A Sum of Moral Philosophy

1. Ethickes.

MOrality is the Art of behavior, prescribing directions for manners arising out of use and customary conversation.

Manners are either

• 1 Real, making a good man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .
• 2 Complementall, making a fair conditioned man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

The Virtues arising out of both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Goodness is Positiue. Complement varies according to

• 1 Time.
• 2 Place.
• 3 Person.

The one necessary, the other indifferent, if used there is a grace and ornament, if not the impeach is not great.

Goodness is wrought by actions of Virtue.

Natural for men to work: or life termed by the Pythagoreans 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a fardle of Actions: Beasts are dull and at command, aguntur non agunt: men only are Active, as having

• Wit for Iudging.
• Will for prosecuting.

Actions are to be perfected by

• Virtue for directions.
• Fortune for success.

Virtue is lame without Fortune, and Fortune blindeheady and headless without virtue Our working is either

• 1 In a state Politic.
• 2 In a family Oeconomicke.
• 3 In private touching our selves only Ethicke.

In Ethics are four causes of Actions.
• 1 The Final, the utmost is felicity, the special and immediate end, any particular good being in show or substance good.
• 2 The Formal as
  • Virtues
  • Vices
  making our
  • Bonum
    • Uerum.
    • Apparens.
  Actions
  • Good
  • Bad,
• 3 Material, as Passions, whereon our virtues must work.
• 4 Efficient as
  • Wit that makes prudence.
  • Will that makes prae election.

This is your Subject of all Ethics.

II, Of Particular Ends.

NO Action so sudden, but proposeth some end: As actions are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite affects them as either in show or substance good.

Desire naturally is for preservation; Evil as it is evil is an enemy to being: Hence the aim of all Appetite must be some good Appetites are either

• 1 Natural, as common Inclinations to a genenerall good of being: as for the Earth to bear downwards, the fire upwards,
• 2 Sensitiue called appetitus sensitivus, whose issues are, to wit
  • Griefe for things to to be avoided.
  • 2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted.
• 3 Rationall, partly from the Understanding, that judges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.

Hence ariseth three sorts of Good, viz.

• 1 Bonum Entis: The object proper to the natural.
• 2 Bonum sensus: Whose satisfactiō is delight.
• 3 Bonum Moris: Whose manager is Reason.

If reason be governess, we apprehend true good.

If lead by Passion, we follow appearances.

Passion sets a color on Evil, & persuades the good of it.

Hence are all vicious desires.

Our way for such objects is with Annibal to bear the gilded pillars in Juno's Temple, before we venter to feast on them.

Things are desired, either as

• 1 Vsefull only to others, not for themselves, so riches in themselves are nothing, but are desired for use only.
• 2 Vsefull both for others, & desirable in themselves: so Virtues of themselves are comely, and are as means to happiness.
• 3 Desirable only for themselves, not for others as felicity the last good, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , finis finium.

That we often fail of the end intended, is for the want of either

• 1 Iudgen ent in choice of the right means.
• 2 Ability in not prosecuting that we have chosen.
• 3 Constancy in not persevering in what we have chosen, and began to prosecute.

The excellency of one end above another is known,

1 If that end have the most worthy means directing to it

Hence the end of Policy is above others as having the means of other Practick ends subalternate to it.

2 If it comprehend the special end intended by actions of less worth, as the art of Horse-man-ship is referred to art Military.

Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.

Felicity is the best of ends: our soul affecteth it: Virtues work it: Constancy in goodness perfects it: It self is the up-shot of all practicke ends.

III. Of Universal Ends. Felicity.

FElicity is the proposal of the best good.

We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgment: Passion goes by opinion, an as opinion is staggering, so must such proposals be. Hence, to some pleasure, to others wealth, to others honor is Felicity; all are pleasures for the time, but content not.

This Felicity is not true, but forged.

True felicity is from an uprightness of judgment.

That we may find it out, seek we what in a man can be Of

• 1 Greatest perfection.
• 2 Sole sufficiency.
• 3 Quietnesse of mind.

1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the best goods.

2 Sole sufficiency that there be

• 1 Contentation in what we enjoy
• 2 No want of what we enjoy not

This keeps us from repining.

3 Quiet of mind that there be

• 1 Integrity towards God.
• 2 True dealing with men Body or fortune
• 3 Not doting on the goods of Body or fortune
• 4 Stopping extravagancy of passions.

But using them always as helps not as ends.

A breach in any of these mars tranquility.

In a man we consider a double carriage, either as

• 1 Living in this life only Moral.
• 2 Preparing himself for a future life, Christian.

Hence Stoics and Platonickes held, we were free of two Cities

• 1 The greater,—Heaven.
• 2 The lesser, —The World.

This world as it bears the image of the Heavenly, and is the way of our iournying thither: So the actions of the one truly moral, are not in opposition to the Christian Each of these lives have in their end

• 1 Greatest perfection.
• 2 Sole sufficiency.
• 3 Truest quietness of mind.

The felicity of the one is presence of all good, when the soul is separated.

The means to get this general is Religion.

The felicity of the other is presence of all good, whilst we live.

The means to get it, is common honesty, or universal justice.

Living in this world our work is either in

• Soul only.
• Soul and Body.

The work of our soul only is immanent.

The perfection of it is contemplation.

The object and aim of it is Truth.

The satisfaction is content and quietness of mind.

The means to attain it, is Sapience and Pondering.

That is an habit generally wrought by two particulars

• 1 Understanding for conceit, and apprehension of principles.
• 2 Science for inference of conclusions.

This true felicity, since in it is

• 1 True perfection,
• 2 Sole sufficiency,
• 3 Quietnesse of mind

is termed Felicitas contemplatiua.

Our work both in Soul and Body is transient, so called because the action of the soul were secret were it not, that the spreading of the body displayed it: The operations of the soul properly are punctual and indivisible: As they partake of the body, so they open themselves both to the view, and use of others: Hence arise actions of practice, their special aim is the good of others, and since we are not for our selves only, but to be useful to others, & society arises out of community of nature our special felicity, for use must be practicke.

There are two special Felicities then.

As sin and vice being in all a double misery

• 1 Darkness of understanding for discerning truth.
• 2 Depravation of will for affecting goodness.

So to remedy these our perfection must be

• Contemplatiue for the one.
• Practicke for the other.

These come not of the strength of men, since the blind cannot judge of colors, the perverse cannot will goodness.

They are given of God, if any gift comes from above to man, saith Aristotle; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

It is most fit it should be our felicity, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

The stern to manage these must be faith.

Without it

• Contemplation is curiosity.
• Good actions but fashion, & vain-glory

This is the aim of the heathen goodness.

With it

• Contemplation is wisdom.
• Action is
  • 1 Duty to God.
  • 2 Charity to our neighbor
  • 3 Salvation to our selves.

This alone is man's felicity.

IV. Temporal happiness described.

THe perfection of things is in their operation: Idleness, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.

To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,

In masteries the crowns are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.

Actions is a power common to all; communities commend not, since commendation aims at a special, and preferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a special action of man, that proceeds from the soul not as it is vegetative, and sensitive (so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rational, only proper to man.

In the reasonable Soul we consider two parts, the one

• Governing.
• Governed.

The governing part is by

• Wit,
• Will regulating our souls actions, and stopping their unwarrantable excurrence: This called Recta Ratio, or Virtus.

The part to be governed is the seat of Passions.

Though they naturally sprout from the stem of reason, and are proper to men only, yet in themselves they are wild and unruly, but strength of reason must order them, Our perfection is not

• in the latter which must obey.
• but in the former, which must govern.

Reasons in strength and actions of Virtue are nothing, unless they are continued: Perfection of good must be without Ruptures: The intercedents of an after evil mars the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must be a work of honesty to the end of our days.

This felicity ends with our life, and therefore temporal.

The other begins after death, and is eternal.

V. Things required to temporal Happiness.

HAppinesse is a Virtue common not for our selves only, but for the good of others.

An happy man's employment must be beneficence: his reward esteem and credit among the people.

That he may be best in performance, and highest repute, he must have the goods of

• Mind.
• Body.
• Fortune.

The mind as most inward, so affordeth goods most proper to felicity; A man for moral goodness is to be judged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not overmuch to be desired, yet if offered they are to be received; we take them for continency, not necessity, as useful to set forth our Virtues both to the good and view of others.

Riches and the goods of Fortune serve for the weal of the body, the body for the soul, the soul for God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward: they make not a man happy, but adorn him; they give his luster, not his being.

The thing that makes happiness properly and principally is virtue; yet Fortune must grace it; as the Stones & Timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, before we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. Seneca.

Virtue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Counsel, though his underlings be rebellious; He is able to keep him in guard, though abroad there be mutinies; He may be happy in himself in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can bear, if a greater weight should be laid upon him, and can suffer cold, though in the interim his teeth chatter.

An happy man useth ill fortune, as a good Captain bad arms, though vnframable, yet using them according to art military, or as a skillful craftsman showing his art on a shoe of bad leather, both may do well, but better, if their means were better.

The goods of the mind are either

• 1 Wit for judging.
• 2 Will for choosing, what we have judged.
• 3 Power for prosecuting what we have chosen.
• 4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions,

Habits are the lowest gifts of the mind.

1 They are gotten by use and custom, the other art natural.

2 They work on passions, whose grounds is sense.

The other are without sense, since

• 1 Prosecution
• 2 Choice.
• 3 Judgment
• 4 Power
• 5 Wit.
• 6 Will.

are inseparate substances.

Habits are only for the corporal.

Their kinds are

• Intellectuall,
• Moral.

The intellectual, some by doctrine, & instinction, and are 5, to wit,

• 1 Understanding for contēplatiō
• 2 Science for contēplatiō
• 3 Sapience. for contēplatiō
• 4 Prudence. for action,
• 5 Art for action,

The moral come by use, and custom, viz

• If ruling passion, it is Virtue.
• If ruled by it, it is Vice.

Their properties are

• 1 To be begotten by us.
• 2 Being gotten long to continue with us.

The difference betwixt the work of nature, and of manners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the action, as first we have the power of laughing, before the act: Manners are first in action, then in habit.

The goods of the Body are

• 1 Health.
• 2 Strength.
• 3 Grace of person.

Though Virtue could appear in deformity, yet it is more honorable in a comely personage; as the Ruby planted in Iron hath his luster, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.

The goods of fortune are

• 1 Wealth.
• 2 Worth of birth.
• 3 Reputation and credit.
• 4 Friends.
• 5 Goods of Posterity.

1 Goods either in

• Money.
• Goods.
• Lands.

The use and end

• 1 For necessity principal.
• 2 Then for pleasure
  • 1 Not of pampering.
  • 2 But of recreation.

It is requisite for pourveiance: Poverty and Want are repining: necessity of having armeth to Importunity and impudency in procuring: Thence the beggars life, though most to be pitied for want, yet deserves least favor for their boldness. The Pythagoreans would have an happy man wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like over-much light, it quels the eye-sight. That we must wish for no more prosperity, then may fit us for action, as the Pilot takes not the ship of most weight, but of most convenience for coasting: That the evils of much prosperity are greater, then they of adversity; as in the body superfluities work more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as affliction compels our mind; so height of wealth puffs it up, and empties it: Hence we see the rich often injurious and encroaching: A happy man by wisdom prevents these.

2 Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there be no stain of blood. Low birth deiects the mind.

Bastardy is dishonorable, as debarring inheritance to the common rites of a Citizen.

Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child, as Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly given, gave this the reason of it, that surely his father was drunken, when he begot him: Contrarily it was Diophantes brag, that he could prevail in any demand with the Athenians, since his father Themistocles could do so before him.

3 Reputation is either viz: in

• Height of place, as preferments.
• Good opinion of our fellow Citizens.

1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd governors come in rather by intention then right: Optimates is an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry thenselves, that Sud consilia optimo cui{que} debentur: They are defined by Tully, Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, nec naturâ improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti: Hence he ranges even rusticks and trades-men, so they be honest.

The reason may be, the ground of evil society must be religion, and justice; without it can neither be restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evil doers, nor reward for the well deserving. Wealth and Power make a Society spracke, and passable, but justice informs, and acts it: This is as the soul to quicken it, that as the Organe to vent and spread it: Hence the right of governance principally is due to the best in life.

2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Virtuous.

It opens it self in

• Words
• Works

of service.

Three things breed in a man credit

• Wisdom.
• Honesty.
• Love and kindness.

The special of these is Honesty: for a man truly honest hath that wisdom, that he can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his love is such, that he will labor to benefit all, and injury none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it self into praise for actions extraordinary, into honor, glory and admiring: honor and admiration ascends upward, and is the title due to the extreme point of goodness: We yield it to things of most distance, & farthest out of our compass: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore Pythagoras boasted he had got his good by Philosophy, that he had learned to wonder at nothing, since admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of judgment.

As in Nature there is excess and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also.

Things honored and admired are out of the reach of Envy.

Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to virtue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good he exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himself: Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: Non vt optimis par sit, sed vt malis melior.

Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: it admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may be given and taken of equals: Glory is for a superior only; praise recants down-wards to confer with defects, and after conference to extol the better deserts of the other: Glory admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.

Hence Felicitas bonum

• Honorable.
• Non laudabile.

4 Goods of posterity as of

• Children
• Kindred

somewhat to be respected of an happy man.

It follows him after death as a complement of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary happen.

5 Friends are requisite to happiness partly for

• Use.
• Comfort.

1 For use, since a man cannot rely upon the purchase of his own hands only, but he often requires an help: Management of things are sundry, and since they must each have their several dispatch, they cannot so well be compassed by one.

2 For comfort, since a man is pliable to utter himself to someone of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in revealing them. — Strangulat inclusus dolor. Again our nature abandoneth solitariness: Presence of friends keeps us from feeding on our own hearts, like Bellepheron in the wilderness.

To friendship three things are required,

• 1 Virtus, vt pulchrum.
• 2 Consuetudo, vt iucundum.
• 3 Usus, vt necessarium.

Virtue the ground, that must b • gin it.

Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.

Use and help, that must show, utter and exercise it.

As it is the prop and stay of man's life, and follows immediately from the sociableness of his nature, so it relies on three goods

The end of all appetites

• Bonum honestum.
• Bonum vtile.
• Bonum iucundum.

Friends must not be

• suddenly gotten.
• many in multitude.

1 Suddaine friends have but small root of love.

It was Zeuxis answer when he was reprehended for sloe painting, that he must bestow time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue forever. Observance of their passions and qualities must precede, before we enter to cl • se with them.

1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to us.

2 Whether they encroach not too fast into our acquaintance, for towardness of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so less entire, or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.

2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channel must have many shallowes, that is cut into sundry streams. One bragged to Chilo, that he knew not many his enemies: he replied that by that he knew not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenure precise, and proper to one, not to be enlarged to multitudes: Agesilaus would use all in courtesy, but he was familiar and friendly but to few.

The Giant that had 50 bellies, was fain to have an 100 hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly have but two hands. Amicitia tantum inter dues.

Men of worth have many fellows, few friends.

Friendship is when they follow principally for Virtue.

When they follow for goods outward

• Countenance.
• Power.

1 Countenance: It is greatness of retinue useful to men of place. In pace decus, in bello praesidium.

2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselves, depress their adversaries. In government it is good to use men of one rank equally: for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In favor it is best to use men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more careful, and the rest more officious.

VI. The Stoics tenent of Happiness.

HAppinesse being the perfection of man must be in things that most honor him, nothing so worthy of him as virtue. It proceeds immediately from his soul, as partaking both of wit and will.

Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be styled

• Virtuous.
• Happy.

To live according to virtue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The Reasons are three.

1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose work is for the best, and virtue is naught but the perfection of God.

2 Man by nature an image of God, as Virtue and Goodness flows immediately from the one, so ought from the other.

3 Our soul hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and will of Good: the conioyning of both is man's nature, which of it self must both judge and affect true good: this only is virtue. Virtue is termed by them any special action proper to any special nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature active, and virtuous: As things are most material, so are they less quick: Hence souls are most virtuous, and this virtue is their felicity.

VII. Of Passions in general.

PAssions are the matter of Virtue.

They are the nails, that fasten soul and body together.

In them we note their

• 1 Rising and increase.
• 2 Issues and consequence.
• 3 Prevention and stopping.

Their rising partly from

• 1 The souls nature.
• 2 The occurrences of objects.

The soul grows in passion

• 1 Not by the understanding part.
• 2 But by the sensitive part, which
  • 1 Iudgeth a Truth.
  • 2 Induceth a color of Truth.

The sensitive works for passion

• Abroad by the five outward senses.
• Within by the imagination or fancy.

The work of the fantasy is to resume what the memory hath retained, and the common sense judged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.

These appearances go masked under the habit of

• Truth.
• Good.

If of truth, they persuade a weak understanding & so breed, viz.

• 1 Curiosity
• 2 Folly
• 3 Giddines

and hence are

• 1 Heretics.
• 2 Poets
• 3 Fond studēts.

these err in the Theory.

If of good they persuade a weak will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and err in the practike: That which makes a fancy venturous & resolved in these collections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soul, and as fantasy is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.

Hence arise the tenets against the Stoics.

1 Passions are a natural part of the soul.

2 They may be moderated well from their excurrence, but cannot be thoroughly barred of their existence in us.

3 They are not in themselves evil, but in their degrees.

4 They are often profitable, and means to further virtue, as fear teaches us to avoid evil, self-love to prosecute our good, Mercy and pity teaches a King: Clemency and anger wheteth our valor.

5 Their excess is not positively evil, but upon circumstances, as with my friend I may be angry for his fault, but be reconciled again: with my foe I may be more implacable.

6 Though strengthened by opinion, yet not proceeding from without us, but natural apprehensions within.

7 In a man two parts

• Understanding
• Sense

both in reluctance to the other.

1 Understanding takes the good of most worth for honesty.

Hence ariseth conscience, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

2 Sense takes the good of most

• Pleasure.
• Profit

hence are passions.

The will hath two inclinations to follow, either

• Reason, or
• Sense.

In judgment we often condemn, what in passion we prosecute.

objects that move our fantasy are

• Evils to be avoided.
• Goods to be followed.

The ground that persuades our soul to appehend these objects, is self-love.

This as it is

• 1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man.
• 2 Ruled by Sense is bad: and nurseth passions.

It may be defined,—An inordinate inclination of the affecting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason.

The issues of passions are

• General.
• Special,

1 The General are.

1 Rebellion against reason.

2 Division in themselves.

3 Insatiable in their extent.

4 Importunate for action. Hence they work headinesse, and sudden resolution.

5 Desirous of things

• 1 Foolish.
• 2 Inconvenient,
• 3 Impossible.

6 Inconstancy of prosecution.

2 The special are.

1 Driuing the body to distemper by

• 1 Raising the humors.
• 2 Altering the Complexion.
• 3 Forecing new motions.

As in fear the blood chilleth, in anger boils, in grief the heart closeth, in joy opens.

2 Blinding the Judgment; The Reason is,

The Understanding receives her notice from the fancyes impression: which befriending Passion representeth often to the Judgment not true and real, but apparent and conceited shapes.

3 Perverting our will.

The will inclines oftener to passion, then Judgment, because passion is given more to choice and liberty.

The Judgment is precise and settled to one part.

The prevention of passions is to

• Discouer
• Temper

them

1 Discouery is had,

1 From the use of company; as Augustus judged of his two daughters Julia and Livia, finding one delighted to converse with grave men, the other with yongsters; pronounced the one staid, the other light.

2 From the view of complections; as the Cholericke breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure, slegme, sloth; melancholy, sadness.

3 From the use of talk, as if it be

• 1 Suddaine.
• 2 Often.
• 3 Personally impeaching.
• 4 Censuring.

2 To discover our selves observe we what our enemies speak of us. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in us, when our selves are blinded with self-love.

After the discovery ou • Passions must be tempered.

The temper of them must be reason, and wisdom checking the sense, and stopping the Excurrence of Fantasy.

Men by reason teach birds to speak, dogs to hunt, horses to curveat, though sense persuade the contrary.

And we discharge our selves of the meat we have eaten with pleasure, when we hear it was polluted or forbidden.

The way to temper them is not to root out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion, but their skips: and Lycurgus should not so much cut down the vines ro bar drunkenness, as have planted cesterns of water to have allayed the heat thereof. It was Zeno his saying of musical instruments, that even barren wood & dead guts would speak, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.

Wisdom must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they over-grow.

Our ways to slack them are,

1 To bend to the other extreme; as if my sight be scattered by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black object: And Epamminandas way to stop his surfeit on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draught of Vinegar.

2 Abstinence from things hurtful, though lawful.

3 Stop all occasions, that are motives to set passion on head.

4 Barre self conceits, and fancifull apprehensions.

5 Yield not to inconstancy and fleeting.

6 Labor to mortify the Flesh.

If passion be too violent, that we cannot slack it, our labor must be,

1 To stay execution; As Archytas professed to his baylife that carelessly kept his ground, that were he not angry, he would tell him part of his mind: And Plato would not himself beat his man, while he was moved, but gave him up to Spensippus to be handled by him.

2 To conceal it in what we may; for it breeds disrespect, if we open our yielding to it: this made Plutarch to be upbraided by his servant, when he could not dissemble his anger that it was a shame for him to be angry, since he had written a book to the contrary.

A man (saith Plato ) is sometimes his own lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his own vassal, when sense and passion.

VIII The division and number of Passions.

THe bent and aim of all passions are either,

• The gaining of a good:
• The avoidance of evil.

Good & evil are gained avoided by 2 inclinations of the soul

• 1 The concupiscible that affects.
• 2 The irascible that prosecuts & venters on what we affect.

Both these have their objects

• Good.
• Evil.

The attainment of the

• Good breeds pleasure.
• Evil breeds grief.

Thence

• Pleasure
• Griefe

are the heads of all passion.

The passions aiming at good are either

• 1 Love.
• 2 Desire.
• 3 Hope.
• 4 Boldness.
• 5 Pleasure.

The good presented is affected first by

• Love
• Desire

these proceed from the concupiscible,

Then it is prosecuted for attainment by

• Hope
• Boldness

these proceed out of the • rascible.

Then being attained there resorts pleasure: this only for the good present, the other for the Good absent.

The passions aiming at the avoidance of evell are.

1 Hate opposite to love.

2 Abomination or detesting, opposite to desire being but the vehemence or high degree of hate, as desire is of Love,

3 Despair opposite to hope.

4 Fear to boldness.

5 Paine or Griefe the Issue of all, when the evil is in presence.

As

• Goods
• Evils

come

• Nearer or
• further of

their attainment, so they partake more or less

• Pleasure of
• Griefe,

These 10 Passions are simple, seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone, or Griefe alone,

There are seven mixed passions.

These work either

• on our selves.
• or on others.

1 They that work on our selves are 2.

• 1 Shamefastnesse
• 2 Repentance mixed of
  • 1 Fear for infamy.
  • 2 Sorrow for fault.
  • 3 Desire of Amendment

2 They that work on others, are either

• for them
• or against them.

1 For them are 2.

3 Pitty whose object is the evil of another, which we would have removed.

Mixt of

• Griefe for the evils befalling
• Desire for the removal of them.

4 Zeal, conceived in the behalf of one we love.

Mixt of

• 1 Griefe for the wrongs done.
• 2 Anger against the party wronging.
• 3 Love to the party wronged.
• 4 Boldness to right him in what we may.

The passions that work against another either

• In thought only.
• Or in deed.

1 In thought, 1.

5 Iealousy or suspicion mixed with

• Griefe.
• Anger.
• Fear.
• Hate.

2 In deed, 2.

6 Anger mixed with either

• 1 Griefe for wrongs.
• 2 Hate against the party wronging.
• 3 Desire of revenge.
• 4 Boldness in venturing.

7 Maligning: this is different from anger, since anger is moved upon wrong done: This without that motive: only because it is well with another.

This contains

• Envy muttering at another's good.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , joying at others fall.

The former mixed of

• Hate
• Griefe.
• Desire of falling.

The latter of

• Hate.
• Joy for the Evil fallen.

This of Passions in general.

IX Of love the first Passion.

[Obiectum.] THe object of Love is goodness; the issue joy and content.

It is either with or without passion.

1 Without Passion it's in

• God
• Angels

both have wills which are the affectors of good and this affecting is Love.

1 God's love is partly in

• Reflexe to himself.
• Communicating good to others.
• viz. the creatures.

1 By reflex into himself, he views his own goodness: & goodness is the Loadstone of Love.

2 He communicates to creatures goods of

• Nature.
• Grace.

1 Nature is general to all, & comprehends the Works of

• Creation
• Preservation
• temporal.

In this is the true Bonum Entis, which God loves.

2 Grace is special to some and comprehends the spiritual acts of his love as

• Redemption
• Satisfaction
• Glorification

In this is the true Bonum moris, and this is God's love.

2 Angels love is by contemplation of

• God.
• the Works of God.

They see in all perfection of good, the fountain is God, the streams scatter into each part of the world: things they cannot hate, only sin they hate, which is as nothing.

This love hath these tenets.

1 It is in the best natures, and the perfection of them.

2 As the best things are most lovely, so they are most in imparting their loves to others.

3 It is Impotence to be hating, envying, murmuring, all which are opposite to Love.

4 It cannot be perfect in man, it is truest in God, & nature; these are not interrupted by Passions.

5 The bond of matrimony hath not truly this love, since it is spiced with lust: we may rather term it the Union of affections willed by God for Avoidance of further evil.

6 It works for the best things with reluctance to sense.

2 Love with Passion is either

• Proper
• Improper.

1 Love improper is in beasts, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Empresse of Nature.

Birds build their neasts, and spare their own crawes to fill their young ones: the Partridge flags before the Faukner, and ventures the taking, that her young ones may escape. The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these combats: In the worst natures are some sparkles of love: As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a luster, and in beast are rude lines of man's natural affection; As in wild figs and oliues are the spices of the sweet, though in harsher manner:

2 Love proper is in men alone.

It is either of

• our selves.
• or others.

1 Love of our selves called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 either

• 1 True according to reason, or
• 2 Fancied according to Sense.

1 True self-love apprehends that which is simply good, both in present and future.

It respects the goods of the soul before those of the Body.

It chooses the less good of most durance before the greatest good of less continuance.

It is the Well-head of Charity.

And the spurr of Virtue, since by it we benefit our selves.

2 The properties of it are

• Wishing
• Working

the best to our selves.

3 Consent with our own parts, as of

• Reason.
• Passion.

4 Louing to retire into our own thoughts.

5 Ioying at our own good, and grieving at the contrary.

Hence it is the attribute only of good men.

2 The evil follow shows, and opinatiue good, which failing breeds sorrow: the good man aims at truth, and therein contents himself.

2 Conscience suffers not the evil to view their own thoughts, they are at odds with themselves; Sense and Reason are hard at combat with them: Love cannot be there, where there is difference.

3 Self-love causeth Joy; Evil men, though they have joy of sense, they have grief of Reason, and their joy is not for durance, but ends in Repentance.

4 Intemperance is the badge of Evil men, whose work is to breed diseases in

• Soul.
• Body.

A good man so loves himself, that he will either stop raising or labor their allaying.

5 As goodness is wisdom, so Evil is Folly, which blindeth us that we cannot distinguish the good from the Evil, but choose at random, and so prove our selves without self-love.

The opposite of self love is either a stupid neglect, or a desperate hate of himself, they that mangle themselves, are of this rank: Self-love fancied according to sense is the badge of Fools; It is the seed-plot of Passion, the bathe of Flatterers, the nurse of vices in manners real, of Phantasticke humors, in manners of Complement.

It ariseth from 3 heads, viz.

• 1 Blindness of understanding.
• 2 Easynesse of comparing our selves with others.
• 3 Partiallity in judging to our own side.

The Issues of it are 4.

• 1 Admiration of our selves.
• 2 Arrogancy of Speech.
• 3 Easy excusing our own faults.
• 4 Despising of others admonition, and counsel.

The ways to restrain it are.

1 Prise the Act of any above thine own particular, as many eyes see more then one, and many hands make better riddance.

2 Amplifie others virtues depressing thine own.

3 Be sparing in Vauntes, seldom in excuses.

This self-love bars the admittance of goodness; it comes not, unless it be taught. Sought it cannot be, unless it be acknowledged wanting; Self-love bars this acknowledgement.

Love to others is directed either to

• God. or
• our Neighbors.

1 Love to God is only in a sanctified will none can truly hate him but sinners: The reason is because, God is Love, and sin is in opposition to God.

2 Love to our Neighbors is either to

• Enimyes or
• Friends.

1 Love to our Enimies is one of the cunning'st Poynts of Charit • , and an imitation of the divine nature.

1 Pardoning them, if they repent, as the Lions do the beasts, that submit them selves.

2 Pardoning them, though persisting, and being without submission.

3 Not pardoning them only, but working a good for them.

The Necessity of this Love is,

1 Because God loveth us being his enemies, and we must do, as we would be done unto.

2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him, and none so harmed us now, but he may do us good hereafter; and for this is to be loved.

2 Love to our friends is either

• for public respect. or
• private, and particular.

1 Love for public respect is the love of our Country, that is the duty of all; but it is most splendent in heroickes, who pawn their life for it.

It was questioned, whether this love was engrafted by nature, or assumed by custom?

1 If it come by nature, why doth not the poor love as well as the rich?

2 How comes it, that many for gain leave their country, never to return, since, where we love, we love to converse: Some have been Traitors against it, and Nero's to fire it.

We answer, Nature cannot be so strict, right, and even, but sometime she breeds Monsters: gain may withdraw men's hearts, and fasten them to foreign Coastes.

The Poor love their home, but rich men more, because they reap the goodness of their country in a larger manner.

Men's love of country is first for themselves, as we fear storms, least our selves pinch for them, and we quench a fire, least our own souls be fired by it.

2 Love for private respects is either

• 1 Ascending to our Superiors.
• 2 Descending to our inferiors.
• 3 Betwixt equals.

1 That in decent is far more hearty then that in ascent. Hence fathers are more loving to children, then children to fathers:

2 That betwixt Equalls stands upon more Indifferency of Points; and in the best counterpoyse of either they may fall to Iarringe: Hence Brothers and Sisters fall to Iarring, and friends have many distastes.

These Loves are linked either by bond

• Natural, or
• Civil.

1 The Natural bond is threefold,

1 Under God to parents, who challenge of us

• 1 Honor.
• 2 Maintenance, if need so require.

It was Solons law, that none should be free from their duty, but those that had learned no trade of their fathers.

Parents are either of

• 1 Blood, that frame us in body.
• 2 Manners, that by direction frame us in Soul; such are teachers.

It was Socrates his tenent, that by nature both these had challenge of Love: it is also doubted by many, whether Alexanders debt was not as ample to Aristotle his master, as to Philip his father.

2 Our bond of nature is to

• Brethren
• Sisters.

They challenge of us,

1 Counsel.

2 Liberty of Conference.

3 Pleasure of Conversation.

4 Helps of Fortune; So we wrong not our selves overmuch in furnishing them:

Brothers love is

• 1 Honoured by our friends.
• 2 Envied and feared of our enemies.
• 3 Vsefull to our selves.
• 4 Ioyous to our Parents.

King Eumenes his Mother professed her self happy in this, that of 4 Sons 3 youngest squired the body of the eldest, and that Eumenes was nothing jealous or mistrustful of them: Nature hath made them in a family feet to bear up our body both in equality and proportion; If they exceed, they cause halting, if they trip at one another, they cause fallinge.

A Lady of Persia made it a great dispute, whether they were better to loose her brother, or her son; she said they could get a new son, but a brother, since her Parents were dead, they could not.

Brothers dislike (it may be) often admits remedy, but their hate is inreconcileable: As the Ioyntures of Art, though riuen with rents, may be glued again, but Natures breach cannot.

The special Motiues of their dislike are 2.

1 If we leave their commerce, and follow strangers as if we should cut off our flesh and inch in the room of it a strange piece: And the Arcadian Poet in Homer, when he had lost his leg, for his best help was to hoppe on a leg of Wood; strangers will be distrustful of us, since we leave our own.

Can you style youre friend brother, when you cannot account a brother youre friend: as absurd a thing, as if you mangled his natural body: but hanged his Idol with laces and Garlands.

2 If we are always checking, and thwarting their courses, as Laco said by his short wife, of 2 Evils, the least is to be chosen: So if our brother be bad, rather let him have his fourth, then demerit his hate.

Though the dog bite and the horse throw us, yet we keep them, and we suffer Apes, Catts and Lions, though sometimes harmful.

Wincking at faults in company is usual, when we would not displease, though it be not so honest, yet for avoidance of further Evils, it may be tolerated.

We must be our Brothers Freind, not his Judge,

3 Our bond of Nature is to our kin either of

• Blood, or
• Marriage.

both galling offices of love proper to the family. as Invitation to

• Marriage feasts.
• Funerals.

2 The civil bond of love is to

• 1 Citizens.
• 2 Country-men.
• 3 Strangers.

As particular respects vary, so this order varies.

It is the engaging of man unto man in heart began by use and acquaintance: It acteth, as one Soul in 2 Bodies.

There are 2 branches of it

• 1 Wishing.
• 2 Indeauouring the best for another not for his own but the others sake.

The main motives of it are the 3 goods

• 1 Pleasure.
• 2 Profit.
• 3 Honesty.

• 1 Pleasure are the aims of Epicures; loves as they are diverse, and fancifull, so such loves must be.
• 2 Profitte are the aims of Epicures; loves as they are diverse, and fancifull, so such loves must be.
• 3 Honesty makes love more settled: it appears not as Alcibiades changing his coat to the fashion of the Place, but as Socrates keeps his tenor.

This love gets his growth by 3 knots

• 1 Affecting.
• 2 Acquaintance.
• 3 Trust.

The Twine to wind and fasten it must be a Resemblance of Manners.

Motiues to make me effect one

1 I see him sympathize with my

• Joy
• Greife

befreinding Brutus.

2 He accounts my friends his and my enemies his; So Cicero loved App • us Pulcher for Brutus his sake, and by it bound Brutus the more to him.

3 He is pleasant-hearted and jesting; If I jest with him he takes it not amiss.

4 He reports well of me behind my back and rather in secret show his mind then in public it should be told me.

5 He delights in my Company.

6 He goes neat, but curious in apparel: this was Demosthenes and Hortensius his trick to get them favorites, when they first began pleadinge.

7 He lives peaceably with others, which persuades me, he will do so with me too.

These things may move affecting in me not acquaintance, since the

• Flatterer
• Dissembler

may do as much

Motiues to move me to acquaintance.

1 He reports well of me before mine Enimies, and if they except, he defends me.

2 I see him honestly given, not giddily.

3 He doth me a good turn, so it be no prejudice to himself.

4 He is no busy-medler in my matters.

5 He overthwartes me not in talk, especially being either serious or angry.

6 He keeps the 7 former motives without dissimulation.

These move acquaintance, and I would trust him in matters obvious, and ordinary, but in things secret, and nearly touching me, I may not, unless he had Wisdom joined to his Honesty.

Motiues to move me to trust him.

1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimulation and the 6 latter with wisdom.

2 He is wary, that he be not felt by others to open himself by Ignorance.

3 He doth me a good turn though to his own Preiudice.

4 If I have wronged him, he will not revenge it, though having opportunity.

5 He suffers wrong for my sake.

6 He discloseth to me his heart, opens his faults, showeth me his hopes and fears.

This makes the up shot of love, and the Bond of Freindship. As the Diamond engraues the Diamond, and fire increases fire: so his love increaseth my love, and makes up an Union between us.

X. Of Desire the 2. Passion.

DEsire is the stop, and scale of Love: it adds vehemency to our assecting.

The object of it is some pleasing good; The issue delight.

Goods are made pleasant unto us either by

• Nature or
• Custom.

1 By nature are such as in them selves have no Paine.

2 By Custom the hunts-man affects the cold winters-walks, and the student loveth his watchings, and they are desirable to him, though in themselves are painful, but are pleasant for the End.

Desire is partly

• with Hope.
• without hope.

1 If a thing desired be within compass of attainment we raise up our powers within, and watch helps abroad to gain it, then desire is joined with Hope.

2 If it be not likely to be gained, it leaves hope, and spends it self only in wishing.

Thus we desire

• Mines of Gold
• Managements of States

though there be no hope or expectance of it

About Desire are these Tenants

1 It is a note of want, and Impotency. Thence the covetous are said always to be wanting in their greatest Abundance.

2 It is never but with grief, till the thing be obtained, and in the attainment it ceases. Hence it cannot be in God, seeing in him is no Want, Greife, or Passibility of Nature.

3 We cannot desire things, we know not.

4 It is limited only by satisfaction; without it grows eager importunity.

5 It is grounded only upon Sence: Angels properly have it not nor Plantes.

6 It appears first in beasts: In a more pregnant manner it is in men, seeing in them the sensible part is more various, as having opinion to float and to cast their desires to infinite resolutions, which beasts want.

Desire is either

• Proper, or
• Improper.

1 The Improper is an Inclination to the regaining of a Good; this is called Appetitus naturalis, by which the Earth beareth downward, the fire upward, and by it appears in all Natural Bodies.

2 The Proper is in men principally.

This is for the bettering either of the

• Reasonable part, or
• Sensible part.

1 For the reasonable, there is a desire of knowledge naturally in-grafted in the Soul.

2 For the sensitive part, the desires are either necessary as of

• Meats.
• Drinks.

Natural not necessary, as Venery, which though it be necessary to man in Specie, yet is not to this or that man in Individuo: Neither natural, nor necessary, as are all Phantasies, and conceited Appetites.

The 2 former is common to men with beasts.

The last comes by an Opinatiue apprehension of Colourable goods it openes it self most in Excess of things: It grows boundless and infinite, for as opinion is infinite, so these desires brooded, and hatched by it must be infinite.

Fancied Desires are either.

• Extraordinary
• Ordinary.

1 The Extraordinary are caused by diseases, as the choleric desires honey, the Fever-sick Wine, others eat chalk, coals &c. or are incident to great bellies, whose longing proceeds from a raw cold Humour; If they fail of it, they either endanger themselves, or their infants; it comes especially, when they travel for Wenches. The Low-country-women of all others are most given to these desires, because of their coldness of Temper.

2 The ordinary ariseth from Voluntary Passions.

They bend either to

• Pleasure.
• Profit.

1 The desires bending to Pleasures are mainly to sooth the 5. Sences. These are craving and excessive all joined make up luxury. Cleopatra in her Voyage to Anthony had all these, odors for her smell, Music for her Ears, cakes for her taste, costly hangings and soft-Pillowes for her sight and touch.

The like was noted of Antiochus in his war against the Romans.

The 2 special senses that Luxury seeks to please are

• Touching.
• Tasting.

From th • se arise 2. importunate ones

• 1 Lust for Venery.
• 2 Liquo • ousenes for
  • Meats.
  • Drinks.

The Excurrences of both these are a certain sign of a corrupt, lewd, and intemperate Soul.

1 Lust is in beasts, but exceeds in men.

1 Beasts have it but at set times, men at their Pleasure, ad Libitum.

2 Beasts have it less violently, men, so, that many have wrought their deaths for it.

The only way to allay it, and to excel beasts is

• Right reason.
• Religion.

Our Caveats against it must be to avoid wanton

• 1 Words.
• 2 G • stures.
• 3 Meats.

It never admits moderation, and warrantize, but only in the bond of Marriage.

2 Liquorousnes for meats and drinks aims not at necessity, but pampering: thence it cannot be truly in beasts, who feed not but for hunger.

This Desire is seen in us either

• Eating overmuch.
• Too greedily for the Time.
• Inseasonably at all times.
• Feeding rather on delicates, then strong meats.

It is Seneca's saying of the Belly. Parvo contentus est, si des illi quod debes, non quod potes.

2 Desires ayeming at profit are either of

• Wealth, as Covetousnes.
• Honor, as Ambition.

1 Covetousnes is for the Purse, it gapes after money, either to have it only in possession, this is Parsimony: or to have it for Use, and purveyance, not of natures, but of Superfluities: This desire may be termed Vaunting, or ostentation.

Parsimony is only to have, not to Use; It is the truest note of Poverty.

Increase rather feeds, then allays it: he that still drinks, and cannot be satisfied, needs rather purging, then filling.

These extort from others not to benefit themselves: but we rather hate the Viper, that stings only to kill, then the Bear or Lyon, that kill only to eat.

They make others to want: yet themselves are like the Bath-masters Asses, that carry on their backs the Rubbers and the cleansing Towells, yet they themselves are all miry with filth: They never profit, but by their death. As a kind of mice feeding in the gold-mines eat the Oare, yet redeliver it not till they be exenterated.

This Desire grows infinite, and ariseth from 3. heads

1 Imitation of them, whom we see to prosper and we wish to be as they are.

2 We make Wealth our End, not our means Concupiscentia finis solum infinita; means to Ends are bounded, since the end is beyond them.

3 Riches are for Use; they are not of themselves good; As man cannot be sure of his estate, but he may require helps from them, and as losses are ever imminent, Soe riches are ever desired for prevention: Desire of money for Ostentation aims wholly at superfluity: if at necessaries, the poor might equal the rich in this Kind: And Diogenes might by this as well vaunt himself in his Tubbe, as Alexander in his Throne. One came to Scopa Thessalus, but to beg some of his superfluous stuff, his answer was that the grace of his Wealth was seen in superfluities rather, then in necessaries. If Ismenias at Thebes, and Callias at Athens both the richest of their times bare no greater port, then Epamminondas, or Socrates, we might term their Wealth blind, and hartles: Therefore Telemachus in Homer passes over Nestors household, where all was frugal, nothing superfluous, but amplifies in rich terms the gaudie and costly furniture of Menelaus.

This Desire Ends in Expence, as the former in keeping,

They are opposed as Logic and Rhetoric, the one resembles the hand in spreading, the other in closing.

Logic is for the Covetous to learn to count 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 computo. As Rhetoric for the Vaunter to Vent, and utter himself: this is the chief factor for gains both to antique, and moderne pleaders.

The way to stop both these golden desires is contentation in our present estate: this is called by Socrates the Souls riches.

2 Desires of honor termed Ambition is either of

• Low and competent
• Highest, and best

Honors.

It ariseth from 2. heads.

1 Presumption of our own worth.

2 Pride over others.

The abates of it are

• Humility in respect of our selves.
• Charity in respect of others.

As we may not merely want this desire, so we must not let it exceed in us; The Excess breeds Envy in all; the defect is faulty only in those, which have desert, occasion, and fit means to game their honor.

Men of Worth to extenuate their goods, and gifts, when necessity requires their trial, is to bury their goods with them, and to wrong the Weale public

This desire in the mean is only allowable.

If it be of lower Honors it is termed Modesty, if it perch to the highest, it is magnanimity, and is only for great hearts, and the best perfections.

Both these are grounded on four conditions.

1 That we challenge no more honor, then what in the opinion of the best we have deserved.

2 That we get them by lawful means, not by out-stripping others.

3 That we rest without seeking more, having gotten the former,

Unless they be

• Easily offered.
• Forciblie put on us.

4 That we keep our Place, and defend it against all backbiters, and murmurers.

XI. Of Hope the 3. Passion.

AS Love and Desire is to affect good, so

• Hope.
• Boldness.

to prosecute it.

The 2. former come from the concupiscible, as a Lord to will.

The 2. latter as a steward to purvey, and proceeds from the Irascible.

Love is the base, to Desire; so Hope to Boldness.

1 It is always the apprehender of Good.

2 The goods must not be in presence, but in future.

3 It must be of a thing not easy, and without search, but hard to compass.

4 It must not be so hard, but it must apparently be in possibility to attain.

It hath these Tenants.

1 It is neither without assurance, though not of the thing, yet of persuasion.

2 It makes us take delight in things painful.

3 The surer the hope is, the greater is the Joy, when the thing is attained.

4 It brings security, and barreth fear.

5 The Adiunct of it is Expectation; herein is some grief since we yet want the good, which we would have in presence.

6 It is a note of imperfection of being: whence it is only for this life, it goes not beyond.

7 It moves our powers of

• Body
• Soul

for atchiuements.

The Persons given to Hope are,

1 They that rather have deserved, or intend to deserve well of us.

2 They that have potencie of friends and best means.

3 They that have hot, and quick spirits, which enlarge our harts to attempts.

Hence young men, and Drunkards are most given this way.

Old men are least hoping

• 1 For the coldness of temper, making them unfit to attempt.
• 2 For their experience of many dangers, and stoppages, which contrary, and cross their hope.

4 They that quickly apprehend the good, but fore cast not the stoppage in the way, that hinders the good: Thence Fools, and Inconsiderate persons build only upon Hope.

The kinds of Hope.

Hope is either

• 1 Natural.
• 2 Supernatural or Theological.

1 The Supernatural is a Virtue only infused by God.

The second Sister to

• Faith.
• Charity.

2 The Natural is either

• Improper.
• Proper.

1 Improperlie it is in beasts: As the Dog springs the Deere within Compass of attaineing, hopes to take him: So the Hauke the Pattridge.

[Object:] How should beast have hope, since hope comes from the Understanding?

Beasts have their natural instinct which proceeds from God, and understanding without them: by it they Judge of things future, as the Emmot foresees the cold Winter, Mice leave the house, when it begins to fall, and Ravens oft foretell weather.

2 Hope Proper is in men only.

It is either of things.

• Necessary that must be.
• Possible, that may be otherwise.

1 Things necessary are hoped for: as the Jews calling, the worlds End, the Resurrection, which cannot be otherwise, because God hath appointed it.

Things Possible are attained

• Partly by ourselves.
• Partly by others.

Then our Hope relies much on others help.

Motiues to raise hope.

1 Shew the means to be strong and pregnant.

2 That the Evils feared are not in proportion to the goods expected.

3 That to men of religion we must not urge the general only but the particular Providence of God.

4 To grave men use rather few and strong reasons, then many and weak: To the common sort use probabilities rather of circumstance then realties of substance, because of Ignorance they are led most with conjectures.

XII. Of Boldness the 4 ^th . Passion.

BOldnes hartens our Hope, as desire doth our love.

Its object is mixed

• Evils to be removed
• Goods to be attained.

It goes under the name of Conscience and Courage: It begins with reluctance, and struggling, but ends with Victory.

Courage is either

• Suddaine upon Sence.
• Deliberate upon Reason.

1 That upon Sence grounds only upon a presuming hope, Weighes not every occurrence of danger, begins with resolution, but seeing dangers arise unlooked for, slackes and often fails, before it overcome: Thus quick in the onset, but slow in the Issue.

2 That upon reason begins slowly, endeth ventrouslie, views every circumstance, fore-lays the uttermost of dangers: If it happens less then his account, it heartens him the more, he resolves to conquer by out-faceing danger.

An example of both is seen in Lucius Paulus, and Terentius Uarro the 2. Roman General at the overthrow of Cannae.

Courage hath his 2, Extreames

• Heady rashness.
• Base cowardice.

The parties most courageous are.

1 Whose temper of Body is such, that they are hot spiritted; which happens in three sorts of men,

1 Whose heart is little, because of combring and closing of spirits, whereas in the larger hearts their diffusion causeth fear.

2 Whose lunges are greatest and fullest of blood: This argues plenty of heat, and much quickness.

3 Who are heated with much Wine: Thence the Germans used it principally in their consultations of War: And Alexanders drinking was thought to add some-what to his courage.

2 They that have many and strong helps, are venturous.

3 They that be most subject to choller.

4 They that rely on God's promises, and cast their hopes upon him.

Hence it is, That Martyrs are most resolute.

5. They that have a Conscience of their Innocency: on the contrary they are most fearful, which have been most injurious.

6 They that have oft escaped dangers: hence old Soldiers are more venturous, then fresh-water-men.

7 They that see not inconveniencies, and stops: Hence the wiser sort are more cautelous, and none so desperate, as he, that fore-sees least.

5. Motiues to make courageous.

1 Shew the Excellence of the Victory: The means easy, and present, that must compass it.

2 If our equals and inferiors have overcome: why should not we hope the like? It was Cicero's argument to persuade the sufferance of Evil: If children at Sparta could endure strokes without groaning, why should not men? And amongst men if the barbarous vaunt before their enemies, why should the learned trembl • .

3 Set them into anger: this makes a boiling of their blood, and by consequence courage: Anger is wrought by laying open their wrongs, and disgraces offered without a cause.

4 Shew the

• Paucity
• Weaknes

of their enemies, that they either

• Will not
• Dare not

oppose them.

5 That in former combats they have had success, and why not in these standing in the same proportion.

Our main work must be to

• Perswade hope.
• Excell fear

XIII Of Pleasure the 5 ^th . Passion.

THis is the aim and up-shot of the 4. former Passions:

• Love
• Desire

are like the qualities of lightness in fire, which inclineth it to make

• Hope.
• Boldness.

like the motion or Passage of it.

Pleasure resultes as the quietness and rest of the Soul in her object: it is never hearty before the goods are in presence.

It is generally in men and beasts; it is termed properly pleasure, or delight: As it is in men by Opinion, it is called Joy, Gaudium.

This in men hath 2. operations, sc:

• 1 Enlarging the heart: hence properly it is called laetitia, quasi latitia.
• 2 Forcing outward gestures, and so it is called Exultatio.

The Tenants touching it are,

1 Noah Passion is so vehement: So that many have died of it; the reason is because it opens the heart, and being overmuch passes out the spirits, that keep in life.

2 The greater Joy, the greater content, and in men it is the consequent of happiness.

3 It is never true, and of continuance, but where there is Peace of Conscience.

4 It is the Adjunct of Virtue.

5 It is increased by Variety of objectes.

6 It purifies the Soul, helps concoction, expelles superfluities, hence the merry have

• Good wits.
• Faire complexions.

7 It is for goods present: though we joy for remembrance of things past, or for hope of things future, yet they are apprehended by us in a sort of Presence.

Motiues to raise delights in a man are,

1 Perswade him to a

• Love
• Desire

of those things, we would have him delighted in.

2 Mark his inclination, sort, profession, and frame yourself to the like practices.

3 Amplifie the goodness of the thing, we would have him delight in, not by describing it in gross, but viewing every particular: Thence Poets in their love-legends describe every part of their M ^rs th • more to delight.

4 Shew the continuance of this Joy, that it breeds not after-repentance Variety c • useth delight, and uniformity raiseth loathing.

Pleasure is

• Comon to men with beasts
• Proper to men alone.

1 That in common is the Issue of Sence, and comes from a natural appetite,

It is

• Negative for the avoidance only of trouble.
• Positiue for the gaining of some real good.

This grounded on 2 conditions, viz.

• 1 The attaineing of a good convenient.
• 2 The persuasion that we have attained it.

2 That proper to men is voluntary and hatched by Opinion.

It is either of

• Mind or
• Body

The Pleasures of the mind are best, yet all not warrantable, as the

• Prone
• Malicious

take delight in their passions, yet their minds are corrupt: these begin in hope, but end in shame and Griefe.

The truest delight of the mind without repentance is

• 1 Meditation on God, and heavenly things.
• 2 The view of learning.

Eudoxus wished to be burned with Phaëton, so he might stand near the sun to contemplate the nature of it: And Archimedes left not his drawing of lines, till a sword was drawn through his body.

Pleasures of the body are sensual, and quickly Exceed Measure.

The Properties of them are

• 1 Inconstancy and fleeting.
• 2 Saciety, & cloying like rank meat.
• 3 Ending in repentance.
• 4 They quench the thirst no more then Salt water, that wets the palate, but inflames the stomach.

They are persuaded by three Enimyes.

• 1 World.
• 2 Flesh.
• 3 Devil.

The Wordlings take

• Present
• Apparent

Joy for future, and real pain.

The good had rather suffer here, and play hereafter.

Sensuall pleasures proceed from the diverse affecting of the Sences, as Music, and odors affect the Eare and Smell, pictures the Eye, &c. The strongest delight comes from the Sence of touching, The reason is, Delight is caused of Love: we love those things, that most besteed us, of all the Sences touching is most useful; without which it is impossible we should live: And as the goods affected by it are more dear; so the pleasure, when it is attained, must be more moving.

These bodily exercises in their Excess distract the minds, and hinder the use of right reason.

XIIII. Of Hate and Detesting.

THese are the 2. opposites of

• Love.
• Desire.

Hate begins the dislike, dedetesting is the vehemency of it.

The object of both is evil: It is either of the

• Thinge.
• Person.

1 The thing hated principally is Sin, and for it we dislike of the Person

Sin is against the law of

• 1 Nature this breeds the hate of either
  • Moralists.
  • Heathens.
• 2 Grace, this breeds the hate of Christians.

since all partake of nature, and are bound to its laws.

2 The Person we may not simply hate. It is proper to Ubicun{que} homo est, ibi benificio locus est.

3 heads of Sin move • ate

• 1 Irreligion towards God.
• 2 Injustice towards men.
• 3 A self inclination to evils without outward motives.

If these heads grow stronger, and are done willfully, it transcends hate, and mov • s detestation.

The principle object of it is Atheism.

1 It is the ground-plot of all other sins.

2 It is an evil of Will, not of Understanding; we cannot allege Ignorance for that, which the creature reveals. It is voluntary presumption.

3 Athists are most unfit for Society.

Their commerce is either

• 1 Scoffing.
• 2 Impudency.
• 3 Vain.

of that Constitution, as is most contrary to wisdom, and moral gravity.

These things move the greatest detestation.

Hate is either

• In common against states.
• Particular for private respects.

1 That in common aryses, if

• Their religion be in oposition to ours.
• Their laws be against nature.
• Their oft injuries done be without hope of righting.

2 Hate for private respects, is

• 1 Against a wronger of many, as
  • 1 Tyrants
  • 2 Extortioners.
• 2 Against a wronger of himself only for the indignity of his person.

This is set down by its life

• 1 Towards God.
• 2 Towards himself.
• 3 Towards his Neighbor.

His entry into the World is shameful, his stay, and departure hence with misreport, like a snuff leaving a stink, when the light is out.

XV. Of Despayre a • d Fear.

THese 2. are opposite to

• Hope.
• Boldness.

Their special Art is in avoiding the future evil, which seeing they cannot master, they yield.

1 Despair ariseth from fail of helps.

2 Feate from the Imminence of evils.

The tenets of despair are 3.

1 It deiecteth the mind.

2 It makes venterous to try the utmost of dangers.

3 It is deepest in them, who before had greatest hopes.

The tenets of fear are 3.

1 It is never moved, but where some spice of hope is, for things without remedy are rather despair, then fear.

2 The greater the things feared, and of long continuance, the greater is the fear.

3 It prepares Patience, awakes industry whereas despair is only in suffering.

It ariseth from 3 heads

• 1 The debility of the person.
• 1 The greatness of the danger.
• 3 The certainty and imminency thereof

Fear is either of a

• Person.
• Thinge

1 Of a Person it is either

• 1 Filiall, which is properly love.
• 2 Servile, which is only for escape.

The persons most feared by us are.

1 Great men offended with us.

2 Lewd men made powerful.

3 They who stand in bodily fear of us.

4 High stomachs wronged by us.

5 They, who have our life and credit in their hands

We fear them either

• 1 As in themselves faithless.
• 2 To be provoked • y
  • 1 Gaine.
  • 2 Threates.
  • 3 Danger on their part, want of service in our part

Persons not • uch to be feared are.

1 They that are soon angry, and soon pleased.

2 They which open themselves too much in menaces and threats.

3 They that disclose their purposes. They close heart concocts malice. Ulysses is said to dissemble his disslike for the Woers riot; but revenged them at occasion. Anthony and Dolabella frayd not Coesar, though they conspired against him: He answered he feared not those fat, and open fact Traitors, but two lean ones Brutus and Cassius which proved his deaths-men. Demissos animo, & tacitos vitare memēto.

2 Things feared are evils bringing either

• 1 Destruction to the whole man, or
• 2 Baine to any part of him.

Evils are of

• 1 Sin, malum culpae.
• 2 Punishment, malum paenae.

1 The former is feared by the best men.

2 The latter is feared by the worst.

The parties most fearful are,

1 They, whose quantity of heart is such, that it diffuseth the spirits.

2 They, that know their own weakness, and others ableness to hurt.

3 They, that amplifye on the Evils feared.

The parties least fearful are, The

• Wise
• Just

who count no evil but

• Sin
• Disgrace

which they endeavor to avoid.

1 The most courageous.

2 They that prefer honor before their lives.

3 They that have strength of means to back them.

XVI Of Greife.

GReife is the End of the former Passions, and ariseth from the presence of evil.

It is of

• Body.
• Mind.

that of the min • is more dangerous.

The Tenants of it are;

1 It never touches things of absolute perfection, as God, Angels, &c. but is there most frequent, where is most plenty of evils, as in hell.

2 It drieth the Body and ingendereth melancholy by cold blood.

3 It makes one unfit for Action.

It grows upon us by

• 1 Yeilding too much to pleasures.
• 2 Entertayning a conceit of evils present.

The Way to resist it in our selves.

1 Propose to yourselves examples of Patience, as of Marius. Ita tulit dolorem; vt vir & vt homo maiorem ferre sine causa necessariâ noluit.

2 Resolue to resist evils. As that Soldier, that stands it out, often wins, when the coward dies by flight. Animi contentio Sola officij tanquam custodia.

3 That the evils now are not so great, but the goods ensuing counterpoyse them.

The way to allay it in others is comfort

• Perswasion of a good to come.
• Removall of an evil present.

In it are 2. things.

1 The time to apply it, when the grief is ripened, not newly begun; As Surgeons first let the sore soften, before they begin to draw it.

2 The manner of applieing it is

• General.
• Special.

1 The General by these places.

1 Shew how greater evils have happened to others, then we now suffer. It was Socrates his saying, if of all men's evils heaped together all should have equal share, each would rest content with their present estate.

2 Our evils be ordinary, and do what we can, we shall have

• 1 Cares of mind.
• 2 Diseases of Body,

3 If the thing be •••• eable, show the means of regaining it; if not, yet it is a folly 〈◊〉 mourn for it:

4 That God sees, wha • is better for us, then we for our selves.

2 The special is according to the main motives of Griefe.

1 These are

• Death.
• Temporal misfortune.

2 Our comfort death is.

1 It is vnavoydable by fate, and all men must, and do taste of it.

2 It is no Evil, but a passage to a better life.

3 Our life hath many troubles, and anguishes, death is the quiet of them.

4 If we grieve for the dead, then either, because they are not or because they are in torment; If they are not, why grieve we more for their now not-being, then for our children yet unborn; If they be in torment, it is seen, they were evil, we were the better rid of them.

Of deaths they are most greveous, that are

• Suddaine.
• Untimely.

Against these our comforts are 3.

1 We ever bear Corruption in our flesh, that in a moment may kill us.

2 Dying young makes us less fixed to the world, and fitter for God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . He calls us hence as from a banquet, lest overmuch sitting should make us surfeit.

3 The thing cannot be sudden, since we are ever liable to evil. We ought ever to expect it.

2. Our comfort for temporal misfortunes.

1 They come from God's decree, and so are necessary to fall on us.

2 They are profitable unto us, and debar our insolence.

3 They may befall any as well as us.

4 Shall we grieve ever or leave at last? If ever, to great a misery we impose on us: if we will l •• ue, why resolve we not at first.

The Persons most given to 〈◊〉 ••• fe are 3.

1 Whose temper of Body is Mela • cholie.

2 Weomen, because of their easines in yielding.

3 They, who have given themselves to overmuch Joy: This falling must end in depth of Griefe.

XVII. Of Samefacenes.

It is a mixed passion joined with

• Fear of infamy.
• Love of Honesty.

It ariseth partly

• before a fault.
• After a fault.

It is only in good natures, but unsteady, soon failing, and easily revoked by council: It it commendable in youth, but not in the Aged.

The Effects of it are 2.

1 It moves to virtue; thence termed Purpura virtutis.

2 It calls blood into the face. Reason and Passion move the heart; the heart, the spirits, the spirits the blood.

Now shame consists of 2 passions

• 1 Fear, that gathers blood to the heart.
• 2 Love, that sends it abroad to the outward parts.

If we fear only disgrace, and have no love to good, our blood keeps within: This is the sign of a bad nature, which being convicted of faults looks not red; but pale in the Face.

If we fear not only disgrace, but love and desire amendment, our blood spreadeth outward, and causeth blushing. Aristoteles his daughter being asked, what she counted the fairest color, answered the ruddy caused by an ingenuous blush.

It is a note of the best natures, and fittest for Counsel.

The reason, why t •• blood showeth it self most in the face is, because as the blo •• is moved by the spirits so the spirits are most quick, 〈◊〉 animate the organ of sense; and the Organs of sense princi • ally are about the face.

The Extreames of shame are

• • 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an overbashfulnes
• 2 Impudence, the defect of shame.

Bashfulnes in it self is not evil, but may often be a provocation to evil. It is grounded upon an overlenity of nature, and easines of yielding. The object of it is fear of infamy. The persons whom it may hurt are 5.

1 Young men as leading them to an vnset'led and floating carriage in manners.

2 It makes them easy to suitors, without respect of their choice.

3 Incontinent persons; It makes them unable to resist evil-motions, though in the yielding they grieve at it.

4 It debarreth their courage in punishing faults, and makes them loath to displease.

5 They, which are rich, powerful, kind-hearted, and have many helps to further others.

1 It makes the rich

• Rash lenders.
• Heady suretys.

2 The kind hearted by it either

• 1 Follow the riot of bad company.
• 2 Bear false witness for their Acquaintance.
• 3 Soone take pains for others.
• 4 Join their to unworthy men.

3 The powerful have many suitors, and by it are made easy to yield to any demand, and profer without election.

The way to bar it is to acquaint our selves with resistance to motions, denials of suits, if they be not honest, and convenient, but hurtful to the granter.

The Inhabtants of Asia were all slaves, because they could not pronounce this word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . And Brutus said.

Impudence passes not fear of Infamy.

The difference betwixt it and bashullnesse is, that the bashful retain a love of virtue; the Impudent do not.

XVIII Of Repentance.

REpentance is an act of Conscience arising from the thought of an evil done.

It is either

• 1 Theological, because of offenses done against the law of Grace.
• 2 Moral because of things done against the law of nature, or common Honesty.

1 Repentance theological is in Christians alone.

2 Moral is in Heathens.

It is raised by three motives

• 1 Infamy.
• 2 Punishment.
• 3 Hate of vice.

1 That arising from fear of Infamy, and punishment is slavish, and incident to the most.

2 The best repent for the hate of vice: For as they love good for the good, not for reward: So they hate evil for the Evils sake, not for the punishment.

The parts of repentance are 2.

• 1 Hate of the evil done.
• 2 Resolution of amendment.

It is descried 3. ways

• 1 By contrition of the heart.
• 2 By confession of the mouth.
• 3 By satisfaction by good works.

Its properties are three.

1 Repentance must be with vehemency of grief, least, while our grief for the fault slackenes, our care for amendment slackenes also.

2 It must not be for a time, but for continuance, since evil is ever to be hated, and good ever to be resolved upon.

3 It must not be deferred, least delay breed custom of evil, and custom hardness of heart.

The stops of repentance are 7.

1 Shame to confess • our faults, or pride in not acknowledging them.

2 Delighting in our sins.

3 Hope of longe life.

4 Despair of obtaining grace.

5 Presumption of God's mercy.

6 Longe custom of sinning.

7 Examples of bad men, which have longe flourished, yet never repented.

The tenets of repentance are 5.

1 Repentance cannot be in a nature merely good, as God, nor merely bad, as the Devil; but in such only as are partly good, and partly bad, as in men.

These are

• Bad by nature; hence they offend.
• Good by grace; hence they amend.

2 It is only in things, that we to fall: Beasts have it not: those actions are not voluntary, but necessary, which cannot be repented off.

3 It ariseth from a knowledge, and taste of sin committed: thence children have it not.

4 It groundeth on hope: They that die desperate have it not, since the desperate are swallowed up with grief: The repentant receive grief for the evil past, but joy for the future good, and future things more move then those past.

5 Repentance is joined with shame, as Impenitence is joined with jmpudence.

XIX. Of Pitty.

Pitty looks outwardly to the Evils of others, but by reflex to our own.

It is mixed with

• Greife for the Evils fallen.
• Desire for their remedy.

Evils that raise pity are 4

• 1 Greife • f mind.
• 2 Tortu • • f Body.
• 3 Dan •• r of others death.
• 4 Mis fortune in goods.

The Evils move most

• 1 If they are so near to fall, that we fear them.
• 2 If so lately fallen, that we freshly remember them.
• 3 If their then present falling bars our Expectance of contrary profit.

The ground of pity is our communion of nature.

The extent of it is a Desire to help.

This desire hath 2 conditions

• If we we are able to help.
• If justice permit.

1 Greiuing for such as laws, and Justice will have banished, is womanish.

2 For those we are not able to remedy, it is fruitless.

The Tenants of pity are 4.

1. The better nature, the more it is inclinable to it.

2 It is means to provoke charity.

3 It compares the evil fallen with the desert, and concluds the person unworthy to suffer it.

4 It brings us to acknowledge our own misfortunes.

The parties most pitying are 5.

1 Old men partly

• As not being so stomackefull, as the young.
• As having more experience of Dangers.

2 Weaklings

• Weomen
• Children

they think for their infirmity, they may soon suffer the like.

3 Scholars, as being by books accquainted with many examples of dangers.

4 They that have felt former evils, and now are rid of them.

5 They that have opinion of another's worth, they count it below his deserts to be in evils.

The parties least pitying are 5.

1 Who are most given to

• Anger
• Boldness

they recount not the evils, that may befall them.

2 Scoffers and they who are ready to wrong others.

3 They that are in ex • remitie of distress: As in Cities besieged parents eat their own children; whereas otherwise they used to pity them. Their care is for the remedy of their own harms, little for others: thence they that fear imminent dangers, pity not others, but care for themselves.

4 They that are in height of fortune not likely to fall. Thence tyrants and rich men pity least,

5 They that have prejudice against others behavior, what befalls them, they count it desert, and do less grieve at it.

The persons, whom we pity most, are 4.

1 Acquaintance rather then strangers.

2 Our equals either in

• 1 Yeares.
• 2 Manners.
• 3 Profession.
• 4 Office.
• 5 Stock.

2 They who suffer those evils, which we our selves feared,

4 Men bearing their harms with

• 1 Patience
• 2 Courage

by it we count them unworthy of them, & so pity them.

The way to raise pity for others.

1 Shew the valor, and the worth of the person, that suffers.

2 The greivousnes of the Evils befallen.

3 The like may happen either to them, or their friends.

Conscience of a man's own case moves it.

XX. Of Zeal and Jealousy.

1 ZEale is a Passion grounded on love.

It is

• 1 Griefe for a fault committed.
• 2 Desire for a good intended.

It borders on repentance, and is the issue and effect of it.

It is ever with fervency: It is most dangerous, unless it be regulated with knowledge.

It is either for a

• Good quality.
• the good of a person.

1 The former is in the best, who • re • ealous of good for goodness it self.

2 The latter comes from the respect of a person conceived in the behalf of one, we love.

It supposeth

• Wrong done to our friend
• Desire of remedy

or grief for it.

2 Iealousy is a passion conceiting an Evil in another, that perhaps is guiltless of it: it comes only by conjectures.

It proves often injurious.

It breeds trouble in ourselves, and distrust to our friends.

The way to bar it is, not to skanne the actions of others, but with a favorable interpretation.

XXI. Of Anger.

ANger is a compound of sundry passions: As 1. Pleasure in revenge. 2. Greife in recounting the wrongs. 3. Insolence in ouerbearing 4. Envy in repining at the welfare of others: The proper Act of it is desire of hurting.

The tenets of it are 5.

1 A just injury requires as just anger; and it is stupidity not to be moved with it.

2 It is not bent against men in general, but to some in special only. Thence Timon is not said to be angry with all but hate all.

3 Noah passion is more indiscreet then it: thence it's ridiculous, and to be contemned, none more violent, thence terrible, and to be feared.

4 Being moderate it whets Valour; but over-earnest it weakens revenge.

5 To be suddai ••• moved is a sign of weakness; hence it agrees more to the sick, then the sound, to old folks then to young: And to Women.

Adjuncts of anger are these viz.

• 1 Vexation of mind.
• 2 Ignorance of his own strength.
• 3 Vndecency of gesture.
• 4 Wrongefull opinion of others.

The causes raising it are

• General.
• Special.

1 The general disrespect shown 4 ways.

• 1 By derision in words.
• 2 Injury in deeds, as against.
  • Body.
  • Goods.
  • Name.
• 3 Ingratitude for good turns
  • 1 Friends.
  • 2 Inferiors either in
    • 1 Blood.
    • 2 Authority.
    • 3 Wealth.
    • 4 Virtue.
• 4 Want of due observance from our.

2 The special are according to the nature of special persons.

1 If we have too settled a persuasion of those we converse with, if they fail in the contrary to our expectation, our choller riseth: Hence credulity inflames anger.

2 Curiosity inflames it, if we busy our selves too much in love, and frivolous matters: Crosses in either of them fret us.

3 If we delight in one thing more then another, when we should use either with indifferency: As in an household, if our stuff of this fashion like us better then that, and we take pleasure in it, the loss or the mislaying of it frettes us

The ways to allay anger in others.

1 Prove the wrong done upon

• Ignorance.
• Constrainte.
• Suddaine P • ssion.
• Mischance.

2 That it was done to our own harm, as well as his.

3 Shew sorrow for it, for outfacing grows of Impudency, that of disrespect, the nurse of Anger.

4 Be not opposite in talk.

5 Dissemble our Humility, and fear: the angered by this are less prone to revenge.

6 Seeme to be serious for his good, and overcome this wrong with other passages of kindness.

7 Speak not against men of his sort and quality though their persons grieve him not.

8 Scoffe at none whatsoever, but be affable to all. Isocrates. ad Daemon.

To bear anger in our selves the ways are 4.

1 Use no heart grief but

• Sports.
• Games.
• Merriments

yet bar insolent delights, since these are ouerbearing, and anger others.

2 Resolue to resist choler by not easily accepting disrespects.

3 A sudden fear, or grief vnexspected allayeth ones anger.

4 If a wrong be offered, rather contemn the offerer as wanting wit, then think our selves disgrased by it.

How to behave our selves in anger. 3.

1 Bend our selves to a contrary passion; as Socrates with his friend labored to look most pleasantly on him.

2 Retire we our selves from Company till the passion hath spent it self.

3 Not to revenge before our anger be past.

Persons most given to anger. 4.

1 Weaklings, as Children, women, sick men, old folks.

2 They, that are ambitious, and standing for offices.

3 They, that require much awe and reverence of others.

4 They, that know their deserts well, yet are scorned.

The parties, with whom we are least angry.

1 They, who reuer • nce us which argues, they do not disrespect us.

2 We cannot be a • gry with him, whom we fear; since anger implies hope of revenge: fear not.

3 Men doing things upon choller, less anger us.

4 Anger cannot be against those, whom we cannot hurt, as gods, and kings, that are out of our reach.

XXII. Of Maligninge.

THis Passion hath 2 partes

• 1 Envy greiving at another Good.
• 2 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , joying for another's evil.

1 It is in the worst-natures, and is opposite to common society.

2 It is principally betwixt equals, as men of the same sort: hence we envy not those, that are in eminency above us: A common soldier never envies Alexander; one of his nearest captains may.

3 It aims especially at the goods of

• Honor.
• Fortune.

4 It eats up a man's heart by fretting at others.

5 It ariseth from pride of our own deserts.

The way to avoid it in our selves is to think that there must not be an equallity of Gifts and goods in all: that as men are diverse, soe they must have distinction of place, and if any excel, we ought not to repine.

Great men avoid the Envy of others 3. ways.

1 Let them show themselves gentle, and affable to all.

2 Imploy their goods to the uses of others.

3 They must not think to be singular in anything, since that is envious. Nemo de nobis vnus excellat, This is the law of the Ephesians, who therefore banished Hermadorus.

XXIII The Efficient cause of virtue.

VErtue is effected by 3. things

• 1 Nature
• 2 Precept.
• 3 Practize.

Nature begins the inclination; Precept directs it; Practice perfecteth it.

Nature works virtue either from the

• Soul only.
• Temperature of the Body.

In Soul are 2 Partes

• Understanding.
• Will.

The understanding is either viz.

• 1 Speculatiue, working for contemplatiō: the Issue of this is Sapiēce or pondering.
• • Practicke, working for action: The Issue of it is Honesty or Moral Virtue.

1 The Acts proper to • he practicke Understanding are 3

• 1 Conscience.
• 2 Consultation.
• 3 Prudence.

These judge things to be

• Good.
• Evil.

Then the will records them

• 1 For affecting it if it be good.
• 2 For avoiding it, if it be evil.

Of practicke understanding.

As the Speculatiue is the discerner of truth from falsehood: So the practicke of good from evil: Both judge from principles, & undoubted opinions: The practicke judges only of moral principles arising out of the law of nature: Grounds, that Atheists assent unto in the general; though they will not follow them in particular.

The principles of these are,

1 Honor God.

2 Love honesty.

3 Obay

• Parents.
• Magistrates.

4 Love our Country.

5 Hurt no man, but do, as you would be done by.

6 Yeild every man his own.

7 Use all sociably, and in friendship, as far as stands with our

• Credit.
• Benefit.

8 Execute common malefactors for the common quiet sake.

9 Suffer distinction of Lordships, lands, bounds, men's private possessions, &c.

These rules all nations assent unto, and from these institute their common weals, Ius gentium. The breach of these is accusable by nature, and this accusation is termed Conscience.

XXIIII Of Conscience.

COnsciēce is the immediate act of our soul, arisi • g from a natural apprehension of good, and avoydanc • of evil: It cannot be totally extinguished in any.

It bring us

• To know our faults.
• To condemn them.
• To have will to prosecute the contrary.

It is either of

• faults past; so it
  • Checkes.
  • Condemnes.
• future, so it retains.

It is best in the mean, and most dangerous, when it is to

• Large.
• Nice.

1 The former calls evil good, and breeds presumption.

2 The latter counts of the best good as evil, and breeds despair.

It grounds upon this Syllogism.

Noah evil is to be committed:

This particular is evil, Ergo.

Not to be committed.

The Major is drawn from the practicke understanding out of the rules of Nature. The minor ariseth from view of particulars, which are variable, and may often deceive; if our apprehension of them be false, our Conscience must needs err.

Error of conscience proceeds from these heads.

1 From ignorance, if we know not what is to be

• Chosen.
• Refused.

2 Negligence in not fitting our selves, and getting direction from others, if we find our own weak.

3 Pride in not humbling our conceits to others, that are

• Wiser.
• Honester

then us.

4 Singularity in following our own private spirit.

5 Passion, that inclines conscience to follow appetite. Perit omne iudicium, cum res transit in affectum.

6 Pusillanimity in distructing all things, and fearing to venture on any thing, least we offend: If we do anything against conscience, be it good or bad; the act utterly is sinful.

XXV. Of Consultation.

COnsultation is grounded on these rules.

1 It is not touching the End, but of the means directing to it.

2 Things past are not to be consulted off, but things future.

3 Not necessary things, but contingent.

4 Things nothing appertaineing to us are not to be consulted off.

Our consultation is either

• By our selves alone.
• By others.

1 We consult with ourselves if the matter be

• 1 Of a great secrecy.
• 2 Suddainly befallen.
• 3 If we have not a friend to impart it.

2 To consult with others observe them to be

• Honest.
• Wise.
• Faithful.

The question in our consultation is,

1 Whether the thing be convenient for us,

2 Whether possibly to be compassed.

1 It is judged convenient if it be, viz.

• 1 Safe for us, not discommodious.
• 2 Not against the 4. rules of Honesty.
  • Prudence.
  • Justice.
  • Temperance.
  • Fortitude.

2 Possibility of compassing it found out from view of all these means, we must use in working that end.

The particular ways of Consultation are.

1 Whether the thing be profitable, or disprofitable.

2 Whether honest, or dishonest.

3 When 2. profits are proposed, we question, which is greatest,

4 If 2. things be honest, which is most honest.

5 When one part is only honest, the other only profitable, which is rather to be prosecuted.

In morality, the least honesty countervayles the most profit and is to be preferred before it: In Politickes or persuasion must be according to the auditory, with whom we deliberate.

Before the Vulgar our consultation must be most inclining to profit, since they are most addicted that way; before the better sort stand rather for honesty and Honor.

XXVI Of Prudence.

PRudence is a special quality of a moralist, being the sole directresse, and governess of all his actions.

It is only in things ambiguous, and borders on Consultation.

It consists in

• Choyce.
• Judgment.
• Fitnesse of Application.

It longe consulteth, and quickly executeth.

It corrects things past, directs the present, foresees the future.

The special rule of it, is silence in revealing our purpose.

The ways to get it are.

1 Industrie in

• Disputing
• Reading

matters practicke.

2 Observations of men's carriages.

3 Noting what effects proceed out of what causes.

4 Acquaintance with sundry positive laws especially of our own land.

5 Vsing to invent much of our own, not to stand strictly on authority of others.

The partes requisite to prudence are.

1 Memory for retaining experiences past.

2 Understanding for judging moral principles.

This gotten by—

• Hearing.
• Inventing our selves.

3 That we may be ready to hear is required docility, our readiness to learn.

4 For invention is required, Solertia, a ripeness of finding out means.

5 When we have

• Learned,
• Experiēced,
• Invented,

we must confer one thing with another, and discourse of the convenience of it. Hence to prudence is required reasoning.

Ra • io.

6 Out of this discourse arise precepts for action.

These observe 3. things.

1 Direction for fit means to fit Ends. Hence is required Providence.

2 Weighing each circumstance of the business: Hence Circumspection is required.

3 Avoyding all stops, and impediments: Hence is required Caution for evil.

XXVII. Of the Will.

THe seat of the Will is the Heart, where passions reside

As the brain is the seat of the Understanding.

The will prosecutes what the understanding judges.

The object of it is Good: Of the understanding Truth.

Will without passion chooseth the true good: with passion the forged and apparent only.

If goods be evident, it affects simply without praise; if doubted, there is first deliberation.

It hath 2 partes, viz.

• 1 Approbation, or willing.
• 2 Refusall, or nilling.

For execution it commands in men

• Passions.
• Faculty of motions.

1 The former it rules by persuasion, as by an Aristocracy or state regiment, whereby government is not so absolute, but the rest may interpose.

2 The latter it rules by command, as a Lord over his servant, without relent in the one, or reluctance in the other.

The tenets of the will are 2.

1 It affects nothing, but what the understanding hath weighed first and contrarily the Understanding conceits nothing, but the will persuades; their offices are joint and mutual.

2 It cannot be constrained being of greatest freedom and liberty: Though we have not freedom of will, to come from worse to better, in matters of grace, yet in matters civil we have, since it comes from a common motion of goodness conceived by the practicke Understanding.

XXVIII. The Former causes of Uertue.

TO examine this we inquire what is the

• 1 Nature.
• 2 Properties.
• 3 Seuerall kinds of Virtue.

1 Its nature is to moderate the passionate part of the Soul, It is termed by Plutarch, A disposition of the understanding part, according to Reason.

This reason either

• 1 Rules the passionate parte, so termed virtue.
• 2 Yeilds unto it: so it nurces up vice.

Aristotle defines it thus.

1 It is not connatural, but bred by custom, thence termed Habit.

2 Of Habits some

• 1 Inforciue as the understanding, that compelles us to assent unto an evident truth.
• 3 On choice, and praelection, and such a one Virtue is.

3 Praelection and choice may be of things utterly naught, as when 2 evils stand compared, and in competition, but the choice of virtue must rely on the mean for his Center: whereas evils spread to the extremes, and multiply degrees: Goodness acknoledges one only point of perfection, The golden mediocrity.

Mediocrity changes according to circumstance of

• 1 Time.
• 2 Place.
• 3 Person.

if it were set, and definitively one.

It were virtue for all to use it alike, but the beggar may not be liberal of his purse, though a king may; And Milo the wrastler may eat large meals, when the weakeling taking the same proportion may be termed riotous: The spitle of a man to a man is wholesome, but to a Serpent death: and what is virtuous to one, may prove a vice to a nother. This Mediocrity is to be ruled by Judgment of each circumstance, which prudence must praescribe.

Directions how we shall attain the mean.

1 Of the 2. Extreames see which is most opposite to virtue, and avoid it.

2 Sift out the vice, our nature is most prone to, and labor to avoid it, by taking the other extreme: As a man being given to be prodigal let him labor to be covetous. Ab extremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. So we straighten sticks by bending them as much the contrary way, as they are bent the other way.

3 Resolue to resist body • y pleasures, and embrace them of the mind. 2 The properties, and notes of virtue.

1 No moral virtue, but is placed between 2 vices.

• 1 The Excess to be depressed:
• 2 Defect to be raised.

2 Its ever in action, and the action must be with 3. conditions

• 1 Knowledge. Scienter.
• 2 Perseverance. Constanter.
• 3 Willingnes. Volenter.

3 Delight in goodness is a sign of the virtue gotten.

— Sorrow argues, we do it unwillingly.

4 Virtue is conversant especially about the Moderating of since these are the grounds and ends of all the rest.

• Greifes.
• Pleasure.

5 It is exercised about the highest, and hardest employments.

6 It is amiable to all men, even to strangers, and enemies.

The grounds of virtue 3.

• 1 Religion towards God.
• 2 Charity to our neighbors.
• 3 Cherishing our selves according to reason.

The comprehension of all virtue is universal Justice: by it we yield our duty to

• God.
• Neighbors.
• our selves.

XXIX. The Seuerall Kinds of virtues.

VErtues are either

• 1 common to all.
• 2 Special to some persons.

1 The common are requisite to all, though perhaps few have them.

They are either

• 1 Proper, or full virtues
• 2 Improper or half virtues.

1 Full Virtues are directed either

• 1 To our private good only.
• 2 To the good of others.

1 Our private good is gotten by the governance of 2 passions

• 1 Desire.
• 2 Fear.

1 Our desire is of things

• Natural.
• Adv • ntitious.

1 Natural

• Of nourishment: The virtue that tempers this is Sobriety.
• Of Venery: the virtue, that allaies this is Chastity,

The conjoining of both is called Temperance.

2 Goods adventitious, as of

• Wealth; the Virtue for this is content.
• Honor; the Virtue for this modesty, or a decent competition, of what we deserve.

3. Our fear is allayed by Fortitude.

2 Virtues directed to the good of others are.

1 Justice of

• Exchange.
• Distribution.

2 Bestowing of gifts for the

• Great ones, termed Magnificence.
• Smaller sort, Liberality.

3 Courtesy, and pleasantness of Conversation.

2 The half and imperfect virtues are

• 1 Veracity, or a habit of telling truth
• 2 Grace of carriage.
• 3 Aemulation.
• 4 Continence.
• 5 Patience.

2 The virtue special to some persons is the Heroicall spirit, which cannot be incident to all, but only to the highest, and best perfections.

XXX. Of Temperance.

THis contains

• 1 Sobriety touching
  • Meats
  • Drinks
  both these have their
  • 1 Propertys.
  • 2 Effects.
• 2 Chastity, tamer of lusts.

The propertys of Temperance.

1 With moderation to desire absent delights, and to use them present honestly.

2 To affect only such as are lawful, and honest.

3 For attaining, or enjoining them to do nothing, that may prejudice

• 1 Health.
• 2 Credit.
• 3 Private Estate.

The effects of Temperance

• 1 Soundnes of body.
• 2 Strength of understanding.
• 3 Promptnes of both acquiring, and exercising all other virtues.

Excess.	Mean.	Defecte.
Intemperance that vnbridles our appetites, and gives the onset to all kind of vice.	Temperance	Stupidity, the utter refusal of all natural necessary delights; a fault so seldom, that the Ancients could invent, no name for it.

Excess	Sobriety	Defect.
In Meats, Glutony. Drinks, Drunkenesse	mean.	Overmuch abstinence from necessary Meats Drinks

Castitas

• 1 Caelibatus
• 2 Coniugij.

Of Chastity.

Chastity is the containing of bodily lust to the unmarried moderateing of them to the married.

It is in

• Mind.
• Body.

The breach of it is not from the act only, but from the thought and affection of defiling.

The Integrity of mind and body is termed Virginity, the Quee • e of Virtues. If we abstain in body but with reluctance of mind, it is termed Containing, A virtue Civil, since law cannot take hold of us, but not full Moral.

Excess.	Mean	Defect.
Vnchastity in 1 Words. 2 Gesture. 3 Actions. 4 Thoughts	Chastity	1 Defrauding our bodies of pleasures lawful: This is vicious. 2 In none, but the married, which must not defraud one another.

It effecteth 3 things

• 1 Diseases to the body.
• 2 Deformities.
• 3 Corruption to the mind.

XXXI. Of Content.

THis virtue moderates the desire of wealth.

There are • . parts of it

• 1 A grateful acceptance of our present estate
• 2 Barring desires of more, then benefits our use.

The properties of it are.

1 It breeds quietness, and Tranquillity of mind.

2 It cannot be incident to fools, and ambitious men.

3 It is a token of a good nature, and wise discretion to know sufficiency.

4 It is the truest riches; whereas the enjoining of the greatest possessions with desire to get more, is the truest Pouerty.

5 It ventures not wealth in rash misspending, but keeps what is gotten without fear, till occasion, and use force him to spend.

Excess	Mean	Defect
Covetousnes, whose effects are 2. 1 A desire of gain. 2 It persuades us to all vice for the attaining it.	〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉	Neglect of our state temporal. The effects hereof are 2. 1 Idleness in our Vocation. 2 Extremity of Want.

XXXII. Modesty, and Magnanimity.

BOth these are conversant about honor: The ground of them is desert.

Their proprietys. 3.

1 To sue for honor deserved.

2 To accept it offered.

3 To stand for his place, when his honor is deservedly yielded to him.

Their difference.

Modesty is of lower, and less honor, as our desert is lower, and of less things.

Magnanimity is for the most generous heart, to desire the best, as his virtue is in supereminency above others.

Modesty hath these rules.

1 It argues, that both our selves and others have fit approbation of our virtue.

2 It is resolute against carpers, and wrongful imputers.

3 It is humble in not acquiring further, then shall benefit us.

4 It shows it self in

• Words
• Gestures

either for the

• Wishing what we deserve.
• Refusall of what we deserve not.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Ambition hatched by presumption	modesty	Ouer-seruilenes called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . It ariseth from Ignorance of our own worth, not daring to show our selves in the world.

XXXIII Of Magnanimity.

MAgnanimity is for the highest perfectiō. It aims at the best honor, so (Whereas Honor is the repute of the Multitude) the perfection of it is greatst, when that repute is most transcendent and general. Thence the person truly magnanimous must have the whole fardle of virtues, that he may benefit all, that speak well of him, and hurt none to avoid Ignominie.

The Adjunct of Magnanimity must be the highest place, and office.

The Rules are. 8.

1 The person having it counteth his honor received due unto him both for others good, and his own desert.

2 He cares not for common censures.

3 He rather gives then takes rewards.

4 He remembers not Injuries.

5 He is pliable to all sorts of persons, with satisfaction to them, and credit to himself.

6 He admires not others

• Words,
• Deeds,

since he himself on

• Pleasure
• Occasion

is able to do the like.

7 He is sparing in censuring others, yet living.

8 He puts not himself upon voluntary dangers, yet vndergoes the utmost, if it be put on him.

Excess	Mean	Defect
Pride	Magnanimity	Pusillanimity, or unfit, dijection called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

Pride is in

• 1 Vaunting our own parts.
• 2 Suffering others to attribute more to us then we deserve.

It ariseth from philauty.

It betrays it self in

• Words.
• Gesture.
• Apparel.

It hath these tenets. 5.

1 A proud man admireth none but himself.

2 The way to abate him is to let him know, that we scorn him.

3 He is unjust, as attributing all to himself, and derogating from others.

4 It is most inclining, and most dangerous in falling.

5 It is hateful in all, but detestable in poor folk.

Pusillanimity doth vndervalue our worth.

The rules of it are. 4.

1 It is ingratitude towards God to receive gifts, and by our reservednes to lessen them.

2 It makes other jealous of our parts, when we our selves distrust them.

3 It is the mother of Idleness.

4. It defrauds other, that may get by us.

XXXIIII Of Fortitude.

THe Passions that exercise this virtue are

• 1 Care to be raised.
• 2 Boldness to be repressed.

It is the Indurance of Evil for

• Honor
• Honesty

sake

Evils are

• Internal from ourselves, as Vices.
• External, as dangers falling from without us.

1 The internal the most valiant ought to dread: his fear must be to nothing but sin.

2 The eternal are

• 1 Extraordinary as
  • Prodigies.
  • Strange
    • Lightnings
    • Thunders &c.
    from God
• 2 Ordinary, and befalling in common.

1 The former none contemn, but

• Atheists.
• Fools.
• Madmen.

2 The valiant man's virtue is only in contemning the latter.

2. evils ordinary are

• 1 General to all as, Death &c.
• 2 Especiall, to some as
  • Exile.
  • Diseases.
  • Misfortūes.

Death is the principal object of fortitude, since 'tis the most terrible of all other evils.

1 As barring us from the exercise of all moral virtues: the upshot of all goods.

2 As bereaving us of all temporal commodities, the objects of our delights in this world.

All death is not properly the object of fortitude, but the most honorable, as dying in war.

1 Since it is with highest honor.

2 With most good to the public wealth.

The effects of fortitud are 3.

1 To triumph over our enemies.

2 To keep our own state quiet from the wrong of others.

3 To assure us in extremityes.

The Incourages of this virtue are 5.

1 Words of cheering from the honorable, and wiser sort.

2 Examples of others showing their words by their deeds.

3 Excercise in skirmish.

4 Hope of reward; if not of spoil, yet of Glory.

5 The Enimies weakness, and vnprovision.

The Tenants of Fortitude are 3.

1 The danger that it vndergoes must have 3. conditions.

• 1 They must be honourably undertaken; not on sudden passion, or resolution.
• 2 They must be in show, that they may be commended by the weal public.
• 3 They must not be for private respects, but for public.

2 The Valorous must not be stockish but have some feeling of wounds, yet voluntary he endures them for his ends sake.

3 It is not lawful for him to kill himself, since he doth it for avoidance of further evil, which is cowardice, nam

5 sorts of men seem to have fortitude, yet have not.

1 They that undergo dangers only

• on hope of reward for fear of punishment.
  • As pressed Soldiers.

2 They that war only, because they have had experience in the war, and cannot show their skill otherwise.

3 They that run to skirmish in hot blood.

4 They that overcame often, and for hope of like success venture more,

5 They, that weigh not the extent of the danger, they are soon resolute.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Rashnes of venturing this grounds most on the passion of boldness.	Fortitude	Cowardize. This grounds most on the Passion of fear.

XXXV. Of Justice.

IVstice is the mother, and foundresse of other Virtues: it 〈◊〉 in every constitution of state

• Public.
• Private,

It is grounded in proportion and valuing.

It is either

• Universal comprehending all virtues.
• Particular for some especial
  • State,
  • Person.

1 Universal 2. parts

• Discretion to yield each his due.
• Obedience to the law.

The laws are either

• Written, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .
• Vnwritten, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

1 The written are the positive laws of the land grounded on the

• Law of
  • Nature.
  • Nation.
• Customs of places.

and they are

• Public.
• Private.

1 Public

• Endicted by the whole state, as Statutes.
• Proceeding from the King alone, as edicts, and Proclamations.

2 Private is for special contract; as leases, bonds, deeds, and all which have force of law.

2 The not-written is the law of

• Nature.
• Nations.

The precepts of this Justice are, viz.

• 1 Live honestly.
• 2 Wronge none.
• 3 Yeild every man his right.

2 Particular Justice is.

• Distributiue designeing to each man
  • Office
  • Rewards,
  • Punishments
  according to desert.
• 2 Commutatiue in matter of exchange, and bargain between man and man.

The breach of the

• Former is favor, an acception of persons, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .
• Latter, deceit.

4 things prevent both kinds of Justice

• 1 Love of money.
• 2 Favor to the person.
• 3 Fear to displease great ones.
• 4 Rancor, and malice.

Justice of distribution considers 2 things.

• Reward for the person deserving.
• Punishment for the person offending.

The objects of it are either

• Honor to the good.
• Reward to the good.
• Chastening to the bad.

Its tenent is.

It is not positive but varies according to the quality of the person: As in any army all must have their pay, but the captain more then the common Soldier: And it were injustice to make them equal in reward, that are unequal in desert. The like in punishments.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Injustice in dispensing to us above our desert	Justice	Injustice in yielding us less then our desert.

Both are termed Injury.

The excess is Injury to others, and robbing them of their due, and bestowing on us that deserve it not.

The defect is Injurie to our selves since others can have, and we not.

The Rule of Injury is.

1 That it is suffered still with repining and unwillingness: thence a man cannot do himself Injury, since as he receives the wrong, he is repining, and as he offers it, he is voluntary: And we cannot will and nill at one time the same thing.

Justice of Exchange respecteth not the quality of the person but the worth of the thing: It is principally in buying and selling and in all matters of contract.

This differs from the other, for this goes upon quality (so much for so much) that not: They are in trades, thus is Merchandize, the mean is money.

In ancient time they used to give wares for wares: afterwards they gave Metals by weight for them. Now for more Convenience of portage they have invented money, to wit, metal in stamp and by it they exchange commodities.

The extreme in general is unjust exchange.

Excess	Mean	Defect,
When we sell for more then its worth	Justice commutatiue	when we sell for less then it is worth.

In the former we wrong the buyer, and it is the greater fault; In the latter we wrong our selves, and it is more tolerable, since our selves are the cause of it.

The mean rule for this Injustice is.

1 He is more in fault, that doth the wrong, then he that takes it, It was Socrates his saying. Aul. Gell Noct. Att. l. 2. c. 9

XXXVI Of Liberality, and Magnificence.

THe act of this Virtue is releiuing others wants, without prejudice to our own.

Their difference is

• Liberality is for less gifts.
• Magnificence is for greater.

The Object of both is money or money-worth.

Liberality is of lower abilities.

In it are considered 2. Conditions

• End.
• Manner.

of giving.

The end only is to benefit others in honest sort.

They that give

• 1 To receive
  • Like
  • Greater
  profit
• 2 Upon ostentation.
• 3 On long importuning and suite.

are not counted liberal

The manner of giving is bounded circumstances

• 1 Who the
  • giver,
  • receiver,
  is.
• 2 The time that the gift ought to come.
• 3 The place where:
• 4 The quality of it.
• 5 The quantity of it.

1 The Person must be

• Freehearted to any.
• Wise to bestow on the worthiest.

1 Though the receiver be lewd, yet, if he be in poverty, his poverty makes him worthy of relief.

2 The time must be without pause. Bis dat, qui cito dat.

3 The place must be considered of

• 1 If we give only for honesty sake, take a public place, that others may witness it, since fame is the Trumpet of Virtue.
• 2 If for poverty and Alms blow no trumpet; a place of most priuacy makes the gift most acceptable, Vbicun{que} est homo ibi benificio locus est. Seneca.

4 The quality must be such, that it be not to the hurt of the receiver: it must rather be for profit, then for pleasure.

5 The quantity with moderation between either

• Too much.
• Too little.

drawn from consideration of the want of the receiver, present use of the giver, that by giving he not disfurnisheth himself for his own employments.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Prodigality in wasting a man's private estate	Liberality	Avarice, or Niggardize: this is willing to receive all, give not.

Avarice is worse then Prodigality.

1 It is further removed from liberality, whose act is in giving, since the niggard gives nothing and the prodigal gives too much.

2 The niggard defraudes both himself and others: The prodigal harms himself only, and benefits others.

Magnificence is a Virtue only for great ones.

The Magnificent must be high above others in

• 1 Blood,
• 2 Office,
• 3 Virtue.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Riotous misspending. The End of it ostentatiō Cause 1 Folly. 2 Neglect of our private estate.	Magnificence	Sordide Parsimony fearing to spend when Honor Necessity require

XXXVII. Of courtesy and Vrbanity.

THis virtue shows it self in

• Serious
• Sporting

Conversation.

The act of it is pleasure, and plyablenes of behavior.

The End of it to

• please others.
• Demerit their good opinion.

It hath 2 parts

• Easines of Access.
• Slownesse to take offense.

The stern to guide it is Gravity, least our affability turn to lightness.

It was said of Cato Major: Erat in illo viro comitate condita grauitas.

The rules of it are 3.

1 It is most honorable in high persons.

2 It is Varied according to the circumstance of

• Time.
• Place.
• Person.

3 It intends our

• Owne Honesty.
• Another's profit.

For courtesy in serious matters the extremes are.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
1 Popularity in great ones. 2 Soothing in the lower rank.	Comitie	Morosity, as seeking neither to please any in honest causes, nor be displeased by any.

Affability in sports is called vrbanity for

• Taking
• Giving

jests.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Securrility for abuse	Vrbanity	Rusticity making not able to give, not Willing to take jests.

XXXVIII. Of Grace of Carriage.

THis virtue makes not a man

• Real for honesty.
• But complemental.

Its rules are

• General
• Special

for fashion.

1 General. 7.

1 Go cleanly in apparel.

2 Keep our body from loathsomnes.

3 Have a fit composure of

• Gesture, especially for
  • Head.
  • Hands.
• Gate, and all without affectation, and nicenes.

4 Have convenience of speech for

• Fitnes of words.
• Discretion of reply.
• Moderation of sound; that it be not.
  • Over-loud.
  • Affected.
  • Harsh.

5 Barre insolent

• 1 Gesture.
• 2 Shrickes in •• ughter; let not that be often, but as occasion is offered: and that not so much apprehended by us, as the company also.

6 Use due reverence to our betters, observance to strangers, pleasure to our Acquaintance, Courtesy to our inferiors.

7 Take meat and drink mannerly.

Special rules are had from consideration of each

• Person.
• Degree.
• Quality.

Persons differ in

• 1 Sexe 2 years.
• 3 Manners 4 Fortune.

Towards all our Carriage must be honest and pleasing.

1 Honest pleasure is made by

• Speech.
• Gesture.

1 Twixt difference of sex this behavior is requisite: women must be

• Little speakers not forward for action.

Men must take up the talk.

Their talk must be serious of

• Learning.
• Not things sorrowful, but of mirth, and obvious passages.

Their gesture is learned by dancing.

2 Difference of years is either in, sc.

• Youth.
• Midle Age.
• Old Age.

Ways to be graceful with young.

1 They are soon angry: Cross them not in

• Word
• Deed

to raise passion in them

2 Enquire not of his faults: If a friend, tell him in private, if a stranger, he scorneth thy rebuke.

3 Tell them of good hopes, and great adventures. Yong men are credulous and confident: and if you persuade them to the hope of a good, they will love you for it.

4 Our speech must rather be of pleasure, then profit.

5 Be merry and jesting, and seem to like of their company.

3 To be graceful with old men 5 ways.

1 Be not resolute in tenets discoursing with them: they are soon testy, if they be croste, and love rather a young man doubtful in controversies, then over-holding; since they know the hardness of finding out a truth, and the earnestness of youth in holding a possible falsehood.

2 They are suspicious, we may not grow in too fast with them, or force into their company.

3 Our speech must rather be of profit, then honesty, since they are generally covetous.

4 Shew reverence to age, not for fashion, but as spying some sparks of authority in their persons.

5 They are talkative, feed them with speech, but rather second them in their conceits, then to sift them from contradictions, take heed of often replies, they must rather be forced by Question, then they proceed voluntarily.

To ask them questions, save only of things necessary, and pertaining to themselves is against good manners.

The middle aged keep an indifferent tenor betwixt both

• Yong.
• Old.

Our way to be graceful with them is to keep the middle strain for

• Honesty, which likes young men.
• Profit, which likes old men.

Difference of manners is seen according to the difference of passions and the way to behave our selves in such a case is from the observance of his

• Passion.
• Age.

which have been formerly described.

Difference of fortune is seen in

• Nobility of birth.
• Height of office.
• Riches.

Our behavior to these must be

• Yeilding in word,
• Submission in body
• Assigning titles,
  • this is most honest for us.
  • Pleasing for the • .

XXXIX. Of Aemulation.

AEMulation stirs us up to Virtue and heartens us to Imitation.

The object of it is a good quality in others and attainable by us.

It is with grief, that others have out-stripped, and with hope of over-taking them.

It differs from Envy; since that is in the worst; this in the best natures: Licurgus in Sparta commended it to youth, naming it the nurse of Virtues.

In it self it is profitable, but in excess rayses

• Hate.
• Envy.

The parties most given to it are,

1 Yonge men, since they are ever in rising.

2 They, who have equality of

• Trades.
• Professions.
• Abilitys.

as the Roman aemulates the Athenian the scholar, the Carthaginian the Merchant, &c.

3 They, who count themselves of worth, and hope to attain to as much perfection as another.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Indignation for another's rising.	Aemulation	Abjection of mind, as not weighing, whether we be out stripped or no.

XL. Of Continency.

THis is conversant about the restraint of

• Desires
• Pleasures

especially of

• Nourishment.
• Venery.

The difference between a continent and temperate man is: The temperate hath his passion of desire subdued within The continent not without foil and reluctance; passion dwelling within like a dangerous Citizen: though stopped from rising, yet ever feared.

Hence Continency is not properly a virtue, since passion is not brought to consent with reason: And incontinence is not properly a Vice, since it doth that fact, but in Judgment condemns it.

The Intemperate doth it, • nd approves i • , since his

• Will is corrupted
• Judgment is blinded.

The opposite of Continence is Incontinence:

The Incontinent before the act hath knowl • dge of what is right and fit to be done: in the Act he is carried by Passion, which blinds him that he cannot apply that knowledge: After the Act he remembers the fault; and begins to repent.

He falls into this vice by

• Heedlesnes, as not willing to forecast his danger,
• Infirmity, • s not able to resist his Passion.

Falls from infirmity are less curable, then falls of headines, since the one comes from a debility of nature; the other but from an heat of Passion.

XLI. Of Patience.

THis differs from Fortitude, as Continence from Temperance: The Act of it is bearing of harms, but with grief, and trouble of mind.

Hence it is no perfect Virtue, since virtue must be

• with Joy.
• Voluntary.

Excess	Mean	Defect.
Stockish obduration: The Spartans used their children to it in beating them, yet not suffering them to lament.	Patience	Impatience: A womanish yielding to vnavoydable Evils.

XLII. Of the Heroicall Spirit.

THis riseth a degree of Eminence above the rest.

It differs from other virtues as heat from Warmth.

It extends it self to a 3 fold eminence

• Of understanding: so that famous lawgivers and special sages are Heroicall.
• Of Grace; so Excellence of faith is Heroicall. Of Moral behavior.

It is grounded on a

• Stronge composure, & temperature of Body.
• Stronge composure of mind.

It is set forth by 3 helps

• Many abilities for Action.
• Constancy of continuance.
• Prosperousnes of Success.

The opposite of it is Sauagenes, A general falling from all good duty without Judgment to know, or will to wish the contrary.

These are the Catalogues of virtue. Virtue tempers Passion.

Passion gets his mean from Wit, and Will. And these intend for their felicity.