A Treatise of Monarchy

CAP. I. Of Political Government, and its Distinction into several Kinds.

G Overnment and Subjection are Relatives, [Sect. 1] so that what is said of the One, may in proportion be said of the other: Which being so, it will be needless to treat of both: because it will be easy to apply what is spoken of one to the other. Government is Potestatis Exercitium, the exercise of a Moral Power. One of these is the Root and Measure of the other; which if it exceed, is exorbitant, is not Government, but a Transgression of it. This Power and Government is differenced with respect to the Governed, to wit, a Family, which is called Economical: or a public society, which is called Political, or Magistracy. Concerning this Magistracy we will treat 1. in general. 2. Of the principal kind of it.

In general concerning Magistracy, There are two things about which I find difficulty and difference, viz. the Original, and the End.

First for the Original: There seem to be two extremes in Opinion; while some amplify the Divinity thereof: Others speak so slightly of it, as if there were little else but Human Institution in it. I will briefly lay down my apprehensions of the evident truth in this point: and it may be, things being clearly and disctinctly set down, there will be no real ground for contrariety in this matter. Three things herein must necessarily be distinguished, viz. 1. The Constitution of Power of Magistracy in general. 2. The Limitation of it to this or that kind. 3. The Determination of it to this or that Individual Person or Line.

For the first of these, 1. It is God's express Ordinance that in the societies of Mankind, there should be a Magistracy or Government. At first when there were but two, God ordained it, Gen. 3.16. S ^t . Paul affirms as much of the Powers that be, none excepted, Rom. 13 1. 2 This Power where ever placed ought to be respected as a participation of divine Sovereignty, Psal, 82.1.6. and every soul ought to be subject to it for the Lord's sake 1 Pet. 2.13. that is, for conscience sake of God's Ordinance, Rom. 13.5. and under penalty of Damnation, v. 2. These are Truths against which there is no color of opposition. Indeed this Power may be claimed by them who have it not; and where there is a limitation of this Power, subjection may be claimed in cases which are without those limits: But to this Ordinance of Power where it is, and when it requires subjection, it must be given; as before.

For the second. 1. In some particular communities the Limitation of it to this or that kind, is an immediate Ordinance of God: so Kingly Power was appointed to the Jews on their desire, 1 Sam. 8.9. whether they had not a kind of Monarchical Government before, I will not stand on it: but it is evident that then, on their earnest desire God himself condescended to an establishment of Regalitie in that state. 2. But for a general binding Ordinance, God hath given no word, either to command or commend one kind above another: Men may according to their Relations to the form they live under, to their affections and judgments in divers respects, prefer this or that form above the rest; but we have no divine limitation: and it were an absurdity to think so; for then we should uncharitably condemn all the Communities which have not that form for violation of God's Ordinance and pronounce those other Powers unlawful. 3. This then must have another and lower fountain to flow from, which can be no other then Human. The higher Power is God's Ordinance: That it resideth in One, or more; in such or such a way is from human designment: for when God leaves a matter indifferent, the restriction of this indifferency is left to secondary causes. And I conceive this is S ^t . Peters meaning, when he calls Magistracy 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Human Creature; S. Paul calls it God's Ordinance, because the Power is God's: S. Peter calls it human Ordinance, because the specification of it to this or that form, is from the societies of Mankind. I confess it may be called a human Creature, in regard of its subject, which is a Man, or Men: or its End which is to rule over Men for the good of Men, but the other seems more natural and it induces no disparagement to Authority, being so understood. But how ever you take that place, yet the thing affirmed stands good, that God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own Act bind themselves.

For the third: the same is to be said of it, as of the second: some particular men we find whom God was pleased by his own immediate choice to invest with this his Ordinance of Authority: Moses, Saul, David, yea God by his immediate Ordinance determined the Government of that people to David's posterity and made it successive; so that that People after his appointment and word was made known to them, and the room void by Saul's death, was as immediately bound by divine Law to have David, and his Sons after him to be Magistrates, as to Magistracy it self. But God hath not done so for every people: ascriptum est cannot be alleged for the endowing this or that person or stock with Sovereignty over a community: They alone had the privilege of an extraordinary Word. All others have the ordinary and mediate hand of God to enthrone them: They attain this determination of Authority to their Persons by the tacit and virtual, or else express and formal consent of that Society of men they govern, either in their own persons, or the root of their succession, as I doubt not, in the sequel it will be made appear. But let no man think that it is any lessening or weakening of God's Ordinance in them, to teach that it is annexed to their Persons by a human Mean: for though it be not so full a title to come to it by them simple Providence of God, as by the express Precept of God: yet when by the disposing hand of God's Providence a Right is conveyed to a person or family, by the means of a public Fundamental Oath, Contract and Agreement of a State, it is equivalent then to a Divine Word; and within the bounds of that public Agreement the conveyed Power is as Obligatory, as if an immediate word had designed it. Thus it appears that they which say there is divinum quiddam in Sovereigns, and that they have their power from God, speak in some sense truth; As also they which say that originally Power is in the People, may in a sound sense be understood. And in these things we have Dr. Ferns consent in his late discourse upon this subject. Sect. 3.

[Sect. 2] For the end of Magistracy; to set out that is no hard matter, if we consider what was looked at when God ordained it. That was the Good of the society of men over which it is set: So Saint Paul, Rom. 13.4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . God aimed at it in the Institution of Government: and so do all men in the choice of it, where they may be choosers: such a Government, and such persons to sway it, as may most conduce to public Weale. Also it is the measure of all the Acts of the Governor: and he is good or bad according as he uses his Power to the good of the State wherewith he is entrusted. That is the end: but not the sole end; The preservation of the Power and Honor of the Governor is an end too: but I think not co-ordinate, but subordinate to the other: because doubtless in the Constitution of Government, that is first thought on, and this in congruity to that; Also the reason why the Power and Honor of the Magistrate must be preserved, is for the public societies sake because its welfare depends thereon: And if it fall out that one of them must suffer: every good Magistrate will descend something from his greatness be it for the good of the Community: On the other side, though every subject ought for the honor and good of the Magistrate to give up his private; yet none ought to advance the greatness of his Sovereign with the public detriment. Whence in my apprehension the end of Magistracy is the good of the whole Body, Head, and Members conjunctly: but if we speak divisim, then the good of the Society is the Ultime end: and next to that, as conducent to that, the Governors Greatness and Prerogative. And herein also accordeth Dr. Fern with us. Sect. 3. Where he says, That the people are the end of the governing Power. There is another question of mainer concernment, here in our general discourse of Authority fitly to be handled. viz. How far subjection is due to it? but because it hath a great dependence on the kinds and States of Power, and cannot be so well conceived without the Precognition thereof: I will refer it to after opportunities.

For the division of this Power of Magistracy. It cannot [Sect. 3] be well divided into several species; for it is one simple thing an indivisible bcame of Divine Perfection; yet for our more distinct conceiving thereof. Men have framed several distinctions of it. So with respect of its measure, it is absolute or limited: In respect of its manner. It is as St. Peter divides it, Supreame, or Subordinate. In respect of its Mean of acquiring it is Elective, or successive; for I conceive that of Conquest, and Prescription of usuage are reducible to one of these, as will appear afterwards. In respect of its degrees it is Nomotheticall or Architectonicall and Gubernative or Executive. And in respect of the subject of its residence there is an ancient and usual distinction of it into Monarchical, Aristocratical and Democratical. These either simple or mixed of two, or all three together, of which the Predominant gives the denomination. These are not accurate specificative, Divisions of Power, for it admits none such, but partitions of it according to divers respects. The course of my intention directs me to speak only of Monarchical Power, which is the chief and most usual form of Government in the world; The other two being apt to resolve into this, but this not so apt to dissolve into them.

CHAP. II. Of the Division of Monarchy into absolute and limited.

[Sect. 1] NOW we must know that most of those distinctions which were applied to Power in general are appliable to Monarchy: because the respects on which they arise are to be found in it. But I will insist on the three main divisions: for the handling of them will bring us to a clear understanding of what is needful to be known about Monarchical Power.

First, of the distinction of Monarchy into Absolute and Limited. Absolute Monarchy is when the Sovereignty is so fully in one, that it hath no Limits or Bounds under God, but his own Will. It is when a people are absolutely resigned up or resign up themselves to be governed by the will of one man. Such were the ancient Eastern Monarchies, and that of the Persian and Turk at this day, as far as we know. This is a lawful Government and therefore where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by Oath and Contract, or are borne and brought unto it by God's Providence, it binds them and they must abide it▪ because an Oath to a lawful thing is Obligatory. This in Scripture is very evident as Ezek. 17 16.18.19. Where Judgment is denounced against the King of Judah for breaking the Oath made to the King of Babylon; and it is called God's Oath, yet doubtless this was an Oath of absolute subjection. And Rom. 13. the power which then was, was absolute; yet the Apostle not excluding it; calls it God's ordinance, and commands subjection to it: so Christ commands tribute to be paid, and pays it himself; yet it was an arbitrary tax, the production of an absolute power. Also the sovereignty of masters over servants was absolute, and the same in Economy as absolute Monarchy is in policy, yet the Apostle enjoins not masters called to Christianity to renounce that title as too great and rigid to be kept but exhorts them to moderation in the exercise of it; and servants to remain contented in the condition of their servitude. More might be said to legitimate this kind of government, but it needs not in so plain a case.

This absolute Monarchy hath three degrees, yet all within [Sect. 2] the state of absoluteness. The first, when the Monarch, whose will is the people's Law, doth set himself no stated Rule or Law to rule by, but by immediate Edicts and commands of his own will governs them, as in his own and Councils judgment he thinks fit. Secondly, when he sets down a Rule and Law by which he will ordinarily govern, reserving to himself liberty to vary from it, wherein, and as oft as in his discretion he judges fit: and in this the Sovereign is as free as the former, only the people are at a more certainty what he expects from them in ordinary. Thirdly, when he not only sets down an express Rule and Law to govern by, but also promiseth and engages himself in many cases not to alter that rule: but this engagement is an after condescent and act of grace, not dissolving the absolute oath of subjection, which went before it, nor is intended to be the rule of his power, but of the exercise of it. This Ruler is not so absolute as the former in the use of his power, for he hath put a bond on that, which he cannot break without breach of promise; that is, without sin: but he is as absolute in his power, if he will sinfully put it forth into act, it hath no politick bounds, for the people still owe him absolute subjection, that not being dissolved or lessened by an act of grace coming afterwards.

[Sect. 3] Now in governments of this nature, How far obedience is due, and, Whether any resistance be lawful, is a question which here must be decided. For the due effecting whereof, we must premise some needful distinctions to avoid confusion. Obedience is twofold; first, Positive and active, when in conscience of an authority we do the thing commanded: secondly, Negative and passive, when though we answer not Authority by doing, yet we do it by contented undergoing the penalty imposed. Proportionably resistance is twofold: first, Positive, by an opposing of force: secondly, Negative, when only so much is done as may defend ourselves from force, without return of force against the Assailant. Now this negative resistance is also twofold: first, In inferior and sufferable cases: secondly, or in the supreme case and last necessity of life and death: and then too it is first, either of particular person or persons; secondly, or of the whole community. And if of particular persons, then either under plea and pretence of equity assaulted; or else without any plea at all, merely for will and pleasure sake: for to that degree of rage and cruelty sometimes the heart of man is given over. All these are very distinguishable cases, and will be of use either in this or the ensuing disputes.

[Assert. 1] To the question I say, First, Positive obedience is absolutely due to the will and pleasure of an absolute Monarch, in all lawful and indifferent things: because in such a State the will of the Prince is the supreme Law, so that it binds to obedience in everything not prohibited by a superior, that is, Divine Law: for it is in such case the higher power, and is God's ordinance.

[Assert. 2] Secondly, When the will of an absolute Monarch commands a thing forbidden to be done by God's Law then it binds not to active obedience; then is the Apostles rule undoubtedly true, It is better to obey God then men: For the Law of the inferior gives place to the superior. In things defined by God, it should be all one with us for the Magistrate to command us to transgress that, as to command us an impossibility; and impossibilities fall under no Law. But on this ground no man must quarrel with Authority, or reject its commands as unlawful, unless there be an open unlawfulness in the face of the act commanded. For if the unlawfulness be hidden in the ground or reason of the action, inferiors must not be curious to inquire into the grounds or reasons of the commands of superiors; for such license of enquiry would often frustrate great undertakings, which much depend on speed and secrecy of execution. I speak all this of absolute government, where the will and reason of the Monarch is made the higher power, and its expression the supreme Law of a State.

Thirdly, suppose an absolute Monarch should so degenerate [Assert. 3] into Monstrous unnatural Tyranny, as apparently to seek the destruction of the whole community, subject to him in the lowest degree of vassalage, then such a community may negatively resist such subversion: yea, and if constrained to it by the last necessity, positively resist and defend themselves by force against any instruments whatsoever, employed for the effecting thereof. 1. David did so in his particular case, when pursued by Saul: he made negative resistence by flight, and doubtless he intended positive resistence against any instrument, if the negative would not have served the turn: else why did he so strengthen himself by Forces? sure not to make positive resistance, and lay violent hands upon the Person of the Lord's Anointed, as it appeared; yet for some reason he did it doubtless, which could be none other, but by that force of Arms to defend himself against the violence of any mis-employed inferior hands. If then he might do it for his particular safety, much rather may it be done for the public. 2. Such an act is without the compass of any the most absolute Potentate; and therefore to resist in it, can be to resist no power, nor the violation of any due of subjection. For, first, the most submiss subjection ever intended by any community, when they put themselves under another's power, was the command of a reasonable will and power; but to will and command the destruction of the whole body over which a power is placed, were an act of will most unreasonable and self-destructive, and so not the act of such a will, to which subjection was intended by any reasonable creatures. Secondly the public good and being is armed at in the utmost bond of subjection; for in the constitution of such unlimited sovereignty, though every particular man's good and being is subjected to the will of One supreme yet certainly the conservation of the whole Public was intended by it; which being invaded; the intent of the constitution is overthrown and an act is done which can be supposed to be within the compass of no political power: So that did Nero as it was reported of him in his immanity thirst for the destruction of whole Rome; and if he were truly what the Senate pronounced him to be, Humani generis hostis, then it might justify a negative resistance of his person; and a positive, of any Agent should be set on so inhumane a service. And the united Provinces are allowed in resisting Philip 2 ^d . though he had been their absolute Monarch, if he resolved the extirpation of the whole people, and the planting the country with Spaniards, as it is reported he did. And that assertion of some, that All resistance is against the Apostles prohibition. Resistance by power of Arms is utterly unlawful, cannot be justified in such a latitude. But of this more will be spoken in the current of this discourse.

[Assert. 4] Fourthly, suppose by such a power any particular person or persons life be invaded, without any plea of reason or cause for it, I suppose it hard to deny him liberty of negative resistance of power; yea, and positive, of any Agents, in such assault of murder: for though the case be not so clear as the former yet it seems to me justified by the fact of David, and the rescuing of Jonathan from the causeless cruel intent of his Fathers putting him to death. As also such an act of will carrying no color of reason with it, cannot be esteemed the act of a rational will, and so no will intended to be the Law of Sovereignty. Not that I think a Monarch of such absoluteness is bound to yield a reason why he commands any man to be put to death, before his command be obeyed; but I conceive the person so commanded to death may be justified before God and men for protecting himself by escape, or otherwise, unless some reason or cause be made known to him of such command.

Fifthly, Persons subject to an unlimited dominion must [Assert. 5] without resistance subject their Estates, Liberties, Persons, to the will and pleasure of their Lord, so it carry any plea or show of reason and equity. First, it seems to me evident, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19 20. if well doing be mistaken by the reason and judgment of the power for ill doing, and we be punished for it, yet the Magistrate going according to his misguided reason it is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be submitted to; because such a one suffers by Law, in a State where the Lord's will is the Law. Secondly, In commands of the power where is the plea of reason and equity on the part of the commander, whether it be such indeed, some power must judge, but the constitution of absolute Monarchy resolves all judgment into the will of the Monarch, as the supreme Law: so that if his will judicially censure it just it must be yielded to as if it were just without repeal or redressement by any created power. And let none complain of this as a hard condition, when they or their Ancestors have subjected themselves to such a power by oath, or political contract: If it be God's ordinance to such, it must be subjected to and its exorbitances born, as he says in Tac • tu •… , as men bear famine, pestilence, and other effects of God's displeasure.

Sixthly in absolute Monarchy the person of the Monarch [Assert. 6] is above the reach of just force and positive resistance: for such a full resignation of men's selves to his will and power, by the irrevocable oath and bond of political contract, doth make the person as sacred as the Unction of Saul or David. In such a State all lawful power is below him, so that he is uncapable of any penal hand which must be from a superior, or it is unjust. I have been the longer on this absolute Monarchy, because though it doth not concern us, yet it will give light to the stating of doubts in governments of a more restrained nature: for what is true here in the full extent of power, is there also as true within the compass of their power.

[Sect. 4] In moderate or limited Monarchy it is an enquiry of some weight to know, What it is which constitutes it in the state of a limited Monarchy.

First, A Monarchy may be stinted in the exercise of its [Assert. 1] power, and yet be an absolute Monarchy, as appeared before in our distinction of absolute Monarchy: If that bounds be a subsequent act, and proceeding from free will and grace in the Monarch; for it is not the exercise, but the nature and measure of power, wherewith he is radically invested, which denominates him a free, or conditionate Monarch.

[Assert. 2] Secondly, I take it, that a limited Monarch must have his bounds of power ab externo, not from the free determination of his own will. And now Kings have not divine words and binding Laws to constitute them in their Sovereignty, but derive it from ordinary providence, the sole mean hereof is the consent and fundamental contract of a Nation of men, which consent puts them in their power, which can be no more nor other then is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection, This is the root of all sovereignty individuated and existent in this or that person or family; till this come and lift him up he is a private man, not differing in state from the rest of his brethren; but then he becomes another man, his person is sacred by that sovereignty conveyed to it, which is God's ordinance and image. The truth hereof will be more fully discovered, when we come to speak of Elective and Successive Monarchy.

[Assert. 3] Thirdly He is then a limited Monarch, who hath a Law beside his own will for the measure of his power. First, the supreme power of the State must be in him, so that his power must not be limited by any power above his; for then he were not a Monarch, but a subordinate magistrate. Secondly, this supreme power must be restrained by some Law, according to which this power was given, and by direction of which this power must act; else he were not a limited Monarch, that is, a liege Sovereign, or legal King. Now a Sovereignty comes thus to be legal, or defined to a rule of Law, either by original constitution, or by after-condescent. By original constitution, when the society public confers on one man a power by limited contract, resigning themselves to his government by such a Law, reserving to themselves such immunities: In this case, they which at first had power over themselves, had power to set their own terms of subjection; and he which hath no title of power over them but by their act, can de jure have no greater then what is put over to him by that act By after-condescent, viz. when a Lord, who by conquest, or other right, hath an absolute arbitrary power; but not liking to hold by such a right, doth either formally or virtually desert it, and take a new legal right as judging it more safe for him to hold by, and desirable of the people to be governed by. This is equivalent to that by original constitution; yea, is all one with it: for this is in that respect a secondary original constitution. But if it be objected, that this being a voluntary condescent is an act of grace, and so doth not derogate from his former absoluteness as was said before of an absolute Monarch, who confines himself to govern by one rule; I answer. This differs essentially from that: for there, a free Lord, of grace yields to rule by such a Law, reserving the fullness of power, and still requiring of the people a bond and oath of utmost indefinite subjection; so that it amounts not to a limitation of radical power: whereas here is a change of title, and a resolution to be subjected to, in no other way, then according to such a frame of government; and accordingly no other bond or oath of allegiance is required, or taken, then according to such a Law: this amounts to a limitation of radical power. And therefore they speak too generally, who affirm of all acts of grace proceeding from Princes to people, as if they did not limit absoluteness: 'It is true of acts of grace of that first kind; but yet you see, an act of grace may be such a one, as may amount to a resignation of that absoluteness into a more mild and moderate power unless we should hold it out of the power of an absolute Lord to be other; or that by free condescent, and act of grace, a man cannot as well part with, or exchange his right and title to a thing, as define himself in the use and exercise; which I think none will affirm.

[Sect. 5] In all Governments of this allay and legal Constitution there are three Questions of special moment to be considered.

First, How far subjection is due? As far as they are God's Ordinance, as far as they are a power and they are a power as far as the Contract fundamental from which under God their authority is derived doth extend. As absolute Lord's must be obeyed as far as their Will enjoins, because their Will is the measure of their Power, and their subjects Law: so these in the utmost extent of the Law of the Land, which is the measure of their power, and their subjects duty of obedience. I say so far, but I do not say no further: for I believe, though on our former grounds it clearly follows that such Authority transcends its bounds if it command beyond the Law: and the Subject legally is not bound to subjection in such case, yet in Conscience a Subject is bound to yield to the Magistrate, even when he cannot de jure, challenge obedience, to prevent scandal or any occasion of slighting the power which may sometimes grow, even upon a just refusal: I say, for these causes a subject ought not to use his liberty, but morem gerere, if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion, and in which his act may not be made a leading case, and so bring on a prescription against public Liberty.

[Sect. 6] Secondly, how far it is lawful to resist the exorbitant Illegal Commands of such a Monarch? 1. As before in lighter cases, in which it may be done, for the reasons alleged, [Pos. 1] and for the sake of public peace, we ought to submit, and make no resistance at all, but de jure recedere.

[Pos. 2] 2. In cases of higher nature. Passive resistance, viz. By appeal to Law, by Concealment, by Flight, is lawful to be made, because such a Command is politically powerles, it proceeds not from God's Ordinance in him: and so we sin not against God's Ordinance in such Non-submission, or Negative resistance.

3. For Instruments or Agents in such commands, if the [Pos. 3] straight be such, and a man be surprised, that no place is left for an appeal nor evasion by Negative resistance; I conceive, against such. Positive resistence may be made: because authority failing or this Act in the Supreame Power, the Agent or Instrument can have none derived to him; and so is but in the nature of a private person, and his Act, as an offer of private violence, and so comes under the same rules for opposition.

4. For the person of the Sovereign, I conceive it, as well [Pos. 4] above any Positive Resistence, as the Person of an absolute Monarch; Yea, though by the whole Community, (except there be an express reservation of Power in the body of the State, or any deputed Persons or Court, to use in case of intolerable exorbitance. Positive Resistence, which, if there be, then such a Governor is no Monarch, for that Fundamental Reservation destroys it's being a Monarchy in as much as the Supreame Power is not in one.) For where ever there is a Sovereign Politique Power constituted, the person or persons who are invested with it are Sacred, and out of the reach of Positive Resistance or Violence: which, as I said, if just, must be from no inferior or subordinate hand. But it will be objected, that since every Monarch hath his power from the consent of the whole body, that consent of the whole Body hath a Power above the Power of the Monarch, and so the resistance which is done by it, is not by an inferior power and to this purpose is brought that Axiom. Quicquia efficit tale est magis tale. I answer, That rule even in natural causes is liable to abundance of restrictions: And in the particular in hand it holds not. Where the cause doth bereave himself of that perfection by which it works, in the very act of causing, and convey it to that effect, It doth not remain more such then the effect, but much less, and below it, as if I convey an estate of Land to another, it doth not hold that after such conveyance I have a better Estate remaining in me then that other, but rather the contrary; because what was in one is passed to the other: The Servant who at the year of Jubilee would not go out free, but have his ear bored, and given his Master a full Lordship over him: can we argue, that he had afterward more power over himself then his Master, because he gave his Master that power over him, by that act of Economical Contract. Thus the Community whose consent establishes a Power over them cannot be said universally to have an eminency of Power above that which they constitute; sometimes they have, sometimes they have not: and to judge when they have, when not respect must be had to the Origiginall Contract and Fundamental Constitution of that State, if they have constituted a Monarchy, that is, invested one man with the Sovereignty of Power, and subjected all the rest to him; Then it were unreasonable to say, they yet have it in themselves; Or have a power of recalling that Supremacy which by Oath and Contract they themselves transferred on another: Unles we make this Oath and Contract less binding then private ones, dissoluble at pleasure, and so all Monarchs Tenants at will from their people. But if they in such Constitution reserve a power in the body to oppose and displace the Magistrate for exorbitancies, and reserve to themselves a Tribunal to try him in, that man is not a Monarch but the Officer and Substitute of him or them to whom such Power over him is reserved or conferred. The Issue is this, If he be a Monarch he hath the Apex or Culmen Potestatis, and all his Subjects divisim and conjunction, are below him: They have devested themselves of all superiority and no Power left for a Positive Opposition of the Person of him whom they have invested.

[Sect. 7] Thirdly, Who shall be the Judge of the Excesses of the Sovereign Lord in Monarchies of this composure? I answer, A frame of Government cannot be imagined of that perfection but that some inconveniencies there will be possible for which there can be provided no remedy: Many miseries to which a people under an absolute Monarchy are liable are prevented by this Legal Allay and definement of Power. But this is exposed to one defect from which that is free, that is an impossibility of constituting a Judge to determine this last controversy, viz. the Sovereigns transgressing his fundamental limits. This Judge must be either some Forraigner, and then •… e lose the freedom of the State, by subjecting it to an external power in the greatest case: or else within the body: If so then 1. either the Monarch himself, and then you destroy the frame of the State, and make it absolute; for to define a Power to a Law, and then to make him Judge of his Deviations from that Law, is to absolve him from all Law. Or else 2. the Community and their Deputies must have this power: and then, as before, you put the apex Potestatis, the prime 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the whole body, or a part of it, and destroy the being of Monarchy: The Ruler not being God's immediate Minister but of that Power, be it where it will to which he is accountable for his actions. So that I conceive in a limited legal Monarchy, there can be no stated internal Judge of the Monarchs actions, if there grow a fundamental Variance betwixt him and the Community. But you will say, It is all one way to absoluteness to assign him no Judge as to make him his own Judge. Answ. I say not simply in this case there is no Judge: But that there can be no Judge legal and constituted within that frame of Government: but it is a transcendent case beyond the provision of that Government, and must have an extraordinary Judge, and way of devision.

In this great and difficult case, I will deliver my apprehensions freely and clearly, submitting them to the censure of better Judgments. Suppose the controversy to happen in a Government fundamentally legal, and the people no further subjected then to Government by such a Law.

1. If the act in which the exorbitance and transgression [Pos. 1] is supposed to be, be of lesser moment, and not striking at the very being of that Government, it ought to be borne by public patience, rather then to endanger the being of the State by a contention betwixt the head and body Politique.

2. If it be mortal and such as suffered, dissolves the frame [Pos. 2] and life of the Government and public liberty. Then the illegality and destructive nature is to be set open and redresment sought by Petition; which if failing, Prevention by resistance ought to be. But first that it is such must be made apparent; and if it be apparent, and an Appeale made ad conscientiam generis humani, especially of those of that Community, then the fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every man's conscience; and every man (as far as concerns him) must follow the evidence of Truth in his own soul, to oppose, or not oppose, according as he can in conscience acquit or condemn the act of carriage of the Governor. For I conceive in a Case which transcends the frame and provision of the Government they are bound to. People are unbound, and in state as if they had no Government; and the superior Law of Reason and Conscience must be Judge: wherein everyone must proceed with the utmost advice and impartiality: For if he err in judgment he either resists God's Ordinance, or puts his hand to the subversion of the State and Policy he lives in.

And this power of judging argues not a superiority in those who Judge, over him who is Judged for it is not Authoritative and Civil, but moral, residing in reasonable Creatures and lawful for them to execute, because never devested and put off by any act in the constitution of a legal Government, but rather the reservation of it intended: For when they define the Superior to a Law, and constitute no Power to Judge of his Excesses from that Law, it is evident they reserve to themselves, not a Formal Authoritative Power, but a moral Power, such as they had originally before the Constitution of the Government; which must needs remain, being not conveyed away in the Constitution.

CHAP. III. Of the division of Monarchy into Elective and Successive.

THe second division of Monarchy, which I intend to [Sect. 1] treat of, is that of Elective or Successive. Elective Monarchy is that, where by the fundamental constitution of the State, the supreme power is conveyed but to the person of him whom they take for their Prince; the people reserving to themselves power, by men deputed by the same constitution to elect a new person on the decease of the former. Successive is, where by the fundamental constitution of the State, the Sovereignty is conferred on one Prince; and in that one, as a root and beginning to his heirs, after a form and line of succession, constituted also by the fundamentals of that Government. In the first, the Peoples oath and contract of subjection extends but to one person: In the other, to the whole Race and Line of Successors; which continuing, the bond of subjection continues; or which failing, the people return to their first liberty, of choosing a new person, or succession to be invested with Sovereignty.

I do conceive that in the first original all Monarchy, yea [Sect. 2] any individual frame of Government whatsoever, is elective: that is, is constituted, and draws its force and right from the consent and choice of that Community over which it swayeth. And that triple distinction of Monarchy in o that which is gotten by Conquest, Prescription, or Choice is, not of distinct parts unless by Choice be meant full and formal Choice: my reason is, because man being a voluntary agent and subjection being a moral act, it doth essentially depend on consent: so that a man may by force and extremity be brought under the power of another, as unreasonable creatures are, to be disposed of, and trampled on, whether they will or no: But a bond of subjection cannot be put on him, nor a right to claim Obedience and Service acquired, unless a man become bound by some act of his own Will. For, suppose another, from whom I am originally free, be stronger then I, and so bring me under his mercy do I therefore sin if I do not what he commands me? or can that act of violence pass into a moral title, without a moral principle?

[Sect. 3] But this will be more manifest, if by induction I show how other titles resolve into this. I will begin with that of divine institution. Saul and David were by the Sacrament of anointing designed to the Kingdom, as it were by God's own hand, which notwithstanding, they were not actually Kings till the Peoples consent established them therein: That unction was a manifestation of the appointment of God, and when it was made known to the People, I think it had the power of Precept, to restrain the Peoples choice to that person; which if they had not done, they had resisted God's ordinance. Yet they were not thereby actually endowed with Kingly power, but remained as private men, till the Peoples choice put them in actual possession of that Power, which in David was not till after many years.

[Sect. 4] Then for that of Usuage or Prescription; if any such did ever constitute a Monarchy, it was by virtue of an Universal consent by that Usuage and Prescription proved and implied: For in a Popular state, where one Man in the Communitie, by reason of great estate, Wisdom, or other Perfection is in the eye of all the rest, all reverence him, and his advice they follow: and the respect continues from the People to the house and family, for divers generations. In this case, subjection at first is arbitrary in the people; and if in time it become necessary, it is because their Custom is their Law; and its long continuance is equivalent to a formal Election: so that this Tenure and Right if it be good and more then at pleasure, as it was at first, the considerate must needs ascribe it to a consent, and implicit choice of the People.

But the main Question is concerning Monarchy archieved [Sect. 5] by Conquest; where at first sight the Right seems gotten by the Sword, without the consent and Choyce of the People, yea against it. Conquest is either 1. Total where a full Conquest is made, by a total subduing a people to the Will of the Victor: or 2. Partiall, where an entrance is made by the Sword: But the People either because of the Right claimed by the Invader; or their unwillingness to suffer the Miseries of War, or their apparent inability to stand out in a way of Resistance, or some other consideration, submit to a composition and contract of subjection to the Invader. In this latter it is evident, the Sovereigns Power is from the Peoples consent; and the Government is such as the Contract and fundamental agreement makes it to be if it be the first Agreement, and the pretender hath no former Title which remains in force, for then this latter is invalid, if it include not and amount to a relinquishing and disannulling of the Old. But the difficulty is concerning a full and mere Conquest; and of this I will speak my mind clearly. Such a War and Invasion of a People, which ends in a Conquest, 1. it is either upon the pretence or claim of a Title of Sovereignty over the People invaded: and then, if the pretender prevail, it is properly no Conquest, but the vindication of a Title by force of Arms. And the Government is not Original, but such as the Title is by which he claymes it. 2. Or it is by One who hath no challenge of Right descending to him to justify his claim and Invasion of a People: Then if he subdue, he may properly be said to come to his Government by Conquest.

And there be who wholly condemn this title of Conquest as unlawful, and take it for nothing else but a National and public robbery: so one of the Answerers to Doctor Ferne, says in his p. 10. Conquest may give such a right as Plunderers use to take in houses they can master.— It is inhumane to talk of right of Conquest in a Civil, in a Christian State. But I cannot allow of so indefinite a Censure: rather I think the right of Conquest is such as the precedent War was: if that were lawful, so is the Conquest: For a Prince may be invaded, or so far injured by a neighbor People, or they may be set on such a pernicious enmity against him and his people, that the safety of himself and people may compel to such a War, which war if it end in Conquest, who can judge such Title unlawful? Suppose then Conquest may be a lawful way of acquisition: yet an immediate cause of right of Sovereignty; that is, of a Civil power of Government to which obedience is due, it cannot be: I say, an immediate cause, for a remote impulsive cause it oft is, but not an immediate formal cause; for that must ever be the consent of the people, whereby they accept of, and resign up themselves to a Government, and then their Persons are morally bound, and not before. Thus far the force of conquest may go; it may give a man title over, and power to possess and dispose of the Country and Goods of the Conquered; yea, the Bodies and lives of the Conquered are at the Will and Pleasure of the Conqueror: But it still is at the Peoples choice to come into a moral condition of subjection or not. When they are thus at the mercy of the Victor, if to save life they consent to a condition of servitude or subjection, then that consent, oath, or covenant, which they in that extremity make, being in relicita, binds them, and they owe moral Duty. But if they would rather suffer the utmost violence of the Conqueror, and will consent to no terms of subjection as Numantia in Spain, and many other People have resolved; they die or remain a free People. Be they captived or possessed at pleasure, they owe no duty, neither do they sin in not obeying; nor do they resist God's ordinance, if at any time of advantage they use force to free themselves from such a violent possession: yea perhaps, if before by contract they were bound to another, they should sin if to avoid death or bondage they should swear or covenant fealty to a Conqueror, and it were more noble and laudable to die in the service, and for the faith to their natural Sovereign. Thus I am persuaded it will appear an uncontrollable truth in Policy, that the consent of the People, either by themselves or their Ancestors is the only mean in ordinary providence by which sovereignty is conferred on any Person or Family: neither can God's ordinance be conveyed and People engaged in conscience by any other means.

It hath been affirmed by some, that mixture and limitation [Sect. 6] is inconsistent to successive Monarchy; as if where ever Sovereignty is entailed to a succession, it must needs be absolute: But I must profess I cannot see how it can stand with truth: Rather I think, that both Elective and Hereditary Monarchy are indifferently capable of absoluteness or limitation. If a free, and not pre-engaged People to any Government, by public compact yield up themselves to a Person, to be commanded by his Will as their supreme Law, during his natural life, and no longer, can it be denied but that he is an absolute, and yet Elective Monarch? unless you will say, he is not absolute, because he cannot by his Will, as by a Law, bind them to elect his son to succeed him, and change their Government into hereditary. But his being limited in this Clause doth not disparage his Sovereignty, or make his power of Government limited, because this belongs not to present Government, but is a mere provision for the future. Again, if the power of Ruling according to a Law, be by consent conveyed to one Person, and his heirs to succeed after him, how this should come to be absolute and the entailement should overthrow the constitution, I cannot imagine: If the whole latitude of power may be by a People made hereditary sure a proportion may as well; unless the limitation be such as includes a repugnancy to be perpetual. Indeed this enstating of a succession makes that power irrevocable, during the continuance of that succession but it makes it neither greater nor less in the Successor then was in his Progenitors, from whom he derives it.

In a successive Monarchy the Successor holds by the original [Sect. 7] Right of him who is the root of succession; and is de jure King the immediate instant after his Predecessors decease: Also the people are bound 〈◊〉 him, though they never take any Oath to his person. For as he commands in virtue of the original Right, so they are bound to obey by virtue of the original Covenant, and national Contract of Subjection: the new oath taken either by King or People, is but a reviving of the old; that the Conscience of it by renewing might be the more fresh and vigorous: it neither gives any new power, nor adds or detracts from the old, unless by common agreement an alteration be made; and so the foundation in that clause is new, which cannot be without the consent of both parties.

CHAP. IIII. Of the Division of Monarchy into Simple and Mixed.

[Sect. 1] THe third division is into Simple and Mixed. Simple is when the Government absolute or limited is so entrusted in the hands of one, that all the rest is by deputation from him: so that there is no authority in the whole Body but his, or derived from him: And that One is either individually one Person, and then it is a simple Monarchy: Or one associate Body, chosen either out of the Nobility, whence the Government is called a simple Aristocraty: or out of the Community, without respect of birth or state, which is termed a simple Democracy. The supreme authority residing exclusively in one of these three, denominates the Government simple, which ever it be.

Now experience teaching People, that several inconveniences are in each of these, which is avoided by the other: as aptness to Tyranny in simple Monarchy: aptness to destructive Factions in an Aristocracy: and aptness to Confusion and Tumult in a Democracy. As on the contrary, each of them hath some good which the others want, viz. Unity and strength in a Monarchy; Counsel and Wisdom in an Aristocracy; Liberty and respect of Common good in a Democracy. Hence the wisdom of men deeply seen in State matters guided them to frame a mixture of all three, uniting them into one Form, that so the good of all might be enjoyed, and the evil of them avoided. And this mixture is either equal, when the highest command in a State by the first Constitution of it is equally seated in all three; and then (if firm Union can be in a mixture of Equality) it can be called by the name of neither of them but by the general style of a Mixed State: or if there be priority of Order in one of the three, (as I think there must be or else there can be no Unity) it may take the name of that which hath the precedency. But the firmer Union is, where one of the three is predominant and in that regard gives the denomination to the whole: So we call it a Mixed Monarchy, where the primity of share in the supreme power is in one.

Now I conceive to the constituting of Mixed Monarchy [Sect. 2] (and so proportionately it may be said of the other. )

1. The Sovereign power must be originally in all three, viz. If the composition be of all three so that one must not hold his power from the other, but all equally from the fundamental [Pos. 1] Constitution: for if the power of one be original, and the other Derivative, it is no mixture, for such a Derivation of power to others is in the most simple Monarchy: Again, the end of mixture could not be obtained; for why is this mixture framed, but that they might confine each other from exorbitance, which cannot be done by a derivate power, it being unnatural that a derived power should turn back, and set bounds to its own beginning.

2. A full equality must not be in the three estates, though [Pos. 2] they are all sharers in the Supreame power; for if it were so, it could not have any ground in it to denominate it a Monarchy, more then an Aristocracy or Democracy.

3. A power then must be sought wherewith the Monarch [Pos. 3] must be invested, which is not so great as to destroy the mixture; nor so titular as to destroy the Monarchy; which I conceive maybe in these particulars.

1. If he be the head and Fountain of the power which governs and executes the established Laws, so that both the other States as well conjunctim as divisim, be his sworn subjects, and owe obedience to his commands, which are according to established Laws.

2. If he hath a sole or chief power in capacitating and putting those persons or societies in such States and conditions, as whereunto such Supreme power by the foundations of the Government doth belong, and is annexed: so that though the Aristocratical and Democratical power which is conjoined to his, be not from him: yet the definement and determination of it to such persons is from him, by a necessary consecution.

3. If the power of convocating or causing to be put in existence, and dissolving such a Court or Meeting of the two other estates as is authoritative, be in him.

4. If his authority be the last and greatest, though not the sole, which must establish and add a consummatum to every Act. I say these, or any of these put into one person makes that State Monarchical, because the other, though they depend not on him quoad essentiam et actus formales, but on the prime constitution of the Government, yet quoad existentiam et determinationem ad subjecta, they do.

The Supreme power being either the Legislative or the Gubernative. In a mixed Monarchy sometimes the mixture is the seat of the Legislative power, which is the chief of the two: The power of constituting officers for governing by those Laws being left to the Monarch: Or else the Primacie of both these powers is jointly in all three: For if the Legislative be in one, then the Monarchy is not mixed but simple, for that is the Superior, if that be in one, all else must needs be so too: By Legislative, I mean the power of making new Laws, if any new be needful to be added to the foundation: and the Authentic power of interpreting the old; For I take it, this is a branch of the Legislative and is as great, and in effect the same power.

Every mixed Monarchy is limited: but it is not necessary [Sect. 3] that every limited should be mixed: For the Prince in a mixed Monarchy, were there no definement of him to a Law but only this: that his Legislative acts have no validity without the allowance and joint authority of the other: this is enough to denominate it exactly a limited Monarchy: and so much it must have, if it be mixed. On the other side, if in the foundations of his Government he be restrained to to any Law besides his own Will, he is a limited Monarch, though that both the Legislative and Gubernative power (provided he exceed not those Laws) be left in his own hands: But then the Government is not mixed.

Now concerning the extent of the Princes power, and the [Sect. 4] subjects duty in a mixed Monarchy, almost the same is to be said, which was before in a limited: for it is a general rule in this matter: such as the Constitution of Government is, such is the Ordinance of God: such as the Ordinance is, such must our duty of subjection be. No Power can challenge an obedience beyond its own measure; for if it might, we should destroy all Rules and differences of Government, and make all absolute and at pleasure. In every mixed Principality.

First, Look what Power is solely entrusted and committed [Assert. 1] to the Prince by the fundamental Constitution of the State, in the due execution thereof all owe full subjection to him, even the other Estates, being but societies of his subjects bound to him by Oath of Allegeance as to their liege Lord.

Secondly, those acts belonging to the power which is stated [Assert. 2] in a mixed Principle if either part of that Principle, or two of the three undertake to do them it is invalid it is no binding Act; for in this case all three have a free Negative voice: and take away the privilege of a Negative Voice, so that in case of refusal the rest have power to do it without the third, then you destroy that. Third, and make him but a Looker on: So that in every mixed Government, I take it, there must be a necessity of concurrence of all three Estates in the production of Acts belonging to that power, which is committed in common to them: Else suppose those Acts valid which are done by any major part, that is, any two of the three, then you put it in the power of any two, by a confederacy at pleasure to disannul the third, or suspend all its Acts, and make it a bare Cypher in Government.

[Assert. 3] Thirdly in such a composed State, it the Monarch invade the power of the other two, or run in any course tending to the dissolving of the constituted frame, they ought to employ their power in this case to preserve the State from ruin; yea that is the very end and fundamental aim in constituting all mixed Policies: not that they by crossing and jarring should hinder the public good; but that, if one exorbitate, the power of restraint and providing for the public safety should be in the rest: and the power is put into divers hands, that one should counterpoize and keep even the other: so that for such other Estates, it is not only lawful to deny obedience and submission to illegal proceedings, as private men may, but it is their duty, and by the foundations of the Government they are bound to prevent dissolution of the established Frame.

[Assert. 4] Fourthly, the Person of the Monarch, even in these mixed Forms, (as I said before in the limited) ought to be above the reach of violence in his utmost exorbitances: For when a People have sworn allegiance, and invested a Person or Line with Supremacy, they have made it sacred, and no abuse can devest him of that power, irrevocably communicated. And while he hath power in a mixed Monarchy, he is the Universal Sovereign, even of the other limiting States: so that being above them, he is de jure exempt from any penal hand.

[Assert. 5] Fifthly, that one inconvenience must necessarily be in all mixed Governments, which I shown to be in limited Governments, there can be no Constituted, Legal, Authoritative Judge of the fundamental Controversies arising betwixt the three Estates. If such do arise, it is the fatal disease of these Governments, for which no salve can be prescribed; For the established being of such authority, would ipso facto overthrow the Frame, and turn it into absoluteness: So that if one of these, or two, say their power is invaded, and the Government assaulted by the other, the Accused denying it, it doth become a controversy: of this question there is no legal Judge, it is a case beyond the possible provision of such a Government. The Accusing side must make it evident to every man's Conscience. In this case, which is beyond the Government, the Appeale must be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as by Evidence men's Consciences are convinced, they are bound to give their utmost assistance. For the intention of the Frame in such States, justifies the exercise of any power, conducing to the safety of the Universality and Government established.

CHAP. I. Whether the Power wherewith our Kings are invested, be an Absolute, or Limited and Moderated Power?

[Sect. 1] H Aving thus far proceeded in general, before we can bring home this to a stating of the great controversy, which now our sins, God's displeasure, and evil turbulent men have raised up in our lately most flourishing but now most unhappy Kingdom. We must first look into the Frame and Composure of our Monarchy; for till we fully are resolved of that, we cannot apply the former general Truths, nor on them ground the Resolution of this ruining contention.

Concerning the Essentiall Composure of this Government, that it is Monarchical, is by none to be questioned: but the enquiry must be about the Frame of it. And so there are seven great questions to be prosecuted.

First, whether it be a Limited Monarchy, or Absolute? Here the question is not concerning Power in the Exercise, but the Root and being of it: for none will deny but that the way of Government used, and to be used in this Realm, is a designed way: Only some speak as if this Definement were an act of Grace from the Monarchs themselves, being pleased at the suit, and for the good of the People, to let their power run into act through such a course and current of Law: whereas, if they at any time shall think fit on great causes to vary from that way, and use the full extent of their power, none ought to contradict, or refuse to obey. Neither is it the question, Whether they sin against God if they abuse their power, and run out into acts of injury at pleasure, and violate those Laws which they have by Public Faith and Oath promised to observe; for none will deny this to be true, even in the most absolute Monarch in the world. But the point controverted is punctually this, Whether the Authority which is inherent in our Kings be boundless and absolute, or limited and determined, so that the acts which they do, or command to be done without that compass and bounds, be not only sinful in themselves, but invalid and non-authoritative to others?

Now for the determining hereof, I conceive and am in [Sect. 2] my Judgment persuaded, that the Sovereignty of our Kings is radically and fundamentally limited, and not only in the Use and Exercise of it: And am persuaded so on these grounds and Reasons.

First, Because the Kings Majesty himself, who best [Reas. 1] knows by his Council the nature of his own power, says, that the Law is the measure of his power: which is as full a concession of the thing as words can express. If it be the measure of it, then his power is limited by it; for the measure is the limits and bounds of the thing limited. And in his Answer to both the Houses concerning the Militia, speaking of the men named to him, says, If more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them, then by Law is in the Crown it self, His Majesty holds it reasonable, that the same be by some Law first vested in him, with power to transfer it to the these persons, &c. In which passage it is granted that the Powers of the Crown are by Law, and that the King hath no more then are vested in him by Law.

[Reas. 2] Secondly, because it is in the very Constitution of it mixed, as I shall afterwards make it appear, then it is radically limited; for as I shown before, every mixed Monarchy is limited, though not on the contrary: for the necessary connection of other power to it, is one of the greatest limitations. A subordination of Causes doth not ever prove the supreme Cause of limited virtue; a co-ordination doth always.

[Reas. 3] Thirdly, I prove it from the ancient, ordinary, and received denominations; for the Kings Majesty is called out Liege, that is, Legal Sovereign; and we his Liege that is, his Legal Subjects: what do these names argue, but that his Sovereignty and our subjection is legal that is, restrained by Law?

[Reas. 4] Fourthly, had we no other proof, yet that of Prescription were sufficient: In all ages, beyond record, the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom have been the Rule of Government; Liberties have been stood upon, and Grants thereof, with limitations of Royal power, made and acknowledged by Magna Charta, and other public and solemn acts; and no Obedience acknowledged to be due but that which is according to Law, nor claimed but under some pretext and title of Law.

[Reas. 5] Fifthly, the very Being of our Common and Statute Laws, and our Kings acknowledging themselves bound to govern by them, doth prove and prescribe them Limited: for those Laws are not of their sole composing, nor were they established by their sole Authority, but by the concurrence of the other two Estates: so that to be confined to that which is not merely their own, is to be in a limited condition.

Some there be which have lately written on this subject, who take another way to prove our Government limited by Law, viz. by denying all absolute Government to be lawful; affirming that Absolute Monarchy is not at all God's Ordinance, and so no lawful power secured from resistance. What is their ground for this? God allows no man to rule as he list, nor puts men's lives in the pleasure of the Monarch: It is a power arbitrary and injurious. But I desire those Authors to consider, that in absolute Monarchy there is not a resignation of men to any Will or list, but to the reasonable Will of the Monarch, which having the Law of reason to direct it, is kept from injurious acts. But see for defense of this Government, Part 1. cap. 2.

Having set down those Reasons on which my Judgment [Sect. 3] is settled on this side, I will consider the main Reasons whereby some have endeavored to prove this Government to be of an absolute nature, and will show their invalidity. Many Divines perhaps inconsiderately, perhaps wittingly for self ends, have been of late years strong Pleaders for Absoluteness of Monarchical Power in this Land; and pressed Obedience on the Consciences of People in the utmost extremity, which can be due in the most absolute Monarchy in the world; but I seldom or never heard or read them make any difference of Powers, but usually bring their proofs from those Scriptures, where subjection is commanded to the higher Powers, and all resistence of them forbidden and from Examples taken out of the manner of the government of Israel and Judah: as if any were so impious to contradict those truths, and they were not as well obeyed in Limited Government as in Absolute; or as if Examples taken out of one Government do always hold in another, unless their aim were to deny all distinction of Governments, and to hold all absolute, who have anywhere the supreme power conveyed to them.

Among these, I wonder most at that late discourse of Dr. Ferne, who in my Judgment avoucheth things inconsistent, and evidently contradictory one to the other: For in his Preface he acknowledges our Obedience to be limited and circumscribed by the Laws of the Land, and accordingly to be yielded or denied to the higher Power; and that he is as much against an absolute Power in the King and to raise him to an arbitrary way of Government, as against resistence on the Subjests part: also, that his power is limited by Law, Sect. 5. Yet on the other side he affirms, That the King holds his Crown by conquest; that it is descended to him by three Conquests, Sect. 2. that we even our Senate of Parliament hath not so much plea for resistence as the ancient Roman Senate had under the Roman Emperors, whose power we know was absolute, Sect, 2. that in Monarchy the judgment of many is reduced ro one: that Monarchy settles the chief power and final Judgment in one, Sect. 5 what is this but to confess him limited: and yet to maintain him absolute?

But let us come to the Arguments. First, say they, our Kings came to their right by Conquest; yea, says the Dr. by three Conquests: He means the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, as appears afterwards: Therefore their right is absolute. Here, that they may advance themselves, they care not though it be on the ruin of public liberty, by bringing a whole Nation into the condition of conquered slaves: But to the Argument. 1. Suppose the Antecedent true, the Consequution is not always true; for as is evident before in the first Part. All Conquest doth not put the Conqueror into an absolute right. He may come to a right by Conquest: but not sole Conquest; but a partial, occasioning a Right by final Agreement; and then the right is specificated by that fundamental agreement: Also he may by sword prosecute a claim of another nature: and in his war intend only an acquiring of that claimed right, and after conquest rest in that: Yea farther, he may win a Kingdom merely by the Sword and enter on it by right of Conquest: yet considering that right of conquest hath too much of force in it to be safe and permanent; he may think conquest the best mean of getting a Kingdom, but not of holding, and in wisdom for himself and posterity, gain the affections of the people by deserting that Title, and taking a new by Politique agreement, or descend from that right by fundamental grants of liberties to the people, and limitations to his own power: but these things I said in effect before, in the first part, only here I have recalled them, to show what a non sequitur there is in the Argument. But that which I chiefly intend, is to show the infirmity or falsehood of the Antecedent: it is an Assertion most untrue in it self; and pernicious to the State: Our Princes profess no other way of coming to the Crown, but by right of succession to rule free subjects in a legal Monarchy. All the little show of proof these Assertors have, is from the root of succession: So William commonly called the Conqueror. For that of the Saxons was an expulsion not a Conquest, for as our Histories record, They coming into the Kingdom drove out the Britain's, and by degrees planted themselves under their Commanders; and no doubt continued the freedom they had in Germany: unless we should think that by conquering they lost their own Liberties to the Kings for whom they conquered and expelled the British into Wales. Rather I conceive, the Original of the subjects liberty was by those our forefathers brought out of Germany: Where, as Tacitus reports, nec Regibus infinita aut libera potestas: Their Kings had no absolute but limited power: and all weighty matters were dispatched by general meetings of all the Estates. Who sees not here the antiquity of our Liberties and frame of Government? so they were governed in Germany, and so here to this day, for by transplanting themselves, they changed their soil; not their manners and Government: Then, that of the Danes was indeed a violent Conquest; and, as all violent rules, it lasted not long; when the English expelled them they recovered their Country and Liberties together. Thus it is clear, the English Liberty remained to them till the Norman Invasion, notwithstanding that Danish interruption. Now for Duke William, I know nothing they have in him but the bare style of Conqueror, which seems to make for them: The very truth is, and every intelligent reader of the History of those times will attest it, that Duke William pretended the grant and gift of King Edward who died without children and he came with forces into this Kingdom, not to Conquer but make good his Title against his enemies: his end of entering the Land was not to gain a new absolute Title but to vindicate the old limited one, whereby the English Saxon Kings his Predecessors held this Kingdom. Though his Title was not so good as it should be, yet it was better then Harold's, who was only the Son of Goodwin, Steward of King Edwards house; Whereas William was Cousen to Emma mother to the said King Edward; by whom he was adopted; and by solemn promise of King Edward was to succeed him: Of which promise Harold himself became surety, and bound by oath to see it performed: Here was a fair Title, especially Edgar Atheling the right Heir being of tender age, and dis-affected by the people. Neither did he proceed to a full Conquest, but after Harola who usurped the Crown was slain in battle, and none to succeed him, the Throne being void, the people chose rather to submit to William and his Title, then endure the hazard of ruining war, by opposing him, to set up a new King: It is not to be imagined, that such a Realm as England could be conquered by so few, in such a space, if the people's voluntary acceptance of him and his claim had not facilitated and shortened his undertaking. Thus we have it related in Mr. Cambd • n, that before Harold usurped the Crown, most men thought it the wisest Policy to set the Crown on Williams head, that by performing the Oath and promise, a War might be prevented: And that Harold by assuming the Crown, provoked the whole Clergy and Ecclesiastical State against him: and we know how potent in those days the Clergy were in State affairs: Also that after one battle fought wherein Harold was slain, he went to London, was received by the Londoners, and solemnly inaugurated King as unto whom by his own saying the Kingdom was by God's Providence appointed, and by virtue of a gift from his Lord and Cousen King Edward, the glorious, granted: so that after that battle the remainder of the war was dispatched by English forces and Leaders But suppose he did come in a Conqueror, yet he did not establish the Kingdom on those terms, but on the old Laws, which he retained and authorized for himself and his Successors to govern by. Indeed after his settlement in the Kingdom, some Norman Customs he brought in, and to gratify his soldiers dispossessed many English of their estates, dealing in it too much like a Conqueror: but the trial by twelve men, and other fundamentals of Government, wherein the English freedom consists, he left untouched, which have remained till this day: On the same Title he claimed and was inaugurated, was he King which was a title of rightful succession to Edward: therefore he was indeed King not as Conqueror, but as Edwards Successor, and on the same right as he and his Predecessors held the Crown. As also by the grant of the former Laws and form of Government, he did equivalently put himself and successors into the State of legal Monarchs, and in that Tenure have all the Kings of this Land held the Crown till this day, when these men would rake up and put a Title of Conquest upon them, which never was claimed or made use of by him who is the first root of their succession.

Another reason which they produce is the successive nature [Sect. 4] of this Monarchy: for with them, to be elective and limited, and to be successive and absolute, are equipollent: They conceive it impossible that a Government should be Hereditary and not absolute: But I have enough made it appear, Part 1. Chap. 2. Sect. 6. That succession doth not prove a Monarchy absolute from limitation, though it proves it absolution from interruption and discontinuance, during the being of that succession to which it is defined. And that which they object that our Kings are actually so before they take the Oath of governing by Law, and so they would be, did they never take that Oath; wherefore it is no Limitation of their royal power, is there also answered in the next Sect. and that so fully, that no more need be said. The same Law which gives the King his Crown immediately upon the decease of his Predecessor, conveys it to him with the same Determinations and Prerogatives annexed, with which his Progeintors enjoyed it so that he entering on that Original Right, his subjects are bound to yield obedience, before they take any Oath: And he is bound to the Laws of the Monarchy before he actually renews the bond by any Personal Oath. There is yet another argument usually brought to this purpose, taken from the Oath of Allegiance: but of that I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAP. II. Supposing it be in the Platforme limited. Wherein, and how far forth it is limited and defined?

[Pos. 1] I Conceive it fundamentally limited in five particulars. First, in the whole latitude of the Nomotheticall power; so that their power extends not to establish any Act, which hath the Being and state of a Law of the Land: nor give an authentic sense to any Law of doubtful and controverted meaning, solely and by themselves, but together with the concurrent Authority of the two other Estates in Parliament.

[Pos. 2] Secondly, in the Governing Power, there is a confinement to the Fundamental Common Laws, and to the superstructive Statute Laws, by the former concurrence of Powers enacted, as to the Rule of all their Acts and Executions.

[Pos. 3] Thirdly, in the power of constituting Officers, and means of governing; not in the choice of Persons for that is entrusted to his Judgment, for ought I know, but in the constitution of Courts of Judicature: For as he cannot Judge by himself or Officers, but in Courts of Justice; so those Cours of Justice must have a constitution by a concurrence of the three Estates: They must have the same power to constitute them, as the Laws which are dispensed in them.

[Pos. 4] Fourthly, in the very succession; for though succession hath been brought as a Medium to prove the Absoluteness of this Government yet if it be more thoroughly considered, it is rather a proof of the contrary; and everyone who is a successive Monarch is so far limited in his power that he cannot leave it to whom he pleases, but to whom the Fundamental Law concerning that Succession hath designed it. And herein though our Monarchy be not so far limited as that of France is said to be, where the King cannot leave it to his Daughter, but to his Heir male, yet restrained it is; so that should he affect another more, or judge another fitter to succeed, yet he cannot please himself in this, but is limited to the next Heir borne, not adopted or denominated: which was the case 'twixt Queen Mary and the Lady Jane.

Lastly, in point of Revenue wherein their Power extendeth [Pos. 5] not to their Subjects Estates; by Taxes and Impositions to make their own what they please, as hath been acknowledged by Magna Charta, and lately by the Petition of Right, the case of Ship-money, Conduct-money, &c. Nor, as I conceive, to make an Alienation of any Lands, or other Revenues annexed by Law to the Crown. I meddle not with personal limitations, whereby Kings, as well as private men, may limit themselves by Promise and Covenant, which being particular, bind only themselves; but of those which are radical, and have continued during the whole current of succession from unknown times. Other limitations, it is likely, may be produced by those who are skillful in the Laws: but I believe they will be such as are reducible to some of these, which I take to be the principal and most apparent limitations of this Monarchy, and are a most convincing induction to prove my Assertion in the former Chapter, That this Monarchy, in the very Mold and Frame of it, is of limited constitution.

CHAP. III. Whether it be of a Simple or Mixed Constitution?

WHen the Government is simple, when mixed; also [Sect. 1] where the mixture must be, which denominates a mixed Government, is explained Part 1. Cap. 3. Now I conceive it a clear and undoubted Truth, that the Authority of this Land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and constitution thereof. And my judgment is established on these grounds.

[Reas. 1] First, It is acknowledged to be a Monarchy mixed with Aristocracy in the house of Peers, and Democracy in the house of Commons. Now (as before was made appear in the first Part) it is no mixture which is not in the Root and Supremacy of Power: for though it have a subordination of inferior Officers, and though the Powers inferior be seated in a mixed subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government; for it is compatible to the simplest in the world, to have subordinate mixtures.

[Reas. 2] Secondly, that Monarchy where the legislative power is in all three, is in the very Root and Essence of it compounded and mixed of those three; for that is the height of power, to which the other parts are subsequent and subservient: so that where this resideth in a mixed subject that is in three distinct concurrent Estates, the consent and concourse of all most free, and none depending on the will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sense and in the very model of it of a mixed constitution: but such is the state of this Monarchy, as appears in the former question, and is self-apparent.

[Reas. 3] Thirdly, that Monarchy, in which three Estates are constituted, to the end that the power of one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, is mixed in the root and essence of it: but such is this, as is confessed in the answer to the said Propositions. The truth of the major will appear, if we consider how many ways provision may be made in a Political Frame to remedy and restrain the excesses of Monarchy. I can imagine but three ways. First, by constituting a legal power above it, that it may be regulated thereby, as by an over-ruling power: Thus we must not conceive of our two houses of Parliament, as if they could remedy the exorbitances of the Prince by an Authority superior to his; for this were to subordinate him to the two Houses, to set a superior above the Sovereign, that is, to destroy the being of his Monarchical power. Secondly, by an original conveyance to him of a limited and legal power so that beyond it he can do no potestative act; yet constituting no formal legal power to refrain or redress his possible exorbitances; here is limitation without mixture of another constituted power: As the former of these overthrows the power of the Sovereign, so this makes no provision for the iudemnity of the people. Thirdly, now the never enough to be admired wisdom of the Architects and Contrivers of the frame of Government in this Realm (whoever they were) have found a third way, by which they have conserved the Sovereignty of the Prince; and also made an excellent provision for the Peoples freedom, by constituting two Estates of men, who are for their condition Subjects, and yet have that interest in the Government, that they can both moderate and redress the excesses and illegalities of the Royal power, which (I say) cannot be done, but by a mixture, that is, by putting into their hands a power to meddle in acts of the highest function of Government; a power not depending on his will, but radically their own, and so sufficient to moderate the Sovereigns power.

Now what can reasonably be said in opposition to these [Sect. 2] grounds, proving a fundamental mixture, I cannot devise. Neither indeed is a mixture in the Government denied by the greatest Patrons of irresistibility; only such a mixture they would fain make it, which might have no power of positive resistence. I will therefore set down what they probably may or do object to this purpose, and will show the invalidity thereof.

First, this mixture seems not to be of distinct powers but of [Object. 1] a Power & a Council; authority in the Prince to give power to Acts, and counsel in the two Houses to advise and propose wholesome Acts; as if the royal power alone did give life to the Law: only he is defined in this power, that he cannot animate any Act to the being of a Law, but such as is proposed unto him by this great and Legislative Council of Parliament. Sol, This were probable, supposing the Parliament were only in the nature of a Counsel; but we know it is also a Court, the High Court of Parliament: Now it is evident that a Court is the seat and subject of Authority and power, and not barely of counsel and advice.

[Object. 2] Secondly, the two Houses together with the King, are the supreme Court of the Kingdom; but taken divisely from the King, it is no Court, and consequently hath no power. Sol. Suppose them no entire Court divided from the King, yet they are two Estates of the three which make up the supreme Court; so that they have a power and authority, though not complete and sufficing to perfect an Act, without the concourse of the third: For it appears by the Acts of that Court, that every of the three Estates hath a Legislative power in it; every Act being enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and by the Authority of the Lord's and Commons assembled in Parliament.

[Sect. 3] Thirdly, they have an authority, but in subordination to [Object. 3] the King, and derived from him, as his Parliament. Indeed this is a main Question, and hath very weighty Arguments on both sides, viz. Whether the authority of both the Houses be a subordinate authority, and derived from the King as its original? Three Reasons seem strong for the affirmative: First, because it is his Parliament, so called and acknowledged: If his Court, then the power whereby they are a Court is his power, derived from him, as the power of other Courts is. Secondly, because he hath the power of calling and dissolving it. Thirdly, because he is acknowledged in the Oaths of Allegeance and Supremacy to be the Head, and of supreme authority in the Kingdom, and all subject to him.

And whereas some make answer that he is Singulis major, but Vniversis minor, so the Answerer to Doctor Ferne, I wonder that the Proposition of the Observator, that the King is Vniversis minor, should be so much exploded. Every member scorsi •• is a subject, but all collection in their houses are not: And he says simply, the Houses are co-ordinate to the King, nor subordinate; that the Lord's style, Comites, or Peers, implies in Parliament a co-ordinative society with his Majesty in the Government. I conceive this Answerer to avoid one extreme falls on another; for this is a very overthrow of all Monarchy, and to reduce all Government to Democracy; For look where the apex potestatis is, there is the Government. Also it is against Common Reason: For the King, is he not King of the Kingdom? and what is the Kingdom but all united? all the particulars knit together in one body politick? so that if he be King of the Kingdom, he is Vniversis major too; for the King is major, and the Kingdom is the united universe of the People. Thus those expressions are some of them false, some though secundum quid true; yet spoken simply, and in that manner, are scandalous and incompatible to Monarchy. Thus you see what may be said on the one side, to prove the King to be the original of all power, even of that which is in the Houses of Parliament assembled.

On the other side are as weighty Arguments to prove the contrary, viz. That the two Houses authority is not dependent, nor derived from the Royal power. First, the authority of the Houses being Legislative, is the supreme, and so cannot be derived. Three concurrent Powers producing one supreme act, as con-cause, joint causes of the same highest effect cannot have a subordination among themselves in respect of that casualty; it not being imaginable how a power can cause the supreme effect, and yet be a subordinate and derived power. Secondly, the end of constituting these two Estates being the limiting and preventing the excesses of the third, their power must not be totally dependent and derived from the third, for then it were unsuitable for the end for which it was ordained: For to limit an Agent by a power subordinate and depending on himself, is all one as to leave him at large without any limitation at all. Thirdly, that which hath been spoken of a mixed Monarchy, doth fully prove that the two other powers which concur with the Monarch, to constitute the mixture, must not be altogether subordinate to it, and derived from it. I must profess these Reasons to prevail with me, that I cannot conceive how the authority of the two Houses can in the whole being of it, be a dependent and derived power.

That we may find out the truth amidst this potent contradiction [Sect. 4] of both sides, recourse must be had to the Architecture of this Government, whereof I must declare myself to be so great an Admirer, that what ever more then human wisdom had the contriving of it, whether done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, I conceive it unparalleled for exactness of true policy in the whole world; such a care for the Sovereignty of the Monarch, such a provision for the liberty of the People, and that one may be justly allayed, and yet consist without impeachment of the other, that I wonder how our Forefathers in those rude unpolished times could attain such an accurate composure. First then suppose a people, either compelled to it by conquest, or agreeing to it by free consent, Nobles and Commons set over themselves by public compact one Sovereign, and resign up themselves to him and his heirs, to be governed by such and such Fundamental Laws: there's a supremacy of power set up, though limited to one course of exercise. Secondly, then because in all Governments after cases will come, it requiring an addition of Laws, suppose them covenanting with their Sovereign, that if cause be to constitute any other Laws, he shall not by his sole power do that work, but they reserve at first, or afterwards it is granted them (which is all one) a hand of concurrence therein, that they will be bound by no Laws, but what they join with him in the making of. Thirdly, because though the Nobles may personally convene, yet the Commons (being so many) cannot well come together by themselves to the doing of such a work, it be also agreed, that every Corporation of the Commons shall have power to depute one or more to be for the whole in this public legislative business; that so the Nobles by themselves, the Commons by their Deputies assembling, there may be representatively the whole body, having Commission to execute that reserved authority for establishing new Laws. Fourthly, because the occasion and need of making new Laws, and authentic expounding the old, would not be constant and perpetual, and it would carry an appearance of a Government in which were three Heads and chief Powers, they did not stablish these Estates to be constantly existent, but occasionally, as the causes for which they were ordained should emerge and happen to be. Fifthly, because a Monarchy was intended and therefore a Supremacy of power (as far as possible) must be reserved for one, it was concluded that these two Estates should be Assemblies of his Subjects sworn to him, and all former Laws; the new, which by agreement of Powers should be enacted, were to be his Laws, and they bound to obey him in them as soon as established: And being supposed that he who was to govern by the Laws, and for the furtherance of whose Government the new Laws were to be made, should best understand when there was need, and the assembling and dissolving the two Estates meeting, was a power of great privilege, it was put into the Princes hand by writ to convocate and bring to existence, and to adjourn and dismiss such meetings Sixthly, in process of time Princes not caring much to have their Government looked into, or to have any power in act but their own, took advantage of this power of convocating those Estates, and did more seldom then need required make use of it; whereon provision was made, and a time set within which an Assembly of Parliament was to be had. Now when you have made these suppositions in your mind, you have the very model and platform of this Monarchy, and we shall easily find what to answer to the arguments before produced on either side. For first it is his Parliament, because an assembly of his subjects, convocated by his Writ, to be his Council, to assist him in making Laws for him to govern by: yet not his, as other Courts are altogether deriving their whole authority from the fullness which is in him. Also his power of assembling and dissolving proves him thus far above them, because in their existence they depend on him; but their power and authority quoad specificationem, the being and kind of it, is from original constitution: for they expect no Commission and authority from him, more then for their meeting and reducing into existence; but existing, they work according to the privileges of their constitution, their acts proceeding from their conjunct authority with the Kings, not from its subordination to the Kings. The oath of Allegeance binds them, and respects them as his subjects, to obey him, governing according to established Laws: it supposes and is built upon the foundations of this Government, and must not be interpreted to overthrow them▪ he is thereby acknowledged to be supreme so far as to rule them by Laws already made; not so far as to make Laws without them, so that it is no derogation to their power; and I believe of these things none can make any question. Therein consists the accurate Judgment of the Contrivers of this Form, they have given so much into the hands of the sovereign, as to make him truly a Monarch; and they have reserved so much in the hands of the two Estates, as to enable them to preserve their own liberty.

CHAP. IIII. [Quest. 4] How far forth it is mixed; and what parts of the Power are referred to a mixed Principle?

I Shall be the briefer in this, because an answer to it may be easily collected out of the precedent Questions: for he who knows how far this Government is limited, will soon discern how far it is mixed, for the Limitation is mostly affected by the mixture: but distinctly, I conceive that there are three parts of the power referred to the joint concourse of all three Estates: So that either of them not consenting or suspending its influence the rest cannot reduce that power ordinarily and legally into act.

[ 1] The first is the Nomotheticall power, understanding by it the power of making, and authentic expounding Laws, so that I believe an act cannot have the nature and form of a Law of the Land, if it proceed from any one, or two of these, without the positive concurrence of the third.

[ 2] Secondly, The power of imposing taxes and payments on men's estates: that the King by himself cannot assume men's properties by requiring impositions not granted him by Law, is often confested: And that the other Estates cannot do it by themselves, I conceive it as unquestionable: For it were strange to give that to the secondary and assisting Powers, which is denied to the Sovereign and principal. If it be objected that every Corporation electing Deputies, and authorizing them to be vice totius Communitatis, do thereby grant them power, and entrust them as to make laws to bind them, so to dispose of any part of their estate, either by rate or payment for the public good: I answer, that they are by that deputation enabled as for one, so for the other; that is, according to the fundamental usuage of the Kingdom; that is, by the joint consent of the other estates, for though the house of Commons is chosen by the people, and they represent the people, yet the representation doth not give them a power which was not in the people. Now the people have no power to do an act which either directly, or by consequence doth put it in the will and pleasure of any one or two of the Estates, to overthrow the other: But this power of opening and shutting the Purse of the Kingdom is such a power, that if it be in one or two of the Estates, without the third, then they by that power might necessitate that other to do any act, or disable it from its own defense. This and the Legislative power have such a nearness, that they cannot be divided, but must be in the same subject: this is so great a power, that put it absolutely in any Estate single, you make that Estate in effect absolute, making the rest dependent and beholding to it for their subsistence.

Thirdly, the power of dispatching the affairs of the [ 3] Kingdom which are of greatest difficulty and weight, the ardua regni, which the Writ for convocating the other Estates doth mention, supposing thereby that such difficulties are not to be dispatched by the power of one alone; for if they were, why then are the two other convocated to be assisting? I acknowledge many matters of great moment may be done by the Regal power, and in such case it may be said, that the other Estates are gathered ad molius tra • sigendum, that the advise and sense of the Community may be for direction. But I conceive there be two sorts of affairs, which ought not to be transacted without the concurrence of all three. First, such as concern the public safety and weal, so far as stable detriment or advantage comes to the whole body by the well or ill carriage thereof; for then there is the same reason as in making new Laws: For why was not the power of making any new Laws left in the hands of one, but reserved for the concurrence of all three? save because the end of the Architects was, that no new thing which was of so much concernment as the stable good and damage of the Kingdom, should be introduced without the consent and advice of the whole: so that if any business be of that moment, that it is equipollent to a Law in the public interest, it should be managed by such an authority and way as that is. Secondly, such as introduce a necessity of public charge, be it matter of War or else, if to the effecting of it the Purse of the Kingdom be required, it is evident that it ought to be done by the concurrence of all, because they only jointly (as appears before) have power to impose a public charge on the estates of men. And it were all one to put the power of our estates in the hands of one, as to put the power of such undertakings in his sole hands, which of necessity bring after them an engagement of public expense.

CHAP. V. [Quest. 5] How far forth the two Estates may oppose and resist the will of the Monarch?

THis Question is in the general already handled in the [Sect. 1] first Part, so that it will be easy to draw those Answers there to this particular here: Therefore conformably to what I then affirmed, I will answer this Question by divers Positions.

[Pos. 1] First, the Monarch working according to his power, not exceeding the Authority which God and the Laws have conferred on him, is no way to be opposed either by any or all his Subjects, but in conscience to God's ordinance obeyed. This is granted on all sides.

Secondly, if the will and command of the Monarch exceed [Pos. 2] the limits of the Law, it ought for the avoidance of scandal and offense be submitted to, so it be not contrary to God's Law, nor bring with it such an evil to ourselves, or the public, that we cannot be accessory to it by obeying. This also will find no opposition. Disobedience in light cases, in which we are not bound, makes an appearance of slighting the power, and is a disrespect to the person of the Magistrate. Therefore Christ, to avoid such offense, would pay tribute, though he tells Peter, He was free, and need not have done it.

Thirdly, if he command a thing which the Law gives [Pos. 3] him no authority to command, and it be such as would be inconvenient to obey, in this case obedience may lawfully be denied: This also finds allowance from them which stand most for royal power. Doctor Ferne in his Preface acknowledges obedience to be limited and circumscribed by the established Laws of the Land, and accordingly to be yielded or denied. And Sect. 1. says he, We may and ought to deny obedience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawful by the Law of God, yea by the established Laws of the land. Here he says more then we say; yea more then should be said, as appears in the second Position: it is not universally true, that we ought.

Fourthly, if he exceed the limits of the Law, and proceed [Pos. 4] in courses illegal, means there are which it is agreed upon the Subjects may use to reduce him to legal Government; so much Doctor Ferne allows Sect. 4. Cries to God, Petition to the Prince, Denial of Obedience, Denial of Subsidy, &c.

Fifthly but the point in controversy is about positive and [Pos. 5] forcible resistance, the lawfulness of which some do utterly deny and others do as confidently maintain: but yet this point might be brought to a narrower state then in the confused handling of it, it usually is: by distinguishing twixit forceable resistence used against the Kings own person, or against inferior Officers and Instruments advising to, or executing the illegal commands.

[Sect. 2] For the first, as I have before expressed myself, force ought not to be used against the person of the Sovereign, on any pretence whatever, by any or all his subjects; even in limited and mixed Monarchies: for if they be truly Monarchs, they are irrevocably invested with Sovereignty, which sets their persons above all lawful power and force. Also the Sovereign power being so conferred on that person: The person and power cannot be really sundered, but the force which is used to the one, must also violate the other: for power is not in the Sovereign as it is in inferior Officers: as water is otherwise in the spring then in the channells, and pipes deriving it: It is not inseparably in them, and therefore they offending, force may be used against them without violation of the Ordinance of Authority. These Arguments approve it unlawful in any: That which the Dr. brings, I approve as strong against all private force, where he allows defense against the person of the Prince himself, so far as to ward his blows, but not to return blows, no though for natural defense: because the Common-Wealth is concerned in his person, Sect. 2. And to divert a private evil by inducing a public, is unjust and unlawful: so that for this point of force against the person of the Prince: I think there ought to be no contention. If any have been so rash to hold it lawful on these grounds, that the whole Kingdom is above him because they make him King, and that by miscarriage he may make a forfeiture, and so lay himself open to force: I do judge these grounds very insufficient: unless the Kingdom reserve a superiority to itself, or there be a fundamental clause of forfeiture on specified causes; and then it is not properly a Monarchy: but all this hath been already handled in the general Part.

Secondly, for Instruments of oppression of public liberty if the wrong be destructive, and no other means of prevention, but force, be left: I am persuaded it may be used, and positive resistence made against them; And if I find any contradiction from the most rigid Patrones of Royalty, it must be only in this point. And here I must complain of the indistinct dealing of that Doctor in this matter; who mingleth both these points together: and scarce speaks anything to resolve men's consciences in this: But speaks either in general, or else of force against the Princes own person: Whereas I think, the case which sticks most on the conscience at this time, is this latter: Of opposing, mi • -leading and mis-employed subjects, which he speaks very little to. Nay, he seems to me, after all his disclaiming of resistence, to come home to us, and though sparingly, yet to assent to lawfullnes of resistence in this point. For Sect. 2. speaking of David's guard of armed men: He says, It was to secure his person against the cut-throats of Saul, if sent to take away his life: He means to secure it by force, for Soldiers are for force: He means no negative securing by flight, for that may be done even against Saul himself: but he speaks of such a securing which might only be against cut-throats. So then he grants securing by force against these: But they went on Saul's command, and mostly with his presence. Again, in the instance of Elisha, he seems to acknowledge lawfulness of personal defense against the sudden and illegal assaults of Messengers, he means by force, for he speaks of such which he will not allow in public, which can be understood of none, but by force: But it appears the Doctor in his whole discourse hath avoided this point of resistence of mis-employed subjects; which yet is the alone point which would have given satisfaction: for before it appears, we agree in all the rest, and in this too for ought I know, he having not distinctly said anything against it.

Now concerning this case of forceable resistence of inferior [Sect. 3] persons mis-employed to serve the illegal destructive commands of the Prince, I will do two things. 1. I will maintain my Assertion by convincing Arguments. 2. I will show the invalidity of what is said against it.

This then is my Assertion: The two Estates in Parliament may lawfully by force of Arms resist any persons or number of persons advising or assisting the King in the performance of a command illegal and destructive to themselves, or the public.

[Arg. 1] 1. Because that force is lawful to be used for the public conservation which is no resistence of the Ordinance of God; for that is the reason condemning the resistence of the Powers: Now this is no resistence of God's Ordinance: For by it neither the person of the Sovereign is resisted, nor his power: Not his person, for we speak of Agents employed, not of his own person: Nor his power; For the measure of that, in our Government, is acknowledged to be the Law: And therefore he cannot confer Authority to any beyond Law: so that those Agents deriving no Authority from him: are mere Instruments of his Will: Unauthorized persons; in their assaults Robbers, and, as Dr. Ferne calls them, Cut-throats. If the case be put, What if the Sovereign himself in person be present with such Assaylants, joining his personal assistance in the execution of his Commands? It is much to be lamented, that the will of the Prince should be so impetuous in any subverting Act, as to hazard his own person in the prosecution of it. Yet supposing such a case, all councils and courses must betaken, that no violence be offered to his person, and Profession of none intended: But no reason the presence of his person should privilege ruining Instruments from suppression, and give them an immunity to spoil and destroy subjects, better themselves; His person being secured from wrong; His power cannot be violated in such an Act, in which none of it can be conferred on the Agents. And sure David, though he avoided laying hands or using any violence against the person of Saul, and on no extremity would have done it: Yet for the Cut-throats about him, if no other means would have secured him, he would have rescued himself by force from their outrage: Though Saul was in their company: Else what intended he by all that force of Soldiers: And his enquiry of God at Keilah: by which it is plain, He had an intent to have kept the place by force, if the people would have stuck to him: Neither is it to the purpose which the Dr. says, Sect. 2. That his example was extraordinary, because he was anointed and designed to succeed Saul, for that being but a designation, did not exempt him from the duty of subjection for the present, or lessen it, as is plain by the great conscience he made of not touching Saul: But he knew it was one thing to violate Saul's Person and Power, and another to resist those Instruments of Tyranny, the Cut-throats which were about him.

Secondly, Because without such power of resistence in [Arg. 2] the hands of subjects, all distinction and limitation of Government is vain: and all forms resolve into absolute and arbitrary; for that is so, which is unlimited; and that is unlimited, not only which hath no limits set: but also which hath no sufficient Limits, for to be restrained from doing what I will, by a power which can restrain me no longer nor otherwise then I will, is all one, as if I were left at my own Will. I take this to be clear: Now it is as clear, that without this forceable resistence of Instruments of usurped power be lawful, no sufficient limits can be to the Princes Will and all Laws bounding him are to no purpose. This appears by enumerating the other means, Prayer to God: Petition to the Prince: Denial of obedience: Denial of Subsidy: a moderate use of the power of denying as Doctor Ferne calls it: These are all: but what are these to hinder, if a Prince be minded to overthrow all, and bring the whole Government to his own Will? For Prayer, and Petition, these are put in to fill up the number: They are no limitations, they may be used in the most absolute Monarchy; for denial of obedience, that may keep me from being an Instrument of public servitude; but Princes Wills never want them which will yield obedience, if I deny it; Yea enough to destroy all the rest, if nothing be left them but to suffer: Then for denial of Subsidy, if he may by thousands of Instruments take all, or what he, or they please, and I must not resist: what need he care whether the people deny or grant: If a Prince be taught, that he may do it: cases and reasons will soon be brought to persuade him, that in them he may lawfully do it; as late experiences have given us too much Testimony: Thus it is apparent, that the denial of this Power of Resistence of Instruments overthrows and makes invalid all Government, but that which is absolute: and reduces the whole world de jure to an absolute subjection, that is, servitude: for the end of all constitution of moderated forms is not that the supreme power might not lawfully exorbitate, but that it might have no power to exorbitate.

The Dr. is conscious hereof; and therefore tells us in his Sect. 5. This is the very reason which is made for the Popes power of curbing and deposing Kings in case of heresy: because else the Church, says the Papist, hath no means for the maintenance of the Catholic Faith, and its own safety: But who sees not the vast difference 'twixt these two? and that the same reason may be concluding here, which is apparently non concluding there; For 1. They thereby would draw to the Pope an authoritative power: we no such superior power: but only a power of resistence for self-conservation which nature and the Law of reason gives to everyone; and may stand with the condition of subjection and inferiority. 2. They on this reason give the Pope a Power over the very person of the King; we only of resisting of unauthorized invading destroyers, coming under the color of an authority which is not in the Sovereign to be derived. 3. They prove a civil right for spiritual reasons, we only for civil reasons. 4. The Church and the faith are constituted in their very formal being from Christ himself, who is the head and great Shepherd immediately in his own person: and as it is his own family; so he keeps the power of preserving it in his own hands; having made direct and particular promises to assure us of their upholding against all subvertion, by his own power: so that here is assurance enough, without visible means of force for a spiritual body, which lives by faith. But in a civil State there is no such assurance nor supporting promises: power only in the undefined being of it, being God's immediate Ordinance, and not in this specificated or determinate being: wherefore it hath no such immediate provision made for its preservation, no promise of a divine power for its standing: but as it is left by God to men's wisdom to contrive the frame, so to their providence to establish means of preservation. As the body is outward and Civil, so the upholding means must be such; spiritual and infallibly assuring a Formed State hath not, as the Church and Faith have; if there be none of outward force and power neither, then none at all it hath, and is in ill case indeed. But there is an art full of venom, when a truth cannot be beaten down by just reasoning, then to make it odious by hateful comparisons: so in this case aspersions are cast, as if the Patrons of Resistence did borrow the Popish and Jesuitical grounds, and their Positions as dangerous to Kings, as the Jesuits hell-bred and bloody Principles: whereas it appears by all this discourse, and I am persuaded is written in Capitall Letters in the very Conscience of them which despitefully object it, that there is no congruity at all 'twixt their Doctrines, no more then 'twixt Light and Darkness.

Thirdly, because such power is due to a public State for [Arg. 3] its preservation, as is due to a particular person: But every particular person may lawfully by force resist illegal destructive Ministers, though sent by the command of a legal Sovereign, provided no other means of self-preservation be enough. This Assumption the Doctor seems to grant; he denies it to be lawful against the Person of the Prince, but in effect yields it against subordinate persons: But the main is against the Proposition, and the Doctor is so heavy a friend to the State that he thinks it not fit to allow it that liberty he gives every private man. But whose Judgment will concur with his herein, I cannot imagine; for sure the Reason is greater, the public safety being far more precious, and able to satisfy the damages of a public resistence, then one particular man's is of a private. But of this more in answer to his Reasons.

Fourthly, because it is a power put into the two Estates by [Arg. 4] the very reason of their Institution; and therefore they not only may, but also ought to use it for public safety: yea they should betray the very trust reposed in them by the Fundamentals of the Kingdom if they should not. An authority Legislative they have: Now to make Laws and to preserve Laws are acts of the same power; yea, if three powers jointly have interest in making of Laws, surely either of these severally have, and ought to use that power in preserving them. Also that the authority which the Houses have is as well given them for preserving the government by established laws, as for establishment of laws to govern by, is a truth proved by the constant use of their power to that end, in correcting the exorbitance of inferior Courts, questioning delinquent Judges and Officers of State for violations, and much is done in this kind by the sole authority of the Houses, without the concurrence or expectance of Royal power: so then, supposing they have such an authority for safety of public Government, to question and censure inferior Officers for transgressions, though pretending the Kings authority, can it be denied but that their authority will bear them out to use forcible resistence against such, be [Arg. 5] they more or fewer.

Fifthly, the Kings Warrant under his hand exempts not a Malefactor from the censure of a Court of Justice, nor punishment imposed by Law, but the Judge must proceed against him according to Law: for the Law is the Kings public and authoritative Will; but a private Warrant to do an unlawful act, is his private and unauthoritative Will: wherefore the Judge ought to take no notice of such Warrant, but to deal with the Offendor as no other then a private man. This proves that such Instruments thus illegally warranted, are not authorized; and therefore their violence may be by force resisted, as the assaults of private men, by any; and then much rather by the Houses of Parliament: which, supposing them divided from the King to have no complete authority, yet sure they have two parts of the greatest Legislative authority. But I fear I shall seem superfluous, in producing Arguments to prove so clear a truth: Is it credible that any one will maintain so abject an esteem of their authority, that it will not extend to resistence of private men, who should endeavor the subversion of the whole frame of Government, on no other Warrant then the Kings Will and Pleasure? Must they be merely passive? Is patience, and the denial of their Votes to a subversion, all the opposition they must use, if a King (which God forbid) should on his Royal pleasure send Cut-throats to destroy them as they sit in their Houses? Is all their authority (if the King desert them or worse) no more then to Petition, and suffer; and by a moderate use of their power of denying, dissent from being willing to be destroyed? If power of resisting by force of subverters armed by the Kings Will (for by his Authority they cannot) be unlawful for them, all these absurdities must follow: yea, the vilest Instrument of Oppression, showing but a Warrant from the King to bear him out, may range and rage all his days through a Kingdom, to waste and spoil, tax and distrain, and at utmost of his insolence must have no more done to him by the Parliament it self, then to stay his hand, as the basest Servant may his Masters, or the meanest Subject the Kings own hand; by the Doctors own confession. Consider then and admire, if any men of learning will deny this power of forcible resistence of Ministers, of subverting commands to be lawful. I have thus far confirmed my assertion, not that I find any openly opposing it, but because the Doctor and some other seem to have a mind that way, and do strike at it, though not professedly and in open dispute.

For the several proofs brought in behalf of Resistence, some of them prove as much as is here asserted; others are not to the purpose. Particularly, that of the Peoples rescuing Jonathan from his Fathers bloody resolution proves lawfulness of hindering unreasonable self-destructive purposes, even in absolute Monarchies, if it prove anything. That of Vzzal's thrusting out by the Priests, is not to the purpose: but David's raising and keeping Forces about him, and his purpose at Keilah, proves the point directly viz. Lawfulnesse of forcible resistance of Cut-throats, even though Saul himself were in presence: This the Doctor sees plainly, and therefore shuffles it off, by saying, His example is extraordinary; as if he were not a present Subject, because he was designed by God's revealed counsel to be a future King. And he confesses Elisha's example of shutting the door against the Kings messenger proves personal defense against sudden illegal assaults of messengers, which is the thing in Question.

[Sect 4] Let us now view the strength of what is said against resistence whether anything comes home against this Assertion. The Doctors proofs from the Old Testament come not to the matter: Moses, and afterwards the Kings, were of God's particular designation, setting them absolutely over the people, on no condition or limitation; so that did they prove anything, yet they concern not us, respecting a Government of another nature. But particularly, that of Corah and the Princes rebelling against Moses, is not to the matter; it was a resistence of Moses own Person and Office; and doubtless penury of other proofs caused this and the rest here to be alleged: For that 1 Sam. 8 18. how inconsequent is it, to say, the people should cry unto the Lord, therefore they had no other means to help them but cries to God; though (I confess) in that Monarchy they had not. That speech 1 Sam. 26 9. was most true there, and is as true here, but not to the purpose, being spoken of the Kings own Person. But the main authority brought against resistence, is that Rom. 13. and on that Doctor Ferne builds his whole discourse: Let us therefore something more largely consider what is deduced out of that Text. First, he supposes the King to be the Supreme in Saint Peter, and the Higher power in Saint Paul. Secondly, he collects All persons, every soul is forbidden to resist. Thirdly, that then was a standing Senate, which not long before had the supreme Power in the Roman State: It is confessed; but that they could challenge more at that time when Saint Paul writ then our great Council will or can, I deny: For that State devolving into Monarchy by Conquest, they were brought under an Absolute Monarchy, the Senate it self swearing full subjection to the Prince; his Edicts and Acts of Will were Laws, and the Senates consent only pro forma, and at pleasure required. He who reads Tacitus cannot but see the Senate brought to a condition of basest servitude, and all Laws and Lives depending on the will of the Prince: I wonder then the Doctor should make such a parallel. Indeed the Senate had been far more then ever our Parliaments were or ought to be: but now that was far less then our Parliament hath been, or (I hope) ever will be: They were become the sworn Vassals of an absolute Emperor, ours the sworn Subjects of a Liege or Legal Prince. Fourthly, he says, then was more cause of Resistence, when Kings were Enemies to Religion, and had overthrown Laws and Liberties. I answer, There were no causes for Resistence: Not their enmity to Religion, had they but a legal power, because Religion then was no part of the Laws and so its violation no subversion of established government. And for the overthrow of Laws and Liberties, that was past and done, and the government new, the Senate and all the rest actually sworn to absolute Principality: Now an Ordinance of absolute Monarchy was constituted, the sacred bond of an Oath had made it inviolate. But what would he infer hence, all being granted him? Sure this he doth intend, That every soul among us, several, and conjoined in a Senate, must be subject for conscience, must not resist, under pain of Damnation: All this, and what ever besides he can justly infer out of that Text, we readily grant: But can any living man hence collect, that therefore no resistence may be made to fellow-subjects, executing destructive illegal acts of the Princes will in a legal Monarchy? Will he affirm that the Ordinance of God is resisted, and Damnation incurred thereby? God's Ordinance is the Power, and the Person invested with that power; but here force is offered to neither as before I have made it appear. And herein we have B. Bilso • consenting, where he says, that the superior power here forbidden to be resisted, is not the Princes will against his Laws but agreeing with his Laws. I think the day it self is not more clear then this satisfaction, to all that can be concluded out of that Text: so the foundation of all that discourse is taken from it, if his intent were thence to prove unlawfulness of Resistence of Instruments of Arbitrarinesse in this Kingdom.

Let us also consider the force of his Reasons, whether they impugn this point in hand. He says, such power of resistence would be no fit means of safety to a State, but prove a remedy worse then the diseases. His Reasons, first, because it doth tend to the overthrow of that order, which is the life of a Common-wealth; it would open a way to People, upon the like pretences, to resist, and even overthrow power duly administered. 2 It may proceed to a change of government. 3. It is accompanied with the evils of Civil-War. 4. On the same ground the two Houses proceed against the King, may the people proceed to resistence against them; accusing them not to discharge their trust. Lastly, seeing some must be trusted in every State. It is reason the highest and final trust, should be in the highest power. These are his main reasons on which he builds his conclusion against resistence.

To his first, I say it were strange if resistence of distructive disorder should tend to the overthrow of Order: It may for the time disturb, as Physic while it is in working disturbes the natural body, if the peccant humors make strong opposition: but lure it tends to health, and so doth this resistence of disorder to Order. Neither would it open a way for the people to violate the Powers; for doing right can open no way to the doing of wrong If any wicked seditious spirits should make use of the Vail of Justice to cover unnatural Rebellion: Shall a people's right and liberty be taken from them to prevent such possible abuse? Rather let the foulness of such pretences discover it self, so God and good men will abhor them: such Cloakes of Rebellion have in former ages been taken off, and the Authors brought to just confusion, without the expense of the liberties of this Kingdom.

To the second; must not Instruments be resisted, which actually intend, and seeked a change of Government: because such resistence may proceed to a change of Government? Is not an unlikely possibility of change to be hazarded, rather then a certain one suffered? But I say, It cannot proceed to a change of Government, unless it exceed the measure of lawful resistence: yea it is impossible, that resistence of Instruments should ever proceed to a change of Government; for that includeth the greatest resistence and violation of the person and power of the Monarch, the lawfulness of which I utterly disclaim.

Thirdly, it is not ever accompanied with the evils of Civil War: But when the Princes Will finds enough Instruments of their Countries ruin to raise it. And then the mischife of that war must light on those which raise it: But suppose it may ensue, yet a temporary evil of war is to be chosen rather then a perpetual loss of liberty, and subversion of the established frame of a Government.

In the fourth, I deny the parity of reason: for the two Houses are bodies constituted and endowed with legislative authority, and trust of preservation of the frame, by the Fundamentalls of the Kingdom: which the people out of those Houses are not. Again the Government being composed of a threefold consenting power, one to restrain the exorbitance of another: All three together are absolute and equivalent to the power of the most absolute Monarch: The concurrent Will of all three, makes a Law, and so it is the Kingdoms Law.

To the last, I answer, In every State some must be trusted, and the highest trust is in him who hath the Supreame power: These two the Supreame Trust, and the Supreame Power are inseparable: And such as the power is, such is the trust: An absolute power supposes an absolute trust: A Power allayed with the annexion of another power as here it is, supposeth a trust of the same nature. A joint trust, yet saving the supremacy of the Monarch, so far forth as it may be saved, and not be absolute and the others authority nullified. It may be further argued: that it being the Prerogative Royal to have the managing of the sword, that is, legal force, in the Kingdom; none can, on any pretence whatever use lawful force, either against him, or any, but by his Will: for it is committed to him by law, and to none but whom he assigns it to: so that the Laws of the Kingdom putting all power of force and Arms into his trust, have placed him, and all those who serve him, in a state of irresistiblenes in respect of any lawful force. This is a point much stood on and on this ground, the Parliament now assuming the disposing of the Militia by an Ordinance, it is complained on, as a usurping of what the Law hath committed to the King as his Prerogative; The opposing of which Ordinance by a Commission of Array, was the beginning of this miserable Civil-War. I will distinctly lay down my Answer hereto, submitting it to every impartial judgment.

[Pos. 1] 1. The power of the Sword being for defense of the Laws, by punishing violators, and protecting subjects, it is subservient to Government, and must needs belong to him who is entrusted with the Government, as a necessary requisite without which he cannot perform his trust.

[Pos. 2] 2. As it is an appendix to the power of Government, and goes along with it, so it goes under the same terms: belonging to the Prince, as the other doth: sc. absolutely, to use at will, where the Monarchy is absolute; or with limitation, to use according to Law, where the Monarchy is limited: so that, in this Government the Arms and sword of the Kingdom is the Kings, to a defined use committed to him; viz For defense of the Laws and Frame of Government established, and not for arbitrary purposes, or to enable Ministers to execute commands of mere Will.

[Pos. 3] 3. The two Houses in virtue of the Legislative authority, in part residing in them, are interested in the preservation of Laws and Government, as well as the King: And in case, the King should misimploy that power of Arms to strengthen subverting Instruments: Or in case the Laws and government be in apparent danger, the King refusing to use the sword to that end of preservation for which it was committed to him: I say, in this case, the two Estates may by extraordinary and temporary Ordinance assume those Arms, wherewith the King is entrusted, and perform the Kings trust: And though such Ordinance of theirs is not formally legal, yet it is eminently legal, justified by the very intent of the Architects of the Government, when for these uses they committed the Arms to the King. And no doubt they may command the strength of the Kingdom to save the being of the Kingdom: for none can reasonably imagine the Architectonicall Powers, when they committed the power of government and Arms to one to preserve the Frame they had composed, did thereby intend to disable any, much less the two Estates, from preserving it, in case the King should fail to do it in this last need. And thus doing the Kings Work, it ought to be interpreted as done by his Will: because as the Law is his Will, so that the Law should be preserved is his Will, which he expressed when he undertook the government: 'It is his deliberate Will, and ought to be done, though at any time he oppose by an after-Will, for that is his sudden Will, as Doctor Ferne himself Sect. 1. doth teach us to distinguish.

CHAP. VI. In what cases the other Estates may, without or against [Quest. 6] the Kings Personal consent, assume the Arms of the Kingdom?

WHo ever were the Authors of that Book lately [Sect. 1] published, styled, Scripture and Reason pleaded for defensive Arms, have laid new and over-large grounds for resistence. Two Assertions they endeavor to maintain: First, those Governors (whether supreme or others) who under pretence of authority from God's Ordinance, disturb the quiet and peaceable life in Godliness and Honesty, are far from being God's Ordinance in so doing, Sect. 3. Secondly, This Tyranny not being God's Ordinance, they which resist it even with Arms, resist not the Ordinance of God. Hereon, Sect. 4. they free Christians, even in the Apostles time, and so under the Roman Emperors, or any other Government, from necessity of passive subjection in case of persecution; affirming, that the Christians in those first Persecutions, had they been strong enough, might have used Arms for defense against the Tyranny of their Emperors. Their ground is from the Reasons used by the Apostle Rom. 13. where he commands subjection, & forbids resistence to the higher power, because they are God's ordinance, his Ministers for praise to well-doers, for terror to evil doers. But I must profess myself to dissent from them in this opinion, conceiving that the Apostle in urging those Reasons drawn from the due ends of Power, doth intend to press them to subjection by showing them what benefit comes to men by authority in its due use; and not to show them how far they are bound to be subject, and in what cases they may resist: For had he such a meaning at that time, when the Governors did altogether cross those ends of their Ordination, he had taught them rather a Doctrine of Resistence then Subjection: shall we conceive that he would press subjection to Powers in the hands of Heathens and Persecutors, if he had not intended they should passively be subject unto them, even under those Persecutions? Rather I approve the received Doctrine of the Saints in ancient and moderne times, who could never find this license in that place of the Apostle: and do concur with Master Burroughs, professing against resistence of authority, though abused: If those (says he) who have power to make Laws, make sinful Laws, and so give authority to any to force obedience we say here there must be either flying, or passive Obedience. And again, We acknowledge we must not resist for Religion, if the Laws of the land be against it. But what do they say against this? In making such Laws against Religion the Magistrates are not God's ordinance; and therefore to resist is not to resist God's ordinance: As an inferior Magistrate, who hath a Commission of Power for such ends, is resistible if he exceed his Commission, and abuse his Power for other ends; so Princes being God's Ministers, and having a deputed Commission from him to such ends, viz. the promotion of godliness, Peace, Justice, if they pervert their power to contrary ends, may be resisted without violation of God's ordinance. That I may give a satisfactory answer to this, which is the sum of their long discourse, I must lay it down in several Assertions.

First, I acknowledge God's ordinance is not only Power, [Assert. 1] but Power for such ends, sc. the good of the People.

Secondly, it is also God's ordinance, that there should be [Assert. 2] in men, by public consent called thereto, and invested therein, a power to choose the means, the Laws, and Rules of government conducing to that end: and a power of Judging in relation to those Laws, who be the well doers which ought to be praised, and who the evil doers who ought to be punished. This is as fully God's ordinance as the former; for without this the other cannot be performed.

Thirdly, when they who have this final civil Judicature [Assert. 3] shall censure good men as evil doers; or establish iniquity by a Law, to the encouragement of evil doers; in this case, if it be a subordinate Magistrate doth it, appeal must be made (as Saint Paul did) to the supreme; if it be the supreme, which through mistake or corruption doth mis-censure, from whom there lies no Civil Appeale, then without resistence of that Judgment we must passively submit: And he who in his own knowledge of innocence or goodness of his cause shall by force resist, that man erects a Tribunal in his own heart against the Magistrates Tribunal; clears himself by a private Judgment against a public, and executes his own sentence by force against the Magistrates sentence, which he hath repealed and made void in his own heart. In unjust Censures by the highest Magistrate, from whom there is no Appeale but to God, the sentence cannot be opposed till God reverse it to whom we have appealed: In the mean time we must suffer, as Christ did, notwithstanding his Appeale, 1 Pet. 2.23. and so must we notwithstanding our Appeale, 1 Pet. 4 19. for he did so for our example. If an Appeale to God, or a censure in the Judgment of the condemned might give him power of resistence, none would be guilty, or submit to the Magistrates censure any further • hen they please. I desire those Authors, before they settle their judgment in such grounds (which I fear will bring too much scandal) to weigh these particulars. First, their opinion takes away from the Magistrate the chief part of God's ordinance, sc. power of definitive judgment of Laws and Persons, who are the good, and who the bad, to be held so in Civil proceedings. Secondly, they justify the Conscience of Papists, Heretics, and grossest Malefactors to resist the Magistrate, in case they be persuaded their cause is good. Thirdly, they draw men off from the commands of Patience under persecution, and conforming to Christ and his Apostles, in their patient enduring without verbal or real opposition, though Christ could not have wanted power to have done it, as he tells Peter. Fourthly, they deprive the Primitive and Moderne Martyrs of the glory of suffering, imputing it either to their ignorance or disability. Fifthly, it is a wonder, that since in Christ's and his Apostles time there was so much use of this power of resistence, they would by no express word show the Christians this liberty, but condemn resistence so severely. Sixthly, there is in the case of the Parliament now taking up Arms no need of these offensive grounds; Religion being now a part of our National Law, and cannot suffer but the Law must suffer with it.

[Sect. 2] Now to the proposed Question I answer, first Negatively, sc. 1. It ought not to be done against all illegal proceedings, but such which are subversive and unsufferable. Secondly, not public resistence, but in excesses inducing public evils: for to repel private injuries of highest nature with public hazard and disturbance, will not quit cost, unless in a private case the common Liberty be struck at. Thirdly, not when the government is actually subverted, and a new form (though never so injuriously) set up, and the People already engaged in an Oath of absolute subjection: for the remedy comes too late, and the establishment of the new makes the former irrevocable by any justifiable power, within the compass of that Oath of God: This was the case of the Senate of Rome in Saint Paul's time. Secondly, affirmatively: I conceive three cases when the other Estates may lawfully assume the force of the Kingdom, the King not joining, or dissenting, though the same be by Law committed to him. First, when there is invasion actually made, or imminently feared by a foreign Power. Secondly, when by an intestine Faction the Laws and Frame of government are secretly undermined, or openly assaulted: In both these cases the Being of the Government being endangered, their trust binds, as to assist the King in securing, so to secure it by themselves, the King refusing. In extreme necessities the liberty of Voices cannot take place, neither ought a Negative Voice to hinder in this exigence, there being no freedom of deliberation and choice, when the Question is about the last end: Their assuming the sword in these cases is for the King, whose Being (as King) depends on the Being of the Kingdom; and being interpretatively his act, is no disparagement of his Prerogative. Thirdly, in case the Fundamental Rights of either of the three Estates be invaded by one or both the rest, the wronged may lawfully assume force for its own defense; because else it were not free, but dependent on the pleasure of the other. Also the suppression of either of them, or the diminishing of their Fundamental Rights, carries with it the dissolution of the Government: And therefore those grounds which justify force to preserve its Being, allows this case, which is a direct innovation of its Being and Frame.

CHAP. VII. Where the Legal Power of Final judging in these cases doth reside, in case the three Estates differ about the same?

IN this Question (for our more distinct proceeding) some [Sect. 1] things are necessarily to be observed. First, that we meddle not here with the judicature of Questions of inferior nature, viz. such as are 'twixt subject and subject, or the King and a subject, in matter of particular right, which may be decided other way, without detriment of the public Frame, or diminution of the privileges of either of the three Estates. Secondly difference is to be made even in the Questions of utmost danger: First, for it may be alleged to be either from without, by invasion of foreign Enemies; or by a confederacy of intestine subverters, in which neither of the three Estates are alleged to be interested, and so the case may be judged without relation to either of them, or detriment to their privileges. Here I conceive a greater latitude of power may be given to some to judge without the other; for it infers not a subordinating of any of the three to the other. Secondly, or else it may be alleged by one or two of the Estates against the other, that not contenting it self with the Powers allowed to it by the Laws of the Government, it seeks to swallow up, or entrench on the privileges of the other, either by immediate endeavors, or else by protecting and interesting it self in the subversive plots of other men. Thirdly, in this case we must also distinguish betwixt, first, authority of raising Forces for defense against such subversion, being known and evident: secondly and authority of judging and final determining, that the accused Estate is guilty of such design and endeavor of subversion, when it is denied and protested against. This last is the particular in this Question to be considered; not whether the People are bound to obey the authority of two, or one of the Legislative Estates in resisting the subversive assays of the other, being apparent and self-evident; which I take in this Treatise to be clear. But when such plea of subversion is more obscure and questionable, which of the three Estates hath the power of ultime and supreme judicature by Vote or sentence to determine it against the other; so that the People are bound to rest in that determination, and accordingly to give their assistance, eo nomine, because it is by such Power so noted and declared?

For my part in so great a cause, if my earnest desire of public good, and peace, may justify me to deliver my mind, I will prescribe to the very Question: for it includes a solecism in government of a mixed temperature: To demand which Estate may challenge this power of final determination of Fundamental controversies arising betwixt them is to demand which of them shall be absolute: For I conceive that in the first part hereof, I have made it good, that this final utmost controversy arising betwixt the three Legislative Estates, can have no legal, constituted Judge in a mixed government: for in such difference, he who affirms that the people are bound to follow the Judgment of the King against that of the Parliament, destroys the mixture into absoluteness: And he who affirms that they are bound to cleave to the Judgment of the two Houses against that of the King, resolves the Monarchy into an Aristocracy, or Democracy, according as he places this final Judgment. Whereas I take it to be an evident truth, that in a mixed government no power is to be attributed to either Estate, which directly, or by necessary consequence, destroys the liberty of the other.

Yet it is strange to see, how in this Epidemical division of [Sect. 2] the Kingdom, the Abettors of both parts claim this unconcessible Judgment. But let us leave both sides, pleading for that which we can grant neither, and weigh the strength of their Arguments.

First, Dr. Ferne lays down two reasons, why this final Judgment should belong to the King • 1. Monarchy, says he, Sect. 5. settles the chief power and final Judgment in one. This Position of his can be absolutely true nowhere but in absolute Monarchies: and in effect, his book knows no other then absolute government. 2. Seeing someone must be trusted in every State, It is reason, says he, Sect 5. the highest and final trust, should be in the higher and Supreame power. I presume by final trust, he means the trust of determining these Supreame and final disagreements; and accordingly I answer; It is not necessary that any one be trusted with a binding power of Judicature in these cases; for by the foundations of this government, none is, yea, none can be trusted with it: for to intend a mixed government, and yet to settle the last resolution of all judgment in one, is to contradict their very intention. Neither in a constituted government must we dispose of powers according to the guess of our reason; for men's apprehensions are various; The Dr. thinks this power fittest for the King: His answerers judge it fittest for the two Houses, and give their reasons for it too. Powers must there reside, where they are de facto by the Architects of a government placed: he who can bring a fundamental Act stating this power in any, says something to the matter: but to give our conjectures, where it should be, is but to provide fuel for contention.

On the contrary, The Author of that which is called A Fuller Answer to that Dr. hath two main Assertions placing this Judgment in the two Houses.

1. The final and casting result of this States Judgment concerning what these Laws, dangers, and means of prevention are, resides in the two Houses of Parliament, says he, p. 10.

2. In this final resolution of the States Judgment, the people are to rest, ibidem, pag. 14. Good Lord! What extreme opposition is between these two sorts of men? If the maintenance of these extremes be the ground of this war, then our Kingdom is miserable, and our Government lost which side soever overcome: for I have, more then once, made it good, that these Assertions are destructive on both sides: But I am rather persuaded, that these Officious Propugners overdoe their work, and give more to them whose cause they plead, then they ever intended to assume: Nay, rather give to everyone their due: give no power to one of these three to crush and undo the other at pleasure: But why doth this Answer give all that to the two Houses which ere while they would not suffer when the Judges in the case of Ship-money had given it to the King? sure when they denied it to him they did not intend it to themselves. 1. He tells us In them resides the reason of the State: And that the same reason and Judgment of the State which first gave this government its being, and constitution; therefore all the people are to be led by it and submit to it as their public reason and Judgment.

I answer, If by state, he mean the whole Kingdom: I say, the reason of the two Houses divided from the King, is not the reason of the Kingdom, for it is not the Kings reason, who is the head and chief in the Kingdom. If by state be meant the people, then it must be granted, that as far forth as they represent them, their reason is to be accounted the reason of the Kingdom: and doth bind so far forth as the public reason of the Kingdom can bind after they have restrained their reason and will to a condition of subjection: so that put case it be the reason of the state, yet not the same which first gave this Government its being: for then it was the reason of a State, yet free and to use their reason and Judgment in ordaining a Government: but now the reason of a State bound by Oath to a Government, and not at liberty to resolve again: Or to assume a supreme power of judging, distructive to the frame of Government they have established, and restrained themselves unto Their reason is ours, so far as they are an ordained representative body: But I have before demonstrated, that in this frame, the Houses could not be ordained a legal Tribunal to pass Judgment in this last case: for then the Architects by giving them that Judicature, had subordinated the King to them, and so had constituted no Monarchy. 2. He argues, the Parliament being the Court of supreme Judicature and the Kings great and highest Council, therefore that is not to be denied to it, which inferior Courts ordinarily have power to do, viz To judge matters of right between the King and Subject: Yea, in the highest case of all: The Kings power to tax the subject in case of danger, and his being sole Judge of that danger, was brought to cognizance, and passed by the Judges in the Exchequor. I answer, 1. There is not the same reason betwixt the Parliament & other courts. In these • he King is Judge, the Judges being deputed by him, and judging by his authority; so that if any of his Rights be tried before them, it is his own Judgment, and he judges himself; and therefore it is fit he should be bound by his own sentence: But in Parliament the King and People are Judges, and that not by an authority derived from him, but originally invested in themselves. So that when the two Estates judge without him in any case not prejudged by him, it cannot be called his Judgment, (as that of the other Courts, being done by his authority) and if he be bound by any Judgment of the two Estates without him, he is bound by an external power which is not his own; that is, he is subordinated to another power in the State where he is supreme; which is contradictory. Secondly, in other Courts, if any case of right be judged 'twixt him and the subject, they are cases of particular Rights which diminish not Royalty if determined against him. Or if they pass cases of general right, (as they did in that of Ship-money) it is but declaratively to show what is by Law due to one and the other: yet their Judgment is revocable, and liable to a repeal by a superior Court, as that was by Parliament. But if the Kings Prerogatives should be subjected to the Judgment of the two Estates, the King dissenting, then he should be subject to a sentence in the highest Court, and so irremediable; a Judicatory should be set up to determine of his highest Rights without him, from which he could have no remedy. Thus main causes may be alleged, why, though other Courts do judge his Rights, yet the two Estates in Parliament (without him) cannot: and it is from no defect in their power, but rather from the eminency of it, that they cannot. If one deputed by common consent of three, doth by the power they have given them determine controversies between those three, it is not for either of them to challenge right to judge those cases, because one who is inferior to them doth it. Indeed if the power of the two Houses were a deputed power, as the power of other Courts is, this Argument were of good strength: but they being concurrents in a supreme Court by a power originally their own, I conceive it hard to put the power of final Judgment in all controversies 'twixt Him and them exclusively, or solely into their hands.

If it be demanded then, how this cause can be decided? [Sect. 3] and which way must the People turn in such a contention? I answer, If the non-decision be tolerable, it must remain undecided, whiles the Principle of legal decision is thus divided, and by that division each suspends the others power. If it be such as is destructive, and necessitates a determination, this must be made evident; and then every Person must aide that Part, which in his best Reason and Judgment stands for public good, against the destructive. And the Laws and Government which he stands for, and is sworn to justifies and bears him out in it, yea; binds him to it. If any wonder I should justify a power in the two Houses to resist, and command aide against any Agents of destructive commands of the King, and yet not allow them power of judging when those Agents or commands are destructive. I answer, I do not simply deny them power of judging and declaring this; but I deny them to be a legal Court ordained to judge of this case authoritatively, so as to bind all People to receive and rest in their judgment for conscience of its authority, and because they have Voted it: 'It is the evidence, not the power of their Votes, must bind our Reason and Practice in this case: We ought to conceive their Votes the Discoveries made by the best eyes of the Kingdom and which in likelihood should see most: But when they Vote a thing against the proceedings of the Third and supreme Estate, our Consciences must have evidence of Truth to guide them, and not the sole authority of Votes; and that for the Reason so oft alleged.

CHAP. VIII. The contention now in being is debated, and the readiest means of Reconcilement proposed.

THus have I (for my own satisfaction, and the Conscience [Sect. 1] of every moderate and impartial man who will peruse the same) set down what I verily conceive to be the truth concerning those high matters, first of Monarchy in general, and then of this of England, and have given my determination concerning all the weighty Questions which arise considerable in the course of handling both: Now nothing remains, but to resolve the Conscience by this precedent light, what to • udge of the unhappy contention, which now is broken out into open war, between the King and the two Houses. But this depending on matter of fact, is more fitly referred to every man's own memory and Judgment; and nothing is to be done, but to acquaint himself with the certain truth of those matters of fact, and then to judge thereof according to the former Rules. To this issue the whole controversy is brought, That the two Houses may lawfully resist by force of Arms, all counsels and attempts of what men soever, tending to the subversion of the established Frame of Government, or themselves and their Fundamental Privileges; which is equivalent to the other; yea, though they are warranted by the commands and personal presence of the King himself: And that clearly, this is no resistence of the higher power in our Government (so no force be intended or used against the Kings own Person) nor doth it come within the censure of Saint Paul Rom. 13. nor any other Scripture, nor right Reason grounded thereon: so that the Conscience assured hereof, hath nothing else to do but to inquire whether the truth of Factlyes either in the Affirmative of the two Houses; That the Kingdom was in imminent danger, the King refusing to join with them for prevention of it, when they assumed the Militia for defense: Or else in the Kings Negative. Much hath been said on both sides, to draw the Consciences of men to adherence; and many (no doubt) have judged according to their pre engaged affections: Many Papers have I seen running out on both sides to unjustifiable extremes, and have much holpen on the contention, by making the breach wider: yea, I have read more said for them then (I am persuaded, notwithstanding the heat of the contention) either will say for [Sect. 2] themselves, or can without the subversion of the other.

Now for a man to resolve his Conscience about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of this War, the course is not to cry it down indefinitely, as a Resistence of God's ordinance, nor of the higher Power: Nor to justify it, because the cause stood for is Religion, and expurgation of in-crept corruptions in Church and State: For all standing for Religion and Reformation is not a justifiable cause to take up Arms; we having proved it before, that in this Kingdom nothing can warrant it, but apparent danger from destructive Counselors and Instruments. Neither is it enough to demand, as Doctor Ferne doth Sect 6. Who were first in Arms? for the other part will by their Almanac find Arms and Forces gathered and employed before those in Hull: but that is not the resolving enquiry; it may fall out the defensive part may be first in Arms, to prevent the ruin of counsels and Plots which are apparently contrived, but not executed. The resolving enquiry (I think) must be, Whether at the Parliaments taking up of Arms, the Common-wealth, Frame of established Government, or (which is all one) the Being and radical Powers of Parliament were in apparent danger of subversion? For if so, then the Arms and Force used against the Counselors or Agents thereof is proved lawful by all the precedent discourse.

Now it will be alleged, and is in part acknowledged, that there was a grand intention and plot of altering the Government of this Kingdom, and reducing it to an arbitrary way. They will not say his Majesty was conscious of it; but it was aimed at by many about him, and in power with him, whom it concerned to have him absolute: By these men he was told that such things were Law, which if they had been so, then he had been absolute by law. They will instance in the long and purposed disuse of Parliaments: The arbitrary Taxes and Impositions on most of the Commodities of the Kingdom: The encroachnent of the Arbitrary Courts upon the Legal: The Imposition of Ship-money: And the Judges opinion that the King had power to tax the subject in times of danger, and that he is the sole Judge of that danger: The raising an Army, and forcing the subject to furnish the same with Coat and Conduct-money. The intention of bringing up the Army, to subvert, or at best, to awe and confine the Parliament to bounds of proceeding of their own setting. All this before or upon the beginning of the Parliament. Then the evidences and proofs against the Earl of Strafford, His Majesty's coming with the terror of such an attendance into the House of Commons, to demand such a number of Members. Here is a succession of designs, all before the least show of resistence: for his Majesty's coming to the House was Iannuary 4. 1641. And the first Petition to his Majesty about the Militia was not till the 26. of the same: And their resolution to settle it by themselves, His Majesty's refusing was not till March 1. And among all these there is not one but tends to destroy the frame of Government. Not that everyone who had a hand in them did aim at such a destruction; but looking on the design it self (and we must judge of men's intentions by the nature of their Counsels and enterprises,) everyone of them strikes at the foundation of this legal frame, and tends to the introduction of Absoluteness and Arbitrarinesse in the Sovereign.

I acknowledge, that since that time, there is a Plea on both sides of danger of subversion: The King withdrew from London: and oft affirms that He was driven thence, and could no longer remain in safety: And the two Houses on the former designs plead a danger of subversion from evil Counselors. Both sides now complain of danger, and have taken up Arms to repel that danger: but these complaints of danger, and taking up of Arms by both sides, was all since the succession of those fore-recited plots. I know what hath been intended or done since the taking of Arms may be all affirmed to be for defense against danger; the withdrawment of so many Members of both Houses, the acts of hostility on both sides, the taxing, spoiling, and undoing of thousands of innocent people, all must be excused by necessity of War, and self-defense. But what can be said for all those Plots and Essaies, which were the Parliaments first grounds of Feares and Forces? Were they removed before they took up Arms, and so their assuming them made causeless and inexcusable? You will say, Those were the Plots of men in grace and authority about His Majesty, and that the illegality of those proceedings being made known to him, He disclaims them professing solemnly he hath no intent but to govern by Law; and acknowledges that the Law is the measure of his power. But they do tell you, That they object nothing against his Majesty, they impute nothing to Him, nor use force against Him, but those destructive Counselors, and their Abbettors which are about Him; because their danger is not from His intentions, but from theirs. It is answered, that His Majesty offers to secure them, the Laws, Liberties, and Religion, by any Acts they shall devise to that purpose. They will tell you, Their danger is not from want of Laws to secure them, for they are secured by Law already; their danger is from Men, and their Plots and Designes to overthrow Law; and a danger of subversion of Law cannot be secured by Law; succeeding Laws can be no better nor stronger then former Laws: so that where those men and their counsels are in power, whose aim hath been the subversion of Parliaments, Liberties, and Laws; and those Doctrines remain affirmed and maintained by the Clergy of that side, which subvert all limitations of Monarchy, make all Laws Acts of grace, and revocable Immunities granted to Subjects; condemning for Rebellion all force used even by the Parliament it self, against the meanest Instruments of violence employed by the Princes Will; making the Princes Will and God's Ordinance one and the same thing, of the same latitude; so that resistence of one is resistence of the other: such Counselors and such Doctrines are (they say) the ground of public danger, from which no Laws but Justice can secure us. Public Liberty and Power of forcible resistence of Instruments of servitude are so conjoined, that if you make it unlawful simply to use such power of resistence, you make it unlawful for a People to be free.

What course then can be sufficient to answer their Demands [Sect. 3] of safety, if Laws cannot do it? Though I incur the censure of high Presumption, yet I will be so bold to afford my opinion herein, submitting it to the censure of every Judicious Reader; wishing it were worthy to be scanned by those, in whose hands it is to heal our divisions. What honest heart doth not bleed, to see the ruin of this late flourishing Kingdom go on so fast? Who can do other then speak his mind, who conceives he thinks of anything which may conduce to Peace and the re-uniting of this divided Body? Suffer me therefore to disclose my heart in a case, in which every good man hath a deep interest. Thus then I could heartily desire.

[Petit. 1] First, that the Parliament would desire and seek in this unusual way of Force, no more then what makes necessarily for their, and the public security: for none can justify force in them, any further then for security of their Privileges, Laws, and frame of Government.

[Petit. 2] Secondly, that His Majesty would be pleased (according to his gracious Resolution, viz. To deny only those things, the granting whereof would alter the Fundamental Laws, and endanger the foundation on which public happiness is built: ) to condescend to all Acts of safety, both by establishing of Laws tending to it; and removal of Persons of destructive counsels and Judgments, because the danger alleged is from such.

[Petit. 3] Thirdly, that because their main fear hath been, that while his Majesty is swayed by such Persons, whose Judgment and endeavors have been for Absoluteness, the Militia of the Kingdom may be by them (making use of his Majesty's Authority) employed in bringing to pass their long fomented, and not yet deserted design; His Majesty would be pleased (for this present) to authorize such over the Militia whom the Houses shall approve of, not thereby disparaging his power over the Militia, which by Law is invested in him; but satisfying by a condescent of grace their Feares from apprehensions of present danger.

[Petit. 4] Fourthly, that the two Houses (in their wisdom) would put a difference between those Persons who were the ancient D • linquents, Contrivers, and principal Agents in the former designs of Arbitrarinesse; and those Members of both Houses; who since the Kings with-drawment, and their assuming the Militia, have gone from the Houses to serve and adhere to his Majesty: For since the time that both parts have declared themselves to be in danger, many good subjects and Patriots have followed the parts, from conscience and persuasion of the truth of Allegations on either side, as their care and opinion of either Part hath lead them; (not that I can acquit them, who on any misleading assist the destructive party, from guilt, as Accessaries and Instruments of so unnatural a design) but that I cannot see how the authority and freedom of either of the three Estates can choose but undergo a show of disparagement, if its adherents and propugners (when it cries out of danger of subversion from the other, and calls and requires their assistance) should be proceeded against and punished as Delinquents, when they profess their aim hath been no more then to preserve the just rights of any of the fundamental Estates of the Kingdom, without impairment of the other.

Fifthly that if possible, all those might be re-admitted into [Petit. 5] their several Houses, which are not guilty of the former designs for Absoluteness, and have nothing alleged against them but their adherence to the King in this division, and might fit and act securely there, according to the due freedom of their Houses.

Sixthly, that his Majesty (for the sake of Peace, and present [Petit. 6] necessity of composing this distemperature) would be pleased to put himself upon the Judgment and Affection of the two Estates so assembled in their full Bodies and suspend the use of his Negative voice, resolving to give his royal assent to what shall pass by the major part of both Houses freely voting, concerning all matters of grievance and difference now depending in the two Houses. I am confident, if ever this War be transacted without the ruin of one side, which will endanger, if not undo the whole, it must be by some such way of remission of rigor on both sides as I have now described: Which the God of Peace, in whose hands are the hearts and counsels of men, speedily and graciously effect for his Name sake.