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To the Christian Reader, being none of those men, who (according to S. Paul's Prophecy) love pleasures more than God.

To the same Christian Reader, being none of those men, who (contrary to S. James his Rule ) hold the Faith of Christ, or the Truth of God, with respect of persons.

I Could have wished, good Reader, that M ^r . B. had observed those two Rules sometime prescribed their Orators at Athens, that they should speak when they spake, without preface, or passion. For if any Preface whatsoever, as Plato saith, seem long to those that desire to come to the main matter; much more must a prolix and impertinent Preface, needs be no other than a mere Purgatory to the studious Reader, either diuerting or with-holding him from that that most he desireth. And for passion and affection, it is apparent, that they do not only not help or further ought, but hinder much the discovery either of truth or of right. But Mr. B. it seemeth, liked not to be tied to either of those Laws: for he beginneth his Book with a long Proem, and his Proem with much passion. Which course since he hath taken, and there is a necessity of examining what he here saith, I must entreat thee to blame him (who hath given the occasion) and not me, if thou be kept longer than is fit, from that which thou hastn •… st unto, and that should have been our principal aim in this work.

SOme years are past since Mr. G. took occasion, from casting of Lots to find out for whose sake a dangerous storm was, to justify playing with Dice, Cards, &c. and to confute me by Name in open Pulpit.

It hath been ever deemed that Beginnings are ominous: and such matter as men meet with at the first entrance of a work, they are wont commonly to look for and expect in the process. If this work of Mr. B. should by this rule be judged of, it would receive no small prejudice; sithence it beginneth at the first entrance with a flat untruth, to wit, that I confuted him by name in open Pulpit.

True it is, that handling the first of Jonah, I took occasion, by the Lot there cast, to entreat at large of the Use of Lots in general, the rather for sundry doubts and scruples that by diverse had been moved unto me concerning the Use of them: And that among other things I defended the Use of a Lot generally used in disport, either for combination of the sporters only, or for prosecution and determination of the sport; and consequently did justify the Lot used in Cards and Dice &c. rather than the Games themselves simply, or any otherwise, considered. For my main question concerning lusorious Lots is, whether the light Use of a Lot be a thing utterly unlawful, as Mr. B. and some others avouch it to be; and so whether that make such games among others to be unwarrantable, not whether in other respects they be unwarrantable or no.

But that by name in open Pulpit I confuted Mr. B. or that in propounding of any Argument in this Argument by me refuted, I did in Pulpit once name any Author thereof, is a thing altogether untrue; concerning which I have cleared myself by solemn protestation to Mr. B. himself, as shall after by his own confession in part also appear: And many also that heard me and took notes of what was delivered, can yet testify as much.

I hearing thereof by many sent him this message; If it would please him to send the substance of the Confutation (for I dare not rely upon report) I would either reply or change mine opinion with thanks to God for him; though for the present I thought he failed in Judgment, Discretion, and Charity.

By whom M ^r . B. heard this I know not. If they told him ought that was untrue, the fault was not mine but theirs; peradventure his also, in being over-credulous in that which the party, whom he made use of between himself and me, could have informed him to be otherwise. And I cannot but wonder by the way, that M ^r . B. who here telleth his Reader that he dareth not rely upon reports, yet hath not doubted upon bare report, (if any such were) especially having since the same been bettet informed, to avow peremptorily in print, that I confuted him by Name in open Pulpit. These things sure do not agree well together. If he durst not rely upon report then, how dare he now so far forth rely upon it, as to aver that in print, which he could not have but by report? unless his judgment be altered since concerning that point.

But hearing indeed, it seemeth, that among other Arguments answer was given to those also contained in his Dialogue; He shown himself, as I was informed, therewith to be much offended, and sent me word, that if I would let him have in writing what I had delivered, it should be answered. Whereupon I sent him so much of it as concerned his Dialogue extracted out of the rest. Which he promised to consider of, and return answer unto.

Yea, but in this business, M ^r . G. in M ^r . B. his opinion, hath failed much many ways. If he had then either told me so meeting me, as he did many times, or had sent me such word, I might then have given him some satisfaction therein. But let us now at length hear, and others determine, wherein.

1. In Judgment: Because that Doctrine was not drawn from his Text; Except this be a judicious deduction.

Gentiles cast Lots in a most serious matter: Therefore Christians may use Lotterie in Dicing, Carding, &c.

I perceive if M ^r . B. might have the framing of M ^r . G ^•s . Arguments, there would be very judicious deductions in them indeed. But if without any such iniudicious deduction, the Question of the Use of Lots in general might well by occasion of that Text be discussed, then is Mr. B. his deduction nothing judicious, from thence taxing Mr. G. as failing in Judgment, for taking occasion thereby to discuss that Question. But herein Mr. B. dealeth with me as he doth with Peter Martyr in his Dialogue; where, because Peter Martyr relateth in his discourse entreating of Dice-play, how Plato compareth the Life of Man thereunto, he denieth, yea and seriously consuteth this Consequence, implying the same to be Peter Martyrs;

Plato compareth man's life to Table-play,

Therefore Table-play is lawful.

I will not here stand upon the Ordinary plea, that it is n •… great disgrace for a man (a mean man, as myself especially) to go astray with great Guides, before he be informed (as myself never was till now) of their error. Nor will I say, as one sometime did (it was no warrantable saying) I will choose rather to err with such, than to go the right way with any other: as if it were safe, as some Papists avow, to err at all with any. But yet, considering the ordinary practice of some principal Divines of our times, and such as Mr. B. himself (I am sure) esteemeth for judicious; as also treading in the track of two Reverend Prelates (besides others) in this very particular, who take occasion upon the same Text (though not so largely as I do) to consider of Lots in more general manner than concerneth the particular Lot in the Text mentioned, and to speak the one of them somewhat of the Lusorie Lot also now questioned; I shall crave leave of Mr. B. to incline to their Judgments herein rather than his, till he bring better Reasons for his Opinion than as yet he hath brought. Nor will Mr. B. ever be able to prove that every by- point handled by occasion of a Text, must of necessity be necessarily deduced ever from the words of the Text. Howsoever it be, it mattereth not much, since it neither mendeth Mr. B. his cause, nor yet marreth mine in the Point between us controverted.

2. In Discretion. Because that Doctrine (though occasioned by his Text, yet) so insisted upon, encourageth Gamesters in their sinful course, and buildeth up those Abuses, which the Laws of our Land would pull down.

The Charge, you see, riseth, From a gross failing in Judgment to a fouler faulting in Discretion, if all that Mr. B. here auerreth, be true. But whether my discourse doth, either encourage Gamesters unto any sinful course; (unless to use any Lot in Game be a sinful course, which M ^r . B. must not yet take for granted) or build up such Abuses as our Laws would pull down; I appeal to the Book it self; let M ^r . B. either show so much out of it, or else his Charge here is but a mere Calumnie.

But of this more hereafter.

3. In Charity: Because he confuteth me by Name (as I was certified) not having had any conference with me either by speech, or by writing, though I be his Neighbor Minister.

The heaviest Charge cometh last. A breach of Charity at least. To fail in Judgment or Discretion, may argue some weakness of brain; to fail in Charity argueth much more, an evil mind. But let M ^r . B ^s . words here and else-where be well weighed, and peradventure they will give over-much ground of suspicion of some want of that in him, that he chargeth me here to have failed in. M ^r . G. saith he, failed in Charity, because he confuteth me by Name, as I was certified, having had no conference with me by speech or writing, though I be his neighbor Minister. Not to insist much on by-matters; that M ^r . B. is my neighbor Minister, is more than ever I heard before: that he is my neighbor and a Minister, it may well be; yet it is more than I knew, when I dealt in this point; nor do I yet know, where his place of abode is, save that himself of late hath told me, that I go oft by his door; and so he may be termed my neighbor, yet in no very strict sense, as any other Inhabitant in the Borough of Southwarke may. But to let that pass, if M ^r . B. his meaning be that I confuted him by name in the Pulpit, as he charged me at first, and which I utterly deny; how will it stand with Charity or Conscience upon a bare report, which he saith else-where he dareth not rely on, and that a •… ter better information acknowledged to have been given him, yet still so oft, and so peremptorily to charge me therewith, and with breach of Charity therein? If his meaning be that I have since that confuted, and do (the letter of my Book still abiding) by name confute him, not in the Pulpit, but in print, because he saith in the present tense, he confuteth me by name, I deny it not, nor do I hold it any breach of Charity so to do. His Book is abroad under his Name, as well as mine is under mine: Nor is it anymore a breach of Charity for me by Name so to confute him in the one, than it was in him by Name to control and oppose Peter Martyr in the other. But neither could this be any ground for M ^r . B. then to judge me guilty of uncharitableness, when as yet it was not; nor could any certify him then of it, unless they knew more of my mind then, than I myself did; nor was it done before I had dealt with M ^r . B. by writing, as himself in the next passage freely acknowledgeth. M ^r . B ^s . words therefore hang but vnhandsomly together, when he saith, he thought I failed in Charity, because I confute him by Name, as he was certified, &c. His mind and his pen, or both, and the known truth, it may be feared, had some struggling together, when he wrote thus.

Well; Mr. G. sent me his Answer to my Dialogue. I acknowledge it with hearty thanks. But why have I not replied in so many years? I answer: Sat cito, si sat been. To speak freely; I think I should never have replied, in hope that the Question would have died, had not M ^r . G. confuted my Dialogue in Print. But now, the rather, being provoked by many learned Ministers and other. who tell me, that seeing of all those whom M ^r . G. confuteth, viz. Peter Martyr, Zwinglius, Cartwright, Danaus, Perkins, Fenner, &c. I only live, I ought to reply, lest my silence should give way to impious iniquity; I am ready to perform my promise in replying. Which indeed I could not have done so conveniently before, because the answer, which M ^r . G. sent me, had not the positive grounds of his Opinion, which the printed book hath.

True it is, I was not dainty to deliver M ^r . B. an Answer to the whole Substance of his Dialogue, but upon promise returned me first from M ^r . B. that in defense of his own Arguments he would reply thereupon. Which himself also, after long delay, being urged either to do or tredeliuer it, did by word of mouth to my self again oblige himself either to do or to yield the truth; for so his words both times were. But after a year or twoes stay longer, when nothing would be returned, and I was by diverse informed, how I was in meetings oft traduced and backbited, mine intentions scanned, my positions taxed, some as senseless, some as impious, diverse assertions fastened on me, that I never delivered, diverse of those depraved that were delivered, and that M ^r . B. himself among others was not sparing herein: I condescended at length to the importunity of those (yet having had the whole work viewed and reviewed first by diverse, as well religious as judicious Divines, and having by writing dealt with diverse others of contrary Judgment,) that had pressed me to the printing of it.

Now why M ^r . B. did not all that while reply upon mine Answer, which he was so instant to have, he rendereth two Reasons; in my mind very weak ones.

1. He hoped, it would have died. And how was that likely, when his Challenge had revived it; and that bruited abroad, a Reply was expected. But his former Dialogue belike was enough to dash all that either had been or could be said without further Reply.

2. The writing I sent him, had not my positive grounds. As if his own Arguments, had they been effectual, could not without them have been sufficiently defended.

Why now at length he doth it, he hath two Grounds likewise, but those suggested to him from others, as the former were from himself.

1. Because he only liveth of all those whom Mr. G. refuteth. Where in the Catalogue of those whom he saith I refute, he reckoneth some, as Zwinglius, whom I refute not at all, as not knowing certainly what they held, some that himself refuteth as well as I do, and that allow Cards and Tables as not simply unlawful, as Peter Martyr, Danaus, and Perkins; that so both I might seem utterly to dissent from them concerning the lawfulness of those Games, whereas I maintain no more concerning the lawfulness of them in themselves than they do, (though in our grounds, I confess, we differ) and that himself might seem, as the last man alive amongst them, to stand up in the defense of them, when as indeed he opposeth and impugneth them, and these Games, by them not utterly disallowed.

2. Lest by his silence he should give way to impious iniquity. Here is again terrible imputations. They were before in the privative; Want of Judgment, want of Discretion, want of Charity; in the manner of my dealing. They come now in the positive: Impious Iniquity; Not Iniquity alone, but Impiety and Iniquity, the breach of both Tables, combined in one: where, think we, but in the matter of my discourse? Surely, if such impious Iniquity be maintained by me in this Argument, I beshrew M ^r . B. for sparing his pen, when he might by discovery of it in his reply have prevented the printing of it: And little cause I have to thank those my friends before spoken of, that having had many the view of it before it came forth, would not any of them do me the favor to advertise me thereof. But affection peradventure might ouersway judgment in them. And an Adversary many times is sharper-sighted then a Friend. Mean while remember, I pray thee, good Reader, that there is nothing easier than to charge and accuse: all the skill is, which M ^r . B. must look to, to make good.

Before I proceed, I protest before God, that I esteem M ^r . G. as a learned, painful, and faithful Minister, and a right honest man; and therefore pray thee (Christian Reader) that whatsoever I write may be considered as concerning the Question between us, and not in any wise applied to the least prejudice of so reverend a Brother, or to any of his excellent parts.

If M ^r . B ^s . purpose were to deal only with the Question in controversy, why runneth he out into such by-matters, as make nothing at all thereunto? Why doth he labor so much to cast such aspersions, to procure prejudice, as well upon my manner of my dealing, as on the matter that I deal in? Or what is this but as if one should cast filth and dirt openly in a man's face, and yet bear the standers by in hand, that he did it not to disgrace him? But proceed we.

So excellent that I wonder what moved him to publish his Opinion in print; and the more because of many passages in his Book.

Me thinks I hear some of those here, that Bernard speaketh of, who when they desire most to disgrace a man, begin first to tell of his good parts, and how much it grieveth them that one otherwise so well qualified, should be so far over-seen. But to let that pass.

M ^r . B. here wondereth what should move me to put mine opinion (not relating what it is) in print. As if some new opinion were now broached by me that either had never been heard of, or never published before. Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that both the Opinion held by me concerning the lawfulness of a lusorious Lot in general, is, and hath ever been (for ought that can be shown to the contrary) more generally received than that that he holdeth, and hath been in print maintained by others before me; yea concerning Cards and Tables, (which I deal with principally, in regard of the Lot in them, defending them only as not in that regard unlawful) that they were in print defended by some of those that himself mentioneth, before I was borne, or he either.

I might wonder rather that M ^r . B. should think either himself or any other nowadays so privileged, that they might take liberty to themselves to publish new conceits in Print, contrary to what is and hath been generally received, and yet think much that any other in Print should oppose them.

But many passages in my Book show that I ought not so to have done.

First, He taketh knowledge of many enormious Crimes, which accompany Dice, Cards, &c. p. 193. and in the quotations.

Secondly, He giveth this Rule, That that, which is no necessary duty, but a thing indifferent only otherwise, may not be done, where is strong presumption upon good ground, that it shall spiritually endanger a man's self, or others, by giving occasion of sin unto the one or the other, p. 107, 108, 109.

If many and grievous sins attend Dice, Cards, &c. If those games be too too commonly abused, as he confesseth, p. 194. and if an indifferent thing may not be done which giveth occasion of sin: I wonder why M ^r . G. writeth in defense of Dice, &c. And the more, because he granteth, that where the use and abuse of a thing are so enwrapped and entangled together, that they cannot easily be severed the one from the other, then the use of the thing it self (if it be unnecessary otherwise) would be wholly abandoned, p. 262, 263.

Here is the sum of M ^r . B ^s . Argument. Mr. G. taketh notice that many enormious Crimes oft (for so I say only) accompany Cards and Dice: and they are by many too commonly abused: and he granteth further, that things indifferent may not be done when they give occasion of evil: and that where the use of a thing and the abuse of it are so entangled together, that they cannot easily be severed, the thing being unnecessary, would wholly be abandoned. Therefore Mr. G. ought not to have delivered his Opinion, that a Lot used in game is not simply unlawful; and that it is not the Lot either in these games or in any other (for it is used in many besides these) but such abuses attending them, when they are not, or cannot well be severed from them, that makes them evil or unlawful. For this is my main opinion given of them. Or rather, if you will have the truth of it; Therefore Mr. G. ought not to have contradicted M. B. his opinion, that no Lot in game is lawful.

He might have added, what I add, that those evils attend other Games wherein no Lot is, as well as those wherein it is: And that it is not the Lot therefore from whence they arise: and that the use and the abuse may easily be severed by those that be well affected, as well in these Games as in any other. And I might add, that Martyr, Danaus, yea and Calvin himself, though they saw all that he saith I say, yet durst not pass such a sentence on them as M ^r . B. hath done. But what force is in the Consequence, let any indifferent man judge.

Thirdly, He showeth in many pages, how severely Tables, but especially Dice, be condemned by Laws Civil, Canonical, and Municipall, that is, our English Statutes, as he showeth at large, Lib. 8. §. 5. 8. He wisheth the Laws were yet more severe, and put in better execution, p. 206. He saith, that our common dicers may be marshalled among the flock of the Devils followers, p. 217. He affirmeth most rifelings and Lotteries to be little better than unlawful Games, p. 120. And he teacheth that by these Games we must not give offense to the Laws under which we live, p. 251. Now I wonder that so good a man is not afraid to offend our Law by allowing forbidden Games, even Dice, as well as Cards &c. which consist not only of Lotterie.

To all this, that is indeed nothing but a deal of dust and smoke raised to dasle men's eyes, that they may not discern what the point in Controuersie is, I have already in my Discourse of Lots answered at large. And it is a frivolous course for M ^r . B. to produce it here, passing dry-foot by the Answer that is thereunto there given.

Thither therefore I might justly send M ^r . B. for an answer. But I answer here again in few words.

1. Our Laws do not simply or generally condemn or forbid Cards or Dice, but to some only, used in some manner, and at sometimes.

2. It is not in regard of any such superstitious conceit of the unlawfulness of a Lot in them, as M ^r . B. maintaineth, that either ours or any other Laws condemn or inhibit them.

3. It is a gross falsehood that I offend our Laws by allowing any Games that are thereby forbidden, so far forth as the Law forbiddeth them. Mine own words by M ^r . B. himself produced clear me thereof: And it is too palpable a Calumnie to charge me therewith. If a man should defend the lawfulness in themselves of bowling, coiting and logeting against some fantastical spirit that should question the same, (as there is nothing almost so absurd but some or other have held) would any man, think we, be either so malicious or so senseless, as to tax him for the same as offending our Laws, because in the same Laws these are also prohibited, though there be no Lot in them, even as strictly as those other are? Or were he a justifier therefore of the abuses accompanying the same, that should defend them as in themselves not unlawful?

4. I will not answer M ^r . B. here as the Philosopher did one, that telling idle stories, was still asking, Is it not a wonder? It is a wonder, quoth he, rather that any man can endure to hear thee thus trifle. But I wonder that M ^r . B. since he deemeth it so fearful a thing to be faulty herein, is not afraid himself to offend our Laws, I might say, by fastening upon them or the makers of them such superstitious conceits concerning the use of a Lot, as I verily think M ^r . B. himself cannot imagine, ever entered into their brains; as supposing that these Laws were framed upon such Grounds as his Book is built upon: but I say rather, by condemning that that they allow and approve of, and that not in the meaner sort, but in those of best fashion, that should be examples unto others, and I might add, at such times, when, if at one time more than other, they ought to be most religious of any. M ^r . B. therefore if he do well remember himself, may turn his wonderment here from me to himself.

Lastly, though I grant that common Dicers may well be ranked among the Devils followers, yet followeth it not that all use of a Die is therefore to be condemned; no more than it will follow that because Tavern-haunters may well go in the same rank with such, therefore all resort to any Tavern on any occasion whatsoever is to be utterly disallowed.

Here I have occasion to think, that I may have some more comfort in mine opinion, than M ^r . G. can have in his. For he nameth famous, learned and godly men concurring with me in Opinion. •… ut in the multitude of his quotations, I find none approving Dice in play. And whereas some learned Divines, in some sort, allow Games consisting of Lot and wit, but altogether condemn Dice, M ^r . G. defendeth mine Opinion, disapprouing a mixed, as well as a mere Lot, because, as he saith, a true Lot is in either, p. 126. and he deemeth them to be amiss, who allow Lots in Game, and y •… t add for a Caution, that religiousness be used in the action, in regard that holy things must be done in holy manner.

1. How any man may have sound comfort in any error, be it what it will, is more than I am aware of: since that every error is unsound and contrary to truth: nor can I see therefore how that should minister any sound or true comfort, that hath no soundness nor truth it self. Some excuse there may be for it, but small comfort in it, when a man together with some great ones goeth out of the way. M ^r . B. therefore must first be assured of the truth of what he holdeth, before he can from his company have any true comfort of it. The rather since that by his own confession, he ought not to teach a •… untruth, though it were to God's glory: and what comfort can he have of doing that, that ought not by him to be done?

2. The Reason produced by him (supposing all he saith) is a very weak one, and such as I doubt not but he himself would have waiued, had he been of the first that had questioned some things yet in controversy with us.

3. Many famous, learned and godly concurring with M ^r . B. I name not, because I know not many; howbeit indeed all I know, I name. And for those that concur with me in the justification of a Lot used in Game; I made no special or particular relation of them, not because none such were, for there are diverse, but because I was not so much to deal with them that concurred, as with those that either did indeed, or might seem to oppose. Of which number I was religious not to miss or omit any one that I could light upon, whom I found ought in to that effect.

4. Albeit it be not much material what human Authorities are on either side: since that neither the Faith of Christ, nor the Truth of God are to be held with respect of persons: Yet since that M ^r . B. would seem herein at least to rely somewhat thereupon, and would make what I maintain odious, or suspicious at least, by the nakedness of it, and the want of famous, learned and godly concurring in it, such as he glorieth here to have concurring with him: let me a little, good Reader, entreat thy patience, which M ^r . B. enforceth me, I might well say, to abuse, I must needs say, to detain with impertinent discourse all this while much against mine own will, while, to remove this imputation, I run out a little further in relating the Opinions of others on either side, and in clearing the state of the Question in Controuersie, which M ^r . B. to procure the more distaste to his opponents, (as the manner is of those that maintain a weak cause, willing rather to fasten upon any by-matter, that may breed some jealousy of the adverse party, than to keep close to the point it self) propoundeth still in hypothesi, in one particular that he knoweth to be much abused, when the Question indeed is a great deal more general.

The Question therefore is not between M ^r . B. and me, whether Dice-play, which so oft he hath up, that he might traduce me as a maintainer of it, as it is over-frequently used or abused rather, is allowable or no; but whether any Lot at all in the largest sense taken, used in game, or to speak as himself doth in the very Title of his Book, whether any Game at all consisting in chance, be allowable. So that Mr. B. if he please, may put the Question as well of Even and Od, or of Best by trust, or of Heads and Points, or of Cross and Pile, as of Dice; and of Shuffling of Arrows blind-fold or behind a man's back, or of Casting Bowles together out of someone man's lap or arms to decide or sort who shall side, as of Cards & Tables, which come here into disquisition only, in regard that a Lot either is, or is deemed to be in them. And I marvel why M ^r . B. as he peremptorily condemneth Cards & Tables, & requireth an utter necessary abolition of them, doth not withal also very seriously and severely enioine all Parents to restrain and utterly inhibit their Children from playing at Cockall, and Cross and Pile, and Even and Od, and Heads & Points, considering that these are Lotteries likewise or Games consisting of chance as well as those are; and there is impious iniquity therefore (to use M ^r . B ^s . tragical terms) by his Grounds, as well in the one as in the other. But it would peradventure have been somewhat too ridiculous if he should so have done.

But to leave that, in their judgment concerning such Games, there is the more seeming difference among Divines and others, because they do not generally agree about the Definition of a Lot, in regard whereof also it is ofttimes uncertain whether they do allow a Lot in Game or no, taken in that large extent of signification that M ^r . B. and I understand it.

Whereas therefore the Games controverted are of two sorts, some depending wholly upon Casualty, and some but in part only; some hold a Lot in both, and therefore utterly condemn either; some hold a Lot in the former, but not in the latter, and therefore allow those, but disallow these, some hold a Lot in neither, and therefore allow either; some hold a Lot in both, and yet allow either. Now in the general Conclusion thus laid down, it is true that M ^r . B. goeth with the first, and I with the last; but in application of the Judgments of the middle sort to the Games in question, I concur in part with the former, wholly and fully with the latter, whereas M. B. dissenteth wholly and fully from both.

There concur therefore with me in allowance of the Games of both sorts, First. Our most high and mighty Sovereign himself King James, for his singular learning and judgment admired as well abroad as at home, and whose voice therefore may well in a far greater controversy bear weight. Secondly, the right Reverend the late Lord Bishop of London: yea and thirdly M. Calvin himself, who would not he saith, utterly condemn Cards and Dice, were it not for the ordinary abuse of them.

In allowance of the latter there concur again with me, Bishop Babington, Peter Martyr, Danaus, Perkins. All whom, as well the latter as the former, yea the latter more specially, M ^r . B. opposeth: M ^r . Fenner only, M ^r . B ^r . teacher, (for so himself acknowledgeth him) for ought I know, (nor do I name any other, howsoever M. B. say I name famous, learned and godly men, concurring with him in opinion ) therein clearly or directly passing sentence on his side.

Nor helpeth it M ^r . B. that I grant, willing ingenuously to embrace and acknowledge whatsoever light of truth I can from any side discern to discover it self, that the grounds that some of them have laid being duly considered, fight as well against the one sort of Games, which yet they defend, as against the other, which they disallow. For their Judgment is to be framed by what they conceived and apprehended, and do themselves directly declare and deliver unto us, not by what may be by us deduced, though never so necessarily it follow (being more than they saw or were aware of,) from any other position or conclusion of theirs.

Schoolmen or other such writers of former times I name not now, though I might many, and have done some obiter in my Book; because M ^r . B. would peradventure except against them. As for the Ancients indeed little is to be found of this Controuersie in them; because the exception taken against them for the dependence upon casualty is in truth but a new conceit, never heard of till of late. And for Divines among us, I doubt not but a far greater number of our Reverend Brethren in the Ministry abiding here about the City, to go no further abroad, yea even of those that M ^r . B. himself cannot but esteem reverently of, do dissent from M ^r . B. than concur in Judgment with him, in the condemning of all Lotterie whatsoever used in disport; or, because some of them may understand Lotterie otherwise than he and I do, in condemning all light and lusorious actions that either merely or mixedly depend upon Casualty.

Fourthly, He granteth that Prayer specially applied to the Lot may be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of some consequence, p. 91. And yet he holdeth, that the less weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111. The reason why I wonder at this passage, shall be given in my Reply.

M ^r . B. should have done well then to have forborne to trouble both himself and us with telling us of this his wonderment, till he meant to give us a reason of it. For I suppose hardly any man living beside himself can guess what the, And yet, here should intimate, till he further explain himself.

The last passage now to be observed as matter of my wondering, is this. Notwithstanding, he confidently affirmeth that we may not do ought without warrant, p. 301. sufficiently confirmeth the same; because such an act is not done of Faith, and therefore not free from sin, Rom. 14. 23. but is a mere presumption, and tempting of God, pag. 313. & quot. ^a . & ^b . and earnestly reproveth one kind of Lotterie (why not all against which the same reason is of like validity?) because not found revealed in any word of God, but brought in either by Satan, or by some of his Instruments, who are addicted to vanity, p. 315. & 316. and yet he avoucheth, That it is a sufficient warrant for the use of Lots; in that the oppugners, being learned, can say nothing against them, but what hath been, or may be sufficiently answered, pag. 235. May I not wonder that so judicious a Scholar doth not observe this discrepance? Lottery is unlawful, if not warranted by the word; which position supposeth the word to be perfect, as is the Author thereof; and secondly Lotterie is lawful, if learned men can say nothing out of the word against it. Which position supposeth two things, viz. that the word is like the Laws of Men, that is, imperfect, as be the Authors thereof: and, that learned men cannot so fail in diligence of reading, clearness of understanding, and firmness of memory, but that, if there were in the word anything against Lotterie, they could not but see it.

1. I fear there will not want those that will strongly suspect that some speeches of M ^r . Bs. here proceed rather from spleane and gall against M ^r . G. than from love to any truth supposed to be opposed by him; and that with much better color, than M ^r . B. can deduce that which he here chargeth me with from any words of mine here alleged. For what one title of all that M ^r . B. alledgeth here out of my Book, intimateth any such thing as is here by M ^r . B. thence deduced, to wit, that the word of God is imperfect. As if that which there is nothing in God's word against it, were not warranted by the word: or the word must needs be imperfect if this be held sufficient warrant for an action, that there is nothing in God's word against it. For thence must this heinous Charge be inferred, if from any part of my Position at all. Which Position, or whatsoever else M ^r . B. pleaseth to style it, (for it is propounded by me only, as matter of consideration, not as a peremptory position, ) he should have done well to have related all out in mine own words, which are these; It may be thought a sufficient warrant for the use of th •… se Lots, in that the oppugners of them being m •… n so learned, and so well read in God's word, can say nothing against them, but what either hath been or may be sufficiently answered by others. Which words are there spoken, not as presupposing that learned men cannot fail •… in reading, understanding, and remembrance, but as very probably presuming that men learned & well read in the word, bending their minds and studies that way, might and should at length find out such a special institution and consecration of Lotterie in general to be a divine sentence and an holy Oracle, that might not lightly therefore be dealt with, if it were anywhere to be found. And that the contrary issue of their diligent search and industrious opposition producing nothing but what had been or might easily be answered, might seem sufficient to produce such a moral certainty as in ci •… ill Actions the Casuists do ordinarily require. But I refer myself and M ^r . B ^s . dealing herein to the judgment of any impartial par •… ie upon due view of the place it self.

2. Howbeit to stay M ^r . B ^• ▪ wonderment somewhat; that he may not make me an Owl sitting alone 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by myself: at least to set him up another to wonder at as well as my sel •… ; (one that it se •… 〈◊〉 he would not, for else he could not but see, when he found him sitting together in the same bush with me. M ^r . Bradshaw (a man well known to M. B. while he lived, and one that it would be no disparagement to M ^r . B. I suppose, if I should say he were as judicious a man as himself,) in his Answer to Johnson the Separatist, useth these words, This is a sufficient justification of our Ministry, that such malicious Aouersaries thereof, who would seem so expert in the Scripture, are no better able by Scripture to prove their unchristian accusation. Here is a more peremptory assertion than mine is by much, and that in a matter, I wisse, of much more weight. It is sufficient, saith he; it may be thought so, say I: that men that would seem so expert in the Scripture, saith he; that men so well read in God's word, say I. Now I will request M ^r . B. to look a while off me, and turning his speech to him tell him▪ that he wondereth that M ^r . B ^r . though he do confidently avow (as he need not doubt but he would have done) that we may not do ought without warrant; yet doth withal avouch, that this is sufficient justification of our Ministry, that men so expert in Scripture cannot make good ought against it: and that so judicious a Scholar doth not observe this discrepance; and how hereby God's law is made, like human laws, imperfect. And let him imagine but what Mr. Br. would in all likelihood have answered him, or Mr. Johnson, if he should in that manner have replied upon him. Mean while he need not wonder, that I see not this discrepance, when one far more judicious than myself could not see it, either in my work, (for he had the viewing of it ere it came out, and was a chief instigator of me to the setting of it out,) or in his own.

2. What by the way he alledgeth out of my book by me there produced against Diuinatorie Lots, though mangled in citation, as the former, after his manner, that therefore they are to be condemned, because they are not found revealed in any word of God, nor were ever delivered by any Prophet of God, nor are grounded on any principles of reason and nature, or were learned by any course of natural and ordinary observation; but were brought in either directly by Satan, or by some limbs and instruments of Satan, &c. persons addicted wholly to vanity and to ungodly curiosity. And hereupon asketh, Why, if this reason be good against one kind of Lotterie, it should not be of like validity against all. I make no doubt but the consequence is firm and good. It remaineth for him to prove all kind of Lotterie to be such, and he shall have my suffrage for the condemning of all. Mean while I desire a little more fair dealing at M ^r . B ^s . hands in allegation of mine assertions.

Well: it may be seen shortly, how M ^r . G ^s . diligence, understanding and memory have served him in defending lusorious Lots.

It is very likely, that they have all oft times failed me. There is no man but they may; myself much more the meanest of so many.

In the mean while sufficiency of his answering is but upon the Trial, and not yet adjudged.

And of M ^r . Bs. reply the like.

All these passages well reuiewed by M ^r . G. I should think he cannot wonder that a man of 64 years complete (and therefore his wits may fail) doth wonder, that so godly, wise and learned a man, the faculties of whose mind are at the best, did not say to himself before he preached, much more before he penned this lusorious Doctrine, Let Baal plead for himself; and, These gamesters shall without any encouragement from me, draw on their iniquity with their cords of vanity; and the rather, because he acknowledgeth that accompt is to be given unto God of gaming, p. 261. If of the act, much more of justifying it. From which accompt good Lord deliver me. For I fear that in justifying lusorious Lots, I should put false spectacles on a gamesters nose, whereby the bridge seemeth broader than it is, and so he falleth in without fear; to use M ^r . G _s . similitude, p. 264.

Surely either M ^r . G. is a wonderful strange man, or else M ^r . B. is very prone to wonder at things that are not very wonderful. For here is nothing with him but wondering, and wonder upon wonder. He telleth his Reader again and again that he doth wonder: he demandeth of him whether he may not wonder: he would not have me, nay he thinketh, I cannot wonder, that he doth thus wonder. Some Heathen wisemen have held it a point of the highest wisdom for a man to wonder at nothing. I am not of their minds. Yet as another saith, that it is as well reproueable in a man for him to trust everyone, as not to trust any: so I hold it an unwise part in any man, as well to wonder at everything, as to wonder at nothing; as well to wonder where just cause of such wonderment is not, as not to wonder where it is. Now all that hath by M ^r . B. been said being well considered, I leave it to others to judge what just cause of so much wonderment he hath produced hitherto out of my writings.

2. But let us hear what further matter M ^r . B. hath here found, for this his wondering humor to work upon: for the former passages have already been examined. That a man of 64. years complete should see more than one some fourteen or fifteen years younger than himself, as M ^r . B. persuadeth himself that he doth, it is no wonder. Knowledge gathered by experience and continuance of study, is wont to grow together with years in those that be industrious, as I believe M ^r . B. to be: It is not that therefore, I presume, that M ^r . B. so much wondereth at. But that which he wondereth at, and I must not wonder that he doth wonder at, is this, that so godly, wise, and learned a man, &c. (I would entreat M ^r . B. no more thus to commend me: I like not his manner of commendation. I observe it to be ever but a foil to what here followeth, to be but a shooing horn still, the more smoothly to draw on some disgraceful aspersion or other, and to make my supposed failing therein the fouler; as before, so here:) that such an one, forsooth, should plead for Baal, and give encouragement to gamesters: for that is apparently implied. Which whether I be guilty of, I appeal to my Book, and to all that will vouchsafe the reading of it. Must he needs be held to plead for Baal, that should maintain that the trees growing in Baals grove, which Gideon cut down, were natural trees indeed as others are, and not enchanted Fairies in the likeness of trees, against some fantastique that were possessed with some such senseless conceit: or that should have defended the lawfulness of using the wood of them either for sewell or fence, contrary to the fancy of some superstitious Jews, notwithstanding that superstitiously they had before been abused, being consecrated unto Baal? Or do they plead for Baal, that maintain against the Separatists, that our Churches are not now Idol-Temples, being rid of those abominations, that before they were defiled with? What encouragement I give Gamesters, M ^r . B. himself hath in part before shown, and my Book it self may further show.

3. Account if I should not look to give to God for whatsoever I teach, it were strange indeed, when I teach that account is to be given even of our lightest employments. But let M ^r . B. remember also, that account must be given of wrongful charging and groundless censuring of our brethren; and that an heavy one too, if S. James be believed.

4. As he feareth, which I hope not, that I have failed one way; so let him take heed lest he fail the other way in the same place spoken of: Remembering that as well it is a sin to add to God's word, as to detract from it, and as heavy a judgment denounced against the one as the other: And that, as one saith well, though I remember not well who, We must not •… ick God's measure an inch to some, because others will thereupon take an ell more than they should.

But M ^r . G. believeth that he hath written the truth, (Preface to the Reader) and is confident that truth is to be known, especially concerning matters of common practice, p. 263. and giveth four reasons by which he was moved to defend lusorious Lots, p. 264.

The first is to draw men from superstition, in restraining themselves, when God doth not restrain them. This beggeth the Question, as, I hope, will appear in the Reply.

These words are not mine. Neither are they found in the place quoted; nor would I have spoken in that manner. Yet that I there imply a superstitious conceit in the contrary Opinion, it is true. Neither is it to be taxed as a begging of the Question, being not produced there as any proof of the point in controversy, but as my Judgment of them, whereupon I was induced the rather to deal with them. As for the thing it self, let it appear in the Reply; and it will come yet time enough.

A second Motiue is, because Arguments against lusorious Lots have made many stagger in the necessary Use of serious Civil Lots. It may be so, some failing in their Judgment. But it may be also, that many moe will be made to stagger by reading M ^r . G ^s . exceptions against Arguments for, & Cautions in those serious Civil Lots, cap. 5. and by his Maxim, The less weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111.

1. My second motive M ^r . B. here omitteth, and so also do I therefore. This that he saith is part of the third; part, I say; because I say more than so, and yet no more than I can make good neither, that those Arguments, the chief of them, that are brought against the one kind, will, if they be sound, necessarily overthrow also the other.

2. What mine Exceptions may chance to do, is a matter merely contingent; and there is of it therefore no certainty. But of the other that they have made many stagger, I am very certain; nor see I which way M ^r . B. keeping to his own grounds will ever be able to settle them. If my Exceptions be such, as is here implied, it had been a good work to have removed them, for their sakes, that might chance else to stumble at them.

3. That Maxim, as M ^r . B. termeth it, was once before nibbled at. But the time of the trial of it, belike, is not as yet. What staggering it should cause in the use of a Lot, unless to those that willfully put themselves upon hazard of apparent inconvenience, I cannot as yet conceive.

A third Motiue is to take away much heartburning; Nay rather this justifying lusorious Lots, will not only cause more heart-burning; but encourage also Gamesters to over-crow such as are scrupulous. For, if many well-affected have been constrained, in regard of scruple in this kind to strain themselves to some inconveniences by refusal of those games, when by those, whom they had dependence upon or familiarity withal, they have been urged occasionally thereunto: (which to prevent hereafter is a fourth cause of his writing,) How will these supporters, and familiars insult upon the scrupulous, now they have so learned a patron of their gaming? Some have strained themselves to some inconveniences for not pledging drunken Healths, being drink-offerings to Bacchus. To prevent which hereafter should M ^r . G. do well unto edification to preach and write in justification of these Healths?

1. M ^r . B. snappeth still at many things; but dealeth not entirely with any. One short shred he snatcheth out of my fourth Motiue, or as he styleth it, the third; and another somewhat longer out of the second, which he here calleth the fourth; letting the rest go; for what reasons himself best knoweth. But if the inconveniences there mentioned, many more than M ^r . B. here relateth, may (as it is no question but that they may, if the truth be found and cleared to be on this side) be thereby remedied, it is an effect of some consequence, and such as may well recompense the travel therein taken.

2. But it will rather prove clean contrary, if M ^r . B. may be believed. For it will encourage Gamesters to over-crow such as are scrupulous; (and how can it do so, if those scrupulous ones shall have received satisfaction, and so shall have deposed their scruple?) having gotten so learned a patron of their gaming? A pretty nip; of the same stamp with some other before: as if others more than one or two, whose learning I doubt not but M ^r . B. deemeth deservedly mine to come far short of, had not before me in Print defended the use of a Lot in disport.

3. For drunken healths, if M ^r . B. can show that a lusorie Lot and they are of the like nature, he saith somewhat: till that, his instance may stand by for a stale. But suppose that in detestation of these drunken healths, M ^r . B. should publish a Book, endeavoring therein by diverse Arguments to prove that it is utterly unlawful for one friend to drink to, or to pledge, another at Table, and much more to drink at Table to, or to pledge (as we say) any that are then absent; and many weak ones should thereupon make scruple of such common curtesies; and both they and the profession of piety should thereby be exposed to derision, and just imputation of superstition, I think it would not be deemed labor amiss bestowed (for those weak ones sake at least) for some learned man to take pains to confute such a conceit. And this instance, if M ^r . B. please to apply to the present controversy, I suppose that it will prove somewhat more pertinent than that he produceth; it will in part at least clear the meaning of one of my motives.

The Sum of his Causes (as he expresseth himself in his Preface to the Reader) is, To set at liberty the entangled Consciences of Godly-disposed persons. Indeed; If any Consciences, simply for playing with Lots, should seek his satisfaction in private, then if M ^r . G. quieted him by his grounds (supposed true) it were not amiss. But is every Doctrine, though true, to be insisted upon both by Preaching and Printing, and that affirming matter in Question, and of no necessary use?

Here is the Sum indeed, it seemeth, of that that M ^r . B. would have. He must have liberty, (by what rule I know not) to preach and print (for what he hath printed, he saith himself that he had preached ) what he will; but his doctrine must not be contradicted either in Pulpit or by Press. He may ensnare and entangle Christian Consciences in public; but M ^r . G. must not quiet them again but in private. Especially so long as his doctrine runneth in the Negative, Touch not, taste not, handle not: (it is a Text not unfitly applied to the present purpose, by one sometime of another judgment, but upon better consideration now concurring in justification of the lusorie Lot:) as if the Apostles had never affirmatively preached Christian liberty, or opposed publicly the courses of those that sought to limit and restrain it, and that in things not absolutely necessary neither, but such as might well have been forborne.

That is therefore to little purpose, that M ^r . B. addeth;

I say, Affirming, remembering the holy wisdom of the Apostles and Elders, who decreed touching offensive things (yet some of them lawful, if conveniently used) only negatively; and deemeth it not necessary to decree affirmatively things that were then, and might be in use for a time.

For neither is it equal that some one particular act should for all circumstances be a general rule to all others: the practice of the Apostles themselves, and by name of S. Paul being at other times in points of the very same kind to the contrary that M ^r . B. here urgeth: Neither is there the same reason of Dogmatical Divinity, by grounds of faith informing the Conscience concerning the true Nature of the things themselves, and of Ecclesiastical Discipline by Canons and Constitutions restraining not Christian Liberty▪ but the outward Use of it for Order sake, and the benefit of our Brethren.

It is as if one should thus Reason. The Apostle took no stipend of the Church of Corinth: therefore no Minister of the Gospel may take stipend of his people. Or, S. Paul wrought with his hands for his living: Therefore all Ministers of the Gospel ought so also to do. For such is M ^r . B ^s . Argument, or else it is none at all; The Apostles and Elders determined negatively only of some things offensive: therefore no man may presume to deal in the affirmative of such.

Many (I fear, too many) learned Divines approve Usury in their Judgment, though condemned by Law. Yet none that I know ever insisted upon the justification thereof by Preaching and Printing.

Whether Many Divines among us be of that mind or no, is more than I know. Nor list I to take notice what hath been either preached or published of that Argument by any. This I am sure of, that our Law, though it condemneth Usury, it alloweth Lotterie; and therefore the instance is not even in that regard as it ought, and is intended here to be.

Again, Was there ever any so troubled with playing with Lots? I doubt it. But without doubt thousands will now more boldly use Lusorious Lots, without regard of the Cautions, in these licentious times. As Usurers regard not the Cautions which Divines set down. For it is enough to them that some godly Divines affirm Usury to be lawful.

1. What M ^r . B. meaneth by so troubled with Lots, I know not: But that many are by means of the Doctrine by M ^r . B. and others maintained, superstitiously conceited of them, I am sure; and that diverse so conceited have thereupon sometime strained to sin against conscience, as themselves have confessed, to their disquiet afterward, and sometime have been constrained to undergo no small inconvenience for the avoiding of the like again.

2. But thousands now, saith M ^r . B. (as if the use of such Lots had never been defended, or were never heard of till now) will now more boldly use Lusorious Lots without regard of the Cautions. M ^r . B. speaketh very peremptorily; and yet I take him for no Prophet; and his prediction therefore yet may fail. But if any be emboldened by my Book upon better information to use a Lusorie Lot in due manner, where it is otherwise not unlawful, I have no cause to be sorry for it. If any be emboldened to abuse it, not regarding the Cautions, it will be their own fault, not mine, who deliver nothing that tendeth to the emboldning of them thereunto. Not to add, that the Cautions concern not a Lot used in sport as it is a Lot, but Game rather and Recreation in general: which neither M ^r . B. nor any other sound Divine disalloweth, many by writing defend, and yet do they not thereby give encouragement to any to use Game or Recreation in undue manner: nor are they held guilty therefore of the sin of those that regarding not the Cautions by them annexed to the Doctrine of it, use it otherwise than they ought.

Oh that M ^r . G. had considered what he writeth, p. 107. before cited; and what he writeth, p. 103. & 104. viz. Where inconveniences, that shall necessarily, or in good probability appear to accompany the thing questioned, or ensue upon the doing thereof, shall be such, and so great as the Conueniences, which stand on the other side, shall not be able to countervail; there that action is worthily disallowed as inconvenient, and a Lot consequently unlawful: what he writeth in his Spiritual Watch, p. 27. viz. The rifer any evil is in those places, or ages we live in, the more careful should we be to shun and avoid such a sin. No doubt he would have taken heed how by writing he make way to the sin of, or by Lusorious Lots.

1. I am much beholden to M ^r . B. for his good wishes. The Considerations that he wisheth I had taken into thought, are indeed good and needful; but unless he can assume, and make good his Assumption, that the penning and publishing of my Discourse is such and so inconuentent as is therein specified, he hath little reason to persuade himself, that it must needs doubtlesle have prevailed with me to the staying and suppressing of my Book. Which yet had it appeared in probability and likelihood to have been, I should not have failed to be as chary of the publishing of it, as M ^r . B. himself would have had me to be.

2. Nor do I doubt, but as I writ, that evils the rifer they are, the more careful we should be to shun and avoid them. But that by defending of the lawfulness of a Lusorious Lot in it self, I make way to sin in the use, or rather in the abuse of it, I deny; and my denial standeth good, until the point it self be disproved. I do no more make way to the one by defending the other: than some of the Ancient Fathers made way to the abuse of Wine either by Drunkenness or otherwise, when they defended against the Manichees, Tatiani, Encratitae, and others, that Wine was God's good Creature, and men might lawfully drink of it. Or than so many of our late writers, as defend the lawfulness of an Oath lawfully used, against the Anabaptists, that utterly condemn all use of it, do thereby make way for the justification of that ordinary vain swearing, that is as rife, yea far rifer, than any abuse of Dice or Lot-play either is or can be.

Many Divines and intelligent men, though of Opinion that lusorious mixed Lots may be used lawfully, yet wish that M ^r . G. had never published his Book. For a running Horse, say they, needeth no spurring.

And many Divines and intelligent men pressed the publishing of it, and that more of them, and with more importunity many of them than is fit for me here to relate: I may truly add, that some even of contrary judgment advised it.

Nor do I spurr any running Horse in my Book: but endeavor only to vngirt some, that M ^r . B. and some others had girt in more than was meet, or than they had any good warrant so to girt in out of God's word: and to ease such as might thereby be not girt only, but galled too.

For my part, I wish, that M ^r . G. had been affected in writing, as he professeth himself to be in the use of lusorious Lots, p. 266.

Nor can I blame M ^r . B. (though his wishes be unequal) that he wisheth so oft that I had not by writing contradicted the subject matter of his Dialogisticall Discourse; which yet he himself by a peremptory Challenge incited me first unto; and by his after-demeanure (in a manner) enforced me further to publish.

But me thinks, if M ^r . B. were so desirous to be informed if he err herein, as else-where he professeth, and to have the Truth tried and cleared, as he would seem else-where also to intimate; yea, or if he were not loath to have his opinion herein scanned or discussed, or were not somewhat suspicious of it that it would not endure light, he should not be so unwilling to have it dealt with by others, he should not take it so evil as he doth, that he is contradicted in it; nor would he cast so much impertinent bymatter here in the way, that may rather hinder than further the pursuit of the truth with that Christian affection that in such cases ought to be held; but proceed rather directly to the making good of his own Arguments, as in my writing given him, I came to the Answer of them directly. If he would gladly understand from others whether he be in an error, why excepteth he so much against me for doing no more than himself saith he would gladly have done? If he mislike that it is by writing and publicly done, he may well blame himself for either; nor see I with what equity he can require to be refuted only in private, when his errors are in Print abroad. But let us hear him yet once further, and so an end with his Preface.

Well, whatsoever M ^r . G. writeth dogmatically, he wisheth thee, good Reader, to imitate him in his practice, to wit, that albeit in judgment thou art rightly informed of the truth concerning the lawfulness of these Games in themselves; yet in godly discretion thou wouldest rather abandon them, considering the too too common and ordinary abuse of them; and that many, it may be, among whom thou livest, may remain unresolved and unsatisfied touching the lawfulness of them, p. 267.

I desire the same, and therewith a suspending thy judgment until thou have well considered my Dialogue, M ^r . G ^s . Answers, and my Reply, together with mine Answer to his positive grounds.

Here I promise (with M ^r . G. p. 128.) to raze what I have reared, if my Reply and Answers be proved insufficient, and so commend thee to God, and to the word of his Grace, which is able to build further. Only, consider what I say, and the Lord give thee understanding in all things.

I wish indeed, as M ^r . B. saith; but without prejudice to any that use those games no otherwise than they ought: as the Apostle wished others in another kind as himself; yet withal acknowledging the liberty that God's word and Spirit had given in that point, and not censuring others that therein did not as he did.

For the rest; I require of thee, good Reader, the same for this my Rejoinder, that M ^r . B. doth for his Reply; and of M ^r . B. the performance only of what here he promiseth: And so requesting God's grace for us all, that both in this and in all other points in these queasy times controuersed, we may without all partiality and by-respects bend our selves to the discovery of the Truth, and without pertinacitie, and endeavor by silly shifts to elude it, yield our selves to it where it is discovered unto us, not considering by whom it is either delivered or discovered, but by what force and strength of Argument we are convinced of it; I proceed in the next place, after one rub more removed, from this tedious, needless and impertinent Preface, to the main body of M ^r . B ^s . Book.

ANSWER TO M ^r . B ^s . POST-SCRIPT.

After the PREFACE is this Post-script added.

TO THE READER.

THAT I may do M ^r . G. no wrong, I am to let thee know, that the 14. of March 1622. Stil. Ang. M ^r . G. denied naming me, when he confuted mine Arguments in Pulpit: yet confessing that he named me in Pulpit with others diversely dissenting from him in Judgment touching Lusorious Lots, when he entered into the Question of playing with Lots.

And that thou mayest, good Reader, understand the full truth; Be pleased, I pray thee, to spend yet a little more idle time with us, while I relate, as briefly as I well may, as well upon what occasion, as what it was, that I spake to M ^r . B. at that time that here he mentioneth. Being informed that it was given out by some of M ^r . B ^s . acquaintance; that (upon the offering of this his Discourse to be licenced for the Press, and complaint made by him of supposed wrong that I had done him in confuting him in open Pulpit by Name) it was by that Reverend Doctor that licenced my Book, acknowledged that I had indeed done M ^r . B. wrong, and that I should therefore give him satisfaction in private, but that M ^r . B. would not therewith be satisfied, but would have it done in public, since the wrong was such; and that the same Reverend Doctor should say▪ that if my Treatise of Lots were again to be licenced, he would not have licenced it: (all which was utterly untrue) and supposing that this could come from none but M ^r . B. himself, I desired meeting him near Paul's Church, to have a few words with him. Which granted, I related unto him, what I had heard, & named the party said to have made such report; demanded of him whether either any such report came frō him, or the things reported themselves were true. M ^r B. denying both to be the Author of the report, and the truth of the things reported; for that I there rested. But I further told him, that I understood that he had offered a Discourse for the Press against part of my Book, which I wished with all mine heart might come forth; the truth, I hoped, would thereby the better be cleared, and I should willingly be informed of ought that I erred in; to which purpose I told him, that I had also dealt earnestly as well with D ^r Westfield, (who I know well, will testify as much) when it was tendered to him some three years ago; as also since with D ^r Featly, the party before mentioned, (which M ^r . B. also acknowledged to have understood from him) that they would be pleased at my request to allow it for the Press. Which why they refused to do, is needless here to relate. I told him further, that I was informed of two things in it; the one, that I was accused therein to have confuted him in the Pulpit by name; the other, (which much more nearly touched me) that I was charged to maintain in that my Treatise some Assertions that were blasphemous. The former he affirmed that he had heard by many. I told him, those many (if there were such) were very much to blame: And withal by solemn protestation, as in God's presence, denied that I had by name in Pulpit refuted either him or any other that I dealt with in this Argument. How I named him or his Book rather, and so him with it, I told him: to wit, that having propounded the Question concerning the light use of a Lot, I recited those Authors that had written of this Subject, viz. B. King upon Jonah, B. Babington on the Decalogue, Peter Martyr on Judges, Danaus of Lot-play, Perkins Cases of Conscience, Fennor of lawful Recreations, Easty history of the Gospel, Bamford Dialogue of Games consisting in Chance: whereof some were of one mind, some of another; and if I should dissent in decision of the Question from any of them, I desired it might be without offense, adding that promise that M ^r . B. hath before related. After which having delivered mine own Judgment, & propounded and prosecuted the Reasons that I had for it; I then answered the Obiectōs on the other side, reduced to some heads, and according to those heads handling them, taking sometime also some part of one and the same Objection from one, and some part of it from another, who had somewhat further pursued it; but not naming (as those may testify that have my notes yet in their hands) any one of those whom then I dealt with. Upon relation of this, or the effect of it, with such protestation, M ^r . B. affirmed that he was therein satisfied, and believed it to be so as I said. And now judge, I pray thee, what (I say not Charity or Conscience, but) candor and ingenuity at least M ^r . B. hath shown, in charging me peremptorily, and that more than once (after this my protestation and his own acknowledgment of the truth) publicly in Print with confuting him by Name in open Pulpit, and breach of Charity in so doing. If M ^r . B. were so chary of doing M ^r . G. wrong, that to prevent, or at least, avoid the same, he added this Post-script, why doth he willfully wrong him in that very point, wherein he would seem here to salve his credit? Or what is this but first to wound a man, and then clap on a fig-leaf that may in part cover rather than cure the gash that he hath given?

For the other Accusation, I told M ^r . B. that if, as Jerome said, in case of Heresy, then of blasphemy much more, a Christian man ought not to be, I say not with him, patient, but at least silent, having any good ground and opportunity to clear himself therein. I signified therefore unto him, that if he would do but as much for me, as I had before done for him, (and I supposed in way of requital I might have required it) to deliver me his Discourse or a Copy of it, I would undertake within short time either to return it with due answer, or to make public acknowledgment of mine error, if I were thereby convinced thereof. Or if he would none of that, (as he would in no wise hear of it) that he would yet inform me what those blasphemous assertions were that in my Book I had broached, and show me (which I as yet saw not) wherein they were such. That which in Charity I held him bound unto; seeing me to wander so foully out of the way, to lend me his hand and help, especially craving the same so instantly, for the bringing of me back again. But other answer to this request of mine from M ^r . B. I could have none, but that he had put that term of blasphemy now out of his Book. I replied again hereunto: that that was but a silly satisfaction, having charged his Brother and fellow-Minister with blasphemy to more than a few, to say that he had now put that word out of his Book. I might in his own words have told him, had I then been acquainted with them; that I held he failed in Charity, in that not having had any conference with me either by speech or by writing, though I be (as he saith) his neighbor Minister; he offered to accuse me of Blasphemy by Name publicly in Print. But I required him, as he would answer one day for the neglect of such a duty, to show me mine error, that I might not continue in so foul and dangerous an offense; or to refer it to any one or more of our Reverend Brethren of the Ministry about the City, such as himself should make choice of, whether that which I required of him were equal and reasonable, and whether he in Charity might refuse it. But I sung to a deaf man. I could get from M ^r . B. no other answer but this, that He would be judged by none but by the whole Church of God. And so we parted. Now, since M ^r . B. will so have it, Let the whole Church of God judge, or so many at least, to whose hands this Discourse shall come, on whose side the breach of Charity (if any be) hath been. And this is more by much than I would ever have troubled my Reader withal, had it not been for M ^r . B ^s . Post-script.

T HE former grounds laid concerning the Nature of Lots in general, the Reasons that induce me to allow Lots of this kind as not evil in themselves, among others are these.

This Tenent seemeth more fearful than beseemeth a learned man, who after the turning over a wonderful number of books to compile his Historical and Theological Treatise of the Nature and Use of Lots, setteth down his Judgment: Allowing lusorious Lots only as not evil in themselves; whereas he affirmeth them to be lawful in themselves, p. 266. So that if these games be used with due observation of all his cautions, why is he fearful to allow them as good in themselves? How then may a scrupulous man, who remembereth not only his wicked ways, but his deeds also that are not good, build upon such quagmirie grounds?

Again; Allowing these games only as not evil in themselves, doth not manifest that Love of God, which (I doubt not) is in M ^r . G ^s . heart. For whereas God is glorified by good works, and these games be too too common, and accompanied with many crying sins, whereby God is everywhere and daily much dishonored, the Love of God would have constrained him, if doing truth, to have brought these games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God.

Lastly, By this Tenent he showeth not due Charity to his Neighbor. For now it is enough for Gamesters to plead; A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not evil in it self. Therefore they will not seek further to know whether it be good in it self, forgetting that it is written; The Axe is put to the root of the trees, therefore every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Is not then hereby his neighbors spiritual danger occasioned?

1. I might demand here, why M ^r . B. dealeth only with my Tenent, but taketh no notice at all of the Grounds fore-laid; contrary to his own assertion, and my course with him, who deal with and discuss as well his Ground •… as his Arguments. But that I let pass.

2. Requesting him to forbear his titles, which I neither desire nor deserve, of learned, and very learned, so oft both here and else-where inculcated to no very good purpose, as before I have shown: and passing by his gird of turning over such a wonderful number of Books; (for M ^r . B. is not, it seemeth, out of his wondering vain yet) I would fain know of him why he calleth my conclusion, a more fearful tenent than beseemeth a learned man. For if by fearful he mean hideous and horrible, as he may well, if it be as he afterward chargeth it to be, contrary to the Love both of God and Man, that must first be shown of him; and how soundly he hath shown it, shall in the discussion of his charge appear. If by fearful he mean timorous, as may seem the rather by the trembling that hereafter he cha •… geth me with, I confess myself indeed to be naturally of a timorous disposition. And yet I suppose it no timiditie, but discretion rather for a man to speak warily. Nor is he necessarily fearful that doth not by and by cry out as M ^r . B. doth of impious iniquity, when ought is allowed that he disliketh: or that doth not by and by commend everything as exceeding good and godly that he justifieth and alloweth as lawful. But to speak moderately belike is a fault and fearfulness with M ^r . B. which I was not aware of before.

3. Examine we the ground of this prolix and fearful Accusation, and we shall find it to be but as they say of the sheering of Swine, much clamor and little wool, many words indeed, but little matter of any worth. The main matter of the Charge is this, M ^r . G. alloweth Lusorious Lots only as not evil in themselves. Where the word, only, is M ^r . B ^s . insertion; which if he added for this end, as it seemeth he did, to make my words bear this sense, not evil only, yet not lawful, and warrantable neither, I disclaim it. Otherwise I confess I conceive my Conclusion in those terms to distinguish the Lusorious Lot it self from any abuse that may otherwise accompany the Game wherein it is used, and so make it evil in that respect. But take the Tenent as it is, Lusorious Lots in themselves not evil. To omit the Distinction so common in the Schools, of it self, and by accident; and the Phrase so frequent among Divines and Writers of the best note, of things in themselves not evil, wicked, or unwarrantable. The Art of Painting, saith Rhenanus, is not evil of it self. To swear, saith Chemnitz, is not of itself against the Moral Law. It is not of it self vicious or condemnable, saith Calvin, for a man to provide for himself. Of some Ceremonies used in our Churches, saith Beza, they are not things impious of themselves, nor such as a man should leave his Ministry for: and of other of them, They are not of themselves idolatrous. And Bucanus, Things indifferent are such as are neither good nor evil of themselves, &c. To pass by, I say, an infinite number of such speeches, that in learned writers occur everywhere. For to what end should I waste time and loose labor, in bringing wood to the wood, and casting water into the sea? Doth not the Apostle himself deliver his tenets sometime in like manner as I do? If thou takest a wife, thou sinnest not: and, if a virgin marry, she sinneth not. And, Let him do as he will, he sinneth not; let them be married. And now let M ^r . B. tell not M ^r . G. but S. Paul, that such a tenent seemeth to him more timorous than beseemeth so worthy an Apostle, &c. setting down his judgment whether folk may marry or no, to say, they sin not in so doing. I might add a judicious Divines Comment on those words of the same Apostle, All things are lawful; that is, they may be taken without sin. As also that M ^r . Perkins in this very point concerning the use of mixed Games, such as Tables and Cards are, passing his censure of them, saith, that they are not simply to be condemned. But of this enough.

4. Yea but M ^r . G. affirmeth them else-where to be lawful in themselves. And why is he fearful now to allow them as good in themselves? Though such words of mine be not found in the place pointed to: yet I fear not to own them, and it is like enough that else-where I may use them. Nor did I ever understand till now, that these two were not equivalent, not to be evil, and to be lawful. Is there any medium in moral actions between lawful and unlawful? Or any difference between unlawful and evil? If not, then everything that is not evil is not unlawful; and everything consequently that is not evil, is lawful. Yea I add further, that everything that is not evil, is in some sense, and that a good sense too, good. The word, good, therefore in common acception is taken two ways; sometime more strictly for some such virtuous act, as deserveth a special note of commendation and praise; and in this sense there is some medium between good and bad. For some actions there be, as for a man to make much of himself, to drink when he is a dry, to love his own, to befriend his friend, to make amends for what he hath done amiss, &c. which though they be allowable, yet are not greatly commendable; neither deserve they much praise and commendation when they are done, nor without much sin many times may they be omitted. Sometime the word is taken in a greater latitude of sense, for any action that is warrantable and allowable whatsoever, and so there is no medium at all between good and bad, every particular moral action being either warrantable or unwarrantable, as in my Lots I have shown at large. And in this sense I say, that not evil, and good are all one: as with the Apostle, not to sin, and to do well are all one. If he marry her, he sinneth not; and afterward, He that marrieth her doth well. Where let M ^r . B. again demand of the Apostle (I dare not) why he was so fearful to say, that he that married did well, at the first, especially observing the Caution that he there giveth, in the Lord: And let him take heed, lest while he rejecteth these, as quagmirie grounds, he plunge many weak Christians into deep quagmires indeed, wherein no firm footing can be found, to fix and rest their perplexed minds and consciences on.

5. This considered, all that followeth is but a mere flash, that vanisheth so soon as it is fired, of it self. Nor will M ^r . B. ever be able to prove, or to persuade any man, I believe, not sworn to stand to his sentence, beside himself, that those deeds not good in the Prophet were any other than evil works, such as the Psalmist saith, wicked men addict themselves unto: for who is bound to repent of ought that is not evil? Or that in John the Baptists speech, the opposition is between fruit good, and fruit not evil; and not rather (as all Divines that ever I read, understand it) between good fruit, and evil fruit, or no fruit; it being evil also, as Chrysostom well observeth, not to do well.

6. For the crying sins that M ^r . B. saith accompany these Games. Do crying sins accompany every lusorie Lot, the shuffling of arrows, for the siding of shooters, or the drawing of pawns for the leading at Chess, &c? For the Question is of any Lot at all used in disport; not of Cards or Dice alone. Or do those crying sins arise from the Lot it self used in them? or not accompany other Games, as bowles, and nine pins, &c. wherein no Lot is? Or must all Lots be necessarily banished from all Game, because some Lot-games are with many attended with such sins? But M ^r . B. hath no mind at all to keep to the Question, or to come directly to that that he should deal with.

I. B.

But here, perhaps, it may be said, The first Reason proving that a Lot may be matter of recreation doth give me a check. Is it a check? Then I will try if I cannot avoid the Mate.

T. G.

M ^r . B ^s . mirth here I let pass, that we may come to the purpose: and set down my first Argument as it is in my Book.

The first Argument.

FIrst, that which may be ordinarily used in other civil affairs, be they more weighty or of less weight, that may also be used for matter of 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉 recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily used in other civil affairs, as, by the express authority of God's spirit speaking by Solomon, for the ending of contentions, and matters in suit or strife, be they weightier or of less weight: For the words in the text are indefinite, neither is there ought to restrain the ordinary use of them in that kind either there or else-where. The word used there, though in its original propriety it signify Law-suits; yet in the ordinary use of it, it extendeth it self to contentions of all kinds. And the practice of God's people recorded in Scripture showeth that even mean matters have been decided and determined usually by Lot: as in matter of Tithe, though it were not much material, which Lamb the Levite had, so that he had one of ten, two of twenty, &c. yet was it decided by Lot. It was a matter of no great weight what gate of the Temple such or such Levites should wait at; I say not, that it was a mean matter to be a Porter in God's house, (though it seem to be mentioned as one of the meanest places of employment there;) but whether company should wait at this gate, and whether at that other gate, (as who should stand at the North door of the Church, and who at the South, to receive people's benevolence, upon occasion of some collection) was no matter of great moment, and yet was that also decided by Lot. Neither was it greatly material which of the Priests offered Incense, or which dressed the Lamps, &c. so it were done by someone of them: yet that also went by Lot. Since that Lots therefore may lawfully be used in other ordinary affairs, God's word indefinitely warranting it, the same else-where not restraining it, and the practice of the godly, carrying it even to mean matters (for the offices themselves were not put by them to Lot, but the distribution of particular duties or stations among those of the same office) I see not what should banish them out of our disports, more than out of other our (though serious, yet) civil affairs.

The Argument collected with all faithfulness (as the rest, and his answers be) is this.

That which may be ordinarily used in other civil affairs, be they more or less weighty, may also be used for matter of recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily used in other Civil affairs. Therefore I see not what should banish it out of our disports, more than of other (though serious, yet) civil affairs.

How faithfully M ^r . B. hath related mine Argument, any eye that compareth this his relation and it, may soon see. I say, A Lot may be used ordinarily in other civil affairs, be they weighty or of less weight, as my Proposition required that I should, and M ^r . B. dealing as the Devil did with Scripture, when he tempted our Savior, clippeth away those last words (for what purpose shall after appear) and relateth thus mine Assumption, But a Lot may be ordinarily used in other Civil affairs. If this be all faithfulness, I know not what faithfulness is. Here is but a bad beginning again, I am sure; and the worse, because the contrary is so solemnly and so seriously professed. But let us hear his Answer.

I. B.

Is not this a fearful conclusion like the Tenent?

T. G.

How timorous the Tenent is, hath before been discussed. And if the Conclusion here be no more timorous, it mattereth not much.

I. B.

Why doth not M ^r . G. conclude positively thus? Therefore a Lot may be used for matter of recreation and delight.

T. G.

It is enough if the premises necessarily infer the Conclusion. Which, what had it mattered, if it had wholly been omitted? as it is sometime with our Savior himself in his disputes. But it is the part of a bad pleader, as the Heathen man well observeth, to leave the main matter, and trifle thus about terms.

I. B.

He, forsooth, seeth not. Can a blind man go stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) M ^r . G. seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia.

T. G.

A little over flowing of the gall, I fear, troubled M ^r . B. when he was about this employment. But what I see not, I hope, he will show me, that seeth better than I do in this business.

I. B.

For if God had opened his eyes, he might have seen plainly, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Civil affairs; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be used in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set purpose to employ God but as it may stand with his pleasure.

T. G.

1. I marvel then why many others sharper sighted than M ^r . G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as M ^r . B ^s , do not see it.

2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argument? unless the denying of the Conclusion be a legal kind of Answer.

I. B.

Hereof more hereafter. In mean while, in further answer to this Argument, I deny the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily used in other Civil matters, yet not for matter of recreation. Whereof also more hereafter.

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Here M ^r . B. showeth why he curtailed and cut off part of mine Assumption before, as Procrustes did those that were too long for his bed; It was too long to serve his turn, and that being cut off, he thought no more was said of a Lot in it, than might well be said of an Oath. Now therefore for further Answer (having given none at all before) either he denieth, not my Proposition, but another of his own forging correspondent to the Assumption that before he had framed; or else he bringeth an instance nothing at all to the purpose. My Proposition is this as himself relateth it, That which may be ordinarily used in other Civil affairs, be they more or less weighty, may also be used for matter of recreation and delight. This thus conceived M ^r . B. denieth, and that he may seem to have some show of reason for this his denial, he addeth, that an Oath may be ordinarily used in other Civil matters, yet not for recreation. To let pass a large liberty given here for Oaths, which if it had in such terms slipped M ^r . G ^s . pen, he should soon have heard of it with a witness, as a patron of, and a pleader for ordinary swearers; as if those places of our Savior and S. James well known, did not precisely condemn ordinary swearing. To let that pass, hoping that M ^r . B. meant not amiss, howsoever his words seem to sound. Unless he put in, be those civil affairs weighty or less weighty, wherein he saith an oath may be used, he saith nothing at all that concerneth my Proposition: If he do, he directly crosseth the doctrine of our Savior; and his own assertious else-where. Neither do I believe that M ^r . B. can give instance of any one particular that may be used ordinarily in Civil affairs, be they more or less weighty, that may not be used also in disport. If he or any other can produce any, I will relinquish this Argument.

The second Argument.

SEcondly, if we consider aright the nature of a Lot, and the great uncertainty of it, we shall find it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and not fit to be used in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make use of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things beforehand, that it may not be material which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left unto it: so where it may be material and of some consequence whether it go the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquity of others may enforce a man unto; a less inconvenience is allowable for the avoiding of a greater;) there will no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the uncertain hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be used.

Now I proceed to the second reason, which is set down in two shapes.

The former is this:

That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto. But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot. Therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be used.

The proposition he proveth thus. Great is the uncertainty of a Lot. Therefore not fit to be used in any weighty affaire.

The former Argument was propounded unfaithfully; this both unfaithfully and negligently. Vnfaithfully, because diverse enforcements of some branches are omitted, as by comparing mine and his may appear: Negligently, because the proof of the Assumption is here said to be the proof of the Proposition. Otherwise I acknowledge it indeed to contain for the main substance the matter of my principal Argument.

M ^r . B ^s . answer followeth.

I. B.

A Lot is taken sometimes for the instrument of purpose disposed unto Casualtie, as [The Lot is cast into the Lap.] and sometime for the event, as [Give a perfect Lot.] Which howsoever it be casual in relation to the former, yet falleth out certainly this or that, by God's whole disposing the former. Prov. 16. 33.

I therefore deny both the Proposition and Assumption, persuaded that M ^r . G. would never have set down this supposed reason, if a Lot in the former acception had not drawn his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lot in the latter acception.

T. G.

M ^r . B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratively not for the casual event applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein used. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense.

For his denial he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembered well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption.

The Proposition is this, as himself also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto▪ Will any man that hath common sense, beside M ^r . B. deny this Proposition, or require a proof of it? If any do, I will for my part deal no more further with such an one, than with one that denieth principles.

The Assumption is this, The lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot.

This M ^r . B. denieth too, and by denying it therefore, it seemeth his denial is grounded upon his former distinction; which yet he seemeth to apply not to the Proposition it self denied, but to the antecedent of the proof, to wit, that a Lot is a matter of great uncertainty. To which he answereth, that a Lot in relation to the Creature used in it is casual; in relation to God's whole disposing the creature, Prov. 16. 33. (which place will come to be examined hereafter in his due place) is certain. If his meaning be this, that it is uncertain in regard of the Creature either using it or used in it, but certain in regard of God in his providence disposing it, who either doubteth of the one, or denieth the other? or what is said more of a Lot herein than is true of any contingent Act, whether casual or other? But if his meaning be that God doth certainly ever dispose every Lot according to the nature of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the better part in a division unequally made, shall go with him that hath the better right the office in an election, with him that is fittest for it: or again, so that in the same case it shall ever fall out the same still certainly, as if in dividing of commodities bought in common, when for the parting of them the Lot hath been cast once, and the one party shall remain unsatisfied, suspecting or pretending that some fraud was used in it, that upon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly go the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it self will soon confute him; and as to him therefore that denieth the fire to be hot, I will wish him only to thrust his finger into the flame, so to him that shall deny a Lot to be of uncertain event, I will wish him only to make trial of it.

I. B.

So that I marvel much, that he findeth a Lot to be not fit to be used in any weighty affaire. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discovering Achan, Josh. 14. Choosing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affairs? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affairs.

T. G.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforcements before spoken of brought for the strengthening of mine Antecedent, which he should rather have dealt withal; nor denying the Consequence, which he giveth therefore as granted; M ^r . B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the Consequent, or in plainer terms, the Conclusion of mine Enthymem or imperfect Syllogism: And by another Enthymem grounded on four instances, endevoreth 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉 to prove the direct contrary to it. His Argument is this:

The division of the land of promise, the discovery of Achan, the choosing of a King, and an Apostle, all done by Lot, were weighty affairs.

Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affairs, than about affairs of less weight.

For the Antecedent, I might well question one branch of it concerning the division of the Land of Promise by Lot, of which also I have spoken else-where at large, and to avoid prolixity refer thither my Reader. Only thus much for the present. Whether that Lot were ordinary and now imitable or no, may be questioned. If it were done with respect to a former prophecy, and with expectation that the seats of the several Tribes should by virtue of the Lot fall out answerably thereunto, it was extraordinary, and not imitable now of any without the like special ground. If it were done only to determine which share each Tribe should have of the Land as equally as could be divided; though the business it self, to wit, the dividing of the Land was weighty, yet that which the Lot was to do in this business was it self of no great weight; for it was not much material which part this or that Tribe had, when little difference was between part and part; yea the less difference there was, the less inequality there could be; the less inequality there could be, the less weighty it was how the Lot went; again, the less danger of inequality, the lawfuller the Lot, and consequently the less weighty the event, the lawfuller still the Lot. So that this instance either is of the same stamp with the other three, and must receive then the same answer with them; or if it be of another kind, yet it confirmeth not the consequent, because neither was that of much weight that the Lot was to do therein, nor will it follow, A Lot was used once (yea say more than once) in a weighty affaire; therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affairs, than it may about those that are of less weight.

This premised for that branch of the Antecedent; I deny now M ^r . B ^s . not Consequent, but Consequence. And that for two causes: 1. Because though it were granted that the instances were to purpose, yet the Consequent will not necessarily flow from thence; In such three cases and upon such occasions a Lot was used in weighty affairs: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before. All that will follow; all granted that M ^r . B. himself requireth; is but this, Therefore in weighty affairs sometimes a Lot is not unlawful; or (for I had almost forgotten myself) the use of a Lot is lawful.

2. Because the instances are nothing to purpose, being of such Lots as were extraordinary, and are not now imitable, as may appear by M ^r . B ^s . own grants in the very next words to these. The Question is about the lawful use of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may lawfully use Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully use, the less weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disprove mine Affirmative herein, or to prove the contrary thereunto, M ^r . B. produceth three Instances of Lots used in such cases, as none lawfully now may use them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinary providence been certainly directed, the event was in hazard to have been of foul and fearful consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some unfit person designed to a place of the highest moment. That these examples are such, I have shown evidently else-where, which M ^r . B. ought to have taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senseless, as to imagine, that to find out a thief or a murderer, or the like, a Lot may now be used, or that in choice of a King, where the place is electiue, a Lot may be cast upon the body of the State without exception of any, as in Saul's case it was, for the settling of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did with the Jews, when they cast Lots for an High Priest, the Lot lighting upon a most silly ignorant Ass. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Savior Christ opened ones eyes with clay, matter fitter to put out than to open a man's eyes. Therefore such matter as will rather put out than open a man's eye is fitter to be used in the like case than any other. Or, A Lot was sometime used by God's special appointment in some weighty affairs wherein we may not now lawfully use it: Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used of us in weighty affairs, than it may be in those that be of less weight.

But will you hear M ^r . B. controlling himself, and overthrowing what he here buildeth? Read me but his next words.

I. B.

But indeed, whether the subject matter be more or less weighty, a Lot may be used about it, provided it be with God's allowance. For want whereof both Diuinatorie and Lusorious Lots be equally unlawful.

T. G.

1. Had M ^r . B. before put in as much as here he doth, whether the subject matter be more or less weighty, he had neither wronged mine Argument, and he might easily have discovered much difference in this very point between the use of a Lot, and the use of an Oath.

2. Are all Diuinatorie Lots unlawful? then are all those three examples before alleged of Lots unto us at least wholly unlawful. For they were all Diuinatorie, aiming at the discovery of that which no wit or skill of man was able by any means to reach to: and by M ^r . B ^s . own ground and grant therefore not now allowable. As for lusorie Lots, sub iudice lis est; it is the Question, which M ^r . B. too oft beggeth.

Or more particularly for the present business: A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully either do or not do, and it is not material whether he do or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of another, or to the hazard of the uncertain motion of any creature whether he shall do it or not do it. But the using of a Lot in game (or the using of it in any business, be it serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event, to wit, who shall join or stand out, who shall lead or follow, who shall overcome or yield to the other side, &c. which are matters merely indifferent, such as may without sin be either done or forborne, either done the one way or the other. The use therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot, is not evil simply in it self.

The other shape of his Reason, more particularly as he saith, for the present business is this.

A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully do or not do, and it is not material whether he do or omit, such may a man lawfully put to the hazard of the uncertain motion of the Creature, whether he shall do it or not do it. But the using of a Lot in Game is but the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event. Therefore the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not evil simply in it self.

T. G.

M ^r . B. cannot (it seemeth) for his life relate any Argument of mine as he ought. For

1. Here in the Assumption he leaveth out that that ought not to have been omitted, to wit, of a Lot qualified and cautioned as before, without which mine Assumption were indeed very false.

2. He mangleth my Conclusion, leaving out the very principal part of it, to wit, Therefore the use of a Lot in such cases, &c. that he might find some matter of exception against it.

But his exceptions to it follow.

I. B.

What a trembling Argument is this?

T. G.

I see, a man must be very peremptory that dealeth with M ^r . B. or else he shall be nothing worth. But I shall desire him to pardon me, if I be not so peremptory, as he and some other are.

But wherein, think we, doth this trembling and timorousness discover it self?

I. B.

In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lot in the former acception. In the Assumption, of a Lot in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himself.

T. G.

What trembling argued this, if I did so? as indeed I do not. And M ^r . B ^s . eye-sight, it seemeth, failed him when he made this exception. For how can I in the Proposition take a Lot either in this or that acception, when there is no word at all of a Lot in it? as even M ^r . B. himself relateth it. In the Assumption I speak of a Lot as it is ordinarily taken, and as himself out of Lyra in effect defineth it, for a variable event (or a casual rather) applied unto the deciding of some doubt, which that it hath any special relation to the Creator, more than any other ordinary civil Actions have, is denied.

I. B.

In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulness: but concludeth only, as not evil simply in themselves.

T. G.

These twice sod Coleworts we had more than once served in before: nor deserve they any answer.

I. B.

Indeed the Conclusion is to follow the worse part. But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is general.

T. G.

The Assumption is, But the using of a Lot in game, or in any other business serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before, is, &c. And the Conclusion, The use therefore of a Lot in such cases is, &c. And where were M ^r . B ^s . wits (think we) then, when he writ this?

I. B.

What? Is M ^r . G. afraid to put (The using of a Lot in game) into the Conclusion?

T. G.

M ^r . G. is not afraid to put it in; for he doth it in effect. But M ^r . B. (who with all faithfulness, if you will believe him, relateth M ^r . G ^s . Arguments) cutteth it out himself in the relating of it, and then asketh M ^r . G. why he putteth it not in. If this be not childish, I know not what is. It is like the Papists dealing with us, that clip the tongue of antiquity, and then ask us why we do not or dare not allege it.

I. B.

Is not the Minor to be the Subject, and the Major to be the Pradicate of the Conclusion? I will not question the figure of this pretended Argument, if Sub, prae, prima, will serve the turn. And though I find it in no mood, yet will I answer the two fore-pieces thereof.

T. G.

That part of the Minor and Major is to be so, I grant; and that I suppose M ^r . B. meant. And that it is so in mine Argument would have easily appeared, if M ^r . B. had related the Conclusion aright.

The Argument thus standeth.

To put a matter of mere indifferency to be done or not done to the hazard of the uncertain motion of any creature whether it shall be done or left undone, is lawful.

But the using of a Lot in any business, be it serious or lusorious, so qualified and cautioned as before, is no other than the putting of a matter of such mere indifferency to the hazard of the creatures uncertain motion.

Therefore the use of a Lot in such cases, be the business serious or lusorious, is not evil of it self, or, if M ^r . B. will admit no other terms, is lawful.

Thus is the Argument it self cleared against M ^r . B ^s . exceptions; let us hear his further Answer to the two fore-pieces of it.

I. B.

The former is not true, except M ^r . G. understand a matter of mere indifferency controverted. For though such a matter may be the Subject matter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controverted is the only subject matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as M ^r . G. truly writeth even in this case, p. 167. If M ^r . G. so understand, then there it some necessity of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then merely in the will of a man whether he shall do it, or not do it.

T. G.

That I say there is no Lot, where no Controuersie is, is untrue. I say only, Where no question or Controuersie is. For a question may be where a Controuersie is not. Since that a Controuersie is properly a Question between two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But unless some such controversy be about the matter of indifferency to be done or not done, my former fore-piece, saith M ^r . B. it not true. If it be then, belike it is. What M ^r . B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferency so to the hazard of an uncertain event, in a matter of controversy is lawful. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controversy, it is not lawful. The reason he giveth why it is lawful in the former, is because there is some necessity then of ending the controversy put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then merely in the will of man whether he shall do it, or not do it. Where 1. M ^r . B. is too busy with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that wheresoever any Controuersie is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so untrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other means also be decided. 3. He misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous event, whereas my words are plain of the doing or not doing the thing it self, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be lawful, that no way hurteth me.

The reason he rendereth why it is unlawful in the latter is, because such a matter unless it be controverted, cannot be the subject matter of a Lot; which we have nothing yet to do withal. And the words therefore, as they are untrue, nor do I anywhere so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the present Proposition. Here is M ^r . B ^s . Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controuersie is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferency to the hazard of some casual event whether it shall be done or not done, unless some controversy be about it, is unlawful. Both the Antecedent is untrue; and the Consequence unsound. He might better have said, Where no Controuersie is, no Lot can be: therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casual event, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is frivolous for one to say, it is not lawful for a man to do that, which by his own grounds and grants is impossible.

I. B.

In the other piece I observe, that M ^r . G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be uncertain. Which is begging the question, for the reason given to his former shaped Argument.

T. G.

I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casual, or as M ^r . B. himself speaketh, a various event, used for the deciding of some doubt. The using, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left undone, is the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition following necessarily from it.

I. B.

Neither is it true that if in game, a controversy (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of mere indifferency is put to hazard.

T. G.

Whether a controversy in game be by Lot ever decided, though there be oft, is not by me here questioned, nor doth the strength of mine Argument depend thereupon. But that a matter of indifferency is put to the hazard of a Lot in every Lot so qualified, as I had before required, must needs be, when one of the Cautions there required is that the matter put to the hazard and decision of a Lot be a thing indifferent. Yet it is against common sense to say that the matters put to the hazard of a Lot in Game usually, (as who shall be on this side and who on that, who shall have the precedency at Tables or Chess, who shall have these and who those cards to make his Game with, and the like) are not things merely indifferent. If they be such, and there be controversy there-about, then by M ^r . Bs. own grants, they may be put to the hazard of a various event, that is in short, to a Lot, as himself defineth it. That they are such no man of reasonable understanding will deny; nor that controversy may be about them in Game. It is lawful therefore by M ^r . B ^s . grounds to use a Lot in Game about them.

I. B.

But more hereof in my third Reply. In mean while consider, whether this second shape be more particularly for the present business, so as to conclude the Question than the former.

T. G.

Indeed as M ^r . B. had dismembered my Conclusion it was not: otherwise it is.

I. B.

And note, that in both these Shapes, only lightness and indifferency of matters put to Lotterie are pressed as causes most justifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped Arguments Proposition, be positively affirmeth, that we shall find a Lot not fit to be used in a weighty affaire. If so, then weightiness and necessity of matters controverted make Lotterie less lawful, if not altogether unlawful. But of that also more in that Reply.

T. G.

Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightness of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the use of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirm the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be used in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margin may there show; nor do I nakedly affirm it, but add something to strengthen it: And M ^r . B. though he have oft again and again carp •… d at it, yet neither offereth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirm now further, what M ^r . B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightiness of the business, in regard of the event, maketh Lotterie the less lawful, nor to be condescended unto without very great necessity, and to be used with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needful in it. And I say therefore the less lawful in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so using it, or in those that urge the use of it, when in such case it is condescended unto. The reason is evident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the event of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may prove well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconvenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconvenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the event. If it must needs then produce such inconvenience if it do fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter upon hazard of such inconvenience. But to put the matter upon the hazard of a Lot, is to put it upon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make use of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it upon hazard of much inconvenience. Which to do (as some say of an Oath in some cases) it either is evil, or it is of evil; it is evil in the party himself that voluntarily doth it, it is from evil in others, when a man is urged thereunto. But for the further confirmation hereof, I refer the Reader to that place, where I handle the Caution of Conuenience.

For matter of Indifferency, I wonder that M ^r . B. dare except against it: And I avow here confidently, without trembling and fearfulness, (which M ^r . B. so oft layeth in my dish) that nothing but what is indifferent may lawfully be put unto the decision of a Lot. And I would know of M ^r . B. whether he dare defend that any either necessary duty, or act evil in it self, may lawfully be put to the decision of a Lot, whether it shall be done or no. If he dare not justify the putting of either to the decision of a Lot, he must needs grant that indifferency (which here he sticketh so much at) is a necessary affection of such things as may lawfully be put thereunto. But of this at large in my first Caution; which M ^r . B. ought to have taken notice of, and to have answered if he could.

For Necessity, it is true, nor do I deny it, but that it may make some Lotteries lawful to some, that for them otherwise to condescend unto were utterly unlawful. As necessity to prevent a greater mischief, may make a man yield to give his purse to a thief, or to cast his wares into the sea, which otherwise he ought not to do: So necessity to prevent a far greater inconvenience may enforce a man to put the losing of that to the hazard of a Lot which he hath very good right to, and but for the avoiding of such grievous inconvenience he might not lawfully depart with, or put the loss of it to the hazard of a Lot. Nor is the Lot therefore the more unlawful unto him either in regard of the Necessity, or of the Inconuenience that thereupon may accrue, being yielded to to redeem a greater. And yet well may the Lot it self in some sense be said truly, to be in regard thereof the more unlawful, than if no such either necessity enforced, or inconvenience accompanied it, because the use of it is not wholly free from iniquity on some side. And this, I hope, will suffice, for the present, to stay the minds of any impartial from entertaining a prejudice concerning my Judgment delivered in this point; (which M ^r . B. is so oft snatching at, as if it were a most senseless conceit, when indeed nothing is more evident, if it be well weighed) until the time come that M ^r . B. will vouch safe to deal indeed with it, as he telleth us still and hath told us oft that he will.

The third Argument.

THirdly, if the use of Lots in game be of it self evil, then must it needs be a sin either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charity in the second. For every moral evil must needs be a breach of God's Law, the whole sum and substance whereof being comprised in those ten Edicts of those two Tables, every breach thereof must of necessity be brought within compass of the one of those twain, and so consequently convinced to be a branch either of Impiety against the one, or of Iniquity against the other.

But the Use of Lots in game is not in it self, or of it self a sin either against Piety, or against Charity.

To spend time and words in proving that the use of a Lot in game as it is a Lot, is not against charity, as that it is no breach of charity for men to draw Cuts or cast Arrows, who shall bowle or shoot first, were both superfluous and ridiculous; superfluous, because it were to prove what no man denieth; ridiculous, because it were to confute what no wise man will anow. And yet to charge a lusorious Lot with Impiety, hath as little ground as the other.

For the manifesting hereof let thus much be considered, that all Impiety may be referred to these two heads, either the profaning of hallowed things, or the hallowing of things profane: since it cannot be imagined how any Impiety should be committed but either by denying holy things their due respect, or by giving the same where it is not due. But lusorious Lots are not of themselves guilty in either of these kinds. In the latter kind even their greatest adversaries will clear them, there being no color to charge them with the hallowing of ought that is not otherwise holy. And in the former kind they may be cleared also by the grounds of God's Law, to wit, from the profaning of ought that is holy. For the thing used in them is a Lot: and nothing can be profaned by them but what is used in them: (by Lots, I mean simply as they are Lots, for to make Lots of holy things, as of parcels of Scripture, or of the Elements consecrate in the Sacrament, &c. is not anything concerning the nature of a Lot, but an abuse cleaving to it in some particular men's practice of it, and such as is to be severed therefore in this our discourse from it.) But a Lot is no holy thing, either of it self and in it own nature, or by virtue of any divine institution. For of these two sorts are all holy things whatsoever, either they are holy of themselves and in their own nature, as God himself, and his titles and attributes are, or else they come to be such, whereas in their own nature they are not, by means of some special divine institution sanctifying and severing them to some holy use, as the Ark, the Tabernacle, the Temple, the seventh day of the world before Christ, and the first day of the week since Christ. Now in neither of these respects can a Lot be said to be holy, not of it self, or in it own nature, for it is nothing else but any casual event applied to the determining or deciding of some doubt: Where the matter of it, a mere casualty, as it is a casualty having no holiness at all in it of it self (for then should all casualties in like manner be such) can much less gain or procure any holiness to it self by any man's application of it to any end whatsoever, much less by the applying of it to a profane or common end, be it more or less weighty.

Neither is a Lot holy by any divine institution; since every such institution must have warrant from some word; and there cannot be produced any word of institution, whereby Lots are specially sanctified and set apart to such uses as may bring them within the compass of things holy and sacred. If any particular Lots have at some time been so used, that can no more impart holiness to all Lots in general, than the religious use of water in Baptism, yea in the Baptism of our Savior, and the sacred use of bread and wine in the Lord's Supper can make all water, or all bread and wine in general to be holy, and so consequently debar men of the ordinary and common use of those creatures either for the necessity of nature or for lawful delight.

Those therefore are amiss that allow Lots in game, and yet add for a Caution, that great reverence and religiousness be used in the action; in regard that Holy things must be done in holy manner. For if Lots in general, even civil as well as sacred, be holy things, they may in no case with no Caution be made matter of sport and pastime, or of gamesome recreation; nor can the light use of them be so corrected and qualified, but that it will-have deadly poison even in the heart and pith of it, not adhering or cleaving unto the bark or outside of it only. But civil Lots are not such; and therefore the lusorious use of them is not the profaning of any holy thing. And if neither the unhallowing of anything hallowed, nor the hallowing of anything unhallowed, then can it not be brought within compass of impiety or sin against the first Table▪ And if it be cleared from all sin against the first Table, and be not charged by any with any sin against the second Table; it must needs rest discharged of all sin in general, and consequently be justified as agreeable to God's word.

I proceed to his third Reason, p. 131. Which is this:

If the use of Lots in game be of it self evil, then must it needs be a sin either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charity in the second.

But the use of Lots in game is not of it self a sin against either Piety or Charity.

Therefore it must be justified as agreeable to God's word.

The Assumption is proved thus:

No man auoweth the use of a Lot in Game (as it is a Lot) to be against Charity: and a lusorious Lot is not the profaning of anything hallowed by any divine Institution, from the word, to any holy use. Therefore not against Piety. Indeed if Lots be holy, they may in no case be made matter of sport.

I could wish that M ^r . B. had dealt in this business as fairly with me, as I have done with him: that he would have given me leave at least to tell my tale in mine own words. The best is, mine own Text before related will help both to show what mine Arguments are, and how maimedly by M ^r . B. they are ever propounded. But to the point.

I. B.

Here I observe one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the second Reason, to wit, The Conclusion containeth more than the premises. For the Conclusion saith, A Lot in game is agreeable to God's word, and then it must be good of it self, which is more than not evil of it self. For that is good of it self, for doing whereof there is either precept or permission in God's word, p. 137.

T. G.

And, good Reader, be pleased to look back to what was before answered to this frivolous exception. For I am even weary of these cole-worts served in so oft. And take along with thee, I pray thee, also M ^r . B ^s . sauce that he setteth on with them, (if thou findest anymore savor than I can in it) to give them the better relish.

I. B.

But to the Assumption and proof thereof I answer; That the use of a Lot in Game is of it self a sin against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by divine institution from the word: as shall be manifested hereafter.

T. G.

Well, till that hereafter come then, mine Argument standeth good.

I. B.

Yet here I think fit briefly to show two things. One is, That an Oath is hallowed to make an holy use of the testifying presence of God. So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy use of the determining presence of God. If M ^r . G. deny a Lot to be holy, except it have a more remote holy use: I say, He may as well deny an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of this point in my second Reply.

T. G.

What M ^r . B. meaneth by all this I do not well understand: save that he beggeth the Question pitifully, and applieth nothing of all this at all to mine Argument, or any part of it. Yet a word or two to it.

1. The Question is, utrum sit, and M ^r . B. telleth us here quorsum sit. The Question is, whether Lots be hallowed or no: and M ^r . B. telleth us to what end they be hallowed; presupposing that, that being in question is to be proved.

2. He telleth us that an Oath is hallowed: What needs it? It is holy of it own nature and in it self: as the very definition of it it self will show. And a man may as well say, that prayer is hallowed to make an holy use of the inuocating of the name of God, as that an Oath is hallowed to make an holy use of the testifying presence of God; or rather of calling in the testifying presence of God; if we regard the true nature of an Oath. But so is not a Lot: they are nothing therefore alike.

I. B.

The other is, That use of a Lot is against Piety, which is (I say not [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the word. For it is without faith: therefore a sin, yea impiety. So disputeth M ^r . G. against a diuinatorie Lot, pag. 313. and so do I against a lusorious Lot.

T. G.

Here we return to our old cole-worts again, which, I see, will still be thrust upon us, and we must not refuse, unless we will seem to say nothing to that that M ^r . B. saith to little purpose so oft.

1. Here is the distinction revived again between not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let M ^r . B. remember what he set us on, when he served in the same before in effect: That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoever is good is warranted; whatsoever is permitted is good: whatsoever is not forbidden is permitted: whatsoever therefore is not forbidden, is warranted. But observe what consequents will follow upon this conceit of M ^r . B ^s . to wit, that Some things that are not evil, (for nothing is evil, that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by God's word: Some things that are against no part of God's Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are sins; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin; and whatsoever is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Divinity; and such it may be, as M ^r . B. scarce dreamed of when he delivered this: and yet follow they necessarily upon the same.

2. M ^r . B. passing by, as his manner is, the proof of mine Assumption before denied by him, disputeth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let us hear his Argument:

That use of a Lot is against Piety, that is not warranted by the word. But the use of a Lot in Game is not warranted by the word: Therefore it is against piety.

The Assumption which he should prove especially, he proveth not at all.

The Proposition, which indeed is unsound also, he proveth sorily thus:

Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, yea impiety. Whatsoever▪ is not warranted by the word, is not of faith: Whatsoever therefore is not warranted by the word, is against Piety.

The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charity, the one comprehending the sum of the first Table distinct from the second, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offenses properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogism granted nothing hurteth me.

3. How I dispute against a Diuinatorie Lot, I have before shown. Let M ^r . B. prove his Assumption above of the one, as I have done of the other, and I will yield him the lawfulness of them alike.

I. B.

If then a lawful Lot be holy, it is, saith M ^r . G. in no case to be made matter of sport.

T. G.

What meaneth this then here? can any man tell? Or how is this inferred upon ought that went before? Or what if M ^r . G. say so? What doth that avail M ^r . B. unless he can prove it so to be? A supposition, we say, giveth no being to ought. Let M ^r . B. assume, and make good his Assumption; and all will soon be at an end.

I. B.

Nay, I may make yet more advantage. For I may say; That maintaining the use thereof in Gaming, as it is a Lot, by practice, much more by writing, is against Charity, as well as against Piety. For so a weak brother is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against, that brother being occasioned, by error of judgment, to stumble. I have this reasoning from M ^r . G. himself, p. 255.

T. G.

M ^r . B. I see, is half weary of his work, that giveth still but a short snatch at it, and then starting aside from it, as the Egyptian Dogs use to do, drinking in Nile, runneth out into by-matters that nothing concern it.

The Question is, whether a Lot used in game, as it is a Lot, be against Charity or no. M ^r . B. proveth it is, because some weak ones are thereby scandalized, as if the use of every Lot in Game, whether in private, or in presence of others, strong or weak, must needs of necessity ever scandalize one or another; or as if the scandal, when such were either taken or given, did not arise either from the inconsiderate act of the one, or the erroneous conceit, caused it may be by M ^r . B. of the other, or from both, and not from the Nature of the Lot so used it self. By M ^r . B ^s . rule, to eat flesh as it is flesh (to speak as he speaketh) or to eat it upon such a day as it is such a day, shall be against Charity, and of it self evil, because some, and not a few, are at some time scandalized thereat.

But I have sinned against Charity by writing my Book. M ^r . B. of all other should not charge me therewith; for who seeth not, that in this Cause he will be deemed as a party? He writeth against the use of a Lot in Game, and thereby seeketh to possess men's minds with a superstitious conceit of it, which if another seek to remove and ease men's minds of, he condemneth them of breach of Charity, sinning the mean while therein, though (I persuade myself) ignorantly, both against Piety and Charity, and ministering thereby the cause of the scandal himself. Yea, observe, I pray you, M ^r . B ^s . dealing in this business. He seemeth in his Epistle Dedicatorie to be doubtful whether he err or no, & affirmeth that he would be glad to understand it, if he do. And yet no sooner is any man's mouth open to debate the matter with him, but he crieth out by and by, that they sin against Charity, in offering to justify a lusorie Lot.

If it be indeed a breach of Charity to discover a gross error, and to endeavor to remove a scandal, by satisfying the minds, and better informing the judgments of those that are therefore scandalized because misinformed, I then confess myself guilty herein. If not, let the blame lie on the heads of those that at first caused the scandal, and of those that will causelessly take scandal at those that seek to remove it.

The fourth Argument.

A Fourth Argument may be taken from the benefit of Christian liberty, by virtue whereof every Christian man hath a free use of all God's good creatures to employ them unto such purposes as by any natural power they are enabled unto, within the bounds above mentioned. But in these ordinary, civil and diuisorie Lots, be they serious or lu •… orious, the creatu •… e is used to no other end or use, but what it hath a natural power unto, and such as by the mutual consent and agreement of those that use it, it may be enabled to effect. For it is in the natural power of the creature used to move or to be moved diversely, and uncertainly in regard of those that make use of it: and it is further in the power of it by their mutual agreement to determine such matters as are ordinarily wont to be determined thereby. Which therefore so long as the use of it is kept otherwise free from superstition and impiety, or from injustice and dishonesty, ought no more to be exiled from a Christian man's recreations, than any other creature or ordinance whatsoever that hath any natural power to delight and give contentment in that kind.

Now then with some comfort I proceed to the fourth Argument, as M ^r . G. calleth it, p. 134.

By virtue of Christian liberty, every Christian man hath a free use of all God's good creatures, to employ them unto such purposes as by any natural power they are enabled unto.

But in lusorious Lots the creature is used to no other end or use, but what it hath a natural power unto, and such as by the mutual consent and agreement of those that use it, it may be enabled to effect.

Therefore it is no more to be exiled from a Christian man's recreation, than any other creature that hath any power to delight.

With this Argument M ^r . B. dealeth just as with the first. He leaveth out (that he may by that means find matter to work upon) those words in the Proposition, within the bounds above-mentioned, that is, so that the same be not either against Piety, or Charity, (which had been in the former Argument insisted on;) or more particularly, as by way of further explication I add after (which M ^r . B. also omitteth) so that the same be kept free from superstition and impiety, (in regard of the first Table ) and from injustice and dishonesty (in regard of the second. ) So that the main ground of the Argument is this, that Man being by God made Lord of the inferior creatures; and that his right and interest in them being restored again to each Christian by his interest in Christ, the heir of all things, he hath free liberty to use any of God's good creatures to such ends and purposes as by nature they are enabled unto, the same being within compass of the bounds beforementioned.

True it is that Calvin from whom I take this Proposition, delivereth it more indefinitely, and somewhat after that manner as M ^r . B. here propoundeth: as the Apostle also doth the like in some places, where he saith; All things are lawful: and, To the pure all things are pure: and, I know, and am assured that nothing of it self is unclean, &c. But his meaning ( which ought to be regarded) is apparent to be the same with that that I say; and being so conceived, it is sound and true, and of good use for direction in the warrantable use of the Creature. Neither do I suppose that M ^r . B. will be able to give any other good reason, why he may lawfully use starch for the stifning of his band, or a flint and a steel to strike fire withal, or a spit to roast his meat with, or cord to girt his bed with, or feathers to lie on, or arrows to shoot with, &c. save this, that these Creatures have a natural power thereunto; and God hath vouchsafed us the use of his Creatures for such purposes as by nature they are enabled unto, so that the same be conditioned as was before said. But let us consider what M ^r . B. objecteth against this.

I. B.

So general and eager is the pursuit after Liberty in this licentious age, that a godly and charitable Christian, much more being a Minister, ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any, much less too too many, to make liberty a cloak of naughtiness.

T. G.

Such a godly, charitable, Christian Minister as M ^r . B. deciphereth here, was M ^r . Calvin, and one, I doubt not, wary of straining Christian liberty beyond its due extent: and yet speaketh he no otherwise than M ^r . G. here doth, or rather not so cautelously as M ^r . G. doth; as the Margine showeth, where his own words are alleged.

I. B.

But M ^r . G. speaketh of Christian liberty, not of licentiousness. Then let us consider what he saith. For both the premises of this Argument are flatly to be denied.

T. G.

When M ^r . B. saith, both the premises, his meaning is, not of mine Argument, but of this Argument, that is, of his own, for the one of them, to wit the Proposition, at least, as appeareth by the reason of his denial ann exed.

I. B.

For sundry good creatures have a natural power to impoison. But Christian liberty giveth us not free use thereof to impoison at pleasure.

T. G.

Nor do I say, or M ^r . Calvin mean that it doth. It giveth liberty to use such creatures for impoisoning, where that use is free from such taint as was formerly mentioned; as for the impoisoning, and (by impoisoning) destroying of vermin, &c. But how doth this instance touch my Proposition at all? As M ^r . B. propoundeth it peradventure it may. As I conceive it myself, I am sure, it doth not. Neither is my Proposition therefore denied, but another of M ^r . B ^s . own put in the room of it, nor any exception at all here taken to it. Let us proceed to see what to the Assumption he saith.

I. B.

Neither is it true that any creature hath a natural power to be a Lot, no more than a stone hath a natural power to be carried upward. For as a stone is carried upward by a power that is without it: so all creatures are moved and applied to be Lots by a power without them.

T. G.

Albeit this be nothing to that that I say, for I say not, that the creature hath a natural power to be a Lot, but that the creature in such a Lot is used to no other end or use, but what it hath a natural power unto. Yet is it most undoubtedly and undeniably true, that the creature that is used in a Lot hath a natural power to be made matter of a Lot; as a stone hath a natural power to be driven upward: else could not either of them by any Art or human power be effected with either, nor without some supernatural work. So that to the Assumption also rightly understood here is nothing at all said.

I. B.

God keep me from teaching that Christian liberty warranteth the unlawful use of any Creature, whatsoever natural power it hath to that use.

T. G.

Nor is any such thing here taught, either by me, or M ^r . Calvin either, if his words be rightly understood.

I. B.

If any Creature have any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be used unto Lotterie, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such use thereof.

T. G.

This is but a denial of the Conclusion; and a plain begging of the point in Question: which is this, whether a Lot in game be (how, but by God's word?) allowable.

I. B.

To the enforcing of the Conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, it is a begging of the Question. For though a Dog having a natural power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation: yet ought a Lotcreature to be, for reasons given, and to be given, or rather defended hereafter.

T. G.

What reason hath been already given, we have seen; what will be, we shall further then see, when it is. But mean while I would gladly understand from M ^r . B. (since he hath pleased to propound this instance ) what reason he can give why a man may lawfully use an Hound or Spaniel to hunt with, other than before of the like was rendered. As for the supposed confirmation of the Assumption, what he understandeth thereby, I know not, unless he mean the illustration of the Conclusion: which, by his instance, it seemeth, he doth. For to that that is brought indeed for the proof of it, here is not a word. So that, neither is my Proposition touched, nor either the Assumption it self, or the proof of it dealt with: the Conclusion only is denied; and the illustration of it propounded as a confirmation of the Assumption, which it hath nothing to do with.

The fifth Argument.

A Fifth Argument may be drawn from the grounds and grants even of those that oppose in this point; and may be framed on this wise. Any thing indifferent is lawful matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing indifferent: Lottery therefore may be made lawful matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by their definition of recreation, to wit, Christian recreation is the exercise of something indifferent for the necessary refreshing of body or mind.

The Assumption, namely, that Lottery is a thing in it own nature indifferent, is thus proved likewise by their definition of things in nature indifferent. Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to use it, but as we shall find it in Christian wisdom beneficial or hurtful unto us. But such is Lotterie, or the use of Lots; not simply commanded, (for that of Solomon before alleged is rather a permission than a precept, or not so much a commandment as an advice and counsel, commending that to us as a wise and prudent course, not enjoining or imposing it as a duty necessary to be done, seeing by other courses beside it such controversies may without sin be composed as are there mentioned, and that effected oft by other means without a Lot, for which a Lot by Solomon is there allowed▪) nor again anywhere forbidden or condemned as evil in it self: by the former definition therefore consequently indifferent, and so lawful matter of Christian recreation and delight.

I. B.

Now then to a fifth Argument à concessis, as M ^r . G. termeth it, p. 135.

Any thing indifferent is lawful matter of recreation. But Lottery is a thing indifferent. Lotterie therefore may be made lawful matter of disport.

The Proposition is confirmed by the words of M ^r . Fennor. Christian, saith he, recreation is the exercise of something indifferent for the necessary refreshing of body or mind.

The Assumption is also proved by M ^r . Fennor.

Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to use it. But such is Lotterie, saith M ^r . G. Not simply commanded. For Prov. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept: or, Not so much a commandment, as an advice commending that as a prudent course. Nor anywhere forbidden as evil in it self.

This is indeed the effect and main sum of mine Argument, though some inforcements of it be omitted. Let us hear M ^r . B ^s . answer.

I. B.

M ^r . Fennors book, from which these allegations be drawn, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be used in sport, doth prove that lusorious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What help then hath M ^r . G. from M ^r . Fennors grants?

T. G.

Much every way. For no testimony is stronger than that that the adverse party giveth against himself. If the grounds granted by him that holdeth and laboreth to prove a lusorious Lot unlawful, be of sufficient validity to prove them lawful and allowable, it is a matter of no small moment. Else why doth M ^r . B. himself in his Dialogue reason from Peter Martyrs grants against Peter Martyr?

I. B.

And his own proofs help him as little.

T. G.

I need none, when mine Adversary speaketh enough for me.

I. B.

For it is granted, that if Lotterie be either commanded or forbidden, it is not indifferent. To pass by the former: only observing, that M ^r . G. doth not absolutely deny it to be commanded, Prouerb. 18. 18.

T. G.

Though he do not deny absolutely, that it is at all commanded, yet he doth deny, that it is simply and absolutely commanded: For that that we are advised to do rather than some other thing, that we are not simply enjoined; which kind of injunction M ^r . Fennor seuereth from things indifferent. And that which among many other lawful courses is commended unto us, as behooveful and useful, is not therefore either simply or absolutely enjoined, yea or at all, where such other may be had.

I. B.

I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appear evidently, that a lusorious Lot is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent.

T. G.

How evidently this will there appear, shall then appear, when the Reply cometh to be discussed. Mean while M ^r . B. here denieth only the Conclusion of my Syllogism. For the second branch of the Assumption, to wit, that a Lot is a thing simply forbidden, (which he would seem to deny, and should deny and disprove if he did ought) he neither here opposeth, nor in his Dialogue or Reply, doth he either defend, much less make good, but maintaineth the contrary rather, that in some cases it is allowable, which it were not, if it were simply forbidden, and so absolutely evil. The Argument therefore from M ^r . Fennor his Teachers grounds standeth good, if his grounds at least be good.

I. B.

But to speak a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by just consequence, as that which is expressly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by just consequence, as that which is expressly permitted. M ^r . G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) deny the former. Again, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoever it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expressly or by just consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as have relation to God, ought to have some warrant from the word. If M ^r . G. put me to prove this, I dare undertake to prove it demonstratively. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawful, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or evil, and she wing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, he determineth the point thus. Nevertheless most true it is, That no particular moral action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the Rules of God's holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why M ^r . G. should say here, Lotterie in game is not anywhere forbidden as evil of it self? That is good of it self which is either commanded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is evil of it self that is forbidden.

T. G.

M ^r . B. having no more to say to the substance of mine Argument, falleth to quarrel again with some terms used in it. A good thing, they say, may do well twice or thrice. But such frivolous exceptions so frequently inculcated, and so tediously prosecuted, cannot but tire the patientest Reader that is.

He maruelleth much (falling into his wonted vein of vain wonderment again) why I should here say, that Lotterie in game is not simply forbidden as evil of it self. I might well ask where I say it: not that I might not well so say, but because I nowhere here say it. But as I said at first, if M ^r . B. might have the framing of my Arguments, they should iudiciously be framed. The Minor should not be part of the Conclusion, as he speaketh elsewhere; but the whole Conclusion or the effect of it should be part of the Minor, or at least of the proof of it. I say therefore in mine Assumption, or rather in the proof of one part of it, not that Lotterie in game is this or that; (it belongeth to my Conclusion to tell what it is) but that Lotterie in general is not simply forbidden ac evil of it self. And my reason (which I rendered of the like before) why I speak so, is; because a thing though not evil simply of it self, yet may be sometime forbidden in regard of some abuse necessarily then annexed thereunto, or some other evil necessarily ensuing thereupon; and may therefore though not simply and absolutely, yet in that respect and in such case be forbidden. That is good of it self, that is commanded or permitted; and yet by circumstances or manner of doing may be marred. And that is evil of it self that is simply forbidden, so as by no manner of doing, it can be made good. But that is not evil of it self, that being of it self good is by evil handling of it marred. A man might well wonder that any mean Christian, much more a grave Minister should wonder to hear some things said to be forbidden as evil of or in themselves; or not be able to distinguish between things simply evil of themselves, and things evil in regard of some consequence only. I might here make use of that School distinction, some things prohibited because simply evil, some things evil only because prohibited. But of these things more than enough, unless they were more to our purpose than they are.

I. B.

It grieveth my soul to see what a wide door to lusorious Lotterie this doctrine will make. For now Lot-mongers will chop Logic, and say, What if a lusorious Lot be forbidden by just consequence, yet they are not forbidden as evil in themselves, and therefore they are indifferent.

T. G.

And it grieveth my soul to see M ^r . B. to trifle so seriously or so sadly rather, and to fight thus with fearful shadows and fancies of his own framing. Where reach I any on this wise to argue? Or what difference enfueth from ought I say between that which is forbidden expressly, and that which by just consequence is forbidden? That which is forbidden simply by just consequence, is simply evil; that which respectively, is so evil only, and not otherwise. But what if no Gamester, but some honest and good Christian being reproved by M ^r . B. for holding two pawns in his hands, and bidding his Adversary choose to determine who shall lead, alleging all Lot-games by just consequence to be condemned in God's word; should tell him, that though Lot-games may in some case or in some kind by just consequence be forbidden, yet they are not forbidden simply or as evil in themselves, and that they are therefore of themselves indifferent. I know not well, how M ^r . B. will be able to answer him. For to say that whatsoever is by just consequence out of God's word in any sort forbidden is simply and of it self evil, were senseless. Since that nothing can be in any sort evil, otherwise than as it is forbidden.

The sixth Argument.

SIxtly and lastly, that the use of Lots in Game is not against God's word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, may appear by this Argument. Where the wisdom of God in his word hath not determined the matter, and the manner, or the other circumstances of a thing lawful in it self, there they are left to man's discretion and wisdom. Else should we hang ever in perpetual suspense, having no rule at all to direct us by in them. And where they are left thus to man's discretion and wisdom, there is warrant sufficient for any circumstance that man shall make choice of (the Magistrate publicly to enjoin, or private persons to practice) that shall not be against the general rules of God's word concerning the same.

For the better conceiving of this point, it is to be considered, that for the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of God's word: and a man must know that he hath warrant thence, because Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. I say, where natural reason doth not of it self afford sufficient direction; for the word is given us in moral matters to supply the defects of it caused by our first Parents their fall; neither doth it abridge us of the help and use of it for direction in such actions, but add a further and fuller help thereunto.

First then for the act it self in general; that is of it self good and lawful, and allowable by God's Law, for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission in God's word, and that either direct and express, or collected by just consequence: if a precept, it is necessary and must be done; if permission only, it is indifferent and may be done or not done, as shall seem good to the party whom it concerneth.

Secondly, for the subject matter, the manner of it, and other such circumstances, where they are by God's word determined, there such only are lawful as the word of God hath enjoined.

Where they are not determined, there all such are lawful as the same word doth not forbid. In the former that rule holdeth, He that is not with me, is against me: in the latter that other, He that is not against me, is with me. Thus for sacrifice and the place of it, before it was determined, it was lawful in any place, because no certain place was designed: but after it was once determined, it was lawful in no place but that alone, that God had expressly thereunto assigned. So for the Passover and other offerings, and the time and season of either, the ordinary sacrifices (I mean the voluntary or free-will offerings) might be offered at any time, because for them was no time determined: but the Passover might be celebrated only at one time, because the time of it was determined.

This would the rather be observed for the readier answering of some frivolous objections made by some Separatists; What warrant, say they, have you to use this or that form of prayer, or to pray upon a book? I answer; It is warrant sufficient that we are enjoined to use prayer, and such kind of prayer, confession of sin, and supplication for pardon, &c. no set form thereof determined; therefore any fit form warrantable: this form that we use, not unfit otherwise; this form therefore allowable. And let a man demand of one of them when he prayeth, what warrant he hath to use that form that he then useth, he can answer no otherwise; or if in effect otherwise, he shall answer otherwise than well. So for a book; the means of help are not determined; and this one among others; this therefore not unwarrantable. And if one of them should be asked, how he proveth it warrantable to use a printed book to read on in the Church; he shall not be able to make other answer than as before: for neither precept nor practice can be found in the word for the use of a thing that was not known in those times wherein the word of God was written.

But to apply this to the present. First, Recreation in general is granted by all to have good warrant from God's word, as a thing both allowed by permission, and enjoined by precept, if not directly and expressly, yet at least by just consequence: and therefore I will not stand upon the proof of it.

Secondly, for the matter and manner of it, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selves, there is nothing determined; any means therefore of recreation that are not against the general Rules of comeliness and decency, of conveniency and expediency, of religion and piety, and the like, are by the word of God allowed, and have from thence sufficient warrant. For example; If question be whether Boules or Chess be lawful or no: what can there be said in justification o •… them more than this, that recreation in general is by God's word allowed; the matter of it in particular not determined: these games not prohibited; therefore lawful and allowable. Now the very same may be said of Lots and Lotterie. Game in general is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawful that is not against the general rules of God's word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable.

If any shall say, that the particular matter or manner of recreation is determined, he must show where. Or if any shall say, that this particular by Lots is against the general rules of God's word otherwise, he must show which and how. Otherwise there is no civil action almost that shall be justifiable, as going in doublet and hose, wearing band and cuffs, carrying a man's purse in his pocket, sitting on a stool at the Table, crossing the water in a Boat when one may go about by the Bridge, eating of Porke, bloudings or ought strangled, and the like, if it shall be deemed enough to make an action unwarrantable, either because there is no particular precept or precedent for it in Scripture, or because it is questioned or condemned by some without any reason or sufficient cause rendered why it should be questioned and condemned in that sort.

And so I conclude and leave this sixth and last reason, taken from the common grounds of other ordinary recreations not questioned; which must all with this either stand or fall; the self-fame grounds supporting either; that this particular is not prohibited▪ nor is against the general rules of God's word otherwise; which as in the former; so in this case must stand good, till the contrary can be proved.

Now to come to M ^r . G ^s . last Reason, which like an Orator he amplifieth, to leave a deep impression behind. But let it be well considered, as in it self, so whether it prove that the use of Lots in Game is not against God's word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, p. 136.

What Rhetorical amplifications M ^r . B. findeth in this Argument, those may well wonder, that know what Rhetorical Amplifications are. But be it Logical or Rhetorical, hear, I pray you, not it, but one that M ^r . B. hath put into the room of it.

I. B.

It is this. Where the wisdom of God hath not determined the subject Matter, the Manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawful in it self, there all such are lawful as the word doth not forbid; and as no Circumstance that a man shall make choice of, shall be against the general Rules of the word concerning the same.

But a Lot is a thing lawful in it self, and the Subject matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by God's word, nor against the general rules.

Therefore a Lot in Game is not prohibited, nor is against the general rules of God's word otherwise.

T. G.

He that should thus reason, were worthy either to be sent to Bedlem, or to be begged in the Court of Wards. Nor is mine this, nor is this mine, unless I be out of my right wits. How they differ (not to be over-tedious) may appear by my words, where having more largely discoursed of and discussed the several parts of it, I thus briefly recollect it: Game in general is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawful that is not against the general rules of God's word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable. Where prefix M ^r . B ^s . proposition, only so knit as it may hang a little more handsomely together, turning, and as, into, so as, (which so framed I own) and you have two entire Syllogisms, and the main sum of mine Argument.

I. B.

The Proposition he confirmeth:

First, touching a thing lawful in it self, by showing that Act to be lawful in it self, which in God's word is either commanded or permitted expressly, or by just consequence.

T. G.

This is an explication indeed of one term used in it: no confirmation of the Proposition, nor so propounded.

I. B.

Secondly, touching the manner, &c. by proving the rest of the Proposition, which he endevoreth to perform,

1. By the authority of Calvin.

2. By Luk. 9. 50. 3. By a gloss. 4. By showing that the circumstance of time for free-will offerings being not determined, they might have been offered at any time; and Sacrifices: might have been in any place before a certain place was determined.

T. G.

M ^r . B. here maketh me much more plentiful in proofs than I am: as shall appear further in his Answer, and mine thereunto.

I. B.

Thirdly, touching the doing of every Act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, by showing, that if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, then must warrant be had out of God's word, because, Whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Which word is given us in moral matters to supply the defect of it caused by our first Parents their fall. Neither doth the word abridge us of the help and use of natural reason for direction in such actions.

T. G.

This is indeed all alleged for the clearing of my Proposition▪ not for the proof of any part.

I. B.

The Assumption is thus proved. Recreation in general is warranted from the word as permitted and enjoined, if not expressly yet by just consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selves, there is nothing determined. Therefore any means that are not against the general Rules of Comelinesse, and decency, Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. of conveniency and expediency, 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14 21. of religion and piety, 1 Cor. 16. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. and the like, are by the word of God allowed.

T. G.

This proof and the Assumption by M ^r . B. before assigned me (to wit, But a Lot is a thing lawful in it self, and the subject matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by God's word, nor against the general Rules ) hang together, as we say, like harp and harrow. He would make the world believe, that M ^r . G. is a strange man, that bringeth that to prove this.

But his Answer ensueth.

I. B.

I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordi •… ns knot with one chop, and say, The use of Lots in Game is forbidden in the word, referring myself to what I have and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answer more particularly, not doubting but that the Proverb may now prove true, viz. In many words there cannot want iniquity.

T. G.

Why doth M ^r . B. use so many words then ere he come to the matter? But the Iniquity he meaneth is on my part: let us see it. For here, it seemeth, is the rank poison, the blasphemy that M ^r . B. observed in my Book.

I. B.

First, I observe fearful shifting, and then unsound arguing. The former thus appeareth: He supposeth the thing must be lawful in it self, and disputeth only about the subject matter, &c.

T. G.

True, I presume Recreation to be lawful in general. Dare M ^r . B. or any man deny it? And yet I presume it not without proof neither. But you must remember that M ^r . B. here sighteth not with me or mine Argument, but ^f with a man of straw of his own making. In his Assumption this is presumed of Lotterie: whereas I presume it of recreation, not of it.

I. B.

Again in the introduction he saith; The use of Lots in game is not against God's word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position, That is against the word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it. But in the Proposition of the main Argument his ground is, Such things are lawful, which the word dot •… not forbid. Four of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his Conclusion is answerable. Is not this a fearful shifting course of reasoning?

T. G.

This then, it seemeth, is one point of that fearful shifting that M ^r . B. chargeth me with. Concerning which enough hath already been said; for this is no new exception. And though the words be not thus generally propounded in my Proposition, as M ^r . B. himself propoundeth it: Yet there is no contradiction between these two: since that Whatsoever is not forbidden in God's word, is by the same word warranted. What proofs he dreameth of shall hereafter appear.

I. B.

Touching the Proposition of his main Argument, I marvel why M ^r . G. avouching such subject matter &c. to be lawful as are not forbidden, limiteth this Assertion with these words (of a thing lawful in it self.) As if such a thing may warrant our retchlesnesse in and about the subject matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, love Aduerbs. An Oath is a thing lawful in it self. Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subject matter &c. be agreeable to the word of GOD?

I. B.

Why I insert those words into mine Assertion, may easily appear to any that will not willfully shut his eyes: because my dispute is concerning Recreation, a thing granted to be such, and the Question only about the subject matter of it. And so far are my words from implying any such matter, as M ^r . B. here thence would infer, that I say in express terms, that As well for the doing of every act, as for the doing of it in this or that manner there must be warrant had out of God's word .

But I marvel much more at this ground, Such things are lawful as the word doth not forbid. I set it down thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted: and therefore the subject matter &c. of a thing lawful in it self. I marvel, I say, because M ^r . G. confirmeth a thing or act it self to be lawful in it self, if it be in the word, either commanded, or permitted expressly, or by just consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so clear a truth, that (me thinks) M ^r . G. cannot, but in proportion of reason, if he believe the word to be perfect unto every good work, hold all things to be unlawful, which are not lawful one of these two ways; and the rather because he peremptorily affirmeth, p. 95. All particular moral actions, be they never so indifferent, to be either conformable or disconformable to God's word; and, by particular actions he meaneth Actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that M ^r . G. would hold to this doctrine! Then should he thereby provoke all who make conscience of their ways, and do truth (that is, do good works sincerely) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary, if he bring not disciples, to the Law and Testimony, by doctrine according to the word; but writh from it, by teaching that to be lawful, which is not forbidden; as therein this light faileth, so thereby he shall make men careless to seek for their warrant, and willful to seek after their own heart and eyes, after which they go a whoring.

T. G.

Here is a long and sore accusation; which might all well without any one word more be answered, only by pointing the finger to what formerly was said. But because M ^r . B. so much presseth me, I will entreat the Readers patience for a little further discussion of what is here objected. All I say here is this, that Where the circumstances of Actions in themselves lawful are not determined in the word, all such are lawful as are not in the same word forbidden, or as are not against the general rules of the said word of God otherwise. And is it not strange that this Assertion should to M ^r . B. seem so strange? Or is this any writhing from the rule of God's word? Yea but I cross myself else-where in it. For I say else-where that such things are lawful as are in God's word either commanded or permitted either expressly or by just consequence. I say so indeed: and what contradiction is there between these two? For is not that by just consequence permitted, that is not prohibited? Yea, (since we are come to these precise terms) that is, neither expressly nor by just consequence prohibited? For I am sure M ^r . B. will not deny that to be prohibited, as well that is by just consequence prohibited, as that is prohibited in express terms. Either M ^r . B. then must give us some medium between permission and non prohibition, or else these two positions will have very friendly agreement. Yea but M ^r . G. himself may seem to assign some when he saith, that in circumstances determined, there is no permission, though no prohibition be of any other. I answer in a word, that the very stinting of an action to those circumstances is a virtual prohibition of all other not expressed, albeit no exclusive particle in the injunction be adjoined. For example, when God bid Abraham take Isaac and sacrifice him on an hill that he should show him: it was as effectual a prohibition of sacrificing him in any other place but on an hill, and on any other hill but that hill, as if God had said expressly (as he doth of the Jews sacrificing, in the place that I assign and not elsewhere) upon that hill, and upon no other: And the reason is apparent; because that commandment could not be fulfilled if any branch of it, whereof the precise place was one, were broken. This is that then that I say, that where the circumstances of actions are stinted, there those only that are enjoined in special are lawful: where they are not, any are permitted, that are conformable to the general rules of direction given in God's word. Against which in this whole heap of words M ^r . B. bringeth nothing, but another of mine own assertions, which no whit crosseth it, his well wishes only ( which might well have been spared) set apart.

I. B.

Well, let us examine his confirmations.

First M ^r . Calvin's testimony in English is this. [When the Scripture delivereth general rules of a lawful use, the use is to be limited according to them.] From hence M ^r . G. concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choice of, that is not against those rules. M ^r . Calvin speaketh of an Use, and of an Use do we dispute. M ^r . G. concludeth a circumstance. M ^r . Calvin saith, according. M ^r . G. concludeth, not against. Is this sound arguing?

It is true that I quote a sentence of M ^r . Calvin's in the margin, as concurring with me in one clause against which it is quoted. And I might ask why M ^r . B. did not take notice of him a little before as well as he here doth. But that I frame any Argument at all out of him, much less ground that I deliver upon his or any other man's authority, is untrue. As for the differences between him and me herein by M ^r . B. here imagined, they are very silly and frivolous. For first of all, doth not the use of a thing consist in the circumstances of it, as in the manner of using, and the like? Or what doth Calvin mean by the limiting of the use by those general rules, but the assigning of it such circumstances as those rules give allowance of. Many, saith he, take for granted, which yet I yield them not, that th •… our liberty is by no qualification to be restrained, but that it is to be left to every man's conscience, to usurp so much of it as to himself seemeth lawful. I confess indeed that men's consciences neither can nor ought to be tied herein to certain precise forms of laws: but since that the Scripture delivereth general Rules of the lawful use of them, according to those is it to be limited of us. Where M ^r . Calvin saith plainly, that for the use of the outward necessaries of this life, (whereof recreation is one) there can no special precise rules be given out of God's word, but it is sufficient for them that we be directed in the use of them by such general directions as the same word doth afford; which is all that I say. Yea he extendeth this afterward to the very matter of our meat, drink and apparel, where he falleth upon the same point again.

Yea but Calvin saith, according, and M ^r . G. not against. M ^r . B. is very curious, that can find a knot in a bulrush. If those general rules be not violated, are they not observed? if there be nothing done against them, how are they violated? if nothing then be done against them, they are undoubtedly observed. It is all one therefore in effect to be according to them, and not against them; and M ^r . B ^s . exception consequently idle.

I. B.

Is the second confirmation from Luk. 9. 50. much better? The words set down by M ^r . G. be these, [He that is not against me is with me.] This place (forsooth) is a Rule holding in the Subject Matter, &c. determined. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against me, Matth. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subject-matter, &c. determined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not M ^r . G ^s . conceit be the same touching things or actions? But let us see whether the conceit be not a be misted fantasy. In the former place Christ's words are occasioned by his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Devils in Christ's Name. Forbid him not, saith Christ, for, He that is not against me is with me. In the latter place Christ spake those words upon occasion of the Pharisees their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions together, this indeed is the sum. All men are either with or against Christ, for there be no Neutrals. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat is a sheep; and he that is not a sheep is a goat. But M ^r . G ^s . argument is this: All men who are not against Christ are with him. Therefore circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawful. Is this sound arguing?

T. G.

And where, I pray you, doth M ^r . G. argue on this manner? But M ^r . B. frameth me Arguments at his pleasure: And then pleaseth himself in finding faults in them; as if their defects concerned me, and not rather himself, who either must father them, or I know none else that will. For his exposition of those places, to let pass what exception might well be taken thereunto, because it is not to the purpose. It is untrue, that I produce them for confirmation of ought that I had before delivered. I imply only that the distinction I delivered (which may be extended also to things or actions, as well as their circumstances; but my dispute now was of these) might in those two Rules or Sentences be not unfitly conceived. And the truth is, I had a notion in my head then of somewhat to that purpose, that in a learned Noble-man's writings I had sometime read; which yet because I was not very certain of, nor had I the Book by me then, I forbare then to cite. The speeches are alleged as by him, so by me, not in way of Confirmation, but by way of Illustration and Allusion; as if I should have said, That rule which in another case our Savior giveth, holdeth well here. A course not unusual, in the writings of the learnedst and most religious. I allege them but as the Apostle doth those words of the Psalmist; Their sound is gone thorough all the earth, and their words unto the worlds ends. Concerning which, I dare not say as Jerome doth over-boldly on another occasion, that the Texts alleged by the Apostle sound one way in their own places, and another way in his allegations of them: because they are spoken of the dumb creatures publishing God's glory in the one place, of the Apostles preaching Christ's Gospel in the other. They agree well and make good harmony, since that the Apostle only alledgeth them by way of allusion, for illustration of the matter that there he dealeth in, not by way of illation or inference, for the confirmation of ought there delivered, or the concluding of ought from thence. The like do I here. And M ^r . B. may as well frame an Argument thus out of the Apostles words, The Psalmist saith, that the heavens preach God's glory to all the earth: therefore the Apostles have preached to the whole world: as extract such an Argument as he doth here out of my words.

I. B.

The third Confirmation is from a gloss. Here I remember an old saying, [A cursed gloss corrupteth the Text.] Now let us see whether M ^r . G. have any blessing by this gloss. The words whereof in English be these, [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note that it speaketh of things. Therefore it maketh as well for Actions, as for Circumstances. Is this Divinity? But what Law? If the civil Law, what is that to the point? Except M ^r . G. can prove the Civil Law to be a perfect Rule to us; and whatsoever it permitteth to be allowed of God. Howsoever (I say) this course of fetching proofs from any other Law than God's Law is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth unwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize Traditions of men, then for one that feareth God to walk in his ways. Is then this glossing sound arguing?

T. G.

Or rather is all this anymore than mere cavilling? To let M ^r . B ^s . grave notes upon this Gloss, and his serious inferences upon the allegation of it pass, wherein he maketh himself most ridiculous. All this ado is, because in the margin of my Book (which a Scholar may make use of) I allege out of the Glossers of the Civil Law, certain Rules that in their Law concur some with the one branch, some with the other of the distinction I there use. It is but as if one handling some point of Divinity about lawful and unlawful silence should say, In some cases that Rule of the Canon Law holdeth▪ Silence is deemed as consent: in other cases that other Rule, Silence is held no denial, and yet no consent neither: or determining how far forth the desire goeth for the deed, should say, In this case, that of the Civil Law holdeth, The Affection is punished, though it take not effect: in that case it holdeth not, but that other rather, The affection is not held faulty, if no effect follow. Which (forsooth) in M ^r . B ^s . conceit must needs therefore be one ground of the truth maintained, or else all is nothing worth. But he wanted better matter, it seemeth, to work upon.

I. B.

Hath the fourth Confirmation more validity in it than the rest? The former three proofs speak not directly of Circumstances according to the Proposition; (so doth M ^r . G. dispute ad idem) here he doth.

T. G.

How should I dispute ad idem, where I dispute not at all? And yet are those ad idem, for that whereunto they are alleged. But M ^r . B. now cometh out of the Margine into the Text again, wherein himself saith I do dispute to the purpose.

I. B.

Here then I inquire. If the circumstances of Time and Place, be at the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawful in it self, doth it follow thereupon, that the subject matter and manner be so too? If God allow anything to be done, of necessity there must be a time and place, when and where it may be done. Even when and where there is just occasion of the Act. It is to be observed, that as here, so in the Proposition it self M ^r . G. slideth from the subject matter, and manner, to circumstances only. Is not this fainting?

T. G.

Or rather is not this fopperie? M ^r . G. slideth from the subject matter and manner to circumstances only, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning indeed the subject matter, as M ^r . B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words do not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I join that word with them; Are not the subject matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and without the essence and substance of those things that they have reference unto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amiss, that refer the Place and the Subject matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a circumstance, I know not what is.

But if it be true of these, saith M ^r . B. that they are at the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawful in it self, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtless doth it; what reason can either M ^r . B. or any other show why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more stinted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawful in it self? This is another of M ^r . B ^s . spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to show his skill in conjuring them down again.

Yea but M ^r . B. can show you some difference between the one and the other. For, If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done. And must there not be Subject-matter and manner too? Or must not a man have warrant as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith M ^r . B. for I hope he will not deny that. Well what warrant then? It may be done when, and where there is just occasion of that act: and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is just occasion thereof offered? So that M ^r . B. denieth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some Circumstances; only he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are no Circumstances. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that warrant from the word is required for the one as well and as much as for the other.

But I leave this his frivolous beating the air: having only observed, how Mr. B. that was so diligent to hook in out of the Margine whatsoever he thought he might with any the least show of color, (though without any just occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it self that I press, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossibility, which by instances I show, of making particular actions good, or justifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue upon the denial hereof. Which I desire by the impartial and judicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I do, and taketh occasion thereby to deal with, and rather than he will let it pass, he will step aside into the Margine to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not go far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.

I. B.

Let us now proceed to that, which M ^r . G. writeth touching both the doing of every Act, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the word, if natural reason of it self afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearful shifting from the word is here? But why doth he join the doing it self of an Act with the manner thereof? I will tell you: even to make a way to his Assumption. For if he stick close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it self is lawful in it self, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expressly or by just consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his Assumption, that every Lot is not lawful in it self. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of natural reason, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he showeth no direction therein of natural reason either sufficient or insufficient.

T. G.

M ^r . B. here beginneth to bless himself; as if indeed some evil Spirit had appeared. This belike was the blasphemous matter that he met with in my Book. But he must not think with such scar-bugs to carry it away. He hath not ^t babes and children only to deal with. His judicious Readers will not be scared with such outcries, from scanning and discussing the things questioned; howsoever some simple, or some partial ones may.

Before he cometh to exagitate the blasphemous Assertion, to cast some dust in his Readers eyes, and breed some prejudice of the adverse party: he maketh Mr. G. no better than a Iugler, who foreseeing the weakness of something in the Assumption or second part of his Argument, laboreth with other by-matter to trouble the Readers head beforehand, that the same may not be discerned. And this was the cause, (as M ^r . B. peremptorily telleth you, having discovered the mist that I cast before my Readers eyes, and knowing my mind herein much better than I did or do myself) why I joined the doing it self of an Act with the manner thereof; and why I tell him of a supposed direction of natural reason. He had need of a long clew, that treadeth the maze of this wild and intricate discourse. But that it may appear in a word to the Reader, how sincerely M ^r . B. herein demeaneth himself: What is it in mine Assumption, that I made all this do about, for fear my Reader should discover the unsoundness of it? Forsooth that A Lot is lawful in it self. Which Proposition (though none of mine, and yet I deny it not neither) M. B. to oppose telleth us (in such language as I think no learned man beside himself would use) that Every Lot is not lawful in it self. But let that position be found in any part of mine Assumption, not as M ^r . B. frameth it, but as it is in my Book, and I will freely confess the whole accusation, that to this very end I did it whatsoever it was that M ^r . B. here saith I did; for I understand not well what it is. If no such thing be in it, with what Conscience can M ^r . B. say so peremptorily, that I did I know not what to keep my Reader from discerning that, or the default of that in it, that indeed is not there at all? And thus having cleared myself from such finister intention, as M ^r . B. here chargeth me with, and I not only had not, but could not have: let us proceed now to the point it self.

I. B.

But let us with fear and trembling consider M ^r . Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction.] Let us consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is given us, in moral matters to supply the defect of natural reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seek sufficient direction in moral matters from natural reason, before we consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times urged thus. I say, where natural reason doth not of it self afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from God's word, if in his persuasion he have sufficient direction from natural reason? Doth the Maxim of God's Spirit, quoted here by M ^r . G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sin,] intimate, that whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natural reason is of faith? Became natural reason only defective, and not corrupted also by our first Parents their fall? O God have mercy upon us! For I see that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against thee: for it is not subject to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why do I vex my soul with this fearful doctrine, seeing M ^r . G ^s . heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For at last he cometh to say: Neither doth the word abridge us of the help and use of natural Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authority (to wit, Of not abridging us of the help, &c.) given to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge us, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth give us leave to use the direction of natural reason in moral matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margent.

T. G.

The strange and fearful Position, as M ^r . B. conceiveth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliver it myself; For the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of God's word.

If the difference between these two be demanded; I answer:

First, M ^r . Bs. Proposition may seem to imply, that in any Act whatsoever sufficient direction may by natural Reason be afforded, (which I say not:) in mine only, that in some kind and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) M ^r . B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater prejudice to that that I hold.

Again, (wherein the most material difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to have warrant from God's word, (which I deny not but that every action ought to have) and another thing to have that warrant taken immediately out of it; as shall afterward appear. So that neither doth M ^r . B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor do I affirm what he here relareth.

Yet for the point, as M ^r . B. here propoundeth it, saving what he would seem to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the envy of; the Proposition it self containeth such an undeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with common sense, but will acknowledge it. For if Natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was even so with Adam in his original estate. If any truth undeniable then be fearful and strange then this position peradventure may be such; but not else.

But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deal not) that for the doing of every act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of God's word. If the question be demanded, why I speak in this manner, I answer, because many things in this kind are so clear and evident even to natural reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may vnanswerably and necessarily be thereby concluded; for which therefore a man need not further warrant out of the word; not that the warrant of God's word is in any wise needless; but that a man may thereby be well assured, that it hath warrant in God's word. For what is the word of God for moral things, but the perfection of true Reason, and a Sum or Body of that Law of Nature at first imprinted in man's soul? So that either it must be held that there are some things in the Law of God not agreeable to Reason; or else it must needs follow, that whatsoever is agreeable to the rules and grounds of true Reason, is agreeable likewise to the Law of God: since that true Reason cannot possibly cross it self, nor swerve or disagree in ought from it self. To say therefore that for the doing of every Act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if natural Reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of God's word: it is all one as to say, In proving of points in controversy between the Papists and us by Authorities, if a man be not very sure that his memory fail him not, he must have recourse to his Books. Which when a man saith, his meaning is not that he may allege ought that is not in the Books whence he alledgeth it, but that if the allegations be so fresh and so firm in his memory, that he is well assured thereof, he need not make further search into his Books for it. Or to come nearer home, to say, In moral things, as well for everything that a man doth, as for the manner of doing it, if the word of God else-where afford not sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of the Decalogue. Which speech should not argue that any action may be done of us, that we have no ground for in God's Law: but that if we can find ground for it in any other part of God's word, we may thereby be sure that it hath undoubted ground there. To the Reason that I adjoin taken from the end of the word, given in moral matters to supply the defect of natural Reason, &c. M ^r . B. answereth nothing at all; but asketh only, if it be our best way to seek sufficient direction from natural Reason, before we consult with God in his word. No. Who saith it? But yet sometimes natural Reason affordeth grounds more readily without seeking, than the word doth. And it is a certain truth, that a Reverend Divine hath, that In every action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or question is made by any) to find out some sentence clearly and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to do, seem we in Scripture never so expert, would trouble us more than we are aware.

To reflect upon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a man's actions ought to be grounded upon it, since that they are all lawful or unlawful so far forth as they are either consonant unto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulness whereof may be demonstrated much more readily from some other, either proofs of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft do the best and religiousest Divines resolve Cases of Conscience concerning Civil actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?

Yea but, saith M ^r . B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from God's word, if in his persuasion he have sufficient direction from natural Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it do not, as it doth not, I might well return it to M ^r . B. and request him to return an answer to it himself. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seek further for it, save for the further strengthening of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsely persuaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsely persuaded of sufficient direction either from natural Reason, or the written word, he hath just cause to look further, though he be not aware of it.

But doth that Maxim, What is not of faith is 〈◊〉 , intimate, that whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natural Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor do I, as M ^r . B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoever is so done 〈◊〉 of faith: because whatsoever is so done, as before was shown, hath sufficient warrant from the word.

Yea but natural Reason is not defective only, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so utterly defaced that there is nothing left of it, that a man can have any certainty at all of? No Sect of Philosophers was ever held more absurd, than those that held that men had no certain knowledge of anything. For moral grounds it seemeth M ^r . B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be upheld. For if natural reason be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence concluded concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of ought, then it is certain that there is no certain knowledge of ought in that kind; and nothing is certain therein, but that all things are utterly and universally uncertain. That reverend Divine before mentioned, hath not amiss observed, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in men's minds, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of men's lives, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordinary and civil affairs, if this light be suppressed, and men should ever be constrained, though it burnt never so clearly, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solemn access still unto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I add further; since that the most of men's particular actions, which they must have ground for being infinite, are not expressly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore have their warrant by consequences deducted from it, in which deduction, sometime a natural principle is joined with a testimony of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though two places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllogisticall form joined together, may truly and infallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is natural Reason that must judge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of iudicature from natural Reason in such cases, and we shall have no certainty left of the lawfulness of ought, that is not in express terms comprised in Scripture. I might well add, that by this M ^r . B ^s . manner of reasoning, an utter uncertainty might be concluded even of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that do not exactly understand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Natural Reason is in part defective and corrupted: and therefore it cannot certainly inform us of ought: This must also of necessity be allowed for a good Consequence; All Translations of Scripture are in part defective and corrupt: therefore nothing can certainly be learned out of them. Yea, Every man's skill in the Originals is in part defective and corrupt; and therefore no man can certainly gather ought thence. Let M ^r . B. therefore, who professeth to have his soul so much vexed with the fearful doctrine that I here deliver, take heed lest by that that he here maintaineth, he vex the soul and perplex the conscience of many a scrupulous Christian, and ensnarle them thereby in such inextricable difficulties, as he shall never be able with all the skill he hath to vnwinde them out of again.

But he findeth me at last fainting and contradicting myself: and therefore all is now almost well again. And wherein? Forsooth, because I affirm that the word doth not abridge us of the help and use of natural Reason for direction in such Actions. And how doth this contradict (for I thought it had confirmed ) that which before I had delivered? M ^r . B. will make it clear unto you.

For first when I affirm that the word doth not abridge us, I do imply that it might abridge us, of such help. Is not this think you a strange Inference? As if when we say against the Stoics, that Grace doth not strip men of human affections; nor make them stocks and stones; we do thereby imply, that Grace might strip them of it, and make mere blocks of them: As much to say, as that it might work against it self, and the word work against that end for which it was given. But this is too too senseless.

Secondly, therefore our most warrantable way must then be to be well informed, when and how far the word giveth us leave to use it. How followeth this upon ought that I say, unless this be a good consequence, God's word doth not abridge us; Therefore it is the best way to be well informed, when and how far it doth. But to omit, that to say, that It is the warrantablest course to be well informed when and how far forth God's word in matters concerning the Law of Nature, (for the Moral Law is no other) giveth us liberty to make use of true reason: Is as much as to say, that it is the warrantablest way to be well informed how far forth God's word warranteth us to use Logic in scanning of moral matters, or how far forth it giveth us leave to be reasonable creatures. Let M ^r . B. have what he would: what followeth hereupon? Why? If that be so then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, think we? Mark the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not upon ought that I say:) It is the best way for us to know how the word giveth liberty to use this direction. Therefore there is no use of it for direction at all in this kind. Nay rather, therefore there is some use even in this kind of it; or else to what end is it to labor to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Judge, Reader.

But that which best is, M ^r . B. hereby taketh occasion to over-slip whatsoever my margin here affordeth for the confirmation of mine opinion in this Point. How fitly, you shall see, if you observe how it followeth. M ^r . G. saith, The word abbridgeth us not of direction hereby: therefore it may abridge: and therefore it is best to be informed how it abridgeth: and therefore M ^r . G ^s . doctrine is contradicted: and therefore I need answer none of his Arguments. Here are strange Ergoes. But where one hath no list to do a thing, a small matter will serve to with-hold him. M ^r . B. that was a little before so▪ curious in this Argument to pull in by head and ears every marginal note, though containing no matter of proof, and drawn out of the Civil Code; is easily induced here to let pass the marginal quotations, where they contain matter of confirmation, though extracted out of holy writ. But yet by his leave, thou shalt have them; and judge when thou hast them, whether M ^r . B. had need to have answered them or no.

First then, for the Point it self that I here hold; it is neither new nor strange. It is all one, saith Tertullian, whether a point be proved by Scripture or by Reason: thereby implying that what was allowable by the one, was warrantable also by the other.

Secondly, for the proof of it, we have it both from the practice and the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. First for his practice; The Apostle, saith Tertullian, appealeth unto Nature. Doth not Nature, saith he, teach you? speaking of some comely and uncomely habits: as by Nature both the comeliness, and consequently the warrantableness of the one being justified; and the uncomeliness, and consequently also the vnwarrantablenesse of the other by the same also sufficiently detected. And again, pleading to the Corinthians for the maintenance of the Ministry, he useth reasons drawn from the light of natural reason in the first place; which yet it seemeth M ^r . B. would control him for, if any other should now do.

Again, Nature it self, saith Tertullian, is instead of the Law to those that are ignorant of it. When the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, which have not the Law, yet do by Nature the things contained in the Law, they having not the Law are a Law to themselves. Which show the effect of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witness, and their cogitations interchangeably excusing and accusing. And surely, if the Law of Nature written in man's 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉 heart be the very same so far forth as it is yet vndefaced, with the Law of God revealed in the word: Then whatsoever by just consequence of Reason may be deduced from the grounds yet in Nature remaining of the one, may be certainly known to be agreeable also unto the other.

And thus we have at length got out of this intricate Labyrinth which M ^r . B. hath drawn or rather withdrawn us into. If the Point were so perilous, as he here pretendeth, and it vexed his soul in such manner as he here professeth, it had been a charitable work, I deem, both to me and himself, to have let me seen it before this, especially so instantly requiring the same, and so to have freed his soul sooner from this grievous vexation. But for the Point it self; I adore, with Tertullian, the plenitude of God's word, as much as M ^r . B. or any other man doth. I acknowledge it with Chrysostom, and Augustine, to be a most perfect and absolute Rule, containing in it all things necessary unto faith and good life. I should grieve at the heart to have uttered the least tittle that should tend to the derogation either of it, or ought in it. If I may be shown that I have so done in ought, I will readily recant it. Concerning this Point in particular, (besides those that viewed the whole work, & advertised me what they wished to have altered, which was not much, nor material) I had conference with one not unknown to M ^r . B. whom I have before named in this Book, as judicious and as precise in his judgment as the most; who not only concurred with me in it, making no doubt at all of it; but withal told how he was oft troubled to satisfy some in their Cases propounded unto him, though he gave them never so good reason for his resolution, because they would not therewith be satisfied, unless he could produce some place of Scripture for every particular. But let the wise and learned judge: and if I may from them be informed that I have herein erred, I will say as he did, Err I may, but an Heretike I will not be; I will not be obstinate in mine error; I will retract it: which I may well, without the least prejudice to the main matter in Question, which it nothing concerneth, and will stand therefore well enough without it. But return we to our task.

I. B.

So then I proceed to the Assumption of the main Argument. In the former part whereof it is to be denied (as was said before) that every Lot is a thing lawful in it self. For as a Diuinatorie by him, Cap. 11. so a lusorious Lot by me and others is denied to be a thing lawful in it self.

T. G.

To pass by the strange manner of speech, that Every Lot is a thing lawful in it self: which I suppose none but M ^r . B. will use. That a Lot is a thing of it self indifferent, and consequently lawful in it self, was before shown. But I have nothing here to say to it: for in mine Assumption there is no mention of it. M ^r . B. must answer, if he will, for his own Argument.

I. B.

More clearly to answer the other part. It is to be observed, that in this large Argument, it cannot be gathered what M ^r . G. meaneth by Subject Matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, p. 230. I understand, he meaneth the matter whereabout the Lottery is employed. If so, I affirm that the subject matter of a Lot is determined by God, namely, A controversy to be ended thereby: and therefore I also affirm, lusorious business (to use M ^r . G ^s . own word, p. 130.) to be a subject matter of a Lot, no less against the general Rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Jonah in M ^r . G ^s . judgment, p. 278. If then a lusorious Lot be not a thing lawful in it self, and if Lusorious business be a subject matter of a Lot, that is against the general Rules, then how can the manner and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the use of a lusorious Lot.

T. G.

Not to say, how fitly the place of Scripture in the Margine is here applied. For the simple Reader, if a man should stand to explain every School term, that, in such discourses and disputes as this, we are enforced oft to use, it would be a very tedious task both to Writer and Reader. Nor doth M ^r . B. himself observe that Rule that he would tie others to: For doth he not oft speak of major, minor, proposition, assumption, mood and figure; Sub, prae, prima, &c. never informing his Reader what thereby is meant. But is it possible that so learned a man as M ^r . B. should not understand what so familiar and ordinary a Logical term as the Subject Matter is, meaneth? But it is yet more strange that M ^r . B. should not understand what himself saith. For this Assumption he speaketh of, is not mine but his own: nor do I here speak any one word of the Subject Matter of Lottery: it is himself only that doth it. Which Subject Matter whether it be, as he saith, determined to be such as he here saith, shall in his due place appear. No more for the present, but that this Assumption I own not, and therefore need take no care for it, whether it fall or stand, so far forth as it cometh here in question.

I. B.

Let us try the force of the Assumptions confirmation. It is true, that Recreation in general, indefinitely understood, is warranted by God's Word. But I believe M ^r . G. will not affirm all recreations taken up by men to be so warranted. Yes, (saith M ^r . G. ) we may recreate our selves with anything, that is not against the general rules; because touching things wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

T. G.

That which indeed was mine Assumption, M ^r . B. hath now at length by good hap light upon. But knowing not well how to bring it otherwise in, he maketh it the Confirmation of mine Assumption, that is the confirmation of it self. Or rather, according to M ^r . B ^s . analysis and resolution of mine Argument, (which was not yet so hard to be brought into form) the confirmation not of mine, but of his own Assumption: and so the Argument should thus stand;

Recreation in general is warranted, and 〈◊〉 particular manner of it prescribed, &c. Therefore a Let is a thing lawful in it self, and the subject matter and manner &c. are not determined by God's word, nor against the general Rules.

You need not marvel why M ^r . B. de •… ieth not this Consequence▪ albeit it be most senseless. For if he should, he knoweth not any that would undertake to defend it, but turn it home to him the true fether indeed of it.

But as he dealeth with me for mine Arguments; so he doth the like with his own inferences. He doth not believe, he saith, that I will defend all recreations taken up by men to be warrantable. And yet as controlling himself herein, he saith, Yes. What is that but as much as, he doth? Now how proveth he this gross Calumnie? Thus forsooth. M ^r . G. saith, we may recreate our selves with anything that is not against the general Rules. And doth he that saith so, defend that All recreations taken up by men are allowable? This is so palpable, that a man though stark blind, yet might feel it with fingers.

I. B.

Of this •… uasion, [Not against] I need not speak at this instant.

T. G.

No: we have had more then enough of it already too oft.

I. B.

But touching things not determined, so much incule •… ted. I ask whether things must be determined particularly, or by name, or else, if not so forbidden, they are lawful. If so, why doth M ^r . G. (speaking of diverse particulars) as of a Key and a Book, of a pair of sheeres, and a sieue, and such like, so earnestly ask, Are they anywhere found revealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind then here, arguing thus: Not found there commanded or permitted; therefore unlawful. If it be said, not so found there, to find out a thief. I then say, Neither are Lots so found there for recreation.

T. G.

What I mean by determined, may easily appear by the instances given of the Passover tied to a certain time, and the sacrifices restrained to someone certain place; to wit, stinted to someone or more particular matter, manner, time, place, &c. as on the other side, by not determined, such as are left free without such special restraint, as the free-will offerings, vows, &c.

For the Objection here brought, we had it once before; and there it was answered. Neither doth M ^r . B. cite my words there used sincerely, but as he is wont: And the place it self, had he not clipt the tongue of it, would without further help have afforded him an answer: to wit, that such Lots diuinatorie must have some special institution, because that is required of them, which by no natural power that either is in them, or man can add to them, they are able to effect. Let M ^r . B. prove as much by the sporting Lot; and there an end.

I. B.

But if by not determined, he meant, Things wherewith we may recreate, are not determined in the Word, either expressly, or by just consequence, then, whosoever saith so, if he be wise, will add [so far as I do remember and know.] For who can remember all the sentences of holy Scriptures, and know all just Consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus add, then his Negation is of no validity; but he himself is too bold in denying, upon presumption, that another remembereth and knoweth no more than he.

T. G.

Here M ^r . B. thinketh he hath got me on the hip. And either he will condemn me of great presumption and want of much wisdom, or else overthrow the main strength of mine Argument. That concerning recreation therefore there are no special rules prescribed in Scripture, whereby it is stinted to this or that particular matter, and is therefore (as from Calvin before was well and truly affirmed) to be directed by the generals; it that which I affirm, and Peter Martyr with me; as by my Margine (which M ^r . B. had no list, it seemeth, to take notice of) may appear.

Yea but no man without presumption, saith M ^r . B. may so affirm, unless he put in this exception, so far as I know or I remember▪ Besides that Peter Martyr then was too presumptuous in this very particular: Our Divines that deal with the Papists are very far over-seen; with whom these assertions are so frequent and usual, That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 •… Sacrament, there is no Scripture for it; That Pen •… nce, or Orders, or extreme Unction, is a Sacrament, cannot out of God's word be proved▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Peter was ever at Rome, or was Bishop there, or that he had a superiority of power and authority above the rest of the Apostles; or that the Pope succeedeth him either in his seat or in such right, cannot be made good out of God's word. And again, for a man to repair to the Sacrament vnshriuen; to eat flesh in Lent, &c. are not against any word of God. Yea this is a general plea with them against most of the Popish superstitions, that there is no ground for them in God's word. Whereas if they had consulted with M ^r . B. beforehand, they should have been better advised, and have added always this exception; So far as I know or remember: and so given their Adversaries just cause to have laughed at them for their labor▪ Where observe we withal, what advantage M ^r . B. here giveth to the Adversary, when he shall be pressed with ought in this kind. For tell we one of them, that for a man to refuse Shrift is not against ought in God's word: After advice had with M ^r . B. he may soon shape you an answer, that you are very presumptuous so to say: for can you, or any man else, remember all the sentences in Scripture, or know all just consequences that may be made from them? Which if it be a sound and sufficient answer, surely for many points of Popery, as some of their new Sacraments, &c. we must lay our hands upon our mouths, and let them alone with them, for ought that I see. As if the Scripture were so vast and diffused a piece of work, that a man could not, without he had such an infinite memory and an universal understanding, tell what were of some particular subjects delivered in each part of it. Yea what a miserable perplexity doth M ^r . B. by this means plung Christian meny Consciences into, the more scrupulous sort especially, when for particular civil actions of ordinary use, their scrupulous hearts causelessly moving doubt of them, having searched to and fro in God's Book, though they can find nothing at all that may control them in the use of them, yet they shall still be perplexed, because M ^r . B. hath here informed them, that there may yet be somewhat in God's word against them, neither can they, do they what they can, have any assurance of the contrary, unless they had such memories and understandings as M ^r . B. here speaketh of? I cannot here pass by a passage of M ^r . Calvin's concerning such scruples; These and the like, saith he, se •… me frivolous trifles: but there is more in them than men are commonly aware of. For when men's Consciences are once in this manner ens •… red, they enter into a long and an intricase Labyr •… th, from whence it is no easy mut •… er to get out again. If a man shall begin to doubt, whether he may use flax, or linne •… made thereof, in his sheets, shirts, handkerchefs, towels, table-napkins, &c. he will not long ofter have the like scruple of hempe; and after that of towe too. And he will begin to think whether he may not dine and sup without any Table-cloth or napkins▪ at all▪ and so consequently whether he may use them or no, when he may well enough be without. Yea at length, saith he, you shall have a man come to that pass, that he will think it a sin ( 〈◊〉〈◊〉 say) to stride over a straw. Such height of superstition men grow unto▪ when way is given to such frin •… lous scruples, which yet M ^r . B. here ministereth much matter unto. For suppose we one of these scrupulous Christians, yea or any other, should repair to M ^r . B. and move this as a doubt to him, whether it be lawful for him to wear band and cuffs either of cambricke or holland, and M ^r . B. having affirmed that it is, he should demand of him, what warrant out of God's word he could furnish him with for it. Answer him this way, that Apparel in general is enjoined, and for the matter of it there is no special direction of restraint given in the word, and therefore liberty left for any that is not against the general Rules in the word, of decency, modesty, frugality, &c. resolving him of such as doubt or question may be moved of: and it is not unlikely but you may give him good satisfaction therein. Whereas go M ^r . B ^s . way and tell him, that though apparel it self be allowed, yet whether the matter of it be determined or no, neither he nor any man can say, unless he had all the Bible, and whatsoever is contained in it, or may be deduced from it, in his head: I suppose you will be so far from giving him any good satisfaction, that you will leave him more perplexed than you found him at first. I propound somewhat of this kind in pursuit of mine Argument, which M ^r . B. misdoubting he might run a ground there, slily saileth by, and not so much as once taketh notice of. Either he meddleth with the Conclusion, and passeth by the premises: Or he frameth me such matter of confirmation as he pleaseth, and letteth pass that that I propound. I demand then, rubbing up M ^r . B ^s . memory a little, as before in my Book, what other proof can be brought for the justifying of Bowles or Chess-play, than such as is here propounded, which it behooved him to have answered if he knew any better, considering that the instance was of much more moment for the clearing and confirming of this branch of mine Assumption, than many things that it hath pleased him to be pidling withal.

For the thing it self: First, it is well known, that for many Heads, or Common places, what is found in the word may soon be laid all together, as for games, for markets, for marriage-feasts, for Lots, and the like: by consideration whereof a man may oft be informed what is in God's word either for or against them. Secondly, such things as require a special Institution, (and of this kind must a Lot be, if it be a divine Oracle, and an immediate judgment and sentence of God, as M ^r . B. pretendeth that it is) the matter is much more obvious. Special Institutions in the word are as stars of the chief magnitude, so eminent and conspicuous, that they cannot easily lie hid, nor need over-much search, and a man may boldly say therefore of such and such things, that there is no special institution of them in the word. Thirdly, for moral matters, we may draw to a nearer scantling than the body of the whole Bible; the Sum of all is comprised in the Decalogue, and whatsoever a man is sure to be against none of those ten Words, or to come yet to a narrower compass, against neither Piety, nor Charity, the Sum of the two Tables, he may surely know not to be against any part of God's word, and consequently to have nothing in God's word against it, though he have not such a vast capacity of understanding or memory, as M ^r . B. here requireth. But consider the whilst what an utter uncertainty and irresolution in this kind M ^r . B. driveth us hereunto: For by his grounds a man may not safely say, that There is nothing against wearing of an Hat in God's word; unless he know all consequences that may be deduced from this Sentence of Scripture, In the beginning God made Heaven and Earth. For if he must needs know so much of all, that may safely say so of ought, then of that in particular, that being one of those all.

I. B.

At last let us religiously consider the general Rules so oft spoken of, and we shall find, that M ^r . G. should have done well not to have pleased Libertines by pleading Not against, but to have given the word due honor by saying with M ^r . Calvin. [The use of things is to be limited according to the general rules.] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the use of things not indecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted, that in 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Paul saith not, All things are lawful, but some things are inexpedient; but in both places thus; All things are lawful, but all are not expedient.

T. G.

Of this distinction we heard before, and answer thereunto was there given. Yet lest I seem to pass by so grave and serious observations with silence,

First, if those rules require more than not indecent, not inexpedient, &c. then whatsoever is not more than so, is against those rules, and is no more by M ^r . G. allowed than by M ^r . B. himself, for ought that M ^r . G. here saith: which M ^r . B. also might soon see, if he knew what he would have. And therefore his, It is to be noted, might very well have been spared, for any hurt it doth M ^r . G ^s . cause, if that be all that it prove.

Again, though this might suffice to keep M ^r . B ^s . exception from fastening on ought that I say: Yet let us see of what weight his annotation here is. The Apostle saith not, Some things are inexpedient, but, all things are not expedient. Why? what difference is there in the Apostles meaning here between these two? Hear we the exposition of as acute and judicious a writer as the most of those that these times of ours have afforded us, though one that lived in much obscurity; on the former place of the Apostle he thus paraphraseth his words, If we Christians ought to be so careful in cherishing and improving piety, that we deem our selves restrained even from the lawful use of things that hurt or hinder piety, how much ought we to abstain from things of their own nature and every way unlawful. On the other place yet more plainly: But all things are not expedient: that is, but the use of some things is sometimes incommodious and harmful to a Christian man, in that that concerneth the defense and iner ease of his faith and piety, and the furtherance of his eternal safety. For it is not to be expected from earthly things, of which the Apostle principally here speaketh, such as are meat and drink, that they should directly further our salvation: it is enough if they be not an impediment thereunto. And again afterward: That doth not edify; that is, is an hindrance to our brothers faith, piety, and safety. As for decency and indecencie; piety and impiety, in actions capable of either, M ^r . B. may as soon divide the point of a Spanish neeale, as assign any medium between the one and the other. Mean while M ^r . B. hath set a new snare here to entangle and snarl scrupulous Consciences in. For though no indecency can be discovered in some kind of attire, yet if they hear M ^r . B. they shall hang, upon this new conceit of his, still in suspense, whether it may be avowed to be decent or no. I might add, that with much difficulty and no little ado they must have it proved to them by some sentence of Scripture, (which I would fain hear M ^r . B. perform) for no reason will serve else, that it is so.

I. B.

Let us consider these rules yet somewhat more nearly to the point. Touching the first: The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly, and by order.] In which is no intimation that all things are in themselves lawful to be done, which are done honestly and by order: but a charge, that all things, be they in themselves never so lawful, be done honestly and by order. Those drink offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths, per antiphrasin, are solemnized sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, always with putting off hats, and some speech more or less: are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, then be Lots and the vsers of them in gaming never so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore justified.

T. G.

M ^r . B ^s . task is to instance if he mean to do ought, against what general Rule of God's word a lusorious Lot is; for that is the issue that we now are at. But instead thereof M ^r . B. telleth us that that no man denies, that if it be in it self unlawful, it is not the more justifiable, because it is not against this first rule of order. And what is this to the purpose? I ask for a pickaxe, and M ^r . B. reacheth me a spade. This is mine Argument, Game in general being allowed, and no particular matter or manner of it prescribed, any is lawful that is not against the general rules of God's word: But Lottery is such, to wit, not against any general Rule of God's word: therefore Lottery is lawful. That it is of it self lawful is the Conclusion; that it is not against any general rule of God's word is the Assumption. M ^r . B. denieth the Conclusion; saith it is unlawful; and that it cannot be made lawful, though it be not against someone such Rule. What manner of answering call we this, wherein nothing is denied or answered to, but that that indeed ought never to be denied?

I. B.

Touching the second Rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edify, 1 Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sin who stumble or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weak, Rom. 14 13, 21. But lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sin, and to be weak in goodness. Therefore they do not edify, and therefore are not expedient.

T. G.

Here M ^r . B. speaketh somewhat to the purpose indeed, if his Answer could be made good. For he saith, that a lusorious Lot is against this second Rule. But how proveth he it? Because lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sin, and grow weak in goodness. What doth every Lot used in game do so? Make that good and take all. Let M ^r . B. prove, that every Lot used in game, as for example sake, every shuffling of arrows, or choice of pawns hid in the hand to decide leading, or every game that children play at, even and odd, heads and points, &c. doth occasion thousands, or someone at least or other to fall into sin, or grow weak in goodness, and I will yield all lusorious Lots to be unlawful. If he cannot, he must no more condemn all lusorious Lots, because where they are abused they produce such effects, then all use of boules for disport in general, because bouling abused doth altogether as much.

I. B.

Concerning the third Rule, Let all things be done to God's glory, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Is this to God's glory, to use his Name in any other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be used, and then to take that Name in vain? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lot is to use God's name in another case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be used; and then also to take that Name in vain: and it is a grievous tempting of God, as shall be proved. Therefore playing with a Lot is not to God's glory, and by consequence not agreeable to religion and piety.

T. G.

This is, to use M ^r . B ^s . term, the kill-cow indeed. But all that here a sporting Lot is charged with, is yet to be proved. It shall be, M ^r . B. saith. In good time; but till then nothing is done. Nor is it true that M ^r . B. saith in the next words, unless what shall be done, be done already.

I. B.

Though it be sufficiently proved that lusorious Lots are directly against two of the general Rules; and not warranted by the third: So that M ^r . G. hath not bettered his cause by appealing to them.

T. G.

How sufficiently M. B. hath proved this, whatsoever he will do; I have shown: Nor is my cause yet anything hereby impeached, until more be brought against it, than as yet is.

I. B.

Yet it is to be observed, that all the Rules require Things and Actions to be according to them. But M ^r . G. by only speaking of them, would justify circumstances, and means of playing with Lots, if (forsooth) they be not against them.

T. G.

Of that frivolous exception, and distinction of according to them, and not against them, enough already hath been said.

For the rest here objected, that by only speaking of them, I would justify circumstances and means of playing with Lots, if they be not against them, albeit neither I, nor any man else, I believe, besides M ^r . B. himself, understandeth well what it meaneth: yet to clear myself from such aspersion, as it may seem to cast on me; I will briefly relate the sum of mine Argument reduced into due form. Thus then it standeth:

Any means or manner of recreation that is not against the general Rules of God's word, these and the like, is allowable. Lottery is such a means of recreation as is not against any of the general rules of God's word, these or the like. Lottery therefore is a means of recreation allowable.

The Proposition I thus proved:

Where a thing is allowed, and the means, manner, and other circumstances are not in particular determined; there is any means or manner of it allowed that is not against those generals. But such is recreation: for it is allowed in general, nor are the means, and manner, and other circumstances of it determined in particular. Any means or manner of it therefore is allowed that is not against the general rules of God's word.

In explication of the first Proposition, I relate those Rules: For confirmation of the Assumption, •… require to be nominated, against what general rule Lottery used in game doth offend. Now let M ^r . B. show which way herein I offend.

I. B.

Thus having evidently shown the Reasons inducing (not drawing) M ^r . G. to allow lusorious Lots, to be •… oth fearful; as these euasiue speeches, [Not evil in themselves] [Not prohibited] [Not determined] and [Not against the general Rules] do import; and otherwise unsound; I will (with God's help I hope) reply upon M ^r . G ^s . answers to mine Arguments against playing with Lots contained in my Dialogue.

T. G.

How well M ^r . B. hath quit himself in this his opposition, there will no doubt, I see, be made, if he may be his own Judge. But if his left hand steed him no better than his right, nor his shield do him more pleasure than his sword hath, I doubt much whether his Reader will receive from him any good satisfaction, howsoever he may therein please and sooth up himself. As there is seldom any workman but liketh well of his own work.

The first Argument.

W Hatsoeuer directly, or of it self, or in a special manner tendeth to the advancing of God's name is to be used religiously , and not to be used in sport; as we may not pray or swear in sport: But the use of Lots directly, or of it self and in special manner tendeth to the advancing of the name of God in attributing to his special Providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and expecting the event .

Therefore the use of Lots is not to be in sports.

I answer: The Assumption is not true if it be understood universally: it concludeth nothing to the Question if it be taken particularly.

The proof annexed to it scarce carrieth good sense: the Printer, it may be, is in fault. But if the meaning of the Author be, as I conceive it, (for I must in part go by guess) that the disposition of every Lot is wholly attributed to, and the event wholly expected from the special and immediate Providence of God; I deny it, neither do the places produced prove it. The former of them, concerning ordinary Lots, or Lots in general, was examined and answered sufficiently before.

The latter is an example of an extraordinary Lot, wherein there was indeed an immediate and special providence. But extraordinary examples make no general rules. Neither is it a good course of arguing, to reason from the special, or a singular, to the general and universal; much less from one extraordinary act or event, to all ordinary courses of the same kind. Herein is the difference between the one and the other, between the extraordinary Lot, wherein there is an immediate hand of God for special purpose, and the ordinary Lot, wherein there is not; that the one could not but fall certainly, were it never so oft cast, as in the Lots used for the discovery of Achan and Jonah, and in the election of Saul and Matthias, and the like: whereas the other cast oft in the same case, as for partition of goods and chatels descending by inheritance upon, or bought in common by diverse, would not constantly and certainly fall out still the same.

The Assumption understood generally is true: and the places quoted make good the proof thereof, as shall be made manifest.

This is said; but should be done. But M ^r . B. having said, it shall be, presently slincketh away from it: nor doth ever after do what here he undertaketh, unless it be by saying that it is manifest to all that will see, that it is so as he saith.

I. B.

First therefore let us consider the supposed distinction between ordinary and extraordinary Lots. M ^r . G. speaketh of a distinction, but showeth not wherein (touching the Lots themselves) it doth consist. Indeed touching themselves (as they be Lots) there is no difference. For in an ordinary, as well as an extraordinary Lot, the things are by man of purpose intentionally disposed unto a variable event, and they are wholly disposed by God unto this or unto that event, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. If so, then it followeth, that the use of all Lots (as they be Lots) whether ordinary or extraordinary, directly or of it self, and in special manner, tendeth to the advancing of the name of God. How? The use of Lots attributeth to God's special providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the event. Doth this scarce carry good sense?

T. G.

Against the proof of the proof of M ^r . B ^s . assumption, from Act. 1. 24, 26. I object two things:

1. That it is but one particular example, and therefore cannot prove a general. To which exception M ^r . B. here answereth not a word; and the exception therefore standeth good still; and is enough to infringe the validity of all proof drawn here from that place.
2. That it is of an extraordinary Lot: and from extraordinary actions, much more from someone of them to conclude of all ordinary, is an unreasonable kind of reasoning. And indeed it is as if a man should thus reason; There was a special hand of God in Pharaohs dream: There is the like therefore in all dreams whatsoever. Or, The Bush was holy that God appeared to Moses in; And therefore every common Hawthorne is holy. So, The Lot whereby Matthias was elected, was by God's special providence immediately disposed: Therefore the like is in every Lot.

Now M ^r . B. that he might seem to say somewhat to this at least; Saith that I deliver a distinction of Lots ordinary and extraordinary, but show not wherein touching the Lots themselves it consisteth. He that readeth my Book may soon see where I define either, what difference I assign between them: and M ^r . B. himself in part also hereafter acknowledgeth it.

Yea but saith he so far forth as they are Lots, there is no difference between them. No reason there should; for the same general nature of a Lot is common to both: as the same nature of a dream is common to all dreams: the same nature of a bush is common to all bushes. Nor did Pharaohs dream, as it was a dream, differ from other dreams: nor that holy bush, as it was a bush, differ from any other bush.

But what is the common nature of a Lot? Hear M ^r . B. himself, and he will tell you truly and fully else-where, that it is the variable event of some sensible thing applied to the determining of some doubtful matter. But because that will not here serve his turn, he changeth his note now, and maketh this the general nature of a Lot common to all Lots, (begging withal pitifully that that is in controversy) that things be by man of purpose intentionally disposed unto a variable event, and wholly disposed by God unto this or that event, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much less both jointly together. For neither is it true, that in every Lot things are by man disposed to a variable event: as where a controversy is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God ever wholly and immediately disposed, as in the proof of his Assumption is affirmed, and here only repeated; and much less are they ever disposed to such event, as by the vsers of the Lot is expected, but rather clean contrary sometime, as in Haman's example. But if it be so in all Lots, saith M ^r . B. then mine Assumption is true. That is as much as to say, if you grant me what I affirm in the proof of mine Assumption, though I barely repeat it only, and do not at all prove it; then mine Assumption standeth firm; to wit, that a Lot doth directly or of it self and in special manner tend to the advancing of the name of God, in attributing to his special providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the event. Which by the way he demandeth, whether it scarce carry good sense or no: because I said it scarce did, being withal willing to salve the matter by supposing that the Printer might be in fault. But I see now, M ^r . B. will take it upon himself; and I must show reason for what I said. What others therefore may deem of it I know not. But I supposed the word, to attribute, to be a verb transitiue, requiring somewhat therefore to be expressed that should be attributed, as well as something or person to which or whom it should be attributed; which in M ^r . B ^s . words doth not appear. It were senseless for any man to say, that he doth in his words and deeds attribute to God, not expressing ought that he doth therein attribute unto him. But let us hear M ^r . B. further.

I. B.

Is there then no difference between an ordinary, and extraordinary Lot? The only difference is the Subject matter whereabout the Lot is employed. The subject matter of an ordinary Lot, is by God's allowance, a controversy to be ended. The subject matter of an extraordinary Lot, is any other matter, whereabout a Lot is employed by God's special direction: otherwise it is unlawful, as be lusorious and diuinatory Lots.

T. G.

I might well let all this wild discourse pass; since it is nothing at all to the purpose, neither to the justifying of his Assumption, nor of the proof of it; yet since he saith it, we will see what he saith. That there is difference between an ordinary and extraordinary Lot, in regard of the subject matter, is most true, but no such difference as M ^r . B. here assigneth. What it is I show where I handle the nature of either. But that the subject matter of an ordinary Lot is ever some controversy, is not true, as I have formerly shown: nor if it were so, did it hinder, but that the Lot used in sport might be an ordinary Lot, since that a controversy is thereby also oft times ended. And again, that no controversy, but some other matter is the subject matter of an extraordinary Lot, is also as untrue: since that a controversy also may and oft is the subject matter of it also. Not to add, that lusorious Lots are without all reason here ranked among extraordinary Lots, no reason rendered why they should be so termed. So that here is much unsound matter packed together to no purpose.

I. B.

In regard of which difference only M ^r . G ^s . Logic holdeth good as thus. From the use of a Lot about another matter than ending a Controuersie, and that by God's special direction, it followeth not, that it is lawful to use a Lot about any other matter, than ending a Controuersie, as gaming, without God's special direction.

T. G.

Instead of making good his own Logic, M ^r . B. telleth us what will hold good in M ^r . G ^s . Logic. What he meaneth by my Logic, I neither know nor inquire. When I make such an Argument as M ^r . B. here frameth, then let him answer it and not before. For this is but to set up men of straw, and then having run a course or two at them, to ride away in triumph, as if he had done some great matter, and laid M ^r . G. or I know not whom in the dust. But mean while M ^r . B. forgetteth to show us the validity of his own Logic; to wit, how an Argument will follow, from one singular example of an extraordinary Lot (by himself confessed to be such) used therein by God's special direction, to the ordinary use of Lots in general.

I. B.

But M ^r . G. maketh another difference, to wit, an immediate and special providence in an extraordinary Lot, which is not in an ordinary Lot. He doth so: and therefore in his Logic, he cunningly joineth a supposed extraordinary Euent to a supposed extraordinary Act, and declineth the proof of an extraordinary Act, which rather he should have done, because mine Argument standeth upon the use of Lots.

T. G.

Nay by M ^r . B ^s . leave, M ^r . G. doth not so. He saith only that there is great difference between an extraordinary Lot wherein an immediate divine providence is, and an ordinary one, wherein the same is not. Not presuming that there is necessarily such an immediate divine providence in every extraordinary Lot, but that such there was in that extraordinary Lot by M ^r . B. alleged, as also there is ever in all such of that kind as are done by God's special direction. I spare to speak much of the idle distinction here between an extraordinary Lot, which by M ^r . B ^s . own grant this was, and an extraordinary Act, which he would here imply that it was not, when he requireth proof of it. If the event were extraordinary, it is enough for my purpose, because M ^r . B ^s . Argument is in express terms concerning the event, wherein somewhat, but I know not what, (for he mentioneth nothing) is said to be attributed unto God's special providence; which if it be therefore more than ordinary in such a Lot, there is no reasoning from it to anywhere it is not so, much less to all whatsoever in general. That this Act it self, or occasion and manner of vising it, was extraordinary, though neither I stand bound here to prove it, and the reason is senseless whereupon M ^r . B. here requireth it, yet I have proved evidently where I entreat particularly of it. But M. B. must remember that here it is his part to prove: it is mine only to answer, deny, or distinguish; and his to take away mine answers, if he will make his Arguments good.

I. B.

Neither doth he soundly prove an immediate and special providence, or extraordinary event to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lot.

T. G.

Neither do I affirm it generally of the former, but of all such of that kind as are used by God's special direction, in which M ^r . B. himself here acknowledgeth it: and of the latter what I say, I have in diverse places proved. Here I speak only by way of distinction between the one and the other, which let M ^r . B. if he can disprove▪

I. B.

For as it is a tempting of God to cast 〈◊〉 •… ry Lot the first time without God's special direction, p. 313. so it is a tempting, yea, a agr •… er tempting of God, when be •… ath give •… his judgment already by the 〈◊〉 of the Lot, to cast the Lot again without hi •… special •… rection. How then c •… M ^r . G. so confidently affir •… , that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly▪ were it never so oft cast?

T. G.

Whether it be a tempting of God or no, upon my occasion what▪soever to cast a Lot more then on •… i •… such a business as God hath given special▪ direction 〈◊〉 use it in, is not the Question▪ th •… gh I suppose it be more then M ^r . B. will be able ever to make good that it is. And whether upon so doing, because it were a tempting of him, God •… old refuse to give answer or no, might also be questioned. He was content by a Sign to answer Gid •… the second time, though he had given assurance sufficient before, and as much as he at first required. He answered the sea-man in the Lot that lighted upon 〈◊〉 , though it were in them a mere tempting of God, by M ^r . B ^s . own grant, having no special direction from God for the doing of it. Nor dare any man say, but that if it had been by them for their 〈◊〉 satisfaction cast oft, as some think it was, it would have lighted upon Jonah still. But all that I say is this, that in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lot, wherein there i •… 〈◊〉 •… diate hand of God for special purpose (good ground supposed for the reiteration of it) the event were it never so oft cast, would be ever the same. For God certainly would never give a sentence contrary to himself. And of the certain steedinesse of such a Lot, we see a pregnant proof in Achan's case, where the Lot sour several times cast, kept on his due course, till it came to seize on that particular person that was aimed at. And the like may be presumed certainly of every such Lot so reiterated. If God refuse further to answer, there is no such immediate hand of God for special end in it: if there be, and he do answer, he will be ever like himself, there shall be no, tis, and tis not, with him.

I. B.

Indeed, the certain event of an extraordinory Lot may in faith be expected, because of God's special direction. And why not so in an ordinary Lot? Seeing God adviseth us pag. 135. to use Lots for the ending of Controuersies, Prov. 18. 18. and assureth us that the whole disposing of them is of him, Prov. 16. 33.

T. G.

I might answer in a word: Let M ^r . B. make trial. But I refer myself to the instances given by me elsewhere, of diverse in several places casting Lots upon the same persons for the self same places, and to what hereof hath been here before said. Only I add that no such special assurance is given us by God for the one, as in such cases was for the other. Nor doth any such thing follow thence, because God hath advised us rather thereby to end controversies than to give way to courses more inconvenient, that therefore God will by a special hand of his guide the Lot thus or thus, to wit, to favor him that hath the better right in this, as to sever the innocent from the nocent in that. How far forth the place produced proveth any such thing, cometh hereafter to be discussed.

I. B.

But M ^r . G. hath answered this place before. Let us then consider what he hath answered.

T. G.

For the sentence of Solomon, there want not good Authors that expound it of singular extraordinary; and miraculous Lots only: such, to use the words of one of our Adversaries, as are used immediately to find out God's will: whereas these that we now dispute of are no such; neither is it now lawful to use any Lot at all to that end.

But the words seem to be more general, and are word for word thus in the original, The Lot, it is cast into the lap; but every judgment or disposition of it (for there is no article there answering our English The) is of God. As he saith else-where, Many seek the Rulers face or favor; but each man's judgment is from God. And, The Horse is prepared for the day of fight: but salvation is of God, or belongeth to God, i •… God's. Which words so read import only thus much, that there is a providence of God in all things, even in the least, in the most casual things, and among the rest by name in a Lot: And so is there no more said of Lots there, than is spoken else-where not of Lots alone or things casual only; but of all men's thoughts and purposes, and words and works, and counsels and courses; as we have formerly shewn; and as beside the Authors there alleged, some of those that urge this place for the proof of this point, confess else-where against themselves, when they say, that The disposing of the Chance is secret, that it may be Chance indeed and wholly of God, who directeth all things.

Yea take the words as they are usually read, The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or the whole disposing thereof, is of the Lord; It may as truly be said with good warrant from diverse other places of Scripture beside those by the Aduerse party produced, that the whole issue or event and disposing of all things great and weighty, or less and lighter, is of the Lord: which yet excludeth not the means, that God worketh by or with, in the most of them, nor implieth an immediate providence universally in them: but is therefore so said, and may truly be said, to show, that it is wholly in God's hands to dispose of the event and issue of all things, and to cross or give way to them, as he shall see good. So that a man may as well, and upon as good ground out of the places concerning all other men's speeches and actions alleged by themselves, (together with those other, which are some of them yet more general and of larger extent) exclude all things else whatsoever from game, as they may Lots, in regard of ought that concerning them can be picked out of this place.

I. B.

Before he saith, p. 144. Good Authors expound this place of singular extraordinary and miraculous Lots only.

T. G.

And if M ^r . G. had stuck to this, I suppose M ^r . B. would not easily have been able to refute it, and so his Argument had stuck fast. But I refuse to take advantage of ought that in mine own judgment I deem unsound. For it is not victory, but truth only that I stand for.

I. B.

But, saith he, the words seem to be more general, and are, word for word, thus in the Original, [The Lot is cast into the lap: but every judgment or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who hold only extraordinary Lots to be meant in this place; and translating the Text [Every judgment] and expounding it [or disposing it] show plainly that this place proveth mine Assumption to be universally true?

T. G.

I perceive a man must not be over-liberal with M ^r . B. for i •… a man give him an inch, he will too soon take an ell. He might well think me very silly, freely to grant him all this, and yet deny his Assumption, i •… this were so plain a Confirmation of it.

That I confute them is not true: I show only my dissent from them. I leave it to M ^r . B. if he can, to confute them.

That I so translate and expound the Text, is true: but very sorry assistance ariseth to M ^r B ^s . Assumption from thence.

I. B.

So that I marvel that he denieth this place to prove mine Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in general.

T. G.

And marvel well he might, did I reason on that manner. But he wanteth matter, it seemeth, to marvel at, that he frameth such to himself. It is one thing to say, It proveth not M ^r . B ^s . Assumption, though it concern Lots in general: and another to say, It proveth not M ^r . B ^s . Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in general. That is all that can be gathered out of ought that I affirm. But M ^r . B. his earnest desire belike to have his Assumption confirmed, suggested this to him.

I. B.

For if it do so, then it proveth that ordinary as well as extraordinary Lots, tend to the advancing of the Name of God.

T. G.

It seemeth that M ^r . B. hath forgotten his own Assumption. If he have, I will make bold to put him in mind of it. It is this, The use of Lots directly, or of it self, and in special manner tendeth to the advancing of God's Name, in attributing to his special providence in the whole and immediate disposing of them, &c. Here is a great deal more than barely tending to the advancing of God's Name, which all things that are disposed by him (and what is not disposed by him?) in some degree or other do. A man might marvel therefore rather why M ^r . B. should not so much, but at all marvel at M ^r . G ^s . denial, that this place so understood, doth prove M ^r . B ^s . Assumption; yea, he might marvel, that M ^r . B. should not see that it did not, if he remembered what his Assumption was.

I. B.

Again, p. 145. M ^r . G. taking the words, as they are usually read in the Geneva Translation, and the Kings Edition, to wit, [The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof, is of the Lord] granteth that the whole event is of God.

T. G.

1. What I yield of my liberality, M ^r . B. is one thing: What you must make good, if you will maintain your own cause, is another thing. That is the translation, say I, word for word. Which unless therefore he can either disprove, or prove his Assumption out of it, his Argument is undone, and his cause with it, having indeed no color of ground beside that place much wrung and wronged to support and uphold it.

2. I take not the words so, but supposing them so to be taken, I say, that no more is therein said of Lots, than may be said of all things that are done in the world, though by means the most of them, that the whole issue and event of them is of God, because he not only hath an hand in them, but it is in his power either to afford or to deny such issue unto them. And what hath M ^r . B ^s . cause gained hereby more than was granted it before? Or how is his Assumption hereby confirmed, when no more is yielded to be said therein of Lots, than may be said of a game at boules?

I. B.

A grant, though true, yet turning the Reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lot cast into the lap.]

T. G.

And do not I speak of Lots in general? Or do I exclude any such as be cast into the lap? Or is it material, whether they be cast into lap, or hat, or helmet, or lot-box, or water-pot, or into none of all these, as in cross and pile, or not cast at all, as in best-betrust? That M ^r . G. should so slily seek to conceal that, and by leger-demaine seek to turn his Readers eye aside from it. But, saith M ^r . B.

I. B.

If then the Lot cast into the Lap, that is, of purpose disposed by man unto a variable event, be wholly disposed by God, so as the event be that which pleaseth him, then God doth not mediately dispose the Lot to this or that event: if not mediately, then immediately, because the whole disposition is of him.

T. G.

And what if the Lots then be not cast into the lap, or be not by man disposed at all? If that alter the case, as may seem here implied, then that will not be true of every Lot, nor of many a Lot, that M ^r . B. here saith.

But if M ^r . B ^s . meaning be (for I would fain understand him) that there is an opposition between man's Act and God's Act in the Text. So is there in those words, The preparations of the heart are in man: but the answer of the tongue i •… of the Lord. Which yet prove not an immediate work of God therefore to be in every answer that a man giveth, or in every word that he uttereth.

But unless M ^r . B. can find some stranger matter in those words, cast into the lap, more than here he discovereth, or any man (I believe) seeth beside himself, he saith no more than he said that I granted before, to wit, that the whole disposing of the Lot is of God, so as the event is what he pleaseth. Which doth not necessarily infer an immediate act of God in it: No more than, if a man should say, as he truly may say, that the whole disposition of war and battle (which the Rabbin's, some of them, compare here with a Lot, and so make this verse▪ cohere with the next before it) is of God the Lord of Hosts, so that the issue and event of it is such as he pleaseth; it would follow thereupon, that he denied arms to be of any use in war, or affirmed all victory to come immediately, and without means from God.

I. B.

Doth not this then make good mine Assumption?

T. G.

No indeed; not a whit: Unless the asking of the Question do ought in it.

I. B.

But for all this M ^r . G. will not have it so. For as he translateth this place, he saith▪ It importeth thus much, [That there i •… a Providence in all things, even the least, & most casual.] And this he would confirm by these my words, viz. [The disposing of the Chance i •… secret, that it might be Chance indeed, and wholly of God, who disposeth all things.] Do these words justify M ^r . G ^s . interpretation of this place? Yes: for they say plainly, God directeth all things; and they say withal, The 〈◊〉 of the Chance (that is, of the things purposely •… isposed by a man unto a variable event) unto a certain event, is secret, that it may be Chance indeed, that 〈◊〉 , an event not by the will of man, but wholly of God. •… o that my words imply this Argument. God directeth •… ll things: therefore much more, in our discerning a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is far from saying that thi •… place importeth only, That there is a providence in all things.

T. G.

M ^r . B ^• . words I have faithfully related; and they •… ustifie as much as I allege them for, to wit, a con •… ession, that God directeth and disposeth as well all •… there things as Lots. What M ^r . B. may please to fish further out of his own words, I am well content he do: what the words themselves of themselves import, any man may soon see.

I. B.

Neither doth M ^r . G ^s . translation infer this imported interpretation.

T. G.

What it will necessarily infer, is not material; what it will well bear, is for me enough. It is sufficient, that no more can be inferred out of it: and that is all that I aver. But M ^r . B. (you shall see) will show that there may.

I. B.

For this discretion [But] doth so oppose every judgment, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth Judgment ) to a Lot cast into the lap, as that every disposing, is all one with the whole disposing.

T. G.

The discretiue (for so I suppose his meaning is) but, doth no otherwise oppose here than in the place before cited; but the answer of the tongue is of the Lord: nor doth it anymore prove, that every disposing is all one with the whole disposing, (though I refuse not that also in such sense as I have shown) than that every man's judgment is all one with the whole judgment of every man; in that speech also of Solomon, Many seek to the Rulers face, but every man's judgment is of God.

I. B.

This place so troubleth M ^r . G. that from it he would have no more gathered, than that the whole event (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by means in the most of them, and not implying immediate providence universally in them.

T. G.

Rather this place so troubleth M ^r . B. being indeed the only main bulwark of his cause, that like a man in a maze he runneth backward and forward, from M ^r . G ^s . to the Geneva translation, and then back to M ^r . G ^s . again, as not enduring the trial of, or trial by either.

It is true, I aver it, nor doth M ^r . B. himself here deny, but that the whole event of all things is of the Lord: nor have the words of the Text in the ordinary Translations any one word more of a Lot, and no necessary implication therefore of any immediate providence in them, which M ^r . B. would pick out of them.

I. B.

I need not examine the means or immediate providence of all the instances quoted in the margent. For here it is impliedly granted, (for he saith not, all, but, the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by means, and that there is an immediate providence particularly; for he denieth such a providence only, as being universally.

T. G.

M ^r . B. it seemeth, little passeth what he say, though never so little to the purpose, so he may seem to say something. The instances some of them are by M ^r . B. himself, though contrary to his own purpose, alleged. Mine Argument standeth thus:

Nothing is said by Solomon in this place of Lots, but what may with good warrant from God's word be truly said of all other human actions, in the most whereof yet God worketh not immediately, but by means. There is nothing therefore said of a Lot in this place, that may prove any immediate providence of God therein.

Now what is it to the purpose whether there be an immediate providence of God in some of them or no. This phrase that may be truly used, where none such is, proveth it not. The impropriety of speech here used I pass by, because it is nothing to the purpose. But till either the Antecedent here be disproved, or the Consequence (which I suppose no man will once question) infringed, M ^r . B. remaineth clean put beside his main bulwark.

I. B.

Howsoever it be in other things, I think it is manifest to all, that will see, that God without means, and therefore immediately, doth dispose the Lot cast into the lap unto this, or that event, what pleaseth him, whereas man disposeth the things only unto a variable event. As at cards a man shufleth them of purpose to dispose them unto a variable event. But by the immediate providence of God, they are so shufled as that this or that event followeth.

T. G.

Here M ^r . B. letteth go his hold of that Text, and without any direct Answer at all given to mine Argument against his deduction, now upon his bare word only telleth us, that it is so here, howsoever it be else-where, and we are all willfully blind if we see it not to be so as he saith. Let him pardon me; I believe him not. He must first show better Cards for it than he hath done yet, or else few wise men and well advised, I suppose, will believe that either all Lots in general, or the shufling of the Cards so and so, are effected without means. Any man, I think that hath his eyes in his head, may soon see it to be otherwise.

I. B.

Therefore (with M ^r . G ^s . favor) any reasonable man may judge it not senseless to say (which he doubteth of. p. 147.) that in Children's plays at even and odd, or at Heads & Points, there is an immediate providence, in inclining the will of the Child, & guiding his conjecture.

T. G.

And with M ^r . B ^s . good favor, I believe any judicious Reader will smile to hear M ^r . B. here affirm it. But I would gladly know of M ^r . B. why he skippeth thus from place to place in his Answer, and doth not go thorough with my discourse and Argument about this very particular, but balk or stride over all that lieth between that he last dealt with, and this that cometh in the very end of it. But especially I would have him tell what he can answer to that instance of a Lot propounded next immediately before this, wherein two appeal to the Cards as they lie left by those that last used them without further shuffling, who (suppose it) left the Cards (though unknown to the appealants) in some certain manner sorted as to themselves then best seemed; whether the event fall out by an immediate providence therein or no. Or, which I now add, when two shall determine to shape their course by the track of a beast gone before them, which being driven to the market by its owner, taketh this rather than that way, because the market that way lieth, whether this be also by an immediate providence or no.

I. B.

Thus we see this place doth confirm mine Assumption, and the proof annexed, M ^r . G ^s . interpretation notwithstanding.

T. G.

But no man, I am sure, unless he borrow M ^r . B ^s . spectacles, will be able ever to see it.

I. B.

But he giveth two reasons against an immediate providence in ordinary Lots.

T. G.

Though I needed not to give any: he that saith it, should prove it: yet I give indeed not two only; but more than two, if M ^r . B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I give these.

I. B.

The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate providence in a Lot, as it is casual, then there is an immediate providence in all things that are casual. But the latter is not true: ergo not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to us, is a certain word of God (saith Bernard, but M ^r . G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting us with his will, p. 17. and, In casual events there is nothing guiding them but God's providence, p. 22.

T. G.

But for over-burdening this Book, I would insert here mine own Argument at large: but so much as Mr. B. relateth shall suffice. He denieth (it seems) here the Assumption; and so auerreth that which all evidence of daily experience doth abundantly confute; and which some of those therefore that have heretofore made this the main ground of their opinion in this point now do relinquish; that there is a special and immediate providence of God in everything that falleth out casually, as in every meeting of any by the way unsought for (though his business lying this way and mine that way at that time are the means of our meeting) the stumbling at a stone, or stepping in some unclean thing, while a man looketh up or aside at some sight in a shop-window, and the like infinite accidents that daily occur. For mine own part the Assertion to me seemeth so senseless, that I will no more spend time to dispute it with him that shall offer to defend it, than with one that shall affirm all the Rivers in the world to run with salt water.

Yea but there be some sayings in mine own Book that aver it. Let us hear them.

Why first Bernard saith, That which seemeth Chance to us, is a certain word of God acquainting us with his will.

First for the Translation, then for the Exposition, and the end for which it is alleged. The words of Bernard are Sermo quidam, that is, word for word, some kind of word, or to avoid ambiguity, a word in some sort. For I hope M ^r . B. when he translateth it, a certain word, doth not take certain in that sense that he did, who expounding the words of the Gospel, There was a certain rich man, observeth thence, that though the Rich man there mentioned, were otherwise an evil man, yet he was sure and certain of his word. But M ^r . G. translateth it, as a word. And who knoweth not that quidam and quoddam are usually notes of diminution and qualification? I wish M ^r . B. had committed no greater fault in relating my words both here and elsewhere, than I have committed in translating Bernard in that manner.

For the exposition of it how it is to be understood, because I show there at large whence by M ^r . B. it is cited, I do thither refer my Reader. Only I add thereunto, upon further view of the place, that it is evidently apparent by the whole sequel of the Sermon, (the main scope whereof is to persuade men to rest satisfied with God's will and pleasure in all accidents and occurrence, as loss of friends by decease, and the like) that Bernard's meaning is, that when ought falleth out, whether by casualty (which he mentioneth, because that might most be stuck at) or otherwise, God's will was thereby manifested that so it should be, and therefore that we were to submit to God's will in it. But no more will it hence follow, that there is an immediate providence of God in all casual things, more than in any other sort of events. God's decreeing will in every event is revealed by his work. And every event, be it casual, or not casual, is a word of God revealing his pleasure unto us, and acquainting us with his will.

For the latter allegation M ^r . B. most shamefully abuseth me, or himself, and his Reader rather, clipping off just so much of the sentence spoken by me; as to make it speak directly contrary to that that it doth. He bringeth me in affirming, that In casual events there is nothing guiding them but God's providence. Whereas my words are these, If in casual events we consider ought beside the creature and the uncertain motion thereof, (uncertain, I say, to us, because not determinable by us, though determined ordinarily by some natural cause or other) there is nothing guiding them but God's providence. I remember one that in the Schools gave this Position to be disputed of, Virtus est vitium; and being required to show some Author for it, produced Horace, where he saith, Virtus est vitium fugere. And I could relate the like trick that a Popish Priest sometime shown me in some things that passed in writing between him and me. And such shifting may well be seem such as they are. But I would wish M ^r . B. to be better advised than to deal thus, if he regard his own credit. Which I wonder he would thus hazard the calling in question, unless he thought that nobody would take the pains to search the places quoted by him: where how that that I say, fitteth his turn, may soon be seen, or rather how directly it contradicteth it.

I. B.

But suppose there is not an immediate providence in all things that be casual, what is that to the purpose? For all things casual are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man unto an uncertain event: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God unto a certain event, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casual. Therefore all other casual things and Lots are not such.

T. G.

M ^r . B. before denied mine Assumption. Now he denieth either the Conclusion, or nothing. Though it be so, saith he, in other casual things, yet in a Lot it is not so; for they are wholly disposed by God, that is, in M ^r . B ^s . understanding, there is an immediate providence of God in them, which is the contradictory of my Conclusion.

What he talketh to no purpose in the world, of Lots not being such, is very frivolous. For either he understandeth not what I say, or what himself would. I ground my Proposition, upon a generally received Axiom thus;

That which agreeth to a thing as it is such or such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such; Therefore whatsoever agreeth to a Lot as it is a Casualty, must necessarily agree to every Casualtie.

M ^r . B. denieth neither Antecedent nor Consequence: but telleth us, that all casual things are not such with a Lot. To what, think we, doth this Answer? Every Casualty as it is a Casualty is such with each Casualty. For the same reason and common nature of Casualtie is in each; though each of them have something over and beside distinct either from other. And what agreeth therefore to any Casualty as it is a Casualty, must needs agree unto all.

I. B.

Neither is it said, an immediate providence is in a Lot, as it is casual, but as the Lot being made casual is wholly disposed by God to this or that event.

T. G.

M ^r . B. hath here given so sore a cut to his own cause, as he will never be able to cure again with all the skill that he hath. For what hath been the main ground, yea the only ground in effect whereupon these Games have been by his Master herein, himself, and those that concur with them condemned, but this, because they depend upon Casualty either in whole or in part? Ask M ^r . B. himself why these Games are unlawful; the very Title of his Book telleth you, because they consist in Chance. In his Epistle dedicatory he repeateth the same again. In the entrance into his Dialogue, Dice are therefore unlawful, because they depend upon Chance. And after, Dice wholly evil, because they depend wholly upon Chance; Cards and Tables somewhat evil because they depend somewhat upon Chance: And are therefore Lots, for from thence they have the denomination of a Lot, which in Latin is called Sors, that is, Chance or hazard; and therefore unlawful. And again, Whether you call Cards and Tables Lots or no, you play with chance or use Lottery, and by so doing make God an umpire in play, which must needs be a sin: because you take the name of God in vain and tempt the Almighty by a game some putting of things to hazard, and making play of Lotterie. Again what do those words imply, the disposing of chance is secret that it may be chance indeed, and wholly of God: but that therefore it is wholly (that is in M ^r . B ^s . meaning immediately ) of God, because it is Chance, which else it were not. Go •… we a little higher from M ^r . B. to his Teacher (as himself termeth him) herein M ^r . F. The Nature of a Lot, saith he, lieth wholly in this, that although the thing be of us, yet the disposition is wholly of God, that is, he useth not our means of cunning, practice, strength, &c. but taketh it wholly to himself. And therefore Dice, dealing of Cards, &c. where the matter is laid on hazard (as they call it) or rather God's providence, without using any cunning of ours to dispose, is upon the same reason of a Lot unlawful. Yea hence he inferreth that to say, what luck is this! how crooked! is in plain terms (so he speaketh) as much as to say, what a God, or a crooked providence of God is this! as presuming that luck, chance, or hazard, (for all is one in effect) is nothing else but God's providence. Now what doth all this tend unto but this: That therefore these games are unlawful because they depend upon Casualty, which maketh them to be Lots: and that therefore it is unlawful to use any game depending upon Casualty; because in that regard there is an immediate providence of God in it? Whereas M ^r . B. therein crossing all this, and ouerturning his own grounds, here telleth us, that It is not said an immediate providence is in a Lot, as it is casual. But how then? forsooth as being casual it is wholly disposed by God to this or that event. That is as much as to say, An immediate providence of God is not in a Lot, as it is casual, (though that be the ground whereupon we have formerly affirmed it to be) but as there is an immediate providence of God in it; (idem per idem) for that is, to be wholly disposed by God; as M ^r . B. still meaneth. Thus you see how M ^r . B. hath now mended the matter, and made good his own grounds. But he will have somewhat out of my words yet, before he have done with them.

I. B.

So that from M ^r . G ^s . axiom this Argument may be framed. An immediate providence in an extraordinary Lot is acknowledged by M ^r . G. as it is a Lot (say I) wholly disposed by God: Therefore an immediate providence is in an ordinary Lot, (as it is a Lot) wholly disposed by God. For there is no difference between these sorts of Lots (as they be Lots) and so disposed. For M ^r . G. hath shown that Prov. 16. 33. speaketh as well of one sort of Lots, as of another.

T. G.

How this that followeth cometh in with a, So that, I know not. Yet let us see what it is. M ^r . G. he saith, hath shown, (I grant it indeed, but I show it not; it is he that should show it, or he will never be able to convince those that say otherwise) that Prov. 16. 33 speaketh of Lots in general as well ordinary as extraordinary. Be it so, what of that? But I acknowledge also an immediate providence in an extraordinary Lot; and that is therein as it is a Lot; saith M ^r . B. and therefore by M ^r . G ^s . Axiom, it must be so in an ordinary one also. For this I suppose it is that he would say. But he must first show where I acknowledge an immediate providence to be in every extraordinary Lot, which I deny to be in many thousands of them: and then prove it to be in such a Lot as it is a Lot; which to affirm and not prove, is to require that in effect without proof to be granted, which all the controversy is about, and which he must not think will be yielded upon his bare, I say.

I. B.

The other Argument is this, which is the Kil kow. If in every Lot there be necessarily an immediate work and providence of God, then it is in the natural power of man to make God work immediately at his pleasure.

But to say that it is in man's power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an immediate work and providence of God necessarily in every Lot. M ^r . G. like an Orator seemeth desirous to draw his Adversary into hatred by these words, [Necessarily, Natural power, Set God on working, At pleasure, To say, and Absurd] Verba dum sint, surdo cannot. But hoping better, I answering his Logic deny the Assumption. For it is as much in man's natural power to set God on working immediately in an ordinary, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God and man do respectively as much in the one Lot as in the other.

T. G.

It is M ^r . B ^s . guise not mine to seek to draw his Adversaries into hatred, by traducing them as Pleaders for Dice play and such abuses as attend thereon, where it is used otherwise than it ought, because they deny every lusorious Lot to be unlawful, or diceplay simply evil in regard of the Lot used in it. I reason but here from what M ^r . B. himself granteth, as shall hereafter appear.

But M ^r . B. denieth the Assumption, which is this, To say that it is in man's power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure, is absurd. And dare M ^r . B. then deny this Assumption? He might as well say, It is in man's power naturally to set God on working of miracles at his pleasure; as say, It is in his power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure. For is not every immediate work of God, or every work wrought without means, miraculous? Some miracles have been wrought by means: but nothing is wrought wholly without means, that is not miraculous. Well, I will not say, that it is blasphemous to •… err this: but yet I believe it cometh nearer blasphemy than anything in my Book doth.

Yea but M ^r . B. hath some good reason for the denial of mine Assumption. For, It is as much in man's power naturally to set God on working immediately in an ordinary as in an extraordinary Lot. Very true, as much in the one as in the other. That is in very truth in neither. If there be in an extraordinary Lot of God's special appointment, (for in no other is there any certainty of it) an immediate providence, neither is that there by any power of man naturally procured, nor is God set a work therein at man's pleasure, but he worketh therein upon his own pleasure, and man only by his appointment. This M ^r . B. himself saw well, and addeth therefore,

I. B.

But an extraordinary Lot is by the special direction of God. True; So is an ordinary Lot by God's special advice to end a controversy.

T. G.

It followeth not from the one to the other. And the reason is apparent. Because in the extraordinary Lot the event required, be it, to find out a malefactor, as in Achan's case, or to discover who the man is that God hath fore-appointed to such an office, as in Saul's case, cannot certainly be effected without such an immediate providence; whereas in the ordinary Lot, nothing is to be determined, but may well and certainly be decided without it. But if it be so, as M ^r . B. saith, that therefore in an ordinary Lot there is an immediate providence; and therefore a setting of God on working immediately so oft as such a Lot is used, because an ordinary Lot is by God's special advice to end a Controuersie: How is that true both in his Dialogue, and in the very next words implied by him, that in a lusorious Lot God is thus set on working? For if God have given no allowance for lusorious Lots, how is he in them set so on working, who doth not so work, but where Lots are used by his own allowance? Or how sin they in setting God on working there, where he doth not work? M ^r . B. therefore here hangeth fast in the briers.

I. B.

If then every Lot be a setting of our glorious God on working, there ought to be prayer, if not by words, yet in heart in the use as well of ordinary as extraordinary Lots. If so, then Lots are not to be used in sports.

T. G.

If every Lot be, saith M ^r . B. contrary to what before he implied, that unless it be done by God's assignment, it is not. If it be so indeed, the rest will follow. But that is it that is to be proved. And for Conclusion of this Argument, let it be observed, that M ^r . B. cannot make this good, whereupon the whole strength of this his principal Argument dependeth, & for the proof whereof he alledgeth, Pro. 16. 33. to wit, that there is an immediate providence of God in every Lot whatsoever, unless this absurd Position be also granted him, that

It is naturally in every man's ( nay in every child's) power, to set God on working immediately at pleasure:

And that little children as oft as they cast for cross and pile, cause God therein to work a miraculous work. That which the rather I require to be observed and remembered, because the whole pith of the next Argument, yea of all the rest in a manner, dependeth upon this point.

The second Argument.

WE are not to tempt the Almighty by a vain desire of manifestation of his power and special providence.

But by using Lots in sport we do so: therefore we may not use Lots in sport.

T. G.

The Assumption they seem to prove on this wise.

To call God to sit in judgment where there is no necessity so to do, or for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mock God:

But by the use of Lots in sport, God is called to sit in judgment where there is no necessity, for the determining of trifles.

By the use of Lots in sport therefore we tempt and dishonor God.

The Proposition is confirmed à simili, by the King and Council, by whose government though we all live, yet were it a dishonor to them to be called upon by children to determine their sports.

I. B.

The Assumption is proved à pari, by comparing together a Lot and an Oath: A Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the providence and determining presence of God, as an Oath in the nature thereof doth suppose the testifying presence of God. Yea so, that as in an Oath, so in a Lot, Prayer is expressed or to be understood. In which regard also as an Oath, so a Lot is an act of religion, in which we refer unto God the determining of such weighty things as can no other ways be determined: and therefore in the use of it is ever infolded, and sometime also expressed, both a confession that God is a sovereign Judge to determine such things, and a supplication to him that by the Lot, when it is cast, he will be pleased so to do. A Lot, therefore, as an Oath, is not to be used but in case of necessity and extremity: and being a solemn act of religion may not be applied to sporting: We may as well jest with the Word, and Sacraments, and Oaths, as with Lots.

There might be diverse several Arguments framed out of these allegations; but because they build all on one ground, and stand upon one bottom, I have thought best to put them in this manner together, that the same common answer might serve them all.

First therefore the using of Lots either in matters sage and serious, or of sport and delight is not of it self any desire of the manifestation of God's special power and providence by an immediate disposition, unless men offend against the caution before given in doing it to this end, to try thereby whether God will vouchsafe to work immediately and extraordinarily or no; which being not of the nature of the thing it self, is not necessarily implied in the ordinary use of it. Neither is there any such calling in of God to decide doubts in game, but the matter in question is put to the casual disposition of the Creature; no more than there was any solemn calling of God in, or calling upon him to determine the Tithe, in the example before alleged out of the Law. And therefore consequently no such tempting of God, as is here charged, in the use of a Lot, be it used either in case of necessity or otherwise.

Yea rather if a Lot be such, as here they say, it is not to be used in my business at all upon any occasion whatsoever. For, It is not lawful to tempt God in any case whatsoever: But to use Lots in any case whatsoever is to tempt God: It is not lawful therefore to use Lots in any case whatsoever.

The Assumption is thus proved evidently by the former grounds and grants: To require a work of God's immediate power and providence in this or that kind, is to stint, and so to tempt God: But to use a Lot in any case, is to require a work of God's immediate power and providence: (for every Lot, say they, is such:) Therefore to use a Lot in any case whatsoever is unlawful.

But this Conclusion is untrue: for a Lot in some cases may lawfully be used: the former ground therefore is false.

It is indeed unlawful and a tempting of God to use a Lot so as they would have it used only, to wit, requiring and expecting an extraordinary work of God in it, in any case or upon any occasion whatsoever, without God's express appointment of it, though all means should fail otherwise. For to have recourse to extraordinary means when ordinary fail, is to tempt God by refusing to depend and wait upon God, as our Savior implieth, when at the Devils motion he refused to speak to his Father to have stones turned into bread, lest by so doing he should tempt God, though it were in case of extremity: that which was the sin of the Israelites sometime in the Wilderness. No such Lot therefore at all as they allow of is allowable. And to speak as the truth is, by the course and force of this their discourse, the only lawful use of a Lot is disallowed and condemned, and an unlawful and unwarrantable use of it is allowed in the room of it.

Secondly, an Oath and a Lot are not alike: the comparison therefore laid between them will not hold. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot put to the special providence or immediate and extraordinary work of God; as the truth of the thing testified is in an oath put to his testimony: neither is there in every Lot any such solemn invocation of God, as there is in an Oath ever either expressed or implied, by which God is called to witness with us the truth of that we avow, or the truth of our purpose to perform what we promise: as may hereby appear.

The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so some of the adverse party define Lottery out of Lyra, To use Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtful or uncertain matter. Which definition of Lottery containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.

Neither do the places produced prove it. They prove only that Prayer was sometime used (but a faithless prayer the one of them without word or warrant) before an extraordinary Lot for an extraordinary power and providence to direct the event of it; the thing intended being such as the Lot by no natural power, either of the Creature using it, or used in it, was able to effect: which kind of prayer hath no place, nor is lawful in ordinary or mere diuisory Lots. For example: In assigning and setting out Tithe, it was not lawful, much less necessary, to pray God so to give a right Lot, that every Lamb or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainly or constantly so come to hand. But they prove not that prayer is part of a Lot, or is in the Lot, as it is part of an Oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the usual definitions of an Oath may appear. In election of offices sacred or civil, prayer is used or at least ought to be used: yet it followeth not therefore that prayer is a part of the choice, or that therefore the election in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a special providence and determining presence of God. Yea prayer may be used both before game and in game, as both before and at meat, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a special providence of God and a determining presence in it.

Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it self, as before hath been shown: there is much difference therefore between Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments, and Oaths. For these things are holy of themselves and in their own nature, as the very definitions of them will soon show: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not always and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as ever, in our ordinary use; whereas no Lot is holy that we can use nowadays; nor indeed was ever any so, save extraordinarily. But God's taking of anything sometime extraordinarily, or from ordinary use, to apply it to some holy and extraordinary use, doth not exempt the kind in general, but the thing only it self so used in special from civil or light and ordinary usage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the use of water in Baptism hindereth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptism, or that hath so been, but is not now. In like manner, when a Lot shall be extraordinarily used for a special sign of God's immediate election and choice, whosoever shall then contemn or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and God's name in so doing; but not whosoever shall use otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had been used in such a business before; there remaining no more holiness in it after that use is over, than in the bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himself to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.

To this long Answer I might make a short Reply. For whereas M ^r . G ^s . main ground i •… this: There is no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinary Lot, and thereupon he buildeth these Answers. Therefore there is no tempting of God by using Lots in sport. Therefore Prayer expressed, or to be understood, is (not) required in ordinary Lots: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is not an holy thing in it self. I might (referring myself to the defense of my former Argument) briefly reply and say: There is an immediate providence of God in an ordinary Lot: Therefore God is tempted by using Lots in sport: Therefore Prayer expressed, or to be understood, is required of them who use an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is an holy thing.

Here that appeareth that I told you before, that unless you grant M ^r . B. what he could not in the former Argument make good, all is gone. For here is nothing that will stand, unless that be made good. So that by his own acknowledgment nothing needed to be anew answered to this Argument, if sufficient Answer have been given to the former.

But M ^r . G. he saith upon such ground denieth all this.

1. M ^r . G. need lay no ground at all for his denial: It is enough for him barely to deny some Proposition, which upon his denial M ^r . B. is to prove.

2. M ^r . G. doth not deny all this upon such ground as M ^r . B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediate providence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in every extraordinary one: for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to work in such manner save when he himself will? But because it cannot be proved that there is so ordinarily in ordinary Lots, nor doth the nature of a Lot require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already been shown.

3. I might demand of M ^r . B. how the use of a lusorious Lot can be a tempting of God, by desiring the manifestation of his special providence in his immediate disposing, if such an immediate providence of God be generally in all Lots. For what is it to tempt God, but to stint him to that, or to try him whether he will do that, or no, which it is uncertain whether he be willing unto or no? But if in all Lots such an immediate providence of God be, then it is certain before hand that God will so work in it. And if it be said, that God is not willing to have lusorious Lots •… ast; yet he is not unwilling, if this ground be good, when they are cast so to work in them: for who can enforce him to it, unless he will? A man might reason therefore rather backward from M ^r . B ^s . grounds, and say, An immediate providence of God is in every Lot necessarily: And, Therefore it is no tempting of God to expect that of it, that cannot but be in it, to wit, a special providence in disposing the Lot without means.

I. B.

But something more in replying, will have more savor in reading.

T. G.

True: if it be not so unsavory as some things before have been. Otherwise the more and the longer, I suppose, the less savor.

I. B.

Therefore I first marvel that M ^r . G. forgetteth himself in concluding: That all Lots be unlawful, if there be an immediate providence in all Lots. What? Were extraordinary Lots unlawful too? Nay; he understandeth an exception of them, because they were commanded by God. So I say, ordinary Lots were advised by God to end controversies. Therefore using them in that case is no tempting of God.

I. B.

M ^r . B. might, if he pleased, easily have seen what my Conclusion intendeth, not to determine ought concerning any such Lots as by God's special appointment were sometime used with expectation of such a special and extraordinary providence in them, but of such only as may in these days be lawfully used, which alone we now deal with. Between which two sorts there is much difference in the case now questioned. It being no tempting of God to expect such an extraordinary work of his in the one, because without it that could not be certainly effected, for which he had enjoined them to be used. Whereas in the other it is; because neither the business whereunto they are used, requireth it, nor hath God himself anywhere promised it. So that it is not the want of either command or warrant for the use of them, but the expecting or requiring that which there is no ground or promise of God for in the use of them, that maketh them guilty in that kind.

That which followeth therefore I avow still, and can easily make good; both that all extraordinary Lots now used are unlawful, and no better than mere Soreeries; as the attempting by Lot to discover a malefactor would be, which yet was lawful when God enjoined it.

And again that to use any Lots in that manner as M ^r . B. prescribeth, to wit, with invocation for and expectation of a special and immediate work of God's providence therein, or to put things to Lot upon presumption of such providence, is to tempt God, he having nowhere promised any such thing.

I. B.

I marvel also, why M ^r . G. should so confidently affirm, that by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate providence in all Lots, an unlawful use of a Lot is allowed in the room of the only lawful use.

T. G.

The reason is apparent, because such an use is allowed, as is superstitious, and without warrant. Yea such as M ^r . B. himself, I doubt not, but will condemn, if that position be unsound, to wit, that such an immediate providence, as M ^r . B. pretendeth, is ordinarily in Lots; which M ^r . B. knowing that M ^r . G. denieth: why should he marvel that he holdeth that, that doth necessarily follow upon the denial of it?

I. B.

But I refer the discussing hereof to the defense of my third Argument.

T. G.

There then we shall deal further with it.

I. B.

Again it is to be observed, that he sets down a Comparison between an Oath and a Lot, which I set not down, whereby the mind of the Reader may be troubled. For I say not: As the truth of a thing is by an Oath put to God's Testimony; so in an Ordinary Lot the right of a thing is put to God's immediate providence. This is it that I say: As an Oath in the Nature thereof supposeth the testifying presence of God: so a Lot, in the Nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a Controuersie; I say not, Deciding a right: For before dividing the land of promise by Lot, no Tribe, or family could challenge more right to one portion than to another. Ending (I say) a controversy is by a Lot referred to God's determining, the same by his whole or immediate disposing the uncertain Lot to a certain event.

T. G.

I set down no more as M ^r . B ^s . but what is his, and he himself in precise terms hath set down before me. Only I show diverse differences, and those material between an Oath and a Lot, in regard whereof there is no sound reasoning from the one to the other. And among other things withal show, that there is no necessity of God's determining presence in such manner as is here presumed in a Lot, because there is nothing in an ordinary Lot put upon Lottery, that requireth any such divine determining presence.

But whereas M ^r . B. here auerreth that no right of ought is in an ordinary Lot put to Question, because the use of it is only to end Controuersie; the reason is most frivolous: For are not Controuersies most frequent about matter of Right? and many of them more impossible to be ended by any other course, than other Controuersies ordinarily are? And sure if there be such an immediate providence and a determining presence of God in them, as by M ^r . B. is presumed, why should not questions of right, where they cannot well be determined otherwise, be referred to a Lot, as well, if not rather, than any other? Since also that that place in the Proverbs speaketh of Controuersies in general, without distinction or exclusion of any. For to reason, as M ^r . B. here from a particular to a general, There was no question of right (though that also may be questioned by those that rank that among extraordinary Lots) in the division of the land of Canaan; Therefore there is none in any: I say no more but that it is like M ^r . B ^s . reasoning oft else-where.

I. B.

It is also to be observed that in the 2. Comparison between an Oath and a Lot, touching Prayer, he saith, Neither is there in every Lot any such solemn invocation. Therefore in some Lot, there is, that is, in an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate providence to direct the event of it. For the same cause (say I) prayer to be expressed, or understood in the use of an ordinary Lot to.

T. G.

You see, if a man grant M ^r . B. what he will, he can prove what he list. We had this before in the brief Answer at first: Why doth he trouble his Reader now with it again? But you see, he cannot go on an inch unless that be still granted; which will never be made good.

I. B.

But, saith M ^r . G. Prayer is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lot. I have said nothing to the contrary. So that he might have spared his definition of a Lot.

T. G.

But if he say nothing now to it, he answereth not mine Argument; that therefore prayer is not necessarily in every Lot either expressed or implied. Wherein also because I spake somewhat short then, it being sufficient to give the contradictory to M ^r . B ^s . assertion, I speak further home now and say, that it is not in any Lot at all; for it is one thing to be used about it, another thing to be in it. Prayer, and other discourse is used oft about or at our meals, but is not therefore in them.

I. B.

But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To use Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtful, or uncertain matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Even by God's whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principal hand in the determination? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or understood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof.

1. If that definition be but a sory one, why did M ^r . B. give no better? Or why doth he not show wherein it is defective?
2. You see still, he must have that granted him, which so oft he inculcateth, or else nothing will fadge with him.
3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principal, because a ruling and over-ruling hand in all things. Must solemn prayer therefore be necessarily used before everything, every step that a man strideth, or every chery that he eateth?
4. It is one thing to have prayer used about a thing; another thing to have prayer necessarily understood or implied in it.
5. By this silly reason it may be proved that any serious affaire about which solemn prayer is to be used, is of the same nature with an Oath.

I. B.

Now then let us consider the places produced to prove it. The former (saith M ^r . G. ) was faithless. I say so too. Because that Lot was without any warrant. This notwithstanding, prayer in this and the other place, doth show that God's people believing that God doth signify his judgment by the whole or immediate disposition of that Lot, did therefore think themselves bound to pray.

T. G.

What is all this to prove that in a Lot, as in an Oath, prayer is ever understood or implied. A man might as well reason thus; Our Savior more than once prayed, before he brake bread: Therefore in all breaking of Bread prayer ever is implied.

I need not add, that in those being extraordinary, there was necessary cause to crave by prayer some special presence and providence, because M ^r . B. himself in his next words observeth it.

I. B.

But both their Lots were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate providence of God. Therefore they might well believe that they should pray. True: so all Christians may, yea and must believe, they ought to pray in the using ordinary Lots, because of God's immediate providence exercised therein.

T. G.

True, if they will believe M ^r . B. on his word: but not else: for out of God's word, I am sure, he cannot make this good, which yet so oft he repeateth, and buildeth all upon.

I. B.

Nay; It was unlawful in setting out Tithe. If so; not because it was an ordinary Lot, (if a Lot) but because the Lord expressly saith, of all that goeth under the rod the tenth shall be holy.

T. G.

I nowhere deny that any Prayer might have been used at that manner of assignment, but prayer only to such particular purpose. Which yet if it had been used, did not require ought against the tenths being holy, but that each tenth might come forth according to the due order of being yeaned.

I. B.

The instance of election of Offices is besides the purpose. For it is not argued thus: Because God's people prayed when they used a Lot; therefore there is an immediate providence of God in a Lot. But thus: There is an immediate providence of God in a Lot: Therefore God's people prayed when they used a Lot.

T. G.

Then belike it was produced to prove nothing at all that was to be proved. For the point to be proved was not that God's people prayed at the use of a Lot, but that that a Lot doth suppose the determining presence, or immediate providence of God. Which hereby also M ^r . B. endeavored to prove. But now M ^r . B. it seemeth, taketh that for a thing granted; which is the point that he is to prove.

The instance is to the purpose; for it doth show that Prayer is not therefore implied in a Lot, as in an Oath, though it be used thereabout.

I. B.

If then there be an immediate providence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof prayer is to be expressed or understood in the lawful use of a Lot, then praying and playing (though they rime well together, yet) run not well together in the lawful use of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both, That a Lot is not to be used but in a case of necessity more or less. And therefore strange (I will not say, absurd) is M ^r . G ^s . Position p. 111. to wit, The less weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be proved, that the less weighty the matter is, the greater is the necessity of ending the controversy by a Lot. The said Position is more strange, because he granteth p. 95. That Prayer specially applied to the Lot may (in some case) be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, as in the choice of a Magistrate. But concerning this also more shall be said in my next Reply.

T. G.

If a man grant M ^r . B. his Ifs still, he can prove anything: else nothing. He said but even now that he doth not here prove it, and yet presently upon it, he telleth us, If then it be so &c. as if it were here proved to hand. But unless that be proved, all that followeth is just naught. For naught and naught and naught maketh naught; as in Ciphering they use to say.

Yet that praying & playing do not at all run well, I hope M ^r . B. will not affirm. For albeit a man may not play with prayer, yet he may pray, I hope, before he play; yea and upon just occasion too at his play.

That absurd Position, as M ^r . B. here implieth it to be, hath been sufficiently canuased already; and hath more truth in it, I believe, than M ^r . B. is aware of. If ought further come against it, it shall in his due place be answered. That here alleged of Prayer used with some Lot, no way crosseth it; nor doth M ^r . B. show wherein it any way doth.

I. B.

Lastly, It serveth my turn that M ^r . G. acknowledgeth that God's name, and an Holy thing is abused, whensoever an extraordinary Lot is contemned, because an immediate providence of God is therein. For the same cause an ordinary Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abused in sport. But M ^r . G. hath shown before, that a Lot is not in it self an Holy thing. Indeed; he would have shown in his third Reason, inducing him to allow lusorious Lots, as not evil in themselves, that a Lot is not holy either in it self, or by divine institution. Whereunto I have already answered somewhat. But having learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now for some more satisfaction, answer somewhat more. A Lot (saith M ^r . G. p. 132, & 133.) is not holy either in it self, because a Casualtie hath no holiness in it self: For then all Casualties should be holy: or by divine institution in the word sanctifying it to some holy Use.

I answer briefly. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an holy thing in it self, because of God's immediate providence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in respect of the same providence? If it be, Then though all casualties be not holy in themselves, yet all lawful Lots be holy in themselves. So that as the Bush that burnt and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested himself to Moses in it, p. 156. So a Lot is holy, because of God's special presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully used, because of God's special presence therein from time to time. Therefore howsoever sport might have been made with the Bush, the presence of God being removed; yet ought sport never be made with a Lot, because God's special presence is ever therein.

T. G.

This should have come before. Yet better at last, we say, than never. But what new matter hath M ^r . B. here brought? Doth he anymore than abuse his Reader by singing over and over his wonted song, that in every lawful Lot (it must be in everyone lawful or unlawful, if it be of the nature and essence of a Lot) there is an immediate providence: and if so, then that such and such things follow; that which no man doubteth of or denieth. I pass by, that he saith, I grant that every extraordinary Lot is God's Name, and God's Name abused in it, when it is contemned; whereas I hold many extraordinary Lots, as all Diuinatorie ones used nowadays, to be rather the Devils Name; and God's Name most honored, when they are most, not contemned only, but detested too.

I. B.

Again, I need not prove that an ordinary Lot to end controversies is by divine institution in the word, seeing M ^r . G. granteth that God in Prov. 18. 18. adviseth us to use it to that end.

T. G.

What I grant, is to be seen. But by this Argument a man may as well prove, every peare-plum, or Lectise-leaf, to be holy, because by divine institution in the word, all herbs and fruits are for man's use. M ^r . B. himself saw the slightnesse hereof: and addeth therefore to mend the matter:

I. B.

But it is not sanctified to an holy use. I have shown otherwise.

T. G.

Where? Can you tell?

I. B.

But what then? Is not a Lot therefore always holy in it self? as M ^r . G. saith in this passage.

T. G.

I nowhere say, that a Lot is not always holy in it self, (nor is any at all so) but only, that Lots are not always sacred.

I. B.

Were all extraordinary Lots sanctified to holy uses?

T. G.

Yea: all that were used by God's special direction, if M ^r . B. speak of such, were sanctified to an holy use, to wit, to be divine Oracles. And what then?

I. B.

Yet M ^r . G. deemeth them all holy in themselves, because of immediate providence in them.

T. G.

Rather: therefore he deemeth them sacred, and in that regard holy, though not holy otherwise of themselves.

I. B.

Why may not I for the same cause, think the same of all ordinary Lots?

T. G.

Prove the same, and then think the same of them. But this is nothing but the rolling of Sisyphus his stone forward and backward: and taking still for granted the main Question it self.

I. B.

And the rather because M ^r . G. saith, p. 227. Marriage being God's ordinance is holy in it self. But (as he acknowledgeth, p. 1.) a Lot is God's ordinance. Therefore from his grant a Lot is holy in it self. If then a Lot is holy in it self, I conclude with M ^r . G. p. 133. It may in no case be made matter of sport.

T. G.

This belike is the new matter that M. B. had of late better learned, and which he thought good therefore to close up this his wild and diffused discourse with; reserving that that he thought would strike all dead to the last. But so sory and silly a thing it is, that I wonder a man of his gravity, unless he did it a little to recreate himself, would produce it. For what man of the meanest understanding seeth not▪ that there is a mere equivocation in the word holy: taken in the Proposition in a general sense, as all God's ordinances, recreation and meat (which in one of the places of Scripture there by me cited, is conjoined with it) as well as marriage, are said to be holy: but concluded in the strict sense here disputed of, as those things only are termed holy, that have special relation unto God: which of Marriage, I suppose, unless it be, as the Popish sort say, a Sacrament, M ^r . B. will not avouch. What such poor shifts as these are argue, I had rather others should say than myself.

Let me add but a word, to solue a seeming contradiction; (howsoever I say not in that place, that Marriage is holy in it self, which yet I well might;) that it is one thing to say, a thing is holy of it self, not requiring therefore any further special institution to make it such; and another thing to say, that it is holy in it self, in way of opposition to man's corrupt and evil usage of it, that may pollute and unhallow that that is holy in it self.

The third Argument.

WHatsoeuer God hath sanctified to a proper end, is not to be perverted to a worse end .

But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controversies .

Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worse; viz. to play, and by playing to get away another man's money, which without controversy is his own.

This Argument thus conceived is faulty two ways. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be perverted, or perversely used; but whether the use of Lots questioned; be a perverting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither again is the question whether men may use Lots playing for money; (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it belawfull or no, I shall not need now to diseusse) much less, whether they may be used in game to that end, to get another man's money from him, or no; (which is no general use of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is used only at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall join, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be used in sport.

Secondly, there is more inferred in the conclusion than was in the premisses, and that which followeth not from ought in them. For the use of a Lot in play is ever to decide some question or controversy, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controversy truly so termed; otherwise it were no Lot.

For the mending of these faults, the Argument may better be conceived on this manner:

That which God hath sanctified to some proper use, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse use. But God hath sanctified Lots to this proper use, to wit, the deciding of controversies in matters of weight. A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other use, much less to a worse.

The Proposition is proved by an instance of the Temple, set apart for prayer, which the Jews therefore are reproved for applying to market and merchandise.

The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Solomon, The Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty. For the other place is but an instance that a Lot once was by God's own appointment so used. It is amplified à simili, by the like use of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought to prove that Solomon's purpose in those words before alleged, is to show the only lawful use of a Lot, (viz▪ to end controversies, which otherwise conveniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mighty to yield) thus: As when the Apostle saith, An Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach us, that men use an Oath to end controversies; (which every man knoweth) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure only for that use of necessary deciding of doubts-of importance among men: so the like words used of a Lot must be understood in the same sense▪ not so much to teach us that a Lot ended such controversies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it only for that use.

For the fuller answer to this Argument and the proofs of it, diverse distinctions, of some good use, would be observed.

First therefore the word, sanctify, is diversely taken. For to omit all other acceptions; it is taken sometime in a larger sense; and so to sanctify signifieth to assign a creature to any special or singular use whatsoever, either sacred or civil: thus are the Medians said by God to be sanctified for the subduing and sacking of Babel: and so are meats said to be sanctified by God's word for man's food; and the unbelieving Mate sanctified to the married believer▪

Sometime again it is taken in a stricter sense; and so to sanctify signifieth to set apart a Creature beside his ordinary use to some sacred and spiritual employment: as where it is said▪ that God sanctified the seventh day of the world; and where men are commanded to sanctify the same: he by precept enjoining that employment of it; they by practice employing it according to his precept.

Now in both these kinds may the Lord well be said sometime to sanctify, but not to appropriate; when by his ordinance he either enjoineth or granteth the use of a Creature so in some kind, as yet he restraineth not, nor inhibiteth the use of it in any other kind. Thus are the fruits of the earth so sanctified for man's food, as they are not yet restrained from physic: yea thus was the water that miraculously gushed out of the rock so sanctified to a spiritual employment, as yet it was not denied unto civil and profane uses, even to the watering of brute beasts: sometime to sanctify and to appropriate, when God sequestreth and seuereth the Creature so sanctified unto someone special or proper use from all other uses else whatsoever.

And thus he sanctifieth and appropriateth either the whole kind of the Creature; as that curious composition of precious and holy ointment expressly inhibited to all other uses; or some particular only of that kind; as the spices and odors ingredients of that holy ointment; as the Tabernanacle, the Temple, and the appurtenances of either: and as those Elements of water, bread and wine that in the Sacraments are sanctified to be signs and pledges of spiritual grace: and that again, either so to continue during the date of that law, as in the vnguent before spoken of; or during the time only of the special use to those ends, as in the Elements last mentioned.

To apply these distinctions then to the present Argument: If they take the word sanctify in the stricter sense, the Proposition is true, but the Assumption is unsound: for Lots are not set apart, or said so to be in either of the places produced, to any holy or spiritual, but to a civil use only.

If in the larger and more general sense, then either they speak of things sanctified only but not appropriated, or of things both sanctified and appropriated too, and that either the whole kind in general, or some of the kind only.

If of things sanctified only, but not appropriated, the Proposition is not true; For bread and wine are sanctified to be seals of God's covenant, and yet doth not that hinder the lawful use of them otherwise: so was oil sometime sanctified to anoint Kings and Priests, and yet did not that then restrain the civil use of it for food, physic, necessity or lawful delight. Or to use a more familiar instance and nearer the present purpose, the fruits of trees are sanctified to be man's food; yet doth not that let but that children, as of old time they did, may lawfully play and make themselves pastime as well with nuts or almonds, as with cheri-stones, or with checkstones, and the like.

If of things sanctified and appropriated; as it was in that holy ointment inhibited to all other uses; and as it is in the Sacraments sequestered and set apart to certain spiritual purposes only, the Assumption is unsound.

If of the sanctification and appropriation not of the whole kind, but of some particulars of the kind, the premisses might be granted, and yet nothing concluded against the use of Lots in general.

If of the whole kind, the Proposition is true, though the proof be not so pertinent; but the Assumption is not sound.

For the proof of it out of Solomon: that place showeth only how a Lot may well and wisely be used; but neither enjoineth that use of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. It approveth only the use as good and commendable in that kind: But it is one thing for a Lot to be used well and wisely to that end; and another thing to have that the proper or only end of it.

But the Apostles speech of an Oath showeth that Solomon meant so, when he used the like speech of a Lot.

It doth nothing less. For neither is it true that the Apostles scope was to show that this is the only end of an oath, to stint strife and controversy, neither is it so indeed.

His purpose is not to show it: for it is only to show how sacred, firm and inviolable an Oath is among men from man to man; (which he proveth by that which all men know and acknowledge) and how much more then from God to man, when he sweareth to us by whom we swear: like the Argument used by the Apostle else-where, A man's covenant or testament once ratified no man annulleth; much less can any annul or abrogate God's.

Neither is that the only lawful end of an Oath. For there be other ends of it; as, to give assurance of the performance of covenants and promises. For what controversy was there between Jonathan and David to be ended by Oath, when they swear either to other? or what controversy was there between God and Abraham, or David and God; when God sware to Abraham, and David to God? or what controversy is there to be ended by those Oaths, that men usually take at entrance into office both in Church and Common▪ weal?

The like may be said of that other place of Solomon. The scope of the place is not to stint or restrain the use of a Lot to the ending of strife, much less to the ending of great quarrels only; or among men of might alone, though Solomon expressly name such: For he speaketh of contentions in general: And why may not a mean inheritance be divided by Lot among mean men as well as a rich one among mighty men? Or do not contentions arise among mighty men many times about mean matters? But the scope of it is rather to persuade all sorts of men to compose their controversies, be they great or small, rather by such a course so easy and so equal, than to plunge themselves by eager pursuit of Law-suits into further inconveniences; and to induce men of mean condition the rather so to do, when even men of might are content oft to submit themselves thereunto.

Not to add, that Lots have been used oft to other ends (for it is but one use among many that is there mentioned) as both hath been in part, and shall further hereafter be shown, and as some of them that in this point oppose us, confess.

I would thank M ^r . G. for mending mine Argument, though there be not any great need, if he had not put into his Assumption these words [In matters of weight] for his own purpose, as shall appear.

What need there was both of mending it, and of inserting those words, that it might conclude, and the conclusion might not be wholly impertinent, by mine Answer may appear.

I. B.

But to the matter. In mine understanding and meaning, the proposition doth sufficiently express all that which moveth M ^r . G. to grant it.

T. G.

Yea and somewhat more too; for it beggeth the question in controversy, and presumeth that that is to be proved; which the Conclusion following it must needs also have done; as in mine Answer I show.

I. B.

Well; then let us consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth M ^r . G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not enjoined? What? Is Recreation (in general) enjoined by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by just consequence? as M ^r . G. in his allowance of lusorious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so useful an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controversies, enjoined by precept, either directly or by just consequence? Doth God more carefully provide for recreations, than for peace among his people? But M ^r . G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135. where he saith: The use of Lots is not simply commanded. For Prov. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept; and not so much a commandment, as an advice and counsel. I will come to an issue. If it will please M ^r . G. to set down his just consequence to prove Recreation enjoined by precept, I will undertake to set down as just a consequence to prove, that a Lot to end a Controuersie is likewise enjoined by precept. In mean while, I cannot be persuaded, that our God of peace, who commandeth us to seek peace and follow after it, and hath ordained a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate providence, to end controversies, which otherwise cannot be ended conveniently, doth leave us at liberty in that case, to use or not to use a Lot.

T. G.

1. M ^r . B. is somewhat like those Lawyers of whom Aristotle saith, that they would have little to say, if they were held to the matter that they are to deal in. He taketh occasion here to run out into a by-matter, which though all were granted him is not a pin to the purpose. For the question is, whether Lots be not only sanctified, but appropriated so to the ending of Controuersies, that to no other purpose they may be used, and whether Solomon's testimony, Prov. 18. 18. prove as much. Now grant all that M ^r . B. here pleadeth for, and that I deny not; That the use of Lots is enjoined in some cases, such as he last mentioneth, or, that it is enjoined by just consequence out of the word, is this sufficient to prove that it is therefore to that use only appropriated, or that this place of Solomon proveth the same? This I deny to follow; and (besides that reason it self evidently discovereth as much) M ^r . B. himself elsewhere cutteth the very sinews of his own Argument, where having objected that Bread and Wine are in the Sacrament to holy uses sanctified, and yet we may recreate our selves therewith; as also that singing of Psalms is sanctified to the praise of God's Name, and yet with singing also we may recreate our selves, he answereth that those ends be not proper, though they be holy. So that all this granted, yet is his Assumption, by his own grant, as far from being proved as ever it was.

2. He chargeth me most untruly to deny that the use of a Lot for ending of any Controuersie is nowhere enjoined in the word, either expressly, or by just consequence. I say only, that Solomon in that particular place questioned, neither enjoineth that use of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. Which latter branch it is especially, that M ^r . B. must oppose & disprove, if he will from thence have any proof. But this is like the Argument that Bellarmine and some others use to prove Calvin and Erasmus, Arians, because they deny some places to be understood of Christ's Deity, out of which the same is supposed to be confirmed by others. Doth a man necessarily say, Such a thing cannot at all be proved out of Scripture; if he say, that Out of this or that place it cannot be proved? Calvin holdeth degrees of glory in heaven; and yet denieth that some places affirm it, which are yet alleged commonly for the proof of it. But whether either this or any other place of Scripture do prove that the use of Lots is enjoined for the ending of Controuersies, is nothing to the purpose, unless it be proved also that they restrain it wholly thereunto.

3. A man if it were to the purpose, might well make question, whether the use of Lots to end controversies, be so necessary as recreation is. Since many an one have lived quietly enough, and done well enough without use of the one, which no man living can do without the use of the other.

4. Why doth M ^r . B. offer to join issue hereupon here, where it is nothing to the purpose, and not rather accept of it before offered him, in the last of my Arguments, concerning other recreations, as Boules, Chess, &c. generally justified, and some other civil actions; but slily slincke by it there, as if no such matter had at all been once mentioned? And I would gladly yet hear what proof he would bring out of God's word for recreation by Boules or Chess, or for wearing band and cuffs, ruffs or falls, and the like. Here it needeth not: for I grant all he requireth; and doubt not but that in some special cases, though very few, a Lot is enjoined necessarily, & that by the word the same may be shown. But M ^r . B. is very forward indeed to prove that that is not denied: but that that is most denied, he still obtrudeth upon us without proof, to wit, that God is in a Lot present by his immediate providence. For that cometh in also here again. It is as the Cross with the Papists; nothing can be done without it.

I. B.

But suppose the use of a Lot be not (thus) enjoined; yet doth not God's counsel (which me thinks is a commandment, though it be said of a man's counsel, that it is no commandment) sanctify it to be used to end controversies? This (I think) will not be denied.

T. G.

1. If it will not, as indeed it is not: why doth M ^r . B. keep such a coile about it; as if it were denied, when it is not. But thus M ^r . B. as he saith of some, loveth to be brief in the main point, and long (even to tediousness) in by-matters.

2. Whether difference be or no between God's counsels and commands, (the Apostle seeming to allow some things, which yet he would not advise, and not absolutely to enjoin some things, which yet he wisheth and adviseth to) I stand not now to dispute. Sure I am, that he that adviseth a man rather to divide by Lot, than to waste himself at Law, doth not enjoin him thereby to divide by Lot, but only to use that course, or some other of like nature, (for it tieth him not to that particular) whereby a quiet end may be had.

3. But to what end should words be multiplied more about this, when as it is acknowledged, whether it be a counsel or a command, a permission or injunction, it is sufficient to sanctify Lots to that use? So that M ^r . B. need not have strained himself to utter herein an untruth, and then dilate upon it with so many Rhetorical amplifications, if he had not been disposed to pick a quarrel without cause.

I. B.

But it is denied, That the use of a Lot is restrained to end controversies, much less great quarrels only; and 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉 sundry instances are given of using Lots to other ends than to end Controuersies. But all those Lots were extraordinary. Therefore whereas in the beginning of this Answer, where he would find fault with mine Argument, he saith, That the use of Lots in play is ever to determine some question or controversy, though a light one (it is like) yet a question or controversy truly so termed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he mean a Lot in general, then (with his favor) he forgetteth himself, in saying, Lots by him quoted were not to end controversies. If he speak of a Lot in play, as being an ordinary Lot, then he faileth in judgment, In denying that the use of ordinary Lots (whereof is the question) is restrained to end controversies: and the instances which he giveth being extraordinary Lots, are not to the point.

T. G.

1. Let it be observed, that M ^r . B. hath never a word here to prove that that is denied. It is denied, as M ^r . B. himself here confesseth, that that place, Prov. 18. 18. doth restrain the use of Lots wholly to the ending of Controuersies, so that they may not in any other case be used with good allowance. For this in effect I cite some of those that seem to concur in opinion with M ^r . B. at least in part, M ^r . Cartwright by name: Nor is there ought either in the Text or about it, as I there plead, to enforce any such thing out of it. All which M ^r . B. sliding by, and not offering by any Argument to make good any such thing out of the Text; pitcheth at length upon some instances in the very tail of my discourse, given of Lots wherein no controversy was to be ended.

His exceptions against them are two:

1. That they were all extraordinary Lots; which yet is more than of all he can make good. For how will he prove it to have been an extraordinary Lot, that was cast upon the scape goat? But suppose there could be no instance given of any Lot in Scripture used where no controversy were. Would that prove that the place of Solomon restraineth it only to such? Nothing less: Nor do I offer to hazard my cause thereupon. My main Answer, which I rely upon is this, that out of the Text no such restraint can be proved or produced: Not to add, say I afterward, that Lots have been used oft to other ends, &c. as some also that in this point oppose us, confess. Besides that, it would be observed, that M ^r . B. who hath so oft offered to argue from extraordinary to ordinary Lots, yet can by no means here endure to hear of any such arguing. He shall do well to remember that Rule given in both Laws, What is not lawful to the one party, neither is lawful to the other. Though indeed neither do I, as may appear, frame any Argument at all out of it.
2. That by mine own confession, if they be not to end controversies they are no Lots at all. But he taketh my words, as I have shown formerly, a little too short. For I say not simply, controversy, but, question or controversy, as he himself here citeth me; the former whereof is a term more general than the latter, and easily salueth the seeming repugnancy.

I. B.

Besides the subject matter of an extraordinary Lot, being by God's special direction, if it be lawful; there may haply be no present controversy. Whereas the subject matter of an ordinary Lot being something questioned between man and man, there may be a great controversy. I say, May be. For if it be well observed, in an ordinary Lot there is not always a present controversy to be determined: But always some question to be decided to prevent a controversy. As may appear by M ^r . G ^s . own words, partly here, where he saith, [That there must be some question or controversy, or else it is no Lot] but more evidently where he saith; that the Lot used by the Soldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth a serious diuisorie Lot, was to prevent all contention and strife, p. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was used about the Land of Promise, about which was no present controversy. For God who would have no controversies, would have such things removed, which may cause or justly occasion controversies. Therefore ^m Christ expounding the Commandment, Thou shalt not kill, forbiddeth words of provocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common controversies, and the occasions thereof be, giveth direction in Prov. 18. 18.

Oh how plentiful M ^r . B. can be where no proof needeth! But keep the horse, as they say, home to the hedge. That Lots may be used also for the preventing of controversies; (and that is more than the bare ending of them: for a thing cannot be ended ere it be begun) M ^r . B. hath at large shown us. Though I know not by what Logic he can gather out of my words, that it must needs ever be either for the one or the other; because I say, it was for the one of them in the Lot cast upon Christ's coat. But what is all this to the purpose? How doth all this prove a restraint of Lottery to the deciding only of some controversy? which it may be M ^r . B. hoped that this long discourse would have put clean out of his Readers head. That, he told you, was denied; and that, not only is not proved, but no assay of proof made of it. For M ^r . B. in the whole ensuing discourse giveth it clean over, and spending many words about other by-matters leaveth his Argument to shift as well as it can for it self. It is the manner of those, saith the Heathen man, that maintain a bad cause, that they desire to dwell rather on anything than that that they should deal in.

I. B.

That which is said of an ordinary Lot, may justly be also said of an Oath, that the use of it is sanctified to end controversies by present determination, or prevention. For, as it is true that Hebr. 6. 16. implieth, that God's oath to man is more inviolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof only M ^r . G. taketh knowledge: so it is true, that Hebr. 6. 16. intimateth, That as an Oath, for confirmation, is among men an end of all strife: so God's Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question, or controversy. Else these words [An end of strife] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me understood, appeareth in the two next verses, where it is written, That God bound himself by oath, as to show the stableness of his counsel, so that the heirs of promise might have strong consolation. So that God's oath to Abraham took away doubting, questioning, and all strife that might be, not only in Abraham's mind, but also in the minds of the heirs of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not only and present contronersies, according to M ^r . G ^s . understanding, but confirming a promise or covenant, doth also end a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is given, to wit, by prevention.

T. G.

I will notstand (lest I either seem too contentious, or prove over-tedious) to frame such exceptions, as well I might, against diverse particulars of this discourse, built mainly upon a mere equivocation: Nor to press anew the Oaths taken usually at entrance into office: Only I demand, how all this proveth, that the Apostles purpose there is to limit the use of an Oath, and to restrain it wholly to such an end. Which though it were also granted, as it never can be proved, yet it leaveth that place of the Proverbs still as free as before. But M ^r . B. hath forgotten, it seemeth, what he was to prove out of it.

I. B.

Now let us somewhat consider M ^r . G ^s . purpose in putting into the Assumption these words, [In matters of weight] Forsooth, by denying the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. Because (as he saith, p. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lots, that is, with uncertain hazard.

T. G.

A Witty man, they say, can soon find a fault, where none is. Why I put or required those words to be put into M ^r . B ^s . Assumption, I render a reason in his due place; to wit, because without them the Conclusion could not have gone currant against a lusorie Lot. Now M ^r . B. if any man can be so filly and senseless as to believe him, telleth us, that I did it to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, viz. to end controversies; saith M ^r . B. in general. I wish him to put in, lest his Conclusion else against lusorious Lots come short, in weighty matters. Whether this be to make way for the bringing of them in, or the shutting of them out, let any judge that hath but common sense only. He might as well have said, that M ^r . Perkins put in the word great for the same purpose, when in the place cited there in my margin, he saith, The proper use of Lots is to decide great controversies. But belike M ^r . B. had no other way to hook that in here, that he is now falling foul on.

I. B.

Surely if M ^r . G. had acknowledged God's special presence by his immediate providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God to end controversies, he would not have so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot.

T. G.

I believe M ^r . B. that if I believed as he doth, (for I hope he thinketh as he writeth) I should believe otherwise than I do. But these coleworts come so oft in still, that I fear there is the less savor for them in this his tedious discourse, which yet he promised us should have the more savor in it for the length of it.

He must prove, he must prove this his immediate providence and imaginary special presence, before he control others either for not admitting of it, or not observing what would necessarily ensue upon it.

But why was he offended with me for putting that into his Assumption, that he himself, as appeareth here, would have therein maintained?

I. B.

It is true, that a matter of less weight in it self, may be the subject matter of a controversy, as a controuer sie may be among men, as well mean, as mighty in their estate, as M ^r . G. here saith, p. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prov. 18. 18. are meant men strong in affections, so as the controversy cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the subject matter of the Controuersie be of more or less weight in it self, so as there is a necess •… ie that one or both parties be satisfied. For otherwise there may be a great quarrel about a matter of less weight. Neither do I say, that only great quarrels are to be ended, or prevented by a Lot, as M ^r . G. denieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, p. 173.) God speaketh in Prov. 18. 18. of contentions in general.

T. G.

1. Not to question the exposition of the word mighty here and Gen. 6. 4. (albeit the word be not the same also in either) which yet I believe M ^r . B. is not able to make good. All granted that is here said, how doth it hence appear, that the use of Lots is in that place of the Proverbs restrained to such quarrels or controversies, as M ^r . B. here speaketh of? Or how appeareth it hence, that for some sinister end I put in those words?

2. If any Controuersies but weighty, may by a Lot be decided; how holdeth the comparison between a Lot and an Oath, both by himself, and by those that herein concur with him, so oft used and urged, for the excluding off from light matters the use equally of either?

I. B.

Here then we may enter into further consideration of that which M ^r . G. writeth, p. 135. to wit, That by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the only lawful use is condemned, and an unlawful use is allowed in the room thereof. What is that only use of a Lot? I can find none other than the putting of that to a Lot which he calleth, (p. 130.) A matter of mere indifferency, that is, Such as is not material, whether a man do or omit. Howsoever there may be a lawful use of a Lot about such a matter questioned, to determine, or prevent a Controuersie, yet I wonder that M ^r . G. deemeth that only lawful.

T. G.

M ^r . B. is like children, that are willing rather to go any whither than to come home. But it is our task now to follow him; and to tread in his steps. What I there say therefore, I stand still unto. And I marvel as much at M ^r . B. that he should once imagine that a man may safely put any other matter then is here specified, to the hazard of a Lot. For may a man put it to the hazard of •… Lot, whether he shall either omit some necessary duty, enjoined him of God, or commit ought that is naught and evil. If he may neither, of those there is nothing left for a Lot to deal but such things as are indifferent, and may consequently be either done or omitted.

I. B.

Doth he not grant p. 91. that Prayer may be conceived in weighty matters, as in the choice of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of mere indifferency, that is such as is not material whether it be done or omitted.

T. G.

And in the choice of a Magistrate, if there appear a material difference between party and party, in regard whereof it may be of consequence whether the one have the office or the other, it is not lawful to put it to the hazard of a Lot, unless some far greater inconvenience enforce it. Which when it shall so do; it may be lawful to entreat God so to direct the Lot, that the mischief may not ensue; but yet there is no assurance (it is but as prayer for other temporal things) that the Lot shall be so directed. For whither the choice of a Magistrate be a matter of mere indifferency or no, is no whit to the purpose. It is not Magistracy it self that is put to the Lot, in such cases, whether men shall live without it or no, but that presumed that Magistracy must be maintained, and Magistrates consequently designed, whether this man or that man shall have the place, which i •… they be both alike fit for, it is a thing indifferent, and not material at all, whether o •… them have it.

I. B.

Did God specially appoint Lots to be used about only matters of weight? and must man so far swerve from God's example as to strive only about matters of such indifferency, and then to put only such controverted to the determination of a Lot?

T. G.

M ^r . B ^s . Rhetoric will not so carry it. What men may strive or not strive about is not now to be discussed (and yet who dare condemn lusorie controversies: or what strifes in themselves are more harmless than they are?) nor what one man's iniquity may enforce another to put to the hazard of a Lot. But in all controversies be the matter in question of more or less weight, the more equality things are reduced unto on either side, the less material it is which way the Lot goeth; and the less material it is which way the Lot goeth, the less danger of wrong or inconvenience; and consequently the lawfuller the Lot. Let M ^r . B. lay aside his Rhetorical amplifications, and answer this Argument.

I. B.

So that I doubt not, but that with sound judgment, and a clear conscience not accusing me of not duly respecting the special providence of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirm, That the more weighty the subject matter of a controversy is, the more justifiable is the Controuersie: and be that matter of more or less weight, the greater the necessity of ending a Controuersie is, the more justifiable is the use of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abusing of God's ordinance?

T. G.

It is the manner of bad pleaders when proofs fail them to fall to protesting. And it is reported to be the guise of your preaching Friers, when they know not how to confute our doctrine, to assure their hearers upon their salvation that it is herefie •… M ^r . B. methinks should do otherwise. I say nothing in this point without reason; which M ^r . B. must refute, if he will have me alter my judgment. But if it may be had with protestations, M ^r . B. will not miss of it. Which when he hath thus solemnly made, grounded still upon a false supposal, (which unless you grant him, all is gone,) he then demandeth, Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abuse? Why so? what is the reason. Because M ^r . B. is persuaded so as he saith. All This wind will shake but little corn, save with such, if there be any, that have pinned their faith upon M ^r . B ^s . sleeve, and must depend upon his persuasions. It is the property of truth, saith one, not to instruct by persuading, but by instructing to persuade.

I. B.

But, (saith M ^r . G. glad of anything to plead for playing with a Lot) The use of a Lot in play is ever to decide some question or controversy truly so termed. If so, then he might have called it a serious Lot according to his doctrine, the lightness of the subject matter controverted not withstanding.

T. G.

M ^r . G. is not so glad of anything to plead for playing with a Lot, as M ^r . B. is glad to lay hold on anything to be girding at M ^r . G. what a silly toy hath he found here to cast in his dish, that if any question or controversy be by a lusoricus Lot decided, it may be by M ^r . G ^s . doctrine termed a serious Lot. If you ask how; you may go seek. But suppose it were so, (as he cannot, I know, make good,) what then?

I. B.

But where about is that controversy? M ^r . G. in his written Answer to my Dialogue before mentioned saith; The controversy tendeth to victory, which till it be decided, there is a Controuersie, though a light one, yet a Controuersie truly so termed. But is that truly or worthily to be called a victory, which falleth out by haphazzard (according to M ^r . G ^s . esteeming a Lot) without any desert? But (say I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him by his immediate providence in disposing the Lot, to humor (I say not, honor) some of the vain-glorious fools with supposed victory, who make a pretended controversy thereabout, whereas (before they intended so to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a controversy truly so termed? I need say no more.

T. G.

No: you have said, though not enough, because nothing at all to the point, not one tittle to make your Argument good, or to prove the main matter denied in it; yet a great deal too much; because so much clean beside the matter. And here nothing but unsavory stuff, unworthy to be answered.

You tell here of M ^r . G ^s . writing, which you never returned any answer to. Why pick you this alone out of it, letting pass many other things in it of more moment still unanswered?

But what is the fault here I marvel, that hath moved M ^r . B ^s . choler thus much? I say, forsooth there is in play a controversy, and that it tendeth to victory. And is it not so in all games and sports ordinarily? Or doth not common use of speech confirm as much? matter of desert, I think, is not usually much respected in play. Yet in those Games that M ^r . B. condemneth there is use of wit and Art to in managing what the Chance affordeth. I might add that there is in Game question, and controversy also, if with M ^r . B ^s . leave I may so speak, whether of the two shall lead, and who shall join either with other, either of which in some cases may well be termed a controversy, though it tend not directly unto victory, and which by Lot also is and may be lawfully decided, for ought M ^r . B. hath hitherto to the contrary discovered.

But what kind of controversy or victory soever it be, that is in Game and disport, must they needs all be styled vainglorious fools, that in game strive, as we say, who shall beat either other. This favoreth too much of supercilious (for I will not say superstitious ) either Stoicism or Pharisaism.

But his reason hereof is worth all: for that is it that is all in all with M ^r . B. which if you once debar him of, he is as mute as a Fish, and standeth stone still, as one at his wits end. It is a tempting of God, by putting him to dispose the Lot by his immediate providence, and thereby to humor such vain-glorious fools. This is the head and foot of all, the perpetual burden of M ^r . B ^s . song, which if you grant him, he is able to prove all that ever he would: but if it go, all is gone with it.

The fourth Argument.

I. B.

THat which there is neither precept for, nor practice of in God's word, general or special, express or implied, that there is no warrant for in the Word.

But such is the use of Lots in game: for we read not in Scripture that Lots were used but in serious matters only, both by Jews and Gentiles: neither is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous use of them by precept, or practice, general or special, express or implied.

There is no warrant therefore for lusorie Lots in God's word: and so consequently they are unwarrantable.

This is like Ambroses argument against merry jests; We read nothing of them in Scripture: therefore they are not to be allowed. Which yet is no good kind of reasoning. The consequence of his Enthymem, and the Proposition likewise of their Syllogism is unsound.

For first an Argument holdeth indeed from the negative in matter of Faith, but not in matter of Fact: as to say, such a thing is not expressed or revealed in the word, therefore it is no matter of Faith, nor such as a man is necessarily bound to believe: but not to say, such a thing is not mentioned or related in Scripture, therefore it was not done, or it never was: as for example, Cain hath but one son mentioned by Moses, therefore he had no more sons or children but him. Much less may a man reason from matter of Fact to matter of Right, as to say, such or such a thing we never read in the word to have been done, and therefore it may not be done. For how many things are there whereof there is no example in God's word, and yet the use of them is generally allowed as lawful and good? Many things there are whereof no precedent of the use of them but in someone kind only, which yet may be used also unto others. No use of butter recorded in the word but for food only: may it not therefore be used also for physic? Yea many things there are of ordinary use, whereof there is no mention at all in God's word, which yet all generally allow: as sugar for sweetening, printing of books, shooting in guns, and the like, which all by this argument are utterly condemned; or if they be justified, then the grounds of it fail.

Secondly, an Action may have warrant sufficient by permission without precept or practice. For where God hath not limited the use of any Creature or ordinance, there he hath left the use of it free. Where he hath not determined the circumstances of any acton, there what he hath not prohibited, that hath he permitted, and that is warrant sufficient for it. Where therefore circumstances are determined, the argument holdeth from the negative to make that unwarrantable, that is not either expressly or by good consequence enjoined. But where they are not determined, the argument is strong enough from the negative to prove that warrantable that is not either expressly or by just consequence prohibited.

For this cause in the point of God's worship the argument holdeth from the negative for the substance of it, because God hath determined it. But in civil affairs it will not hold from the negative to disallow ought; because God hath not so determined them. Else what warrant is there for boules, for tennis, for foot-ball, for chesse, &c. which yet no man disalloweth? Let one example serve for all to show the weakness of this kind of arguing. There is neither precept, nor practice, ( at least allowed or allowable) of eating blood in Scripture: therefore a man may not eat a black pudding. In which conclusion I assure myself these Authors will not accord with the Familists and new Sectaries. And yet may they say more against the one, than these can any of them against the other. For the one is found expressly forbidden both in the old and New Testament both before the Law, under the Law, and after the Law, (to omit what sundry of the Ancients have held of it) but the other nowhere in neither. And if Christian liberty notwithstanding bought with the blood of Christ, give God's children a free use of the one, how much more then of the other. If it loose them there, where they were bound before; sure it bindeth them not there, where they were free before.

M ^r . G. in his book showeth many instances of Lots used both by Jews and Gentiles, and all in serious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they by the light not only of the word, but of Nature too discerned, that Lots are to be used only in serious matters. O let us take heed how we put out so great light.

True: out of the word I relate many instances of Lots used in serious matters both by Jews and Gentiles: nor do I find any lusorious Lots mentioned there to have been used by either. God's word dealeth most with serious, not with lusorious affairs. Nor doth the Spirit of God busy it self to tell us what sports and pastimes men did use in those days. But doth it follow therefore that both Jews & Gentiles did by the light both of God's word and Nature discern that they might not be used in any other affairs than such? Nothing less. For what an infinite number of examples are there, whereof not a few M ^r . B. might have found also in my Book, of Lots used in sport and recreation, whereof in that regard neither Jew nor Gentile that M ^r . B. can show, ever made scruple? Which doth evidently rather infer the contrary to that that M ^r . B. here affirmeth. But to quit M ^r . B ^s . close, If a man should say to M ^r . B. We read of many garments in Scriptures used both by Jews and Gentiles: But we read of none that ever wore band or cuffs; which intimateth to me, that it is by the light both of God's word and Nature too, discerned that such are not to be worn: O take heed, M ^r . B. how you neglect this light, and do that that you have no warrant for, in wearing such. I suppose that even M ^r . B. himself would deem him to be ridiculous, that should so argue. I say nothing more, but leave the application either to M ^r . B. himself or any other. Only I add, that there is nothing more unsavory than to trisle so seriously.

I. B.

But let us consider his answer, which is only to the Proposition, though I have already confuted many principal parts thereof.

T. G.

He may do well to show what parts and where. For I know not, for my part, what he hath as yet either confuted or confirmed.

Yet a little, by his leave, to the Assumption; though not his, yet M ^r . Easties, joined here with his; and by him acknowledged: It is this in effect; There is not any warrant in the word for the ludicrous use of Lots either by precept or practice, general or special, expressed or implied. Now if we believe M ^r . B. this is a very presumptuous Assertion, and such as no man may avow, unless he had a memory able to contain every sentence of Scripture, and an understanding so absolute, as to know every consequent that might be deduced and drawn from each of them. And therefore M ^r . E. or M ^r . B. ought to have said, There is no such warrant, by precept or practice, so far as I know, or to my best remembrance. And thus might M ^r . G. with a knife lent him by M ^r . B. cut a sunder this Gordians knot, to use M ^r . B ^s . words, and so let the denial of the Proposition alone. But we will not take all advantages that M ^r . B ^s . offers may afford.

I. B.

In my Dialogue, to show that the Spirit sometime reasoneth from a matter of fact to a matter of right negatively, I quote these Scriptures, John. 8. 39, 40. 1 Cor. 11. 16. The words of the former are these; Ye go about to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth: This did not Abraham. The Argument is this: Abraham did not kill any that told him the truth: Therefore ye ought not to go about to kill me, if ye would be the sons of Abraham. This is Christ's Logic, wherewith I dare find no fault. Neither doth M ^r . G. For he saith nothing to it, because the Printer putteth for verse. 40. the 48. verse. wherewith M ^r . G. maketh pastime. But I will let pass time now to take further knowledge of it.

T. G.

M ^r . B ^s . Proposition in truth is this: That which there is no example of in God's word is not warrantable by it. This to make good, he setteth against his first ground in the margent, a quotation of those two places. The Printer, it seemeth, had misprinted the one, and directed me to a wrong place, where finding nothing that carried any the least semblance of confirmation for the Point propounded, it may be, I say, that opus est Delio natatore, to fetch ought out of those words; or that I am no Oedipus to assoil M _r . B _s . riddle, or some such like, (for I have no copy now by me of that writing, nor had M ^r . B. (I will not say, the honesty, but) that care of his word, that he should have had, to return me either answer, or it again) and that is all the pastime that M ^r . B. here saith, I make with it. He should have done well to have set down my words, whereby it might have appeared, whether I had used any other terms therein, than might well stand with due reverence and regard to him. In which kind, whether either in that writing, or in my Book, after it published, I have been faulty, I appeal to any that have seen the one, and to all that may, if they will, take a view of the other.

But for the thing it self, how I should have known what it was that was intended, unless it were by divination; or how should I have answered it, before I knew what was intended, unless it had been by prophecy, (as he said sometime that a proclamation was penned) I know not. But M ^r . B. dealeth herein as Bellarmine is wont, who when he hath produced a testimony out of some new-found, and it may be new-coined Author, that hath not been long abroad; and those he dealeth with, it is like, never so much as once heard of; and to this, saith he, the Heretics give no answer at all. But now we know what it is that Mr. B. would have, he shall not be long without an Answer. Where to omit that M ^r . B. speaketh, as if our Savior CHRIST had a Logic by himself, or would either here or elsewhere teach us a new Logic, or another Logic, than I say not Aristotle the Heathen, but Ramus and other Christian Logicians have taught: when as indeed he wrongeth our Savior in deducing from his words that which they will not bear, yea if they should bear, he that is Truth it self, should be contrary to himself. Our Savior, as it is apparent, reasoneth on this manner; They that do such wicked works as Abraham never did, nor would ever have done, (for even this also M ^r . B. himself hereafter acknowledgeth to be intimated; which if it had here been mentioned, would have marred all) show themselves to be such as are no children of Abraham: But you do such wicked works as Abraham never did, nor would ever have done: for you offer to kill me for telling the truth: which Abraham would not have done:

Therefore you show yourselves thereby to be none of his children. So Piscator analysing and explicating the place:

The Lord thus convinceth them from their doings: If ye were Abraham's sons, you would do Abraham's works; that is, such as he did, to wit, good. But you do not Abraham's works, that is, such as he did, to wit, good: and I instance in one, for you seek to slay me that have deserved well of you. Therefore you are not Abraham's sons.

And it is well observed by Calvin, that not all things simply that Abraham did or did not, but those for which he is specially commended, are notes to distinguish the children of Abraham from others. Now observe but, I beseech you, what absurd, if not Logic, yet deductions and consequences M ^r . B. would fasten upon our Savior. For if this place help M ^r . B ^s . cause, or do prove that a man may reason in the point now controuersed, from matter of fact to matter of right, this must be the Argument:

That which Abraham did not, no Christian man may do: But Abraham never played at Cards, or Abraham never used a sporting Lot: Therefore no Christian man may do either.

Or put we some other Assumption to the former Proposition:

But Abraham went not in doublet or hose: or, Abraham wore not bands and cuffs: or, Abraham never walked London streets, &c. Therefore no Christian man may warrantably do any of these.

Yea to go a little further: if we should stretch, as M ^r . B. doth, the words of our Savior, we might thus reason:

They that do not as Abraham did, are none of Abraham's children: But they that deny not their wives, do not as Abraham did: Therefore they that deny not their wives, are not Abraham's children.

Nor is this to control our Saviors Logic, but to show, what manner of Logic M ^r . B. would either teach our Savior, or make us believe that our Savior used. In a word, here is the proof of M ^r . B ^s . Proposition:

Our Savior proveth the Jews not to be the children of Abraham, because they would have killed him, which Abraham did not: Therefore whatsoever there is no example for in God's word, is unwarrantable.

But let us see whether his next quotation stand him in any better steed.

I. B.

Of the other quotation the words be these: We have no custom, nor the Churches of God.

The consequent implied is: Therefore women ought not to pray uncovered. Hereunto M ^r . G. answereth indeed, but so, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatively from a matter of fact to a matter of right: which is all that I intended by the quotation; and not, to imagine this Argument, The Churches of God, and faithful men do not use Lots in gaming. Therefore such gaming is unlawful.

T. G.

M ^r . B ^• . would make his Reader believe here that M ^r . B. had laid this for a ground in his Book, that from matter of fact a man might reason in some case to matter of right; (which yet would do him as much good for the proof of his Proposition, if it were granted him, as a little water would in his shoe) and that for proof thereof M ^r . B. having produced this place, M ^r . G. in his writing had granted the same; (for so he would seem to imply, when he saith, M ^r . G. doth not deny it) whereas indeed all this is but a fiction, and a mere made matter. For howsoever in mine answer to the entire Argument, peeced up partly out of M ^r . B. and partly out of M ^r . Eastie, I speak of such arguing, yet in M ^r . B ^s . Dialogue there is no mention at all of it. But M ^r . B ^s . Proposition is, or must be, to make up his Conclusion, That which there is no example of in God's word, is unlawful. Now how do the Apostles words prove this? Or what other Argument to further M ^r . B ^s . cause could be framed out of them, but such as is above by him mentioned, and I supposed he would have made? But since he waiueth that, let us see how it will prove that that it should. It is not the custom, saith the Apostle, of Christians, to be contentious; as some expound it; or as others, It is not a custom among Christians, for women to be unveiled. Therefore none ought to be such, to wit, contentious: or none ought to do so, that is, bring in such new fashions, as are both indecent, and unusual. Will it now follow hence, that because the Apostle either condemneth conscientiousness, because it is not the manner of Christians to be contentious: or women's appearing in the public congregation unveiled, because it was contrary to the custom of the Christian Churches; and to break settled order in such things is not allowable: Will i •… , I say, follow hence therefore, that nothing is warrantable, whereof no example is in the word? If it do not, either let M ^r . B. put it out of his Book, or else forbear at least to urge it.

I. B.

So that I need not herein reply upon M ^r . G.

T. G.

No: but he hath need to prove his Proposition, unless he will have us to take it upon his word.

I. B.

I only wonder that he saith: The use of Lots in games hath been common in the Churches of God. What? In the public assemblies? as was the fault of women their heads uncovered in the Church at Corinth?

T. G.

To put M ^r . B. out of his wonderment; (you see how fain he would be quarrelling) I mean by the Churches of God, the whole multitude of men professing the faith of Christ, distinguished into particular Churches or Congregations, consisting of diverse households and persons: among whom these lusorious Lots hath been frequent and ordinary in all ages, nor hath there been scruple made of them till of very late times. And by M ^r . B ^s . leave, the Apostle understandeth no other Churches, when he saith, The Churches of God have no such custom. But this is but shooting beside the mark.

I. B.

But M ^r . G. in this answer speaketh of things merely natural or civil, as sweetening with sugar, &c.

T. G.

Name all, good M ^r . B. There is besides, printing of Books, and shooting in guns, playing at boules, tennis, chesse, foot-ball, &c. against which the Argument will hold as well as against either Cards or Tables.

And must not warrant be had as well for civil actions as for others? Or is not recreation, whereof we now dispute, a civil thing? Or must warrant be had by some example out of the word for Cards and Dice, more than for Chess, or else they are in that regard unlawful?

I might here exclaim, as M ^r . B. useth to do, yea and that with better ground than M ^r . B. so oft doth; Oh what a wide gap doth M ^r . B. open here to licentiousness, when he implieth that for actions merely natural or civil, there needs no warrant at all be had out of God's word! It grieveth my soul to see what will ensue hereupon. For now will ungodly men, when they are reproved for ought amiss in the course of their life and conversation, and required to show what warrant they have for it, be ready to say, These are but things merely either natural or civil: and therefore we need not care whether we have any warrant out of God's word for them or no. And either M ^r . B. must imply no less, or else his exception is idle, and of no use.

I. B.

I will not endeavor to prove, that in the word there is matter of just consequence, either general or implied (which is a part of the Proposition) to allow, as well sweetening with sugar, &c. as Recreation in general: and therefore they may be lawful, though they be not mentioned in the word.

T. G.

Here M ^r . B. telleth us, that he will not endeavor to prove that which he need not, because it is not in question: and withal instead of proving what he should prove, he doth utterly himself overthrow it.

That that he saith he will not endeavor to prove, is not at all questioned. For the entire Proposition made up out of M ^r . Eastie and him doth not say, that whatsoever thing hath no allowance from God's word is unlawful: but, whatsoever hath not allowance either by precept or practice in God's word is unlawful. In neither kind whereof, I suppose, M ^r . B. can find ought touching diverse of the particulars before mentioned, which yet he denieth not to be lawful.

That he overthroweth directly that that he should prove, is apparent. For his Proposition is this; Whatsoever there is no example of in God's word, is unwarrantable: And yet here he saith, that some things may be lawful, though they be not mentioned in God's word. What is this but a direct contradiction of that?

I. B.

But suppose M ^r . G ^s . Axiom holdeth in them: what is that to Lots, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate providence, and the use whereof is limited, to end serious controversies? In regard whereof doubt I not, but an Argument concerning the use of them may hold from the negative in matter of fact, as well as in matter of faith, or of the point of God's worship for the substance of it. For I presume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occasion, as he did not, kill a man that told him the truth: so that all that feared God, and knew the nature and use of a Lot, would not, as they did not, use a Lot in game.

T. G.

If M ^r . G ^s . Axiom hold in any, your Proposition is infringed. Any one particular denied, overthroweth an affirmative general. Let his Axiom alone therefore, and prove your Proposition. But that you will never be able to do: and do wisely therefore to let it alone.

Yea but if you will suppose and take that for granted, which was the ground of M ^r . B. his first Argument, and without which never an one of them can subsist, then M ^r . B. presumeth that Abraham would not have played at Cards or Dice, nor no other godly man: And what then? Why? Then we should have had no example either of Jew or Gentile recorded in Scripture that had done so. And consequently, (for that is the Proposition in Question) Nothing is warrantable, whereof there is no example in the word. Here is a deal of loose sand without ought to bind it together. The main matter in Question still begged, and yet nothing inferred out of it, that is ought to M ^r . B ^s . Argument. No due proceeding in ought, only a wheeling round about with a return to the old principle, of an immediate providence in every Lot, the ground of the first Argument: For that cometh in still to help at a dead lift, and is as good as the Tragoedians their God in an Engine, that served to help out still when they were at a stress.

I. B.

Secondly, why may there not be for a thing permitted, some precept in the word, general or implied? The permission of anything must be in the word, either express or by just consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But M ^r . G. reconcileth these two Axioms, [Every Action is indifferent] and [No Action is indifferent] thus, Every naked and bare Action simply conceived, is indifferent: But no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent, p. 94. So that he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular moral Action, or no Action of the reasonable Creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of God's holy word, or disconformable thereunto, p. 95. These things, especially these words (rules of God's word) considered, I may say, that howsoever a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawful, is by precept, or rule, as well as M ^r . G. saith, Recreation in general is both by permission and by precept, if not expressly yet by just consequence p. 138. Doth then M ^r . G. make permission a just exception against the Proposition?

T. G.

M ^r . B. having instead of proving it overthrown his own Proposition: now cometh to try, if he can yet make good M ^r . Easties.

A thing may be warranted, say I, though neither by precept or practice, yet by permission.

Against this M ^r . B. objecteth, that for a thing permitted some precept may be. I answer.

1. Unless he say, must be, he saith nothing; because he saith nothing to the purpose.

2. If there be a precept for ought, so far forth it is not barely permitted: for where permission is, the thing is left free.

Yea but M ^r . G. saith, that recreation is warrantable both by permission and by precept. True by precept in some cases, by permission in other: or by precept in general, by permission in particular, for balls or bowles, and the like.

Yea but again M ^r . G. saith, (to let the rest pass of M ^r . B ^s . Besomes here without bands ) that every thing indifferent, is lawful, if by rule, and consequently, if you give M ^r . B. leave to expound it as he list, by precept. Let me mind M ^r . B. what before he told us, it is a cursed gloss that corrupteth the Text. Doth every Rule necessarily imply a precept? Then belike of things Indifferent, that is, (not, of things neither good nor bad; in which sense my former words cited by M ^r . B. iumbling things here together, nothing to the purpose, are to be understood; but) of things neither enjoined nor inhibited, no Rules can be given. But let us try (though it be too palpable) the truth hereof. When the Apostle saith, A woman is free to marry again if her husband be deceased. Is it not a Rule? Or is it therefore a precept? when he saith, If an infidel inviteth you, you may go if you will: for that is also implied: and, when you are there, you may eat of all that is set before you without scruple of conscience. Are not these Rules, and yet no precepts? If they be, by M ^r . B ^s . own grant, M ^r . G ^s . exception against M ^r . Easties proposition standeth good, and the proposition consequently is unsound.

T. G.

Touching his proof, that permission is a sufficient warrant: I first would know, what ordinance of God that is, which hath not some limited or appointed use thereof.

I. B.

That God's permission is a sufficient warrant, he that requireth to have it proved may as well require it to be proved, that God's word is a good warrant. Idle had the Apostle been if in so weighty affairs being craved his advice, he should have delivered that that would not warrant those things that he gave way for, yea and justified them as free from sin. If she marry, saith he, she sinneth not. And he that denieth it, may as well deny that the Sun is up at high-noon.

His frivolous question therefore is to no purpose in the world: For what if God hath by certain general Rules restrained in some kinds and cases the use of his ordinances: doth it follow therefore that there is nothing in them left free? God hath restrained Recreation by such Rules as by way of Caution are in my Book of Lots delivered. Doth it follow therefore that it is not free for men to recreate themselves either with bowles, or with coites, whether they themselves will, and to make bowles indifferently either of beech or of brasil, and coites either of tile sherds or of horse-shoes. For, I hope, none of all these may be done without warrant.

I. B.

I am sure and have shown that God's ordinance touching a Lot hath.

T. G.

If your own word without further proof may be taken, you have.

I. B.

Secondly, I grieve to observe what a gap M ^r . G. hath by this doctrine opened to Licentiousness. What! may man disposed to sin, employ any creature, whose use God hath not limited, to what use he will? No: for here is to be understood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason touching circumstances, viz. [Any use, but that which is prohibited] Howsoever I could demure thereupon, especially if an express prohibition be understood, yet herein I will be silent having enough granted me.

T. G.

These be all but idle fancies of M ^r . B ^s . own brain. I open no greater gap to any licentiousness, than the word of God warranteth: which M ^r . B ^s . unjust charge must therefore consequently fall upon, and upon the Apostle himself together with me. I spare to observe what grievous and inextricable streits M ^r . B. would cast Christian Consciences into by his contrary Assertions; such, I am sure (let him take heed whom he followeth therein) as himself will never endure to be tied to: to wit, to bring some (I say not warrant, but) precept out of God's word, for every particular Act that he doth, every sort or part of apparel he weareth, every kind of recreation that at any time he useth, and the like.

Only▪ I wish that M ^r . B ^s . ordinary faithfulness may here also be observed. He saith he could demure upon this position, that I give for the circumstances of such Actions, in which they are not determined, viz. [ Any use, but that which is prohibited, is lawful ] especially, if an express prohibition be understood. When as my words are expressly, not either expressly or by just consequence prohibited. I would know of M ^r . B. what precept, (for unless precept, no warrant, saith M ^r . B.) or what permission at least there is for such dealing in God's word.

But he hath enough granted him by M ^r . G. without this. Let us hear how.

I. B.

For the use of Lots in game is prohibited by just consequences, as I have demonstrated.

T. G.

If M ^r . G. left it indefinite, as M ^r . B. in his very next words before intimated, and expressed not himself, whether he meant prohibited expressly only, or by just consequence also: how hath M ^r . B. enough by M ^r . G. granted for the effecting of ought that here he would have? If he did express himself therein, why was M ^r . B. pleased to question what his meaning was?

But how M ^r . B. hath not proved only, but demonstrated, what he here saith he hath done, I know not; unless Pythagoras be revived again in him, and his bare word be as authentical as the best proof that is. Such great words might have been well spared, unless his proofs had been more pregnant: least it be said of him, as he said sometime of the Athenians, that they were like old men, that blew hard, but did little.

I. B.

For the better understanding of the second part of the reason (hasting to an end) I only desire an Answer to this Question. Is any use of a Lot lawful, where the circumstances of Time, Place, and Persons be not determined?

T. G.

M ^r . B. weary, it seemeth, of arguing, cometh now to asking. The end of his Question, he saith, is for the better understanding of the second part of my Reason. Why? admit my reason or some part of it were not worth a button, how doth M ^r . B. make good the Proposition, which all this while he should have proved? But to the Question, I answer as the Spartans sometime in a word: No. And what then? Are there no more circumstances to be observed but these only? Or are there not general Rules according to which I require the use of such things to be regulated?

I. B.

If M ^r . G. except an extraordinary Use, I may as well except the lusorious use of Lots.

T. G.

Can any man living tell what this meaneth? I answer as before; and if M ^r . B. can pick ought our of mine Answer for his advantage, he may.

I. B.

I answer to the exemplification of this reason, granting that an Argument holdeth from the negative for the substance of God's worship. I yet make this Quaere, whether only because God hath determined it?

T. G.

Whether M ^r . B. grant this part of mine Answer or no, yea whether it be sound or unsound is nothing material, since that the strength of mine Answer for the disproof of the Proposition resteth wholly upon the other part, to wit, that from matter of fact not expressed in Scripture, it is no good arguing to matter of right or wrong; and that a thing may be lawful without either precept or practice recorded in the word express or implicit: and much less is it material what become of M ^r . B ^s . quaeres: which I needed not therefore stand to answer; nor doth ought therefore that followeth here, at all touch our cause.

But let us hear M ^r . B ^s . quaere. He maketh it a Question; Whether the Argument therefore only holdeth from the negative for the substance of God's worship, because God hath determined it? I answer: It is enough for my purpose if it do hold therefore. Which M ^r . B. it seemeth, doth not deny. And in many cases it holdeth only therefore: For why we should use water and not wine in Baptism: why bread, rather than roasted flesh in the Lord's Supper, and why bread only and not cheese too, as some have used, no reason can be rendered, but because God so pleased to determine the elements in either. It is true indeed that some sorts of Worship are in themselves impious, and are therefore also disallowed. But let us hear the reason why this Quaere is made.

I. B.

For in those places of Jeremiah, God doth blame his people only for using a worship [which he commanded not] without any intimation that he prescribed his own worship.

T. G.

Is there not an evident intimation that God had prescribed his own worship, (unless it be presupposed that he would not at all be worshipped) when for this very cause he rejecteth some kind of worship, because he had not prescribed the same.

I. B.

To the same purpose writeth Paul to the Colossians against the Traditions of men, and will-worship, not for M ^r . G ^s . cause, but because in so worshipping they held not the Head, verse. 19. which is Christ, King of his Church, teaching and governing the same in all things.

T. G.

The Apostle expressly condemneth one sort of the superstitious he there speaketh of, because they were mere will-worships, and human inventions (wherein let M ^r . B. take heed lest he be found faulty in denying unto Christians the lawful use of God's creatures upon conceits merely superstitious, as those false teachers then did) that is, as Piscator well, because God was not the Author of them. Which is in effect for the very same cause that I aver.

As for that of not holding the Head, it is not urged by the Apostle for any such purpose as M ^r . B. here affirmeth, confounding and blending together those things that are to be distinguished; but against those that would have brought in the Adoration of Angels, who in so doing the Apostle saith relinquished Christ the Head, who is of himself all-sufficient to foster and propagate his Church, without such sending of his servants to seek assistance from any other.

I. B.

But in Deut. M ^r . G ^s . cause is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other Nations served their God's, and sendeth them to his word to observe the same, without putting anything to, or taking ought from the same. Surely I should not gather from hence M ^r . G ^s . cause. Because I fear it would▪ encourage Papists in their superstitious rites and ceremonies called Circumstances, though indeed parts of the substance of outward worship. For they are ready to take hold thereof and say, God hath determined nothing touching these supposed Circumstances, and they are not against the word of God; therefore they are permitted and so warranted.

T. G.

Is it not implied, when God saith, they should not serve the true God as the Heathen served their false God's▪ but so only as he had himself prescribed; is it not implied, I say, that God had for the substance of it determined his own worship?

Or is not this a senseless consequence, M ^r . G. holdeth that God hath determined the substance, but not all particular Circumstances of his service and worship: Therefore M ^r . G. giveth encouragement to Papists to add to God's worship such things as they call Circumstances, but are indeed parts of the substance of it. It is as if one should say, The Apostle chargeth all Christians to provide for themselves and theirs: Therefore he giveth worldly men encouragement to be greedy of the world, which they call providing for them and theirs.

I. B.

But I should gather from that and the other places, (I think, directly, and not auckwardly, ) this Conclusion: Because all things in and unto the service of God ought to be precisely according to God's will revealed in his word; therefore whatsoever is not commanded ought not to be. And the rather (God being jealous) because of the meaning of the fringes upon the Israelites their garments, to wit, That you may remember all the commandments of the Lord, and that ye seek not after your own heart, not after your own eyes, after which you go a whoring.

T. G.

Now we have M ^r . B ^s . collection, not auckward, as mine, but direct, as his are wont to be.

Where first I would understand wherein Mr. Bs. cause differs from M ^r . G ^s . cause: that is, whether that, whatsoever it be, that is there forbidden, be not therefore, yea and therefore only there forbidden, because God had determined his own worship. That which was M ^r . B ^s . exception against M ^r . G ^s . cause before.

2. I would be informed whether M ^r . B. will affirm that all particular circumstances of God's service and worship be precisely determined in the word, for if that be not his meaning here, what saith he more than I say? If it be, let him return answer to the instances produced to the contrary before. For the conceit it self is so senseless, that it deserveth not further to be refuted; neither do I think that any man living will concur with M ^r . B. therein.

3. For the place out of Numbers produced by him, whereby he would prove that, (whatsoever it is) that he saith, it doth no more prove that all things in the service of God ought to be precisely according to God's will revealed in his word, than that all other human actions as well civil as sacred ought so to be. For the place speaketh of God's commandments in general▪

4. How followeth it hence that no action or circumstance in God's service, yea or in other affairs i •… left free, because all such things ought to be precisely according to God's will revealed in his word? I suppose that that Christian that being invited by a Gentile, when there was no just cause otherwise to hinder his going, did as well in going to an Infidels table walk according to the precise rule of God's word, as he should have done in not going: and in eating indifferently of each dish, as in forbearing either this or that when he was there. And I suppose they walk precisely according to the rule of God's written word, as well where they begin their solemn service of God on the Sabbath day at seven of the clock, as where they begin it at eight, or at nine. Which yet were not, if that circumstance of time were precisely determined, and nothing at all therein left free.

I. B.

To the last I answer, That a Lot is no more a civil affaire than is an Oath, though it (as is an Oath) be used in civil affairs.

T. G.

Here is no Question about it whether it be or no: but a Proposition, which M ^r . B. hath all this while forgot, to be justified. As for the rancking of a Lot and an Oath together; and the supposed sacrednesse of a Lot, enough already hath been said. But why doth not M ^r . B. answer here, the Question of Boules and Balls, (for it is very material) and the point concerning a black pudding?

I. B.

And lastly, I affirm again, that God hath determined the use of a Lot to determine Controuersies, so as without God's special appointment (which is not now to be expected) it cannot be lawfully used to any other purpose: Therefore an Argument from the Negative will hold by M ^r . G ^s . rule to disallow the use of any other Lot, as well lusorious as diuinatorie.

T. G.

I will not stand to discuss here how this helpeth M ^r . B ^s . arguing, That is not lawful whereof no example is found in the word, &c.

I observe only how M ^r . B. can conclude, by help of my Rule, what he would, if you grant him withal, what he cannot prove. But the Antecedent should in the former Argument have been made good: which yet M ^r . B. there not only hath not done, but hath not so much as indeauoured to do. And without proof for him to affirm it again and again, is but lost labor both to his Reader and himself.

I. B.

Thus having answered M ^r . G ^s . reasons inducing him to allow Lusorious Lots as not evil in themselves: and removed M ^r . G ^s . answers to mine Arguments, I may more confidently hold mine opinion, which M ^r . Dudley Fennor (of reverend memory) his godly Treatise of Recreations hath taught me, to wit, That Tables and Cards, as well as Dice, and all other Games consisting in Chance (wherein there is use of a Lot) are utterly unlawful.

T. G.

Thus having within less than three weeks space since this book of M ^r . B ^s . came first to mine hands, which he hath been about some ten years a breeding, run through the same, and shown that it containeth nothing material, or of just exception to ought in my Book, neither confuting any of mine Arguments produced in the defense of lusorious Lots, nor confirming and strengthening any of his own against them, I may the more confidently conclude, the rather holding that, that till now of late, was scarce ever questioned of any, that Games depending upon casualty are not in that regard unlawful, nor is a Lot excluded from being matter of disport by any ground or warrant forth of God's word.

A Just Defense of Certain Passages

Project Note

TO HIS LOVING and much respected Friend, M ^r . THOMAS GATAKER Bachelor in Divinity.

THE FIRST PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS PREFACE, WITH ANSWER TO IT.

ANSWER TO M ^r . B ^s . POST-SCRIPT.

TO THE READER.

THE SECOND PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS Answer to M ^r GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulness of a Lusorious Lot. Together with M ^r . G ^s . Reply in defense of his own Arguments, which are word for word also here related.

The first Argument.

The second Argument.

The third Argument.

The fourth Argument.

The fifth Argument.

The sixth Argument.

THE THIRD PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending upon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with M ^r . GATAKERS Answer to them in his Book of the Nature and Use of LOTS. As also M ^r . B ^s . Reply in defense of them: and M ^r . G ^s . Rejoinder thereunto.

The first Argument.

The second Argument.

The third Argument.

The fourth Argument.

AN ADVERTISEMENT to M ^r . BALMFORD.

Some things omitted, or misprinted.

A Just Defense of Certain Passages

Project Note

TO HIS LOVING and much respected Friend, M r . THOMAS GATAKER Bachelor in Divinity.

THE FIRST PART. M r . BALMFORDS PREFACE, WITH ANSWER TO IT.

ANSWER TO M r . B s . POST-SCRIPT.

TO THE READER.

THE SECOND PART. M r . BALMFORDS Answer to M r GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulness of a Lusorious Lot. Together with M r . G s . Reply in defense of his own Arguments, which are word for word also here related.

The first Argument.

The second Argument.

The third Argument.

The fourth Argument.

The fifth Argument.

The sixth Argument.

THE THIRD PART. M r . BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending upon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with M r . GATAKERS Answer to them in his Book of the Nature and Use of LOTS. As also M r . B s . Reply in defense of them: and M r . G s . Rejoinder thereunto.

The first Argument.

The second Argument.

The third Argument.

The fourth Argument.

AN ADVERTISEMENT to M r . BALMFORD.

Some things omitted, or misprinted.

TO HIS LOVING and much respected Friend, M ^r . THOMAS GATAKER Bachelor in Divinity.

THE FIRST PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS PREFACE, WITH ANSWER TO IT.

ANSWER TO M ^r . B ^s . POST-SCRIPT.

THE SECOND PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS Answer to M ^r GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulness of a Lusorious Lot. Together with M ^r . G ^s . Reply in defense of his own Arguments, which are word for word also here related.

THE THIRD PART. M ^r . BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending upon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with M ^r . GATAKERS Answer to them in his Book of the Nature and Use of LOTS. As also M ^r . B ^s . Reply in defense of them: and M ^r . G ^s . Rejoinder thereunto.

AN ADVERTISEMENT to M ^r . BALMFORD.