientiae, est necessarium absolute. 3. Haec propositio, Deus scivit Antichristum futurum, est simpliciter & absolute necessaria: sed ho • consequence, [Ergo Antichristus erit] non est absolute necessarium sed contingens, si secundum se consideretur: At ut divinae scientiae subest, est absolute necessarium. 4. Scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium prou • jam ad ipsa est terminata, est simpliciter necessaria. And they prove the affirmative thus, 1. God's knowledge is Immutable: therefore necessary. 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection: therefore necessary in God. 3. This Can be in God: therefore it necessarily is in him.

134. The Scotists thus express their sense, (after much explication), 1. Futuro contingenti secundum suam propriam naturam consider ato null • necessitas conveire potest. 2. Futura contingentia, etiam ut subsunt Divinae scientiae, non sunt necessaria. 3. Futurum contingens, etiam at subest Divinae scientiae, est q • oad esse simpliciter contingens, & secundum quid necessarium. 4. Propositio haec [Deus scivit Petrum futurum] sive sit de praesenti, vel de praeterito, non est simpliciter necessaria, sed ex suppositione. 5. Praefata propositio & omnia futura contingentia, sunt necessaria necessitate immutabilitatis. 6. Scientia Dei respectu omnium creaturarum quoad esse existentiae earum est contingens, & ex suppositione necessaria. I recite the words of Rada only, that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruse too many Authors, and because no man better discusseth the differences. See also his answers to the Thomists arguments, pag. 514. He that would peruse more, may see them named in Ripalda lib. 1. d. 38. & 37. and may read Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. ar. 5. Aureol. 1. d. 38. ar. 1. Ockam & Gabri. ib. q. unic. ar. 2 & 3. Greg. ib. q. 2. Durand. ib. q. 3. Fab. d. 54. Cajet. Naz. Bannez, Zumel, Gonzal. Arrub. Molin. Vasq. Fasol. m. 1. p. q. 14. ar. 3. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. a. 14. p. 3. Suarez li. 3. de Attribut. c. 2. Ruiz d. 10. Bonavent. 1. d. 39. Aquil. Scotell. in 1. d. 39. q. 2. And on the same a multitude of other known Scotists, &c.

135. Should I proceed to open to you all or half the questions about which the Schoolmens acutest wits do but dream, concerning the Knowledge and Decrees of God, I should weary myself and the Reader to little purpose; such as, An scientia actualis aliorum sit de Essentia Dei? An Essentia Dei sit Motivum adaequatum ejus scientiae? An Deus cognoscat creaturas ex seipso, aut ex alio per discursum? An & quomodo scientia Dei possit dividi in plures? An & quomodo Deus cognoscat Mala? An & quomodo Deus cognoscat negationes & privationes? An Deus cognoscat Entia rationis? An habeat in se Entia Rationis? De scientia Media. An scientia Visionis sit causa futurorum? An futur a causa scientiae? An scientia simplicis intelligentiae sit causa futurorum & practica? An Deus cognoscat futura compenendo & dividendo? An Deus cognoscat praesentia eadem indivisibly cognition, qua ipsa praenovit futura? An Deus noverit Infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiae? An eadem cognition se & creaturas cognoscat? An existente objecto pro solo imperio Voluntatis Divinae possit non esse in Deo aliquis actus scientiae divino intellectui possibilis? &c. with a multitude of lesser questions which arise in the handling of these; And with as many more about Predestination, God's Decrees or Volitions, Predetermination, &c. I think rather your patience is put to it sufficiently already.

136. If you say that by reciting these difficulties, I do but confound men's understandings, rather than elucidate the things in hand, I answer, If you are lost in them, I have my end, which is to make you sensible how unmeet it is, that the Peace of the Church, and the Concord and Communion of Brethren should at all be laid on such multitudes of difficult and unsearchable things which are many vain, and others past man's understanding. Shall we call one another by the names of Sects, and reproach our brethren, as for the truth of God, and as if it were for his Glory, till all these Controversies are cleared to us all? I who profess them to be beyond my reach, and profess my Ignorance of very many of them, am yet censured by my Brethren as too Scholastically curious for so much as naming them, or meddling with them; yea, and for deciding cases which may and must be decided: And of all our present Ministers, I am confident there is not one of fifty (if of a hundred) that hath either thoroughly studied them, or ever will do. Now if the Church must have Love and Concord, how will it be had? Of those few (one of a hundred that study them thoroughly) six men it's like are of three opinions. And what shall the ninety nine do that never so studied them? Either they must know what they never studied, and be in the Right where they understand not what they say: Or else they must unite by an Implicit faith. And in whom shall that be? If the Church, what Church is it? Are not many Churches of many minds? If of the Papal Church, it hath more wit than to decide such Controversies; so that their Doctors are almost Sectaries by divisions to this day.

137. And if any will dream that the Controversies between the Calvinists and Lutherans (or Arminians) and the Dominicans and Jesuits can be resolved for either side without meddling with these questions, he is a person too ignorant to be fit to speak confidently in the Cause. Let him but try a dispute with any able adversary, and he shall be carried to these whether he will or not.

138. But if it be one that is so confident on either part, as to think that his side or opinions are so great and clear, as that the contrary are unfit for our toleration, and communion, I must be so free with him as to say, that he bewrayeth so great Ignorance and Pride, as make his own fitness for communion much more questionable. For is it not most odious Ignorance, for a man not to know his own Ignorance of so many mysteries which no mortals know? And is it not loathsome Pride, for men to be so confident of these false conceits and arrogate to themselves a knowledge which man's earthly state is uncapable of?

139. And it filleth me with shame to find, that (though some stir hath been lately made against the Jansenists) yet all these Sects (Dominicans, Jesuits, Scotists, Nominals, &c.) can live in communion notwithstanding their differences, when yet the Protestants have prosecuted the same differences with all that bitterness, which you may find in the Germans Historians and Divines, (such as Schlusselburgius, Calovius, and many more) and in the sad History of the Low Countries, and in Heylin 's Life of Archbishop Laud, and which you may still hear in all parties, in their ignorant censures of one another, by the names of Calvinists and Arminians. And yet the Church of Rome is justly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty against Dissenters, when thus we thereby condemn ourselves.

SECT. VIII. More of God's Fore-knowledge, and of Permission of Sin.

140. BUt to leave this Wilderness, and speak more of things certain, or such as belong to us in our measure to know: It is certainly unknown to mortals, formally, what knowledge is in God (as is aforesaid), and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents, or any Creatures, ex parte scientis.

141. If any particular manner therefore offer itself to your minds, as that which probably seemeth to be the right, it may afford you reason therefore to suspect that it is not the right: Because it is certain that the Manner is past our reach. And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God.

142. If the Case of Aaron's Sons, the Bethshemites, Uzzah, Uzziah, and others that presumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was so dreadful; what is theirs that profanely toss God's own Name, and pretend to know that of himself, which they know not, and turn his secrets profanely into matter of Contention against the Churches of Christ?

143. Either Futurity as such, is Intelligible in itself to God, or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity; or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in itself, or as things are In Eternity, the Controversy is mostly ended: The perfection of God's understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Causes, it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause, or else as freely and contingently. The first Cause reacheth not our Controversy: For sin hath no necessitating Cause, but free. The second is the same difficulty with that in question, viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause (man's Will) will this or that way determine itself? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause; which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that.

144. If we go to the Jesuits Scientia Media (as it deserveth not that name, so) it is insufficient to this use. For all those circumstances in which God sore-knoweth that the will shall determine itself, are such as necessitate the will so to do, or not: If they say the first, they give away their own cause, and the cause of Religion (speaking of sinful Volitions). If the latter, the case is still as difficult (and the same) as if they had never mentioned those circumstances or conditional knowledge: viz. How God knoweth that a will still free and not necessitated will choose sin rather than duty? For from non-necessitating circumstances it followeth not.

145. If we go the way of Scotus, and say that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione, either that will is supposed to be a Causing efficient will; or not? If it be, it reacheth not the case of sin, seeing God's will doth cause no sin. But if not, then still the difficulty is the same as before, How God that willeth the Event, but causeth it not, doth know that his Will shall be done? For it is not from the Cause to the Effect. To say that his own Immutability proveth it, is no proof: For if his Immutability Cause not, the Effect ariseth not from it: And to say that his Omnipotency or Absoluteness inferreth it, is no proof, unless his Omnipotency Cause it. And to say that it followeth Logically Necessitate Consequentiae, though not Causally necessitate effecti vel consequentis, that what God willeth to be, shall be, is most certain: And so is it from his fore-knowledge (which medium yet the Scotists say is here insufficient.) But that is because it is here supposed that what God so knoweth or willeth to be future, he willeth to be future by the causation of some Cause: for he willeth not anything to be without a Cause. Besides that still sin is not willed by him to be future at all.

146. And here I am to confute the foresaid reason of Rada (recited Thes. 130.) God, saith he, fore-knoweth sin, in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it. And Dr. Twisse often saith, that all confess, that Permission certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted. I answer; There is not so much as any great appearance of the Truth of the consequence unless limited. To Permit is nothing but non-impedire, not to hinder. And if a thing will come to pass because it is not hindered, then the world would have been made without God, and man saved without God, if he would not hinder it. Try if your work will be done merely by your not hindering it.

147. Indeed the word Permission is oft used as a complicate notion, signifying both the permission and the event permitted: But that's nothing to the nature of proper permission itself.

148. A man may be hindered, 1. Morally; and that 1. By Commands, 2. By Threats, 3. By Promise and persuasion; 4. By Gifts; 5. By terrifying stripes on himself or others. In all these respects God permitteth not sin, but hindereth it by them all.

149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically. And that 1. By to • all restraint and disabling, 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible, but difficult. God doth not always thus hinder sin, and therefore thus he permitteth it. He doth not disable the sinner, e. g. to lie: And he doth not always render it difficult to him. But it followeth not necessarily, that this will be done, because it's possible; no nor because it is easy or not difficult to be done.

150. But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily disposed agent. To permit a stone to ascend, will not make it ascend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a stone in the Air to fall, I think with Durand, is enough to make it fall, supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances. And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin.

151. But yet here we must distinguish, 1. Between a necessary and a free agent, 2. Between Adams sinning and ours; 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly, or that hath many dissuasions or but few. 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general, that is, of not living innocently, yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth: nor is it a valid consequence, He is a bad man: Ergo he will do this, and that, and the other Sin: Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits. 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning, that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act. 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin, than to the contrary: So that bare permission will not infer the Certainty of all sin, atleast; and therefore will not here serve turn.

152. But saith Rada, it is not common permission, but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin. Answ. 1. God did not so by Adam at first. 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn, as well as effectual? If so, then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God, as he was to die by God's withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation, and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin, as to live without God. But if not so, then while Necessary Grace, called sufficient, is continued, the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning. But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction, that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him, till Adam cast it away.

It is therefore no good Illation, Deus permittit aliquem peccare: ergo peccat: unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help; which is more than proper permission.

153. And it must be remembered that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin: He always hindereth it so far as to forbid it, to threaten damnation to affright men from it, to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it: He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it; And his daily mercies, and corrections should withhold men from it. Only by doing no more, nor effectually changing or restraining sinners, but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means, he permitteth sin.

154. But it is also confessed, that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited, some of them are ofttimes withdrawn or not given: And so some are without that Teaching, those mercies or those corrections which others have: But yet they are still under a Law of Grace.

155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature, upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him; and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause: And therefore that man's Inclination to Felicity, Truth and Goodness which is Natural, doth continue. Otherwise it is confessed, that Permission would infer sin materially, but no sin formally, if by permission be meant God's withdrawing Reason, Freewill, or executive power.

156. But I easily confess, that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion in sinful actions could be proved, that would certainly infer the event of sin; And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will, sin may be fore known in that decree. And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind, they had never omitted that easy solution of the Case, How God fore-knoweth sin? But this I have elsewhere confuted, and shall add a little here.

157. But first (having disproved all these presumptions of God's way of fore-knowing future sin) I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfy us; which is, [That God's Understanding is Infinite, and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible; But How his understanding reacheth them, what Idea's he hath of them, how they are Intelligible to him, with such like, are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men, who know not their own ignorance. And no manner of understanding is properly Divine, which mortals can comprehend.]

SECT. IX. Of Predestination and Free-will (of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford.)

158. THough Pre-determination belong to God's Execution, and be after his Volitions in order, yet because I am now only to speak of it, as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin, and as quid decretum, I shall touch it here. It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of (besides himself); Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause.

159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of human Actions, in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties, and a Power to Act or not act at this time, or to choose this or that, and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion, doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency. So that when ever any Act is done, as an Act in genere, God is the first Cause of it: For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth, and by his Vital Influx; And there is no Power used to produce it which is not given by God.

160. An Act as such, hath no Morality in it, but is quid natural; And so it is from God as he is fons naturae. But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it, referred to God's Governing Will or Law, and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is man's End. And Materially it is (not the Act as such, but) the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one, or to an undue End rather than a due End, or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object, which is the sin, and the fundamentum of the sinfulness; and so e contra.

161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such. In Omissions (of Loving, Trusting, Fearing, Serving God) there is no Natural Act, but a privation of it. In committed sins, to Love this Object rather than that, hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this; and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such. A modus Entis is not Ens: But this Comparative choice, is but the Modus Modi entis: For an Action is but Modus Entis, and this is but a modus actionis.

162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans, that Man should be a Causa prima, and so be God, if he could determine his own will without God's pre-determining pre-motion; and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of: For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such.

163. If any will litigate de nomine entis, let them call it Being or nobeing as they please; but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do. And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World, is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that, under Divine Universal Influx, without Divine pre-determining pre-motion, on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it, is bolder against God, than I shall be. And if God can do it, we have no reason to doubt whether it be done.

164. Men seem not in denying this, to consider the signification of the word [POWER] when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse, and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it, without the said pre-motion. If so, It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it. He that hath a proper Power to Choose, is Able to Choose, and Can Choose, by that Power.

165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power, and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise. And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents; and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions, by all that he doth by his Laws, Providence and Grace to make them good. But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil.

166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis, the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction. A Cause is called Universal, 1. In praedicando, Logically; And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis, & Statuarius est Causa particularis, & Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae. 2. In causande, as to the effect. And so that is an Universal Cause, whose causality extendeth to many effects. And this is twofold: 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects, but not of all that is proper to each, unless its causality be otherwise (as by the dispositio recipientis) determined. And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose, and the stink of the Dunghill, &c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae, by his common sustaining and moving Influx, of all sinful actions, 2. When it is the Cause of those actions, not only as to that which is common to them all, but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another, and that of itself, and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis, or by any other cause. And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is merely physical in all beings and actions; As in Generation, &c. which is properly to say that he is at once, both Cause universalis, particularis & singularis. And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part. But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause; but only a mere Universal as aforesaid.

167. They that denying our self-determining power, do make Volition, and free-Volition to signify the same, and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act, do seem rather to jest, than seriously dispute. And to define Free-will, to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem, is no other. For Velle juxta rationem, is no more than Velle; the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive. And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one, why do we blind the World with words, and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will, and not whether his Will be free? And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it, be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous. If the will be not forced as long as it willeth, or willeth juxta rationem, then to question whether it can will by constraint, is to question whether it can at once will and not will; yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some.

168. But if this were so, then 1. The suspension of the will might be nevertheless by force or restraint: which is a non velle; And so when they say Voluntatem ab ipso Deo non cogi posse, because when it acteth it acteth willingly, (that is, when it willeth, it willeth) the consequence holdeth not, because it may be forced from all action: (unless they mean that it cannot nolle & non agere at once). 2. And if this were so, then either they mean that God cannot naturally necessitate the will to act, or that such a natural necessitation consisteth with its Liberty. If the first, they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination: For what is that but God's Physical irresistible efficacious premotion, determining the will to act? And what is natural necessitation if this be not? If the latter, then they contradict their own definition of Liberty, which they oft give us, that it is Liberty from natural necessity (which Twisse calleth Libertas naturae distinct from Libertas conditionis, vel civilis.) And what more natural necessity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action, without which no agent natural or free can act, and which none can resist?

169. Their opinion of Liberty also leaveth no difference between brutish appetite or spontaneity, and free-will, save only that this doth follow reason: which indeed is a difference of Guides, but not of Liberty.

170. And according to this opinion, if God gave Satan power to move any man's will to sin by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen, it were no constraint, nor loss of natural Liberty, because it is moved to be Willing.

171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination, then if Satan could infuse unresistibly into the Will, an Inclination to hate God or to any sin, and then physically determine it according to that inclination, it were no force, or loss of natural liberty.

172. But I think he that by irresistible efficiency makes a man's will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts, doth incomparably more against him and his liberty, than he that could force his tongue or hand against his will, or he that only tempted and persuaded him.

173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion, are elsewhere given; I now name but these three, 1. Because (whatever vain talk is used to blind men) it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world, or can be. 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith: For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lies and other sins in the world, then his Veracity which is the formal object of faith, is gone: And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false, nor when God moveth them to the one or the other: For to Call their motion by the name of Inspiration, will satisfy no man, that God's Inspiration can do anymore (at least to interest himself in the act) than his necessary physical premoving determination. 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for not-conquering God, who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act; that is, for not being God's, or greater than God: And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which he thus pre-moved us to irresistibly, and it was as impossible to forbear, as to touch the Moon.

174. In the issue of all these Controversies, the sharpest contenders seem agreed, whether they will or no: Arminius granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary necessitate consequentiae, which is (as is said) but a Logical necessity in ordine probandi: that is, It is a good consequence, [This God fore-knoweth, ergo it will come to pass:] And it is only the necessitas consequentis which he denieth; (which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth necessitas causata, and I had rather call necessitas effecti) which is in ordine productionis. And Dr. Twisse doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert anymore than necessitas consequentiae: And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this, which also fore-knowledge itself will infer; It's worth the reciting: Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digres. 5. [Quid quod ab eruditis eadem statuitur necessitas ab utra{que} profluens, tam à praescientia Dei quam ab ipsius Voluntate. Nam licet Arminius voluerit necessitatem à Dei voluntate profectam esse necessitatem Consequentis, à praescientia vero promanantem duntaxat Consequentiae; aliter tamen visum est magnis Theologis. Sic enim Durand [Non been dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de necessitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam; quia omnia respectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere; & ideo absolute loquendo possunt non evenire.] Expressius Bonaventura [Dei voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri; conditionalem vero minime: sed advertendum quod est necessitas consequentiae, sicut praedictum est de praescientia: Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae; Quia necessario infertur & sequitur, Deus praescivit hoc; Ergo hoc erit: Sed tamen non necessario praescit: quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei, & ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae: sed non consequentis; quia non mutat eventum rei—unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum, non potest falli: sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert (that is, in arguing) non potest impediri.]

Ita Trigosius in sum. Theol. Bonav. [Effectus contingentes & liberi si comparentur ad scientiam, providentiam, & Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid, sive ex suppositione, quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis & consequentiae, non tamen absoluta & consequentis.—Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae [Deus praescivit hoc futurum, Ergo erit: Deus vult aliquid fieri; Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit, & quando voluerit; Quia non stat dari antecedens verum & consequence falsum.]

Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa [Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis & invincibilis, non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta—sed solum conditionata, sicut & de praescientia dictum est.] But the word [effectus] here is more than the rest say.

And more fully ibid. sect. 18. pag. (Vol. min.) 230. [Quid quod Scholastici, nominatim vero Aquinas & Durand (nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem, N. B.) non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum, ration Voluntatis Dei, quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae.]

And yet plainer ibid. sect. 18. pag. 332. c. 2. [At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei, revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit, (quod monuit Perkinsius, & vere,) quam ex suppositione decreti divini, in Argumentatione scilicet: quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura, legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit. At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini: etenim posito quod existat actus liber, necesse est ut existat.]

175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that fore-knowledge, decree, and providence infer as to the acts of sin: viz. of Logical consequence. Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other, and I will contradict it no more.

176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth man's will to the mode as well as to the act, that it be done freely as well as that it be done; if Willingness and freedom were all one, I would grant it, on their grounds. But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining -efficient premotion, and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause, bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel, and be no real cause of the thing itself, I confess I understand not what they mean, nor know what Liberty is, if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination.

177. The same I say of Cameron 's and others way of predetermining by a chain of necessitating Causes, viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie. 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will. For all cometh to one, if all sinful Volitions be necessitated. Nor will it satisfy any man well that Cameron doth resolve all man's sin into the Devils temptation as a necessitating cause, till he know into what to resolve the Devils sin: And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin, and bring all sin and misery on the world; much more he that saith, that God did all this himself.

178. As there is Libera Voluntas, and Liberum arbitrium, or Libertas Voluntatis, & Libertas hominis, so there is a coaction or constraint of the Will and of the Man. I should take my Will to be constrained, if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit, or either. But the man is not said to be constrained, so long as he hath his Will.

179. The unhappy descriptions of free-will, which I mentioned, Jansen hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat. cap. 5. & 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large: As [Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera, sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus. Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem, id est, Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera. Apud Augustinum esse liberam, & esse aliquam hominis & Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur. Voluntas seu Volitio, & libera Voluntas idem est, sicut & Velle & libere Velle: & Impossible est ut Velle non sit liberum—] Lege etiam Annatum & Petavium Cont. Vincent. Lerinens.; & Pennoti propugnacul. haec plenius tractans.

180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that (As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others;) For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that, destroyed Liberty: But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining: which power is called Indifferent, because it is a Power to this or that, and not because it is equally inclined, no nor equally a Power to either. For there may be inequality.

181. When Dr. Twisse with Bradwardine about the definition of freewill, (which positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere vel non agere) limiteth [omnibus] to second causes, Annatus playeth upon his oversight, as if he said that [Agere posset voluntas sine requisitis ex parte causae primae.] But no doubt Dr. Twisse meant the limitation as to the non-agere only: and that with the explication [non quasi motio Divina sit inter ejusmodi prae-requisita quae voluntatem creatam indifferentem relinquat.] Though indeed we cannot imagine that the causae secundae should operate and ponere omnia ad agendum requisita sine prima. And we may well say indeed that Voluntas potest non agere, if the second cause only do its part, when non potest omnino agere. This therefore should be better opened.

182. If by [omnibus requisitis] be meant only [mere necessariis sine quibus agere non potest Voluntas] this taketh not away the Moral (much less the Natural) Power ad agendum vel non-agendum, nor necessarily determineth it. But there may be such an effectual or potent operation on the will, as shall Certainly and Constantly determine it, by causing to determine itself: and antecedently take away its Moral power ad contrarium, though not its Natural. Of the difference between the Natural and Moral power, I shall somewhat insist, and elsewhere more at large.

183. The Natural Liberty of the Will must be distinguished from its Moral Liberty (from evil dispositions) and its Political Liberty (from restraining Laws.)

184. The Natural Liberty seemeth to consist in these three things; 1. That the Will as a finite dependent Creature, be a Power given and upheld by God of self-determining or morally specifying its own acts, without any necessitating Pre-determiner (Divine or human.) Where note that all Divine Predetermination taketh not away that Liberty: But not to be able to determine itself without Divine Physical Efficient Predetermination, is inconsistent with its Natural Power and Liberty. 2. Liberty containeth the Wills Empire over the inseriour faculties (respectively with variety, Despotical or Political.) 3. To be from under the power of any creature, as to necessitation.

185. As the Posse Velle hoc vel illud, velle aut non velle (in quibusdam) sine divina vel alia extrinsica praedeterminatione, is the Wills Natural Liberty, so not to be pre-determined to sin, (in act or habit) by God or creatures, is the Wills Political Freedom, or Libertas Condition is, as Dr. Twisse calleth it: which God himself hath given it, and never taketh away from it.

186. And to be Habitually and Actually Holy, is the Wills Ethical Liberty; which all men have lost so far as they are corrupted by sin: and all men have recovered, so far as they are sanctified by Grace. This is the Free-will which Grace restoreth to us.

187. Habits do not determine the Will infallibly per modum nature, or necessitate its act. Because a man oft acteth contrary to habits.

188. There are some things which Natural Inclination infallibly causeth the Will to determine itself to, without the loss of its primary natural Liberty.

189. For all Liberty lieth not in such an Indifferency as Morally may fall either way: But a certain Natural Liberty is consistent with a constant certainty of self-determination ex Inclinatione Naturali, as 1. To a simple Volition of our own felicity; 2. As to a simple Volition Boni sensibilu quà talis. 3. As to a Volition medii unici, noti, ubi nihil repugnat.

190. And yet here, I mean but quoad specificationem actus: For quoad exercitium it may be omitted. 2. I confine it to simple Volition, which may consist with Comparate Nolition of the same thing.

191. Some Habits are so strong, that (with the Concurrence of convenient objects and circumstances,) the Will doth never act against them; and though they do not absolutely necessitate, nor take away the Natural power ad contrarium, yet do they constantly procure that power to determine itself well or ill according to them, as resembling a Natural In • lination in some degree.

192. That which is commonly called Liberty is not the greatest excellency of the will or felicity of man; An indifferent and undetermined state, is a middle state between that of Brutes and Angels, and is fitted to a Viators condition. But so far as Grace and Holy Habits fix the will to a constant certain self-determination to Good, so far is it set in such a Liberty of excellency as Gibieuf describeth, above our state of loose indifferency.

193. Because Order is necessary to a clear and full understanding, and all our controversies are indeed resolved into this of Free-will, I will here delineate it, as I understand it.

I. FREE-WILL as to the Quid nominis is ambiguous as to the Object, and is

I. Libertas proprie dicta: Quae semper est Libertas ab aliquo Malo, viz.

• I. A malo Effecto viz.
  • 1. A Peccato 1. Actuali 2. Habituali.
  • 2. A Miseria 1. Privativa 2. Positiva.
• II. A Mali Efficiente
  • I. Physice.
    • I. Supra nos: (Deus Optimus Malum peccati non efficit.)
    • II. Intra nos: Ab inclinatione Naturali determinante ad malum.
    • III. Extra nos, viz. à
      • 1. Personis.
        • 1. Angel • s
          • 1. Bonis, qui nec volunt nec possunt.
          • 2. Malis: qui non possunt.
        • 2. Hominibus: qui non possunt.
      • 2. Rebus: Objectis, &c. quae non necessitant.
  • II. Moraliter.
    • I. Supra nos: (Deus peccatum non Causat moraliter.)
    • II. Intra nos
      • 1. Ab ipsius Voluntatis
        • 1. Prava Inclinatione.
        • 2. Malis Habitibus.
        • 3. Actibus, (ad pejus ducentibus.)
      • 2. Ab ignorantia & error Intellectus.
      • 3. Ab inferiorum facultatum (sensus, phantasiae, &c.) tentatione.
    • III. Extra nos, viz. ab
      • 1. Angels
        • 1. Bonis: Qui neminem ad malum alliciunt.
        • 2. Malis: 1. Quoad tentationum species: 2. Gradus.
      • 2. Hominibus, viz.
        • 1. Ne Tyrannide 1. Bona vetent, 2. Mala praecipiant.
        • 2. Ne falsâ doctrinâ Intellectum corrumpant.
        • 3. Ne practice nos tentent 1. Illecebris 2. Nocumentis.
      • 3. A Rebus 1. Terrorem incutientibus, &c. 2. Allicientibus.
• III. A Causa Mali Deficiente, viz.
  • 1. Deficientia Physicâ:
  • 2. Deficientia Morali
  distinguendâ, ut ante de Causa efficiente videre est.

II. Libertas Improprie dicta: cum illud dicitur Libertas

• 1. Quod Majus quid est, ut Dominatio.
• 2. Quod Minus: utpote Boni nihil continens:

viz.

• I. Ad supra, viz. Libertas
  • 1. A Dei Gubernatione, per Leges & judicium.
  • 2. A Dei Attractione & Determinatione Gratiosa & finali.
  • 3. A Dei Dominio & dispositione arbitraria.
• II. Ad Intra, Libertas
  • 1. A Voluntatis Inclinatione naturali ad Bonum natural.
  • 2. A Voluntatis Habitu Confirmato, & Perfectione, Inclinante ad bonum spiritual, Deum scilicet, sanctitatem, coelestia.
  • 3. Ab Intellectus Lumine, specificante actum per Boni intuitum.
• III. Ad Extra, viz.
  • 1. Libertas ab Angelorum Gubernatione & Auxiliis.
  • 2. Ab Hominum
    • 1. Instructione per doctrinam.
    • 2. Regimine necessario per Leges.
    • 3. Auxiliis amicis (in spiritualibus, &c.)
  • 3. A Bonitatis Objectivae determinante attractione.

I mention all these Objective Distinctions, as about the Common use and abuse of the Name of LIBERTY or Free-Will, that you may be able to examine men's words that shall mention it.

194. II. As to the thing itself: passing by our, 1. Moral Liberty from Sin. 2. Our Political Liberty from restraints of Rulers. 3. I shall speak only of the Natural Liberty in hand: And there show

• I. Quid sit, viz.
  • I. Essentialiter.
    • 1. Voluntatem esse sub Deo principium propriae determinationis, & actuum suorum Dominam, potentem se praedeterminare sine necessitante praedeterminatione, Divinâ vel extrinsecâ.
    • 2. Imperare caeteris facultatibus (sed diverse.)
    • 3. Absolute, direct & proprie, nulli subjici praeter Deum,
  • viz.
    • I. Ab extra.
      • 1. Non Angels vel Daemonibus.
      • 2. Non Hominibus, imperantibus, suadentibus, &c.
      • 3. Non Objectis, (sicut est appetitus brutorum.)
    • II. Ab intra.
      • 1. Non sensibus vel phantasiae, dum objecta praesentant.
      • 2. Non Passionibus; (tametsi molestiam ei facessant.)
      • 3. Non Intellectui: Qui dirigit; non imperat.
  • II. Consequenter.
    • I. In voluntate: Hinc nihil potest
      • 1. Imprimere ei malas Inclinationes, nec auferre bonas.
      • 2. Efficere malos Habitus, aut auferre bonos (necessario.)
      • 3. Determinare eam ad Actus malos necessario.
    • II. In Persona: Et ita Personae Liberum Arbitrium est, Me
      • 1. Bonum vel Malum morale posse agere, si velim.
      • 2. Posse Mereri si velim, & malum non commereri posse invitum.
      • 3. Posse foelicem esse si velim, & non Infoelicem nisi Voluntario peccantem.
• II. Qualis sit: Est{que} Libertas Voluntatis,
  • I. Conjuncta cum necessitate conven •• ente naturali,
    • 1. In Volitione simplici seu Amore propriae foelicitatis,
    • 2. In Volitione simplici seu Amore Boni sensibilis,
    • 3. In Volitione Medii unici foelicitatis, omnimode boni,
    Quoad Actus specificationem.
  • II. Separata à necessitate naturali, viz.
    • 1. In Subjectione & Amore erga Causam primam (Creatorem.)
    • 2. In Volitione simplici Dei ut Finis, & Boni spiritualis.
    • 3. In Electione Finis ubi plures praesentantur.
    • 4. In Electione Mediorum ubi diversa offeruntur.
    • 5. In Actu Intendendi finem electum, quoad Exercitium.
    • 6. In Usu Mediorum, & facultatibus subditis imperandis.
• III. Quotuplex sit Libertas Voluntatis; Est{que}
  • 1. Libertas Contradictionis, vel Exercitii, viz. Velle aut Non-velle; Nolie a • t Non-nolle.
  • 2. Contrarietatis, seu specificationis quoad Actum, viz. Velle aut Nolle.
  • 3. Competitionis, Comparationis, vel Contrarietatis, vel specificationis, quoad Objecta: viz. Velle aut Hoc aut Illud; Nolle Hoc vel Illud.

195. If any man will dispute about Free-will named and not defined or distinguished, nor tell us in what sense he taketh it; or if Divines will tediously and fiercely dispute An sit, before they Agree or prove, Quid sit, they are fitter to be pitied, than to be read or heard.

SECT. X. Of Natural and Moral Power as foreseen.

196. ANd having here anticipated the Doctrine of Free-will, I will (as fittest for the Readers use) connex the Difference of the Natural and Moral Power of the Will or Man, as it cometh under Prescience and Decree.

Power is called Natural in all these respects: 1. Because it is in our Natures and we have it from our birth. 2. Because it is essential to the soul. 3. Because it operateth per modum merae naturae, quantum in se, and not freely. Mans soul hath three Powers called Faculties, The Vital-Active, The Intellective, and The Volitive Power: Of which the two first are natural in all these three respects, in themselves considered: But the Will is natural only in the two first respects; And so are the other two so far as they are imperate by the Will, being, as imperate, participatively Free.

197. Power is called Moral, 1. Because it is itself Morally Good or Evil, as a Disposition of the soul. 2. Because it is a Power to Moral Actions. 3. Because it is not called A POWER in the strict physical sense, but Morally, that is, Reputatively, called Quasi Potentia.

198. Two things are called a Moral Power: 1. The Natural Powers themselves, not simply as Natural, but as thus Morally qualified. 2. The Moral disposition of the Natural powers.

199. Morality is first seated in the Will, and from it our Power is first called Moral: But yet it is secondarily in the other two faculties.

200. As to Dr. Twisse his saying, that Potentia non fundatur in Potentia, (Moralis scilicet in Naturali, and as others say, Accidens non fundatur in accident:) I answer 1. Potentia univoce sic dicta non fundatur in potentia: But this is not such. 2. It is false that accidens non fundatur in accident, as the instance of Relation proveth: The term [Accident] is indeed so ambiguous, as proveth that the distribution of all things first into Substance and Accidents is not genuine and congruous, but inept. If you will call Calor, Lumen, or Motus Accidents, and call Gradus also an Accident, and then say, that Caloris, Luminis, Motus, non dantur diversi gradus, because Accidentis non est accidens, you are not to be believed. And if you will say that Ordo is an Accident, and that Qualitatum, Actionum, &c. non datur or do, it is false. 3. But the worst of the error is, that the Natural Powers are called Accidents, which is a falsehood of very ill tendency in many respects: They are the very formal Essence of the soul. And surely the soul may have its Good or Evil Dispositions.

201. There is in the very Essence of the Natural Power or faculty, besides the Vis vel Virt • s agendi, a certain Natural Inclination to some things, which is Inseparable from it, from which the Schoolmen say even of the Will that it is quaedam Natura, & pondus animae. So the soul is Inclined or propense (and not only Able) to Activity as such, to Intellection as such, to Volition as such; and objectively to Truth as such, and to Natural Good and felicity as such. And there is an Inclination of the soul, which is not essential and inseparable, but is much under the power of the Will, and may be got and lost.

202. This adventitious Disposition, is found in the soul in various Degrees: 1. When it is in such a Degree only, as that immediately and properly without any other power added, the will may be said to be Able to Act thus or thus, then it is called a Moral Power: But when it is in such a degree, as that we are Disposed to Act promptly and easily, it is called a Habit.

203. He therefore that is so far disposed to any Good act, and whose Indisposition, or disposition to the contrary, is but such, as that in his present state, without anymore help than he hath, he can move his own will to the said act, and the difficulty is not so great, but that such Power sometime doth overcome it, is said to have a Moral Power. But he that wanteth not Natural force or power, but only a right Disposition of his Will, and so far wanteth it, as that none in his case do ever change their own acts to good, without more help and power than he hath, is said to be Morally unable or impotent: and not only to want the Habit.

204. Whether the Natural Powers be properly called A Power to Believe, Repent, Love God, &c. without the Moral Power or right disposition? though it be a question of some use among the Contenders about these matters, yet it is chiefly de nomine, and therefore of the less moment. This is to be granted of all de re, that Unbelievers want not that Natural Power or faculty, which can Believe and Repent if duly suscitated and disposed: But through an Ill Disposition and contrary course of action, and want of due excitation, that Power will not Act, without God's special Grace. Which [Will not] signifieth, 1. The Undisposedness, 2. The Non-agency: And in strictest speech, the former is best expressed by [The Will is undisposed and averse to Believe, &c.] and the latter by [The Will doth not consent.] But the first may be expressed by [It cannot] because it will not come to pass: Though it is no such [Cannot] as is distinct from [Will not] but the very same. And as [Power] is distinct from [Will] and a man is said to be Able to do that which [he can do if he will], so no doubt but he that Will Believe and Repent, can do it, so far as he is Willing. And this is it that Augustine so much pleadeth for, when he would have us distinguish [Cannot] and [Will not], and when he saith, that Posse Credere est Omnium; Credere autem fidelium.

205. To the fuller opening of this, note the following Conclusions.

No man doth that which he cannot do, at that instant.

206. Human (and all created) Power is dependent, and is not properly a Power to do anything, but on supposition of God's Emanant support and concourse, as he is the first Cause of Nature.

207. Human Power is finite, and is not a Power ad omnia, but ad haec: which therefore are called Possible to us.

208. Power being a Relative word, it may be said to be nullified ad hoc by an alteration of the Object only: As if you double the weight, that man may be Unable to bear it, who Could bear it when it was less: when the object is changed, and not the power indeed.

209. Power supposeth the due object and its due proposal or state. We have no Power to see invisibles, to understand things not intelligible, to will things not apprehended to be good, and not so revealed, &c.

210. The three Conjunct Powers of the soul suppose each other, though they are not formally the same: We have no Power to Will objects not understood, nor to understand, will or execute without Vital-activity; nor to understand most things without the Wills determination ad exercitium.

211. The due qualification also of the Inferior faculties (the Senses, and Fantasy, and Organs) is supposed to the being of true Power. We never had Power to see without eyes, no more than without Light. This Power of the Inferior faculties some call Potentia secunda, as to the acts of the Superior.

212. It is no true Power ad hoc, which is put to overcome a Greater opposing Power. We never had Power to overcome God, or to act against his pre-moving pre-determination (as Bradwardine truly saith.)

213. A man may be Able mediately to do that which he is not Able Immediately to do: I mean he that can write with a Pen, or move things with an Engine, and so act but as a partial, though Principal Cause, may not be Able to write without a Pen, nor to do the same alone as a Total Cause.

214. And a man may have Power to do that Mediately and Hypothetically hereafter, which he Cannot do Immediately, that is, at the present time. He can learn to write, and after can write, who cannot write till he hath learnt. Thus Infants have a remote Power of speaking, and Infidels of believing.

215. No man Doth all that he is truly and properly Able to do.

216. No man doth all that he is Disposed and Habited to. Sudden objects oft carry us againt strong Habits.

217. A man ordinarily Willeth and Acteth according to the predominant Habits of his soul, if he have objects and means.

218. A man always willeth that which he is soley disposed to will, or most disposed to will, at that moment; and which he apprehendeth sub omnimoda ration boni: Much more if he were perfectly Habited to it, in his Vitality, Intellect and Will.

219. No man acteth without the Essential fundamental Inclination to Good and to Natural felicity: But a man may by sudden instigation and occasions will that which before he had no particular disposition to: A Power may be without a Habit.

220. No Good man's Habits here are perfect in goodness.

221. No Bad man here is at the worst; nor destitute of all Moral Power to all things commanded him of God.

222. A bare Moral Power which cometh not up to be an Inclination or Habit, determineth not the Will of itself.

223. Habits tend to the Wills determination per modum naturae, ut appetitus; But they are not sufficient to it, or necessary determiners de eventu.

224. Weak Habits are oft born down: Strong ones rarely, yet sometimes.

225. An unholy soul is much more Impotent as to the great Internal Acts of Loving God, delighting in him, &c. than to any mere external Act which the Natural Power extendeth to: And so are the regenerate in that measure as they are unrenewed.

226. But we are more able to Love or Will aright, than to Work and Do aright; because here both must concur, which requireth more Power than one alone. E. g. to Rule the Thoughts aright requireth more Power than to be Willing to rule them.

227. Yet in that measure that a man is Willing to do Good, he is Morally able, (and more than able) Because Morality being first seated in the will, it is no farther Morally Good or Bad, than it is Positively or Privatively Voluntary. He that is sincerely Willing, is sincerely Abole, and he that is Perfectly Willing, is perfectly able (and more.)

228. Every man's Natural faculties may be called Moral Powers as to the Obligation, as being obliged by God to Moral Good.

229. And because Obligation presupposeth some true Power to obey, mediately or immediately, present or former when the Law was made, therefore man's Natural faculties, though undisposed, are thus far called a moral power to the commanded act.

SECT. XI. Whether God bind Men to Impossibilities.

230. THis leads us to the question, Whether God bind men to things Impossible. Where we must needs distinguish 1. Of disability Antecedent to the Law, and Consequent. 2. Mediate and Immediate. 3. Between Impossibles as such, and as Things Hated or Nilled. 4. Between Primary and Secondary Moral acts. And so I answer,

231. 1. No Law of God (or just men) bindeth to things Naturally Impossible before the Law was made and broken, by an Immediate obligation.

232. A just Law may antecedently bind us mediately to that which is immediately impossible. So he that cannot Read, may be bound to Read mediately; that is, first to Learn, and then to Read. And Paul requireth men to work with their hands, that they may have to give to him that needeth, (and then to give;) which yet before they have got it, is impossible.

233. The obligation of a Law ceaseth, when the thing commanded becometh Impossible without the subjects fault.

234. Every sin is Voluntarium-prohibitum: And so far as Impossible things may be Voluntaria-prohibita (which is all the doubt) so far they may be sins.

235. God's Law is Antecedent to our practice, and mediately ex parte sui bindeth us at once to all that we must do to the End of our Lives. As if a Master in the Morning command his servant his work till night. Therefore as if that servant purposely break his Spade or other Tools that he may not work, he is not therefore so disobliged as to be guiltless; even so when man by sin disableth himself to his commanded duty, the Law is not changed, but is still the same, nor is he thereby excused.

236. Here the Primary sin is that which contracted the Impotency: The Secondary sin is the Impotency itself, thus willfully contracted and seated in the will. The third rank is the not doing of all that was first commanded, and the doing of all that was forbidden.

237. But if it be not only a Moral Vicious Impotency that is contracted (such as the habitual unwillingness in question) but a Physical Impotency (as if a man drunk himself stark mad, or blind, &c.) this is a sin (and the consequent acts and omissions) not simply in itself considered, but secundum quid, and participatively, as it partaketh of the first sin, which is described itself to be [a Voluntary forbidden act disabling us to future duty, and virtually containing a sinful life to the end.]

238. But if it be this Physical Impossibility that is contracted, then though the Law change not, yet the Subjects capacity being changed, strictly and properly God is not said after to Oblige him by that Law, because he is not Receptive and Capable of such new obligations; And yet he is not disobliged as to his benefit. For no man getteth a right to any benefit by his fault. What then? Why, the Precept to that man is past into a Virtual Judiciary Sentence, condemning him as disobedient; even as it is with those in Hell.

239. Therefore since the fall, the Law of Innocency in itself is the same, which once said [Thou shalt continue perfectly Innocent;] but it doth not properly oblige us as a Law to that Innocency or perfection which we were born without, because we are become uncapable subjects: Much less is that Innocency now the Condition of any Promise or Covenant of God; as if he still said [Be personally and perpetually Innocent, and thou shalt live; and that thou mayest live.] But the Law being still the same, we that are uncapable of the duty, are not uncapable of the guilt and condemnation: And therefore the Law and Covenant are now become a Virtual Sentence of Condemnation for not obeying personally, perfectly and perpetually to the death. For he that hath once made Innocency Naturally Impossible to him, is Virtually in the case of one that hath persevered to the death in sin

240. But if the contracted Impossibility be not Physical but Moral, the case is quite different. For then the thing is a threefold sin in itself as aforesaid; 1. The disabling sin. 2. The vicious Disability or Malignity of the Will. 3. And the after sin thereby committed, and omission of duty.

More of Physical and Moral Impotency.

241. 1. No righteous Law forbiddeth Physical Impotency as such, nor commandeth men Physical Impossibilities, as is said; But God's Laws primarily forbid the malignity of the Will, which is its Moral Impotency.

242. 2. Rulers use not to make Punishments for Physical Impotency; But for the Wills Malignity God doth.

243. 3. Rulers use not to propound Rewards for Physical Impossibilities; But for the fruits of Moral Sanctity or Habits, and for themselves, God doth.

244. 4. No just Judge condemneth men for Physical Impotency; But for Moral God and man do.

245. 5. No Good man hateth another for Physical Impotency; But for Moral malignity God and man do.

246. 6. An enlightened Conscience accuseth and tormenteth no man for mere Physical Impotency and Impossibilities: But for the Wills Malignity Conscience will torment men. So that it is evident that one sort of Impotency maketh an act no sin (in its degree) and the other maketh it a greater sin. For Nature and common notices teach men to judge that the More Willingness, the more culpability. But he that hath Actual and Habitual Wilfulness, and is as some Adulterers, drunkards, revengeful persons, proud, covetous, &c. who are so bad that they say, I cannot choose, are the worst of all the sorts of sinners, by such disability.

247. It is most probable that God overcometh Moral Impotency, and giveth Moral Power, by Moral Means, and Operations: For though God can give it by a proper Creation without Moral Means, and we cannot say that he never doth so, nor how oft he doth or doth not; yet it is most probable that his special Grace, doth by his Trine Influx of Power, Wisdom and Goodness, Life, Light and Love, suscitate the natural faculties of the soul to the first special Act, and by it cause a holy Habit, which he radicateth by degrees; And this is Metaphorically a Creation.

248. This is certain, that since the sall we have the same essential faculties; that Original sin is not as Illyricus so long and obstinately maintained (though an excellently good and Learned man) a Substance, though it be the Pravity of a substance: And that sin changed not the human species; Nor doth Grace change our species. It is certain that the Acts of these same natural faculties are commanded to all men, even the unregenerate, under the names of Faith and Repentance; And so these are their duties. And it is certain, that a Course of Moral means (preaching, reading, meditating, conference, threatenings, promises, mercies, afflictions) are appointed and used to the procuring the said faculties to perform these commanded acts: It is certain that these Means have an Aptitude to their end: And that God worketh by his own means: And appointeth not man to use them in vain; And that in working Grace, God preserveth and reformeth Nature, and worketh on Man as Man: and according to the Nature of his means.

249. And I think none dare deny, but that God is Able by his Spirits powerful operation, without any Antecedent new Habit or disposition, to set home these same means so effectually on the Natural powers of the soul, as shall excite them to the first Acts of Faith and Repentance: And by them imprint a Habit, as is said, and shall be said again in Part 3. And if he Can do so, and Can do otherwise, which then is likest to be his ordinary way, I leave to the observers of Scripture and Experience.

450. This is the Common sense of Divines, who place Vocation, exciting the first act of Faith and Repentance, before Union with Christ, and before Sanctification, which giveth the habit, till Mr. Pemble Vind. Grat. taught otherwise, whom Bishop G. Downame confuted in the Appendix to his Treatise of Perseverance.

251. As to the question, How this Grace is called Infused, and not Natural? I answer, It is called Infused and Supernatural, because, 1. It is not wrought by any Natural-moral means only, but by Supernatural-moral means, viz. Revelation, in and by the Gospel of Christ. 2. And this supernatural Revelation cannot work it, without the special extraordinary operation and impression by the Holy Ghost, above the common concourse of God with all his Creatures, as he is fons naturae. This the Schools have Metaphorically called Infusion.

252. But it may be called Natural, 1. In that man's Natural faculties receive God's Influx, 2. And perform the act: 3. And are perfected by it as the Natural body is by Health.

253. And what the difference is ex parte Dei agentis (& ex parte effectus) between God's Natural and Gracious operations, I shall after open in the third Part.

254. The Schoolmen, especially the Scotists and Ockam, and many Franciscans, Benedictines, and other Friars, (yea, such Oratorians as Gibieuf) have fled so high in making Grace supernatural, (feigning a state of pure Naturals that had none) and talk so phanatically of the Deification of the soul, as I think hath ensnared some Sectaries among us to imitate them, feigning that the first Covenant is Moral as a Law, and the second Covenant is the very in-being of a Divine Nature, which they (though obscurely) seem to describe as somewhat above all Habits and Inclinations, put into our own nature, like another form or soul: Which over-doing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity, by doubting whether man's Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not, when it must be made another thing to attain it.

SECT. XII. Of Scientia Media.

255. AFter this Digression about our Will and Powers as the objects of God's Knowledge and Decrees, I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media. And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propositions that are true, is past all doubt, If we may suppose that God had eternal propositions. No doubt but he knoweth now that such propositions are true [If such Causes be put, they will or will not produce this or that as the effect.]

256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propositions to know by, and God knoweth not by them, but only knoweth them as the instruments and way of human knowledge, (For no doubt but he knoweth all that's ours,) Then it must be said that he had from eternity, but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propositions. And who can well determine this?

257. And this will lead the arrogant disputers to other enquiries no less difficult, Whether it be only or primarily the Proposition itself as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of man's mind which God knoweth, or the res ab homine cognita, that is, futurition itself? And if the former, How God knoweth them to be True? If the latter, How he knoweth futurition?

258. And here inextricable difficulties will still arise before them, Whether to have the notion of futurity, be not a part of the Creatures imperfection? Whether God know not all things as present? Whether [Nothing] be properly Intelligible in itself? Whether it be not only Propositions de nihilo that are known, and not the ipsum nihil, (such as futurition is?) Whether to ascribe such knowledge of [Nothing] and such notions or propositions to God, be to ascribe perfection or Imperfection to him?

259. If we may or must say that God from eternity fore-knew our Propositions of future contingents, which are Conditional, yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional, so as that the Creatures state is the condition of God's Knowledge in itself: But only that the object is a conditional proposition, speaking the Condition of the event fore-known: From which God's Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinsecâ, not as an Act, but as This act.

260. We deny not but God may be said as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of absolute propositions; If one be the object of his Knowledge, the other is: Which proveth the hypothetical proposition to be less perfect than an absolute, but not God's knowledge of it to be less perfect.

261. Nor doth God's fore-knowledge that Adam will sin in such circumstances, make his understanding depend on the Creature, but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object: And so it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object: This objection therefore belongeth also to the dispute, Whether God know anything but himself? or out of himself?

262. The feigning God to have in himself so many acts of knowledge, really distinct, and to lie in such an order, is intolerable, seeing God is most simple. But by extrinsical denomination, his Knowledge may by us, through our weakness and necessity, be distinguished according to its respect to diversity of objects, by inadequate conceptions: But on that pretence to feign many needless distributions, is profane,

263. They that think it a good confutation of scientia mediae that Non decreta non sunt futura; therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed, do err much in the antecedent, (For it is false that sin is Decreed) and are either erroneous or uncertain in the conclusion, (For God fore-knoweth sin so far as it is intelligible.)

264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media, is not de conditionatis necessari • s, as [If the Sun set, it will be night] Nor yet of such conditionals as are merely disparate, and have no kind of dependence or connection, as [If Peter die quickly, John will live long:] But of such conditionals, as have some reason of the Connection, and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not. But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis, but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti.

265. Much less dare we conclude with them that God's knowledge of Conditionals is in God before his will to concur, or that they exist; For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God, except by such denomination.

266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav. Concord. Disp. 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione, necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum n • hill possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione, nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute, aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere. At the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition, or of the knowledge of it: And if not, the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose: For futurum tantum sub conditione, is not as such futurum; For the condition suspendeth the futurition: A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted, it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension, than their Cause or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing (sin) let them take heed of the consequence.

267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all serve their turn: seeing they use it to show how God knoweth that Determinately, which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non, or in unnecessary and not determining causes. And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding, which is most true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of God's knowledge of such Conditional propositions, and contingents as so circumstantiated, seemeth True materially, (that They are the Objects of God's knowledge;) but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge, (which hath no Cause;) but only extrinsical denominaters of it in that act: And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose.

268. For I confess I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to satisfy us, how God knoweth anything Intelligible, than to say, By his Infinite perfection. Man knoweth by Reception ab extra, but so doth not God. And if the Quest. How doth God know this, suppose extrinsic efficiency or reception, it is blasphemous! And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth? with horror as I hear men curse and swear and blaspheme: knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsic manner of God's knowledge; And I detest the very question, and am but persuading others to detest it thus understood.

269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents. As Annatus de scient. med. p. 85. contr. Twisse. D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Medi • non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium. Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones. O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark!

270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media, such as some of our own, and the Scotists who dare say that God cannot know future contingents, but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will. As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts, who dwelleth in the unaccessible light. Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works.

271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts, but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause. Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth, who scarce know How we know ourselves.

272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Fasol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navar. Curiel. Cabrera, Mascaren. Verdu, Fonseca, Mendoz. Lessius, Diotalev. Moncaeus, Theophil. in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joseph, Annatus, Twisse, &c. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach, doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durand his third opinion casteth in the way, and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions, Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96, 97, &c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media, Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination, Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse (as to evil actions) Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us, and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord.

273. The old doctrine of God's Prevision, and this de Scientia Media, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they err that hold it to run pari passu, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them, or the futurity of them, nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin: But he willeth to effect that which is Good, and may so far know it.

SECT. XIII. Of God's Will and Decrees in General.

274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same, save as to the extrinsic denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects.

275. God's Decrees are not his works in themselves considered, but only when with his executive power, they operate ad extra: and then his knowledge and will are his working, being productive of the effects.

276. As in point of simplicity God's Acts are all One and yet many, that is, One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence; and yet many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinseca; so also as to their Eternity God's Acts are all Eternal as they are his Essence, ex parte agentis; and yet some of them new and temporary, some past, some present, some future, ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinsecâ.

277. Yet I confess that it passeth my understanding to conceive how it is, that the same Act is Eternal ex parte agentis, and yet but temporary ex parte patientis & effecti: that God should from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte sui to create the world, to redeem, sanctify, justify, &c. and yet that nothing should be done by it till lately. Which drew Ludov. à Dola (de modo conjunct. Concurs. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.) to say, [Probatur Actionem Dei externam seu Concursum in actu secundo esse actum ab ipso Deo distinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non solum poterat nihil agere ad extra, sed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei est omnino distincta ab ipso Deo: Neque dici potest actionem quidem Dei fuisse ab aeterno, sed effectum non fuisse nisi in tempore; Quia tametsi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, esse possit antequam Causa actu agat; tamen Actio esse non potest quin Causa vere agat & producat. Ac impossible est Causam vere Agere & producere, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno (loquimur de productione ad extra & transeunte.) Sane non potest Actio esse sine termino & effectu suo. Sed Actio essentialiter est sui termini productio aut conservatio, & ne con • ipi quidem potest sine illo: Est{que} prorsus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conservationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipsam rem; Est{que} Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipsam formaliter producitur, aut conservatur; nec sejungi ab illa potest.] And so Aureolus.

278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, &c. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things merely by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than mere will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power always equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossible) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God.

279. Prescience with Predefinition or Decree do not infer causally that necessity of the event as predetermining premotion doth: Because they do (alone) nihil ponere in objecto. So that if it could be proved that God doth eternally Decree or will the event of sin, and men's damnation absolutely, it would not prove (alone) that he is therefore the cause of them. It is not therefore the Predetermination of bare Decree which we lay those consequences on, but efficient predetermination.

280. Lombard, d. 45. well concludeth That even that free-will of God by which he willeth, decreeth, and loveth the Creature, is his essence: But yet the Name [Amor Petri, odium peccati, &c.] signifieth not his Essence as such, but his Essential will as denominated from the created or human object.

281. Therefore it cannot be inferred hence, that God is a Creature, because he Willeth or Loveth the Creature: Because his Loving it denominateth his Essence as terminated on or connoting the object, and not as in itself simply.

282. It is not fit or lawful to ask after any Cause of the Will of God; Because it is the first cause of all things else, and hath nothing Superior or antecedent to Cause it; And God is absolutely independent, and is not to be called the Cause of himself.

283. Even the Acts of God's free-will or Decrees, have no Cause even in God himself; no more than those called Necessary. For we must not say that anything in God is an effect.

284. Yet as God's Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object, (which in man is a constitutive Cause of the Act, loco materiae,) so extrinsic objects may be called The Causes (but rather the Objects) of God Will, Love or Knowledge, not as his Essence, but only as so denominated by that Connotation of the object.

285. These distributions of God's Volitions in Number, and by specifying objects, and individuating objects, which are called material constitutive causes of the act, are all according to human weakness; in us who know God but enigmatically, and in a glass: But yet if any man use such words in a broader manner than we think fit, before we censure and condemn him we must hear his sense explained. For all that ever we can say of God is improper, analogical, yea metaphorical; And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about God's attributes and actions differ; For (as is oft said) no man hath formal proper conceptions of anything in God. If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own, he must not speak intelligibly to us, unless he create another understanding in us. And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself, alloweth us to use it, while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import.

286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture, and exterior causes of them, (as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you, because ye have loved me, and believed, &c.) But also Fear, Affliction, Grief, Hatred, Repenting, Rejoicing, &c. Deut. 32. 27. Isa. 63. 9. Gen. 6. 6. Psal. 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hos. 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41, &c. and exterior causes of them.

287. That which is to be understood by all these, is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the Effects of Divine Volitions, as the Dispositio receptiva, may be called a Cause. And I before shown in the instance of the effects of the Suns Influx, how great a hand the various Dispositiones materiae receptivae have in the diversifications of effects. 2. And that God's Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated.

288. Therefore we must say, that God's electing Peter and his rejecting Judas, his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas, are not in specie the same act of his will; nor his Loving Peter, and his Loving Paul the same Numerically; As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint, and his knowing Judas to be a Saint, is not the same numerical act of knowledge; Though as they are God's Essence, all are but one. And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good, and hateth another because he is evil; and he justifieth men because they believe, and condemneth men because they believe not; that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth, &c. Though God's Will have no efficient Cause.

289. Those Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency, but Transient Objectively, are some of them to be denominated as before the thing willed, and some as after. The Will of effecting is before the thing willed: The Will ut finis, or Complacency and Displicency (as also Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Existent, estimation, approbation, reprobation of it) the Will of Continuing, modifying, altering, perfecting, destroying, suppose the existence of the thing willed in esse objectivo. And so many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time, as connoting the objects. And it is no more wrong to God's Immutability so to name them, than to his simplicity to name them many and divers.

290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to God's Immutability, to speak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to such Relative denominations. As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it, and yet is not therefore mutable: Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you, before and behind, on the right hand and on the left. So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity. Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power.

291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects, it is that we conceive of God's acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature, as one being before and one after another; Though not as they are God's Essence.

292. Yet because the use and truth of words or names, is their signification of Things as indeed they are, and we should put no name on any creature, but what is adapted to notify it aright to man's understanding; we must much more be afraid of putting any cau • eless, unmeet, unnecessary names of reality or distinction on the Will or Acts of God.

293. God's Will is not Appetitus rei desideratae; for he wanteth nothing.

294. God willeth efficiently all that he effecteth; and finally by complacence, all that is Good.

295. God's Willing or Loving Himself, is Himself; or an inadequate Conception of Himself as he is. But his Willing or Loving Creatures, is (as is oft said) a relative connotative Conception of Himself as extrinsically denominated, and not as he is himself.

296. God's Will ad extra is Free; And therefore it cannot be said that he Willeth or Loveth ad ultimum potentiae, all that by Power he is Able to Will, or Love, or do: or that he doth all that he is Able to do.

297. Therefore it cannot be denied that there is in God a Negation of Volition: that is, that he willeth not some things which he Could Will. As to have made the World sooner, greater, with other sorts of creatures: to have made some men better, wiser, richer, &c. The exterior objects of God's Will are finite, and contingent beings.

298. Therefore to ascribe to God a Negation of some Possible Volitions cannot be charged as making God's Will to be Idle, or Neutral, or as any Imperfection: seeing it is but his free-negation of his own Act, through his perfection.

299. Nor can it be said, that hereby we make God Finite in that his Will is made Finite in Act, which is Himself. For his Will is Infinite as it is his Essence, and as it Acteth upon Himself; though as it acteth ad extra on finite temporary Creatures, it must needs be relatively, and connotatively as to the terminus denominated finite: which all must hold de re, that think not the World is Infinite. If the Sun were alone in Vacuo, it would be as Great as now it is, and as perfect: And yet as its beams are terminated on this or that recipient Creature, they are more limited.

300. We cannot prove that really God hath any Positive Decrees or Volitions of Nothings as such.

301. Therefore none such should be asserted by Divines, much less pretended necessary to be believed, to our Concord.

302. It seemeth more allowable to hold the Negative, that God hath no such Decrees; because Nothing is not a capable terminus of a Divine act: And therefore it is a fiction of Scaliger, that [Omnipotentia agit in non ens, ut fiat ens,] Exercit. 365. n. 9. pag. 1074. And si entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, much less Divine acts. Also Non-volition is enough to a non-existence or a Nothing; Therefore a Nolition need not be feigned to it: & frustra fit per plura, quod, &c.

303. Yet knowing so little of God as we do, I dare not boldly assert the contrary: But it's enough to know that this must not be asserted, and built on in our disputes.

304. How God Willeth future Contingents troubleth the Schools with many needless difficulties as well as how he knoweth them. About his knowledge of them, before treated of, there are besides the Dominicans that lay it on Pre-determination as decreed, and the Scotists that lay it on Decree or Will alone, several other opinions: One is of Ambr. Catharinus de Praed. Sanct. who holdeth that God knoweth not future Contingents, cert • sub conditione causali, but only by conjecture: Because the object is not otherwise scibile. 2. Vasquez saith, that God cannot know a future contingent merely contingent, as being not determinate: And that the Proposition hereof is ever false, because it is spoken by way of Causality and Consequence, when there is none. 3. Suarez and others say, that God knoweth future contingents, even when the Condition is disparate or of no Causality, a true Connection of the terms suffering. Albertinus Princ. 4. To. 1. qu. 4. dub. 1. p. 292. pretendeth to a middle way, viz. 1. That future contingents sub conditione are certainly known of God, whether the condition be Causal or merely Conditional. 2. But quando Conditio est disparata, non potest futurum Contingens sub illa Conditione cognosci à Deo. 3. But because there is a Concomitancy between the terms of the propositions, such a disparate Proposition may be known of God, sub ration Concomitantiae.

And accordingly they diversify God's Decrees. To the question, Whether conditional future contingents may be known of God in his Decree, he first telleth us of a threefold Decree, 1. Conditional quoad Actum & Objectum, ut [si discernerem concursurum cum voluntate creata, si talis occasio occurreret, hoc futurum esset.] 2. Ex parte objecti only, (being absolute ex parte actus.) 3. Absolute on both parts; I refer you to him p. 296, 297. if you will see the decision, lest I perplex and weary you: And for the same reason pass by a multitude of other controversies of these men.

SECT. XIV. Of several Distinctions of God's Will.

305. MAny distinctions of God's Will are used about these Controversies: As, 1. The Positive Acts of God's Will are distinguished from his not-acting (or not-willing.) 2. The Positive objectively, from the Negative-quoad objectum. 3. The Positive from the oppositive. 4. The Immanent and the Transient acts. 5. The Transient efficienter, and the Transient only objectively. 6. The Natural and the Free. 7. The Efficient and Permissive acts. 8. Beneplaciti & signi. 9. Absolute and Conditional. 10. Effectual and ineffectual. 11. The Decreeing Will and the Preceptive Will. 12. Antecedent and Consequent. And because you will meet with all these, I shall tell you in what sense only they must be received.

306. I. Of the first I have said enough before. God's free-will hath its free-not-willings, that are no nolitions.

307. II. The meaning of the second is, that God doth positively will some Beings, and some Negatives. If they mean Negative Propositions, it's true, but inept; Because those are Positive Beings. If they mean in the second branch [Nothings] they cannot prove that God Positively at all willeth them. But he oft willeth their Antecedents and consequents, and occasions, and he willeth all creatures to be Limited and Imperfect, and so Negations must needs consequently pass upon them: And in that he willeth not-more, and willeth causes which may be deficient, men improperly and consequently say he willeth negatively, ne sint Plura, and the defects. But this is not strict speech.

308. Yet in a Moral sense God is oft said to will Nothings (or Negatives quoad esse:) (As that men shall not have grace, that they shall not live, or not be pardoned, or saved, &c.) 1. Because he doth properly and positively Will and make that Law which condemneth them to these penalties; 2. Because he will have Christ positively Condemn them to Privative punishments; 3. Because he doth positively take away some of the mercies which tend to save them; 4. And he doth freely and penally not-give them that which they are deprived of. So that this Language is not unfit while we speak of Moral Subjects, and of God after our manner. But in strict speech it cannot be proved that any [Nothing] is the proper object of a Volition of God.

309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way. And subtle Albertine To. 1. princ. 4. qu. 4. p. 297. saith, that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Positivo velle negationes,—& Resp. Deum non habere actum positivum non concurrendi, sed negationem actus Volendi dare concursum efficacem: & • uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo se habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum. Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu positivo, sed tantum negative se habet circa concursum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum— Vid. caet.

310. III. The third distinction is between God's Love and Hatred, his Volitions and Nolitions; And this must be used. But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection, than Love and Volition, importing some-what contrary to us, and either hurtful, troublesome, feared, or that possibly may be so. Therefore we must confess here, that we speak of God with greater impropriety, and must disclaim the imperfection in the sense.

311. But if you would not be abused into many errors, swallow not the name [Love] and [Hatred] without distinction; Lest the fore-cited reason of Pennottus cheat you; viz. [God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked: Ergo he can decree or predestinate a man to salvation, whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation.] And all rose from this falsehood, that [Love is nothing but the Willing of salvation to us] and so the same with Decree: Whereas Love is also, yea, most properly a Complacency in Good as Good, and Hatred a Displicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is sometime Antecedent and sometime an effect of this in man.

312. IV. The Immanent and Transient acts, I need say no more of.

313. V. But Divines use to omit the next distinction (of Transient acts) so much, that few of them let you know, whether that which is but Objectively Transient, be numbered by them with Immanent or with Transient acts. Briefly, 1. As God's Will is the first efficient, and with his Wisdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra, it is effectively Transient, (though Essentially Immanent in itself.) 2. But as God's Will is (as aforesaid) the Final Cause or End of all things, and willeth things only Complacentially, supposing all that is Complacent to be Existent (in esse reali, vel in esse cognito) so is it only Objectively Transient, and not effectively; and therefore by many is numbered with Immanent acts. And as God may be said to know and will the creature in himself, and to Love the Idea of it in himself, the phrase is not to be blamed: But as the Creature in itself considered by fore-knowledge or present knowledge (if we may so distinguish) is the object, it seemeth unfit to call the act Immanent, though it do nihil ponere (vel efficere) in objecto.

314. But God's Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra, is even effectively Transient, as well as that which altereth qualities: e. g. his Pardoning, Justifying, Adopting acts of Will.

315. VI. God's Natural Volitions are those which ex natura rei, could not be otherwise; that is, All his Volitions of his own being and perfections; To which some number natural necessary objects, in the creatures: As his Volition that Contradictions shall not be true; that two and two shall be four, or two more than one, &c. His Free Volitions are those which might have been otherwise as to the nature of the thing, and as to the power of the Divine will. Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures.

316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten, and the Holy Ghost freely proceed, ariseth from the ambiguity of the word [free;] which I will not trouble you with.

317. Yet all agree that God's Volitions are all eternal, and therefore eternally necessary necessitate existentiae.

318. And some think it best to say that they are respectively to be called both Necessary and Free; Because God's will chose that which his wisdom saw was Best, and he must necessarily choose the Best. But we must not be here too bold in our Conclusions.

319. VII. The distinction of an efficient and permissive Will is no better, nor other, than that of a Volition and no Volition. But to distinguish the Efficient and Permissive Act, implieth a falsehood, That Permission as such is an Act.

320. Yet God's Law may be said to have a permissive Act, that is, He may declare [This I permit you to do, or leave indifferent] as to political permission. And as to Physical permission, I have shown before, that some positive removal of Impediments, are sometimes called non impedire, or permission: But permission itself as such is no act.

321. VIII. The distinction of Vol. Beneplaciti & signi is old and common: But not a distinguishing the Acts of God's will, but rather his Volitions from the signs of them. For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there shall be such signs.

322. The five signs commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibit, permittit, consulit, implet. And the older Schoolmen say that these are called God's Will Metaphorically only, yea by a remote sort of Metaphor, they being not man's will properly but metaphorically only when applied to man, and accordingly called God's will. But some of the latter say that they are proper signs of God's real will. The truth is, they that first used this distinction seem to have intended only God's Government, if not his word alone with the performance of it, by Voluntas signi, (of which next.) Indeed the whole sensible world and all things in it, is some way or other a sign of God's will: especially the nature of man himself, with the nature of all creatures about him, and the order in which he standeth to them; which is therefore called, The Law of Nature.

323. Physical Permission is no positive sign, nor of a positive will (as afore opened:) But Legal permission may be.

324. The distinction between praecipit and consulit would be vain, but that Aqu. and some others expound consulit by Perswading. For God counselleth to nothing but what is Best; and that which is Best, precept (even natural) maketh it our Duty to choose: But Precept going before and Making Duty, Perswading-counsel may come after and urge us to perform it.

325. God's Voluntas signi & Bene-placiti are never contrary properly taken: Nor doth he give us any false signs of his Will; And therefore his word is always true: But there are many things which ignorance mis-judgeth to be a sign of some Divine Volition, which they signify not; and some dark signs which are not easily understood. If men mistake God's works or word, the sign was not false, but their exposition of it. But of this next.

326. IX. Dr. Twisse useth instead of this the distinction of Volunta • Beneplaciti & Praecepti. His sense is Right, but the terms are too narrow. T • e true Distinction is of God's Will of Natural Things and Events as such, and his Will de Debito vel Jure as such: His will as it is the Fountain of Nature, and as it is the fountain of Morality or Right: O • his Will of Natural Events and his Law.

327. This distinction is of Greater and more Necessary use to us than any of the rest; yea so great that it is included in the first principle of Religion and morality; and is understood (distinctly or more darkly, but really) by all Christians and moral agents.

328. The distinction is fetched from the objects: The common object of the one being Nature as such, and of the other Debitum or Jus as such.

329. As God's Will de Naturalibus is his Bene placitum; and the effects of it are the signa subsequentia, and prophesy a prognostic of the effect; so God's will de Debito is his Beneplacitum, signified by his Law and Judgment.

330. Though the word [Law] be usually taken more narrowly for only [Statute eminent Laws] yet I here take it general • y; And it is [The Governing Will of a Rector signified, constituting or confirming Right (or Dueness) from and to the Subject; or A Rectors constitutive Determination of Right; or, The sign of a Rectors Will constituting Right.]

331. God being most Great and Wise and Good, and man's Creator, and thence our Ab • olute supreme Rector, his Will must needs be the fountain of all Morality and Right.

332. It is not the Will in itself that is a Law, nor doth any Immanent act oblige us, or constitute Duty: But it is God's Will as signified. And therefore Lex aeterna is an improper speech.

333. Tilenus and others who think it fitter only to distinguish Quid Deus ipse vult facere, and Quid à nobis vult fieri, do but hide and not open the truth: For the terms seem to express the Event in both, and distinguish not of Event and Duty. Whereas if God Willed the Event of what he commandeth us, as he doth of what he effecteth, it would be done. And he doth also by his Absolute Decree, Will many things to be done by us, which his Law commandeth not. Such as are many mere Natural actions, quas à nobis vult fieri.

334. Morality being but Modality and Relation of Natural Entities, the Acts or Habits themselves commanded and forbidden are quid Naturale in themselves considered, and so far are under God's will de naturalibus; But it is only the Debitum or Jus that is constituted by his Legislative will.

335. Though God's will de Naturalibus must operate by real efficient efflux, yet his will de Debito effecteth by mere signification or notification to the subject.

336. Legem facere vel signum dare is an act of God's will de quodam naturali vel eventu: (For the signum is aliquid natural.) But per signum facere Jus is that which is proper to the Governing or Legal Will.

337. If we will denominate God's will here ab origin, It is, 1. Antecedent to the Creature, (supposed;) And that is his Creating will. 2. Supposing the Creature in Being; and that is, 1. His will as Proprietary and Actor of all things; And that is his Moving and Disposing will, of Events. 2. His will as Governor (Morally) And that is his Morally Ruling will. 3. His will ut Amator & Finis; And that is his Beneficent and felicitating will. And among these it is his Regent will which I am treating of. And though his Law as making Jus, be the first and chief part, yet his Judgment as it decideth, and his Execution as it giveth every Man his Right and Due, is included.

338. It is not God's will without the sign (as is said) nor the sign without his will, but the sign as notifying, and his will as notified that is a Law, and Jus the Effect: God's will is the principal Cause, and quasi Anima Legis; and the sign is the instrumental Cause, and quasi Corpus.

339. The Sign re • pecteth these things, 1. The matter due. 2. The dueness or right. 3. The will of God concerning or constituting it. 4. The mind and will of man to whom this is signified.

Or, 1. God's will as the Efficient of Right. 2. The matter and form of Right as Constituted. 3. The mind and will of man as the terminus.

340. These signs of God's will are, 1. Natural, called the Law of Nature: which is the Natura & ordo rerum, especially ipsius hominis as before described. 2. By extraordinary Revelation. The latter have the great advantage of plainness, significandi rem praeceptam. The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God. Both are his Laws to man.

341. La • , Judgment and execution (the three parts of Government) differ in that, 1. Law maketh the Debitum or Jus; 2. Judgment determineth of it by dec • sive application; 3. Execution distributeth according to it.

342. The Jus vel Debitum, instituted by the Law, is twofold. 1. A Subditis: What shall be Due from the Subjects: the Debitum Officii. 2. Subditis: what shall be Due to the Subjects: viz. 1. Antecedently to their merits (which is 1. The act of our Governing Benefactor. 2. Or a Divider: such was the Law for dividing the Israelites inheritances.) 2. Consequently; which is by the Retributive part of the Law (commonly called the Sanction,) which is 1. By the Premiant part, what Reward shall be due: 2. By the Penal, what Punishment.

343. Accordingly Laws have several parts: 1. Precept and Prohibition, making Duty: 2. Retributive, 1. Premiant, 2. Penal; called God's Promises and Threats: 3. And subservient or accidental; 1. Narratives Historical, Chronological, &c. 2. Pure Donations: 3. Prophesies; 4. Doctrinal, 5. Exhortatory, 6. Reprehensive, &c.

344. Though Debitum vel Jus facere, be the formal operation of a Law; (which is to be Fundamentum Relationis) yet the Act of the chief parts (preceptive or penal) is commonly called Obligation: And so many say that obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is all the action of a Law. But Obligare is a Metaphor, and therefore in dispute to be laid by, or to give place to the proper terms: And the Premiant act is not properly called obligation; nor the penal act, save in a secondary notion, as he is • bligatus ad poenam ferendam, if judged, who is first Reus poenae, or to whom it is made Due by the Law.

345. The • bligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is not of equality in the disjunctive. As if God were indifferent which we chose: But it is primarily ad obedientiam, and but subserviently ad poenam as a means against future disobedience, and a securing the ends of Government, in case of sin.

346. But the Preceptive and the Premiant parts, are each chief or final in several respects: God Commandeth us a Course of Duty or Right action to this end, that we may be Happy in his Love. And he promiseth us first, and giveth us after in foretaste, this Happiness, to draw us to Duty.

347. But here is a wonderful inseparable twist; and in the main an Identity. God Ruleth us as a Father, or Regent Benefactor: All his Benefits are Free-gifts, as to the Thing and Value; But given 1. In an Order. 2. And the rest as means to the ultimate. In which respects they are a Reward, or means to it. His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit. Duty is the means to keep his first Gifts and to receive more. The very doing of the duty is a receiving of the Reward; the object of duty being felicitating. (As if feasting or accepting offered wealth or honor were our work.) Holiness is happiness, in a great part. And in our End or state of perfection all will be one: To Love God, Rejoice in Him and praise him, will be both our duty and felicity, means and end, as it were, in one.

348. Whereas some say, that if there were no Law, sin would deserve punishment, it is an error: For it is due only by Law. But it's true that it's due by the mere Law of Nature, without any superadded Positive Laws.

349. God's will called Legislative, or Governing is ever fulfilled in strict sense, that is, So much as is God's part and the Laws part to do, is ever done: e. g. God saith [Perfect obedience, &c. shall be Adams duty] and it is done: It is his Duty whether he will or not. He saith [To steal shall be sin] and it is sin. He saith [He that believeth shall have right to Justification and Glory, and he that believeth not shall be Filius mortis, that is, Death and Hell shall be his Due] and so it is. Thus strictly all God's Will is done.

350. But in the secondary remote sense every sin violateth the Will of God, by breaking his Law: For when he saith [Obedience shall be thy duty;] we use to say, It is God's will that we should obey him: And so when we do not obey him, we are said to Violate his will. But this is but metonymically: For that which is God's will indeed is but that we shall be bound to obey (whether we do or not:) And the event, whether we shall or not de facto, is not at all determined by the Law.

351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing, and command the contrary, it would not prove two contrary wills in God; nor is there any great show of a contradiction in it. For to say [I forbid Judas to hang himself] and [I decree that he shall hang himself] are no contradictions; It is but to say, [It shall be his Duty to preserve his life] and [Eventually he shall not preserve it.] All that is a man's Duty doth not come to pass: And to determine of Duty, is not to say, It shall come to pass. Otherwise God's word were false whenever man sinned. Nay in reality, Augustine (truly) judged that by God's Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted, and yet then he was a chosen Vessel, and God Decreed to save him. He thought that Perseverance was the Duty of some that after fell away, and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away, (though not presently to be possessed;) and yet that God decreed that ipso permittente eventually they should fall away and perish.

352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another, and yet knoweth that a certain Traitor that hath broken Prison, is like to fall into the hands of some Thieves or Enemies that will kill him, If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them, it is no contradiction: The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill; But it saith not, that they shall not de eventu, by way of Prognostication.

353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act; • nd yet Decree that the same Act immediately commanded shall not be • one, or that the act directly forbidden shall be done. Because sin is a thing • hat God cannot decree or will, (of which anon.)

354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is sometimes said • o be commanded or forbidden: And this may be contrarily decreed of God. And men that think not truly of the matter, think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden, and so they err by such confused thoughts. E. G. God's command is that I shall relieve a poor man, and not let him fa • ish; and that I shall heal the sick, &c. and yet God may decree that this • oor man shall be famished, and this sick man die; And yet no contradiction. For indeed [Relieving] in effect, is but the End of the Act which is commanded me, and not the act itself: I am bound to offer him • elief: But if one cannot take it, and another will not, yet I have done my duty: And so in the other instance. So God commanded Abraham • o sacrifice his Son, and yet decreed that he should not be sacrificed; And • his without any contradiction. For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham, and made his duty, was not actual eventual sacri • icing. (For then it had been a duty to resist the Angel and do a thing • mpossible.) But to consent and endeavor on his part to sacrifice his Son: which he did. So the preservation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God, and yet at the same time men's death decreed: Because the thing indeed commanded, is not