A Treatise of the Nature and Use of Things Indifferent

CAP. 1. Of things Indifferent ingenerall.

A Thing Indifferent (in the largest extent of sense) is any Mean between two Extreames.

2 Extreames (properly) are the vtvttermost bounds and limitts of anything being in direct opposition one unto the other.

3 To be a Mean between two Extreames, is so to be seated between thē as that it stand equally affected to either, inclinnyng no more to the one, then to the other.

4 Hence the Latins call: things indifferent, Res mediae. (Midle matters) And that by reason of that analogy & proportion that is between them, & those things that in phisicall or Mathematical Dimensions possess the middle place in any line, figure or body: For, that is properly called the middle of anything, that in position being as near as can be, to both extreāes, inclineth no more to the one then to the other, but is a like equally distant from both.

5 And they are therefore called, things indifferent, because in their relation to those extremes between which they are seated, and unto which they are referred, they stand indifferently disposed and affected to either, whence of the Greeks they are called Adiaphora, unto which our English term doth precisly answer. For as that is just the middle of a line that leaveth on both sids so much to either extreme, that there is in respect of it no difference between the one and the other: but unto, it both are equal & a like: So those things are called indifferent properly, that without any difference, do equally agree unto, or dissent, from those extremes, unto which they have reference & relation.

6 By all this it may appear that things Indifferent, are not such, simply, in thenselves & of themselves considered, but as they are compared, and have relatiō to the said opposite extremes, as the Center in a circle, considered in it self, and by it self, is not the middle of anything, but only as it hath reference to the opposite extremes in the Circumference: from any of which it is equally distant, and in that respect only is it called the mean or middle of such a figure.

7 The very essence therefore of a thing indifferent, consists in that equal and indifferent reference and relation that it hath to some two opposite terms or extremes, unto which either in sense or reason it is compared, and by which only it is measured. So that it is in the number of those things that in schools are called relatives, all which have only but an accidental being. The subjects thereof being variable, according to the diverse references and respects that they have unto diverse things. For as a man simply considered in himself, is nether husband, Father, nor Master, but only in respect of Wife, Child and Servant. And as the same man in diverse respects may be a father & a son, a master and a servant: So nothing is in & of it self indifferent, but only in relation & reference to some opposit extreās: And those things which in some such respect may be indifferent, in some other respect may be Extreames.

Cap. 2. Of things more commonly called Indifferent.

1 Though things indifferent may in that former generality, spread themselves to any mediocrity whatsoever. Yet Custom the mistress of all speech, and language, hath restrained & limited the name, to such things only, as are a Mean between good and evil. So that (to omit what in rigorous propriety of speech may be comprehended under the name that is given unto them) In common use of speech, a thing indifferent is only, any mediocrity, between good and evell.

2 The proper Extreames therefore of things indifferent, being good & evil, they cannot (retaininge the nature of their indifference) communicate or partake of either, for whatsoever standeth equally affected to good and evell, cannot in that affection, have in it, either good or evell: It being impossible, that either of the extremes should be found in the Mean, without destruction of the nature thereof.

3 Whatsoever then void of all evil, participateth but the least measure of good: or void of all good, pertaketh but the least degree of evell, cannot bear the name of a thing indifferent, For there can be no indifferency in that, which inclinneth more to the one extreme, then to the other.

4 A thing indifferent therefore being a mean, between good & evell, it is so seated between them: that it is as far removed from Good, as a thing not evil, can be, and as far removed from evil, as a thing not Good can be, and as near unto Good and evil, as any thing can be, that is neither good nor evil. So that whatsoever is Indifferent, is neither good nor evil, whatsoever is either good or evil, is not Indifferent, whatsoever is not Indifferent is either good or evil.

5 Things indifferent, being equally divided from good & evil, are in like manner, divided from all the properties of either, For every property being inseparable from that subject, from the nature whereof it springeth, no one, can be communicated to anything but unto that, unto which the subject it self communicateth it self, If therefore the property of any extreme, be found in a thing indifferent, the extreāe it s • lfe: is to be sound likewise therein. Which to imagine, is as absurd, as to look to find the Circumference of a Circle in the Center.

6 No indifferent thing therefore as it is an indifferent thing, hath power to make anything good or evil, better or worse: For it is the property only of good & evil, either to make or increase good or evil in anything.

7 That which doth more hurt or good, then some things that are good or evil, is not indifferent, but either good or evil: for nothing but Good, can exceed in goodness that which is good, and nothing but evil, can exceed in hurt, that which is evil.

8 Whatsoever worketh upon any affectiō of man, stirring up in him, love, hatred, delight, sorrow, zaele, malice, envy, Jealousy, hope, fear &c. cannot be apprehended as a thing indifferent, by him in whom these passions are wrought. For it is the property only of those things that present themselves as good or evil, to beget and move such passions in the soul of man. For it is impossible that a thing indifferent apprehended as a thing indifferent, should beget any thing in the soul of man but Indifferency, and a Stoicall apathie or sencelesnes: So that whatsoever a man entirely loveth & delighteth in, admireth, commendeth, persueth with zeal, commandeth with authority. Whatsoever also a man shall abhor, condeme, forbid, punish, persecute, he cannot in any sincerity affirm, that he judgeth that thing to be indifferent, but to be in some degree either good or evell.

9 The omission of that is indifferent, the commission whereof is indifferent: and that whose omission is evel, is certainly good.

10 All the former premises considered this must needs follow. That to command a thing indifferent is to cōmaūd no good, to for bid a thing indifferent, is to forbid no evell. To do a thing indifferent is to do no good. To forbear a thing indifferent is to do no evell. And therefore to punish for a thing indifferent, is to punish for no evell.

Cap. 3. Of things indifferent in special.

1 The essence of things indifferent, consisting in a mere and equal privation of Good and Evell, there cannot be given any true kinds or degrees of thē, For all priuattiues considered in them selves are of the same nature.

2 Though their be no true kinds of them, yet they may be varied according to the diversity of those extremes with which they are compared. And therefore may be distinguished according to the common distinctions of good and evell.

3 That Good that hath not an Evell opposite unto it in the same kind, cannot be the extreme of anything indifferent, & therefore cannot vary, distinguish, or denominat a thing indifferent. as if their be not an opposit color unto white, then it is impossible to imagine: how white should be an extreme, to any other color, or any other color a mean unto it.

4 That which is properly a mean, must agree with the extremes in althinges in which the extremes do agree: for example, If black and white be both of them colors: that which is properly a mean between black and white, must be a color also, for it were absurd to call anything but a color, a mean between black and white: so that the mean follows the common natures & qualities of both the extremes, for as it is said before, That only is a mean that is not only equally distant from two extreāes, but withal is as near to both as may be, which cannot be verified of that mean that shall not be found to agree with the extremes in those things wherein the extremes do agree within them selves, and therefore things indifferent follow their extremes. As therefore that cannot be an extreme that hath not in the same kind an opposite, so that can be no medium to any extremes, that doth dissent from them in that wherein they shall accord and agree. So that that denomination and predication that belongs to both extremes, belongs also to their mean. The mean between two opposite Qualities is a Quality: between two substances, a substance, between two actions, an Action: between two goods, a Good, betweē two evils, an Euil, between two quantities, a quantity &c.

5 Hence it will follow, that no substance (as it is a substance) can be called thing indifferent, because that there is a no substance that is evil as it is a substance. For an indifferent substance, must needs (if there were any such) be a mean between a good and an evil substance. If then there be no evil substaunces, it cannot be imagined how there should be any indifferent.

6 The like may be said of all created species and kinds of things cosidered not only in their substances, but qualities and dispositions. For the voice of God pronouncynge them all to be good: none of them are evell, and if none of them be evell, none are indifferent. For indifferent created things, can have no place: either real, or imaginatiue, but between a created Good: and a created Evell. There is therefore no Creature of God: nor no created property or quality of any creature: that is by creation a Thing Indifferent.

7 Also upon the said grounds it apperes, that there is no absolute Indifferent thing: because their is nothing in nature either absolutely good, or absolutely evell: It being impossible that any thing should be an absolute Mean, whose extremes are not absolute, for where one extreme is absolute and the other not absolute: the Mean cannot be absolute, for if it be, it inclineth more to one extreme then the other, which is to distroye the nature of a thing indifferent.

CAP. 4. Of the first distinction of things indifferent.

1 Things indifferent therefore, being to be distinguished according to those distinctions of Good and Evell that are equally common to them both, we are in the next place distinctly to propound the same, and by them accordingly to distinguish the other.

2 First therefore Good & Euell is such, either in appearance only, or indeed also. Whence arriseth the first distinction of things indifferent, for accordingly some things are indifferent in appearance only, some indeed.

3 A Thing indifferet in appearance only, is that which is a mean between that Good and Euell that is in sheew and appearance only. For that appeareth to be indifferent, that being Good or evil indeed, appeareth or seemeth to be neither.

4 A thing indifferent indeed: is that which is a Mean between those things that are in truth and verity Good or evell. So that such an indifferent is void of all true good, and evil.

5 As that which is good in appearaūce only, is indeed either evil or indifferent, and that which is evell in appearance only, is indeed either good or indifferent, and that which is indifferent in appearaūce only, is indeed either good or evil, So that which is indifferent indeed, is in truth, neither good nor evil.

6 As the grossest evil may by meāes of some counterfeit or shadow cast upon it, be in appearance, the greatest good, and the greatest good may be disguised, and in sheew transformed into the greatest evil: So with much more facility may either of them by the wit of man have cast upon thē the forms of things indifferent.

So that there must be special heed taken that we admit not of all things as indifferent indeed that present themselves to us under that name and shape: Florentines can disguise & collor any thing. and it is now a days the common excercise of the greatest wits of the world. to transform good into Evil, Evil into good, and both into Indifferent so that in these days scant anything is as it appears or appears as it is.

Cap. 5. The 2 distinction of things Indifferent

1 Good and Evil is either Internal or External, according to which difference ariseth a second destinction of Things Indifferent.

2 An External Indifferent is whatsoever hath in it nether inward good nor Evil

3 An Internal Indifferent, is whatsoever hath in it, neither inward good nor evil.

4 Something External Indifferent may have in it internal good or Evil & somethinges internally Indifferent may have in them outward Good or Evil

Chap. 6. OF the 3. distinction of things Indifferent.

1 Thirdly Good and Evil, is either of itself or by accident: which also make the 3 distinction of things Indifferent.

2 An Indifferent by accident is a mean between those Extreames that are Good and Evil by accident and not of thems • lues: for that must needs be only accidentally indifferent, whose Extreāes (by which it is limited and defined) are but accidentallie good or Evil: so that whatsoever is Indifferent only in relation of some accidental good or Evil is Indifferent not of it self but by accident

4 There is nothing so good of it self, but it may be made Evil by accident, nothing so evil of itself but it may become good by accident. Nothing so good or Euil but it may become Indifferent by accident, nothing so Indifferent of it self but it may become Good or Evil by accident.

5. Unto this head may be referred, such things as are Indifferent by comparison for as there are some things good simply that are Evil in comparison. & some things Evil simply that are good in comparison▪ so also there is some good and Evil, that in comparison with others is Indifferent.

Cap. 7. OF a 4. Destinction. of things Indifferent.

8 THings are Good or Evil either Actually or Potentially. So are also Things Indifferent.

2 A thing actually Indifferent, is that which hath in it neither actual good nor hurt.

3 A Thing Potentially Indifferent, is that which in act doth either hurt or good, though in po • sibilitie it may do neither.

4 There is nothing actually Indifferent but is potentially good or (a) evil, Their is nothing potentially, only indifferent but it is actually either good or evil. Th • rfore their is nothing absolutely Indifferent.

Chap. 8. OF the 5. Distinction of things Indifferent.

1 LAstly, Good and evil is either Corporal in respect of the body, or spiritual, in r • spect of the mind, In which respect, Things Indifferent do always vary.

2 A Thinge Indifferent in respect of the body is any such thing that applied to the body, doth it neither good nor hurt. As that which maketh a man neither rich nor poor, Strong nor Weak, beautiful nor deformed, hungry nor yet satisfied, sick: nor healthy. &c.

3 That may be Good to the body in one respect that is evil in another et contra and that may be indifferent unto it, in one respect, that is good or evil in another. Also that may be good or evil to one part of the body that is indifferent to another parte. And a thing may be indifferent to one, that is good or evil to another.

4 A thing Indifferent in respect of the mind or Soul, is whatsoever having reference and relation to the soul doth it neither good nor hurt.

5 The Goods and Evils of soul: are either dispositions, qualities, or habitsin the soul, or such actions as proceed from them. As Thoughts, words, deeds. All which are called Moral. A Moral good: is whatsoever in Man or from man is agreeable and correspondent to the law of Nature, Reason, or the Diuīe Law of God revealed supernaturally in his word. Unto this head are to be referred: all true wisdom, knowledge, under standing, providence, discretion, and all actions flowyng from the same. Also all Moral virtues, as, Justice, Tempterāce, Holines, &c. With all the Actions proceeding from them. All which are squared and ruled by some or other of the former Laws. A Moral Evil is whatsoever is any ways repugnaūt (whether in general or particular) to any of thos former Laws. As Ignorance, Folly, Injustice, intemperaunce &c. with all Actions proceeding from them.

6 Those things are in a Moral respect indifferant (whether they be Qualities, inclinations, Habitts or Actions) That have in them (b) neither virtue nor vice. Herein such Actions of man's will are most frequent, that are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God.

7 Ther is no Action of man's will: so indifferent but the doing thereof (by some circumstaūce) may be repugnaunt to the law of God and by consequent be hurt full to the soul of man.

8 An Action that in someone respect unto someone special law, is Indifferēt in respect of some other law may be Good or Evil. As that action may be either Religious or Superstitious, that hath in it neither Temperancie nor Intemperancie.

9 Any action done by man that is not commanded by God, either expressly or by direct consequent, that is a means either of it self or by accident of any hurt either to the body, or soul, of a man's self, or of his Neighbor, either by bringing evil into them, or nurishyng or increasing evil in them, cannot bear the name of an Indifferent action For there is no indifferency in that, which being not required of God. (and therefore is not Good) doth hurt (any ways) a man: which must needs be against the law of God. For the some of the Law of God being the love of God and our Neighbor, And Love aīming only at the Good of the loved. That action, that (besides the law) doth any hurt to any, must either have an exceeption in the law, or else be against it, and thē it cannot be indifferent.

10 Moral Actions whether virtues or vices, respect either God immediately, or our selves or our Neighbor, as is intimated before. So do also all Indifferent Actions.

11 That Action is indifferent in respect of God, that doth neither advance nor obscure the glory of God. For this is the only Good or Evil we can do unto God.

12 Ther is no Action that a man can do by the power of his will, but either in it self or by accident, it doth either glorify or dishonor God, and therefore no action in respect of God, is merely & absolutely indifferent, but thereby God receiveth some Honor or dishonor.

13 All Actions of Religion (amongst which those are special that are peculiarly done in Divine service) are (if they be as they ought to be) in a special manner good, tending more directly to the glory of God, then any other Actiōs, th • refore no action of Religion, whether it be Moral or Ceremonial, is indifferent but either good or evil.

14 No Action of Religion whether Moral or Ceremonial grounded only upon the will of man, and not upon the word of God, can bring any special glory to God, and therefore no such Act can be an act of Religion, but of superstition, and therefore cannot be indifferent.

15 Ther being some mystical Ceremonies of Religion Good: and some Evil. If there be any mystical Ceremonies indifferent, they must then in some special and material point differ from the Evil, even as far as from the good. But there is no mystical Rite of religion, but doth come many degrees nearer to the Evil then to the Good. And therefore there can be no mystical Rite of religion indifferent.

16 An Evil Ceremony of Religion being therefore only Evil because it is forbidden of God: A good Ceremony of religion is therefore only a good Ceremony because it is commanded of God: and that must be an indifferent ceremony that is neither forbidden nor commanded: But all ceremonies in religion that are not good, are evil, and therefore there are no indifferent Ceremonies of Religion.

17 As no man by his sole will, can make that ceremony good in divyne worship that God forbiddeth to be done their in, or make that Evil that God commandeth to be done therein. So can he not make that which is but indifferent to be Good: for he cannot make that to be commanded of God, that is forbidden of God, that (though it be not forbidden) is not commanded: If therefore what Ceremony of religion soever is good, be commanded of God, and if every Ceremony of religion ought to be good, & if whatsoever ceremony is commanded of God is not Indifferent. Hence it will follow: that no Ceremony of Religion is indifferent.

18 Thus much of actions indifferent having reference to God. Those actions of man are indifferent in respect of a man's self, or his neighbor, that being committed, bring neither moral hurt nor good unto him self or them. For those actions are Evil to the doer, and such as hurt his soul: that are a means of bringing either upon himself or upon his neighbor any evil forbidden. And those actions are good to his soul, that are a means of affecting with any Good commanded, him-self or his Neighbor.

19 Whatsoever therefore doing a man no Good is a means either to take frō a man any good thing that God hath freely granted unto him, as life, health liberty, name, honesty, piety, &c. Or to bring upon a man that evil: that God otherwise with holdeth from him, that cannot be indifferent.

20 All such human laws therefore, that upon any penalties, bind m •• to those things that are confessed indifferent, which are such things as God hath left to the free liberty of man to do or not to do: is a deprivyng of mē of that liberty that God hath granted unto thē, & therefore such a law is neither good nor indifferent, But evil to the soul of him that enacteth it, though not of him that obeyeth it. For it is no indifferency in any man to take that away from a man that God hath freely given unto him.

21 All Moral actions, of men that are good or evil, are either private, or common and public. The common and public, are either Domestical, Political, or Ecclesiastical. Actions also in their Indifferency may vary according to their diverse references to these.

22 A private Good or Evil action, is that which affecteth with good or Evil only a man's own person that doth it, and which spreadeth not to the Good or hurt of any other (except secondarely & by accident) as he that eateth and drinketh) doth himself only good properly: Though secondarely and by accident, he may, in that strength he receiveth, thereby do his family or the common wealth good.

23 That action is Indifferent in respect of a man's private self, that doth his own private Person no ways any good or hurt.

24 Those Domestical, Political, Ecclesiastical actions, are good, or evil, that tend to the good or hurt of a family, common wealth, or Church, and those are indifferent, that being done do bring neither good nor hurt, or as much good as hurt unto any of the said societies.

25 That may be good, evil, or indifferent, to a private person as he is a private person, that is not so unto a Family, Cōmon wealth or Church, or unto him, as he is a member, of all or any of them.

26 That may be Indifferent to be done by a Family, or the Commen wealth as it is such, That is evil and not indifferent, to be don by a Church. That may be indifferent to one member of a House Church, or commenwealth, that is not Indifferent to another▪ that may be law full or Indifferent for the Church to do in one place and at someone time, that is unlawful in another place and at another time

27 All which premises or the most of them being granted, it will easily appear to any that can rightly apply these principles and general assertions that the Cerimonies in present controversy in our Church are not (as is pretended by the forces of them) merely Indifferent▪ but either excellent parts of our religion or notorious parts of superstition.

THE PRELATES TO THE Afflicted Ministers in this Realm.

ALL those that willfully refuse to obey the King in things Indifferent, and to conform them selves to the orders of the church authorized by him, not contrary to the word of God, are scismaticks enemies to the Kings Supremacy and State, and not to be tolerated in Church or commenwealth.

But you do willfully refuse to obey the King in things indifferent and to conform yourselves to the orders of the Church authorised by him not contrary to the word of God Ergo

You are Scismaticks Enimies to the Kings Supremacy & the State, and not to be tolerated in Church or Common wealth.

THE AFFLICTED MINIsters, to the Prelates.

All thos that freely & willingly {pro}form unto the King and State, all Obedience 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 not only in things necessary, but Indifferent commanded by law. And that have been always ready to conform thenselves to every order of the Church, authorized by him, not contrary to the word of God, are free from all Schism, Frendes to the Kings Supremacy, and to the State, and unworthy in this manner to be molested in Church or Commenwealth.

But their is none of us that is deprived or suspended from our ministry, but hath ever ben ready, freely and willingly to perform unto the King and State all obedience, not only in things necessary but Indifferent, requyered by Law, And to conform our selves to every Order of the Church authorised by him not contrary to the word of God. Ergo.

We are all free from Schism, Frends to the Kings Supremacy and the State, and most unworthy of such molestation in Church and Commenwealth, as now we sustain.